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http://www.archive.org/details/kantsethicsclaviOOedmu 



Entered according to the act of Congress, in the year 1877, by James Edmunds, in the office of 
the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



KANT'S ETHICS: 



THE CLAVIS TO AN INDEX. 



INCLUDING EXTRACTS FROM SEVERAL ORIENTAL Sxi.CRED SCRIPTURES, AND 
FROM CERTAIN GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS. 



/ 



BY JAMES EDMUNDS. 



■ 



Jesus answered him : If I. spoke evil, bear witness of the 

evil; but if well, why dost thou smite me?— John, xviii., 23. 

(American Bible Union, second, revision.) 




LOUISVILLE COrBIEE-JOt'ENAL PEINT. 



\^ 



A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EXTRACTS, 

"With reference to the paging of the Clavis. 



I 858.— THE LAWS OF MOSES. 1451 B. C* 

Extracts from Exodus begin at page 67 

Extracts from Leviticus begin at page . . / 72 

Extracts from Deuteronomy begin at page 78 

§881.— THE LAWf ACCORDING- TO ZOROASTER. tttf 

Extracts from the Yendidad begin at page 138 

Extracts from the Yispered begin at page 151 

Extracts from the Yasna begin at page 153 

Extracts from the Gathas, in the Yasna, begin at page 159 

Extracts from the Khordah-A vesta begin at page 182 

§ 949.— THE TEACHING % OE THE AWAKENED (BUDDHA). 543 B. C.|| 
Extracts from the Dharmapada begin at page 269 

§871.— THE TEACHINGS** OF CONFUCIUS. 478 B. C.tt 

Extracts from the Great Learning begin at page 103 

Extracts from the Doctrine of the Mean begin at page 109 

Extracts from the Confucian Analects begin at page ..* 120 

§ 1039.— XENOPHONS MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 399 B. G.%% 
Extracts from Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates begin at page 324 

§ 1040.— ARISTOTLE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 322 B. 0.|||| 
Extracts from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics begin at page 411 

§ 1043.— CICERO'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 43 B. O .*** 
Extracts from Cicero de Officiis begin at page ,511 

§ 906.— THE SAYINGS OF JESUS. 33 A. D.ttt 

Extracts from Matthew begin at page 214 

Extracts from Mark begin at page 232 

Extracts from Luke begin at page 235 

Extracts from John begin at page 247 

§ 968.— THE COMMANDMENTS %%% OF MOHAMMED. 632 A. D.|||||| 
Extracts from the Koran begin at 'page 295 



* Bate of the death of Moses, according to the margin of your reference Bible, f See Yasna, 
31'vii., 4 (page 175 below); Vispered, xviii.,1, 2 (page 152 below); Vendidad, iii., 140, 141 (page 
138 below); Khordah-Avesta, xiv., 5 (page 184 below). {See Bharmapada, 1S3 (page 282 below). 
j| Cingalese date of the death of Buddha; see Am. Cyclop. (1873, vol. iii., page 394), article 
Buddhism. See also Dr. Thomas' Biographical Dictionary (article Gautama, page 1005 : "Ac- 
cording to the Ceylonese writers, Gautama was born in 024 and died in 543 b. c; " and note to 
same: " Koeppen, after a careful and thorough examination of the subject, comes to the con- 
clusion that the death of Sakya Muni should be placed, in round numbers, about two centu- 
ries before Asoka (Agoka), and that he (Sakya) was very probably the contemporary of Darius 
Hystaspes, or Xerxes."); and Chambers's Encyclop. (Lippiucott, 1877, vol. ii., pages 402-409, 
article Buddhism). ** See the Confucian Analects, Book VII., chapter xxiv. (page 127 below), 
and Doctrine of the Mean, xx., 18-21 (pages 115, 116 below), ff Date of the death of Confucius, 
according to Dr. Thomas' Dictionary of Biography and Mythology, article Confucius (Lippin- 
eott, 1S77, page 653). "Born, according to the best authorities, 551 B. c, in the kingdom or 
state of Loo (included in the modern province of Shantung): " the same (p. 651). The death of 
Confucius is also stated (in Am. Cyclop., 1874, vol. v., page 238, article Confucius) 479 b. c. 
XI Date of the death of Socrates. See Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. (ed. Morris, 1873, vol. i., page 83 : 
"At the time of his condemnation he was, according to his own account in Plat., Apol., 17 d, 
more than seventy years old." " He must, therefore, have been born at the latest in 469, or 
rather certainly before 469.") See also Arithon's Classical Dictionary (Harper, 1862, page 1245, 
article Socrates : " born at Alopece, a village near Athens, b. c. 469.") |||| Date of the death of 
Aristotle; see Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. (ed. Morris, 1873, vol. i., page 137: "Born 384 b. c. 
(Olymp. 99. 1) at Stagira (or Stageiros) in Thrace, and son of the physician Nicomachus, be- 
came in his eighteenth year (367) a pupil of Plato, and remained such for twenty years "); and 
Anthon's Class. Diet., article xIristoteles (pages 201-203): "Nicomachean Ethics, addressed to his 
son Nichomachus" (page 203*. ***Date of the death of Cicero ; see Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. (ed. 
Morris, 1873, vol. i., page 21S : "January 3d, 106 — December 7th, 43 b. c."); the treatise De 
Officiis was written in the preceding year (page 219). See Anthon's Class. Diet, article Cicero 
(page 344-348), whore it is stated that he " was born at Arpinum, the native place of Marius, 
b. c. 107 " (page 344). fff Date of the crucifixion, according to the margin of your reference 
Bible. Jit See Koran, xvii., 24-34, 36^tl (pages 303, 304 below). ||j||jbate of the death of 
Mohammed ; see Dr. Thomas' Biog. Diet, article Mohammed (page 1599): " Born at Mecca about 
•570 a. d. The year of his birth is not positively ascertained; the authorities are divided 
between 571 and 569, but the former date appears to be generally regarded as the more probable 
■one." " He died, according to the Arabian historians, on his birthday, the eleventh year of the 
Hejrah, (632 a. d.) aged sixty-three, or, according to some authorities, sixty-five years " (the 
:same, page 1602). f||f "Eudoxe, cite par Pline, fait naitre Zoroastre six mille ans avant Platon, 
et Plutarque cinq mille ans avant la guerre de Troie. Suidas, plus modeste, se contente de 
cinq cents ans. Pline, apres avoir cite Eudoxe, conclut par fixer 1'epoque de Zoroastre peu de 
temps avant celle de Xerxes. Justin veut, au contraire, qu' il ait vegu au temps de Ninus, 
treize siecles avant Sardanapale. Apulee le fait contemporain de Cambyse, et veut qu' il ait 
donne des leoons a Pythagore. Porphyre et Clement d'Alexandrie lue assignent pour epoque 
le regne de Cyrus. Ctesias, enfin, la place au regne de Darius fils d' Hystaspe." — Dictionnaire 
de la Conversation et de la Lecture, (2d edition, Paris, 1866, vol. xvi., page 1053, article 
Zoroastre). "The dates generally given are as follows: Xanthus of Lydia places him 
about 600 years before tha Trojan war; Aristotle and Eudoxus place him 6000 years before 
Plato; others, again, 500i) years before the Trojan war. Berosus, a Babylonian historian, 
makes him a Babylonian king, and the founder of a dynasty which reigned between 2200 and 
2000 b. c. over Babylon. The Parsees place him at the time of Hystaspes, Darius's father, 
whom they identify with a king mentioned in the Shah-Narueh (q. v.), from whom, however, 
H3 r staspes is totally distinct. This account would place him at about 550 b. c. Yet there is 
scarcely a doubt that he must be considered to belong to a much earlier age, not later than 
1000 B. c.j possibly, he was a contemporary of Moses." — Chambers's Encyclopcedia, article Zoroaster 
(Lippiucott, 1877, vol. x., page 360). " Traditionally, several of the Gathas are ascribed to 
Zoroaster, whose date was anterior to b. c. 2000 according to Berosus, and whom other writers 
place still earlier. (See Aristot. ap. Diog. Laert. Pref. 6 ; Plin. H. N., xxx., 1 ; Hermipp. Fr. 
79 ; Xan. iryd. Fr.29, etc.) Their style shows them to be considerably anterior to the first Eargard 
of the Vendidad" [see a few lines below], "which must have been composed before the great migra- 
tion of the Medes southward from the Caspian region. Haug is inclined to date the Zoroas- 
trian Gathas as early as the time of Moses. (Essays, page 255.)"- — George Bawlinson's Five Creat 
Monarchies (Scribner, Welford & Co., New York, 1873, vol. ii., page 323, note 5), Media, ch, iv. 
[Of the first Fargard of the Vendidad, Kawlinson says, in note 1, pp. 332, 333,] " the Iranian 
settlements enumerated in the document extend westward no further than Khages, or at the 
utmost to Media Antropatene, which may be indicated by the Vareua of § 18. (See Appendix, A). 
Thus the Arians, when the document was written, had not yet spread into Media Magna, 
much less into Persia Proper. It must consequently be anterior to the time of the first Shal- 
maneser (b. c. 858-823), who found Medes and Persians beyond the Zagros range. (See above, 
page 101.)" " Zerdusht, the prophet, whose era is given very differently by ancient writers 
and by modern investigators, placed variously between 500 or 600 b. c. (Roeth) and 1200 b. c. 
(Haug)." — Chambers's Encycl. (Lippincott, 1877, vol. vii., page 299) article Parsees. " Tlie age 
of the different works mentioned is fixed by Haug in the following manner : The Gathas about 
900 or 1200 b. c; the. larger portion of the Vendidad at about 900 or 1000 b. c; the younger Yasna 
about 700-800 b. c; the latest part of the Vendidad (the Pazend) being written as late as 500 
b. c, when the collection of the different parts also seems to have taken place. This compu- 
tation would give the Zend, or rather the famed Parsee literature, a range of about 800 years, or 
from 1200-400 B. c. Cf. Haug's Essays on the Religion of the Parsees (Bombay, 1862)."— Chambers's 
Encycl. (edition cited above, vol. x., article Zend, ad fin. page 341.) See also Max Mueller's 
Cliips (Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York, 1874, vol. i., pages 79-100: "The Veda and 
Zend-Avesta." See also other essays in the same volume, pages 115-178). 



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(9) 



KANT'S ETHICS. 

By James Edmunds. 

The Clavis to an Index. 

Est enim lex nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine deorum tracta ratio, imperans honesta, 
prohibens contraria. — Cicero (Philip, xi, 12. — Ramage, Beautiful Thoughts from Latin Authors, 
2d ed. p. 32). [Ex Officina Elzeviriana, torn, v (Orat. torn, iii) page 485. 

[In searching for explications, during three readings of Kant's 
Ethics and of the Critique of Pure Reason, I noted on the mar- 
gin such references from one section to another as I found service- 
able. The framework upon which these references are here set 
forth, consists of a series of ^ection heads nearly all selected from 
the text, and constitutes an extended table of contents.] 

PRELIMINARY SCHEMA. 

I. — If I am free, what ought I to do ? (§§ 1-983 inclusive.) 

II.— How can I be free ? (§§ 984-3000 inclusive.) 

We have now before us two problems of human reason, which 
may be more precisely stated as follows : 

I. — Upon the hypothesis that man's will is free, what are the 
duties of man ? 

II. — How can freedom exist in harmony with the universal law 
of natural necessity? (Cf. §§ 258, 129.) 

Supplementary to these problems of the highest importance, 
there may be added — the plenary consummation of the scheme, 
crowning it with hope, (§ 948) — the postulates of practical rea- 
son, (rod and a future life. (See §§ 2548-2558 inolusive, and cf. 
§§ 2361 and 2567.) 

So supplemented, the general scheme becomes threefold : 

I.— What ought I to do ? 

II. — What can I know ? 

III. — What may I hope ? 

As to the solution of this third problem, there will remain, after 
the complete consideration of the former two, no doubt whatever. 
(See § 2565.) And strictly speaking, freedom itself also must be 
stated a^ a postulate of practical reason. (See § 142 and cf. § 131.) 
Bearing in mind, therefore, that the Kantic system does not un-" 
dertake to demonstrate either the actuality or the possibility 
(simpliciter) of freedom (see § 2245 and cf. §§ 251, 128, 136. 138, 
141, 963, and Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., pp. 116, 290), but therein 
rests securely upon the common conscience of mankind (see § 2595 
and cf. §§ 248 and 125), our general scheme may be briefly exhibited 
as follows : 

I. — The Law of Freedom ; 

II. — The Harmony of Freedom and Nature. 



10 Kant's Ethics, 

The first, or ethical division (vols, i., ii.),whichbas its entire and 
perfect subsistence by itself, and may be separately propounded, 
properly precedes the second or logical division (vols, iii., iv., v.), 
whose interest is created and supported by the absolute and un- 
conditioned validity of the Law itself, but whose practical value 
(its speculative is very small), as an impregnable defense against 
idealism, skepticism, materialism, fatalism, atheism, free thinking, 
fanaticism, and superstition, is inestimable (§§ 1031, 1432, 2527, 
2865, 2829, 2658, 2855, 2700, 2810, 1430, 2500, 129, 2964.) 

And, finally, our general scheme manifests the inner connection 
and completeness of the whole system (cf. §§ 274, 246, 278). while 
at the same time the presupposition of the first division does not 
add to the argument any element of weakness. (See § 122.) For 
(be it always remembered) the Law first enforces itself as the 
supreme law of man, and is afterward found to be the supreme law 
of freedom, that law of liberty wherein if a man abide he shall be 
happy in his doing. (James, i., 21.) And although, if the reality 
of freedom be first granted, the deduction and formulation of the 
law thereupon easily follow, the objective validity of the law de- 
pends in nowise upon the reality of freedom, nor its deduction and 
formulation upon the assumption of freedom ; but (exactly the re- 
verse) freedom rises upon the inexorable law, and the hypothesis is 
animated by the law's unconquerable energy. (§§ 173, 174, 178; 
Eomans, iii., 19.) That is to say, that which is in any and 

EVERY EVENT WHATSOEVER MAN'S UNCONDITIONED AND INEVASIBLE 

duty, is afterward clearly seen to be precisely that which would 
be his absolute duty if he were a preeman. Whence it happens 
that our first general problem may be per se more accurately de- 
scribed simply thus : " What ought I to do?" a description which; 
however, not only does not show the intimate unity of the system 
(§ 2551), but gives rise to the mistaken conception that the Kantic 
philosophy is twofold, having both a negative and a positive side* 
whereof the last may be taken and the first left. Undoubtedly, the 
first may be omitted. But to us, who are first men, and not till after- 
ward logicians, the contestf is against principalities, against powers, 
against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against the spiritual 
powers of evil in the heavenly places ; wherefore we ought to take 
on the whole armor of God, that we may be able to withstand in the 
evil day, and having fully done all, to stand. (Eevelations, iii., 12.) 



*See Dr. Calderwood's introduction to Kant's Ethics (p. x.) mentioned below. 
fEphesians, vi. 12, 13. [See the revised version published by the American 
Bible Union]. 



The Clavis to an Index. 11 

FIRST GENERAL DIVISION. 

If I am Free, What Ought I to Do? (§§ 1-983 inclusive.) 

Volume I. 
THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS. 

By Immanuel Kant, Professor of Logic and Metaphysic in the University of 
Koenigsberg. Translated by J. W. Semple, Advocate, (gg 1-636 inclusive.) 
Paging (in parentheses) of Clark's edition of 1869, with an introduction by the 
Eev. Henry Calderwood, LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the 
University of Edinburgh. (Paging [in brackets] of Clark's edition of 1836, 
with an introduction and appendix by J. W. Semple.) 

PRELIMINARY TREATISES. ($ 1-274 inclusive.) 
I — Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics. (§§ 1-146 inclusive.) 

Chapter I.— Transit from the Common Popular Notions of Morality to the 
Philosophical. (?? 1-23 inclusive.) 

There is nothing in the world which can be termed absolutely and 
altogether good, a good will alone excepted. (§§ 1, 2.) 

§ 1. — Good will the only absolute good (p. 1.) Cf. Cicero de 
Officiis, book I., ch. ix : "An action which is intrinsically right is 
only morally good in so far as it is voluntary." (C. E. Edmonds' tr.) 

§ 2. — Good will presupposed by particular virtues, (page 2, 
line 4,) [page 2, line 11.] 

First position. — A good will is esteemed to be so, not by the effects 
■which it produces, nor by its fitness for accomplishing any given end, 
but by its mere good volition. (§§ 3-12 inclusive.) 

§ 3. — Good will is of unconditioned worth, (page 2, line 18.) 
[page 2, line 25.] 

§ 4. — Good will constituted by the sway of reason, (page 2, line 
34.) [page 3, line 10.] 

§ 5. — Happiness not the final aim of man's constitution, (page 
3, line 8.) [page 3, line 19.] 

§ 6. — End of man's existence far higher and nobler than happi- 
ness, (page 3, line 33.) [page 4, line 13.] 

§ 7. — True end. for which reason is implanted, (page 4, line 
'25.) [page 5, line 8.] 

Analysis of the notion ditty, in order to explain the conception of a 
good will. (§§ 8-12 inclusive.) 

§ 8. — Actions at variance with or in accordance with duty 
are not here investigated (but only whether they have been per- 
formed out of duty.) (page 5, line 21.) [page 6, line 8.] 

§ 9. — Duty to preserve one's life. (p. 6, 1. 14.) [p. 7, 1. 4.] 



12 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 10.— Duty to be beneficent, (p. 6, 1. 27.) [p. 7, 1. 18.] 

§ 11. — Duty to promote one's own health, (page 7, line 27.) 
[page 8, line 22.] 

§ 12.— Duty to love our neighbor, (p. 8, 1. 18.) [p. 9, 1. 16.] 

Second position. — An action done out of duty has its moral worthy 
not from any purpose it may subserve, but from the maxim according 
to which it is determined on. (§ 13.) 

§ 13. — Moral worth Of an action depends not on the effecting 
any given end, but on the principal of volition singly, (page 8, 
line 29.) [page 9, line 28.] 

The third position results from the two preceding. Duty is the ne- 
cessity of an act out of reverence felt for law. (§§ 14-16 inclusive.) 

§ 14. — Duty has to be done irrespective of all appetite whatso- 
ever ; and hence there remains nothing present to the will, except 
objectively law, and subjectively pure reverence for it. (page 9, 
line 12.) [page 10, line 14.] 

§ 15. — Reverence is no positive feeling, but an active emotion, 
(page 9, note.) [page 10, note.] 

§ 16. — Moral worth of an action consists not m the effect result- 
ing from it, and consequently in no principle of acting taken from 
such effect, (page 10, line 3.) [page 11, line 4.] 

What kind of law is that, the representation of which must alone de- 
termine the will, if this last is to be denominated absolutely and alto- 
gether good ? (§§ 17-23 inclusive.) 

§ 17. — Form of law in general. — Act from a maxim at all 
times fit for law ijniversal. (page 10, line 16.) [page 12, line 1.] 

§ 18. — Maxim of deceit unfit for law uuiversal. (page 11, line 
11.) [page 12, line 19.] 

§ 19. — Maxims unfit for law universal must be rejected, (page 
12, line 16.) [page 13, line 29.] 

§ 20. — Principle whereon depend the common ethic notices of 
mankind, (page 12, line 33.) [page 14, line 15.] 

§ 21. — Practical powers more easily exercised than speculative, 
(page 13, line 16.) [Errs — wanders.] [page 15, line 1.] 

§ 22. — Innocence is easily seduced, (page 14, line 11.) [page 
15, line 32.] [Cf. Eomans, vii. 23.] 

§ 23. — Hope to attain repose, (page 14, line 34.) [p. 16, 1. 24.] 

Chapter II.— Transit from Common Moral Philosophy^to the Metaphysic of 
Ethics. (II 24-103 inclusive.) 

§ 24. — Duty not a mere aposteriori notion, (page 16, line 4.) 
[page 18, line 4.] 

§ 25. — Secret springs of the will beyond scrutiny, (page 16, line 
24.) [page 19, line 1.] 



The Glavis to an Index. 13 

§ 26. — Actions generally spring from self, not from the stern law. 
(page 17, line 18.) [page 19, line 21.] 

§ 27. — Observation could not even suggest the moral law. (page 
18, line 17.) Cf. Luke xvii. 20. [page 20, line 24] 

§ 28. — Imitation has no place in morals, (p. 18, 1. 33.) [p. 21, 1. 9.] 

§ 29.— Moral philosophy philosophical, (p. 19, 1. 21.) [p. 21, 1. 32.] 

§ 30.— Moral philosophy scientific, (p. 19, 1. 34.) [p. 22, 1. 14.] 

§ 31. — Moral philosophy metaphysical, (page 20, line 19.) 
[page 23, line 1.] 

§ 32. — Pure philosophy of morals distinguished from mixed, 
(page 21, note.) [page 23, note.] 

§ 33. — Moral philosophy strengthens virtue, (p. 21,1.5.) [Hyper — 
beyond ; hypo — beneath. Defecated — separated.] [page 23, line 22.] 

§ 34. — Moral philosophy not anthropological, (page 21, line 25.) 
[Prelected — discoursed.] [page 24, line 17.] 

§ 35. — Eeason must be investigated, (p. 22, 1. 31.) [p. 25, 1. 21.] 

§ 36. — Will is nothing else than practical reason, (p. 23, 1. 6.) 
[JVIien reason determines the will — When reason determines itself to 
act.] [page 25, line 30.] 

§ 37. — Imperative expresses a commandment of reason; the rep- 
resentation of an objective principle, so far as it necessitates the 
will, (page 23, line 27.) [page 26, line 20.] 

§ 38. — Interest indicates the dependency of the will on prin- 
ciples of reason, (page 24, note.) Cf. § 139. [page 27, note.] 

§ 39. — Imperatives are valid only for defective wills, (page 24, 
line 10.) [page 27, line 7.] 

§ 40. — Imperatives are either hypothetical or categorical, (page 
24, line 22.) [page 28, line 1.] 

§ 41. — Imperative actions are necessary, (page 25, line 6.) 
[page 28, line 7.] 

§ 42. — Imperative actions are good. (p. 25, 1. 16.) [p. 28, 1. 17.] 

§ 43. — Imperatives are either problematic, assertive, or apodic- 
tic. (page 25, line 24.) [page 28, line 25.] 

§ 44. — Problematic imperatives ; principles of action necessary 
in order to gain some given purposes, (p. 25, 1. 31.) [p. 28, 1. 32.] 

§ 45. — Assertive imperatives ; announcing the practical neces- 
sity of an act as a mean toward happiness, (page 26, line 23.) 
[page 29, line 28.] 

§ 46. — Apodictic imperative commands categorically, irrespec- 
tive of every ulterior end or aim. (p. 27, 1. 4.) [p. 30. 1. 11.] 

§ 47. — Imperatives are either technical, pragmatic, or ethical, 
(page 27, line 11.) [Pragmatic— See § 2550.] [page 30, line 18.] 



14 Kant's Ethic*. 

§ 48. — How technical imperatives are possible, (page 27, line 
25.) [page 31, line 1.] 

§ 49. — How pragmatic imperatives are possible, (page 28, line 
15.) [page 31, line 26.] 

§ 50. — Possibility of the ethical imperative can not be shown 
aposteriori. (page 29, line 32.) [page 33, line 17.] 

§ 51. — Possibility of the ethical imperative must be investigated 
apriori. (page 30, line 25.) [page 34, line 12.] 

§ 52. — Categorical imperative is a synthetic proposition apriori.. 
(page 31, line 5.) Cf. §§ 1448, 1470, 1698, 2667. [page 34, line 26.] 

§ 53. — Categorical imperative ordains conformity to law. (page 

31, line 12.) Cf. Romans xii. 2. [page 35, line 1.] 

§ 54. — Categorical imperative formulated, (p. 31, 1. 30.) Act 
from that maxim only which thou canst will law universal, [page 
35, line 21.] 

| 55. — All imperatives of duty are derived from the categorical 
imperative, (page 31, line 33.) [page 35, line 24.] 

§ 56. — Categorical imperative is conformed to nature, (page 32,, 
line 5.) [page 35, line 31.] 

§ 57. — Duties of determinate and indeterminate obligation, (page 

32, line 11.) [page 36, line 6.] 

§ 58. — Determinate duty: such a one as admits of no exceptions- 
in favor of appetite, (page 32, note.) [page 36, note.] 

§ 59. — Maxims of suicide unfit for law universal, (page 32, line 
15.) Cf. § 489. [page 36, line 10.] 

§ 60. — Maxims of deceit unfit for law universal, (page 33, line 
1.) Cf. §§ 502-509. [page 36, line 25.] 

§ 61. — Maxims of mental sluggishness unfit for law universal, 
(page 33, line 24.) Cf. §§ 542-547. [page 37, line 23.] 

§ 62. — Maxims of illiberality unfit for law universal, (page 34 r 
line 6.) Cf. §§ 510-514 and 561-565. [page 38, line 8.] 

§ 63. — Maxims of conduct must be fit for universal law. (page^ 
34, line 24.) [page 38, line 27.] 

§ 64. — Violation of the law can not be justified, (page 35, line 4.) 
[page 39, line 10.] 

§ 65. — Laws of duty are apodictic. (p. 35, 1. 28.) [p. 40, 1. 3.] 

§ 66. — Laws of duty are not derived from particularities, (page- 

36, line 6.) [page 40, line 16.] 

§ 67. — Philosophy must uphold her laws, (page 36, line 24.) 
[page 41, line 3.] 

§ 68. — Aposteriori principles are detrimental to morality, (page- 

37, line 3.) Virtue — cf. Cicero's Offices, i. 5. [page 41, line 16.] 



The Glacis to an Index. 15 

§ 69. — Season's practical law is inseparably connected apriori 
with the very idea of the will, (page 37, line 15.) [page 41, line 28.] 

§ 70. — Distinction between subjective and objective ends, (page 
38, line 12.) [page 42, line 29.] 

§ 71. — Categorical imperative is grounded on an absolute end. 
(page 39, line 1.) [page 43, line 22.] 

§ 72. — Man is an absolute end (an end in himself, possessing ab- 
solute worth). Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada 187. Max Mueller, tr. 
(Scribner 1872) page 246. (page 39, lino 6.) [page 43, line 27.] 

§ 73. — Categorical imperative is grounded on humanity, (page 
40, line 3.) Cf. §§ 59-62. [page 44, line 29. 

§ 74. — Suicide is inconsistent with the idea of humanity as an 
absolute end. (page 40, line 23.) Cf. § 59. [page 45, line 18.] 

§ 75. — Deceit is inconsistent with the idea of humanity as an ab- 
solute end. (page 41, line 3.) Cf. § 60. [page 45, line 30.] 

§ 76. — Neglect of self improvement is inconsistent with the 
idea of humanity as an absolute end. (page 41, line 19.) Cf. § 61. 
[page 46, line 17.] 

§ 77. — Illiberality is inconsistent with the idea of humanity as 
an absolute end. (page 41, line 29.) Cf. § 62. [page 46, line 27.] 

§ 78. — Will of every intelligent as universally legislative, (page 
42, line 7.) [page 47, line 8.] 

§ 79. — Will of every intelligent self-legislative, (page 42, line 
26.) [page 47, line 29.] 

§ 80. — Specific difference betwixt a categorical and hypothetical 
imperative, (page 42, line 32.) [page 48, line 3.] 

§ 81. — Will supremely legislative can not be dependent upon any 
interest, (page 43, line 16.) [page 48, line 22.] 

§ 82. — Categorical imperative can only ordain to act according 
to a maxim fit for universal law. (p. 43, 1. 23.) [p. 48, 1. 30.] 

§ 83. — Principle of the autonomy of the will, (page 43, line 34.) 
[page 49, line 10.] 

§ 84. — Eealm of ends, (page 44, line 21.) Analogy to what we 
call the realm of nature, [page 49, line 32.] 

§ 85. — Realm — the systematic conjunction of all intelligent na- 
ture under a uniform and common law. (p. 44, 1. 30.) [p. 50, 1. 9.] 

§ 86. — Systematic conjunction of intelligents. (page 45, line 6.) 
[page 50, line 20.] 

§ 87. — Intelligent is a member of the realm of ends, (page 45, 
line 13.) [page 50, line 28.] 

§ 88. — Finite intelligent not sovereign of the realm of ends, 
(page 45, line 18.) [page 51, line 1.] 



16 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 89. — Morality refers all action to the realm of ends, (page 45, 
line 25.) [page 51, line 9.] 

§ 90. — Duty rests solely on the relation betwixt intelligents. 
(page 46, line 4.) [page 51, line 23.] 

§ 91. — Price and dignity in the realm of ends, (page 46, line 15.) 
[page 52, line 3.] 

§ 92. — Price is relative; dignity is absolute worth, (page 46, line 
20.) [page 52, line 8.] 

§ 93. — Morality the only dignity of humanity, (page 46, line 27.) 
[page 52, line 15.] 

§ 94. — Autonomy the ground of the dignity of humanity, (page 
47, line 21.) [page 53, line 12.] 

§ 95. — Three formulae of one and the same law. (p. 48, 1. 5.) (1) 
form, cf. §§ 53-65 ; (2) matter, cf. §§ 66-77 ; (3) aggregate determina- 
tion, cf. §§ 78-94; (1) unity ; (2) plurality ; (3) totality, [p.53, 1. 31.] 

§ 96. — Conception of an absolutely good will, (page 48, line 34.) 
[page 54, line 28.] 

§ 97. — End of a good will not an end to be effected, (page 49, 
line 14.) [page 55, line 11.] 

§ 98. — World of intelligents (mundus intelligibilis) may be 
cogitated, (page 50. line 6.) [page 56, line 6.] 

§ 99. — Formal principle of the maxims of every intelligent, 
(page 50, line 18.) [page 56, line 18.] 

§ 100. — Worth of intelligents judged of only according to their 
disinterested adherence, (page 51, line 6.) [page 57, line 10.] 

§ 101. — Morality the relation betwixt action and the autonomy 
of the will, (page 51. line 30.) [page 58, line 3.] 

§ 102. — Dignity belongs to that intelligent who discharges all 
his duties, (page 52, line 8.) [page 58, line 15.] 

§ 103. — Autonomy of will is the supreme principle of morality, 
(page 52, line 24.) [page 59, line 2.] 

Chapter III.— Transit from the Metaphysic of Ethics to an Inquiry into the 
Apriori Operations of the "Will. {% 104-146 inclusive.) 

Article I. — The idea freedom explains that of autonomy of will. 
(§§ 104-108 inclusive.) 

§ 104. — Freedom is independence on foreign determining causes, 
(page 54, line 5.) [page 61, line 5.] 

§ 105. — Freedom is not devoid of law. (page 54, line 13.) 
[page 61, line 13.] 

§ 106. — Freedom of will is autononry. (page 54, line 23.) [page 
61, line 23.] 

§ 107. — Freedom is subjection to the moral law. (page 55, line 
2.) [page 62, line 6.] 



The Claris to an Index. 17 

§ 108. — Freedom's law is synthetic, (page 55, line 9.) [page 
62, line 14.] 

Article II, — Freedom must be postulated as a property of the will 
of every intelligent whatsoever. (§ 109.) 

§ 109. — Reason practical must regard herself as free, (page 55, 
line 27.) [page 63, line 3.] 

Article III — Of the interest indissolubly connected with the idea of 
morality. (§§ 110-122 inclusive.) 

§ 110. — Morality and freedom identical, (page 56, line 28.) 
[page 64, line 8.] 

§ 111. — Objective necessity of freedom, (page 57, line 5.) [page 
64, line 18.] 

§ 112. — Fixing the true foundation of morality, (page 57, line 
26.) [page 65, line 11.] 

§ 113. — Mere worthiness to become happy has an interest, (page 
58, line 11.) [page 65, line 31.] 

§ 114. — Freedom and self-legislation convertible ideas, (page 58, 
line 27.) [page 66, line 16.] 

§ 115. — Only one escape, (page 59, line 7.) [page 66, line 30.] 

§ 116. — Knowledge of the appearances of things only, (page 59, 
line 13.) [page 67, line 4.] 

§ 117. — Sensible system distinguished from a cogitable and un- 
seen, (page 59, line 33.) [page 67, line 24.] 

§ 118. — Halt on the threshold of discovery, (page 60, line 20.) 
[page 68, line 14.] 

§ 119. — Laws beyond which the understanding can not pass, 
(page 60, line 29.) [page 68, line 24.] 

§ 120. — Two-fold set of laws regulating conduct, (page 61, line 
15.) Cf. St. Paul (Romans vii.). [page 69, line 13.] 

§ 121. — Groundwork of all moral actions, (page 61, line 25.) 
[page 69, line 24.] 

§ 122. — Freedom not the ground of moral necessitation (but only 
its form), (page 62, line 1.) [page 70, line 3.] 

Article IV. — How is a categorical imperative possible. (§§ 123- 
125 inclusive.) 

§ 123. — Moral necessitation grounded on reason, which by the 
idea Freedom gives a law. (page 62, line 17.) [page 70, line 20.] 

§ 124. — Analogy between the law of freedom and the laws of 
nature. Cf. §§ 2719, 2725. (page 63, line 11.) [page 71, line 20.] 

§ 125. — Authority of the law recognized even by the uneduca- 
ted, (page 63, line 31.) [page 72, line 8.] Cf. § 248. 

Article V. — Of the extreme verge of all practical philosophy. 
(§§ 126-144 inclusive.) 



18 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 126. — Freedom and necessity both apriori conceptions, (page 

64, line 27.) [page 73, line 7.] 

§ 127. — Freedom consequently seems to collide with necessity, 
(page 65, line 14.) [page 73 line 28.] 

§ 128. — Appearance of contradiction must be removed, (page 

65, line 29.) [page 74, line 14.] 

§ 129. — Speculative philosophy prepares the way for the prac- 
tical by reconciling freedom and necessity, (page 65, line 34.) [page 
74, line 19.] CY. § 258. 

§ 130. — Practical reason secure against all assailants, (page 66. 
line 24.) [page 75, line 12.] 

§ 131. — Reason's legal title to freedom. (page 6Q, line 30.) 
[page 75, line 19.] Gf. § 178. 

§ 132. — Man conscious of his reason's independency, (page 67, 
line 1.) [page 75, line 24.] 

§ 133. — Origin and seat in the laws of a cogitable world, (page 
67, line 20.) [page 76, line 13.] 

§ 134. — Cogitable world a mere idea, not an object, (page 68, 
line 8.) [page 77, line 4.] 

§ 135. — Laws of the cogitable world not grounded on an object.. 
(page 68, line 22.) [page 77, line 19.] 

§ 136. — Laws of the cogitable world inexplicable, (page 69, line 
8.) [page 78, line 7. 

§ 137.— Freedom can be defended, (p. 69, 1. 25.) [p. 78, 1. 24.] 

§ 138. — Interest in the moral law inexplicable, (page 70, line 
12.) [page 79, line 15.] 

§ 139. — Interest pure or adulterated, (page 70, note.) [page 
79, note.] 

§ 140. — Interest in the moral law subordinate to obedience. 
(page 70, line 21.) [page 80, line 3.] 

§ 141. — Sole hypothesis on which the categorical imperative is 
possible, (page 71, line 26.) [page 81, line 1.] 

§ 142. — Hypothesis of freedom unconditionally necessary, (page 

72, line 1.) [page 81, line 10.] 

§ 143. — Nothing known of the cogitable world except the form 
of its laws, (page 72, line 17.) [page 81, line 28.] 

§ 144. — Utmost verge of all ethical inquiry, (page 73, line 5.)> 
[page 82, line 20.] 

Article VI. — Conclusion of the groundwork. (§§ 145, 146.) 

§ 145. — Absolute necessity of the categorical imperative, (page 

73, line 25.) [page 83. line 9.] 

§ 146. — Why it is incompi-ehensible. (p. 74, 1. 12.) [p. 84, 1. 1.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 19 

II.— Inquiry into the Apriori Operations of the Will. (Three 
Chapters.) (g§ 147-274.) 

Chapter I.— Analytic of Principles. (^ 147-202.) 

Article I. — Exposition of the notions, principle, rule, maxim, law. 
(§§ 147-152 inclusive.) 

§ 147. — Practical principles are propositions containing different 
rules subordinate to them which may be grounds of determining 
the will, (page 75, line 4.) [page 85, line 4.] 

Remark — Practical laws could not exist if reason were not a prac- 
tical faculty. (§§ 148-152 inclusive.) 

§ 148. — Collision of maxims and laws, (page 75, line 12.) [page 
85, line 14.] 

§ 149.— Man's law is imperative, (p. 76, 1. 9.) [p. 8G, 1. 17.] 

§ 150. — Imperatives objective ; maxims subjective, (page 76, 
line 16.) [page 86, line 25.] 

§ 151. — Imperatives divided into laws and practical precepts- 
(page 76, line 24.) [page 86, line 32.] 

§ 152. — Laws take no cognizance of aims, intentions, or effects, 
(page 77, line 17.) [page 87, line 30.] 

Article II. — Every material principle whatsoever is aposteriori, 
and so can beget no practical law. (§§ 153-155 inclusive.) (Position I.) 

§ 153. — All material practical principles are taken from experi- 
ence and observation, (page 78, line 2.) [page 88, line 15.] 

Remarks— (§§ 154, 155.) 

§ 154. — All practical principles determined by desire pre-sup- 
pose pleasure and are aposteriori. (p. 78, 1. 7.) [p. 88, 1. 21.] 

§ 155. — Principles conditioned by pleasure or pain may become 
maxims but never laws, (page 78, line 23.) [page 89, line 10.] 

Article III— -All material practical principles rest on self love. 
(§§ 156-167 inclusive.) (Position II.) 

§ 156. — Happiness the supreme determinator ol all material prac- 
tical principles, (page 79, line 2.) [page 89, line 20.] 

§ 157. — Moral law is the sole proof of a supreme power of desire, 
(page 79, line 26.) (Corollary.) [page 90, line 16.] 

Remark I. — Distinction betwixt the higher and lower powers of will. 
(§§ 158-164 inclusive.) 

§ 158. — All feelings of pleasure depend on the sensory, (page 
80, line 4.) [page 90, line 23.] 

§ 159. — All feelings of "pleasure differ merely in degree, not in 
kind, (page 80, line 19.) [page 91, line 11.] 

§ 160. — Faculty of representation of no moment when feeling 
determines choice, (page 81, line 4.) [page 91, line 31.] 



20 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 161. — Moral sense would be badly defined as an originary 
deteroamator. (page 81, line 18.) Cf. § 198. [page 92, line 13.] 

§ 162. — Epicurus consistently regards all pleasures as exactly 
the same in kind, (page 82, line 4.) [page 93, line 1.] 

§ 163. — Eeason the supreme power of desire, (page 82, line 21.) 
[page 93, line 19.] Cf. § 157. 

§ 164. — Reason determines the will without the intervention of 
an emotion, (page 83, line 7.) [page 94, line 8.] 

Remark II — Happiness can not found a practical laic. (§§ 165- 
167 inclusive.) 

§165. — Happiness a general denomination for all subjective deter- 
minators. (page 83, line 13.) [page 94, line 14.] 

§ 166. — Laws founded on happiness are subjectively contingent, 
(page 84, line 3.) [page 95, line 7.] 

§ 167.- — Subjective principles can not be elevated to the rank of 
objective laws, (page 84, line 23.) [page 95, line 28.] 

Article IV. — Sole condition of all practical laws. (§§ 168-170 
inclusive.) (Position III.) 

§ 168. — Form of law in general can alone constitute practical 
laws, (page 85, line 25.) [page 97, line 2.] 

Remark. — Aposteriori principles never can become the groundwork of 
any law. (§§ 169, 170.) 

§ 169. — Self annihilating, when brought under the form of law. 
(page 86, line 10.) [page 97, line 21.] 

§ 170. — Possible exceptions are innumerable, (page 86, line 32.) 
[page 98, line 18.] 

Article V — Find the nature of a will whose sole law is the legisla- 
tive form of its maxims. § 171. (Problem I.) 

§ 171.— Concludes upon a free will. (p. 87, 1. 28.) [p. 99, 1. 15.) 

Article VI — Find the sole law regulating the causuality of a free 
will. (§§ 172-175 inclusive.) (Problem II.) 

§ 172. — Concludes upon the legislative form, (page 88, line 16.) 
[page 100, line 8.] 

Remark. — Morality first reveals to man his inward freedom. 
(§§ 173-175 inclusive.) 

§ 173. — Moral necessity not a theoretic deduction from freedom, 
(page 88, line 29.) [page 100, line 23.] Cf. § 122. 

§ 174. — Moral necessity an apodict of practical reason, (p. 89, 
line 13.) [page 101, line 9.] Galatians iv. 21 ; Romans iii. 19. 

§ 175. — Man judges it possible to do what he ought, (page 90? 
line 2.) [page 102, line 1.] 

Article VII. — Fundamental law of reason. (§§ 176-182 inclu- 
sive.) Cf. § 332. 



The Clavis to an Index. 21 

§ 176. — So act that thy maxims of will might become law in a 
system of ' imiversal moral legislation, (p. 90, 1. 21.) See §§ 346 and 
430 for the legal and moral principles into which this fundamental 
law is divided, [page 102, line 21.] 

Remark. — Reason is immediately legislative. (§§ 177, 178.) 

§ 177. — Practical rule is absolute in ethics, (page 90, line 24.) 
[page 102, line 24.] 

§ 178. — Single isolated fact of practical reason, (page 91, line 9.) 
[page 103, line 14.] 

§ 179. — Eeason is spontaneously practical, (page 91, line 22.) 
(Corollary.) [page 103, line 28.] 

Remark. — Obligation is the relation of a defective will to the law. 
(§§ 180-182 inclusive.) 

§ 180. — Moral law not confined to man. (page 91, line 24.) [page 
104, line 2.] 

§ 181. — Conceptions of duty and obligation, (page 92. line 12.) 
[page 104, line 22.] 

§ 182. — Conceptions of virtue and holiness, (page 92, line 20.) 
[page 104, line 30. J 

Article VIII. — Autonomy of will is the sole foundation of the ethi- 
cal nature of man. (§§ 183-198 inclusive.) (Position IV.) 

§ 183. — Moral law expresses nothing but the autonomy of reason, 
(page 93, line 4.) [page 105, line 19.] 

Remark I. — Heteronomy can not satisfy the demands of reason. 
(§§ 184-187 inclusive.) 

§ 184. — Every volition has an end aimed at. (page 94, line 2.) 
[page 106, line 21.] 

§ 185. — Hap})iness of others may be the object of will, (page 94,. 
line 17.) [page 107, line 9.] 

§ 186. — Ends do not condition the will, but are added by the 
law. (page 94, line 25.) [page 107, line 18.] 

§ 187. — Pure will is not determined by desire. (j)age 95, line 5.) 
[page 107, line 31.] 

Remark II. — Contrariety of heteronomy and autonomy is not logical 
merely, but practical. (§§ 188-198 inclusive.) 

§188. — Antipart of autonomy is self love, (page 95, line 17.) 
[page 108, line 12.] 

§ 189. — Self love cunning and deceitful, (page 95, line 27). 
[page 108, line 22.] 

§ 190. — Self love advises ; law commands, (page 96, line 16.) Cf. 
Aristotle, Nic. Eth. book vi., ch. xii. 9. " Now prudence is not the 
same as this faculty [deinotes — craft cleverness, cunning] nor is 



22 Kant's Ethics. 

it without this faculty." Browne's tr. (ed. Bohn) page 173. [page 
109, line 15.] 

| 191. — Duty undoubted; expediency uncertain, (p. 96, 1. 22.) 
[So Confucius — " The path is not far from man. When men try to 
pursue a course which is tar from the common indications of con- 
sciousness, this course can not he considered the path." Doctrine of 
the "Mean, xiii. 1. Dr. Legge's Life and Teachings of Confucius 
(Truebner 1869) page 290.] [page 109, line 21.] 

§ 192. — Obedience to the law always practicable ; to self love, 
not always, (page 97, line 1.) [page 110, line 3.] 

§ 193. — Disobedience to the law despicable; to self love, merely 
vexations, (page 97, line 18.) [page 110, line 21.] 

| 194. — Transgression of law requires punishment; of expedi- 
ency, not. (page 97, line 30.) [page 111, line 3.] 

§ 195. — Utilitarian conception of crime inconsistent, (page 9S, 
line 11.) [page 111. line 18.] 

§ 196. — Moral sense presupposes (and consequently can not 
originate) morality and duty. (p. 98, 1. 28.) [p. 112, 1. 5.] Cf. § 161. 

§ 197. — Moral felicity can not precede obligation, much less 
found it. (page 99, line 10.) [page 112, line 22.] 

§ 198. — Moral sense ought to be cultivated, (page 99, line 21.) 
[page 113, line 1.] 

Appendix. — Tabular view of every possible false system of ethic. 
(§§ 199-202 inclusive.) 

§ 199.— Material principles either subjective or objective, and 
either external or internal, (page 100, line 1.) [page 113, line 16.] 

§ 200. — Material principles either inductive or deductive, (page 
100, line 18.) [page 114, line 1.] 

§ 201. — Supreme perfection not an ethical determinator. (page 
100, line 31.) [page 114, line 14.] 

§ 202. — Sole ethical determinator of the will, (page 101, line 13.) 
[page 114, line 30.] 

Chapter II.— On the Apriori Spring of the Will.' \\ 203-242. Of " the Relation 
Betwixt Pure Practical Reason and the Sensory, and the Necessary Effect,, 
(Cognizable Apriori) Thereon, which Effect we Call the Moral Sense." § 244. 

§ 203. — Essence of all moral worth in acting, (page 102, line 3.) 
[page 116, line 3.] 

§ 204. — Moral law the sole ethical spring of the human will, 
(page 102, line 12.) [page 116, line 12.] 

§ 205. — Effect of the ethical law, as spring, (page 102, line 22.) 
[page 117, line 1.] 

§ 206. — Essence of all moral determination of will, (page 103, 
line 16.) [page 117, line 20.] 



The CJavis to an Index. 23 

§ 207.— Apriori ground of pain. (p. 103, 1. 21.) [p. 117, 1. 25.] 

§ 208. — Self love circumscribed and self conceit overthrown by 
/practical reason, (page 103, line 33.) [page 118, line 6]. Cf. §§ 592- 
594, Eomans xii. 3. 

§ 209. — Apriori ground of reverence, (page 104, line 18.) [page 
118, line 27.] 

§ 210. — Man's will deflected by his aposteriori self, (page 105, 
line 1.) [page 119, line 14.] Cf. §§ 656, 688. 

§ 211. — Moral law therefore inevitably humbles every man. 
(page 105, line 17.) [page 120, line 3.] 

§ 212. — Moral law the subjective ground of reverence, (page 105> 
line 27.) [page 120, line 15.] 

§ 213. — Moral law the ground of the moral sense, (page 106, line 
13.) [page 120, line 32.] Cf. §§ 196-198. 

§ 214. — Eeverence not a pathognomic emotion, (page 106, line 
30.) [page 121, line 18.] 

§ 215. — Reverence toward the law is not a spring advancing 
morality, (page 107, line 21.) [page 122, line 13.] 

§ 216. — Eeverence is a mere spring co-acting the law. (page 107, 
line 34.) [page 122, line 26.] 

§ 217. — Eeverence felt toward persons, not things, (page 108, 
line 8.) [page 123, line 3.] 

§ 218. — Eeverence entertained unwillingly, (page 109, line 7.) 
[page 124, line 6.] 

§ 219. — Eeverent regard for intellectual greatness, (page 109, 
line 29.) [page 124, line 29.] 

§ 220. — Eeverence begins with humility, (page 110, line 19.) 
[page 125, line 22.] 

§ 221. — Eeverence becomes a spring, (p. Ill, 1. 4.) [p. 126, 1. 10.] 

§ 222. — Eeverence begets interest and conforms maxims, (page 
111, line 28.) Maxim: cf. §§ 147-, 332. [page 127, line 3.] 

§ 223. — Moral sense is precisely the susceptibility to have rever- 
ence, (page 112, line 12.) [page 127, line 21.] 

§ 224. — Duty involves practical necessitation. (page 112, line 
34.) [page 128, line 12.] 

§ 225. — Obedience followed by exaltation, (page 113, line 16.) 
[page 128, line 29.] 

§ 226. — Duty is objectively legal, subjectively moral, (page 113, 
dine 31.) [page 129, line 13.] 

§ 227. — Moral inclination can not supersede moral necessitation. 
(page 114, line 9.) [page 129, line 25.] 

§ 228. — Eeverence the only ethical spring of the will, (page 114, 
line 28.) [page 130, line 13.] 



24 Kanfs Ethics. 

§ 229. — Love can not supersede duty, (page 115, line 3.) [page 
130, line 23.] 

§ 230. — Love God means cheerfully to obey his law. (page 115, 
line 27.) [page 131, line 17.] 

§231. — Love is the apotheosis of reverence, (page 116, line 22.) 
[page 132, line 16.] 

§ 232. — Virtue (man's incumbent moral state) is militant, (page 
117, line 19.) [page 133, line 17.] Cf. § 729. 

§ 233. — Virtuous actions are duteous, not meritorious, (page 118, 
line 1.) [page 134, line 2.] Cf. § 455. 

§ 234. — Virtuous actions may very fitly be praised, (page 118, 
line 23.) [page 134, line 25.] 

§ 235. — Ethical fanaticism is transgression, (page 119, line 7.) 
[page 135, line 13.] 

§ 236. — Jesus first taught purity of moral principle, (page 119, 
line 18.) Cf. §§ 723, 907. [page 135, line 25.] Self love: %% 208-210. 

§ 237. — All appetites are dumb before duty, (page 120, line 3.) 
[page 136, line 13.] 

§ 238. — Personality the root of duty, (page 120, line 14.) [page 

136, line 24.] Cf. § 671. 

§ 239. — Humanity extorts veneration, (page 120, line 31.) [page 

137, line 11.] Used as an end: mean (Semple's erratum.) 

§ 240. — Honest men never prostitute humanity, (page 121, line 
15.) [page 137, line 30.] Emitted: eschewed (Semple's erratum.) 

§ 241. — Peace is the effect of reverence, (page 121, line 30.) 
[page 138, line 14. 

§ 242. — Hope of happiness, if permitted sway, destroys man's 
ethical character, (page 122, line 9.) [page 138, line 28.] Cf. § 663. 

Chapter III.— Dilucidation of the Foregoing Analytic— On Freedom and 
Necessity. (g§ 243-274.) 

§ 243. — Practical reason and speculative differ in form, (page 
123, line 4.) [page 140, line 4.] 

§ 244. — Practical reason begins with principles apriori. (page 
123, line 13.) [page 140, line 13.] 

§ 245. — Analytic of practical reason divided analogously to the 
theoretical, (page 124, line 9.) [page 141, line 11.] 

§ 246. — Division of the analytic of practical reason, like that of 
a syllogism, (page 124, line 23.) [page 141, line 27.] 

§ 247. — Powers of practical reason exhibited by the common 
use. (page 125, line 10.) [page 142, line 18.] Cf. § 125. 

§ 248. — Justification of the moral principles (by an appeal to 
the judgment of mankind's moral sense). Cf. §§ 2595, 1145. (page 
125, line 23.) [page 142,line 32.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 25 

§ 249.— Distinguish betwixt utilitarianism and morality, (page 
126, line 21.) [page 144, line 1.] 

§ 250. — Distinction betwixt utility and morality is not con- 
trariety, (page 127, line 7.) [page 144, line 22.] 

§ 251. — Freedom of an active cause cannot be comprehended 
even as to its possibility, (page 127, line 29.) [page 145, line 13.] 
[Defined : cf. Spinoza (Tennemann Hist. Phil., ed. J. E. Morell, 
1870, § 338, page 316) : " Deo parere summa libertas est"] 

§252. — Some who think they can explain freedom as a mere 
psychological quality, (page 128, line 11.) [page 145, line 30.] 

§ 253. — Causality of things in time different from the causality of 
things in themselves, (page 128, line 27.) [page 146, line 15.] 

§254. — Attribute to things in time mechanical causality; to things 
in themselves, freedom, (page 129, line 22.) [page 147, line .14.] 

§ 255. — Problem at whose solution centuries have labored, (page 

130, line 10.) [page 148, line 3.] 

§ 256. — Psychological freedom in nowise to be distinguished 
from physical necessity, (page 130, line 28.) [page 148, line 21.] 
§ 257. — Psychological freedom cannot found moral law. (page 

131 , line 14.) [page 149, line 10.] 

§ 258. — Seeming antagonism between nature and freedom cleared 
up by the Critique, (page 131, line 32.) [p. 149, 1. 28.] Cf. § 129. 

§ 259. — Conscience determinable by no law of things in time, 
(page 132, line 30.) [page 150, line 29.] Cf. § 525. 

§ 260. — Contrition for past sin is legitimate, (page 133, line 13.) 
[page 151, line 14.] 

§ 261. — Man's sentient existence is the absolute unity of one 
phenomenon, (page 133, line 24.) [page 151, line 25.] 

§ 262. — Refer the sensitive itself to the cogitable substratum. 
(page 134, line 5.) [page 152, line 9.] 

§ 263. — Man's choice depends on a free causality at bottom, 
(page 134, line 14.) [page 152, line 19.] 

§ 264. — Difficulty of harmonizing freedom and necessity presses 
upon every other theory as well as upon Kant's, (page 135, line 3.) 
[Exit: out of the labyrinth § 115.— Main theory: §258.— That 
theory : transcendental realism ; see § 2952.] [page 153, line 10.] 

§ 265. — Freedom is illusory upon tb,e theory that things in tim e 
are things in themselves (transcendental realism), (page 135, line 
19.) [page 153, line 26.] 

§ 266. — Spinozism the only alternative to Kant's theory (trans- 
cendental idealism), (page 136, line 7.) [page 154, line 17.] 

§ 267. — Freedom, upon the theory of transcendental idealism, 
does not conflict with God's creative power, (p. 137, 1.8.) [p. 155, 1.20.} 

3 



26 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 268. — Difficulties advance the groundworks of science, (page 
138, line 1.) [page 156, line 15.] 

§ 269. — How the idea Freedom procures us so great an extension 
of moral-practical science, (page 138, line 17.) [page 157, line 1.] 
Think : see § 1649. 

§ 270. — Freedom's category contains synthesis of mere existence, 
not necessarily of the homogeneous, and therefore can refer to an 
unconditioned in the cogitable world, (page 138, line 31.) Cf. §§ 
2203, 2205, 2248. [page 157, line 16.] 

§ 271. — Morality, interwoven with the reason of all men, presup- 
poses such an unconditioned causality, (p. 139, 1. 32.) [p. 158, 1. 20.] 

§ 272. — Causality the only category which allows such a trans- 
cendent synthesis (although only for a practical behoof), (page 
140, line 28.) [page 159, line 19.] 

§ 273. — Freedom can be established only for a practical behoof, 
(p. 141, 1. 9.) [p. 160, 1. 3.] Quit : quit not. — Semple's erratum. 

§ 274. — Every step taken by pure practical reason coincides with 
the march of the Critique of pure speculative reason, (page 141, line 
21.) [page 160, line 16.] 

METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS. 

(gg 275-636 inclusive.) 
Prolegomena to the Metaphysic of Ethics. (§§ 275-477 inclusive.) 

Preface to the Metaphysic of Ethics. (§5 275—280.) 

§ 275. — Metaphysic of Ethics divided into elements of law and 
of morals, (page 145, line 3.) [page 165, line 3.] 

§ 276. — Metaphysical elements of law evolved by pure reason 
from principles apriori. (page 145, line 9.) [page 165, line 9.] 

§ 277. — Scholastic exactness is indispensable, (page 146, line 7.) 
[page 166, line 14.] 

§ 278. — Only one true system of philosophy is possible, (page 147, 
line 6.) Cf. Arist. JSTic. Eth. VI, xiii, 5 and V, i, 12; Confucius Ana, 
XV, ii, iii ; Xen. Mem. I, i, 9 ; III, ix, 5 ; and Buddh. Dharm. 38 § 949. 
Cf. § 819.— Brown (A. D. 1735-1788) into sthenic and .asthenic 
(Am. Cyclop, ed. 1873, vol. iii, page 337). [page 167, 1. 17.] 

§ 279. — Kant's doctrine of time and space not borrowed, (page 
148, line 10.) [page 168, line 25.] 

§ 280. — Kantic terminology cannot be supplied by popular lan- 
guage, (page 149, line 5.) [page 169, line 20.] 
Chapter I.— Introduction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. (§§ 281-338 inclusive.) 

Article I. — Of the relation subsisting betwixt the powers of the 
human mind and the moral law. (§§ 281-291 inclusive.) 

§281. — Power of desire or appetitive faculty is the power man 
has of becoming, by his representations, the cause of the existence 



The Olavis to an Index. 



27 



of the object represented. Cf. Eomans viii, 6. Cf. §676. (page 
150, line 6.) [page 171, line 6.] 

§ 282. — Desire invariabty attended by feeling, which is not 
always its cause, but sometimes its effect, (page 150, line 11.) [page 
171, line 11.] 

§ 283. — Feeling is merely subjective and begets no knowledge, 
(page 150, line 21.) [page 171, line 21.] (Feeling distinguished 
from sensation and intuition : see §§ 283,284.) 

§ 284. — Feeling is the sensible effect of representation, (no mat- 
ter whether or not the representation causing it belong to the 
intellect or the sensory.) (page 151, note.) [page 172, note.] 

§ 285. — Pleasure is either practical or contemplative, (page 151, 
line 10.) [page 172, line 13.] 

§ 286.— -Practical pleasure, when it causes habitual desire, is an 
appetitive interest, (page 151, line 20.) [page 173, line 2.] 

§ 287. — Practical pleasure, when it is the effect of desire, repre- 
sents* an interest of reason, (page 152, line 3.) [p. 173, 1. 10.] 

§ 288. — Concupiscence different from desiring, (page 152, line 
20.) [page 174, line 1.] 

§ 289. — Choice is appetite in respect of the action ; will is appe- 
tite in respect of the ground of the action ; wish is appetite inac- 
tive, (page 152, line 24.) [page 174, line 5.] 

§ 290. — Freedom of choice is independency on sensitive stimu- 
lants, (page 153, line 9.) Cf. § 54. [page 174, line 20.] By an 
imperative ordaining or forbidding : cf. Cicero (page 9) above. 

§ 291.— Moral law, governing the external use of choice, founds 
Jurisprudence ; governing the internal use of choice, founds ethics, 
(page 153, line 26.) [page 175, line 6.] Time : cf. § 1503. 

Article II. — On the idea and the necessity of having a metaphysic 
of ethics. (§§ 292-298 inclusive.) 

§ 292. — Laws of nature may be accepted on the evidence of 
experience, (page 154, line 19.) Cf. §§ 2702, 2725 and refer to 
§§ 2608^2617. [page 176, line 3.] 

§ 293. — Laws of morals can only be accepted in so far as they 
are seen to be founded apriori. (p. 154, 1. 33.) [p. 176, 1. 18.] 

§ 294. — Precepts of eudaimonism cannot be constituted apriori. 
(page 155, line 8.) [page 176, line 26.] 



•^Practical reason creates the desire, whereupon the desire may cause practical 
pleasure. Therefore, notwithstanding that the conjunction of the pleasure with 
Ihe desire is called interest, still, as it is in this case an interest of reason, it 
ought not to be said to be constituted by the pleasure, but rather to be repre- 
sented by it. 



28 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 295. — Authority of law does not depend upon advantage of 
obedience, (p 155, 1. 27.) Cf. §§ 616, 715, 2366. [p. 177, 1. 16.] 

§ 296. — Metaphysic of ethics cannot rest on anthropology, but 
it must apply to it. (page 156, line 14.) [page 178, line 6.] 

§ 297. — Moral anthropology is the antipart of the metaphysic of 
ethics, (page 156, line 32.) [page 178, line 26.] 

§ 298. — Philosophy can contain no technical, but singly a moral 
practical part, (page 157, line 18.) [page 179, line 16.] 

Article III. — Of the division of a system of the metaphysic of 
ethics. (§§ 289-307 inclusive.) 

§ 299. — Notion of an act of free choice in general, (page 158, 
note.) [page 180, note.] 

§ 300. — All legislation requires, first, a law ; secondly, a spring 
of action, (page 158, line 2.) [page 180, line 5.] 

§ 301. — Legislation divided into ethical and juridical, (page 

158, line 13.) Cf § 291. [page 180, line 16.] 

§ 302. — Coincidence of action with the law divided into legality 
and morality, (page 158, line 25.) [page 181, line 10.] 

§ 303. — Duties of forensic obligation are outward only, (page 

159, line 5.") [page 181, line 15.] 

§ 304. — Ethical legislation cannot be external, (page 159, line 
11.) [page 181, line 21.] 

§ 305. — All duties are ethical, irrespective of the law giving them 
birth, (page 159, line 22.) [page 182, line 1.] 

§ 306. — Ethical obligation belongs simply to an inward legisla- 
tion, (page 160, line 9.) [page 182, line 23.] 

§ 307. — Duties of juridical obligation come indirectly to be ethical 
duties, (page 160, line 23.) [page 183, line 5.] 

Article IV.— Preliminary ideas entering into the metaphysic of 
ethics (§§ 308-338 inclusive.) 

§ 308. — Idea Freedom not a constitutive but simply regulative 
principle of speculative reason, (page 160, line 32.) Cf. § 334. 
[page 183, line 16.] 

§ 309. — Eeality of freedom evinced by practical reason, (page 
161, line 5.) [page 183, line 22.] 

§ 310. — Moral laws founded upon the idea of freedom, (page 161, 
line 11.) [page 183, line 28.] See § 123. 

§ 311 — Moral sense not the foundation of the practical laws, but 
an effect, (page 161, line 18.) [page 184, line 6.] Cf. §§ 196, 213. 

§ 312. — Obligation is the necessity of a free action, (page 161, 
line 31.) [page 184, line 20.] 

§ 313. — Imperative is a practical rule making necessary a sub- 
jectively contingent action, (page 161, line 33.) [p. 184, 1. 22.] 



The Claris to an Index. 29 

§ 314. — Categorical imperative represents an act as immediately 
incumbent and makes it objectively necessary, (page 162, line 10.) 
[page 185, line 1.] 

§ 315. — Actions allowed or disallowed, (page 162, line 22.) [page 

185, line 14.] 

§ 316. — Duty is the matter of obligation, (page 162, line 26.) 
[page 185, line IS.] 

§ 317. — Actions are either commanded or prohibited, (page 162, 
line 31.) [page 185, line 23.] 

§318. — Are there any adiaphorous actions? (page 163, line 1.) 
[page 185, line 28.] 

§ 319. — Deeds can be imputed, (page 163, line 12.) [p. 186, 1. 6.] 

§ 320. — Person is one to whom actions can be imputed, (page 163 
line 19.) [page 186. line 13.] 

§321. — Thing is that to which no event can be imputed as an 
action, (page 163, line 25.) [page 186, line 20.] 

§ 322. — Actions either right or wrong, (page 163, line 28.) [page 

186, line 23.] 

§ 323. — Transgression is either fault or crime, (page 163, line 
32.) [page 186, line 27.] 

§324 — Actions are externally either just or unjust (page 164, 
line 1.) [page 186, line 30.] 

§ 325.— Collision of duties is perfectly inconceivable, (page 164, 
line 3.) [page 187, line 1.] 

§ 326. — More extensive ground toward obligation takes pre- 
cedence, (page 164, line 9.) [page 187, line 7.] Cf. § 450. 

§ 327. — External laws either natural or statutable, (page 164, 
line 18.) [page 187, line 17.] 

§ 328. — Laws are objective principles ; maxims are subjective 
rules, (page 164, line 29.) [page 487, line 28.] [Maxims: rules of 
conduct deliberately adopted by an agent-intelligent (regulae quae 
inter maximas haberi debent) — Semple, explanation of terms, p. xv.] 

§ 329. — isTecessity of adopting such maxims as might serve for 
common laws, (page 164, line 33.) [page 187, line 32.] 

§ 330. — Simplicity of the law exceedingly surprising, (page 165, 
line 7.) Cf. § 716. [page 188, line 9.] 

§ 331. — Legality and morality of actions, (page 165, line 22.) 
[page 188, line 25.] 

§ 332. — Supreme principle of ethics, (page 165, line 28.) Cf. § 
176. [page 188, line 32.] 

§ 333. — Law proceeds from will ; maxims, from choice, (page 
165, line 31.) [page 189, line 3.] Cf. § 289. 



30 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 334. — Liberty of choice can only be explained negatively .. 
(page 166, line 3.) [page 189, line 10.] Cf. §§ 141, 308. 

§ 335. — Lawgiver is the author of juridical obligation, but not 
necessarily the author of the law. (p. 166, 1. 23.) [p, 190, 1. 3.] 

§ 336. — Imputation is either judiciary or dijudicatory. (page 
167, line 4.) [page 190, line 14.] 

§ 337. — Legal consequence of disobedience is punishment, (page 
167, line 13.) [page 190, line 23.] Meritorious : Cf. §§ 455, 532, 715, 
and especially § 891. 

§ 338. — Consequences of obedience cannot be imputed to the 
agent, (page 167, line 23.) [page 191, line 3.] 

Chapter II.— Introduction to the Metaphysic of Law. (§§ 339-378 inclusive.) 

Article A. — What the science of law is. (§ 339.) 

§ 339. — Law (jus) is the aggregate of those laws which may be 
externally promulgated, (page 169, line 5.) Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. iv. 
19. Cf. Cicero de Officiis, Book III, ch. vi. 3 and xvii, 5, 6. [page 
192,line 5.] 

Article B.— What is law f (§§ 340-342 inclusive.) 

§ 340. — Criterion to determine whether laws are just, (page 169, 
line 20.) [page 192, line 21.] 

§ 341. — Law merely respects the formal relationship of choices, 
(page 170, line 12.) [page 193, line 13.] 

§ 342. — Law is the aggregate of those conditions according to 
which personal choices may harmonize (and not destroy one 
another) by being subordinated to Freedom's law universal, (page 
170, line 24.) [page 193, line 26.] 

Article C. — Supreme principle of law. (§§ 343-346 inclusive.) 

§ 343. — Every action is right and just whose maxim allows the 
agent's freedom of choice to harmonize with the freedom of every 
other, according to a universal law. (page 170, 1. 29.) [p. 194, 1. 2.] 

§ 344. — Wrong to obstruct just actions, (page 170. line 32.) Cf. 
St. James i., 25. [page 194, line 5.] 

§ 345. — jSTo one is legally entitled to demand that justice be my 
maxim, (page 171, line 5.) [page 194, line 10.] 

§ 346. — So act that the use of thy freedom may not circumscribe 
the freedom of any other, (page 171, line 11.) Cf. §§176, 430-434 
and 332 and 178. [page 194, line 17.] 

Article D. — Law carries with it a title of co-action. (§ 347.) 

§ 347. — Co-action preventing misuse of freedom, goes to establish 
freedom, (page 171, line 23.) Cf. § 221. [page 195, line 2.] 

Article E. — Law may likewise be strictly defined as that by which 
mutual co-action is made consistent with universal freedom. §§ 348-353. 



The Clavis to an Index. 31 

§ 348. — Law is not to be regarded as made up of two parts, the 
one obligation, the other a title of co-action, (page 172, line 4.) 
[page 195, line 15.] 

§ 349. — Strict law can require no internal, but merely external 
determinators of choice, (page 172, line 9.) [page 195. line 20.] 

§ 350. — Quantum of personal freedom is preserved undiminished 
by reciprocal action and co-action, (p. 172, 1. 24.) [p. 196, 1. 6.] 

§ 351. — Propositions of law are deduced from that equal and 
mutual co-action which corresponds to the originary "moral idea of 
the law. (page 172, line 33.) [page 196, line 17.] 

§ 352. — Law insists on a mathematic precision not exigible in 
the offices of virtue, (page 173, line 8.) [page 196, line 25.] 

§ 353. — Two stumbling blocks must be removed, (page 173, line 
22.) [page 197, line 9.] 

APPENDIX TO THE INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF 
LAW. PARTS 1, II, III. (% 354-378 inclusive.) 

PART I. -OF LAW EQUIVOCAL. (& 354-360.) 

§ 354. — Two sorts of usurped law : equity and necessity, (page 
174, line 3.) [page 197, line 20.] 

Article I. — Equity. (§§ 355-357 inclusive.) 

§ 355. — Equity represented as legal right, not as ethical, (page 
174, line 13.) [page 198, line 5.] 

§ 356. — Equity is an absurdity, except so far as it properly be 
longs to ethics, (page 174, line 30.) [page 198, line 22.] 

§ 357. — Equity cannot properly be enforced by law. (page 175, 
line 8.) [page 199, line 3.] 

Article II — Necessity. (§§ 358-360 inclusive.) 

§ 358. — Necessity assumes a right repugnant to law. (page 175, 
line 14.) [page 199, line 9.] 

§ 359. — Necessity outweighs the law's co-action, and is conse- 
quently inconsiderately held to outweigh the law's judgment, 
(page 175, line 22.) [page 199, line 17.] 

§ 360. — Necessity cannot outweigh the law's judgment, (page 
176, line 5.) [page 200, line 5.] 

PART II.-GENERAL DIVISION OF JURISPRUDENCE. (% 361-373 inclusive.) 

Article A. — Division of juridical offices. (§§ 361-365 inclusive.) 
§ 361.— Follow Ulpian [A. D. 215.] in this division, (page 176, 

line 10.) [page 200, line 10.] 

§ 362. — Honeste vive. (page 176, line 14.) [page 200, line 15.] 
§ 363.— Neminem laede. (page 176, line 21.) [page 200, line 23.] 
§ 364.— Suum cuique tribue. "(page 176, line 24.) [p. 200, 1. 26.] 
§ 365. — Found a division of juridical obligation into internal, 

external, and composite, (page, 176, line 30.) [page 201, line 7.] 



32 Kant's Ethic*. 

Article B. — Division of rights. (§§ 366-373 inclusive.) 

§ 366. — Law is either natural or statutable and positive, (page 
177, line 4.) [page 201, line 13.] 

§ 367.— Right is the ethical faculty or title of obliging another, 
and is the legal ground of positive law. (p. 177, 1. 8.) [p. 201, 1. 17.] 

§ 368. — External rights must always be acquired, (page 177, 
line 14.) [page 201, line 24.] 

§ 369. — Freedom is the only birthright of man. (page 177, line 
16.) [page 202, line 2.] 

§ 370. — Eights subordinate to freedom : (1) equality; (2) inno- 
cence ; (3) action, (page 177, line 20.) [page 202, line 6.] 

§ 371. — Juridical falsehood distinguished out of lying, (page 178 
note.) [page 202 note.] Cf. § 505. 

§ 372. — Whoso declines the burden of proof, does in fact appeal 
to his birthright, (page 178, line 1.) [page 202, line 19.] 

§ 373. — Subdivisions of natural law restrained to external rights, 
(page 178, line 13.) [page 203, line 13.] 

PART III. -FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS. 

('it 374-378 inclusive.; 

§ 374. — All obligations are either juridical or ethical, (page 178, 
line 20.) [page 203, line 20.] Compulsion : cf. § 386, 388, 400. 

§ 375. — Division of all moral science founded on the relations 
betwixt the law and the matter of obligation, (page 179, line 9.) 
[page 204, line 4.] 

§ 376. — Division according to the relation betwixt the obliger 
and the obliged, (page 180, line 1.) [page 204, line 25.] 

§ 377. — Division of ethic as a general system of human offices or 
duties, (page 180, line 24.) [page 205, line 22.] 

§ 378. — Law of nature divided into natural and civil or muni- 
cipal, (page 181, line 1.) [page 206, line 1.] 

Chapter III.- Preliminary Notions. (?§379-477 inclusive.) 

§ 379. — Ethics comprehends both law and morals, (page 182, 
line 3.) [page 207, line 4.] 

TITLE I .— EXPOSITION OF THE NOTION VIRTUE. (V-, 380--389 inclusiYe.) 

§ 380. — Duty implies necessitation, i. e, co-action exercised by 
the law upon the choice, (page 182, line 16.) [page 207, line 17.] 

§ 381. — Self co-action first reveals to man his moral freedom, 
(page 183 note.) [page 208 note.] 

§ 382. — Duty involves no more than self co-action, and conse- 
quently comes within the sphere of morals, (page 183, line 5.) 
[page 208, line 7.] 

& 333. — Mighty opposing forces which he has to go forth and 
encounter, (page 183, line 13.) Cf. St, John xvi, 33; I John v, 4; 



The Clavis 1o an Index. 33 

Eev. iii, 12 ; Ephesians vi, 12 ; Buddha's Dharmapada 44, 45. Cf. 
| 736. [page 208, line 16.] § 949. 

§ 384. — Resolve to withstand is moral valor, i. e. virtue, (page 
183, line 21.) [page 209, line 6.] Cf. § 232. 

§ 385. — Ethic objects a matter to man's free choice, an end given 
by pure reason, (page 184, line 6.) [page 209, line 14.] 

§ 386. — No end can be mine unless I make it so. (page 184, 
line 19.) [page 209, line 27.] See § 388. 

§ 387. — Ethics is a doctrine of the ends of reason, (page 185, 
line 3.) [page 210, line 14.] Cf. §§ 1026, 1027, 2605. 

§ 388. — Ethics is a doctrine of the offices of virtue, (page 185, 
line 13.) [page 210, line 24.] 

§ 389. — How is an end which is in itself a ground of duty, possi- 
ble ? (page 185, line 30.) ]page 211, line 10.] 

TITLE IL— EXPOSITION OF THE NOTION OF AN END WHICH IS AT THE 
SAME TIME A DUTY. (?? 39U--399 inclusive.) 

§ 390. — Eelation of an end to duty may be cogitated in a two- 
fold manner, (page 186, line 3.) [page 211, line 15.] 

§391. — Jurisprudence, beginning with the end, statutes the 
duty, (page 186, line 7.) [page 211, line 19.] 

§ 392. — Morals, obliged by the duty, ordains the end. [page 186, 
line 14.) [page 211, line 26.] 

§ 393. — Duties regarding ends are moral duties, or offices of vir- 
tue, (page 186, line 27.) [page 212, line 11.] 

§ 394. — Obligation in general abstracts from all ends, and conse- 
quently is not an office of virtue, (page 186, line 32.) Cf. Coke: 
" Every right is a title ; but every title is not such a right for which 
an action lies." Bun-ill's Law Diet, article Title. Cf Jour. Sp. Phil, 
vol. v, page 304. [page 212, line 17.] 

§ 395. — Yirtuous office can be constituted only where an action 
is both an end and a duty, (page 187, line 9.) [page 212, line 28.] 

§ 396. — Juridical obligements are coercible ; moral depend on 
freedom, (page 187, line 16.) [page 213, line 3.] 

§ 397. — Moral science treats not only of the autonomy, but also 
of the autokraty of the will, (page 187, line 19.) [page 213, 1. 6.] 

§ 398. — Virtue cannot be explained to be a habit, (page 188, line 
1.) [page 213, line 23.] 

§ 399. — Virtuc=a ; non-virtue^O its logical antipart ; vice 
= — aits real antagonist, (page 188, line 10.) [page 214, line 1.] 

TITLE ILL— OF THE GROUND UPON AVHICH MAN REPRESENTS TO HIMSELF 
AN END WHICH IS AT THE SAME TIME A DU MY. (§§ 400-402 inclusive.) 

§ 400. — Categorical imperative connects the idea Duty with that 
of .an end in general, (page 189, line 3.) Cf. §§ 374, 386, 388. [page 
214, line 27.] 



34 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 401. — Because no action can be aimless — (page 189, line 15.) 
[page 215, line 10.] 

§ 402. — Ethics treats of such ends as man ought to aim at. (page 
189, line 25.) [page 215, line 21.] 

TITLE IV.-WHAT ENDS THEY ARE. THE VERY ESSENCE WHEREOF IT IS TO 
BE DUTIES. Hi 403,) 

§ 403. — Such ends are : (1) our own perfection ; (2) our neigh- 
bor's happiness, (page 190, line 6.) Cf. Buddha Dharmapada 166. 
See §§ 192, 423, 430. [page 216, line 3.] § 949. 

TITLE V.-DILUCILATION OF THESE TWO NOTIONS. (M 404-410 inclusive.) 

Article A. — One's own perfection. (§§ 404-407 inclusive.) 

§ 404. — Ethical perfection is formal and qualitative, (page 190, 
line 28.) [page 216, line 25.] 

§ 405. — Perfection the effect of his own activity ; not any gift of 
nature, (page 191, line 9.) [page 217, line 11.] 

§ 406.— Ethico-active reason unconditionally ordains self develop- 
ment, (page 191, line 17.) Cf. §§ 238-240. [page 217, line 20.] 

§ 407.— Culture of his will to the purest grade of ethic sentiment, 
(page 191, line 26.) [page 217, line 30.] 

Article B. — My neighbor's happiness. (§§ 408-410 inclusive.) 

§ 408. — Happiness not an end affording the groundwork of any 
duty, (page 192, line 7.) [page 218, line 13.] Cf § 242. 

§ 409. — Happiness of others it indirectly becomes my duty to- 
advance, because humanity is by the law constituted my absolute 
end. (page 192, line 23.) Cf. §§ 72, 73, 77, 94, 97, 186, 239, 240. 
Cf. Jour^Sp. Phil. vol. v, page 297— See § 403. [page 218, line 30.] 

§ 410. — Not my happiness, but my morality, which to uphold 
in its integrity is at once my end and my duty, (page 193, line 5.) 
[page 219, line 16.] 

TITLE V[— MORALS CONTAIN NO LAW FOR ACT[ONS(THAT WERE JURIS- 
PRUDENCE), BUT FOR THE INWARD MAXIMS SINGLY WHENCE 
ACTIONS TAKE THEIR RISE. (§§ 411, 412.) 

§ 411. — Notion duty relates immediately to law. (page 193, line 
27?) [page 220, line 7.] 

§ 412. — Notion of an end in itself a duty founds a law ordaining 
positive maxims of conduct, (page 194, line 12.) [page 220, 1. 25.] 

TITLE VII.— MORAL DUTY IS OF INDETERMINATE OBLIGATION, BUT THE 
JURIDICAL OFFICES ARE STRICT. (?? 413-417 inclusive.) 

§ 413. — Indeterminate obligation constitutes no exception from 
duty, (page 195, line 3.) [page 221, line 22.] 

§ 414. — Duties of indeterminate obligation are the only offices of 
virtue. Omission is moral unworth ; deliberate transgression is 
vice, (page 195, line 19.) Cf. § 399. [page 222, line 11.] 

§ 415. — Juridical obligations ought to be observed as duties, 
(page 195, line 30.) Cf. §§ 455, 305, 715. [page 222, line 23.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 35 

§ 416. — Ethical complacency meant when it is said that virtue 
is her own reward, (page 196, line 11.) [page 223, line 8.] 

§ 417. — Consciousness of virtue brings forth an ethical delight, 
(page 196, line 21.) [page 223, line 19.] 

TITLE VIII. -EXPOSITION OF THE MORAL DUTIES AS DUTIES OF INDE- 
TERMINATE OBLIGATION. C§§ 418-425 inclusive.) 

PART I.— MY OWN PERFECTION, AS END AND DUTY. (g§ 418-422 inclusive.) 

Article A. — Physical perfection. (§§ 418, 419.) 

§ 418. — Culture of all our faculties in general is an imperative- 
duty, (page 197, line 4.) [page 224, line 4.] 

§ 419. — Duty of physical culture is of indeterminate obligation, 
(page 197, line 20.) [page 224, line 21.] 

Article B. — Ethical perfection. (§§ 420-422 inclusive.) 

§ 420. — Where the law is at once the rule and the mobile of the 
will, (page 197, line 32.) [page 225, line 5.] 

§ 421. — How much ethical content may belong to any action, 
cannot be explored, (page 198, line 12.) [page 225, line 17.] 

§ 422. — Law does not ordain any such inward mental act* but 
merely that it ought to be our maxim to discharge duty because it 
is duty, (page 198, line 24.) [page 225, line 30.] 

PART II. — MY NEIGHBOR'S HAPPINESS AS END AND DUTY. (% 423-425 inclusive.) 

Article A.— Physical wellbeing. (§§ 423, 424.) 

§ 423. — Happiness of others is an end incumbent on us as a duty 
(beneficence), (page 198, line 32.) [page 226, line 7.] Cf § 409. 

§ 424. — Duty of beneficence is indeterminate only, (page 199, 
line 15.) [page 226, line 23.] 

Article B. — The moral welfare of our neighbor. (§ 425.) 

§ 425. — Ought not to tempt others to violate conscience, (page 
199, line 29.) Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 125. Cf. I Cor. viii, 13. 
[page 227, line 9.] § 949. 

TITLE IX.-WHAT A MORAL DUTY (OR VIRTUOUS OFFICE) IS. (?? 425-431.) 

§ 426. — Virtue is the strength of the human will in the execution 
of duty, (page 200, line 11.) [p. 227, 1. 25.] Cf. §§ 232, 436. 

§ 427. — Every duty involves the notion of necessitation by law. 
(page 200, line 21.) [page 228, line 7.] 

§ 428. — Duty in general is not a virtuous office. Particular 
duties springing from ends are offices of virtue, (page 200, line 32.) 
Cf. §§ 394, 395.^ [page 228, line 18.] 



■• : As exploring the ethical content of our actions, i. e., quibbling within our- 
selves about our own moral worth. Self examination may aid us to make the 
law our motive, but is merely an adminicle to virtue, and may be dispensed 
with provided we do make the law our motive. 



36 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 429. — Virtue in general is only one and identic, (page 201 
line 13.) [page 228, line 32.] Cf. %% 278, 456. 

§ 480. — Supreme principle of morals : Adopt such ends in thy 
maxims as may be made imperative on all mankind to design- 
(page 201, line 22.) See §§ 176, 348. [page 229, line 9.] 

§ 431. — Every end apriori is enforced by practical reason as a 
duty incumbent on all mankind, (p. 201,1. 30.) [p. 229, 1. 17.] 

TITLE X.-THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF LAW WAS ANALYTIC ; THAT OF 
MORALS IS SYNTHETIC. (.% 432-436 inclusive.) 

§ 432. — Principle of law is evolved analytically out of the idea 
freedom, (page 202, line 13.) Cf. §§ 122, 346-350. [p. 230, 1. 3.] 

§ 433. — Principle of morals conjoins with the notion of external 
freedom that of an end which is in itself a ground of duty, (page 
202, line 22.) See § 431. [page 230, line 12.] 

§ 434. — Inward freedom put in room of outward co-action, (page 
202, line 28.) [page 230, line 18.] 

§ 435. — Unconditioned end of practical reason consists in this, 
that virtue is its own end and its own reward, (page 203, line 5.) 
[page 230, line 27.] Cf. § 416. 

§ 436. — Man is under an obligement to virtue, in its strength a 
matter of acquisition, (page 203, line 30.) [page 231, line 23.] 

TITLE XL— TABLE OF MORAL DUTIES, (j 437,) 

§ 437. — Form and matter of all internal and external moral 
duties, (page 204, line 6.) [page 232, line 1.] 

TITLE XII. -EMOTIONS PREREQUISITE TOWARD C0N T STI CUTING MAN A 
MORAL AGENT. (?? 43S-449 inclusive.) 

§ 438. — Predispositions by which man is rendered the subject of 
ethical obligement. (page 204, line 23.) [page 232, line 20.] 

Article A. — The moral sense. (§§ 439-441 inclusive.) 

§ 439. — Susceptibility for pleasure or displacency upon the bare 
consciousness of the harmony or of the discrepancy of our actions 
with the law. (page 205, line 10.) [page 233, line 10.] 

§ 440. — All consciousness of obligation presupposes this feeling. 
(page 205, line 22.) [page 233, line 23.] 

§ 441. — No man is destitute of moral sense, (page 205, line 33.) 
[page 234, line 3.] Cf. §§ 2595, 248, 125. 

Article B. — Of conscience. (§§ 442-444 inclusive.) 

§ 442. — Conscience is man's practical reason in the act of holding 
before him in all circumstances his law of duty, in order to absolve 
or condemn him. (page 206, line 11.) [page 234, line 16.] 

§ 443. — Conscience cannot err. (page 206, line 29.) Cf. § 954. 
[page 235, line 3.] 

§ 444. — Duty to quicken the attention due to conscience, (page 
207, line 8.) [page 235, line 17.] Cf. §§ 524, 441. 



The Clavis to an Index. 37 

Article C. — Love of our neighbor. (445-448 inclusive.) 

§ 445. — Love is not and never can be a duty, (page 207, line 17.) 
Cf. Jour, Sp. Phil. vol. v, page 307. [page 235, line 28.] 

§ 446. — Beneficence is at all times incumbent upon us as a duty, 
(page 207, line 30.) [page 236, line 10.] Cf. § 608. 

§ 447. — Beneficence produces philanthropy, and emerges into 
love, (page 208, line 7.) [page 236, line 22.] Cf. § 559. 

§ 448. — Benevolence is only indirectly a duty, (page 208, line 
19.) [page 237, line 3.] Cf. § 558. 

Article D. — Of reverence. (§ 449.) 

§ 449. — Reverence for himself is no man's duty, but is inevitably 
extorted from him by the law. (page 208, line 25.) Cf. §§ 239, 240 # 
[page 237, line 10.] 

TITLE XLII.— GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS, ON 

WHICH EVERY SCIENTIFIC TREATISE ON MORALS MUST BE 

REARED.-POSITI0NS (1) § 450. (2) § 451, Wi 452. gg 450-453.) 

§ 450. — Different grounds of obligation cannot found one and the 
same duty.* (page 209, line 10.) [page 238, line 4.] 

§ 451. — Difference betwixt virtue and vice not one of degree, but 
of relation to the law. (page 210, line 6.) [page 239, line 3.1 

§ 452. — Duty is not conformable to virtue, but virtue must be 
adequate to duty, (page 210, line 30.) [page 239, line 28.] 

§ 453. — Three old apophthegms objectionable, (page 211, line 3.) 
[page 240, line 3.] 

TITLE XIV.— OF VIRTUE IN GENERE. (§§454-457 inclusive.) 

§ 454. — Virtue is the ethic strength (fortitudo moralis) of man 
in the fulfilment of his duty. (p. 211, 1. 11.) Cf. § 384. [p. 240, 1. 12.] 

§ 455. — Virtue, however well deserving of our fellow men, never 
meritprious in respect of the law. (page 212, line 8.) Cf. §§ 233, 
337, 532, 338, 715. [page 241, line 13.] See § 891. 

§ 456. — Different virtues are merely practical applications of the 
one and single principle of virtue, (page 212, line 19.) Cf. § 429. 
[page 241, line 24.] 

§ 457. — ^Esthetic of ethics is a subjective exposition of the 
metaphysic of ethics, (page 212, line 28.) [page 242, line 2.] 

TITLE XV.— OF THE PRINCIPLE DISTINGUISHING BE^VIXT MORALS AND 
LAW. Igg 458-460 inclusive.) 

§ 458. — Inward freedom as the condition precedent of all moral 
duty, (page 213, line 7.) Cf. §§ 442-444. [page 242, line 15.] 



*It is duty in general to attend to every particular obligation ; but that duty 
is founded, not on any particular obligation, but on obligation in general, that 
is, on the law itself. The duty which rises upon a particular obligation is 
manifestly a particular duty ; and the virtue of performing it is a particular 
virtue. Cf. gg 394, 395, 428, 429, and especially 326. See also § 456. Cf. Jour. 
Sp. Phil. vol. v.,' page 304. 



38 Kant's Ethics. 

Of virtue according to the principles of inward freedom. (§§ 459- 
467 inclusive.) 

§ 459. — Why virtue cannot be denned to be an aptitude of acting 
conformably to the law. (p. 213, 1. 19.) Cf. §§ 398, 188. [p. 242, 1. 27.] 

§ 460. — Inward freedom demands two things : (1) self command ; 
(2) apathy, (page 214, line 4.) [page 243, line 16.] Cf. Confucian 
Doctrine of the Mean, i, 4. See § 871. 

TITLE XVI— VIRTUE. SO FAR FORTH AS IT IS BASED UPON A PRINCIPLE OF 

INWARD FREEDOM. DEMANDS, FIRST, (POSITIVELY), MAN'S 

SELF COMMAND. (§§ 461--463 inclusive.) 

§ 461. — Emotions obstruct the exercise of reason, (page 214, line 
13.) [page 243, line 25.] 

§ 462. — Passions lead on to deliberate sin. (page 214, line 19.) 
[page 244, line 2.] 

§ 463. — Virtue consequently ordains self command, (page 215, 
line 3.) Cf. Buddha, Dharmapada 103, 105, 160, 321 ; Confucius, 
Analects (Dr. Legge §191 above) XII, i, 1. [page 244, line 19.] 

TITLE XVII.— VIRTUE AS BASED ON A PRINCIPLE OF INWARD FREEDOM, 

DEMANDS, SECOND (i. e. NEGATIVELY), APATHY, CONSIDERED AS 

FORCE OF WILL. (><§ 464-467 inclusive.) 

§ 464. — Ethic apathy is freedom from passion, (page 215, line 
17.) [page 245, line 4.] 

§ 465. — Enthusiasm is but the seeming strength of passion, 
(page 215, line 27.) [page 245, line 14.] Sensory : cf. § 284. 

§ 466.— True strength of virtue is the mind at tranquility, 
(page 216, line 3.) [page 245, line 23.] [Strike out the last half of 
this section.] 

§ 467. — Virtue can never find a truce with appetite and instinct, 
(page 216, line 18.) [page 246, line 11.] 

TITLE XVIII.— PRELIMINARY— OF THE SUBDIVISION OF. MORALS. §§ 468-476. 

§ 468. — Formally, morals must be completely distinguished from 
law. (page 217, line 2.) [page 247, line 2.] 

§ 469. — Materially, ethics must be represented as the system of 
the ends and scope of practical reason, (page 217, line 12.) [page 
247, line 12.] Cf. §§ 1026, 2605. 

§ 470. — Morals regards only moral duties* (offices of virtue), 
(p. 217, 1. 21.) See §§394, 395/428, 429, 450, 456. [p. 247, 1. 21.] 

§ 471. — Morals because it treats of duties of indeterminate obli- 
gation, requires a method, j (page 218, line 5.) [p. 248, 1. 9.] 



*That is to say, the scier.C3 of morals excludes not only the science of law, but 
the science ot ethics, which underlies both law and morals. The groundwork of 
ethics and the inquiry into the apriori operations of the will must precede 
morals. See \ 275. tMETA-'oix>s — showing the way. 



The Claim to an Index. 39 

§ 472. — Casuistry is interwoven fragmentarily into morals, un- 
der the form of scholia, (page 218, line 21.) [page 248, line 26.] 

§ 473. — Didactic of ethics is the exercise of reason in the theory 
of duty. It is either akroamatic or erotematic. (page 218, line 27.) 
[page 248, line 32.] Cf. § 1397. 

§ 474. — Erotetic method is either catechetic or Socratic. (page 
218, line 34.) [page 249, line 7.] Cf. § 614. 

§ 475. — Ascetic of ethics is the exercise of reason in the practice 
of virtue, (page 219, line 9.) [page 249, line 17.] Cf. § 622. 

§ 476. — Morals is divided into the elementology and the method- 
ology of ethics, (page 219, line 15.) [p. 249, 1. 23.] Cf. § 1471. 

TITLE XIX.-TWOFOLD PRINCIPLE OF DIVISION OF THE SYSTEM OF ETHI- 
CAL CONCEPTIONS, d 477.) 

§ 477. — Ground plan of the science of pure practical reason, 
(page 219, line 23.) [page 249, line 31.] 

TOME I.— ELEMENTOLOGY OF ETHICS. {\\ 478-611.) 
Book I. -Of the Duties Owed by Man to Himself. (?§ 478-550.) 

Introduction. (§H78- 487 inclusive.) 

Article I. — The notion of a, duty owed by mankind to himself appears 
at first sight to involve a contradiction. (§ 478.) 

§ 478. — Duty owed to myself imports .an absurdity when the 
obligating I is taken in exactly the same sense with the I obliged- 
(page 223, line 6.) [page 253, line 6.] 

Article II. — There are duties owed by man to himself. (§ 479.) 

§ 479. — Duties owed to others would be abolished, if I owed no 
duty to myself, (page 224, line 4.) [page 254, line 6.] 

Article III. — Solution of this apparent antinomy. (§§ 480, 481.) 

§ 480. — Man regards himself in a twofold capacity : (1) as a 
sensible being ; (2) as a very reason, (p. 224, 1. 14.) [p. 254, 1. 17.] 

§ 481. — iVlan, in respect of his personality, stands under obliga- 
tion to the humanity subsisting in his person, (page 224, line 24.) 
Cf. §§ 237-239. [page 255, line l.J 

Article IV. — On the principle of subdividing the duties owed by 
man to himself. (§§ 482-487 inclusive.) 

§ 482. — Duties owed by man to himself cannot be divided into 
those owed to the body and those due to the soul, (page 225, line 
8.) [page 255 line 17.] Cf. § 2938. 

§ 483. — Duties owed by man to himself are divided objectively 
into (1) negative (maintain tbyself in the original perfection of 
thy nature) and (2) positive (study to perfect and advance thy 
being.) (page 225, line 26.) (1) of determinate obligation ; (2) of 
indeterminate obligation, [page 256, line 7.] 



40 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 484. — Subjective division of the duties owed \>y man to him- 
self: (1) in respect of his animal part ; (2) in respect of his moral 
being, (page 226, line 18.) [page 257, line 1.] 

§ 485. — Vices subversive of man's duty in respect of his animal 
part : (1) self-murder ; (2) self-defilement ; (3) self-obstupefactiom 
(page 226, line 23.) [page 257, line 6.] 

§ 486. — Yices subversive of man's duty in respect of his moral 
being : (1) lying ; (2) avarice ; (3) spurious humility, (page 226, 
line 33.) [page 257, line 17.] 

§ 487. — Virtue opposed to all these vices is self-reverence, (page 
227, line 16.) Cf. § 592. [page 258, line 3.] 

APOTOMB I.— OF THE DUTIES OP PERFECT AND DETERMIN- 
ATE OBLIGATION, (g? 488-541 inclusive.) 
Chapter I. -Of the Duty Owed by Mankind to Himself in Respect of his 
Animal Part, (gg 488-500 inclusive.) 

Article V — Three vices opposed to this duty. (§ 488.) 

§ 488. — Duty of self-conservation in his animal estate, (page 228, 

line 8.) [page 258, line 17.] 

Article VI.— Of self-murder. (§§ 489-492 inclusive.) 

§ 489. — Self-destruction is a crime, (page 228, line 21.) [page 

259, line 7.] Cf. §§ 59, 74. 

§ 490. — Man cannot renounce his personality, (page 229, line 

28.) [page 260, line 11.] 

§ 491.— Acts of partial self-murder, (p. 230, 1. 8.) [p. 260, 1. 25.] 
§ 492.— Casuistics of self-murder, (p. 230, 1. 21.) [p. 261, 1. 7.] 
Article VII — Of self defilement. (§§ 493-497 inclusive.) ' 
§ 493. — Sexual apjjetite is a last end purposed by nature, (page 

231, line 17.) [page 262, line 8.] 

§ 494. — Attaints the humanity inhabiting his person, (page 231, 
line 31.) [p. 262, 1. 22.] St Paul : " Keep thyself pure. "I Tim. v, 22. 

§ 495. — Sexual appetite is called lust, and gives birth to the vice 
impurity. Upon this instinct is raised the virtue chastity, (page 

232, line 6.) [page 263, line 1.] 

§ 496. — Violation in the highest degree of the duty owed to him- 
self, (page 232, line 10.) [p. 263, 1. 5.] Productive : § 1628. 

§ 497. — Man meanly abdicates his personality, when he attempts 
to employ himself as a bare means to satisfy a brutal lust, (page 
232, line 31.) [page 263, line 26.] 

Article VIII. — Of self -obstupef action by excessive indulgence in 
meats and drinks. (§§ 498-500 inclusive.) 

§ 498. — Vice of intemperance is not constituted by its physical 
results, (page 233, line 21.) [page 264, line 19.] 

§ 499. — Drunkenness and gluttony are the two vices falling un- 
der this head, (page 233, line 29.) [page 264, line 27.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 41 

§ 500— Casuistics of intemperance, (p. 234, 1. 23.) [p. 265, 1. 25.] 

Chapter II.— Of the Duty Owed by Man to Himself as a Moral Being Singly 

Q'i 501-522 inclusive.) 

§ 501. — Opposed to the vices of lying, avarice, and false humility, 
(page 235, line 21.) [page 266, line 27.] 

Article IX.— Of lying. (§§ 502-509 inclusive.) 

§ 502. — Highest violation of the duty owed by man to himself, 
(page 235, line 24.) [page 267, line 2.] Cf. §§ 60, 75, 249. 

§ 503. — Subversive of the purpose and design of language, and a 
renunciation of one's personality, (p. 236, 1. 8.) [p. 267, 1. 15.] 

§ 504. — Candor is veracity in statements ; fidelity is veracity in 
promises; both together make up sincerity, (page 236, line 27.) 
[page 268, line 4.] 

§ 505. — Lying is a crime by its bare form, regardless of its end 
or consequences, (page 236, line 31.) [page 268, line 7.] 

§ 506. — Many an inward lie, the guilt whereof man entails upon 
himself, (page 237, line 5.) — " Although he find none such'" — but 
rather a judge ever present, [page 268, line 16.] 

§ 507. — Seems to taint the vitals of humanity, (page 237, line 
27.) Cf. § 961. [page 269, line 7.] 

§ 508. — Deflective tendency must have preceded man's actual 
lapse from truth, (page 238, line 8.) Cf. §§ 703, 704. [p. 269, 1. 24.] 

§ 509. — Casuistics of lying, (page 238. line 18.) [page 270, line 3.] 

Article X. — Of avarice. (§§ 510-514 inclusive.) 

§ 510. — Avarice of hoarding makes a man a miser, because it 
narrows and contracts, (page 239, line 4.) [page 270, line 25.] 

§ 511. — Aristotle's famous principle, that virtue is the mean be- 
twixt two extreme vices, (page 239, line 12.) The argument in 
this section is perfectly conclusive, [p. 271, 1. 3,] Cf. § 451. 

§ 512. — Profusion and hoarding are specifically distinct vices, in 
respect of the contrary maxims of the miser and prodigal, (page 
239, line 26.) [page 271, line 19.] 

§ 513. — Betwixt truth and falsehood, there is no mean. To be 
too virtuous is as much as drawing a right line too straight, (page 

240 note.) — [" nag commits in so far « fault:" may commit* 

See the first (Semple's) edition.] [page 272, note.] 
§ 514. — Casuistics of avarice, (page 240, line 9.) [p. 272, 1. 4.] 
Article XI. — Of false and spurious humility. (§§ 515-520 inclusive.) 
§ 515. — Man as an animal is of very little moment, (page 241, 
line 21.) [page 273, line 23.] 

§ 516. — Man as the subject of ethico-active reason, is exalted be- 
yond all price, (page 241, line 28.) [page 274, line 1.] Cf. § 91. 

4 



42 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 517. — Ought to estimate himself by a measure at once great 
and small, (page 242, line 4.) Cf. Tsze-sze, in the Doctrine of the 
Mean, ch. xii. (Legge [see above, § 191] p. 289.) [p. 274, 1. 11.] 

§ 518. — Ethical humility opposed to self-righteousness and to 
spiritual hypocrisy, (page 242, line 23.) [p, 274, 1. 31.] Cf. § 220. 

§ 519. — Humility in view of the law becomes arrogancy or 
hypocrisy when it regards other persons.* (page 242, line 31.) 
[^Teacher, we know that thou sayest and teachest rightly, and re- 
gardest not the person of any, but teachest the way of God truly. 
Luke xx, 21 (p. 10 f sup.) Therefore do men fear Him ; He re- 
gards not any of the wise in heart. Job xxxvii, 24 (Conant tr.)] 
[page 275, line 8.] 

§ 520. — True humility results from comparison of a man's self 
with the moral law. (page 243, line 9.) [page 275, line 21.] 

Article XII — Duty in respect of the dignity of our humanity. (§§ 
521, 522.) 

§ 521.— Precepts of true dignity, (page 243, 1. 21.) [p. 276, 1. 2.] 

§ 522-— Oasuistic3 of humility, (page 244, line 7.) [p. 278, 1. 23.] 

Chapter III.— Of the Duty Owed by Man to Himself as his Own Judge. 

(i'i 523-536 inclusive ) 

Article XIII. — -Of conscience. (§§ 523-532 inclusive.) 

§ 523. — Consciousness of an internal tribunal, in man, before 
which his thoughts accuse or excuse him. (page 244, line 30.) Cf 
St. Paul, Romans ii, 15. [page 277, line 16.J 

§ 524. — Man may indeed have ceased to heed him, but not to 
hear him is impossible, (p. 245, 1. 15.) Cf. §§ 442-444. [p. 278, 1. 5.] 

§ 525. — Conscience must represent' to itself always some One 
other than itself as Judge, (p. 245, 1. 28.) Cf. § 259. [p. 278, 1. 19.] 

§ 523. — Twofold personality cogitated only for a practical behoof, 
(page 246, note.) [page 279, note.] 

§ 527. — Conscience must be regarded as a subjective principle 
implanted in the reason of man, calling for an account of every 
action before God. (page 246, line 7.) [page 279, line 3.] 

§ 528.— Idea of a Supreme Being is given subjectively only, by 
practical reason obliging itself to act conformably, (page 247, line 
4.) [page 280, line 5.] Cf. §§ 2371, 2331. 

§ 529. — Religion in genere is a principle of esteeming of all our 
duties as if they were divine commandments, (page 247, line 10.) 
Cf. §§ 541, 628, 896, 2296, 2577, and see § 2420. [page 280, line 11.] 

§ 530. — Minutest scruple of conscience, when it refers to an idea 
of duty, is of weight, (page 247, line 20.) [page 280, line 22.] 

§ 531. — Conscience decides according to the rigor of the law. 
(page 247, line 30.) [page 280, line 32.] Cf. § 455. 



The Olavis to an Index. 43 

§ 532. — Effect of absolution by conscience is not positive (joy) 
but only negative (tranquilization). (p. 248, 1. 1.) [p. 281,- 1. 5.] 

Article XIV — The first commandment of all duties owed by man to 
himself. (§§ 533-536 inclusive.) 

§ 533. — Know thyself. Search thy heart, whether it be good or 
evil, (page 24S, line 13.) [page 281, line 18.] Cf. §§ 422, 706. 

§ 534. — Self-examination is the beginning of all human wisdom. 
(page 248, line 20.) " Inamissible" '=not to be lost. [p. 281, 1. 25.] 

Article XV — Ethical self-knowledge produces impartiality and sin- 
cerity. (§§ 535, 536.) 

§ 535. — Guards against the detestation of one's self, and against 
a disdain of the whole human race in general, (page 248, line 31.) 
[page 282, line 7.] 

§ 536. — Graards against the self-delusion of taking a bare wish, 
however ardent, tor any index of a good heart, (page 249, line 7.) 
In popular language " the will for the deed. " [page 282, line 16.] 

Episode. $■> 537-5-11 inclusive. 

Article XVI. — -Of an amphiboly of the reflex moral notions; where- 
by mankind is led to regard what is only a duty toward himself, as if 
itioere a duty owed by him to others. (§§ 537, 538.) 

§ 537. — Man can have no duty toward (but only in regard op) 
any being other than his fellow man. (p. 249, 1. 21.)- [p. 283, 1. 5.] 

§ 538. — What is man's duty in regard of other beings, visible or 
Invisible? (page 250, line 11.) [page 283, line 27.] 

Article XVII — Our duty in regard of impersonals. (§§ 539, 540.) 

§ 539. — Duty in regard of the beauties of nature, (page 250, line 
23.) [page 284, line 11.] 

§ 540. — Duty in regard of the animal creation, (page 250, line 
33.) [page 284, line 22.] 

Article XVIII — Our duty in regard of God. (§ 541.) 

§ 541. — Eeligion : the duty of recognizing all our duties as if 
they were divine commandments, (page 251, line 16.) Cf. § 2296. 
[page 285, line 9.] See § 529. 

APOTOJIE II.— OF THE INDETERJIIN VTK 310 K\T, nCTIRS OWED BY MAX TO HiSISELF IX 
ItEGARI) OF HIS END. (gg 5-12-550 inelusive.) 

Article XIX. — Of the duty owed by him to himself of advancing his 
physical perfection. (§§542-545 inclusive.) 

§ 542. — Culture of all the different resources of mind, soul, and 
body, is a duty, a commandment of ethico-active reason, (page 
252, line 6.) [" Without so moderate a share of caj>acity": with but.] 
[page 286, line 6.] 

§ 543. — Powers of mind are faculties whose exercise is possible 
by force of reason singly, (page 252, line 30.) [page 287, line 4.] 



44 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 544. — Powers of soul are those which stand at the command" 
of the understanding, (page 253, line 10.) [Powers of mind per- 
tain to man ; powers of soul must be attained and retained. Pow- 
ers of mind are prerequisite to personality; powers of soul are 
perquisite of effort and industry.] [page 287, line 14.] Cf. Bud- 
dha's Dharmapada, 367 (see § 949 below.) 

§ 545. — Culture of our bodily powers (gymastic, properly so- 
called), (page 253, line 18.) [page 287, line 23.] 

Article XX. — Because the law ordains only the maxims of the action.. 
(§§ 546, 547.) 

§ 546. — Choice and degree of natural perfections must be left to 
the private reflection of each individual, (p. 253, 1. 25.) [p. 288, 1. 2.] 

§ 547. — Duty in regard of his physical perfection is only of inde- 
terminate obligation, (page 254, line 6.) [page 288, line 17.] 

Article XXI. — Of the duty owed by man to himself of advancing his 
ethical perfection. (§ 548.) 

§ 548. — Consists (1) subjectively, in the purity of his moral sen- 
timents ; (2) objectively, in the execution of his whole duty, (page 
254, line 14.) [page 288, line 25.] 

Article XXII. — Duty of ethical perfection is indeterminate. (§§ 
549, 550.) 

§549. — Determinate in quality (objectively) ; but (subjectively) 
in degree, it is indeterminate, (p. 254, 1. 28.) [page 289, 1. 11.] 

§ 550. — Only one virtue objectively in idea ; but subjectively in 
real fact a vast number of virtues, (p. 255, 1. 7.) [p. 289, 1. 22.] 

Book II.— Of the Moral Duties Owed by Mankind Toward his 
Fellow Men. (?? 551-59!) inclusive.) 
Chapter I.— Of the Duty Owed to Others, Considered Simply as Men. 

(2§ 551-599 inclusive.) 

APOTOME I.— OF THE OFFICES OF CHAKITY. (§§551-584 inclusive.) 
INTRODUCTION. -OF LOVE AND REVERENCE. (?§ 551-557 inclusive.) 

Art. XXIII. — Principal division of these obligations. (§§ 551, 552.) 
§ 551. — Duties (1) such as oblige our fellow men when we dis- 
charge them ; (2) those which entail no obligation, (page 256, line 
10.) Cf. § 455. [page 291, line 9.] 

§ 552. — Emotions which go hand in hand with our discharge of 
these offices, (page 256, line 15.) [State the last sentence negatively^ 
not so to behave etc., as to etc., but to spare etc.] Pp. 291, 1. 14.] 
Article XXIV. — Analogy to the physical system. (§ 553.) 
§ 553. — Joint action and reaction of attractive and repellent 
forces, (page 257, line 12.) [page 292, line 19.] 

Article XXV. — Love and reverence are practical, not merely emo~ 
tional. (§§ 554-557 inclusive.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 45 

§ 554. — Love must be understood as the practical maxim of 
good will, issuing in beneficence as its result, (page 257, line 24.) 
[page 293, line 2.] 

§ 555.— Beverence must be taken to mean the practical maxim 
of circumscribing our own self esteem, (p. 257, 1. 29.) [p. 293, 1. 7.] 

§ 556. — Duty of reverence is properly negative only, viz : not to 
exalt ourselves above others, (p 258, 1. 6.) § 363. [p. 293, 1. 16.] 

§ 557. — Duty of loving my neighbor means making my own the 
ends and interests of others, in so far as these ends are not im- 
moral, (page 258, line 12.) [page 293, line 23.] 

APPENDIX TO THE INTRODUCTION'.— OF PHILANTHROPY IN GENERAL. 

(§g 558-560 inclusive. 

Article XXVI. — Philanthropy is not merely aesthetic, but practical. 
§558. — Love of our fellow men not a love of complacency in our 

species, but a maxim actively to befriend them, (page 258, line 25.) 

[page 294, line 7.] Cf. §448. 

Article XXVII. — Maxim : Love thy neighbor as thyself. (§ 559.) 
§ 559. — Active philanthropy is a duty mutually owed by all men 

to one another, (page 259, line 6.) [page 294, line 22.] 

Article XXVIII — General philanthropy has no degree. (§ 560.) 
§ 560. — Active practical beneficence admits of degrees, because 

the universal law ordains only the maxim — (Love thy neighbor as 

rthyself). (p. 260.) See §§ 420, 424, 447, and cf. § 549. [p. 295, 1. 25.] 

-Parti. —The Offices of Charity are (A) Bsneioeac )'j (B) Gratitude | (0) Sympathy, (gg561-576.) 
TITLE A.— OF THE DUTY OF BENEFICENCE. (^ 561-565 inclusive.) 

Article XXIX. — Deduction of this obligation from the law not im- 
mediately evident. (§§ 561, 562.) 

§ 561. — Deprive one's self of the bounties of fortune : (1) servile- 
ly; (2) fanatically, (page 261, line 5.) [page 297, line 4.] 

§ 562. — Benevolence is the pleasure we take in the happiness of 
our neighbor ; beneficence is the maxim to make that happiness 
•our end. (page 261, line 13.) [page 297, line 13.] 

Article XXX. — Principle of selfishness self -contradictory and self- 
destructive. (§ 563.) 

§ 563. — Beneficence a universal duty owed by man to man. (page 
261, line 28.) [page 298, line 2.] Cf. §§ 62, 77. 

Article XXXI— Of ethical wealth. (§ 564.) 

§ 564. — Beneficence to others, being a duty owed to one's self, is 
of debt merely, and therefore not meritorious. Consequently it 
ought to be exercised in private and in silence, (page 262, line 16.) 
[page 298, line 22.] 

§ 565.— Casuistics of beneficence, (p. 263, 1. 4.) [p. 299, 1. 15.] 



46 Kant's Ethics. 

TITLE B.-OF THE DUTY OF GRATITUDE. (?§ 566-570 inclusive.) 

Article XXXII. — Reverence toward the benefactor. (§§ 566-568.) 
§ 566. — Gratitude is the veneration of another on account of a 

benefit, (page 263, line 27.) [page 300, line 6.] 

§ 567. — Gratitude is immediately made necessary by the moral 

law. (page 264, line 4.) [page 300, line 17.] 

§ 568. — No retribution can acquit a person of a conferred benefit. 

(p. 264, 1. 10.) [p. 300, 1. 23.] Sacrosanct: inviolable.— Webster. 
Article XXXIII. — Indecorous not to defend the ancients. (§ 569.) 
§ 569. — Gratitude is due to our ancestors, (page 264, line 25.) 

Cf. § 1074. [page 301, line 9.] 
Article XXXIV. — Ethical advantage of gratitude. (§ 570.) 
§ 570. — Take good heed not to regard the benefit as a burden.. 

(page 265, line 5.) [page 301, line 23.] 

TITLE C.-OF THE DUTY OF SYMPATHY. (?§ 571-576 inclusive.) 

An aesthetic susceptibility of pleasure or pain. (§§ 571-574.) 
§ 571. — Cultivate and employ these physical springs as means of 
advancing an effective and rational benevolence. (This duty is 
called humanity), (page 265, line 21.) [page 302, line 12.] 

§ 572. — Humanity depends on practical reason, and is obligatory, 
(page 265, line 30.) [page 302, line 21.] 

§ 573. — Physical sympathy, as in pity, cannot constitute obliga- 
tion, (page 266, line 7.) [page 303, line 1.] 

§ 574.— Mercy is offensive, (page 266, line 19.) [p. 302, 1. 13.] 
Article XXXV. — Virtue of the sympathetic affections. (§§ 575, 576.) 
§ 575. — Instruments enabling us to discharge the offices of a 
humane mind, upon ethical principles, (p. 266, 1. 25.) [p. 303, 1. 20.] 
§ 576. — Charity the highest ethical decoration of the world, 
(page 267, line 5.) [page 304, line 4.] 

Part II,— Of the Vices Springing from the Hatred of our Fel'ows, and whic'i are Opposed to 
the Duties of f hilanthrcphy, (#, 577-584 inclusive.) 

Article XXXVI. — The detestable family of envy, ingratitude, and 
malice. (§§ 577-584 inclusive.) 

§ 577. — Hate is in these vices not open and violent, but veiled 
and secret, (page 267, line 17.) [page 304, line 16.] 

TITLE A. -ENVY IS THE PROPENSITY TO PERCEIVE THE WELFARE OF OUR 

NEIGHBOR WITH A GRUDGE. EVEN THOUGH OUR OWN HAPPINESS 

DOES NOT SUFFER BY IT. [\ 578.) 

§ 578. — Envy arises from not knowing how to estimate our own 
advantages by their own intrinsic worth, but singly by comparing 
them with those enjoyed by others, (p. 267, 1. 22.) [p. 304, 1. 22.] 

TITLE B. -INGRATITUDE : THE WANT OF LOVE IS TRANSMUTED TO A TITLE 
TO HATE THOSE BY WHOM WE HAVE BEEN FIRST BELOVED. U 579.) 

§ 579. — Ground oi the possibility of ingratitude lies in the duty 



Tliz Clauis to an Index. 47 

(owed to one's self) not to come to need, (page 268, line 10.) [That- 
the duty may be misunderstood, is evident ; but I cannot see that 
any possible misunderstanding of the duty has an essential relation 
to the duty in so far as the duty is ground of the possibility of the 
vice.] [page 305, line 16.] 

TITLE 0. -MALICE IS THE EXACT COUNTERPART OF SYMPATHY. AND DE- 
NOTES JOY AT THE SORROW 0E ANOTHER. $1 580-581 inclusive.) 

§ 580. — Malice is an inward hate of mankind, and the veriest 
antipart of the offices of charity. It eventuates in misanthropy.. 
(page 269, line 1.) [The use of the double negative is English as- 
well as Greek, but scarcely to be considered elegant. . See §§ 486,. 
586, 703, 837.] [page 306, line 10.] 

§ 581. — Desire for vengeance seems to rest on some title of jus- 
tice, (page 269, line 23.) [page 307, line 1.] 

§ 582. — Punishment is no act emanating from the private 
authority of the injured. Cod alone can say, Vengeance is mine, 
(page 269, line 29.) " Decern:" adjudge, [page 307, line 7.] 

§ 583. Placability is a duty owed by man to man. (page 270 T 
line 7.) [page 307, line 20.] 

§ 584. — JSTotions of devilish vices and angelic virtues express- 
only a maximum, used as a standard in estimating the morality of 
actions, (page 270, line 20.) [page 308, line 1.] 

APOTOME 1L— OF THE DUTY OF REVERENCE OWED TO OTHERS. 

(22 585—599 inclusive.) 

Part I.— Acknowledgment of a Dignity ii the Perso i of Another, (?? 585-591 inclusive.) 

§ 585. — Eeverence is opposed to self-love, to self-conceit, to con- 
tempt. It is expressed by modesty, (page 271, line 10.) Cf. §§ 
449 and 555. [page 308, line 26.] 

Article XXXVIII. — Humanity is itself a dignity. (§ 586.) 

§ 586. — Every man is obliged practically to recognize the dignity 
of every other man's humanity.' (page 271, 1. 24.) [p. 309, 1. 12.] 

Article XXXIX. — To despise others is in any event contrary to duty. 
(§§ 587-589 inclusive.) 

§ 587. — Consequently the vicious is entitled to reverence, not- 
withstanding his un worth, (page 272, line 13.) [page 310, line 1.] 

§ 588. — Hence some punishments are to b3 reprobated, as dis- 
honoring humanity, (page 272, line 26.) [page 310, line 16.] 

§ 589. — Duty of reverence for man, even in the logical use of 
reason (to uphold for him his reverence for his own understanding.) 
(page 273, line 3.) Cf. § 1091. [Inept : not fit.] [page 310, line 26.] 

Article XL. — Decorum and scandal. (§ 590.) 

§590. — Eight to be reverenced cannot' be abdicated, (page 273, 
line 24.) Cf. §§ 439-441. [page 311, line 17.] 



48 Kant's Ethics. 

Article XLI. — Duty of reverence is expressed indirectly, by forbid- 
ding its opposite. (§ 591.) 

§ 591. — Neglect of the duties founded on the reverence due to 
-every man, is a vice, (page 274, line 12.) [page 312, line 9.] 

Part II.— Of the Vice Subversive of the Eeverenoe Owed by us to Others. ! M 592-599.) 

Article XL II. — These vices are (A) pride; (B) backbiting; (C) 
sneering. 

TITLE A— PRIDE (SUPERBIA). ( U 532-594 inclusive.) 

§ 592. — Pride imputes to others that they will think meanly of 
themselves when contrasted with us. (p. 274, 1. 26.) [p. 312, 1. 25.] 

§ 593. — Pride differs entirely from love of honor, (page 274, line 
31.) Cf. 590. [page 313, line 4.] 

§ 594. — Proud is always at the bottom of his soul, mean and 
abject, (page 275, line 7.) [page 313, line 12.] 

TITLE B— DETRACTION, (g? 595-596 inclusive.) 

Article XLIII. — Blunts away the moral sense. (§§ 595-596.) 
§ 595. — Scandal weakens reverence, on which emotion depends 

the spring toward the moral good. (p. 275, 1. 24.) [p. 314, 1. 2.] 
§ 596. — Duty to suppress our judgments concerning the faults 

of others, (page 276, line 1.) [page 314, line 12.] 

TITLE C.— SCORN". (§3 597. 598.) 

Article XLIV. — Sneering — a sort of diabolic pleasure. §§ 597, 598. 

§ 597. — Wickedness to exhibit, as the object of ridicule, one's real 
faults, (page 276, line 22.) [page 315, line 4.] 

§ 598. — Make no defense against sneering, (page 277, line 1.) 
[page 315, line 16.] 

§ 599. — Reverence toward men is negative ; I am not obliged to 
pay them positive veneration (which is due only toward the law), 
(page 277, line 14.) [page 315, line 30.] 

Chapter II. 

Article XLV. — Of the ethical duties owed by mankind toward one 
another in regard of their state and condition. 

This chapter, consisting of a single paragraph, Mr. Semple omits 
as immaterial. [Cf. Confucian Great Learning, x., 2. (§§ 871 below.)] 
Conclusion of the Elementology— Of Friendship. (§§600-611.) 

Article XLV I. — Of the intimate blending of love with reverence in 
friendship. (§§ 600-604 inclusive.) 

§ 600. — Friendship is an ideal of sympathy, (page 278, line 10.) 
Cf. §§ 571, 572. [page 317, line 5.] 

§ 601. — Friendship is the due equipoise of the attractive senti- 
ment of love and the repellent duty of reverence, and is therefore 
unattainable, (page 278, line 18.) [page 317, line 14.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 49 

§ 602. — Censure (a duty of friendship) conflicts with the love 
essential to friendship, (page 279, line 22.) [page 318, line 18.] 

§ 603. — Friendship is not a union intended for mutual and recip- 
rocal advantage, (page 279, line 30.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. VIII, iii, 
2, 3, and VIII, iv, 4. [page 318, line 26.] 

. § 604. — Love in friendship is circumscribed by demands of rev- 
erence, and cannot be impassioned, (p. 280, 1. 17.) [p. 319, 1. 17.] 

Article XL VII — Moral friendship, as contradistinguished from 
aesthetical. (§§ 605-608 inclusive.) 

§ 605. — Moral friendship is the entire confidence of two people, 
as far as consistent with reverence, (p. 280, 1. 33.) [p. 320, 1. 2.] 

§ 606. — Qualities of moral friendship rarely found together in 
the same subject, (page 281, line 5.) [page 320, line 7.] 

§ 607. — Intermeddling friendship which molests itself with the 
ends of other men. (page 282, line 5.) [page 321, line 13.] §958. 

§ 608. — Duty to cherish good will to men as their friend, serves 
-as a guard against pride, (p. 282, 1. 14.) Where: i. e. in the idea. Cf 
§§ 799, 800. [page 321, line 22.] Cf. § 447. 

APPENDIX. (§§ 609-611 inclusive.) 

Article XL VIII— Of the social virtues. (§§ 609-611 inclusive.) 

§ 609. — Duty both to one's self and to others not to isolate himself, 
(page 283, line 3.) [page 322, line 9.] 

§ 610. — Oblige others, and promote the cause of virtue by mak- 
ing it beloved, (page 283, line 15.) [page 322, line 21.] 

§ 611. — Frequent the society of the wicked as sparingly as possi- 
ble, (p. 283, 1. 28.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. IX, iii, 3, 4. [p. 323, 1. 6.] 

TOME II.— METHODOJLOGY OF ETHICS. (§§.612-626 inclusive.) 
APOTOME I. -DIDACTIC OF ETHICS. (§§ 612-621 inclusive.) 

Article XL IX. — Power of exerting knowledge into act. (§§ 612, 613.) 

§ 612. — Virtue must be acquired, and is not innate, (page 287 > 
line 4.) [page 327, line 5.] Cf. §§ 436, 452. 

§ 613. — Ethics can and must be taught, but virtue must be culti- 
vated (practiced), (page 287, line 13.) Cf. Xen. Mem. IV, i, 5. Cf. 
§§ 729, 730. [page 327, line 14.] Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the 
Mean, xxi., (§ 871 below.) Cf. Buddha Dharmapada, 276, (§ 949.) 

Article L. — The Socratic master and disciple. (§ 614.) 

§ 614. — Virtue's scientific method must be systematic. (The 
;Socratic method explained), (page 288, line 7.) Cf. §§ 471-475. 
[page 328, line 12.] 

Article LI. — The ethical catechism. (§ 615.) 

§ 615. — Ground sketch of the moral duties ought to go before the 
ireligious catechism, (p. 288, 1. 29.) [p. 329, 1. 5.] Cf. §§ 1396, 1245. 



50 Kant's Ethics. 

Article LIT. — Only the law is the infallible standard of education. 

§ 616. — Examples cannot be used in founding principles of vir- 
tue, but only in showing the practicability of our duty, (page 289, 
line 27.) Cf. § 715. [page 330, line 7.] See § 1661. 

Observation. — Fragment of such a. moral catechism. (§ 617.) 

§ 617. — Fragni3nt of a pure moral catechism, (p. 290.) [p. 331.] 

Article LIII. — Be immediately grounded on the pure moral law it- 
self. (§§ 618-621 inclusive.) 

§ 618. — Behests of duty must not be based on any advantages 
or good results. Shame (and not the damage) of disobedience is 
at all points to be insisted on. (page 293, line 11.) [p. 334, 1. 11.] 

§ 619. — Fire the soul to unsheath a yet keener energy of reason 
and prompt her to the more inly hallowing of her law. (page 293, 
line 28.) [page 335, line 3.] 

§623. — Questions in casuistry useful to sharpen the judgment, 
(page 294, line 24.) Cf. § 1661. [page 335, line 32.] 

§ 621. — Religious instruction must never precede moral. Bring 
the understanding to the clearest insight in ethical topics, (page 
295, line 1.) [page 336, line 12.] 

APOTOME II.— THE ASCETIC EXERCISE OP ETHICS. (§? 622-626 inclusive.) 

Article LIV — The practice of virtue renders the will robust and 
makes the heart glad. (§§ 622-626 inclusive.) 

§ 622. — Exercise of virtue makes the mind (1) hardy and (2) 
cheerful in the discharge of duty. (p. 295, 1. 14.) [p. 337, 1. 4.] 

§ 623. — Bear and forbear (1) — (Stoics). Endure the evils of life 
without complaint ; abstain from its superfluous enjoyments, (page 
295, 1. 26.) Cf. Confucian Analects book I, ch. xiv. [p. 337, 1. 16.] 

§ 624. — Transplant himself into a serene and joyous frame of 
mind. (2) (Epicurus), (page 296, line 2.) [page 337, line 23.] 

§ 625. — Self-imposed punishment, to make expurgation for sins, 
is the antipart of the practice of virtue, (page 296, line 14.) Cf. 
§§ 242 and 663 (the latter referred tobySemple). [page 338, line 7.] 
Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada 141, (§ 949 below.) 

§ 626. — All ethical gymnastic consists in subjugating the instincts 
and appetites of our physical system, (p. 297, 1. 5.) [p. 339, 1. 13.] 

Conclusion of the Ethics. 

Religion, as a doctrine of the duties owed to God, falls beyond the 
boundary of pure moral philosophy . (§§ 627-636 inclusive.) 

§ 627. — Belief in God does not belong to the science of law. Are 
we to regard it as belonging to morals? (page 298, line 5.) [page, 
340, line 4.] See §§ 2371, 2832. 



The Clavis to an Index. 51 

§ 628. — Formal of religion belongs to the science of morals, and 
expresses a subjective obligation only, (page 298, line 16.) Cf. §§ 
527-529 and 541. [page 340, line 16.] 

§ 629. — Matter of religion (duties toward God) not cognizable- 
apriori ; consequently not part of pure moral philosophy, (page 
299, line 3.) Cf. § 537. [page 341, line 6.] 

§ 630. — Religion, so far as it lies within the bounds of pure 
reason, belongs to applied moral philosophy, (page 299, line 16.) Cf. 
§§ 144 and 100. [page 341, line 20.] 

§ '631. — Principle of the ethic relation betwixt man and G-od is 
transcendent, (page 299, line 31.) [page 342, line 5.] 

§ 632. — Principle of His divine rights can be no more than that 
of justice, (page 300, line 9.) [page 342, line 18.] 

§ 633. — Reward cannot be expected, on the score of justice, from 
the Supreme Being, (page 300, line 21.) [page 342, line 31.] 

§ 634. — Divine justice hard to be reconciled with the relation of 
man to God. (page 300, line 27.) [page 343, line 5.] 

§ 635. — Justice, cogitated as a transcendent principle, leads to- 
results contrary to the principles of practical reason, (page 301, 
line 7.) [page 343, line 20.] 

§ 636. — Ethics can treat only of the relation betwixt man and 
man. (p. 302, 1. 15.) Cf. § 376. Cf. Job. xxxv, 5-8. [p. 345, 1. 1.] 

Volume II. 

RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARY OF PURE REASON 

Showing in four books, the necessary harmony and identity of the notices of 
reason with those of any possible revelation whatsoever. By Immanuel 
Kant, Professor of Logic and Metaphysie in the University of Koenigsberg, 
Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin, etc. Translated out of 
the original German by J. W. Sample, Advocate. (§§ G37-983 inclusive.) 
[Paging of Clark's edition, Edinburgh, 1838.] 

Preface, (gg fi37-647.) 

§ 637. — J\lan needs no spring to its execution, other than the 
law itself, (page 1, line 1.) Cf. § 645. 

§ 638. — Ethics, therefore, needs no religion, neither objectively 
to aid man's will nor subjectively to aid his power, (p. 1, 1. 13.) 

§ 639. — Transit from ethic to religion, which last contains the 
representation of an end emerging in consequence of the will's 
determination by the Law. (page 2, line 13.) 

§ 640. — Idea of the Summum Bonum takes its rise from ethic, and 
is not its groundwork, (page 3, line 4.) Cf. §§ 2566, 877. 

§ 64*1. — Ethical need to figure to himself a final or last end, as. 
the sequent of his duties, (page 3, line 20.) 



52 Kanfs Ethics. 

§ 642. — Ethic issues inevitably in religion, (page 4, line 18.) 

§ 643. — Position There is a God, is a synthetic apriori 
proposition which extends beyond the notion duty, (page 4, 
line 23 [note.]) 

§ 644. — Superadds to it an effect not involved in the moral law> 
and which consequently can not be evolved analytically from it. 
(page 4, line 35.) 

§ 645. — Ground of the possibility of the synthetical extension of 
reason beyond its law. (page 5, line 17.) Cf. §§ 1119, 1120. 

§ 646. — Commandment Obef the government is of moral obliga- 
tion, (page 5, line 1.) Cf. § 804. 

§ 647. — Good and evil principles figured as two self-subsisting 
causes, (page 10, line 19.) Cf. § 771. 

Preface to the Second Edition. &l 648-659 inclusive.) 

§ 648. — Eevelation and natural religion may be regarded as orbs 
concentric, of which the latter (and smaller) is the sphere of the 
philosopher, (p. 11, 1. 3 [or begin with line 8 if thought best.]) 

§ 649. — Reason and revelation are not only in harmony, but 
identic, (p. 11, 1. 22.) Cf. Cicero (Philip xi. 12, page 9 above.) 

§ 650. — No acquaintance with the Kantic Critiques needed for 
comprehending the substance of this treatise, but only the most 
ordinary notices of ethic, (page 13, line 7 [or begin with page 14, 
line 1 if thought best.]) 

Book I. — Of Indwelling Sin. (On tlie Radical Evil of Human 

Nature.) (§? 651-728 inclusive.) 

Exordium. (U 651-666 inclusive.) 

§ 651. — Ancient complaint that the world lieth in wickedness, 
(page 17, line 4.) See I. John, v., 19. 

§ 652. — Nature ever ready to assist our moral growth. Sanabil- 
ibus cegrotamus mails, (page 18, line 3.) Xen. Mem. III., v., 18. 

§ 653. — Judgment that a person is by nature evil never can with 
certainty be rested on experience and observation, (p. 18, 1. 28.) 

§ 654. — Nature of man here means only the subjective ground of 
the use of his freedom, (page 19, line 23.) 

§ 655. — Ground of moral evil can lie only in a maxim self- 
appointed by choice to its own freedom, (page 19, line 30.) 

§ 656.— Subjective ground of adopting good or bad maxims is 
unsearchable, (page 20, line 7.) 

§ 657. — Ground of moral determination is with man congenite. 
(page 20, line 23.) 

Explanatory Scholion. (§§ 658-666 inclusive.) 

§ 658. — Man is by nature either morally good or morally evil, 
(page 21, line 20.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 53 

§ 659. — Ethic admits unwillingly of moral media, (p. 22, 1. 1.) 

§ 660. — Betwixt a good and an evil moral mindedness no inter- 
mediate can be found, (page 22, line 13.) 

§ 661. — Mankind never can be neither good nor evil, 
(page 22, line 11.) 

§ 662. — Majesty of the law inspires awe, not dread, 
(page 22, line 35.) 

§ 663. — Virtue's aesthetic character valiant and by consequence 
joyous, (page 23, line 16.). (Cf. §§ 242, 232, 624.) Cf. Buddha's 
Dharmapada, 16, 18 (§ 949 below.) 

§ 664. — Neither can man be in some points good and at the same 
time in others morally evil, (page 24, line 18.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. 
book V., i., 14. Cf. Buddha Dharm. xiii. 176. (§ 949 below.) 

§ 665. — Peremptory and rigoristical precision of the moral 
philosophers of antiquity, (page 24, line 26.) 

§ 666.— Moral mindedness, because its last ground is inexplicable, 
is said to belong to man " by nature.'''' (page 25, line 1.) 

Chapter I.— Of Mankind's Onginary Predisposition Toward Good, (gg 667- 

672 inclusive.} 

§ 667. — Man's last ground of moral choice classed according to 
his (1) animality, (2) humanity, and (3) personality, (p. 26, 1. 8.) 

§ 668. — Moral law pertains to personality, not necessarily to 
humanity, (page 26, note.) 

§ 669. — Predisposition for animality may be called mechanical 
self-love, needing no exercise of reason. Abuse of this appetite 
gives rise to beastly vices, (page 27, line 1.) 

§ 670. — Man's humanity may be all classed as comparative self- 
love, for which theoretic reason is required. Abuse of this appetite 
gives rise to devilish vices, (page 27, line 19.) 

§ 671. — Man's predisposition for personality consists in bis sus- 
ceptibility for such reverence as makes the law the spring of his 
will, (page 28, line 19.) Cf. § 238. 

§ 672. — All these predispositions are good and all originary, but 
the third alone is self-practical, (page 29, line 14.) 

Chapter II— Of the Bias to Evil in Human Nature. (§§ 673-682 inclusive.) 

§ 673. — Bias is the susceptibility of so liking that by one taste a 
permanent appetite is established, (p. 30, 1. 9.) Cf. §§ 461-463. 

§ 674. — Bias to evil can only consist in the subjective ground of 
the possibility of an agent-intelligent's maxims swerving from the 
moral law. (page 31, line 4.) 

§ 675. — Three different degrees of this badness of heart : (1) 
frailty; (2) impurity; (3) depravity, (page 31, line 18.) [As to 
impurity, I think Semple is wrong in suggesting the word " sup- 



54 Kant's Ethics. 

posed." The good maxim may cover a subsidiary rule of conduct 
which has erected into a spring an end which as end is right and 
moral, but as spring immoral.] 

| 676. — Frailty finds the moral law weaker than the appetitive 
springs, (page 31, line 28.) Cf. § 281. Cf. Nie. Eth. I., xiii., 11. Cf. 
Oonfucius (Analects II., iv., 6.): "At seventy, I could follow what 
my heart desired, without transgressing what was right." § 191. 

S 677. — Impurity fails to state (in the maxim) the moral Law as 
alone the sufficient spring, (page 32, line 4.) 

5 678. — Depravity in its maxims chooses immoral springs instead 
of the law. (page 32, line 15.) Cf § 694. 

| 679. — Bias to evil charged upon all men. (page 32, line 26.) 
g 680. — Difference betwixt a man of good morals and a morally 
good man. (page 32, line 32.) 

6 681. — Indwelling bias toward evil can cleave only to the moral 
faculty of choice (can not be physical.) (page 33, line 22.) 

S 682. — Indwelling bias toward evil is a deed cogitable (peccatum 
originarium, patent to reason a priori,) and never can be extirpated, 
(page 33, line 32.) [ Unanswerable : Strictly philosophically. But 
it is cogitable that the original bias to evil is implanted by the 
Lawgiver, in order that the necessity of the principle of good may 
continuously direct His creatures to Himself. In this view, the 
two principles may be regarded as connate and essentially co- 
existent.] Cf. § 692 and § 771. 

Chapter III.— Man is by Nature Evil, fgg 633-697 inclusive.) 

Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. (Horace, quoted by Kant.) 

S 683. — Intent of occasionally swerving from the moral law 
adopted into his maxim, (page 35, line 12.) 

§ 684. — First subjective ground of appointing maxims rooted in 
the substratum of humanity, (page 35, line 27.) 

§ 685. — Reflect on the multitude of crying instances thrown by 
the observed actions of man into our hands, (page 36, line 11.) 

§ 686. — Nations proceed upon principles diametrically con- 
trary to their professed objects, (page 37, line 24.) 

§ 687. — Ground of evil can not be placed either (1) in the human 
sensory, or (2) in a corruption of moral-legislative reason (man 
being neither [1] merely an animal, nor [2] altogether a devil.) 
(page 38, line 16.) 

§ 688. — Bias to evil can not be explained (but only exhibited) by 
experience and observation, but must be cognizable apriori and 
be deduced from the idea evil, (page 40, line 1.) 

§ 689. — Cannot depend on the difference of the springs adopted 



The Claris to an Index. 55 

into his maxims (not on their matter), but on their subordination 
(on their form), namely, which one he chooses to make the 
condition op the others, (page 40, line 14.) 

§ 690. — Mankind is only evil so far forth as he inverts the ethical 
order of the springs of his will, (page 41, line 10.) 

§ 691. — Man's outward and observed character may be good, 
although his intelligible remain all the while evil. (p. 41, 1. 22.) 

§ 692. — Natural bias toward evil never can be extirpated by 
man; nevertheless, it can be outweighed, (p. 41, 1. 31.) Cf. § 682. 

§ 693. — Vitiosity of human nature is not so much wickedness as 
rather perversity of heart (whereby the absence of vice is looked 
upon as virtue.) (page 42, line 12.) Cf. § 678. 

§ 694. — Frailty and impurity (§ 675) may be regarded as unin- 
tentional (culpa); but depravity (§ 678) as forethought crime 
(dolus.') (page 42, line 31.) 

§ 695. — Prevents the founding of genuine moral principles within, 
(page 43, line 25.) 

§ 696. — "As it is written, there is none righteous." (.Romans, iii., 
10.) (page 44, line 5.) 

§ 697. — Mean betwixt good and evil is excluded by reason ; 
nevertheless actions, when spoken of merely as deeds exhibited to 
sense, may be said to be mixed or indifferent. [Withholding, in 
view of the phenomenal and frail character of man, the condemna- 
tory sentence of morally judging reason. lieges silent inter arma.~\ 
(page 44, line 17.) Cf. §§ 658-665 and 232 and 454. 

Chapter IV.— Of the Origin of Evil in Human Nature. (Si 698-704 inclusive.) 

§ 698. — Moral evil can not be deduced from any antecedent 
state, (page 45, line 3.) 

§ 699. — Moral evil can not be figured as an inheritance. (In re- 
gard of the three academic faculties : [if hereditary disease ; [2] 
heritable debt ; [3] inherited depravity.) (page 45, line 26.) 

§ 700. — Every wicked action must be held an originary use of 
choice, (page 46, line 11.) Cf. § 736. 

§ 701. — Sufficient ground of imputing consequences is already 
extant in the primary free act out of which they rise. (p. 47, 1. 7.) 

§ 702. — Origin of evil represented by the Scripture as chrono- 
logically beginning in the human race, (page 48, line 1.) 

§ 703. — When we endeavor to unravel and retrace the chronic 
origin of evil, we must assume a bias, (page 49, line 7.) Cf. § 508. 
[_Quite impracticable. Not so. I figure to myself a concreated con- 
tingency as readily as a concreated subsistency, either being incom- 
prehensible by the merely human reason. (Cf. § 682.)] 



56 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 704. — First beginning of all evil utterly unfathomable, (page 
50, line 8.) Cf. § 682. Amendment: cf. § 652. Adiaphora : cf. § 318. 

General Scholion.— Of Reinstating the Predisposition Toward Good into its 
Originary Power. (§g 705-728 inclusive.) 

§ 705. — Man destined for good by his Creator, (page 51, line 18.) 

§ 706. — Lay hold on help, (page 52, line 11.) See § 729. 

§ 707. — Possible that one naturally and radically bad should 
come to make out of himself a man good, (page 52, line 22.) 

§ 708. — Assume that a germ of good still subsists in its entire 
purity, which can not be self-love (unless we speak of a practical 
self-love, of unconditioned complacency [§§ 448, 558] in regard 
of the law. But this is neither more nor less than reverence. 
Cf. §§ 208, 209, 449.) (p. 53,1. 9.) Cf. Buddha Dharm., 285 (§ 949.) 

§ 709. — Original good consists in that sanctity of intent which 
proposes to itself the execution of all duty, (page 54, line 1.) Cf. 
Zend Avesta (Bunsen's Cod in history, vol. i., page 280, or Haug's 
Essays, pp. 141-144.) "But he who chooses Ahura-Mazda, the 
All-Holy and All-True, honors Him in faith by truthful word and 
holy deed." See § 881 below. 

§ 710. — Virtue formally requires no change of heart (morality), 
but only a change of manners (legality), exhibiting actions out- 
wardly in harmony with the law. (page 55, line 2.) 

§ 711. — Virtue materially implies a transvolution of the senti- 
ments of the inner man (whereby he needs no other motive than 
the representation duty. Cf. §§ 452, 459.) (page 55, line 24.) 

§ 712. — When by one single isfiexible determination mankind 
retroverts his will's perverted bias (intelligibly an instant transit.) 
(page 56, line 5.) [Cf. Nic.Eth.VL, viii., 4; VII., viii., 4; VI., v., 5.] 

§ 713. — Gradual reform affects the bent of the sensory (sensibly 
a perpetual progression from bad to better.) (page 56, line 19.) Of. 
Buddha Dharm 40. (§ 949.) Cf. Confucian Analects, IV., v., 3 (§191.) 

§ 714. — Moral education of man can not begin with correcting 
his manners, but must take its rise from a transvolving of his cast 
of thinking, (page 57, line 5.) 

§ 715. — Wonder at deeds of virtue is mischievous in its effect (by 
representing the performance of duty as meritorious and extra- 
ordinary. Cf. §§ 233, 455, 616.) (page 57, line 20.) 

§ 716. — Whereby Reason mightily commands, though annexing 
to that behest neither bribe nor threat, (page 58, line 9.) Cf. § 330. 
Cf Buddha's Dharmapada, 354 (see § 949 below.) Cf. (Zoroaster) 
Avesta: Yagna xxxvii., 13 (Bleeck, vol., ii., page 97 — see § 881 
below); Yagna xxx., 2 (Bleeck, ii., 85); Vispered iii., 22 (Bleeck ii;, 
11); Yagna xix., 29, 30 (Bleeck, ii., 69); Yagna xliii., 9-11 (Bleeck, 



The Clavis to an Index. 57 

ii., 104); Yagna xlviii., 5, 9 (Bleeck, ii., 112, 113); Yagna xxxix., 10- 
13 (Bleeck, ii., 98); Vendidad, Fargard v., 66, 67 (Bleeck, vol. i., 
page 42); Fargard xviii., 11-20 (Bleeck, i., 127, 128.) 

§ 717. — Duty demands that he adhere inviolably faithful to its- 
decrees ; hence he rightly infers that he can do so. (page 58, line 28.) 

§ 718. — No difficulty in combining the idea freedom with that 
of God as a necessary being, (page 59, line 18.) Cf. § 2799. 

§ 719. — Bedintegration of character by one's own exertions in- 
comprehensible, nevertheless j)ossible. (page 60, line 7.) Cf. § 682. 

§ 720. — Duties imposed by the Law remain the same, whether a 
bias to evade them be co-extant with the will or not. (p. 60, 1. 22.) 

§ 721. — Because this bias is ineradicable, begin by unremittingly 
wrestling and so making stand against it. (page 60, line 28.) Cf. 
Ephesians, vi., 12, 13 and §§ 672, 687. Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 
127, 236 (See § 949 below.) 

§ 722. — All religions may be divided into those of mere worship, 
and the religion of a moral life, (page 61, line 23.) Cf. Arist. Nic. 
Eth. X., vii., 12. Cf. Confucius, Analects, IX., xxiii (§ 191 above.) 

§ 723. — Self-amelioration the unalterable decree, upon the prin- 
ciples of moral religion (which, amid all public ones that have 
hitherto appeared, the Christian religion alone is. Cf. §§ 236,, 
864, 906-911.) (page 62, line 11.) Cf. Xenophon's Memorabilia, I., 
iii., 3; II. Corinthians, viii., 12; Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, X. r 
vii., 11, 12; Philippians ii., 12, 13; Buddha's Dharmapada, 19, 16 
(§ 949 below); Confucius, Analects, VI., x., and XII., xxi , 3; and. 
Doctrine of the Mean, xiii., 3 (§ 871.) 

§ 724. — Not necessary for every one to know what God does ; 
but all should know what they themselves have to do in 
order to render themselves worthy of his aid. (page 62, line 20.) 
See Buddha, Dharmapada (§ 949 below), 271, 272, (with which 
compare Isaiah, xxvi.. 3); and St.' John xvii., 25 (with which com- 
pare Ephesians, i., 8, and Colossians, i, 27) ; and Proverbs ii., 1-5 ; 
and Confucius, Analects, XVI , viii ; and Doctrine of the Mean,. 
xiv., 5 (§ 871 below.) 

Appendix to the General Scholion. (gg 725-728 inclusive.) 

§ 725. — Outworks of a religion within the bounds of naked rea- 
son: (1) works of grace; (2) miracles; (3) mysteries; (4) means of 
grace, (page 63, line 1.) See §§ 777, 872, 962. 

§ 726. — Beason impugns neither the possibility nor yet the ex- 
istence of objects corresponding to those ideas, (page 63, line 11.), 

§ 727. — Baneful results following these morally transcendent 
ideas : (1) fanaticism ; (2) superstition ; (3) illuminatism ; (4) thau- 
maturgy. (page 63, line 26.) Cf. Jeremiah xxiii., 28.. 

5 



58 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 728. — Works of grace never can afford the groundwork ©f any 
maxims, whether regulating the theoretical or practical conduct of 
the mind, (page 64, line 5.) 

Book II.— Of the Combat Betwixt the Good and the Evil 
Principle, for the Dominion over Man. (§§ 729-787 inclusive.) 

Exordium. I g 3 729-737 inclusive.: 

§ 729. — Virtue signifies fortitude or valor, and reminds us- that 
there is an enemy to be overcome, (page 67 r line 4.) Cf. § 454.. Cf. 
Cicero de Officiis., I., xix., 2. Cf. §§ 613, 706. Buddha's Dharina- 
pada, 40, 66 (§ 949 below ) 

§ 730. — Stoics mistook their enemy. They called on wisdom to 
make a stand against folly, instead of calling- upon her to wage 
war upon wickedness, (page 67, line 21.) Cf. Dharmapada 315. 

:'§ 731. — Beginning must be made by dislodging evil from posses- 
sions it has usurped, (page 68, line 16.) 

§ 732. — Appetites not to be extirpated, but kept in subjection. 
■ (Prudence.) (page 69, line 4.) Cf. I. Cor. ix., 26, 27.. Cf. Cicero de 
Officiis III., iii., 7. Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 321 (§ 949 below) ;, 
and Doctrine of Mean, i , 4 (§ 871 below ) 

§733. — Only the morally evil is to be eradicated.. (Wisdom.) 
(page 69, line 11.) Cf. Proverbs ii., 6-12 ; iii., 13-18 ; iw, 5-9 ; viii.,. 
1-13 ; ix., 12 ; and Koran, x., 108, 109 ; xvii., 16; iv., 81, § 968. 

§ 734. — Induce philosophers to mistake the actual enemy of 
good, (page 69, line 21.) 

§ 735. — Ground of moral evil and that of moral good equally in- 
comprehensible, (page 70, line 21.) [Utterly inexplicable, and: 
can only be regarded.] 

§ 736. — Wrestle not against flesh and blood, (page 70, line 9.) . 
Ephesians vi., 11, 12. [Were we not already secretly banded: . EHpe- 
me de inimicis rneis Deus metis; et ab insurgentibns in me libera me.. 
Psal. lix., 1.] Cf. §§ 383, 700. 

§737. — Ethic of Christianity represents moral good as distant 
from moral evil, not as heaven from earth, but as heaven from 
hell, (page 71, line 7.) 

APOTOME I.-0F THE TITLE OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE TO RULE OVER MAN- 
KIND. (§§738-770 inclusive.) 

TITLE A.— IMPERSONATED IDEA OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE. <M 738-742.) 

§ 738. — Happiness is immediately attached (by the will of the 
Most High) to morality as a supreme condition of happiness, 
(page 72, line 5.) 

§ 739. — Idea of the perfect man emanates from God's very es- 
sence, (p. 72, 1. 10.) Cf. John, i., 2 ; Hebrews, i., 3 ; Johnjii., 16. 



The Clavis to an Index. 59 

§ 740. — Self-elevation to this ideal of moral perfection is ob- 
viously a duty. (p. 72, 1. 22.) [The last sentence may be omitted.] 

§ 741. — Eepresentation of a person ready and willing- to dis- 
charge all the offices of humanity, (page 73, line 25.) Vis insita — 
ingrafted. Cf §§ 1732, 1733. Of. I. Cor. xiv., 8. 

§ 742. — Adhere unchangeably to the archetype of humanity, so 
(through such practical faith) to enter into everlasting bliss. 
i(page 74, line 9.) St. John, v., 40. 

TITLE II. -OBJECTIVE REALITY OF THIS IDEA. Q'i 743-749 inclusive.) 

§ 743. — Necessity of unconditional obedience is self-evident and 
needs no examples from experience and observation, (p. 74, 1. 23.) 

§ 744. — Want of belief in virtue not to be supplied by any faith 
grounded on miraculous supports, (page 75, line 17.) 

§ 745. — Law would entitle us to expect from every one an 
ectypal transcript of this idea, (page 75, line 32.) James, iii., 12. 

§ 746. — Consequently no person, who. in doctrine, life, and 
death, had fully set forth the exemplary pattern of a course of life 
acceptable to God, ought therefore to be looked u])on as anything 
else than a naturally begotten man. (page 76, line 17.) 

§ 747. — Supernatural person, exemplifying the idea of holiness, 
could not be represented as a pattern for our imitation, (page 77, 
line 2.) Cf. § 715. 

§ 748. — Analogical schematism is allowable in explaining our 
conceptions of the supersensible ; but when turned into a schema- 
tism for determining an object, it becomes anthropomorphism, 
which is of the most hurtful consequences in religion, (p. 78, 1. 16.) 
•Cf. §§ 921, 2827. See §§ 2408-2443, especially §§ 2430-2432. 

§ 749. — Figured as extant in an Ideal of Humanity, is valid for 
all men, at all times, and throughout all worlds, (page 79, line 1.) 

TITLE C. -DIFFICULTIES CONTRARY TO THE REALITY OF THIS IDEA, 
TOGETHER WITH THEIR SOLUTION. [M 750-770 inclusive.) 

§ 750. — Good conduct, regarded as a constant progression from 
bad to better in infinitum, must always be estimated by us as de- 
fective. (First difficulty.) (page 80, line 19.) Cf. Matthew v., 48. 

§ 751. — Trust, notwithstanding his perpetual short coming, that 
"he may on the whole be well pleasing to God. (p. 81, 1. 16.) Cf. § 713, 

§ 752. — Never yet steadfastly persevered in good. (Second diffi- 
culty.) (page 82, line 1.) Cf. Matt, vi., 33. 

§ 753. — Work out your own salvation, with fear and trembling. 
(page 82, line 16.) Pbilippians, ii., 12. Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada ? 
.236 (§ 949 below.) 

§ 754. — Views into a blessed or cursed eternity, (p. 83, 1. 17.) 



60 Kant's Ethics 

§ 755. — Whether the pains of hell are finite or eternal, is at 
childish question, (page 84, line 8.) 

§ 756. — Just because reason is free, its sentence over man can 
not be corrupted or bribed, (page 85, line 15.) Cf. § 770. 

§ 757 — "All's well that ends well," an adage which can not be- 
applied to morals, (page 85, line 24.) \_Brocard: a canon, or ele- 
mentary principle.] Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. I., vii., 12 ; 1., ix., 7. 

§ 758. — When we go hence, we have cause to regard our account 
as closed. (Not a principle constituent of knowledge of the super- 
sensible, but a regulative principle of practical reason.) (page 86, 
line 18.) Cf. Eccles. xi., 3. Wisdom: Dharmapada 411 (§ 949.) 

§ 759. — Comforter, reassuring us when backslidings make us 
apprehensive, (page 86, line 1.) [ Trajectory : curved course (no 
man's course being straightforward.)] 

§ 760. — Still he began from evil, and this prior guilt he never 
can abolish. (Third difficulty.) (page 87, line 23.) [Tye: bound. 
Prestable: payable.] [is indifferent : but ought not to be (unless in- 
deed the creditor have knowledge that the debtor has rendered. 
quid pro quo for the surety.)] 

§ 761. — Look forward to an illimitable punishment and everlast- 
ing extrusion from the Kingdom of God. (page 88, line 18.) 

§ 762. — Punishment due to his misdeeds not inflicted prior to- 
repentance, (page 88, line 32.) [Henceforward: This should be 
stated negatively : No longer an object of the divine displacency.] 

§ 763. — Punishment takes place in the very act of redintegrating 
one's character, (page 89, line 19.) 

§ 764. — Punishment attending a change of heart belongs properly 
to "the old man" (physically the self-same guilty person as:, 
before.) (page 90, line 1.) Cf. Eomans vi., 6; Ephesians, iv., 22. 

§ 765. — What was due to his " old man " (as punishment), he 
joyously goes through for the sake of that good wherewith his: 
" new man " is invested, (page 91, line 6.) Cf Ephesians, iv., 24. 
[As morally another : The section may end here, omitting the next 
thirteen lines, and appending the note to the word pu7iishment.'\ 

§766. — Already held to be (cogitably) that "new MAN"(alive= 
unto righteousness) which he is (physically) never more than about 
to become. {Decree of Grace.) (page 92, line 2.) Cf. Galatians ii.^ 
21. Cf. §§ 712, 713. 

§ 767. — Deduction of the idea of justification is no more than the 
solution of a speculative problem. (Positive use of the above in- 
quiry.) (page 93, line 1.) 

§ 768. — No expiations can supply the want of a total change of 
heart. (Negative use.) (p. 93, 1. 21.) Dharmapada, 264, 394 (§ 949.> 



The Clavia to an Index. 61 

§ 769. — What mankind may, at the end of life, have to hope or 
fear, (page 94, line 4.) 

§ 770. — Inexorably rigid sentence is always uttered, for no one 
can bribe his own reason, (page 95, line 1.) Cf. §§ 756, 757. 

-APOTOME II— OF THE TITLE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE TO 
RULE OVER MANKIND, AND OF THE BATTLE OF THE GOOD 
WITH THE EVIL PRINCIPLE FOR THE SOVEREIGN EMPIRE 
OVER THE HUMAN RACE, (§§771-776 inclusive.) 

§ 771. — Sacred Volume represents the two principles in man as 
persons without, (page 96, line 6.) Cf. §§ 647, 682. Cf. Avesta 
(§ 881 below): Yagna, xliii., 5, 15 (Bleeck, vol. ii., 103, 105); Yagna, 
xxx , 3-6 (Bleeck, ii , 85); Yagna, lvi., (7) 6 (Bleeck, ii., 123.) 

§ 772. — Kingdom of evil erected by the prince of this world, 
(page 96, line 14.) Cf. Matthew, viii., 12. [Imprescriptible — That 
*ean not be impaired by disuse. Abeyance: suspension or temporary 
extinction.] 

§ 773. — Appeared a person in whom the prince of this world had 
nothing, (page 98, line 8.) Cf. John, xiv., 30; xii., 44-50. [When— 
rebellion — omit nine words] [but yet, etc.: omit forty-four words.] 

§ 774. — Exhibition of mankind's indwelling good principle in its 
entire moral perfection, (page 99, line 17.) Cf. John, xvii..4and i., 
14. Psalms, xi., 4 and liii., 2. John, i., 11, 12. Titus, ii., 14. 

§ 775. — Kingdom of the evil principle still endures, (page 101, 
line 15.) Cf. John, xiv., 30, 31 ; Matthew, x., 17. 

§ 776. — Moral suggested by the narrative is that there is abso- 
lutely no salvation for mankind apart from genuine moral prin- 
ciples, (page 102, line 1.) [Omit the last nine lines.] 

GENERAL SCHOLION. -OF MIRACLES. (§? 777-787 inclusive.) 

§ 777. — Moral religion tends eventually to displace and dispense 
"with all miraculous beliefs, (page 103, line 10.) 

§ 778. — Serve no purpose whatever to question the accuracy of 
narrations of matters incomprehensible (which any one may be- 
lieve and repeat without being or ever becoming thereby a better 
man.) (page 104, line 8.) [Adminicles : imperfect proofs ; helps; 
supports.] 

§ 779. — Object to cultivating any practical belief in the marvel- 
ous, (page 105, line 7.) 

§ 780. — Miracles are events brought about by causes with the 
laws of whose efficiency we are and must ever remain totally unac- 
quainted, (page 106, line 9.) Cf. note to § 779. 

§ 781. — No more than a general moral notion that whatever Cod 
does will be all very good. (Theistical miracles.) (p. 107, 1. 1.) 

§ 782. — Demonian miracles are the most irreconcilable with the 
exercise of reason, (page 107, line 22.) 



62 Ka if s Ethics: 

§ 783. — No practical benefit can accrue from such tenets, (page^ 
108, line 10.) 

Appendix to the General Seholion. (;§ 784-787 inclusive.) 

§ 784. — Knowledge of natural law is enough both for a sure and 
rational application and for explication secundum quid (although 
not for an' explication simpliciter.) (page 110, line 1.) 

§ 785. — Natural wonders encourage reason ; preternatural won- 
ders overwhelm the understanding, (page 110, line 17.) 

§ 786. — Necessary maxim on which we must regulate the use of" 
our understanding, (page 111, line 11.) Cf. §§ 2406, 2405. 

§ 787. — Must not be mistaken for a positive theoretical assertion.. 
(page 111, line 29.) [Rash: i. e., without due deliberation— and" 
indecorous: i. e., not befitting the gravity of the topic] § 2374. 

Book III. — The Entire Conquest of the Evil by the Good 
Principle is only Possible Through the Coming 1 and Found- 
ing- of a Kingdom of God on Earth. (§g 788-801 inclusive.) 

Exordium, ("ii 788-791 inclusive.) 

§ 788. — Continue always armed and ready for a conflict, (page- 
115, line 6.) Cf. Eomans, vi., 18. Dharmapada, 40, 315 (§ 949 ) 

§ 789. — Corrupt themselves mutually and plunge one another- 
into evil, (page 115, line 18.) 

§ 790. — Form a general combination for the express purpose of' 
warding off the bad and cultivating what in mankind is good, 
(page 116. line 23.) St. John, ii., 17. 

§ 791. — Combined under its ideal moral laws, may be called an 
ethical society (and, by analogy, an ethical state or kingdom.) 
(page 117, line 25.) 

APOTOME I.-PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF THE VICTORY OF' 
THE GOOD PRINCIPLE, BY FOUNDING A KINGDOM OF GOD 
ON EARTH, (gg 792-8"5 inclusive.) 

Caapter I.— Of tie Ethical Stats of Nature. (33 792-793 inclusive.) 

§ 792. — Ethico-civil state distinguished from a political state.. 
(page 119, line 6.) 

§ 793. — Ethico-civil state distinguished from the ethical state of 
nature, (page 119, line 15.) 

§ 794. — Every member of a political state is entitled to persist 
in his ethical state of nature, (page 120, line 1.) 

§ 795. — Ethico-civil state can not be ruled (but only limited) by 
political authority, (page 120, line 25.) 

§ 796. — Idea of an ethical commonwealth embraces an ideal ag- 
gregate of all mankind, (page 121, line 6.) 

Chapter II.— Mankind Ought to Quit His Ethical State of Nature in Order- 
to Become a Member of an Ethical Commonwealth. (^3.797-800 inclusive.) 

§ 797. — Ethical state of nature is tantamount to an open and, 
perpetual invasion of the principles of virtue, (p.. 121, 1. 26.) § 789.. 



The Clavis to an Index. 63 

§ 798. — Exeundum esse e statu naturali. (Hobbes.) (page 122 ? 
line 22.) [i. e. that from this will follow a departure, etc.] 

§ 799. — Duty imposed by the idea of an ethical state differs en- 
tirely, both in kind and principle, from all other duties, (page 122, 
line 19.) 

§ 800. — Idea of a Supreme Moral Governor presupposed by that 
of an ethical state, (page 123, line 20.) Cf. §§ 639, 640, 875, 877. 

Chapter III.— The Idea of an Ethical Commonwealth is the Idea of a People 
of God Combined Under Moral Laws, (gjj 801-806 inclusive.) 

§ 801. — Laws of the ethical state must be regarded as command- 
ments issuing from a common Lawgiver, (page 124, line 4.) See 
§§ 335, 346. 

§ 802. — People of an ethical state can not be regarded as them- 
selves legislating, (page 124, line 17.) 

§ 803. — Ethical state can only be cogitated as a people of God, 
standing under ethic laws, (page 124, line 25.) Sec §§ 523-532 
(referred to by Semple) and 442. [From the will of a Superior, 
but from every free will which he has created.] 

§ 804. — Whenever anything is acknowledged to be duty, 
obedience is enjoyed by the Divine Will, (page 125, line 17.) 

§ 805. — Theocracy as a juridical commonwealth whereof the 
legislator is God. (page 126, line 3.) Cf. Titus, ii., 14. Cf. § 859. 

§ 806. — Eabble, or mob, whose ringleader is the evil principle. 
(page 126, line 24.) Cf. § 647. 

Chapter IV.— The Idea of a People of God is by Human Endeavor) only to 
be Realized by Forming a Church, (gjj 807-81(5 ) 

§ 807. — Idea of an ethical commonwealth can never be fully 
realized by man. (page 127, line 4.) 

§ 808. — Mankind ought to proceed as if every thing depended 
on himself, (page 127, line 11.) 

§ 809. — Wish of every honest minded man. (page 127, line 25.) 
Matthew, vi., 10. Cf. Avesta (Yacna, xix., 35) § 881. 

§ 810. — Idea of the invisible church ; the archetype, (p. 128, 
1. 1.) See note to Khordah Avesta. li (Bleeck, vol. iii., page 179.) 

§ 811. — Visible church, representing the moral kingdom of God 
on earth. (Endeavors to copy the form and feature of the invisible 
church.) (page 128, line 7.) 

§ 812. — Numerical oneness of the church. (Its universality.) 
(page 128, line 24.) 

§ 813. — Purity of the church. (Its quality.) (page 128, line 32.) 

§ 814. — Mutual relationship of freedom. (Relativity of the 
church.) (page 129, line 4.) No room either for hierarchy or for 

ILLUMINATISM. 



64 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 815. — Can not be founded on arbitrary formulae. (Modality of 
tbe cburcb ; an unchangeable constitution.) (page 129, line 14.) 

§ 816. — Constitution of the church likened to that of a family 
under a common, invisible, and moral Father, (page 129 line 24.) 
Of. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. viii., p. 346., note (wherein I ought to have 
given more especial credit to P. DeLanoye's Barneses the Great, 
" Egypt 3300 years ago," pages 130, 133, 136, 138, from which I de- 
rived my information and references.) Of. Kent (Comm., ii., 190, 
lect. xxix.): "A father's house is always open to his children." 

Chapter V.— The Constitution of every Church Invariably Rests on a Histori- 
cal Belief (Revealed Faith): this may be called Church Faith, and is best 
Founded on a Holy Writ. (?| 817-827.) 

§ 817. — Pure religious faith alone can serve as a groundwork for 
a church universal, (page 130, line 14.) 

§ 818. — Idea of divine worship is placed in room of the idea of a 
pure moral religion, (page 130, line 27.) 

§ 819. — Divine Will commands either by merely statutable or by 
pure moral laws, (page 131, line 32.) Cf. §§ 2566, 905. 

§ 820. — Eevelation of statutable divine laws would found a his- 
torical but never a pure rational belief, (page 132, line 18.) 

§ 821. — True worship consists in " doing the will of God " 
(Ephesians, vi., 6) by good moral deportment- (in obedience to 
pure moral laws.) (page 133, line 3.) Cf. Matthew, vii., 21 ; I. 
John, ii. 17; Zoroaster, Avesta, Vispered, xviii., 1, 2 (Bleeck, ii., 
22; § 881 below); Buddha, Dharmapada, 86 (§ 949 below); Confucius, 
Doctrine of the Mean, xx., 19 (§ 871 below); Mohammed, Koran, 
ii., 172; v., 53; xvi., 92; etc. (§ 968 below); Bomans ii., 13. 

§ 822. — Church faith distinguished from pure religious belief, 
(page 133, line 20.) 

§ 823. — No insuperable ground for holding the laws forming and 
instituting any church to have been enacted by divine authority, 
(page 134, line 20.) 

§ 824. — Creed of the church will always be found anterior to the 
pure ethical belief, (page 135, line 6.) 

§ 825. — No ecclesiastical faith bottomed upon a Scripture has ever 
perished, (page 136, line 12.) 

.§ 826. — One religion, although there may be various kinds of 
belief, (p. 137, 1. 17.) § 944. [I object to Mr. Kant's use of the word 
faith, for the reason that it tends toward the confusion of the con- 
ception properly represented by the word : and for the same reason 
I would avoid the use of the word belief. Beserving these words 
for the proper uses, we (who borrow from all tongues with apt 
adaptability) have ready a word creed, which can be appropri- 
ated to the arbitrary statutory beliefs, and indeed is.] Cf. § 278. 



The Clavis to an Index. 65 

§ 827. — Heterodoxy swerves in unessentials ; heresy stumbles at 

essentials ; infidelity disbelieves (this or that creed), (p. 138, 1. 22.) 

Chapter VI —The Pure Ethical Belief is the Supreme Expounder of all Eccle- 
siastical Creeds "Whatsoever. (g§ 828-837 inclusive.) 

§ 828. — Ecclesiastico-historical creeds available to confirm the 
grounds and ideas of naked reason, (page 140, line 4.) § 832. 

§ 829. — Depend mainly on the exegetical mode in which the re- 
vealed text is expounded, (page 140, line 20.) 

§ 830. — Bible to be tested by the standard of morality, (page 
141, note.) Jeremiah, xxiii., 28; John, vii., 17; II. Timothy, iii., 17. 

§ 831. — Sacred Scriptures of every variety, in both ancient and 
modern times, have been forced into moral interpretations, (page 
141, line 9.) One Divine Essence : Of § 862. 

§ 832. — Moral interpretations possible, because moral-practical 
reason underlies the different revelations, (page 142, line 19.) Cf. 
James, ii., 17. §§ 858, 871, 881, 906, 949, 968. 

§ 833. — Natural religion must supply the supreme canon of all 
scriptural exegesis, (page 143, line 12.) See II. Timothy, iii., 16, 
and ii., 16, and John, xvi., 13, and Ephesians, v., 9. Cf. John, v., 
39. [Depravities: crookedness ; want of virtue.] 

§ 834. — Learning and biblical criticism are indispensable to sup- 
port a church rising on a holy writ, (page 143, line 32.) 

§ 835. — Divine must not be disturbed by the arm of the magis- 
trate, (page 145, line 12.) Cf. § 795. 

§ 836. — No feeling can be trusted as a touchstone of revealed 
truth, (page 146, line 5.) Cf. St. John, vii., 17. [Elapses: sliding in; 
sudden entrance.] Cf §§ 164, 197, 140, 283, 284. 

§ 837. — Holy writ can have no expounder save the religion of 
pure reason working together with scripturary learning, (page 
147, line 16.) 

Chapter VII.— The Observed Transit of the Church Creed, Whereby it is 
Seen Gradually to Merge and to Become Eventually Sank and Lost in the 
Supremacy and Sovereignty of the Pure Apriori Ethical Belief, is a Certain 
Index that the Kingdom of God is at Hand. (?§ 838-855 inclusive.) 

§ 838. — Historical belief is contingent; pure moral religion alone 
is necessary, (page 148, line 15.) 

§ 839. — Historical belief may attend religion as its concomitant 
and introductory vehicle, (page 149, line 5.) [Omit the last sen- 
tence — the term church militant ought to be restricted to those 
whoPUTon the whole armor of God. (Ephesians, vi., 13.) For if a 
trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for 
battle ? (I. Corinthians, xiv, 8 )] 

§ 840. — Saving faith can be but one and practical, and must 



66 Kant's Ethics. 

pervade all diversities of church belief, (page 149, line 19.) Burst- 
inq from the vehiculary husk: Mark, iv., 28. [Ingenuous: native; 
indigenous; free born. (Andrews Latin Lexicon.)] 

§ 841. — Saving faith consists of two inseparable parts : (1) belief 
in righteousness; (2) belief in absolution, (page 150, line 7.) Of. 
§§ 766-768. Cf. (1) James, ii., 24, and (2) Galatians, ii., 21. 

§ 842. — Emerges a very extraordinary antinomy, (p. 150, 1. 28.) 

§ 843. — Eveiy sinner would gladly have the benefit of vicarious 
atonement, (page 151, line 6.) Cf. § 722 [ Utiliter : duly. Eadicitus : 
utterly. Funditus : completely. — Andrews.] 

§ 844. — Absolution is conditioned by redintegration of character. 
(Eepentance must go before forgiveness.) (page 152, line 3.) Cf. 
Luke, xiii.. 1-9. Reconciled! on: II. Corinthians, v., 20. 

§ 845. — Condition precedent of all exertion toward good works — 
(faith ; the required absolute conformity to law not being possible 
by man. See §§ 750, 751. Cf. Romans, iv., 15, 16.) (page 152, line 
19.) Cf. James, ii., 22 ; II. Peter, i., 5. Cf. §§ 760, 749. 

§ 846. — Practically we must begin by good works (by hencefor- 
ward leading an honest and upright life. §841.) (p. 153, 1. 7.) §724. 

§ 847. — Theoretically, the notion of absolution is necessary ; but 
reformation of life is the supreme condition, (page 153, line 22.) 

§ 848. — Ethic starts with a principle of acting ; revelation begins 
with a principle of believing, (page 154, line 7.) Cf. Arist. Nic. 
Eth. X.; ix., 1. 

§ 849. — Good moral conduct a duty absolutely imperative ; 
while absolution is of grace, (page 154, line 18.) Romans, vii., 1. 

§ 850. — Solution of the antinomy of faith, (page 155, line 9.) 
[To lead a life acceptable to God (which is your rational service, 
Romans, xii., 1,) in order to expert that His benignant care, that is, 
" before we can expect." The expectation must not constitute the 
motive. (Cf. §§ 228, 154. Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. VI., ii., 4.)] 

§ 851. — All forms of religion have afforded room for this antagon- 
ism of a twofold set of principles of faith, (page 157, line 18.) 

§ 852. — Transit to the pure religion of reason a necessary result 
of our physical and moral nature, (page 159, line 3.) 

§ 853. — Kingdom of Cod has come, whenever the transition 
principle has taken public root, (page 160, line 20.) Cf. Cicero de 
Ofnciis, I., v , 1: quae, si oculis cerneretur, 7nirabil.es amores, ut ait 
Plato (Phaedrus, c. 65, Anthon says), excitaret sapientiae. With 
this, compare Zoroaster, Avesta, Yagna. xxxi., 2 (Bleeck, ii., 86.) 

§ 854. — Aim at this grand end — concord and unity in religious 
belief, (page 161, line 9.) 

§ 855. — Give to the world perpetual peace, (page 162, line 3.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 67 

APOTOME II.— HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE GRADUAL 
FOUNDING OF A KINGDOM OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE ON 
EARTH, (g? 856-871.) 

§ 856. — No universal history of religion can be written, (page 
163, line 4.) 

§ 857. — Church history begins with the subordination of ecclesi- 
astical faith to pure ethical belief, (page 163, line 12.) [Enodation : 
solution of difficulty ; untying a knot. — Webster.'] 

§ 858. — Judaism an aggregate of statutable laws, whereon rested 
the political constitution, (page 164, line 24.) [The last fifteen lines 
may be omitted.] Judaical belief: Cf. §§ 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 
871, 881, 905, 906, 949, 968, and the following extracts from the 
Second Book of Moses, called Exodus : 

III., 13. And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the 
children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers 
hath sent me unto you ; and they shall say to me, what is his name ? 
what shall I say unto them? 14. And God said unto Moses, I AM 
THAT I AIM :f and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children 
of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you. 

IV., 10. And Moses said unto the Lord, O my Lord, I am not 
eloquent, neither heretofore, nor since thou hast spoken unto thy 
servant: but I am slow of speech, and of a slow tongue. 11. And 
the Lord said unto him, Who hath made man's mouth ? or who 
maketh the dumb, or deaf, or the seeing, or the blind ? have not I 
the Lord ? 12. Now therefore go, and I will be with thy mouth, 
and teach thee what thou shalt say. 

XIV., 10. And when Pharoh drew nigh, the children of Israel 
lifted up their eyes, and, behold, the Egyptians marched after them; 
and they were sore afraid : and the children of Israel cried out to 
the Lord. 

13. And Moses said unto the people, Fear ye not, stand still, and 
see the salvation of the Lord, which he will show you to-day: for 
the Egyptians whom ye have seen to-day, ye shall see them 

t " LXX. et author Vulgatae editionis Latinae hacc in praesentj transtuler- 
unt, Ego sum qui sum." [Annotata ad Exodum, cap. iii. page 47, Fagius. — 
(Jritici Sacri : sive annotata doctissimorum virorum in "Veins ac Novum Testa- 
mentum, etc, Amsterdam, MDCXCV1IL, vol. i.] '' Verutn Hebraei saepe 
usurpant futurum loco praesentis. Esse mitem soli Deo con ven it, qui est ilia 
Essentia quae nee praeteriit nee praeteribit, h. e. semper est. qui nunquam 
coepit, nee unquam desiturus est, sed transcendit omnem temporis rationem, et 
qui solus dicere. potest, Sum " [Clarius, id p. 51.] '-Est Deus ilia axistentia 
quae nee praeteriit nee praeteribit : h. e. Est Deus semper, qui nunquam coepit 
nee unquam desinetsed transcendit omnem temporis rationem, et quii-olus dicere 
potest, Sum. Est enim ipse omnis essentiae atque vitae fons et pienitudo,'' etc. 
[Munsterus, id. p. 46.] Ego eimi '0 ox. [LXX., ed. Leander van Ess, 
Lipsiae 1824, page 57.] Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil, vol. viii., page 350. 



'68 Kant's Ethics. § 858 

again no more forever. 14. The Lord shall light for you, and 
ye shall hold your peace. 

15. And the Lord said unto Moses, Wherefore criest thou 
unto me ? Speak unto the children op Israel, that they GO 
FOEWABD : 

26. v And the Lord said unto Moses, Stretch out thine hand over 
the sea, that the waters may come again upon the Egyptians, 
upon their chariots, and upon their horsemen. 27. And Moses 
stretched forth his hand over the sea, and the sea returned to his 
strength when the morning appeared ; and the Egyptians fled 
against it ; and the Lord overthrew the Egyptians in the midst of 
the sea. 

XV., 1. Then sang Moses and the children of Israel this song 
unto the Lord, and spake, saying, I will sing unto the Lord, for 
he hath triumphed gloriously : the horse and his rider hath he 
thrown into the sea. 

2. The Lord is my strength and song, and he is become my sal- 
vation : he is my God, and I will prepare him an habitation ; my 
father's God, and I will exalt him. 

6. Thy right hand, LorD, is become glorious in power : thy 
right hand, O Lord, hath dashed in pieces the enemy. 

11. Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the gods ? who is like 
thee, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders? 

13. Thou in thy mercy hast led forth the people which thou hast 
redeemed : thou hast guided them in thy strength unto thy holy 
habitation. 

17. Thou shalt bring them in, and plant them in the mountain 
of thine inheritance, in the place, O Lord, which thou hast made 
for thee to dwell in ; in the sanctuary, O Lord, which thy hands 
have established. 

18. The Lord shall reign for ever and ever. 

XIX., 3. And Moses went up unto God, and the Lord called 
unto him out of the mountain, saying, Thus shalt thou say to the 
house of Jacob, and tell the children of Israel : 4. Ye have seen 
what I did unto the Egyptians, and how I bare you on eagles' 
wings, and brought you unto myself. 5. Now therefore, if ye will 
obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be 
a peculiar treasure unto me above all people : for all the earth is 
mine : 6. And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an 
holy nation. These are the words which thou shalt speak unto 
the children of Israel. 

XX., 1. And God spake all these words, saying, 2. I am the 



§ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 69 

Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt,, 
out of the house of bondage. 

3. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 4. Thou shalt not 
make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that 
is in heaven ahove, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the 
water under the earth : 5. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to 
them, nor serve them : for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, 
visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third 
andiburth generation of them that hate me; 6. And showing 
mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my 
commandments. 

7. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain : 
for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name 
in vain. 

8. Eemember the sabbath-day, to keep it holy. 9. Six days 
shalt thou labor, and do all thy work : 10. But the seventh dav is- 
the sabbath of the Lord thy God : in it thou shalt not do any work, 
thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy 
maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy 
gates : 11. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the 
sea and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day : wherefore 
the Lord blessed the sabbath-day, and hallowed it. 

12. Honor thy father and thy mother : that thy days may be= 
long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. 

13. Thou shalt not kill. 

14. Thou shalt not commit adultery. 

15. Thou sbalt not steal. 

16. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. 

17. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not 
covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-ser- 
vant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor 'anything that is thy neighbor's. 

22. And the Lord said unto Moses, Thus thou shalt say unto the 
children of Israel : Ye have seen that I have talked with you from 
heaven. 23. Ye shall not make with me gods of silver, neither 
shall ye make unto you gods of gold. 

XXL, 12. He that smiteth a man so that he die, shall be surely- 
put to death. 13. And if a man lie not in wait, but God deliver 
him into his hand; then I will appoint thee a place whither he shall 
flee. 14. But if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbor, 
to slay him with guile ; thou shalt take him from mine altar, that he 
may die. 

15. And he that smiteth his father, or his mother, shall be surely- 
put to death. 



70 Kant's Ethics. § 858 

16. And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be 
found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death. 

17. And he that curseth his father or his mother, shall surely be 
put to death. 

18. And if men strive together, and one smite another with a 
stone, or with his fist, and he die not, but keepeth his bed : 19. If 
he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that 
smote him be quit ; only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and 
shall cause him to be thoroughly healed. 

26. And if a man smite the eye of his servant, or the eye of * his 
maid, that it perish ; he shall let him go free for his eye's sake. 
27. And if he smite out his man-servant's tooth, or his maid-ser- 
vant's toath ; he shall let him go free for his tooth's sake. 

28. If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die : then the ox 
shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten ; but the owner 
of the ox shall be quit. 29. But if the ox were wont to push with 
his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to his owner, and 
he hath not kept him in, but that he hath killed a man or a 
woman ; the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to 
death. 30. If there be laid on him a sum of money, then he shall 
give for the ransom of his life whatsoever is laid upon him. 31. 
Whether he have gored a son, or have gored a daughter, according 
to this judgment shall it be done unto him. 32. If the ox shall 
push a man-servant, or a maid-servant ; he shall give unto their 
master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned. 33. 
And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit, and not 
cover it, and an ox or an ass fall therein ; 34. The owner of the 
pit shall make it good, and give money unto the owner of them; 
and the dead beast shall be his. 35. And if one man's ox hurt 
another's, that he die; then they shall sell the live ox, and divide 
the money of it; and the dead ox also they shall divide. 36. Or if 
it be known that the ox hath used to push in time past, and his 
owner hath not kept him in ; he shall surely pay ox for ox, and the 
dead shall be his own. 

XXII., 1. If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or 
sell it ; he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a 
sheep. 2. If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he 
die, there shall no blood be shed for him. 3. Ifthesunbe risen 
upon him, there shall be blood shed for him : for he should make full 
restitution ; if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft. 
4. If the theft be certainly found in his hand alive, whether it be 
ox, or ass, or sheep ; he shall restore double. 

5. If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall 



§ 858 The Clavis to- an Index. 71 

put in his beast, and shall feed in another man's field ; of the best 
of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard shall he make 
restitution. 6. If fire break out, and catch in thorns, so that the 
stacks of corn, or the standing corn, or the field, be consumed there- 
with; he that kindled tho fire shall surely make restitution. 

7. If a man shall deliver unto his neighbor money or stuff to 
keep, and it be stolen out of the man's house ; if the thief be found, 
let him pay double. 8. If the thief be not found, then the master 
of the house shall be brought unto the judges, to see whether he 
have put his hand unto his neighbor's goods. 9. For all manner of 
trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for 
any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the 
cause of both parties shall come before the judges ; and whom the 
judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbor. 10. 
If a man deliver unto his neighbor an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, or 
any beast, to keep ; and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no man 
seeing it: 11. Then shall an oath of the Lord be between them 
both, that he hath not put his hand unto his neighbor's goods ; and 
the owner of it shall accept thereof, and he shall not make it good. 
12. And if it be stolen from him, he shall make restitution unto the 
owner thereof. 13. If it be torn in pieces, then let him bring it 
for witness, and he shall not make good that which was torn. 

14. And if a man borrow aught of his neighbor, and it be hurt, 
or die, the owner thereof being not with it, he shall surely make it 
good. 15. But if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not make it 
good : if it be an hired thing, it came for his hire. 

20. He that sacrificeth unto any god, save unto the Lord only, 
he shall be utterly destroyed. 

21. Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for ye 
were strangers in the land of Egypt. 22. Ye shall not afflict any 
widow, or fatherless child. 23.' If thou afflict them in anywise, 
and they cry at all unto me, I will surely hear their cry ; 24. And 
my wrath shall wax hot, and 1 will kill you with the sword ; and 
your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless. 

25. If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, 
thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon 
him usury. 

26. If thou at all take thy neighbor's raiment to pledge, thou 
shalt deliver it unto him by that the sun goeth down : 27. For 
that is his covering only, it is his raiment for his skin: wherein shall 
he sleep ? and it shall come to pass, when he crieth unto me, that 
I will hear ; for I am gracious. 

28. Thou shalt not revile the gods, nor curse the ruler of thy 
people. 



72 Kant's Ethics. § 858 

XXIII., 1. Thou shalt not raise a false report : put not thine 
hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness. 

4. If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou 
shalt surely bring it back to him again. 5. If thou see the ass of 
him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldst forbear 
to help him, thou shalt surely help with him. 

6. Thou shalt not wrest the judgment of thy poor in his cause. 
7. Keep thee far from a false matter ; and the innocent and right- 
eous slay thou not : for I will not justify the wicked. 

8. And thou shalt take no gift : for the gift blindeth the wise, and 
perverteth the words of the righteous. 

9. Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger : for ye know the 
heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. 

10. And six years thou shalt sow thy land, and shalt gather in 
the fruits thereof : 11. But the seventh year thou shalt let it rest 
and lie still ; that the poor of thy people may eat : and what they 
leave the beasts of the field shall eat. In like manner thou shalt 
deal with thy vineyard, and with thy oliveyard. 

12. Six days thou shalt do thy work, and on the seventh day 
thou shalt rest : that thine ox and thine ass may rest, and the son. 
of thy handmaid, and the stranger, may be refreshed. 

13. And in all things that I have said unto you' be circumspect : 
and make no' mention of the name of other gods, neither let it be 
heard out of thy mouth. 

XXXIII. , 17. And the Lord said unto Moses, I will do this thing 
also that thou hast spoken : for thou hast found grace in my sight, 
and I know thee by name. 

18. And he said, I beseech thee, show me thy glory. 19. And 
he said, I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will 
proclaim the name of the Lord before thee \ and will be gracious to 
whom I will be gracious, and will . show mercy on whom I will 
show mercy. 20. And he said, Thou canst not see my face : for 
there shall no man see me, and live. 

EXTRACTS FROM LEVITICUS. 

VI., 1. And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, 2. If a soul 
sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and lie unto his neigh- 
bor in that which was delivered him to keep, or in fellowship, or 
in a thing taken away by violence, or hath deceived his neighbor ; 
3. Or have found that which was lost, and lieth concerning it, and 
sweareth falsely ; in any of all these that a man doeth, sinning 
therein : 4. Then it shall be, because he hath sinned and is guilty,. 
that he shall restore that which he took violently away, or the 
thing which he hath deceitfully gotten, or that which was deliv- 



§ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 73 

ered him to keep, or the lost thing which he found, 5. Or all that 
about which he hath sworn falsely ; he shall even restore it in the 
principal, and shall add the fifth part more thereto, and give it unto 
him to whom it appertaineth, in the day of his trespass-offering. 

XVIII., 1. And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, 2. Speak 
unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, I am the Lord your 
God. 3. After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, 
shall ye not do : and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither 
I bring you, shall ye not do : neither shall ye walk in their ordin- 
ances. 4. Ye shall do my judgments, and keep mine ordinances^ 
to walk therein : I am the Lord your God. 5. Ye shall therefore 
keep my statutes, and my judgments : which if a man do, he shall 
live in them : I am- the Lord. 

29. For whosoever shall commit any of these abominations, even 
the souls that commit them shall be cut off from among their people. 
30. Therefore shall ye keep mine ordinance, that ye commit not 
any one of these abominable customs, which were committed before 
you, and that ye defile not yourselves therein : I am the Lord 
your God. 

XIX , 1. And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, 2. Speak 
unto all the congregation of the children of Israel, and say unto 
them, Ye shall be holy : for I the Lord your God am holy. 3. Ye 
shall fear every man his mother, and his father, and keep my sab- 
baths : I am the Lord your God. 4. Turn ye not unto idols, nor 
make to yourselves molten gods : I am the Lord your God. 

9. And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not- 
wholly reap the corners of thy field, neither shalt thou gather the 
gleanings of thy harvest. 10. And thou shalt not glean thy vine- 
yard, neither shalt thou gather every grape of thy vineyard ; thou 
shalt leave them for the poor and stranger : I am the Lord 
your God. 

11. Ye shall not steal, neither deal falsely, neither lie one to* 
another. 12. And ye shall not swear by my name falsely, neither 
shalt thou profane the name of thy God : I am the Lord. 13. 
Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbor, neither rob him : the wages 
of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the; 
morning. 14. Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling- 
block before the blind, but shalt fear thy God : I am the Lord. 
15. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment : thou shalt not 
respect the person of the poor, nor honor the person of the mighty: 
but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor. 16. Thou 
shalt not go up and down as a tale-bearer among thy people ; 
neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor : I am 

6 



74 Kant's Ethics. § 35S 

the Lord. 17. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: 
thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin 
upon him. 18. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge 
against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy 

NEIGHBOR AS THYSELF : 1 am the LORD. 

27. Ye shall not round the corners of your heads, neither shalt 
thou mar the corners of thy beard. 28. Ye shall not make any 
cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you: 
I am the Lord. 29. Do not prostitute thy daughter to cause her to 
be a whore; lest the land fall to whoredom, and the land become 
full of wickedness. 30. Ye shall keep my sabbaths, and reverence 
my sanctuary : I am the Lord. 31. Regard not them that have 
familiar spirits, neither seek after wizards, to be defiled by them : 
I am the Lord your God. 32. Thou shalt rise up before the hoary 
head, and honor the face of the old man, and fear thy God : I am 
the Lord. 33. And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, 
ye shall not vex him. 34. But the stranger that dwelleth with 
you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love 
him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt : I am 
the Lord your God. 35. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judg- 
ment, in meteyard, in weight, or in measure. 36. Just balances, 
just weights, a just ephah, and a just hin shall 'ye have: I am the 
Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt. 37. 
Therefore shall ye observe all my statutes, and all my judgments, 
and do them : I am the Lord. 

XXIV., 15. And thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, 
saying, Whosoever curseth his God shall bear his sin. 16. And 
he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put 
to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him : as well 
the stranger, as he that is born in the land, when he blasphemeth 
the name of the LORD, shall be put to death. 

17. And he that killeth any man shall surely be put to death. 

18. And he that killeth a beast shall make it good ; beast for 
beast. 19. And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor ; as he 
hath done, so shall it be done unto him: 20. Breach for breach, 
eye for eye, tooth for tooth : as he hath caused a blemish in a man, 
so shall it be done to him again. 21. And he that killeth a beast, 
he shall restore it : and he that killeth a man, he shall be put to death. 
22. Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as 
for one of your own country : for I am the Lord your God. 

XXV., 1. And the Lord spake unto Moses in Mount Sinai, say- 
ing, 10. And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim 
liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it 



■'■'§ 858 The Glavis to an Index. 75 

shall be a jubilee unto you ; and ye shall return every man unto 
his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family. 11. 
A jubilee shall that fiftieth year be unto you : ye shall not sow, 
neither reap that which groweth of itself in it, nor gather the grapes 
in it of thy vine undressed. 12. For it is the jubilee ; it shall be 
holy unto you: ye shall eat the increase thereof out of the field. 13. 
In the year of this jubilee ye shall return every man unto his 
possession. 

23. The land shall not be sold for ever : for the land is mine ; for 
ye are strangers and sojourners with me. 24. And in all the land 
of your possession ye shall grant a redemption for the land. 25. 
If thy brother be waxen poor, and hath sold away some of his pos- 
session, and if any of his kin come to redeem it, then shall he re- 
deem that which his brother sold. 26. And if the man have none 
to redeem it, and himself be able to redeem it ; 27. Then let him 
count the years of the sale thereof, and restore the overplus unto 
the man to whom he sold it; that he may return unto his posses 
sion. 28. But if he be not able to restore it to him, then that which 
is sold shall remain in the hand of him that hath bought it until 
the year of jubilee : and in the jubilee' it shall go out, and he shall 
return unto his possession. 

29. And if a man sell a dwelling-house in a walled city, then he 
may redeem it within a whole year after it is sold ; icithin a full 
year may he redeem it. 30. And if it be not redeemed within the 
space of a full year, then the house that is in the walled city shall 
"be established forever to him that bought it, throughout his gener- 
ations : it shall not go out in the jubilee. 31. But the houses of the 
villages which have no wall round about them, shall be counted as 
the fields of the country : they may be redeemed, and they shall 
go out in the jubilee. 32. Notwithstanding, the cities of the 
Levites, and the houses of the cities of their possession, may the 
Levites redeem at any time. 33. And if a man purchase of the 
Levites, then the house that was sold, and the city of his possession 
shall go out in the year of jubilee; for the houses of the cities of the 
Levites are their possession among the children of Israel. 34. But 
the field of the suburbs of their cities may not be sold, for it is their 
perpetual possession. 

35. And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay with 
thee ; then thou shalt relieve him : yea, though he be a stranger, or a 
sojourner ; that he may live with thee. 36. Take thou no usury of 
him, or increase : but fear thy God ; that thy brother may live with 
thee. 37. Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor 
lend him thy victuals for increase. 38. 1 am the Lord your God, 



76 Kant's Ethics. § 858: 

which brought you forth out of the land of Egpyt, to give you the 
land of Canaan, and to be your God. 

39. And if thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and 
be sold unto thee ; thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond- 
servant : 40. But as an hired servant, and as a sojourner he shall 
be with thee, and shall serve thee unto the year of jubilee : 41. 
And then shall he depart from thee, both he and his children with 
him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession 
of his fathers shall he return. 42. For they aremy servants which 
1 brought forth out of the land of Egypt : they shall not be sold as. 
bondmen. 43. Thou shalt not rule over him with rigor, but shalt 
fear thy God. 

XXVI., 1. Ye shall make you no idols nor graven image, neither 
rear you up a standing image, neither shall ye set up any image of 
stone in your land, to bow down unto it: for I am the Lord your 
God. 2. Ye shall keep my sabbaths, and reverence my sanctuary: 
I am the Lord. 

3. If ye walk in my statutes and keep my commandments, and. 
do them; 4. Then I will give you rain in due season, and the 
land shall yield her increase, and the trees of the field shall yield 
their fruit : 5. And your threshing shall reach unto the vintage, 
and the vintage shall reach unto the sowing-time : and ye shall eat 
your bread to the full, and dwell in your land safely. 6. And I 
will give peace in the land, and ye shall lie down, and none shall 
make you afraid : and I will rid evil beasts out of the land, neither 
shall the sword go through your land. 7. And ye shall chase your 
enemies, and they shall fall before you by the sword. 8. And five 
of you shall chase an hundred, and an hundred of you shall put 
ten thousand to flight : and your enemies shall fall before you 
by the sword. 9. For I will have respect unto you, and make 
you fruitful, and multiply you, and establish my covenant with 
you. 10. And ye shall eat old store, and bring forth the old be- 
cause of the new. 11. And I will set my tabernacle among you : 
and my soul shall not abhor you. 12. And £ will walk among j r ou, 
and will be your God, and ye shall be my people. 13. I am the 
Lord your God, which brought you forth out of the land of Egypt, 
that ye should not be their bondmen ; and I have broken the bands 
of your yoke, and made you go upright. 

14. But if ye will not hearken unto me, and will not do all these 
commandments ; 15. And if ye shall despise my statutes, or if 
your soul abhor my judgments, so that ye will not do all my com- 
mandments, but that ye break my covenant: 16. I also will do- 
this unto you ; I will even appoint over you terror, consumption,, 



§ 858 The Chwis to an Index. 77 

and the burning ague, that shall consume the eyes, and cause sor- 
row of heart : and ye shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies 
shall eat it. 17. And I will set my face against you, and ye shall 
be slain before your enemies : they that hate you shall reign over 
you, and ye shall flee when none pursueth you. 18. And if ye 
will not yet for all this hearken unto me, then I will punish you 
seven times more for your sins. 19. And I will break the pride of 
your power ; and I will make your heaven as iron, and your earth 
as brass : 20. And your strength shall be spent in vain : for your 
land shall not yield her increase, neither shall the trees of the land 
yield their fruits. 21. And if ye walk contrary unto me, and will 
not hearken unto me; I will bring seven times more plagues upon 
you according to your sins. 22. I will also send wild beasts among 
you, which shall rob you of your children, and destroy your cattle, 
and make you few in number; and your high-ways shall be desolate. 
23. And if ye will not be reformed by me by these things, but will 
walk contrary unto me ; 24. Then will I also walk contrary unto 
you, and will punish you yet seven times for your sins. 25. And 
I will bring a sword upon you, that shall avenge the quarrel of my 
covenant : and when ye are gathered together within your cities, 
I will send the pestilence among you; and ye shall be delivered 
into the hand of the enemy. 26. And when I have broken the 
staff of your bread, ten women shall bake your bread in one oven, 
and they shall deliver you your bread again by weight : and ye 
shall eat, and not be satisfied. 27. And if ye will not for all this 
hearken unto me, but walk contrary unto me ; 28. Then I will 
T^alk contrary unto you also in fury ; and I, even I, will chastise 
you seven times for your sins. 29. And ye shall eat the flesh of 
your sons, and the flesh of your daughters shall ye eat. 30. And I 
will destroy your high places, and cut down your images, and cast 
your carcasses upon the carcasses of your idols, and my soul shall 
abhor you. 31. And I will make your cities waste, and bring your 
^sanctuaries unto desolation, and I will not smell the savor of your 
sweet odors. 32. And I will bring the land into desolation : and 
your enemies which dwell therein shall be astonished at it. 33. 
And 1 will scatter you among the heathen, and will draw out a 
sword after you : and your land shall be desolate, and your cities 
"waste. 34. Then shall the land enjoy her sabbaths, as long as it 
lieth desolate, and ye be in your enemies' land ; even then shall the 
land rest, and enjoy her sabbaths. 35. As long as it lieth desolate 
5t shall rest ; because it did not rest in your sabbaths, when ye 
dwelt upon it. 36. And upon them that are left alive of you I 
will send a faintness into their hearts in the lands of their enemies; 



78 Kant's Ethics. § 858 

and the sound of a shaken leaf shall chase them ; and they shall 
flee, as fleeing from a sword ; and they shall fall when none pur- 
sueth. 37. And they shall fall one upon another, as it were before 
a sword, when none pursueth : and ye shall have no power to 
stand before your enemies. 38. And ye shall perish among the 
heathen, and the land of your enemies shall eat you up. 39. And 
they that are left of you shall pine away in their iniquity 
in your enemies' lands; and also in the iniquities of their fathers 
shall they pine away with them. 

40. If they shall confess their iniquity, and the iniquity of their 
fathers, with their trespass which they trespassed against me, and 
that also they have walked contrary unto me ; 41. And that I 
also have walked contrary unto them, and have brought them into 
the land of their enemies ; if then their uncircumcised hearts be 
humbled, and they then accept of the punishment of their iniquity: 
42. Then will I remember my covenant with Jacob, and also my 
CDvenant with Isaac, and also my covenant with Abraham will I 
remember ; and I will remember the land. 43. The land also shall 
be left of them, and shall enjoy her sabbaths, while she lieth deso- 
late without them : and they shall accept of the punishment of 
their iniquity: because, even because they despised my judgments, 
and because their soul abhorred my statutes. 44. And yet for alL 
that, when they be in the land of their enemies, I will not cast them 
away, neither will I abhor them, to destroy them utterly, and to 
break my covenant with them : for I am the Lord their Clod. 45. 
But I will for their sakes remember the covenant of their ancestors, 
whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt in the sight. 
of the heathen, that I might be their God : I am the Lord. 

46. These are the statutes and judgments and laws, which the 
Lord made between him and the children of Israel in mount Sinai 
by the hand of Moses. 

EXTRACTS FROM DEUTERONOMY. 

I., 5. On this side Jordan, in the land of Moab, began Moses to 
declare this law, saying, 

6. The Lord our Gfod spake unto us in Horeb, saying, Ye have 
dwelt long enough in this mount : 7. Turn you, and take your 
journey, and go to the mount of the Amorites, and unto a\\ the places 
nigh thereunto, in the plain, in the hills, and in the vale, and in the 
south, and by the sea-side, to the land of the Canaanites, and unto 
Lebanon, unto the great river, the river Euphrates. 8. Behold, I 
have set the land before you : go in and possess the land which the 
Lord sware unto your fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to give, 
unto them and to their seed after them. 



§ 858 The Olavis to an Index. 79 

9. And I spake unto you at that time, saying, I am not able to 
bear you myself alone : 10. The Lord your God hath multiplied 
you, and behold, ye are this day as the stars of heaven for multi- 
tude. 11. (The Lord God of your fathers make you a thousand 
times so many more as ye are, and bless you, as he hath promised 
you !) 12. How can I myself alone bear your cumbrance, and your 
burden, and your strife ? 13. Take ye wise men, and understand- 
ing, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers 
over you. 14. And ye answered me, and said, The thing which 
thou hast spoken is good for us to do. 15. So I took the chief' of 
your tribes, wise men, and known, and made them heads over you, 
captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, and captains 
over fifties, and captains over tens, and officers among your tribes. 
16. And I charged your judges at that time, saying. Hear the 
causes between your brethren, and judge righteously between every 
man and his brother, and the stranger that is with him. 17. Ye 
shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the small 
as well as the great ; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man ; for 
the judgment is God's : and the cause that is too hard for you, bring 
it unto me, and I will hear it. 18. And I commanded you at that 
time all the things which ye should do. 

IV., 1. Now therefore hearken, O Israel, unto the statutes and 
unto the judgments, which I teach you, for to do them, that ye may 
live, and go in and possess the land which the Lord God of your 
fathers giveth you. 2. Ye shall not add unto the word which I 
command you, neither shall ye diminish aught from it, that ye may 
keep the commandments of the Lord your God which I command 
you. 3. Your eyes have seen what the Lord did because of Baal- 
peor : for all the men that followed Baal-peor, the Lord thy God 
hath destroyed them from among you. 4. But ye that did cleave 
unto the Lord your God are alive every one of you this day. 5. 
Behold, I have taught you statutes and judgments, even as the 
Lord my God commanded me, that ye should do so in the land 
whither ye go to possess it. 6. Keep therefore and do them; for 
this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the 
nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this 
great nation is a wise and understanding people. 7. For what 
nation is there so great, who hath God so nigh unto them, as the Lord 
our God is in all things that we call upon him for f 8. And what 
nation is there so great, that hath statutes and judgments so righteous 
as all this law, which I set before you this day ? 9. Only take heed 
to thyself, and keep thy soul diligently, lest thou forget the things 
which thine eyes have seen, and lest they depart from thy heart all 



80 Kant's Ethic*. § 858 

the days of thy life : hut teach them thy sons, and thy sons' sons; 
10. Specially the day that thou stoodest before the Lord thy God in 
Horeb, when the Lord said unto me, (rather me the people together, 
and I will make them hear my words, that they may learn to fear 
me all the days that they shall live upon the earth, and that they 
may teach their children. 11. And ye came near and stood under 
the mountain ; and the mountain burned with fire unto the midst of 
heaven, with darkness, clouds, and thick darkness. 12. And the 
Lord spake unto you out of the midst of the fire : ye heard the voice 
of the words, but saw no similitude ; only ye heard a voice. 13. And 
he declared unto you his covenant, which he commanded you to 
perform, even ten commandments ; and he wrote them upon two 
tablets of stone. 14. And the Lord commanded me at that time to 
teach you statutes and judgments, that ye might do them in the 
land whither ye go over to possess it. 

15. Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves ; for ye saw no 
manner of similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in 
Horeb out of the midst of the fire ; 16. Lest ye corrupt yourselves 
and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the 
likeness of male or female, 17. The likeness of any beast that is on 
the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl that flieth in the air, 
18. The likeness of anything that creepeth on the ground, the 
likeness of any fish that {sin the waters beneath the earth: 19. 
And lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest 
the sun, and the moon, and the stars, even all the host of heaven 
shouldest be driven to worship them, and serve them, which the' 
Lord thy God had divided unto all nations under the whole heaven. 
20. But the Lord hath taken you, and brought you forth out of 
the iron furnace, even out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of 
inheritance, as ye are this day. 21. Furthermore the Lord was 
angry with me for your sakes, and sware that I should not go over 
Jordan, and that I should not go in unto that good land which the 
Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance : 22. But 1 must die 
In this land, I must not go over Jordan : but ye shall go over, and 
possess that good land. 23. Take heed unto yourselves, lest ye 
forget the covenant of the Lord your God, which he made with 
you, and make you a graven image, or the likeness of any thing 
which the Lord thy God hath forbidden thee. 24. For the Lord 
thy God is a consuming fire, even a jealous God. 

25. When thou shalt beget children, and children's children, and 
ye shall have remained long in the land, and shall corrupt yourselves, 
and make a graven image, or the likeness of any thing, and shall do 
evil in the sight of the Lord tlry God, to provoke him to anger: 26. 



§ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 81 

I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that ye 
shall soon utterly perish from off the land whereunto ye go over Jor- 
dan to possess it; ye shall not prolong your days upon it, hut shall ut- 
terly he destroyed. 27. And the Lord shall scatter you among 
the nations, and ye shall be left few in number among the heathen, 
whither the Lord shall lead you. 28. And there ye shall serve 
gods, the work of men's hands, wood and stone, which neither see, 
nor hear, nor eat, nor smell. 29. But if from thence thou shalt 
seek the Lord thy God, thou shalt find him, if thou seek him with 
all thy heart and with all thy soul. 30. "When thou art in tribula- 
tion, and all these things are come upon thee, even in the latter 
days, if thou turn to the Lord thy God, and shalt be obedient unto 
his voice ; 31. (For the Lord thy God is a merciful God ;) he will 
not forsake thee, neither destroy thee, nor forget the covenant of 
thy fathers which he sware unto them. 

32. For ask now of the days that are past, which were before thee, 
since the day that God created man upon the earth, and ask from 
the one side of heaven unto the other, whether there hath been any 
such thing as this great thing is, or hath been heard like it ? 33. 
Did ever people hear the voice of God speaking out of the midst of 
the fire, as thou hast heard, and live ? 34. Or hath God assayed to 
go and take him a nation from the midst of another nation, by temp- 
tations, by signs, and by wonders, and by war, and by a mighty 
hand, and by a stretched out arm, and by great terrors, according 
to all that the Lord your God did for you in Egypt before your eyes? 
35. Unto thee it was showed, that thou mightest know that the Lord 
he is God : there is none else beside him. 36. Out of heaven he 
made thee to hear his voice, that he might instruct thee : and upon 
earth he showed thee his great fire ; and thou heardest his words 
out of the midst of the fire. 37. And because he loved thy fathers, 
therefore he chose their seed after them, and brought thee out in his 
sight with his mighty power out of Egypt ; 38. To drive out 
nations from before thee greater and mightier than thou art, to 
bring thee in, to give thee their land for an inheritance, as it is this 
day. 39. Know therefore this day, and consider it in thipe heart, 
that the Lord he is God in heaven above, and upon the earth be- 
neath: there is none else. 40. Thou shalt keep therefore his statutes, 
and his commandments,which 1 command thee this day, that it may 
go well with thee, and with thy children after thee, and that thou 
mayest prolong thy days upon the earth which the Lord thy God 
giveth thee, for ever. 

V., 1. And Moses called all Israel, and said unto them, Hear. O 
Israel, the statutes and judgments which I speak in your ears this 



82 Kant's Ethics. § 858- 

day, that ye may learn them, and keep, and do them. 2. The Lord 
our God made a covenant with us in Horeb. 3 The Lord made not 
this covenant with our fathers, but with us, even us, who are all of 
us here alive this day. 4. The Lord talked with you face to face in 
the mount, out of the midst of the fire, 5. (I stood between the 
Lord and you at that time, to show you the word of the Lord : for 
ye were afraid by reason of the fire, and went not up to the mount;) 
saying, 

6. I am the Lord thy G-od, which brought thee out of the land of 
Egypt from the house of bondage. 7. Thou shalt have none other 
gods before me. 

8. Thou shalt not make thee any graven image, or any likeness of 
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, 
or that is in the waters beneath the earth : 9. Thou shalt not bow 
down thyself unto them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy Godam 
a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children 
unto'the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, 10- 
And showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and 
keep my commandments. 

11. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain :.- 
for the Lord will not hold Mm guiltless that taketh his name 
in vain. 

12. Keep the sabbath-day to sanctify it, as the Lord thy God, 
hath commanded thee. 13. Six days thou shalt labor, and do all 
thy work : 14. But the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord 
thy God : in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor 
thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor 
thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger- 
that is within thy gates ; that thy man-servant and thy maid-ser- 
vant may rest as well as thou. 15. And remember that thou wast 
a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord thy God brought 
thee out thence through a mighty hand and by a stretched, out 
arm: therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the 
sabbath- day. 

16. Honor thy. father and thy mother, as the Lord thy God 
hath commanded thee; that thy days may be prolonged, and: that 
it may go well with thee, in the land which the Lord thy God. 
giveth thee. .... 

17. Thou shalt not kill. 

18. Neither shalt thou commit adultery. 

19. Neither shalt thou steal. 

20. Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbor.. 

21. Neither shalt thou desire thy neighbor's wife, neither shalt 



§ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 83" 

thou covet thy neighbor's house, his field, or his manservant, or 
his maidservant, his ox, or hie ass, or any thing that is thy 
neighbor's. 

22. These words the Lord spake unto all j^our assembly in the 
mount out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud, and of the thick 
darkness, with a gTeat voice : and he added no more. And he 
wrote them in two tablets of stone, and delivered them iinto me.. 
23. And it came to pass, when ye heard the voice out of the midst 
of the darkness, (for the mountain did burn with fire,) that ye 
came near unto me, even all the heads of your tribes, and your 
elders ; 24. And ye said, Behold, the Lord our God hath showed 
us his glory and his greatness, and we have heard his voice out of 
the midst of the fire : we have seen this day that God doth talk 
with man, and he liveth. 25. Now therefore why should we die? 
for this great fire will consume us: if we hear the voice of the Lord 
our God any more, then we shall die. 26. For who is there of all 
flesh that hath heard the voice of the living God speaking out of 
the midst of the fire, as we have, and lived? 27. Go thou near, and 
hear all that the Lord our God shall say : and speak thou unto us 
all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee ; and we will hear 
it, and do it. 28. And the Lord heard the voice of your words, 
when ye spake unto me ; and the Lord said unto me, 1 have heard 
the voice of the words of this people, which they have spoken unto 
thee : they have well said all that the} 7 have spoken. 29. that 
there were such an heart in them, that they would fear me, and 
keep all my commandments always, that it might bo well with 
them, and with their children for ever ! 30. Go say to them, Get 
you into your tents again. 31. But as for thee, stand thou here 
by me. and I will speak unto thee all the commandments, and the 
statutes, and the judgments, which thou shaft teach them, that they 
may do them in the land which -I give them to possess it. 32. Ye 
shall observe to do therefore as the Lord your God hath com- 
manded you : ye shall not turn aside to the right hand or to the 
left. 33. Ye shall walk in all the ways which the Lord your God 
hath commanded you, that ye may live, and that it may be well 
with you, and that ye may prolong your days in the land which ye 
shall possess. 

VI , 1. Now these are the commandments, the statutes, and the 
judgments, which the Lord your God commanded to teach you, 
that ye might do them in the land whither ye go to possess it: 2. 
That thou might est fear the Lord thy God, to keep all his statutes 
and his commandments which I command thee, thou, and thy son, 
and thy son's son-, all the days of thy life ; and that thy days may 
be prolonged. 



J84 Kanfs Ethics. § 858 

3. Hear therefore, Israel, and observe to do it ; that it may be 
-well with thee, and that ye may increase mightily, as the Lord 
God of thy fathers hath promised thee, in the land that floweth 
with milk and honey. 

4. Hear, O Israel : the Lord our God is one Lord : 5. And 

THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD THY GOD WITH ALL THINE HEART, AND 
WITH ALL THY SOUL, AND WITH ALL THY MIGHT. 6. And these 

words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart : 
7. And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and 
shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou 
walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou 
risest up. 8. And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thine hand, 
and they shalt be as frontlets between thine eyes. 9. And thou 
shalt write them upon the posts of thy house, and on thy gates. 

10. And it shall be, when the Lord thy God shall have brought 
thee into the land which he sware unto thy fathers, to Abraham, 
to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give the great and goodly cities, which 
thou buildedst not, 11. And houses full of all good things,which thou 
filledst not, and wells digged, which thou diggedst not, vineyards 
and olive-trees, which thou plantedst not ; when thou shalt have 
•eaten and be full ; 12. Then beware lest thou forget the Lord, 
which brought thee forth out of the land of Egypt, from the house 
of bondage. 13. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, 
and shalt swear by his name. 14. Ye shall not go after other gods, o 
the gods of the people which are round about you ; 15. (For the 
Lord thy God is a jealous God among you) lest the anger of the 
Lord thy God be kindled against thee, and destroy thee from off 
the face of the earth. 16. Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God, 
as ye tempted him in Massah. 17. Ye shall diligently keep the 
commandments of the Lord your God, and his testimonies, and his 
statutes, which he hath commanded thee. 18. And thou shalt 
do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord : that it 
may be well with thee, and that thou mayst go in and possess the 
good land which the Lord sware unto thy fathers, 19. To cast 
out all thine enemies from before thee, as the Lord hath spoken. 

20. And when thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying, What 
mean the testimonies, and the statutes, and the judgments, which 
the Lord our God hath commanded you? 21. Then thou shalt 
say unto thy son, We were Pharaoh's bondmen in Egypt; and the 
Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand : 22. And the 
Lord showed signs and wonders, great and sore, upon Egypt, upon 
Pharaoh, and upon all his household, before our eyes : 23. And 
he brought us out from thence, that he might bring us in, to give 



§ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 85* 

us the land which he sware unto our fathers. 24. And the Loiu> 
commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God,, 
for our good always, that he might preserve us alive, as it is at this 
day. 25. And it shall be our righteousness, if we observe to do alL 
these commandments before the Lord our God, as he hath com- 
manded us. 

VII., 6. For thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God : 
the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto 
himself, above all people that are upon the face of the earth. 7. 
The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye 
were more in number than any people; for ye were the fewest of all 
people : 8. But because the Lord loved you, and because he would, 
keep the oath which he had sworn unto your fathers, hath the Lord 
brought you out with a mighty hand, and redeemed you out of the 
house of bondmen, from the hand of Pharaoh king of Egypt. 

9. Know therefore that the Lord thy God, he is God, the faithful 
God, which keepeth covenant and mercy with them that love him 
and keep his commandments to a thousand generations ; 10. And 
repayeth them that hate him to their face, to destroy them : he 
will not be slack to him that hateth him, he will repay him to his 
face. 11. Thou shalt therefore keep the commandments, and the 
statutes, and the judgments, which I command thee this day, to^ 
do them. 

12. Wherefore it shall come to pass, if ye hearken to these 
judgments, and keep, and do them, that the Lord thy God shall 
keep unto thee covenant and the mercy which he sware unto thy 
fathers : 13. And he will love thee, and bless thee, and multiply 
thee : he will also bless the fruit of thy womb, and the fruit of thy 
land, thy corn, and thy wine, and thine oil, the increase of thy 
kine, and the flocks of thy sheep, in the land which he sware unto 
thy fathers to give thee. 14. Thou shalt be blessed above all peo- 
ple : there shall not be male or female barren among you, or among 
your cattle. 15. And the Lord will take away from thee all sick- 
ness, and will put none of the evil diseases of Egypt, which thou 
knowest, upon thee; but will lay them upon all them that hate thee.. 

X., 12. And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of' 
thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his ways, and to 
love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and 
with all thy soul, 13. To keep the commandments of the Lord, 
and his statutes, which I command thee this day for thy good ? 
14. Behold, the heaven and the heaven of heavens is the Lord's 
thy God, the earth also, with all that therein is. 15. Only the 
Lord had a delight in thy fathers to love them, and he 



.86 Kant's Ethics. § 858 

■chose their seed after them, even you above all people, as 
it is this day. 16. Circumcise therefore the foreskin o? your 
heart, and be no more stiff-necked. 17. For the Lord your 
God is G-od of gods, and Lord of lords, a great God, a mighty, 
and a terrible, which regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward : 18. 
He doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow, and 
loveth the stranger, in giving him food and raiment. 19. Love 
ye therefore the stranger: for ye were strangers in the land of 
Egypt. 20. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God ; him shaft thou 
serve, and to him shalt thou cleave, and swear by his name. 21. 
He is thy praise, and he is thy God, that hath done for thee these 
great and terrible things, which thine eyes have seen. 22. Thy 
fathers went down into Egypt with three-score and ten persons : 
and now the Lord thy God hath made thee as the stars of heaven 
for multitude. 

XL, 1. Therefore thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and keep 
his charge, and his statutes, and his judgments, and his command- 
ments, alway. 

18. Therefore shall ye lay up these my words in your heart and 
in your soul, and bind them for a sign upon your hand, that they 
may be as frontlets between your eyes. 19. And ye shall teach 
them your children, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine 
house, and when thou walkest by the way, when thou best down 
and when thou risest up. 20. And thou shalt write them upon the 
door posts of thine house, and upon thy gates : 21. That your days 
may be multiplied, and the days of your children, in the land 
which the Lord sware unto your fathers to give them, as the days 
of heaven upon the earth. 

26. Behold, I set before you this day a blessing and a curse ; 
27. A blessing, if ye obey the commandments of the Lord your 
God, which I command you this day: ; 28. And a curse, if ye will 
not obey the commandments of the Lord your God, but turn aside 
out of the way which I command you this day, to go after other 
gods, which ye have not known. 

XIV., 22. Thou shalt truly tithe all the increase of thy seed, 
that the field bringeth forth year by year. 

23. And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God, in the place 
which he shall choose to place his name there, the tithe of thy corn, 
of thy wine, and of thine oil. and the firstlings of thy herds 
and of thy flocks ; that thou mayst learn to fear the Lord thy God 
always. 

24. And if the way be too long for thee, so that thou art not able 
to carry it; or if the place be too far from thee, which the Lord 



^ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 87 

thy God shall choose to set his name there, when the Lord thy 
God hath blessed thee : 25. Then shalt thou turn it into money, 
and bind up the money in thinehand, and shalt go unto the place 
which the Loud thy God shall choose: 26. And thou shalt bestow 
that money for whatsoever thy soiil lusteth alter, for oxen, or for 
sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink, or for whatsoever thy soul 
desireth : and thou shalt eat there before the Lord thy God, and 
thou shalt rejoice, thou, and thine household. 27. And the Levite 
that is within thy gates ; thou shalt not forsake him: for he hath 
no part nor inheritance with thee. 

28. At the end of three years thou shalt bring forth all the tithe 
of thine increase the same year, and shalt lay it up within thy 
gates : 29. And the Levite, (because he hath no part nor inherit- 
ance with thee,) and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, 
which are within thy gates, shall come, and shall eat and be satis- 
fied ; that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine 
hand which thou doest. 

XV., 1. At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release. 
2. And. this is the manner of the release : Every creditor that 
lendeth aught unto his neighbor, shall release it; he shall not exact 
it of his neighbor, or of his brother ; because it is called the Lord's 
release. 3. Of a foreigner thou mayst exact it again : but that 
which is thine with thy brother thine hand shall release ; 4. Save 
when there shall be no poor among you ; tor the Lord shall greatly 
bless thee in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an 
inheritance to possess it : 5. Only if thou carefully hearken unto 
the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe to do all these command- 
ments which I command thee this day. 6. For the Lord thy God 
blesseth thee, as he promised thee : and thou shalt lend unto many 
nations, but thou shalt not borrow ; and thou shalt reign over many 
nations, but they shall not reign over thee. 

7. If there be among you a poor man of one of thy brethren 
within any of thy gates in thy land which the Lord thy God giveth 
thee, thou shalt not harden thine heart, nor shut thine hand from 
thy poor brother: 8. But thou shalt 0])en thine hand wide unto 
him, and shalt surely lend him sufficient for his need, in that which 
he wanteth. 9. Beware that there be not a thought in thy wicked 
Jieart, saying, The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand ; 
and thine eye be evil against thy poor brother, and thou givest him 
naught ; and he cry unto the Lord against thee, and it be sin unto 
thee. 10. Thou shalt surely give him, and thine heart shall not be 
grieved when thou givest unto him : because that for this thing 
the Lord thy God shall bless thee in all thy works, and in all that 



88 Kant's Ethics. § 858 

thou puttest thine hand unto. 11. For the poor shall never cease 
out of the land : therefore I command thee, saying, Thou shalt 

OPEN THINE HAND WIDE UNTO THY BROTHER, TO THY POOR, AND TO 
THY NEEDY, IN THY LAND. 

12. And if thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman, 
be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years ; then in the seventh 
year thou shalt let him go free from thee. 13. And when thou 
sendest him out free from thee, thou shall not let him go away 
empty: 14. Thou shalt furnish him liberally out of thy flo(k, 
and out of thy floor, and out of thy wine-press : of that wherewith 
the Lord thy God hath blessed thee thou shalt give unto him. 15. 
And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land 
of Egypt, and the Lord thy God redeemed thee : therefore I com- 
mand thee this thing to-day. 16. And it shall be, if he say unto 
thee, I will not go away from thee; because he loveth thee and thine 
house, because he is well with thee ; 17. Then thou shalt take an 
awl, and thrust it through his ear unto the door, and he shall be 
thy servant forever. And also unto thy maidservant thou shalt 
do likewise. 18. It shall not seem hard unto thee, when thou 
sendest him away free from thee : for he hath been worth a double 
hired servant to thee, in serving thee six years : and the Lord thy 
God shall bless thee in all that thou doest. 

XVI., 16. Three times in a year shall all thy males appear before 
the Lord thy God in the place which he shall choose ; in the feast 
of unleavened bread, and in the feast of weeks, and in the feast of 
tabernacles : and they shall not appear before the Lord empty : 
17. Every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of 
the Lord thy God which he hath given thee. 

18. Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, 
which the Lord thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes : and 

they SHALL JUDGE THE PEOPLE WITH JUST JUDGMENT. 19. Thou shalt 

not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, neither take a 
gift : for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the 
words of the righteous. 20. That which is altogether just 
shalt thou follow, that thou mayst live, and inherit the land 
which the Lord thy God giveth thee. 

21. Thou shalt not plant thee a grove of any trees near unto the 
altar of the Lord thy God, which thou shalt make thee. 22. 
Neither shalt thou set thee up any image ; which the Lord thy God 
hateth. 

XVII., 8. If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, 
between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke 
and stroke, being matters of controversy within thy gates : then 



§ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 89 

shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the Lord 
thy God shall choose ; 9. And thou shalt come unto the prie'sts 
the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and 
inquire ; and they shall 6how thee the sentence of judgment : 10. 
And thou shalt do according to the sentence, which they of that 
place which the Lord shall choose shall show thee; and thou shalt 
observe to do according to all that they inform thee : 11. Accord- 
ing to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, and ac- 
cording to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do : 
thou shalt not decline from the sentence which they shall show 
thee, to the right hand nor to the left. 12. And the man that will 
do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest that 
standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God, or unto the 
judge, even that man shall die : and thou shalt put away the evil 
from Israel. 13. And all the people shall hear, and fear, and do 
no more presumptuously. 

XVIII., 9. When thou art come into the land which the Lord 
thy God giveth thee, thou shalt not learn to do after the abomina- 
tions of those nations. 10. There shall not be found among you 
any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the 
fire, or that useth divination, or an observer of times, or an en- 
chanter, or a witch, 11. Or a charmer, or a consulter with 
familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer. 12. For all that do 
these things are an abomination unto the Lord : and because of 
these abominations the Lord thy God doth drive them out from 
before thee. 13. Thou shalt be perfect with the Lord thy God. 
14. For these nations, which thou shalt possess, hearkened unto 
observers of times, and unto diviners : but as for thee, the Lord 
thy God hath not suffered thee so to do. 

.XIX., 1. When the Lord thy God hath cut off the nations, 
whose land the Lord thy God giveth thee, and thou succeedest 
them, and dwellest in their cities, and in their houses ; 2. Thou 
shalt separate three cities for thee in the midst of thy land, which 
the Lord thy God giveth thee to possess it. 3. Thou shalt prepare 
thee a way, and divide the coasts of thy land, which the Lord thy 
God giveth thee to inherit, into three parts, that every slayer may 
flee thither. 

4 And this is the case of the slayer, which shall flee thither, that 
he may live : Whoso killeth his neighbor ignorantly, whom he 
hated not in time past ; 5. As when a man goeth into the wood with 
his neighbor to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the ax 
to cutdown the tree, and the head slippeth from the helve, and light- 
eth upon his neighbor, that he die ; he shall flee unto one of those 

7 



90 Kant's Ethics. §*85S 

cities, and live : 6. Lest the avenger of blood pursue the slayer, 
while his heart is hot, and overtake him, because the way is long, 
and slay him ; whereas he was not worthy of death, inasmuch as 
he hated him not in time past. 7. Wherefore I command thee, 
saying, Thou shalt separate three cities for thee. 8. And if the 
Lord thy God enlarge thy coast, as he hath sworn unto thy fathers, 
and give thee all the land which he promised to give unto thy 
fathers; 9. If thou shalt keep all these commandments to do them, 
which I command thee this day, to love the Lord thy God, and to 
walk ever in his ways ; then shalt thou add three cities more for 
thee, beside these three : 10. That innocent blood be not shed in 
thy land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance, 
and so blood be upon thee. 

11. But if any man hate his neighbor, and lie in wait for him, 
and rise up against him, and smite him mortally that he die, and 
fleeth into one of these cities : 12. Then the elders of his city 
shall send and fetch him thence, and deliver him into the hand of 
the avenger of blood, that he may die. 13. Thine eye shall not 
pity him, but thou shalt put away the guilt of innocent blood from 
Israel, that it may go well with thee. 

14. Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's land-mark, which they 
of old time have set in thine inheritance, which thou shalt inherit 
in the land that the Lord thy God giveth thee to possess it. 

15. One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity,, 
or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth : at the mouth of two wit- 
nesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be 
established. 

16. If a false witness rise up against any man to testify against 
him that which is wrong ; 17. Then both the men, between whom 
the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord, before the priests, 
and the judges, which shall be in those days ; 18. And the judges 
shall make diligent inquisition : and behold, if the witness be a false 
witness, and hath testified falsely against his brother; 19. Then 
shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to have done unto his 
brother : so shalt thou put the evil away from among you. 20, 
And those which remain shall hear, and fear, and shall henceforth 
commit no more any such evil among you. 21. And thine eye 
shall not pity ; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, 
hand for hand, foot for foot. 

XXI., 15. If a man have two wives, one beloved, and another 
hated, and they have borne him children, both the beloved and the 
hated ; and if the first-born son be hers that was hated : 16. Then 
it shall be, when he maketh his sons to inherit that which he hath, 



; l § 858 The Clavis to an Index. 91 

itkat he may not make the son of the beloved first-born, before the 

son of the hated, which is indeed the first-born : 17. But he shall 
acknowledge the son of the hated for the first-born, by giving him 
a double portion of all that he hath : for he is the beginning of his 

-strength ; the right of the first-born is his. 

18. If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not 
obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, 
when they have chastened him, will not hearken unto them : 19. 
Then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him, and bring 
him out unto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place ; 
20. And they shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son is 

: stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice ; he is a glutton, 
and a drunkard. 21. And all the men of his city shall stone him 
with stones, that he die : so shalt thou put evil away from among 

.you; and all Israel shall hear, and fear. 

XXII. , 1. Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep go 
astray, and hide thyself from them: thou shalt in any case bring 
them again unto thy brother. 2. And if thy brother be not nigh 
unto thee, or if thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it unto 
thine own house, and it shall be with thee until thy brother seek 
after it, and thou shalt restore it to him again. 3. In like manner 
shalt thou do with his ass ; and so shalt thou do with his raiment; 
and with all lost things of thy brother's, which he hath lost, and 
thou hast found, shalt thou do likewise : thou ma} r est not hide thy- 
self. 4. Thou shalt not see thy brother's ass or his ox fall down by 
the way, and hide thyself from them : thou shalt surely help him 
to lift them up again. 

6. If a bird's nest chance to be before thee in the way in any 
tree, or on the ground, whether they be young ones, or eggs, and the 
dam sitting upon the young, or upon the eggs, thou shalt not take 
the dam with the young: 7. But thou shalt in any wise let the 
dam go, and take the young to thee ; that it may be well with thee, 
and that thou mayest prolong thy days. 

8. "When thou bulkiest a new house, then thou shalt make a bat- 
tlement for thy roof, that thou bring not blood upon thine house, if 
any man fall from thence. 

XXIII., 15. Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant 
which is escaped from his master unto thee : 16. He shall dwell 
with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose in 
■one of thy gates, where it liketh him best : thou shalt not op- 
press him. 

19. Thou shalt not lend upon usmy to thy brother ; usury of 
money, usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon 



92 Kant's Ethics. § 858 

usury : 20. Unto a stranger thou may est lend upon usury ; but 
unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury : that the Lord 
thy God may bless thee in all that thou settest thine hand to in 
the land whither thou goest to possess it. 

24. When thou comest into thy neighbor's vineyard, then thou 
mayest eat grapes thy fill, at thine own pleasure ; but thou shalt 
not put any in thy vessel. 25. When thou comest into the stand- 
ing-corn of thy neighbor, then thou mayest pluck the ears with 
thine hand ; but thou shalt not move a sickle unto thy neighbor's 
standing- corn. 

XXIV., 6. No man shall take the nether or the upper millstone 
to pledge : for he taketh a man's life to pledge. 

7. If a man he found stealing any of his brethren of the children 
of Israel, and makcth merchandise of him, or selleth him; then 
that thief shall die ; and thou shalt put evil away from among you. 

10. When thou dost lend thy brother anything, thou shalt not 
go into his house to fetch his pledge. 11. Thou shalt stand ahroad, 
and the man to whom thou dost lend shall bring out the pledge 
abroad unto thee. 12. And if the man be poor, thou shalt not 
sleep with his pledge : 13. In any case thou shalt deliver him the 
pledge again when the sun goeth down, that he may sleep in his 
own raiment, and bless thee : and it shall be righteousness unto 
thee before the Lord thy God. 

14. Thou shalt not oppress an hired servant that is poor and 
needy, whether he be of thy brethren, or of thy strangers that are- 
in thy land within thy gates : 15. At his day thou shalt give him. 
his hire, neither^shall the sun go down upon it; for he is poor, and 
setteth his heart upon it : lest he cry against thee unto the Lord, 
and it be sin unto thee. 

16. The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither 
shall the children be put to death for the fathers : every man shall 
he put to death for his own sin. 

17. Thou shalt not pervert the judgment of the stranger, nor of 
the fatherless ; nor take a widow's raiment to pledge : 18. But 
thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in Egypt, and 
the Lord thy God redeemed thee thence : therefore I command 
thee to do this, thing. 

19. When thou cuttest down thine harvest in thy field, and hast 
forgot a sheaf in^the field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it : it 
shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow : 
that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine 
hands. 20. When thou beatest thine olive-tree, thou shalt not go 
over the boughs again: it shall be for the stranger, for the father- 



■'§ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 93 

less, and for the widow. 21. When thou gatherest the grapes of 
thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean it afterward : it shall be for the 
stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow. 22. And thou shalt 
remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt : there- 
fore 1 command thee to do this thing. 

XXV., 1. If there be a controversy between men, and they come 
unto judgment, that the judges may judge them ; then they shall 
justify the righteous, and condemn the wicked. 2. And it shall be, 
if the wicked man be worthy to be beaten, that the judge shall 
cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face, according 
to his fault, by a certain number. 3. Forty stripes he may give 
bim, and not exceed : lest, if he should exceed, and beat him above 
these with many stripes, then thy brother should seem vile 
unto thee. 

4. Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn. 

13. Thou shalt not have in thy bag clivers weights, a great and a 
small. 14 Thou shalt not have in thine house divers measures, a 
great and a small. 15. But thou shalt have a perfect and just 
weight, a perfect and just measure shalt thou have : that thy days 
may be lengthened in the land which the Lord thy God giveth 
thee. 16. For all that do such things, and all that do unright- 
eously, are an abomination unto the Lord thy God. 

XXVI., 1. And it shall be, when thou art come in unto the land 
which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance, and posses- 
sest it, and dwellest therein ; 2. That thou shalt take of the first of all 
the fruit of the earth, which thou shalt bring of thy land that the Lord 
thy God giveth thee, and shalt put it in a basket, and shalt go unto 
the place which the Lord thy God shall choose to place his name 
there. 3. And thou shalt go unto the priest that shall be in those 
days, and say unto him, I profess this day unto the Lord thy God, 
that I am come unto the country which the Lord sware unto our 
fathers for to give us. 4. And the priest shall take the basket out 
of thine hand, and set it down before the altar of the Lord thy God. 
5. And thou shalt speak and say before the Lord thy God, A 
Syrian ready to perish -was my father, and he went down into 
Egypt, and sojourned there with a few, and became there a nation, 
great, mighty, and populous : 6. And the Egyptians evil-entreated 
us, and afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage : 7. And when 
we cried unto the Lord God of our fathers, the Lord heard our 
voice, and looked on our affliction, and our labor, and our oppres- 
sion : 8. And the Lord brought us forth out of Egypt with a 
mighty hand, and with an out-stretched arm, and with great ter- 
ribleness, and with signs, and with wonders : 9. And he hath 



94 Itanfs Ethic*. § 858* 

brought us into this place, and hath given us this land, even a land 
that floweth with milk and honey. 10. And now, behold, I have 
brought the first fruits of the land, which thou, Lord, hast given 
me. And thou shalt set it before the Lord tlry God, and worship 
before the Lord thy God : 11. And thou shalt rejoice in every 
good thing which the Lord thy God hath given unto thee, and 
unto thine house, thou, and the Levite, and the stranger that is- 
among you. 

12. When thou hast made an end of tithing all the tithes of thine 
increase the third year, which is the year of tithing, and hast given 
it unto the Levite, the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow, that 
they may eat within thy gates, and be filled ; 13. Then thou shalt 
say before the Lord thy God, I have brought away the hallowed 
things out of mine house, and also have given them unto the Levite, 
and unto the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow, accord- 
ing to all thy commandments which thou hast commanded me : I 
have not transgressed thy commandments, neither have I forgotten 
them: 14. I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, neither have 
I taken away aught thereof for any unclean use, nor given aught 
thereof for the dead : but I have hearkened to the voice of the Lord 
my God, and have done according to all that thou hast commanded 
me. 15. Look down from thy holy habitation, from heaven, and 
bless thy people Israel, and the land which thou hast given us, as 
thou swarest unto our fathers, a land that floweth with milk and, 
honey. 

16. This day the Lord thy God hath commanded thee to do these 
statutes and judgments : thou shalt therefore keep and do them 
with all thine heart and with all thy soul. 17. Thou hast avouched 
the Lord this day to be thy God, and to walk in his ways, and to* 
keep his statutes, and his commandments, and his judgments, and 
to hearken unto his voice : 18. And the Lord hath avouched thee 
this day to be his peculiar people, as he hath promised thee, and 
that thou shouldst keep all his commandments; 19. And to make 
thee high above all nations which he hath made, in praise, and in 
name, and in honor ; and that thou mayest be an holy people unto 
the Lord thy God, as he hath spoken. 

XXVII., 11. And Moses charged the people the same day, say- 
ing, 12. These shall stand upon mount Gerizin to bless the people, 
when ye are come over Jordan ; Simeon, and Levi, and Judah, and 
Issachar, and Joseph, and Benjamin : 13. And these shall stand 
upon mount Ebal to curse ; Beuben, Gad, and Asher, and Zebulun,. 
Dan, and Naphtali. 

14. And the Levites shall speak, and say unto all the. men of: 
Israel with a loud voice, 



§ 858 The Glavis to an Index. 95 

15. Cursed be the man that maketh any graven or molten image, 
an abomination unto the Lord, the work of the hands of the crafts- 
man, and putteth it in a secret place. And all the people shall 
answer and say, Amen. 

16. Cursed be he that setteth light by his father or his mother. 
And all the people shall say, Amen. 

17. Cursed be he that removeth his neighbor's land-mark. And 
all the people shall say, Amen. 

18. Cursed be he that maketh the blind to wander out of the 
way. And all the people shall say, Amen. 

19. Cursed be he that perverteth the judgment of the stranger, 
fatherless, and widow. And all the people shall say, Amen. 

20. Cursed be he that lieth with his father's wife ; because he un- 
covereth his father's skirt. And all the people shall say, Amen. 

21. Cursed be he that lieth with any manner of beast. And all the 
people shall say, Amen. 

22. Cursed be he that lieth with his sister, the daughter of his 
father, or the daughter of his mother. And all the people shall say. 
Amen. 

23. Cursed be he that lieth with his mother-in-law. And all the 
people shall say, Amen. 

24. Cursed be he that smiteth his neighbor secretly. And all the 
people shall say, Amen. 

25. Cursed be he that taketh .reward to slay an innocent person. 
And all the people shall say, Amen. 

26. Cursed be he that connrmeth not all the words of this law to 
do them. And all the people shall say, Amen. 

XXVIII., 1. And it shall come to pass, if thou shalt hearken 
diligently unto the voice of the Lord thy Cod, to observe and to do 
all his commandments which I command thee this day, that the 
Lord thy God will set thee on high above all nations of the earth : 
2. And all these blessings shall come on thee, and overtake thee, if 
thou shalt hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God. 

3. Blessed shalt thou be in the city, and blessed shalt thou be in 
the field. 

4. Blessed shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy 
ground, and the fruit of thy cattle, the increase of thy kine, and 
the flocks of thy. sheep. 

5. Blessed shall be thy basket and thy store. 

6. Blessed shalt thou be when thou comest in, and blessed sha.lt 
thou be when thou goest out. 

7. The Lord shall cause thine enemies that rise up against thee 
to be smitten before thy face : they shall come out against thee one 



96 Kant 8 Ethics. § 858 

way, and flee before thee seven ways. 8. The Lord shall com- 
mand the blessing upon thee in thy store-houses, and in all that 
thou settest thine hand unto ; and he shall bless thee in the land 
which the Lord thy God giveth thee. 9. The Lord shall estab- 
lish thee an holy people unto himself, as he hath sworn unto thee, if 
thou shalt keep the commandments of the Lord thy God, and walk 
in his ways. 10. And all people of the earth shall see that thou 
art called by the name of the Lord ; and they shall be afraid of 
thee. 11. And the Lord shall make thee plenteous in goods, in the 
fruit of thy body, and in the fruit of thy cattle, and in the fruit of 
thy ground, in the land which the Lord sware unto thy fathers to 
give thee. 12. The Lord shall open unto thee his good treasure? 
the heaven to give thee rain unto thy land in his season, and to 
bless all the work of thine hand : and thou shalt lend unto many 
nations, and thou shalt not borrow. 13. And the Lord shall make 
thee the head, and not the tail ; and thou shalt be above only, and 
thou shalt not be beneath : if that thou hearken unto the command- 
ments of the Lord thy Clod, which I command thee this day, to ob- 
serve and to do them : 14. And thou shalt not go aside from any 
of the words which I command thee this day, to the right hand or 
to the left, to go after other gods to serve them. 

15. But it shall come to pass, if thou wilt not- hearken unto the 
voice of the Lord thy God, to observe to do all his commandments 
and his statutes which I command thee this day; that all these curses 
shall come upon thee, and overtake thee : 

16. Cursed shalt thou be in the city, and cursed shalt thou be in 
the field. 

17. Cursed shall be thy basket and thy store. 

18. Cursed shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy- 
land. the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep. 

19. Cursed shalt thou be when thou comest in, and cursed shalt 
thou be when thou goest out. 

20. The Lord shall send upon thee cursing, vexation, and 
rebuke, in all that thou settest thine hand unto for to do, until thou 
be destroyed, and until thou perish quickly; because of the wicked 
ness of thy doings, whereby thou hast forsaken me. 21. The Lord 
shall make the pestilence cleave unto thee, until he have consumed 
thee from off the land, whither thou goest to possess it. 22. The 
Lord shall smite thee with a consumption, and with a fever, and with 
an inflammation, and with an extreme burning, and with the 
sword, and with blasting, and with mildew ; and they shall pursue 
thee until thou perish. 23. And thy heaven that is over thy head 
shall be brass, and the earth that is under thee shall be iron. 24. 



§ 858 The Claim to an Index. 97 

'The Lord shall make the rain of thy land powder and dust : from 
heaven shall it come down ujDon thee, until thou be destroyed. 25. 
The Lord shall cause thee to be smitten before thine enemies : thou 
shalt go out one way against them, and flee seven ways before them; 
and shalt be removed into all the kingdoms of the earth. 26. And 
thy carcass shall be meat unto all fowls of the air, and unto the 
beasts of the earth, and no man shall fray them away. 27. The 
Lord will smite thee with the botch of Egypt, and with the emerods, 
and with the scab, and with the itch, whereof thou canst not be 
healed. 28. The Lord shall smite thee with madness, and blind- 
ness, and astonishment of heart : 29. And thou shalt grope at 
noonday, as the blind gropeth in darkness, and thou shalt not pros- 
per in thy ways : and thou shalt be only oppressed and spoiled 
evermore, and no man shall save thee. 30. Thou shalt betroth a 
wife, and another man shall lie with her : thou shalt build an house, 
and thou shalt not dwell therein : thou shalt plant a vineyard, .and 
shalt not gather the grapes thereof. 31. Thine ox shall be slain be- 
fore thine eyes, and thou shalt not eat thereof: thine ass shall be 
violently taken away from before thy face, and shall not be restored 
to thee : thy sheep shall be given unto thine enemies, and thou shalt 
have none to rescue them. 32. Thy sons and thy daughters shall 
be given unto another people, and thine eyes shall look, and fail 
with longing for them all the day long : and there shall be no might 
in thine hand. 33. The fruit of thy land, and all thy kbors, shall 
a nation which thou knowest not eat up ; and thou shalt be only 
oppressed and crushed alway : 34. So that thou shalt be mad for 
the sight of thine eyes which thou shalt see. 35. The Lord shall 
smite thee in the knees, and in the legs, with a sore botch that 
cannot be healed, from the sole of thy foot unto the top of thy 
head. 36. The Lord shall bring thee, and thy king which thou 
-shalt set over thee, unto a natiomwhich neither thou nor thy fathers 
have known ; and there shalt thou serve other gods, wood and 
stone. 37. And thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb and 
a by-word, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead thee. 38. 
Thou shalt carry much seed out into the field, and shalt gather 
■but little in ; for the locust shall consume it. 39. Thou shalt plant 
vineyards and dress them, but shalt neither drink of the wine, nor 
gather the grapes ; for the worms shall eat them. 40. Thou shalt 
have olive-trees throughout all thy coasts, but thou shalt not anoint 
thyself with the oil ; for thine olive shall cast his fruit. 41. Thou 
shalt beget sons and daughters, but thou shalt not enjoy them ; for 
they shall go into captivity. 42. All thy trees and fruit of thy 
land shall the locust consume. 43. The stranger that is within 



98 Kane s Ethics. § 858 

thee shall get up above thee very high ; and thou shalt come down 
very low. 44. He shall lend to thee, and thou shalt not lend to 
him : he shall be the head, and thou shalt be the tail. 45. More- 
over, all these curses shall come upon thee, and shall pursue thee, 
and overtake thee, till thou be destroyed ; because thou hearken- 
edst not unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to keep his com- 
mandments and his statutes which he commanded thee: 46. And 
they shall be upon thee for a sign and for a wonder, and upon thy 
seed forever. 47. Because thou servedst not the Lord thy God 
with joyfulness and with gladness of heart, for the abundance of 
all things ; 48. Therefore shalt thou serve thine enemies which 
the Lord shall send against thee, in hunger, and in thirst, and in 
nakedness, and in want of all things: and he shall put a yoke of 
iron upon thy neck, until he have destroyed thee. 49. The Lord 
shall bring a nation against thee from far, from the end of the 
earth, as swift as the eagle flieth; a nation whose tongue thou shalt 
not understand ; 50. A nation of fierce countenance, which shall 
not regard the person of the old, nor show favor to the young : 51. 
And he shall eat the fruit of thy cattle, and the fruit of thy land, 
until thou be destroyed : which also shall not leave thee either corn, 
wine, or oil, or the increase of thy kine, or flocks of thy sheep,, 
until he have destroyed thee. 52. And he shall besiege thee in all 
thy gates, until thy high and fenced walls come down, wherein thou 
trustedst, throughout all thy land : and he shall besiege thee in all 
thy gates throughout all thy land, which the Lord thy God hath 
given thee. 53. And thou shalt eat the fruit of thine own body,. 
the flesh of thy sons and of thy daughters, which the Lord thy God. 
hath given thee, in the siege, and in the straitness, wherewith 
thine enemies shall distress thee : 54. So that the man that is ten- 
der among you, and very delicate, his eye shall be evil toward his 
brother, and toward the wife of his bosom, and toward the remnant 
of his children which he shall leave : 55. So that he will not give 
to any of them of the flesh of his children whom he shall eat : be- 
cause he hath nothing left him in the siege, and in tiae straitness, 
wherewith thine enemies shall distress thee in all thy gates. 56. 
The tender and delicate woman among you, which would not ad- 
venture to set the sole of her foot upon the ground for delicateness 
and tenderness, her eye shall be evil toward the husband of her 
bosom, and toward her son, and toward her daughter, 57. And 
toward her young one that cometh out from between her feet, and 
toward her children which she shall bear : for she shall eat them 
for want of all things secretly in the siege and straitness, wherewith 
U no enemy shall distress thee in thy gates. 58. If thou wilt not 



§ 858 The Clavis to an Index. 99 

observe to do all the words of this law that are written in this book, 
that thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name, THE LOKD 
THY GOD ; 59. Then the Lord will make thy plagues wonder- 
ful, and the plagues of thy seed, even great plagues, and of long- 
continuance, and sore sicknesses, and of long continuance. 60. 
Moreover he will bring upon thee all the diseases of Egypt, which 
thou wast afraid of; and they shall cleave unto thee. 61. Also 
every sickness and every plague which is not written in the book 
of this law, them will the Lord bring upon thee, until thou be 
destroyed. 62. And ye shall be left few in number, whereas ye 
were as the stars of heaven for multitude ; because thou wouldest 
not obey the voice of the Lord thy God. 63. And it shall come to 
pass, that as the Lord rejoiced over you to do you good, and to 
multiply you ; so the Lord will rejoice over you to destroy you, 
and to bring you to nought ; and ye shall be plucked from off the 
land whither thou goest to possess it. 64. And the Lord shall 
scatter thee among all people, from the one end of the earth even 
unto the other ; and there thou shalt serve other gods, which neither 
thou nor thy fathers have known, even wood and stone. 65. And 
among these .nations shalt thou find no ease, neither shall the sole 
of thy foot have rest: but the Lord shall give thee there a tremb- 
ling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind. 66. And thy 
life shall hang in doubt before thee : and thou shalt fear day and 
night, and shalt have none assurance of thy life : 67. In the morn- 
ing thou shalt say, Would God it were even ! and at even thou 
shalt say, Would God it were morning ! for the fear of thine heart 
wherewith thou shalt fear, and for the sight of thine eyes which 
thou shalt see. 68. And the Lord shall bring thee into Egypt 
again with ships, by the way whereof I spake unto thee, Thou 
shalt see it no more again : and there ye shall be sold unto your 
enemies for bondmen and bondwomen, and no man shall buy you. 
XXX., 1. And it shall come to pass, when all these things are 
come upon thee, the blessing and the curse, which I have set before 
thee, and thou shalt call them to mind among all the nations whither 
the Lord thy God hath driven thee, 2. And shalt return unto the 
Lord thy God, and shalt obey his voice according to all that I 
command thee this day, thou and thy children, with all thine 
heart, and with all thy soul : 3. That then the Lord thy God will 
turn thy captivity, and have compassion upon thee, and will re- 
turn and gather thee from all the nations whither the Lord thy 
God hath scattered thee. 4. If any of thine be driven out unto the 
outmost parts of heaven, from thence will the Lord thy God gather 
thee, and from thence will he fetch thee: 5. And the Lord thy 



100 Kant's Ethics. § 858 

'God will bring thee into the land which thy fathers possessed, and 
thou shalt possess it ; and he will do thee good, and multiply thee 
above thy fathers. 6. And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine 
heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Loud thy God with all 
thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live. 7. And 
the Lord thy God will put all these curses upon thine enemies, and 
on them that hate thee, which persecuted thee. 8. And thou shalt 
return and obey the voice of the Lord, and do all his command- 
ments which I command thee this day. 9. And the Lord thy God 
will make thee plenteous in every work of thine hand, in the fruit 
of thy body, and in the fruit of thy cattle, and in the fruit of thy 
land, for good : for the Lord will again rejoice over thee for good, 
.as he rejoiced over thy fathers : 10. If thou shalt hearken unto 
the voice of the Lord thy God, to keep his commandments and 
his statutes which are written in this book of the law, and if 
thou turn unto the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with 
all thy soul. 

11. For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is 
not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. 12. It is not in heaven, 
that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and 
bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? 13. Neither is it 
beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea 
ibr us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it ? 14. 
JBut the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy 
heart, that thou mayest do it. 

15. See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death 
and evil; 16. In that I command thee this day to love the Lord 
thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments and 
his statutes and his judgments, that thou mayest live and multiply • 
and the Lord thy God shall bless thee in the land whither thou 
goest to possess it. 17. But if thine heart turn away, so that thou 
^vilt not hear, but shalt be drawn away, and worship other gods, 
and serve them ; 18. I denounce unto you this day, that ye shall 
surely perish, and that ye shall not prolong your days upon the 
land, whither thou passest over Jordan to go to possess it. 19. I 
call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have 
set before you life and death, blessing and cursing : therefore choose 
life, that both thou and thy seed may live : 20. That thou mayest 
love the Lord thy God, and that thou mayest obey his voice, and 
that thou mayest cleave unto him : for he is thy life, and the length 
of thy days : that thou mayest dwell in the land which the Lord 
sware unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to 
give them. 



§ 858 The Olavis to an Index. 101 

XXXI., 9. And Moses wrote this law, and delivered it unto the 
priests the sons of Levi, which bare the ark of the covenant of the 
Lord, and unto all the elders of Israel. 10. And Moses commanded 
them, saying, At the end of every seven years, in the solemnity of 
the year of release, in the feast of tabernacles, 11. When all Israel 
is come to appear before the Lord thy God in the place which he 
shall choose, thou shalt read this law before all Israel in their hear- 
ing. 12. (rather the people together, men, and women, and chil- 
dren, and thy stranger that is within thy gates, that they may 
hear, and that they may learn, and fear the Lord your God, and 
observe to do all the words of this law : 13. And that their chil- 
dren, which have not known anything, may hear, and learn to fear 
the Lord your God, as long as ye live in the land whither ye go 
over Jordan to possess it. 

XXX1L, 4. Me is the Eock, his work is perfect : for all his ways 
are judgment : a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right 
{5 he. 

XXXIII , 26. There is none like unto the God of Jeshurun, who- 
rideth upon the heaven in thy help, and in his excellency on the 
sky. 27. The eternal God is thy refuge, and underneath are the 
everlasting arms : and he shall thrust out the enemy from before 
thee ; and shall say, Destroy them. 28. Israel then shall dwell in. 
safety alone: the fountain of Jacob shall be upon a land of corn and 
wine ; also his heavens' shall drop down dew. 29. Happy art thou, 
O Israel : who is like unto thee, O people saved by the Lord, the 
shield of thy help, and who is the sword of thy excellency! and. 
thine enemies shall be found liars unto thee ; and thou shalt tread 
upon their high places. 

§ 859. — Judaism insists only on outward conformity, and takes- 
no note whatever of moral informedness op intent in observance, 
in which latter point alone Christianity afterward placed the very 
spirit and genius of morality, (page 165, line 24.) See §§ 858, 805. 

§ 860. — Every sequent arising from fulfilling or transgressing the 
edicts of the Pentateuch is limited to this life, (page 166, line 3.) 
\_Sequacity: a disposition to follow, or logical consistency.] [Omit 
all but the first eleven lines.] Cf. § 858. 

§ 861. — Mosaic economy rather excluded the rest of mankind 
from its communion, (page 168, line 1.) [Omit the last half of the 
section.] Cf. § 858. 

§ 862. — Only one unseen God, of whom no sensible likeness was 
to be made, (page 168, line 8.) Cf. Xen. Mem. IV., iii., 13; I., iv., 
17; Cicero de Natura Deorum, Book II., cap. ii.; Lao Tse, ch. 25 
(Max Mueller's fourth lecture on the science of religion, ed. Scrib- 



102 Kant's Ethics. 

ner, Armstrong & Co., New York, 1872, page 114); Aristotle' de 
Mundo 5 (in Bamage, Beautiful Thoughts from Greek Authors, second 
ed., 1873, page 102); Plato Theaet. 85, ed. Bonn, vol. i., page 411 (in 
Eamage, page 378); Big-Veda (X., cxxi., 8 : " He who alone is God 
above all gods." — Mueller's Chips, vol. i., page 29, eel. Scribner, 1874, 
and also in Bunsen's God in History, vol. i.); Zoroaster, Avesta 
(§ 881 below); Yagna, lxix., 2, 3 (Bleeck, vol. ii., page 137); Yagna 
xliii., 7 (Bleeck, ii., 104); Yagna, xxviii., 11 (Bleeck, ii., 82) 
Khordah-Avesta, xvii., 37 (Bleeck, vol. iii., 24); Khordah- Avesta 
xiv., (Bleeck, iii., 14, 15.) 

§ 863. — General church history must consequently commence 
with the origin of Christianity, which, as an entire abandonment 
of that Judaism whence it sprang, was grounded on a quite new 
principle, and effected a thorough revolution in points of faith, 
(page 168, line 26.) Cf. § 859, above. 

§ 864. — Suddenly burst forth the new Christian faith. Jesus 
taught that a moral faith alone, which proved its reality by good 
deportment, could sanctify and save, (page 169, line 17.) Cf. §§ 
.236, 723, 908. 

§ 865. — Although his moral, soul-amending tenets can dis- 
pense with all such adminicles of their truth, still the sacred volume 
has accompanied and interwoven them with miracles and mysteries, 
(page 170, line 5.) Cf. § 778. [Nuncupative : oral.— See Webster.] 
[The section may begin with the word although, omitting what 
precedes.] [Just people of the ordinary run : The earliest testimony 
I have seen is contained in a quotation by Eusebius (book iv., ch- 
17) from the Apology of Justin Martyr, (born probably between 
a. d. 89 and 118, and killed at Borne 165) addressed to the emperor 
Antoninus Pius (reigned 138-161,) ed. Bohn, page 140.] 

§ 866. — Boot of multiform turmoil nourishes in the soil of despot- 
ically commanding church faith, (page 173, line 1.) [Omit the last 
six lines.] 

§ 867. — Principle of an equitable reserve in speaking of all mat- 
ters that concern revelation, (page 174, line 25.) 

§ 868. — Every interpretation of the Scripture must be entirely 
moral, (page 175, line 23.) Cf. § 724. 

§ 869. — Government bound not to oppose ethical principles by 
test acts or any other legislation, (page 176, line 10.) Cf § 795. 

§ 870. — Behold, the Kingdom op God is within you. (page 178, 
line 8.) \_Again, etc.: page 179 may be omitted.] [Finally dashed. — 
Webster, quotes Psalm ii., 9, to show the meaning of dash.] God 
becomes all in all : Cf. I. Corinthians, xii., 6 ; xv., 28 ; Ephesians, i., 
.23 ; John Scotus Erigena (Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. i., 
pp. 359, 361, 362); Proclus (Ueberweg, vol. i., pp. 257, 258). § 2920. 



The Clavis to an Index. 103 

§ 871. — Kingdom of God on earth not a Messianic but a moral 
kingdom, (page 181, line 3.) [The Hindus: The rest of the section 
may be omitted.] \_Has perished: i. e. the creed of such of them as 
are supposed to be Gypsies. The American Cyclopedia says that 
*' Buettner, Euediger, Bacmeister, Pallas, and Grellmann, consider 
them to have come from India, whence they were driven by 
the ravages of Tamerlane (1398), and where they belonged to 
the Soodra caste, or to the Pariahs." Also that " Yigne holds 
that modern Gypsies are descendants of Cashmere Hindoos, 
who fled from persecution toward the end of the fourteenth cen- 
tury. Arab Shah, who lived at Samarkand in 1422, says (in his 
life of Timour) that the Gypsies were probably descendants of 
Buddhists, who emigrated about 300 b. c, when persecuted by 
Nara." — Article " Gypsies," ed. 1874, vol, viii., page 356. (The ob- 
jection to the latter supposition is that the Buddhists have taken 
with them their sacred writings into other countries.) See § 949.] 
[Religion of Zoroaster : see § 881.] [Christianity : see §§ 906-911.] 
[Mohammedanism : see § 963 ] [Judaical belief : see § 858.] Chinese 
creed : cf. the following extracts from the Great Learning. f 

1. What the Great Learning teaches, is — to illustrate illustrious 
virtue ; to renovate the people ; and to rest in the highest excel- 
lence. 2. The point where to rest being known, the object of pur- 
suit is then determined ; and, that being determined, a calm unper- 
turbedness may be attained. To that calmness there will succeed 
a tranquil repose. In that repose there may be careful delibera- 
tion, and that deliberation will be followed by the attainment of the 
desired end. 3. Things have their root and their completion. 
Affairs have their end and their beginning. To know what is first 

. t " The Life and Teachings of Confucius, with explanatory notes, by James 
Legge, D. D." London, Truebner & Co., 1869. I omit the valuable notes ap- 
pended by Choo He and by Dr. Legge, which the reader will easily find, the 
work being readily accessible. I have added many references to the paging 
which will facilitate search, and have noted at least some of the verses and chap- 
ters omitted (retaining the numbers of omitted portions) ; though it seems 
scarcely possible that the reader can be seriously annoyed by any want in 
this respect, inasmuch as the numbering of the extracts here presented will 
probably be a sufficient clue and guide. 

" Though we cannot positively assign the authorship of The Great Learn- 
ing," says Dr. Legge (Preliminary Essays, page 27), ;t there can be no hesitation 
in receiving it as a genuine monument of the Confucian school. There are not 
many woi-ds in it from the sage himself; but it is a faithful reflection of his 
teachings, written bj r some of his followers, not far removed from him by lapse 
•of time. It must synchronize pretty nearly with the Analects, and may be 
safely referred to the fourth century before our era." And again (page 27), 'An 
ancient tradition attributes it to K'ung Keih, the grandson of Confucius." 



104 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

and what is last will lead near to what is taught in the Great 
Learning, [pages 264, 265.] 

4. The ancients who wished to s illustrate illustrious virtue 
throughout the empire, first ordered well their own States. Wish- 
ing to order well their States, they first regulated their families. 
Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their per- 
sons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their 
hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be 
sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, 
they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such exten- 
sion of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. 5. Things 
being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge 
being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being- 
sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being recti- 
fied, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, 
their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their 
States were rightly governed. Their States being rightly governed, 
the whole empire was made tranquil and happy, [page 266.] 

6. From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must 
consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides. 
7. It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that what should spring 
from it will be well ordered. It never has been the case that what 
was of great importance has been slightly cared for, and, at the 
same time, that what was of slight importance has been greatly 
cared for. [Chapter I. of the commentary which immediately fol- 
lows the above seven paragraphs of text, I here omit, and also 
other portions, retaining in some instances merely the numbers of 
omitted sections (hereinafter marked*).] 

Chapter II. 1. On the bathing-tub of T'ang, the following words 
were engraved : — " If you can one day renovate yourself, do so 
from day to day. Yea, let there be daily renovation." 4. There- 
fore the superior man in everything uses his utmost endeavors. 
[ch. iii,* iv*, I omit.] 

V. 1. This is called knowing the root. 2. This is called the per- 
fecting of knowledge.f 

t The above fifth chapter of commentary explained the meaning of 
"investigating' things and carrying knowledge to the utmost extent," 
hut it is now lost. I have ventured to take the views of the scholar Ch'ing to 
supply it, as follows: — The meaning of the expression, " The perfecting of 
knowledge depends on the investigation of things, 1 ' is this : — If we wish to carry 
our knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the principles of all things 
we come into contact with, for the intelligent mind of man is certainly 

FORMED TO KNOW, AND THERE IS NOT A SINGLE THING IN WHICH ITS PRINCI- 
PLES do not inhere. But so long as all principles are not investigated, man's 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 105 

VI. 1. What is meant by " making the thoughts sincere," is the 
allowing no self-deception, as when we hate a bad smell, and as 
when we love what is beautiful. This is called self-enjoyment. 
Therefore, the superior man must be watchful over himself when 
he is alone. 

2. There is no evil to which the mean man, dwelling retired, 
will not proceed ; but when he sees a superior man, he instantly 
tries to disguise himself, concealing his evil, and displaying what is 
good. The other beholds him, as if he saw his heart and reins ; — 
of what use is his disguise ? This is an instance of the saying — 
" What truly is within will be manifested without." Therefore, 
the superior man must be watchful over himself when he is alone. 

4. Eiches adorn a house, and virtue adorns the person. The 
mind is expanded, and the body is at ease. Therefore, the superior 
man must make his thoughts sincere, [page 272.] 

VII. 1. What is meant by "■ The cultivation of the person de- 
pends on rectifying the mind," may be thus illustrated : — If a man 
be under the influence of passion, he will be incorrect in his con- 
duct. He will be the same, if he is under the influence of terror, 
or under the influence of fond regard, or under that of sorrow and 
distress. 2. When the mind is not present, we look and do not 
see ; we hear and do not understand ; we eat and do not know the 
taste of what we eat. 3. This is what is meant by saying that the 
cultivation of the person depends on the rectifying of the mind. 

VIII. 1. What is meant by " The regulation of one's family de- 
pends on the cultivation of his person," is this : — Men are partial 
where they feel affection and love ; partial where they despise and 
dislike ; partial where they stand in awe and reverence ; partial" 
where they feel sorrow and compassion ; partial where they are ar- 
rogant and rude. Thus it is that there are few men in the world who 
love, and at the same time know the bad qualities of the 
object of their love, or who hate, and yet know the excellences of the 
object of their hatred. 2. Hence it is said, in the common adage, "A 
man does not know the wickedness of his son ; he does not know 



knowledge is incomplete. On this account, the Learning for Adults, at the out- 
set of its lessons, instructs the learner, in regard to all things in the world, 

TO PROCEED FROM WHAT KNOWLEDGE HE HAS OF THEIR PRINCIPLES, AND PUR- 
SUE his investigation of them, till he reaches the extreme point. After ex- 
erting himself in this way for a long time, he will suddenly find himself pos- 
sessed of a wide and far-reaching penetration. Then, the qualities of all things, 
whether external or internal, the subtle or the coarse, will all he apprehended ; 
and the mind, in its entire substance and its relations to things, will be perfectly 
intelligent. This is called the investigation of things. This is called the per- 
fection of knowledge. — Choo He's note, [page 271.] Cf. § 1419. 



106 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

the richness of his growing corn." 3. This is what is meant by 
saying that if the person be not cultivated, a man cannot regulate 
his family, [page 273.] 

IX. 1. What is meant by " In order rightly to govern his State, 
it is necessary first to regulate his family," is this: — It is not pos- 
sible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family. 
Therefore, the ruler, without going beyond his famity, completes 
the lessons for the State. There is filial piety: — therewith the 
sovereign should be served. There is fraternal submission : — there- 
with elders and superiors should be served. There is kindness : — 
therewith the multitude should be treated. [2.*] 3. From the lov- 
ing example of one family, a whole State becomes loving, and from 
its courtesies, the whole State becomes courteous ; while, from the 
ambition and perverseness of the one man, the whole State may be 
led to rebellious disorder ; — such is the nature of the influence. 
This verifies the saying, "Affairs may be ruined by a single sen- 
tence ; a kingdom may be settled by its one man." 4. Yaou and 
Shun led on the empire with benevolence, and the people followed 
them. Kee and Chow led on the empire with violence, and the 
people followed them. The orders which these issued were con- 
trary to the practices which they loved, and so the people did not 
follow them. On this account, the ruler must himself be possessed 
of the good qualities, and then he may require them in the people. 
He must not have the bad qualities in himself, and then he may re- 
quire that they shall not be in the people. Never has there been 
a man, who, not having reference to his own character and wishes 
in dealing with others, was able effectually to instruct them. 5. 
Thus we see how the government of the State depends on the regu- 
lation of the family. [6 ,* 7 * 8,* 9.*] 

X. 1. "What is meant by " The making the whole empire peaceful 
and happy depends on the government of his State," is this : — 
When the sovereign behaves to his aged, as the aged should be be- 
haved to, the people become filial ; when the sovereign behaves to 
his elders, as elders should be behaved to, the people learn brotherly 
submission ; when the sovereign treats compassionately the young 
and helpless, the people do the same. Thus the ruler has a prin- 
ciple with which, as with a measuring square, he may regulate his 
conduct, [pages 275, 276.] 

2. What a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not display in 
the treatment of his inferiors ; what he dislikes in inferiors, let him 
not display in the service of his superiors ; what he hates in those 
who are before him, let him not therewith precede those who are 
behind him ; what he hates in those who are behind him. 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 107 

■let him not therewith follow those who are before him; 
what he hates to receive oil the right, let him not bestow on the 
left ; what he hates to receive o'n the left, let him not bestow on the 
right : — this is what is called " The principle, with which, as with 
a measuring square, to regulate one's conduct." [page 277.] 

3. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, " How much to be rejoiced 
in are these princes, the parents of the people! " When a prince 
loves what the people love, and hates what the people hate, then is 
he what is called the parent of the people, [page 277.] 

4. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, "Lofty is that southern hill, 
with its rugged masses of rocks ! Full of majesty are you, O 
grand-teacher Yin, the people all look up to you." Eulers of king- 
doms may not neglect to be careful. If they deviate to a mean 
selfishness, they will be a disgrace in the empire, [page 277.] 

5. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, "Before the sovereigns of the 
Yin dynasty had lost the hearts of the people, they were the mates 
of God. Take warning from the house of Yin. The great decree is 
not easily preserved.'" This shows that, by gaining the people, the 
kingdom is gained, and, by losing the people, the kingdom is lost. 

6. On this account, the ruler will first take pains about his own 
virtue. Possessing virtue will give him the people. Possessing 
the people will give him the territory. Possessing the territory 
will give him its wealth. Possessing the wealth, he will have re- 
sources for expenditure. 

7. Virtue is the root ; wealth is the result. 8. If he make the 
root his secondary object, and the result his primary, he will only 
wrangle with his people, and teach them rapine. 9. Hence, the 
accumulation of wealth is the way to scatter the people ; and the 
letting it be scattered among them is the way to collect the people. 
10. And hence, the ruler's words going forth contrary to right, 
will come back to him in the same way ; and wealth, gotten by im- 
proper ways, will take its departure by the same, [page 278.] 

11. In the Announcement to K'ang, it is said, " The decree in- 
deed may not always rest on us ;" that is, goodness obtains the 
decree, and the want of goodness loses it. 

12. In the Book of Ts'oo, it is said, " The kingdom of Ts'oo does 
not consider that to be valuable. It values, instead, its good men." 

13. Duke Wan's uncle, Fan, said, " Our fugitive does not account 
that to be precious. What he considers precious, is the affection 
due to his parent, [page 278.] 

14. In the Declaration of the duke of Ts'in, it is said, " Let me 
have but one minister, plain and sincere, not pretending to other 
abilities, but with a simple, upright mind ; and possessed of generr 



108 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

osity, regarding the talents of others as though he himself possessed 
them, and, where he finds accomplished and perspicacious men, lov- 
ing them in his heart more than his mouth expresses, and really 
showing himself able to bear and employ them : — such a minister 
will be able to preserve my sons and grandsons, and black-haired 
people, and benefits likewise to the kingdom may well be looked for 
from him. But if it be his character, when he finds men of ability, 
to be jealous and hate them ; and, when he finds accomplished and 
perspicacious men, to oppose them and not allow their advance- 
ment, showing himself really not able to bear them : — such a min- 
ister will not be able to protect my sons and grandsons, and black- 
haired people ; and may he not also be pronounced dangerous to the- 
State ? " [pages 278, 279.] 

15. It is only the truly virtuous man who can send away such a 
man and banish him, driving him out among the barbarous tribes 
around, determined not to dwell along with him in the Middle 
kingdom. This is in accordance with the saying, " It is only the 
truly virtuous man who can love or who can hate others." 16. To 
see men of worth and not be able to raise them to office ; to raise 
them to office, but not to do so quickly : — this is disrespectful. To 
see bad men and not be able to remove them ; to remove them, but 
not to do so to a distance : — this is weakness. 17. To love those 
whom men hate, and to hate those whom men love ; this is to out- 
rage the natural feeling of men. Calamities cannot fail to come 
down on him who does so. [page 279.] 

18. Thus we see that the sovereign has a great course to pursue. 
He must show entire self-devotion and sincerity to attain it, and by 
pride and extravagance he will fail of it. 

19. There is a great course also for the production of wealth. 
Let the producers be many and the consumers few. Let there be 
activity in the production, and economy in the expenditure. Then 
the wealth will always be sufficient. 20. The virtuous ruler, by 
means of his wealth, makes himself more distinguished. The vicious 
ruler accumulates wealth, at the expense of his life, [page 280.] 

21. Never has there been a case of the sovereign loving benevo- 
lence, and the people not loving righteousness. Never has there 
been a case where the people have loved righteousness, and the af- 
fairs of the sovereign have not been carried to completion. And 
never has there been a case where the wealth in such a State, col- 
lected in the treasuries and arsenals, did not continue in the sov- 
ereign's possession. 

22. The officer Mang Heen said, " He who keeps horses and a 
carriage does not look after fowls and pigs. The family which 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 109 

keeps its stores of ice does not rear cattle or sheep. So, the house 
which possesses a hundred chariots should not keep a minister to 
look out for imposts that he may lay them on the people. Than 
to have such a minister, it were better for that house to have one 
who should rob it of its revenues." This is in accordance with the 
saying : — " In a State, 'pecuniary gain is not to be considered to be 
prosperity, but its prosperity will be found in righteousness." 

23. When he who presides over a State or a family makes his 
revenues his chief business, he must be under the influence of some 
small, mean man. He may consider this man to be good ; but 
when such a person is employed in the administration of a State or 
family, calamities from Heaven, and injuries from men, will befall it 
together ; and, though a good man may take his place, he will not 
be able to remedy the evil. This illustrates again the saying, " In 
a State, gain is not to be considered prosperity, but its prosperity 
will be found in righteousness." [page 281.] 

EXTRACTS FROM THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN. 

Chapter I. 1. What Heaven has conferred is called the nature; 
an accordance with this nature is called the path of duty ; the reg- 
ulation of this path is called instruction, [page 283.] 

2. The path may not be left for an instant. If it could be left, it 
would not be the path. On this account, the superior man does 
not wait till he sees things, to be cautious, nor till he hears things, 
to be apprehensive, [page 283.] 

3. There is nothing more visible than what is secret, and nothing 
more manifest than what is minute. Therefore, the superior man 
is watchful over himself, when he is alone, [page 283.] 

4. While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, 
the mind may be said to be in the state of equilibrium. When 
those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, 
there ensues what may be called the state of harmony. This 
equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the huma,n actings 
in the world, and this harmony is the universal path which they all 
should pursue. [Cf. § 446. (page 38 above).] 

5. Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, 
and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and 
all things will be nourished and flourish, [ii * iii,* iv,* v,* vi,* vii,* 
viii,* ix,* (chapters which I here omit).] 

X. 1. Tsze-loo asked about forcefulness. [page 287.] 

2. The Master said, "Do you mean the forcefulness of the South, 

the forcefulness of the North, or the forcefulness which you should 

cultivate yourself? 3. To show forbearance and gentleness in 

teaching others ; and not to revenge unreasonable conduct: — this 



110 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

is the forcefulness of Southern regions, and the good man makes it 
his study. 4. To lie under arms ; and meet death without regret : — 
this is the forcefulness of Northern regions, and the forceful make 
it their study. 5. Therefore, the superior man cultivates a friendly 
harmony, without being weak. How firm is he in his forcefulness ! 
He stands erect in the middle, without inclining to either side. — 
How firm is he in his forcefulness ! When good principles prevail 
in the government of his country, he does not change from what he 
was in retirement. — How firm is he in his forcefulness ! When 
bad principles prevail in the country, he maintains his course to 
death without changing. — How firm is he in his forcefulness! " 

XI. 1. The Master said, " To live in obscurity, and yet practice 
wonders, in order to be mentioned with honor in future ages ; — this 
is what I do not do. 3. The superior man accords with the 
course of the Mean. Though he may be all unknown, unregarded 
by the world, he feels no regret. It is only the sage who is able 
for this." [page 288.] 

XII. 1. The way which the superior man pursues, reaches wide 
and far, and yet is secret. 2. Common men and women, however 
ignorant, may intermeddle with the knowledge of it ; yet in its ut- 
most reaches, there is that which even the sage does not know. 
Common men and women, however much below the ordinary stand- 
ard of character, can carry it into practice ; yet in its utmost 
reaches, there is that which even the sage is not able to carry 
into practice. Great as heaven and earth are, men still find 
some things in them with which to be dissatisfied. Thus it is, that 
were the superior man to speak of his way in all its greatness,, 
nothing in the world would be found able to embrace it ; and were 
he to speak of it in its minuteness, nothing in the world would be 
found able to split it. [page 289.] 

3. It is said in the Book of Poetry. " The hawk flies up to 
heaven ; the fishes leap in the deep." This expresses how this 
way is seen above and below. 4. The way of the superior man 
may be found, in its simple elements, in the intercourse of common 
men and women ; but in its utmost reaches, it shines brightly 
through heaven and earth, [page 289.] 

XIII. 1. The Master said, " The path is not far from man. When 
men try to pursue a course which is far from the common indica- 
tions of consciousness, this course cannot be considered the path. 
[2.*] 3. When one cultivates to the utmost the principles of his 
nature, and exercises them on the principle of reciprocity, he is 
not far from the path. What you do not like, when done to your- 
self, do not do to others, [page 290.] 



g 871 The Clavis to an Index. Ill 

4. " In the way of the superior man there are four things, to not 
one of which have I as yet attained. — To serve my father as I 
would require my son to serve me : to this 1 have not attained ; to 
serve my prince as I would require my minister to serve me : to 
this I have not attained ; to serve my elder brother as I would re- 
quire my younger brother to serve me : to this I have not attained ; 
to set the example in behaving to a friend as I would require him 
to behave to me : to this I have not attained. Earnest in practic- 
ing the ordinary virtues, and careful in speaking about them, if ? 
in his practice, he has anything defective, the superior man dares 
not but exert himself; and if, in his words, he has any excess, he 
dares not allow himself such license. I^Thus his words have respect 
to his actions, and his actions have fc respect to his words ; is it not 
just an entire sincerity which marks the superior man ? " 

XIV. 1. The superior man does what is proper to the station in 
which he is : he does not desire to go beyond this. 2. In a position 
of wealth and honor, he does what is proper to a position 
of wealth and honor. In a poor and low position, he does what is 
proper to a poor and low position. Situated among barbarous 
tribes, he does what is proper to a situation among barbarous tribes. 
In a position of sorrow and difficulty, he does what is proper to a 
position of sorrow and difficulty. The superior man can find him- 
self in no situation in which he is not himself. 3. In a high situa- 
tion, he does not treat with contempt his inferiors. In a low situa- 
tion, he does not court the favor of his superiors. He rectifies him- 
self, and seeks for nothing from others, so that he has no dissatis- 
factions. He does not murmur against heaven, nor grumble against 
men. 4. Thus it is that the superior man is quiet and calm, wait- 
ing for the appointments of Heaven, while the mean man walks in 
dangerous paths, looking for lucky occurrences, [page 291.] 

5. The Master said, "In archery we have something like the way 
of the superior man. When the archer misses the center of the 
target, he turns round and seeks for the cause of his failure in 
himself." [page 291.] 

XV. 1. The way of the superior man may be compared to what 
takes place in traveling, when to go to a distance we must first 
traverse the space that is near, and in ascending a height, when we 
must begin from the lower ground, [pages 291, 292.] 

2. It is said in the|Book of Poetry, u Happy union with wife and 
children is like the music of lutes and harps. When there is con- 
cord among brethren, the harmony is delightful and enduring. 
Thus may you regulate your family, and enjoy the pleasure of your 
wife and children." 3. The Master said, " In such a state of things, 
parents have entire complacence! " [page 292.] 



\ 

112 Kant's Ethic*. % 871 

XVI. 1. The Master said, " How abundantly do spiritual beings 
display the powers that belong to them ! 2. We look for them, but 
do not see them ; we listen to, but do not hear them ; yet they enter 
into all things, and there is nothing without them." [3,* 4,* 5.*] 

XVII. 1. The Master said, " How greatly filial was Shun ! His 
virtue was that of a sage ; his dignity was the imperial throne ; his 
riches were all within the four seas. He offered his sacrifices in 
his ancestral temple, and his descendants preserved the sacrifices 
to himself. 2. Therefore, having such great virtue, it could not but 
be that he should obtain the throne, that he should obtain those 
riches, that he should obtain his fame, that he should attain to his 
long life. 3. Thus it is that Heaven, in the production of things, is 
surely bountiful to them, according to their qualities. Hence the 
tree that is flourishing, it nourishes, while that which is ready to 
fall, it overthrows, [page 294.] [Cf Matthew xxv., 29 (§ 906).] 

4. " In the Book of Poetry, it is said, ' The admirable, amiable? 
prince, Displayed conspicuously his excelling virtue, Adjusting his 
people, and Adjusting his officers. Therefore, he received from 
Heaven the emoluments of dignity. It protected him, assisted 
him. decreed him the throne ; Sending from heaven these favors, 
as it were repeatedly.' 5. We may say therefore that he who is 
greatly virtuous will be sure to receive the appointment of Heaven." 
[pages 294, 295.] [xviii,* xix.*l 

XX. 1. The Duke G-ae asked about government, [page 298] 
2. The Master said, " The government of Wan and Woo is dis- 
played in the records, — the tablets of wood and bamboo. Let there 
be the men, and the government will flourish ; but without the 
men, the government decays and ceases. 3. With the right men 
the growth of government is rapid, just as vegetation is rapid in 
the earth ; and moreover their government might be called an easily- 
growing rush. 4. Therefore the administration of government lies 
in getting proper men. Such men are to be got by means of the 
ruler's own character. That character is to be cultivated by his 
treading in the ways of duty. And the treading those ways of 
duty is to be cultivated by the cherishing of benevolence. 5. Be- 
nevolence is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great 
exercise of it is in loving relatives. Righteousness is the accordance 
of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honor- 
ing the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to 
relatives, and the steps in the honor due to the worthy, are pro- 
duced by the principle of propriety. 6. When those in inferior sit- 
uations do not possess the confidence of their superiors, they cannot 
retain the government of the people. 7. Hence the sovereign may 



-§ 871 The Claris to an Index. 113 

-not neglect the cultivation of his own character. Wishing to cul- 
tivate his character, he may not neglect to serve his parents. In 
order to serve his parents, he may not neglect to acquire a knowl- 
edge of men. In order to know men, he may not dispense with a 
knowledge of Heaven, [pages 298, 299.] 

8. "The duties of universal obligation are five, and the virtues 
wherewith they are practiced are three. The duties are those be- 
tween sovereign and minister, between father and son, between 
husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those 
belonging to the intercourse of friends. Those five are the duties 
of universal obligation. Knowledge, magnanimity, and energy, these 
three, are the virtues universally binding. And the means by 
which they carry the duties into practice is singleness. f 9. Some 
are born with the knowledge of those duties ; some know them by 
study ; and some acquire the knowledge after a painful feeling of 
their ignorance. But the knowledge being possessed, it comes to 
the same thing. Some practice them with a natural ease ; some 
from a desire for their advantages ; and some by strenuous effort, 
but the achievement being made, it comes to the same thing." 

10. The Master said. " To be fond of learning is to be near to 
knowledge. To practice with vigor is to be near to magnanimity. 
To possess the feeling of shame is to be near to energy. 11. He 
-who knows these three things knows how to cultivate his own 
character ; knowing how to cultivate his own character, he knows 
how to govern other men. Knowing how to govern other men, 
he knows how to govern the empire with all its States and families. 

12. " All who have the government of the empire with its States 
.and families have nine standard rules to follow ; — viz.: the cultiva- 

t " The duties of universal obligation " is, literally, " the paths proper to be 
Itrodden by all under heaven "= the path of the Mean. Of the three virtues! 
the first is the knowledge necessary to choose the detailed course of duty; the 
: second is "benevolence," "the unselfishness of the heart "= magnanimity (so 
I style it for want of a better term), to pursue it ; the third is the valiant energy, 
which maintains the permanence of the choice and the practice. The last clause 
is, literally, " Whereby they are practiced is one/' and this, according to Ying" 
ta, means — " From the various kings downward, in the practicing of these five 
duties &nd three virtues, there has been but one method. There has been no 
change in modern times and ancient." This, however, is not satisfactory. We 
want a substantive meaning for " one." This Ghoo He gives us. He says: — 
" The one is simply sincerity; " the sincerity, that is, on which the rest of the 
work dwells with such strange predication. I translate, therefore, the term here 
by singleness. There seems a reference in the term to the being alone in ch. i., 
p. 3. [page 109 above.] The singleness is that of the soul in the apprehension 
and practice of the duties of the Mean, which is attained to by watchfulness over 
-one's self, when alone. — Ex-tract from Dr. Legge's note, page 300. 



114 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

tion of their own characters ; the honoring of men of virtue and 
talents ; affection toward their relatives; respect toward the great 
ministers ; kind and considerate treatment of the whole body of 
officers ; dealing with the mass of the people as children ; encourag- 
ing the resort of all classes of artisans ; indulgent treatment of men 
from a distance ; and the kindly cherishing of the princes of the 
States. 13. By the ruler's cultivation of his own character, the 
duties of universal obligation are set up. By honoring men of virtue 
and talents, he is preserved from errors of judgment. By showing 
affection to his relatives, there is no grumbling nor resentment 
among his uncles and brethren. By respecting the great ministers,. 
he is kept from errors in the practice of government. By kind and 
considerate treatment of the whole body of officers, they are led to 
make the most grateful return for his courtesies. By dealing with, 
the mass of the people as his children, they are led to exhort one, 
another to what is good. By encouraging the resort of all classes 
of artisans, his resources for expenditure are rendered ample. By 
indulgent treatment of men from a distance, they are brought to. 
resort to him from all quarters. And by kindly cherishing the 
princes of the States, the whole empire is brought to revere him. 
14. Self- adjustment and purification, with careful regulation of his-. 
dress, and the not making a movement contrary to the rules of 
propriety : — this is the way for the ruler to cultivate his person- 
Discarding slanderers, and keeping himself from the seductions of 
beauty ; making light of riches, and giving honor to virtue : — this^ 
is the way for him to encourage men of worth and talents. Giving 
them places of honor and emolument, and sharing with them in their 
likes and dislikes: — this is the way for him to encourage his relatives 
to love him. Giving them numerous offices to discharge their 
orders and commissions : — this is the way for him to encourage the 
great ministers. According to them a generous confidence, and 
making their emoluments large : — this is the way to encourage the 
body of officers. Employing them only at the proper times, and 
making the imposts light : — this is the way to encourage the people. 
By daily examinations and monthly trials, and by making their 
rations in accordance with their labors : — this is the way to en- 
courage the classes of artisans. To escort them on their departure 
and meet them on their coming ; to commend the good among 
them, and show compassion to the incompetent : — this is the way 
to treat indulgently men from a distance. To restore families 
whose line of succession has been broken, and to revive States that 
have been extinguished ; to reduce to order States that are in con- 
fusion, and support those which are in peril ; to have fixed, times 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 115 

for their own reception at court, and the reception of their envoys ; 
to send them away after liberal treatment, and welcome their com- 
ing with small contributions : — this is the way to cherish the 
princes of the States. 15. All who have the government of the em- 
pire with its States and families have the above nine standard rules. 
And the means by which they are carried into practice is singleness. 

16. " In all things success depends on previous preparation, and 
without such previous preparation there is sure to be failure. If what 
is to be spoken be previously determined, there will be no stumbling. 
If affairs be previously determined, there will be no difficulty with 
them. If one's actions have been previously determined, there will 
be no sorrow in connection with them. If principles of conduct 
have been previously determined, the practice of them will be in- 
exhaustible. 17. When those in inferior situations do not obtain 
the confidence of the sovereign, they cannot succeed in governing 
the people. There is a way to obtain the confidence of the sov- 
ereign ; — if one is not trusted by his friends, he will not get the 
confidence of his sovereign. There is • a way to being trusted by 
one's friends ; — if one is not obedient to his parents, he will not be 
true to friends. There is a way to being obedient to one's parents; 
if one, on turning his thoughts in upon himself, finds a want of 
sincerity, he will not be obedient to his parents. There is a way 
to the attainment of sincerity in one's self; — if a man do not un- 
derstand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself. 

18. " Sincerity is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincer- 
ity is the way of men. He who possesses sincerity, is he who T 
without an effort, hits what is right, and apprehends, without the 
exercise of thought ; — he is the sage who naturally and easily em- 
bodies the right way. He who attains to sincerity, is he who 
chooses what is good, and firmly holds it fast. 19. To this attain- 
ment there are requisite the extensive study of what is good, ac- 
curate inquiry about it, careful reflection on it, the clear discrimin- 
ation of it, and. the earnest practice of it. 20. The superior man, 
while there is anything he has not studied, or while in wdiat he has 
studied there is anything he cannot understand, will not intermit 
his labor. While there is anything he has not inquired about, or 
anything in what he has inquired about which he does not know, 
he will not intermit his labor. While there is anything which he 
has not reflected on, or anything in what he has reflected on which 
he does not appi'ehend, he will not intermit his labor. While there 
is anything which he has not discriminated, or while his discrimin- 
ation is not clear, he will not intermit his labor. If there be any- 
thing which he has not practiced, or if his practice fails in earnest- 



116 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

ness, he will not intermit his labor. If another man succeed by one 
effort, he will use a hundred efforts. If another man succeed by 
ten efforts, he will use a thousand. 21. Let a man proceed in this 
way, and, though dull, he will surely become intelligent; though 
weak, he will surely become strong." [pages 304, 305.] 

XXI. 1. When we have intelligence resulting from sincerity, this 
condition is to be ascribed to nature ; when we have sincerity re- 
sulting from intelligence, this condition is to be ascribed to instruc- 
tion. But given the sincerity, and there shall be the intelligence, 
given the intelligence, and there shall be the sincerity, [page 305.] 
[Cf. Socrates (Xen. Mem. IV, i., 5) ; Zoroaster (Khordah-Avesta 
xiii); Psalm cxix., 73 : Da mihi intellectum, et discam mandata tua, 
in the Vulgate, with which reading agrees the Septuagint : Sunet- 
ison me, KAI MATHESOMAI entolas sou.] § 881. 

XXII. It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity 
that can exist under heaven, who can give its full development to 
his nature. Able to give its full development to his own nature, 
he can do the same to the nature of other men. [page 306.] [I omit 
the remainder of this chapter.] 

XXIII. Next to the above is he who cultivates to the utmost the 
shoots of goodness in him. From those he can attain to the posses- 
sion of sincerity. This sincerity becomes apparent. From being 
apparent, it becomes manifest. From being manifest, it becomes 
brilliant. Brilliant, it affects others. Affecting others, they are 
changed by it. Changed by it, they are transformed. It is only 
he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can exist 
nnder heaven, who can transform, [page 307.] [xxiv.*] 

XXV. 1. Sincerity is that whereby self-completion is effected, 
and its way is that by which man must direct himself. 2. Sincer- 
hVv is the end and begiuning of things ; without sincerity there 
would be nothing. On this account, the superior man regards the 
attainment of sincerity as the most excellent thing. 3. The pos- 
sessor of sincerity does not merely accomplish the self-completion 
of himself. With this quality he completes other men and, things 
also. The completing himself shows his perfect virtue. The com- 
pleting other men and things shoivs his knowledge. Both these are 
virtues belonging to the nature, and this is the way by which a 
union is effected of the external and internal. Therefore, when- 
ever he — the entirely sincere man — employs them, — that is, these vir- 
tues, — their action will be right, [pages 308, 309.] 

XXVI. 1. Hence to entire sincerity there belongs ceaselessness. 
2. Not ceasing it, it continues long. Continuing long, it evidences 
itself. 3. Evidencing itself, it reaches far. Beaching far, it be- 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 117" 

comes large and substantial. Large and substantial, it becomes 
high and brilliant. 4. Large and substantial ; — this is how it contains 
all things. High and brilliant ; — this is how it overspreads all 
things. Beaching far and continuing long ; — this is how it perfects 
all things, [page 309.] [5,* 6.*] 

7. The way of Heaven and Earth may be completely declared in 
one sentence. They are without any doubleness, and so they pro- 
duce things in a manner that is unfathomable. 8. The way of 
Heaven and Earth is large and substantial, high and brilliant, far- 
reaching and long-enduring, [page 310.] [9.*] 

10. It is said in the Book of Poetry, " The ordinances of Heaven r 
how profound are they and unceasing ! " The meaning is, that it 
is thus that Heaven is Heaven. And again, " How illustrious was 
it, the singleness of the virtue of King Wan ! " indicating that it 
was thus that King Wan was what he was. Singleness likewise is 
unceasing, [page 311.] 

XXVII. 1. How great is the path proper to the sage ! 2. Like 
overflowing water, it sends forth and nourishes all things, and rises 
up to the height of heaven, [page 311.] [3.*] 

4. It waits for the proper man, and then it is trodden. 5. Hence 
it is said, " Only by perfect virtue can the perfect path, in all it& 
courses, be made a fact." 6. Therefore, the superior man honors 
his vh'tuous nature, and maintains constant inquiry and study, 
seeking to carry it out to its breadth and greatness, so as to omit 
none of the more exquisite and minute points which it embraces, 
and to raise it to its greatest height and brilliancy, so as to pursue 
the course of the Mean. He cherishes his old knowledge, and is 
continually acquiring new. He exerts an honest, generous earnest- 
ness, in the esteem and practice of all propriety. 7. Thus, when 
occupying a high situation, he is not proud, and in a low situation, 
he is not insubordinate. When the kingdom is well-governed, he 
is sure by his words to rise ; and when it is ill-governed, he is sure 
by his silence to command forbearance to himself. Is not this 
what we find in the Book of Poetry, — " Intelligent is he and pru- 
dent, and so preserves his person ? " [pages 311, 312.] 

XXYIII. 1. The Master said, " Let a man who is ignorant be 
fond of using his own judgment; let a man without rank be fond of 
assuming a directing power to himself ; let a man who is living in 
the present age go back to the ways of antiquity ; — on the persons 
of all who act thus calamities will be sure to come." [2,* 3,* 4,* 5.*] 

XXIX. 1. He who attains to the sovereignty of the empire, hav- 
ing those three important things, shall be able to effect that there 
shall be few errors under his government. 2. However excellent may 



118 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

have been the regulations of those of former times, they cannot be 
attested. Not being attested, they cannot command credence, and 
not being credited, the people would not follow them. However 
excellent might be the regulations made by one in an inferior situ- 
ation, he is not in a position to be honored. Unhonored, he cannot 
command credence, and not being credited, the people would not 
follow his rules. 3. Therefore the institutions of the Ruler are 
rooted in his own character and conduct, and sufficient attestation 
of them is given by the masses of the people. He examines them 
by comparison with those of the three kings, and finds them without 
mistake. He sets them up before heaven and earth, and finds 
nothing in them contrary to their mode of operation. He presents 
himself with them before spiritual beings, and no doubts about them 
arise. He is prepared to wait for the rise of a sage, a hundred ages 
after, and has no misgivings. 4. His presenting himself with his 
institutions before spiritual beings, without any doubts about them 
arising, shows that he knows Heaven. His being prepared, with- 
out any misgivings, to wait for the rise of a sage, a hundred ages 
after, shows that he knows men. [pages 313, 314.] 

5. Such being the case, the movements of such a ruler, illustrating 
his institutions, constitute an example to the empire for ages. His 
acts are for ages a law to the empire. His • words are for ages a 
lesson to the empire. Those who are far from him, look longingly 
for him ; and those who are near him; are never wearied with him. 
6. It is said in the Book of Poetry, — " Not disliked there, not tired 
of here, from day to day, and night to night, will they perpetuate 
their praise." Never has there been a ruler, who did not realize 
this description, that obtained an early renown throughout the 
empire, [pages 314, 315.] 

XXX. 1. Chung-nef handed down the doctrines of Yaou and 
Shun, as if they had been his ancestors, and elegantly displayed 
the regulations of Wan and Woo, taking them as his model. Above, 
he harmonized with the times of heaven, and below, he was con- 
formed to the water and land. 2. He may be compared to heaven 
and earth, in their supporting and containing, their overshadowing 
and curtaining, all things. He may be compared to the four sea- 
sons in their alternating progress, and to the sun and moon in their 
successive shining. 3. All things are nourished together without 

tTsze-sze here refers to his grandfather Confucius by his marriage-name 
Chung-ne, instead of the usual designation " The Master." The reader may con- 
sult Dr. Legge's note to chapter ii. (Life and Teachings of Confucius, page 285.) 
See also the article Confucius in Dr. Thomas' Biographical Dictionary. (Lip- 
pincott, 1873, page 651.) 



§ 871 The Claris to an Index. 119 

their injuring one another. The courses of the seasons, and of the 
sun- and moon, are pursued without any collision among them. The 
smaller energies are like river currents ; the greater are seen in 
might}* transformations. It is this which makes heaven and 
earth so great, [page 315.] 

XXXI. 1. It is only he, possessed of all sagely qualities that 
can exist under heaven, who shows himself quick in apprehension, 
clear in discernment, of far-reaching intelligence and all-embracing 
knowledge, fitted to exercise rule ; magnanimous, generous, benign, 
and mild, fitted to exercise forbearance ; impulsive, energetic, firm, 
and enduring, fitted to maintain a firm hold ; self-adjusted, grave, 
never swerving from the Mean, and correct, fitted to command 
reverence ; accomplished, distinctive, concentrative, and searching, 
fitted to exercise discrimination. 2. All-embracing is he and vast, 
deep and active as a fountain, sending forth in their due seasons 
his virtues. 3. All-embracing and vast, he is like heaven. Deep 
and active as a fountain, he is like the abyss. He is seen, and 
the people all reverence him ; he speaks, and the people all believe 
him ; he acts, and the people are all pleased with him. 4. There- 
fore, his fame overspreads the Middle kingdom, and extends to all 
barbarous tribes. Wherever ships and carriages reach ; wherever 
the strength of man penetrates ; wherever the heavens overshadow 
and the earth sustains ; wherever the sun and moon shine ; 
wherever frosts and dews fall : — all who have blood and breath un- 
feignedly honor and love him. Hence it is said, — " He is the equal 
of Heaven." [pages 315-317.] 

XXXII. 1. It is only the individual possessed of the most entire 
sincerity that can exist under heaven, who can adjust the great in- 
variable relations of mankind, establish the great fundamental vir- 
tues of humanity, and know the transforming and nurturing opera- 
tions of Heaven and Earth ; — shall this individual have any being 
or anything beyond himself on which he depends? 2. Call him 
man in his ideal, how earnest is he ! Call him an abyss, how deep 
is he ! Call him Heaven, how vast is he ! 3. Who can know him, 
but he who is indeed quick in apprehension, clear in discernment, 
of far-reaching intelligence, and all-embracing knowledge, possess- 
ing all heavenly virtue ? [pages 317, 318.] 

XXXIII. 1. It is said in the Book of Poetry, " Over her em- 
broidered robe she puts a plain, single garment," intimating a dis- 
like to the display of the elegance of the former. Just so, it is the 
way of the superior man to prefer the concealment of his virtue, 

- while it daily becomes more illustrious ; and it is the way of the 
mean man to seek notoriety, while he daily goes more and more to 



120 Kane 8 Ethics. § 871 

ruin. It is characteristic of the superior man, appearing insipicL 
yet never to produce satiety ; while showing a simple negligence, 
yet to have his accomplishments recognized ; while seemingly plain, 
yet to he discriminating. He knows how what is distant lies in 
what is near. He knows where the wind proceeds from. He 
knows how what is minute becomes manifested. Such an one, we 
may be sure, will enter into virtue, [page 318.] 

2. It is said in the Book of Poetry, " Although the fish sinks and 
lies at the bottom, it is still quite clearly seen." Therefore, the 
superior man examines his heart, that there may be nothing wrong 
there, and that he may have no cause for dissatisfaction with him- 
self. That wherein the superior man cannot be equalled is simply 
this, — his work which other men cannot see. [pages 318, 319.] 

3. It is said in the Book of Poetry, " Looked at in your apart- 
ment, be there free from shame, where you are exposed to the light 
of heaven." Therefore, the superior man, even when he is not 
moving, has a feeling of reverence, and while he speaks not, he has 
the feeling of truthfulness, [page 319.] 

4. It is said in the Book of Poetry, " In silence is the offering 
presented, and the spirit approached to ; there is not the slightest 
contention." Therefore the superior man does not use rewards, 
and the people are stimulated to virtue. He does not show anger,, 
and the people are awed more than by hatchets and battle-axes. 

5. It is said in the Book of Poetry, " What needs no display is 
virtue. All the princes imitate it." Therefore, the superior man 
being sincere and reverential, the whole world is conducted to a, 
state of happy tranquility, [page 31 9-] 

6. It is said in the Book of Poetry, " I regard with pleasure your 
brilliant virtue, making no great display of itself in sounds and ap- 
pearances." The Master said, "Among the appliances to transform 
the people, sounds and appearances are but trivial influences. It is 
said in another ode, 'Virtue is light as a hair.' Still r a hair will 
admit of comparison as to its size. ' The doings of the supreme 
Heaven have neither sound or smell.' — That is perfect virtue." 

EXTRACTS FROM THE CONFUCIAN ANALECTS. 

BOOK I, Chapter I. 1. The Master said, " Is it not pleasant 
to learn with a constant perseverance and application ? 2. Is it 
not delightful to have friends coming from distant quarters ? 3. Is 
he not a man of complete virtue, who feels no discomposure though 
men may take no note of him? " [page 116.] 

III. The Master said, " Fine words and an insinuating appear- 
ance are seldom associated with true virtue." [page' 117..} 



>;§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 121 

V. The Master said, " To rule a country of a thousand chariots, 
there must be reverent attention to business, and sincerity ; econ 
omy in expenditure, and love for the people ; and the employment 
of them at the proper seasons." [page 118.] 

VI. The Master said, " A youth, when at home, should be filial, 
and, abroad, respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and 
truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and cultivate the friend 
ship of the good. When he has time and opportunity, after the 
performance of these things, he should employ them in polite 
studies." [page 118.] 

VIII. 1. The Master said, " If the scholar be not grave, he will 
not call forth any veneration, and his learning will not be solid. 2. 
Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles. 3. Have no 
friends not equal to yourself. 4. When you have faults, do not 
fear to abandon them." [page 119.] 

XIV. The Master said, " He who aims to be a man of complete 
virtue, in his food does not seek to gratify his appetite, nor in his 
dwelling-place does he seek the appliances of ease : he is earnest in 
what he is doing, and careful in his speech ; he frequents the com- 
pany of men of principle that he may be rectified : — such a person 
may be said indeed to love to learn." [page 120.] 

XVI. The Master said, " I will not be afflicted at men's not know- 
ing me; I will be afflicted that I do not know men." [page 121.] 

BOOK II, Chapter I. The Master said, " He who exercises 
government by means of his virtue, may be compared to the north 
polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn toward it." 

IT. The Master said, "In the Book of Poetry are three hundred 
pieces, but the design of them all may be embraced in that one sen- 
tence — ' Have no depraved thoughts.' " [page 121.] 

III. 1. The Master said, " If the - people be led by laws, and uni- 
formity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to 
avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. 2. If they be 
led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules 
of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will 
become good." [page 122.] 

IV. 1. The Master said, "At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learn- 
ing. 2. At thirty, I stood firm. 3. At forty, I had no doubts. 4. At 
fifty, I knew the decrees of heaven. 5. At sixty, my ear was an 
obedient organ for the reception of truth. 6. At seventy, I could 
follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was 
right." [page 122.] 

VII. Tsze-yew asked what filial piety was. The Master said, "The 
filial piety of now-a-days means the support of one's parents. But 

9 



122 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

dogs and horses likewise are able to do something in the way of 
support ; — without reverence, what is there to distinguish the one- 
support given from the other? " [page 123.] 

VIII. Tsze-hea asked what filial piety was. The Master said, 
" The difficulty is with the countenance. If, when their elders have 
any troublesome affairs, the young take the toil of them, and if, when 
the young have wine and food, they set them before their elders, is, 
this to be considered filial piety? " [page 123.] 

IX. The Master said, " I have talked with Hwuy for a whole 
day, and he has not made any objection to anything I said; — as if 
he were stupid. He has retired, and I have examined his conduct 
when away from me, and found him able to illustrate my teachings.. 
Hwuy! He is not stupid." [page 124.] 

X. 1. The Master said, " See what a man does. 2. Mark hi& 
motives. 3. Examine in what things he rests. 4. How can a man 
conceal his character ! " [page 124.] 

XI. The Master said, " If a man keeps cherishing his old knowl- 
edge so as continually to be acquiring new, he may be a teacher of 
others." [page 124.] 

XIII. Tsze-kung asked what constituted the superior man. The 
Master said, " He acts before he speaks, and afterw T ard speaks ac- 
cording to his actions." [page 124.] 

XIY. The Master said, " The superior man is catholic and no 
partizan. The mean man is a partizan and not catholic." 

XV. The Master said, " Learning without thought is labor lost ; 
thought without learning is perilous." [page 124.] 

XVIII. The Master said, " Yew, shall I teach you what knowl- 
edge is? When you know a thing, to hold that you know it ; and 
when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it ; — 
this is knowledge." [page 125.] 

XX (i Ke K'ang asked how to cause the people to reverence their 
ruler, to be faithful to him, and to urge themselves to virtue. The 
Master said, " Let him preside over them with gravity ; — then they 
will reverence him. Let him be filial and kind to all ; — then they 
will be faithful to him. Let him advance the good and teach the 
incompetent ; — then they will eagerly seek to be virtuous." 

XXII. The Master said, " I do not know how a man without 
truthfulness is to get on. How can a large carriage be made to go 
without the cross bar for yoking the oxen to, or a small carriage 
without the arrangement for yoking the horses ? " [Cf. XV., v.] 

XXIV. 1. The Master said, "For a man to sacrifice to a spirit 
which does not belong to him is flattery. 2. To see what is right 
and not to do it, is want of courage." [page 127.] 



£ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 123 

BOOK III., Chapter, XIII. 1. Wang-sun Kea asked, saying, 
" What is the meaning of the saying, ' It is better to pay court to 
the furnace than to the south-west corner '? " 2. The Master said, 
" Not so. He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he 
can pray." [page 130.] 

XXVI. The Master said, " High station filled without indulgent 
generosity ; ceremonies performed without reverence ; mourning 
conducted without sorrow ; — wherewith should I contemplate such 
ways ? " [page 134.] 

BOOK IV., Chapter I. The Master said, " It is virtuous man- 
ners which constitute the excellence of a neighborhood. If a man 
in selecting a residence do not fix on one where such prevail, how 
can he be wise ? " [page 134.] 

II. The Master said, " Those who are without virtue cannot 
abide long either in a condition of poverty and hardship, or in a 
condition of enjoyment. The virtuous rest in virtue ; the wise de- 
sire virtue." [page 134.] 

IV. The Master said, " If the will be set on virtue, there will be 
no practice of wickedness." [page 134.] 

V. 1. The Master said, " Riches and honors are what men desire. 
If it cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be held. 
Poverty and meanness are what men dislike. If it cannot be ob- 
tained in the proper way, they should not be avoided. 2. If a 
superior man abandon virtue, how can he fulfil the requirements of 
that name ? 3. The superior man does not, even for the space of 
a single meal, act contrary to virtue. In moments of haste, he 
cleaves to it. In seasons of danger, he cleaves to it." 

VI. 1. The Master said, " I have not seen a person who loved 
virtue, or one who hated what was not virtuous. He who loved 
virtue would esteem nothing aboye it. He who hated what was 
not virtuous, would practice virtue in such a way that he would 
not allow anything that is not virtuous to approach his person. 2. 
Is any one able for one day to apply his strength to virtue ? I 
have not seen the case in which his strength would be insufficient. 
3. Should there possibly be any such case, I have not seen it." 

IX. The Master said, "A scholar, whose mind is set on truth, 
and who is ashamed of bad clothes and bad food, is not fit to be 
discoursed with." [pages 135, 136.] 

X. The Master said, " The superior man in the world does not 
set his mind either for anything, or against anything ; what is right 
he will follow." [page 136.] 

XI. The Master said, " The superior man thinks of virtue ; the 
small man thinks of comfort. The superior man thinks of the 



124 Kant's Elides. § 871 

sanctions of law; the small man thinks of favors which he may 
receive." [page 136.] 

XIV. The Master said, "A man should say, I am not concerned 
that I have no place, — I am concerned how I may fit myself for 
one. I am not concerned, that I am not known, — I seek to be 
worthy to be known." 

XV. 1. The Master said, " Sin, [Tsang Sin, a disciple of Con- 
fucius] my doctrine is that of an all-pervading unity." Tsang the 
philosopher, replied, " Yes." [Cf. Bk. XV, ii , 3.] 2. The Master went 
out, and the other disciples asked, saying, " What do his words 
mean? " Tsang said, " The doctrine of our Master is to be true to 
the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to 
others, — this and nothing more." [pages 136, 137.] 

XVI. The Master said, " The mind of the superior man is con- 
versant with righteousness ; the mind of the mean man is conver- 
sant with gain." [page 137.] 

XVII. The Master said, " When we see men of worth, we should 
think of equaling them; when we see men of a contrary character 
we should turn inward and examine ourselves." [page 137.] 

XVIII. The Master said, " In serving his parents, a son may re- 
monstrate with them, but gently ; when he sees that they do not 
incline to follow Ms advice, he shows an increased degree of rever- 
ence, but does not abandon Ms purpose ; and should they punish 
him, he does not allow himself to murmur." [page 137.] 

XXIV. The Master said, " The superior man wishes to be slow 
in his words and earnest in his conduct." [page 138.] 

XXV. The Master said, '• Virtue is not left to stand alone. He 
who 'practices it will have neighbors." [page 138.] [xxvi.*] 

BOOK V., Chapter IV. 1. Some one said, " Yung is truly vir- 
tuous, but he is not ready with his tongue." 2. The Master said, 
" What is the good of being ready with the tongue ? They who 
meet men with smartnesses of speech, for the most part procure 
themselves hatred. I know not whether he be truly virtuous, but 
why should he show readiness of the tongue ? " [page 139.] 

IX. 1. Tsae Yu being asleep during the day time, the Master 
said, " Botten wood cannot be carved ; a wall of dirty earth will 
not receive the trowel. This Yu ! — what is the use of my reprov- 
ing him? " 2. The Master said, "At first, my way with men was 
to hear their words, and give them credit for their conduct. Now 
my way is to hear their words, and look at their conduct. It is 
from Yu that I have learned to make this change." 

X. The Master said, I have not seen a firm and unbending man." 
Some one replied, " There is Shin Ch'ang." " Ch'ang," said the 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 125 

Master, "is under the influence of his lusts; how can he be firm and 
unbending?" [page 141.] 

XXVII. The Master said, " In a hamlet of ten families, there 
may be found one honorable and sincere ss I am, but not so fond 
of learning." [page 145.] 

BOOK VI., Chapter II. The Duke Gae asked which of the dis- 
ciples loved to learn. Confucius replied to him, " There was Yen 
Hwuy ; he loved to learn. He did not transfer his anger ; he did 
not repeat a fault. Unfortunately, his appointed time was short 
and he died ; and now there is not such another. I have not yet 
heard of any one who loves to learn as he did." [page 146.] 

V. The Master said, " Such was Hwuy that for three months 
there would be nothing in his mind contrary to perfect virtue. The 
others may attain to this once a day or once a month, but nothing 
more " [page 147.] 

IX. The Master said, "Admirable indeed was the virtue of Hwuy ! 
With a single bamboo dish of rice, a single gourd dish of drink, and 
living in his mean narrow lane, while others could not have en- 
dured the distress, he did not allow his joy to be affected by it. 
Admirable indeed was the virtue of Hwuy ! " [page 148.] 

X. Yen K'ew said, " It is not that I do not delight in your doc- 
trines, but my strength is insufficient." The Master said, " Those 
whose strength is insufficient give over in the middle of the way, 
but now you limit yourself." [page 149.] 

XVII. The Master said, " Man is born for uprightness. If a 
man lose his uprightness, and yet live, his escape from death is the 
effect of mere good fortune." [page 150.] 

XVIII. The Master said, " They who know the truth are not 
equal to those who love it, and they who love it are not equal to 
those who find delight in it." [Cf Dharmapada 79, 354, 364 (§ 949).] 

XX. Fan Ch'e asked what constituted wisdom. The Master 
said, " To give one's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, 
while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be 
called wisdom." He asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, 
" The man of virtue makes the difficulty to be overcome his first 
business, and success only a subsequent consideration ; — this may 
be called perfect virtue." [pages 150, 151.] 

XXVIII. 1. Tsze-kung said, " Suppose the case of a man exten- 
sively conferring benefits on the people, and able to assist all : what 
would you say of him? Might he be called perfectly virtuous ? " 
The Master said, " Why speak only of virtue in connection with 
him ? Must he not have the qualities of a sage ? Even Yaou and 
Shun were still solicitous about this. 2. Now the man of per- 



126 Rants Ethics. § 871 

feet virtue, wishing- to be established himself, seeks also to establish 
others ; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge 
others. 3. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in our- 
selves ; — this may be called the art of virtue." [page 152.] 

BOOK VII., Chapter I. The Master said, "A transmitter and 
not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients, I venture to com- 
pare myself with our old P'ang." [page 153.] 

II. The Master said, " The silent treasuring up of knowledge ; 
learning without satiety ; and instructing others without being 
wearied: — what one of these things belongs to me ? " [page 153.] 

III. The Master said, " The leaving virtue without proper culti- 
vation ; the not thoroughly discussing what is learned ; not being 
able to move toward righteousness of which a knowledge is gained ; 
and not being able to change what is not good : — these are the 
things which occasion me solicitude." [page 153.] 

VI. 1. The Master said, " Let the will be set on the path of duty. 
2. Let every attainment in what is good be firmly grasped. 3. 
Let perfect virtue be accorded with. 4. Let relaxation and enjoy- 
ment be found in the polite arts." [page 154.] 

VII. The Master said. " From the man bringing his bundle of 
dried flesh for my teaching upward, I have never refused instruc- 
tion to any one." [page 154.] 

XVIII. 1. The duke of She asked Tsze-loo about Confucius, and 
Tsze-loo did not answer him. 2. The Master said, •' Why did you 
not say to him, — He is simply a man, who in his eager pursuit of 
knowledge forgets his food, who in the joy of its attainment forgets 
his sorrows, and who does not perceive that old age is coming on ? " 

XIX. The Master said, " I am not one who was born in the 
possession of knowledge; I am one who is fond of antiquity, and 
earnest in seeking it there.'''' [pages 157, 158.] 

XX. The subjects on which the Master did not talk, were, — pro- 
digious things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings. 

XXI. The Master said, " When I walk along with two others, 
they may serve me as my teachers. I will select their good quali- 
ties and follow them, their bad qualities and avoid them." 

XXII. The Master said, " Heaven produced the virtue that is in 
me. Hwan T'uy — what can he do to me ? "f 



tCONEUClUS CALM IN DANGER, THROUGH THE ASSURANCE OF HATING A 

divine mission. According to the historical accounts, Confucius was passing 
through Sung on his way from Wei to Ch'in, and was practicing ceremonies 
with his disciples under a large tree, when they were set upon by emissaries of 
Hwaw T'uy, a high officer of Sung. These pulled down the tree, and wanted to 
kill the sage. His disciples urged him to make haste and escape, when he 
calmed their fears by these words. Ai the same time, he disguised himself till he 
got past^Sung. Tin's story may be apocryphal, but the saying remains. — a remark- 
able one. — Dr. Legged note. [Cf. Book IX., eh. v., and Book XIV., ch. xxxviii.] 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 127 

XXIII. The Master said, " Do you think, my disciples, that 1 
Iiave any concealments ? I conceal nothing from you. There is 
nothing which I do that is not shown to you, my disciples ; — that 
is my way." [page 158.] 

XXIV. There were lour things which the Master taught, — let- 
ters, ethics, devotion of soul, and truthfulness, [page 158.] 

XXYI1. The Master said, " There may be those who act without 
knowing why. I do not do so. Hearing much and selecting what 
is good and following it, seeing much and keeping it in memory: — 
this is the second style of knowledge." [page 159.] 

XXIX. The Master said, " Is virtue a thing remote? I wish to 
be virtuous, and lo ! virtue is at hand." [page 159.] 

XXXIII. The Master said, " The sage and the man of perfect 
virtue ; — how dare I rank myself with them ? It may simply be said 
of me, that I strive to become such without satiety, and teach others 
without weariness." Ivung-se Hwa said, " This is just what we, 
the disciples, cannot imitate you in." [page 160.] 

XXXIY. The Master being very sick, Tsze-loo asked leave to 
pray for him. He said, " May such a thing be done?" Tsze-loo 
replied, " It may. In the Prayers it is said, ' Prayer has been made 
to you, the spirits of the upper and lower worlds.' " The Master 
said, " My praying has been for a long time." [page 161.] [xxxv,* 
xxxvi,* xxxvn.*] [Cf. Psalms, lxxxviii., 1 ; cxxxviii., 3.] 

BOOK VIII., Chapter VII. 1. Tsang the philosopher said, 
" The scholar may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous 
endurance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. 2. Per- 
fect virtue is the burden which he considers it is his to sustain ; is 
it not heavy ? Only with death does his course stop ; is it not 
long? " [page 164.] [See Book IV., ch. xv. above.] 

XII. The Master said, " It is not easy to find a man who has 
learned for three years without coming to be good." [page 164.] 

XIII. 1. The Master said, " With sincere faith he unites the 
love of learning; holding firm to death, he is perfecting the excel- 
lence of his course. 2. Such an one will not enter a tottering 
state, nor dwell in a disorganized one. When right principles of 
government prevail in the empire, he will show himself; when they 
are prostrated, he will keep concealed. 3. When a country is well 
governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed 
of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honor are things to 
be ashamed of." [page 165.] 

XVII. The Master said, " Learn as if you could not reach your 
object, and were always fearing also lest you should lose it." [page 
165.] [xviii,* xix,* xx* xxi.*] 



128 Kant's Ethics. § 871 

BOOK IX., Chapter IV. There were four things from which 
the Master was entirely free. He had no forgone conclusions, no 
arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism. 

V. 1. The Master was put in fear in K'wang. 2. He said, 
"After the death of king Wan, was not the cause of truth lodged here 
in me ? 3. If heaven had wished to let this cause of truth perish,, 
then I, a future mortal, should not have got such a relation to that 
cause. While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what 
can the people of K'wang do to me? " Of. Book VII., ch. xxii. 

XL 1. The Master being very ill, Tsze-loo wished the disciples 
to act as ministers to him. 2. During the remission of his illness,. 
he said, " Long has the conduct of Yew been deceitful ! By pre- 
tending to have ministers when 1 have them not, whom should I 
impose upon ? Should I impose upon Heaven ? 3. Moreover, than 
that I should die in the hands of ministers, is it not better that I 
should die in the hands of you, my disciples ? And though I may 
not get a great burial, shall I die upon the road ? " [page 170.] 

XVIII. The Master said, " The prosecution of learning may be 
compared to what may happen in raising a mound. If there want 
but one basket of earth to complete the work, and I stop, the stop- 
ping is my own work. It may be compared to throwing down the- 
earth on the level ground. Though but one basketful is thrown at 
a time, the advancing with it is my own going forward." 

XXIII. The Master said, " Can men refuse to assent to the words 
of strict admonition ? But it is reforming the conduct because of 
them which is valuable. Can men refuse to be pleased with words 
of gentle advice? But it is unfolding their aim which is valuable. 
If a man be pleased with these words, but does not unfold their- 
aim, and assents to those, but does not reform his conduct, I can 
really do nothing with him." [pages 172, 173.] 

XXIV. The Master said, "Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first 
principles. Have no friends not equal to yourself When you. 
have faults, do not fear to abandon them." [page 173.] 

XXV. The Master said, " The commander of the forces of a large 
State may be carried off, but the will of even a common man can- 
not be taken from him. [xxvi * xxvii * xxviii,* xxix,* xxx *] 

BOOK X., Chapter XII. The stable being burned down, when 
he was at court, on his return he said, " Has any man been hurt?" 1 
He did not ask about the horses, [page 180.] 

XV. 1. When any of his friends died, if he had no- relations who- 
could be depended on for the necessary offices, he would say, " I 
will bury him." [page 181.] [2.*] [xvi,* xvii,*. xviii.*] 

BOOK XL, Chapter XL Ke Loo asked about serving the spirits* 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 129' 

of the dead. The Master said, " While you are not able to serve- 
men, how can you serve their spirits ? " Ke Loo added, " I venture 
to ask about death ? " He was answered, " While you do not know- 
life, how can you know about death? " [page 185.] [Of. Zoroaster,, 
Avesta, Yacna, xxvi, 21, 35. (§ 881 below.)] 

XXIII. 1. Ke Tsze-jen asked whether Chung-yew and Yen 
K'ew could be called great ministers. 2. The Master said, " 1 
thought you would ask about some extraordinary individuals, and 
you only ask about Yew and K'ew ! 3. What is called a 
great minister, is one who serves his prince according to what is 
right, and when he finds he cannot do so, retires. 4. Now. as to 
Yew and K'ew, they may be called ordinary ministers." 5. Tsze- 
jen said, " Then they will always follow their chief; — will they? "' 
6. The Master said, " In an act of parricide or regicide, they would 
not follow him/' [page 188.] [xxiv,* xxv.*] 

BOOK XII., Chapter I. 1. Yen Yuen asked about perfect vir- 
tue. The Master said, " To subdue one's self and return to pro- 
priety, is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself 
and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect vir- 
tue to him. Is the practice of perfect virtue from a man himself, or- 
is it from others? " 2. Yen Yuen said, " I beg to ask the steps of 
that process." The Master replied, " Look not at what is contrary to* 
propriety ; listen not to what is contrary to propriety ; speak not 
what is contrary to propriety ; make no movement which is con- 
trary to propriety." Yen Yuen then said, " Though I am deficient 
in intelligence and vigor, I will make it my business to practice this. 
lesson." [page 191.] [Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada 160. (§ 949.)] 

II. Chung-kung asked about perfect virtue. The Master said,. 
" It is, when you go abroad, to behave to every one as if you were re- 
ceiving a great guest ; to employ the people as if you were assist- 
ing at a great sacrifice ; not to do to others as you would not wish 
done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the coun- 
try, and none in the family." Chung-kung said, " Though I ami 
deficient in intelligence and vigor, I will make it my business to 
practice this lesson." [pages 191, 192.] 

III. 1. Sze-ma New asked about perfect virtue. 2. The Master 
said, " The man of perfect virtue is cautious and slow in his 
speech." 3. " Cautious and slow in his speech ! " said New ; — " \® 
this what is meant by perfect virtue? " The Master said, " When 
a man feels the difficulty of doing, can he be other than cautious; 
and slow in speaking? " [page 192.] 

IV. 1. Sze-ma New asked about the superior man. The Master 
said, "The superior man has neither anxiety nor fear." 2. u Being; 



130 Kant's Ethic*. § 871 

without anxiety or fear! " said New; — " does this constitute what 
we call a superior man ? " 3. The Master said, " When internal 
examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be anxious 
about, what is there to fear ? " [page 192.] 

V. 1. Sze-ma New, full of anxiety, said, " Other men all have 
their brothers. I only have not." 2. Tsze-hea [a disciple of Con- 
fucius] said to him, " There is the following saying which I have 
heard : 3. ' Death and life have their determined appointment ; 
■riches and honors depend upon Heaven.' 4. Let the superior man 
never fail reverentially to order his own conduct, and let him be 
respectful to others and observant of propriety : — then all within 
the four seas will be his brothers. What has the superior man to 
•do with being distressed because he has no brothers? " 

YII. 1. Tsze-kung asked about government. The Master said, 
•" The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, 
sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people 
in their ruler." 2. Tsze-kung said, " If it cannot be helped, and 
one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be 
foregone first? " "The military equipment," said the Master. 3. 
Tsze-kung again asked, " If it cannot be helped, and one of the 
remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be 
foregone? " The Master answered, " Part with' the food. From of 
•old, death has been the lot of all men ; but if the people have no 
faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the State." 

X. 1. Tsze-chang having asked how virtue was to be exalted, 
■and delusions to be discovered, the Master said, " Hold faithfulness 
and sincerity as first principles, and be moving continually to what 
is right ; — this is the way to exalt one's virtue." [page 195.] [2,* 3.*] 

XVI. The Master said, " The superior man seeks to perfect the 
admirable qualities of men, and does not seek to perfect their bad 
qualities. The mean man does the opposite of this." [page 198.] 

XVII. Ke K'ang asked Confucius about government. Confucius 
replied, " To govern means to rectify. If you lead on the people 
with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?" [page 196.] 

XVIII. Ke K'ang distressed about the number of thieves in the 
State, inquired of Confucius about how to do away with them. Con- 
fucius said, " If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should re- 
ward them to do it, they would not steal." [page 197.] 

XIX. Ke K'ang asked Confucius about government, saying, 
-" What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the 
principled?" Confucius replied, " Sir, in carrying on your gov- 
ernment, why should you use killing at all ? Let your evinced de- 
.sires be" for what is good, and the people will be good. The rela- 



-§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 131 

tion between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind 
.-and the grass. The grass must bend when the wind blows across 
it." [page 197.] 

XX. 1. Tsze-chang asked, " What must the officer be, who may- 
be said to be distinguished?" 2. The Master said, " What is it 
you call being distinguished?" 3. Tsze-chang replied, " It is to 
be heard of through the State, to be heard of through the Family." 
4. The Master said, " That is notoriety, not distinction. 5. Xow, 
the man of distinction is solid and straightforward, and loves 
righteousness. He examines people's words, and looks at their 
countenances. He is anxious to humble himself to others. Such 
a man will be distinguished in the country; he will be distinguished 
in the family. 6. As to the man of notoriety, he assumes the 
appearance of virtue, but his actions are opposed to it, and he rests 
in this character without any doubts about himself. Such a man 
will be heard of in the country; he will be heard of in the family." 

XXI. 1. Fan-ch'e rambling with the Master under the trees about 
the rain-altars, said, " I venture to ask how to exalt virtue, to cor- 
rect cherished evil, and to discover delusions." 2. The Master 
said, " Truly a good question ! 3. If doing what is to be done be 
made the first business, and success a secondary consideration ; — is 
not this the way to exalt virtue? To assail one's own wickedness 
and not assail that of others ; — is not this the way to correct cher- 
ished evil ? For a morning's anger, to disregard one's own life, and 
involve that of one's parents ; — is not this a case of delusion ? " 

XXII. 1. Fan Oh'e asked about benevolence. The Master said, 
** It is to love all men." He asked about knowledge. The Master 
said, " It is to know all men.', 2. Fan Ch'e did not immediately 
understand these answers. 3. The Master said, " Employ the up- 
right and put aside all the crooked ; — in this way, the crooked can 
be made to be upright." 4. Fan Ch'e retired, and seeing Tsze-hea, 
he said to him. " A little ago, I had an interview with our Master, 
and asked him about knowledge. He said, ' Employ the upright, 
and put aside all the crooked ; — in this way, the crooked can be 
made to be upright.' What did he mean?" 5. Tsze-hea said, 
" Truly rich is his saying ! 6. Shun, being in possession of the 
empire, selected from among all the people, and employed Kaou- 
yaou, on which all who were devoid of virtue disappeared. T'ang 
being in possession of the empire, selected from among all the peo- 
ple, and employed E-Yin, and all who were devoid of virtue disap- 
peared." [page 198.] 

XXIII. Tsze-kung asked about friendship. The Master said- 
" Faithfully admonish your friend, and kindly try to lead him. If 



132 Kant s Ethics. § 871 

you find him impracticable, stop. Do not disgrace yourself." 
[pages 198, 199.] [xxiv .*] 

BOOK XIII., Chapter IX. 1. When the Master went to Wei, 
Yen Yew acted as driver of his carriage. 2. The Master observed, 
" How numerous are the j)eople ! " 3. Yew said, " Since they are 
thus numerous, what more shall be done for them?" ''Enrich 
them," was the reply. 4. "And when they have been enriched, 
what more shall be done? " The Master said, " Teach them." 

XIII. The Master said, " If a minister make his own conduct cor- 
rect, what difficulty will he have in assisting in government ? If 
he cannot rectify himself, what has he to do with rectifying others?" 

XXIV. Tsze-kung asked saying, " What do you say of a man 
who is loved by all the people of his village?" The Master re- 
plied, " We may not for that accord our approval of him." "And 
what do you say of him who is hated by all the people of his vil- 
lage ? " The Master said, " We may not for that conclude that he 
is bad. It is better than either of these cases that the good in the 
village love him, and the bad hate him." [page 206.] 

XXV. The Master said, " The superior man is easy to serve and 
difficult to please. If you try to please him in any way which is 
not accordant with right, he will not be pleased. But in his employ- 
ment of men, he uses them according to their capacity. The mean, 
man is difficult to serve, and easy to please. If you try to please 
him, though it be in a way which is not accordant with right, he 
may be pleased. But in his employment of men, he wishes them 
to be equal to everything." [pages 206, 207.] 

XXVII. The Master said, " The firm, the enduring, the simple, 
and the modest, are near to virtue." [page 207.] 

XXX. The Master said, " To lead an uninstructed people to war 
is to throw them away." [page 207.] 

BOOK XIV., Chapter II. 1. " When the love of superiority, 
boasting, resentments, and covetousness are repressed, may this be 
deemed perfect virtue?" 2. The Master said, " This may be re- 
garded as the achievement of what is difficult. But 1 do not know 
that it is to be deemed perfect virtue." [page 208.] 

III. The Master said, " The scholar who cherishes the love of 
comfort, is not fit to be deemed a scholar.'' [page 208.] 

XI. The Master said, " To be poor without murmuring is difficult. 
To be rich without being proud is easy." [page 210.] 

XIII. 1. Tsze-loo asked what constituted a complete man. The 
Master said, " Suppose a man with the knowledge of Tsang Woo- 
chung, the freedom from covetousness of Kung-ch'o, the bravery of 
Chwang of Peen, and the varied talents of Yen K'ew ; add to these 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 133 

the accomplishments of the rules of propriety and music : — such an 
one might he reckoned a complete man." 2. He then added, " But 
what is the necessity for a complete man of the present day to 
have all these things? The man, who in the view of gain thinks 
of righteousness; who in the view of danger is prepared to give up 
his life; and who does not forget an old agreement, however far 
back it extends : — such a man may be reckoned a complete man." 

XXIX. The Master said, " The superior man is modest in his 
speech, but exceeds in his actions." [page 216.] 

XXX. 1. The Master said, " The way of the superior man is 
threefold, but I am not equal to it. Virtuous, he is free from 
anxieties ; wise, he is free from perplexities ; bold, he is free from 
fear." 2. Tsze-kung said, " Master, that is what you yourself say.'' 

XXXI. Tsze-kung was in the habit of comparing men together. 
The Master said, ',' Ts'ze must have reached a high pitch of excel- 
lence ! Now, I have not leisure for this. ,, [page 216.] 

XXXII. The Master said, U I will not be concerned at men's not 
knowing me ; I will be concerned at my own want of ability." 

XXXVI. 1. Some one said, " What do you say concerning the 
principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness ? " 2. 
The Master said, " With what then will you recompense kindness? 
3, Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with 
kindness." [page 217.] 

XXXVII. 1. The Master said, -'Alas ! there is no one that knows 
me." 2. Tsze-kung said, "What do you mean by thus saying — thatno 
one knows you? " The Master replied, " I do not murmur against 
Heaven. I do not grumble against men. My studies lie low, and 
my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven ; — that knows 
me ! " [pages 217, 218.] [Cf. Psalms lxix., 3; cxxiii , 1.] 

XXXVIII. 1. The Kung-pih, Leaou, having slandered Tsze-loo 
to Ke-sun, Tsze-fuh King-pih informed Confucius of it, saying 
" Our Master is certainly being led astray by the Kung-pih, Leaou, 
but I have still power enough left to cut Leaou off, and expose his 
corpse in the market and in the court." 2. The Master said, " If 
my principles are to advance, it is so ordered. If they are to fall 
to the ground, it is so ordered. What can the Kung-pih, Leaou, 
do. where such ordering is concerned?" [page 218.] [Cf. VII., 
xxii,, page 126 above.] [xxxix* to xlvii* I omit.] 

BOOK XV., Chapter II. 1. The Master said, " Ts'ze, you think, 
I suppose, that I am one who learns many things and keeps them 
in memory? " 2. Tsze-kung replied, " Yes, — but perhaps it is not 
so?" 3, " No," was the answer ; " I seek a unity all-pervading." 

V. 1. Tsze-chang asked how a man might conduct himself, so as 
to be everywhere appreciated. 2. The Master said, " Let his words 



134 Kan? 8 Ethics. § 871 

be sincere and truthful, and his actions honorable and careful; — 
such conduct may be practiced among the rude tribes of the South 
or the North. If his words be not sincere and truthful, and his 
actions not honorable and careful, will he, with such conduct, be 
appreciated, even in his neighborhood ? 3. When he is standing, 
let him see those two things, as it were fronting him. When he 
is in a carriage, let him see them attached to the yoke. Then may 
he subsequently carry them into practice." 4. Tsze-chang wrote 
these counsels on the end of his sash, [pages 222, 223.] 

Till. The Master said, " The determined scholar and the man 
of virtue will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their vir- 
tue. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue 
complete." [pages 223, 224.] 

IX. Tsze-kung asked about the practice of virtue. The Master 
said, "The mechanic, who wishes to do his work well, must first 
sharpen his tools. [Cf. Doctrine of the Mean, xxi., page 116 above.] 
When you are living in any state, take service with the most worthy 
among its great officers, and make friends of the most virtuous 
among its scholars." [page 224.] 

XT. The Master said, " When a man is not in the habit of say- 
in g ._< What shall I think of this ? What shall 1 think of this ? ' I 
can indeed do nothing with him ! " [page 225.] 

XTI. The Master said, " When a number of people are together? 
for a whole day, without their conversation turning on righteous- 
ness, and when they are fond of carrying out the suggestions of a 
small shrewdness ; theirs is indeed a hard case." [page 225.] 

XT1I. The Master said, "The superior man in everything con- 
siders righteousness to be essential. He performs it according to 
the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in humility. He com- 
pletes it with sincerity. This is indeed a superior man." 

XTIII. The Master said, " The superior man is distressed by his 
want of ability. He is not distressed by men's not knowing him." 

XX. The Master said, '^What the superior man seeks, is in him- 
self. What the mean man seeks, is in others." [page 226.] 

XXIII. Tsze-kung asked, saying, " Is there one word which may 
serve as a rule of practice for all one's life? " The Master said, 
" Is not reciprocity such a word ? What you do not want done 
to yourself, do not do to others." [page 226.] 

XXIX. The Master said, to have faults and not to reform them, — 
this, indeed, should be pronounced having faults." [page 228.] 

XXX. The Master said, " I have been the whole day without 
eating, and the whole night without sleeping : — occupied with 
thinking. It was of no use. The better plan is to learn." 



§ 871 The Clavis to an Index. 135 

XXXI. The Master said, " The object of the superior man is 
truth. Food is not his object. There is ploughing ; — even in that 
there is sometimes want. So with learning ; — emolument may be 
found in it. The superior man is anxious lest he should not get 
truth ; he is not anxious lest poverty should come upon him." 

XXXIV. The Master said, " Virtue is more to man than either 
water or tire. I have seen men die from treading on water and fire, 
but I have never seen a man die from treading the course of virtue." 

XXXV. The Master said, " Let every man consider virtue as 
what devolves on himself. He may not yield the performance of 
it even to his teacher." [page 229.] 

XXXVI. The Master said, " The superior man is correctly firm, 
and not firm merely." [page 229. J 

XXXVII. The Master said, U A minister, in serving his prince,, 
reverently discharges his duties, and makes his emolument a sec- 
ondary consideration." [page 229.] 

XXXVIII. The Master said, " There being instruction, there 
will be no distinction of classes." [page 230.] [xxxix,* xl,* xli.*] 

BOOK XVI., Chapter VII. Confucius said, " There are three 
things which the superior man guards against. In youth, when 
the physical powers are not yet settled, he guards against lust. 
When he is strong, and the physical powers are full of vigor, he 
guards against quarrelsomeness. When he is old, and the animal 
powers are decayed, he guards against covetousness." [page 235.]. 

VIII. 1. Confucius said, " There are three things of which the 
superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the ordinances 
of Heaven. He stands in awe of great men. He stands in awe of 
the words of sages. 2. The mean man does not know the ordin- 
ances of Heaven, and consequently does not stand in awe of them. 
He is disrespectful to great men. . He makes sport of the words of 
sages." [page 235.] 

X. Confucius said, ' c The superior man has nine things which 
are subjects with him of thoughtful consideration. In regard to 
the use of his eyes, he is anxious to see clearly. In regard to the 
use of his ears, he is anxious to hear distinctly. In regard to his 
countenance, he is anxious that it should be benign. In regard to 
his demeanor, he is anxious that it should be respectful. In regard 
to his speech, he is anxious that it should be sincere. In regard 
to his doing of business, he is anxious that it should be reverently 
careful. In regard to what he doubts about, he is anxious to ques- 
tion others. When he is angry, he thinks of the difficulties his 
anger may involve him in. When he sees gain to be got, he thinks 
of righteousness." [page 236.] 



136 Kanfs Ethics. 

XL 1. Confucius said, " Contemplating good, and pursuing it, as 
if they could not reach it ; contemplating evil, and shrinking from it, 
as they would from thrusting the hand into boiling water: — I have 
seen such men, as I have heard such words. 2. Living in retire- 
ment to study their aims, and practicing righteousness to carry out 
their pi-ineiples : — I have heard these words, but I have not seen 
such men." [page 236.] [xii,* xiii,* xiv.*] 

BOOK XVII., Chapter VI. Tsze-chang asked Confucius about 
perfect virtue. Confucius said, " To be able to practice five things 
everywhere under heaven constitutes perfect virtue." He begged 
to ask what they were, and was told, " Gravity, generosity of soul, 
sincerity, earnestness, and kindness. If you are grave, you will 
not be treated with disrespect. If you are generous, you will win 
all. If you are sincere, people will repose trust in you. If you are 
earnest, you will accomplish much. If you are kind, this will en- 
able you to employ the services of others." [page 240.] 

XIX. 1. The Master said, " I would prefer not speaking." 2. 
Tsze-kung said, " If you, Master, do not speak, what shall we, your 
disciples, have to record?" 3. The Master said, " Does Heaven 
speak ? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are 
-continually being produced, but does Heaven say anything? " 

XXII. The Master said, " Hard is the case of him, who will stuff 
himself with food the whole day, without applying his mind to any- 
thing good! Are there not [incorrupt] gamesters and chess players ? 
To be one of these would still be better than doing nothing at all." 

XXIII. Tsze-lo6 said, " Does the superior man esteem valor?" 
The Master said, " The superior man holds righteousness to be of 
highest importance. A man in a superior situation, having valor 
without righteousness, will be guilty of insubordination ; one of the 
lower people, having valor without righteousness, will commit rob- 
bery." [page 246.] 

XXIV. 1. Tsze-kung said, "Has the superior man his hatreds 
also?" The Master said, " He has his hatreds. He hates those 
who proclaim the evil of others. He hates the man who, being in 
low station, slanders his superiors. He hates those who have valor 
merely, and are unobservant of propriety. He hates those who are 
forward and determined, and, at the same time, of contracted un- 
derstanding." 2. The Master then inquired, "Ts'ze, have you 
also your hatreds ? " Tsze-kung replied, " I hate those who pry out 
matters, and ascribe the knowledge to their wisdom. I hate those 
who are only not modest, and think that they are valorous. I hate 
those who make known secrets, and think that they are straight- 
forward." [pages 246, 247.] [xxv ,* xxvi.*] 



The Clavis to an Index. 137 

BOOK XX., Chapter III. 1. The Master .said, " Without re- 
'cognizing the ordinances of Heaven, it is impossible to be a superior 
man. 2. Without an acquaintance with the rules of Propriety, it 
is impossible for the character to be established. 3. Without 
knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know men." 

GENERAL SCHOLIOK.-OP MYSTERIES. (§g 872-891 inclusive.) 

§ 872. — Holy mysteries found in all religious forms of faith, 
(page 183, line 10.) 

§ 873. — Feelings are not knowledge, and consequently teach no 
mystery, (page 183, line 24.) Sec §§ 283, 284, 836. 

§ 874. — Ethic is publicly communicable, and therefore not mys- 
terious, (page 184, line 6.) 

§ 875. — Freedom is no mystery whatever ; but when transferred 
to the last object of practical reason (viz. the realizing the idea of 
our chief moral end), it issues inevitably in holy mysteries, (page 
184, line 18.) Cf. §§ 469, 1026, 2605. 

§ 876. — Touching that which it is everyone's duty to know, no 
secret or mystery obtains ; but only touching that which God alone 
can do. (page 184, line 29.) Cf. § 784. \There are in nature arcana- : 
omit the sentence.] See §724. 

§ 877. — Seeing that mankind cannot by himself alone realize that 
idea of the sovereign and supreme good, (page 185, line 1.) Cf- 
§§ 799, 800, 639, 640, 1120, 706. [§ 878 begins with page 186, line 3.] 

§ 878. — Concerned about knowing, not what the nature of God 
may be in itself, but what he is in reference to us as moral agents. 

§ 879. — Belief in God as (1) Omnipotent Creator, (2) Benignant 
Governor, (3) Bighteous Judge, (page 186, line 15.) 

§ 880. — Same threefold notion occurs in constitutional law: (1) 
legislative; (2) executive ; (3) judicial, (page 186, line 28.) 

§ 881. — Many nations of antiquity have concurred in holding 
this opinion, (page 187, line 20.) [Omit the last sentence.] \_Phta: 
see the American Cyclopedia, (ed. 1874, vol. vi., page 464,) article 
Egypt. ~] Zoroaster's creed: cf. § 871, and the following extracts from 
the Avesta.* 

*" Avesta: the Beligious Books of the Parsees; from Professor Spiegel's Ger- 
man translation of the Original Manuscripts. By Arthur Henry Bleeck, author 
of a Persian Grammar, etc. In three volumes [in one]. Hertford : printed for 
Muncherjee Hormusjee Cama, by Stephen Austin, 1864." Mr. Bleeck states in 
the preface (page viii.) that " this edition has been printed by Mr. Cama for the 
purpose of distributing it gratuitously to his Parsee brethren in India; but the 
translator having expressed a wish that a few copies might be sold in this coun- 
try, to introduce the ancient religion of Zarathustra to the English public, Mr. 
Cama has kindly acceded to the translator's request." I have inserted many 
(references to the paging of Bleeck's volumes, and have also noted some of the 

10 



138 Kant' 8 Ethics. § 88t 

VENDIDAD, III. 75. Creator of the corporeal world, Pure One! 
76. Who fourthly rejoices this earth with the greatest joy? 77. 
Then answered Ahura-Mazda : He who most cultivates the fruits 
of the field, grass and trees, which yield food, O holy Zarathustra. 
78. Or, he who provides waterless land with water, or gives water 
to the waterless (land). 79. For the earth is not glad which lies 
long uncultivated. 80. If it can be cultivated ; 81. Then is it 
good for a habitation for these (men). 84. He who cultivates 
this earth with the left arm and the right, with the right arm 
and the left, O holy Zarathustra, 85. To him it brings wealth. 
87. He who cultivates this earth. O holy Zarathustra, with the left 
arm and the right, with the right arm and the left. 88. Then this 
earth speaks to him : Man ! thou who culti vatest me with the left 
arm and the right, with the right arm and the left, 89. Always 
will I come hither and bear. 90. All food will I bear, together 
with the fruits of the field. 91. He who does not cultivate this, 
earth, O holy Zarathustra, with the left arm and the right, with 
the right arm and the left, 92. Then .this earth speaks to him : 
Man ! thou who dost not cultivate me with the left arm and the 
right, with the right arm and the left, 93. Always thou standest 
there, going to the doors of others to beg for food. 

96. Creator of the corporeal world, Pure One ! 97. What is the 
increase of the Mazdayasnian law? 98. Then answered Ahura- 
Mazda : When one diligently cultivates corn, O holy Zarathustra.. 
99. He who cultivates the fruits of the field cultivates purity. 100. 
He promotes the Mazdayasnian law. [vol. i., page 24.] 

138. (It is asked) Whether any one praises and hears the Maz- 
dayasnian law. 139. Or whether any one does not praise and 
hear the Mazdayasnian law ; 140. Since it (the law) will take 
away these (sins) from those who praise the Mazdayasnian law,, 
141. If afterward they do not again commit wicked deeds. 

149. In this wise, O holy Zarathustra, does the Mazdayasnian 
law take away all the evil thoughts, words and deeds, of a pure 
man, even as the strong swift wind clears the sky from the right 
side. 150. Well is it here, O Zarathustra, when one has performed 

verses and sections which I have here omitted (appending the numbering of 
omitted verses [in brackets] at the end of extracts presented) ; but 1 have judged 
it not necessary to attempt completeness in either respect, inasmuch as the num- 
bering of the extracts will 03 in general a sufficient guide for the reader. I 
have retained many of the notes, more perhaps than my present purpose requires^ 
Double parentheses ((thus)) enclose hereinafter matter which in Bleeck's text. 
i^ enclosed in brackets [thus.] I have substituted s (italic) for g (cedilla),, 
and have disregarded other diacritical marks. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 189 

good works. 151. The good Mazdayasnian law cuts completely 
away all punishment, [vol. i., page 26.] 

IV. 1. Who to a lending man does not pay back the debt ; 2. 
Is a thief of the loan, a robber of what is lent to him ; 3. For him 
(the debtor) one must preserve night and day as well as (his own 
property).- [vol. i., page 30.] [Cf. Khordah-Avesta, xxvi. below.] 

54. He who prepares to strike a man that is to him Agerepta ; 
55. If he knocks him down it is to him Avaoirista ; 56. If revenge 
sits in his mind it is to him Aredus. 57. At the fifth of the sins 
Aredus (the man) fills up his body ((i. e. with sin.)) 

130. With regard to the married, I call them, O holy Zarathus- 
tra, before him 131. Who is not married ; 132. Him who has a 
household before him who has none ; the father of a family before 
the childless ; 133. The rich before the poor. 134. For he seeks 
most among other men to protect the Vohu-mano who furthers the 
increase of cattle, before him who does it not. [vol. i., page 36.] 
[I omit verses 135-158.] 

Y. 23. Creator! Does the water destroy a man? 24. Then 
answered Ahura-Mazda : The water does not destroy a man. 25. 
Asto-Yidhotus* binds him, the birds carry the bound one away ; 

*For the convenience of the reader, I have thought it worth while to col- 
lect here some of the more frequently recurring Zend terms, with reference to 
the pages of Bleeck where explanation may be sought : 
Aeshma — "The Daeva Aeshma, the very evil." (Venclidad x., 23.) (vol. i., page 

93.) "Aeshma (wrath)." (Yasna xxix., 1,) (vol. ii., page 83.) 
Ahriman — The same as Anra-mainyus. 

Ahura-Mazda — [See Khordah-Avesta xiv. below.] ''Praise be to the name of 
Ormazd, the God with the name ' Who always was, always is, and always- 
will be.'" (vol. iii., page 14.) See Mazda. 
Airyana-vaeja — " This country must be placed in the furthest east of the Iranian 
highlands, at the sources of the Oxus and Jaxartes." " In later times, Air- 
yana-vaeja becomes a purely fabulous country." (vol. i., page 6.) 
Ameretat — The lord of the trees ; one of the Amesha-spentas. (vol. ii., page 29.) 
Amerdat (the same as Ameretat.) (vol. iii., pages 156, 160, 166. (See vol. 
ii., page 91.) 
Amesha-spentas — [Archangels: see at the head of the first Gatha below. (Yasna 
xxviii.)] Seven in number: (1) Vohumano ; (2) Asha-vahista ; (3) Khsha- 
thra-vairya; (4) *S'penta-armaiti ; (5 and 6) Haurvat and Ameretat; (7) 
'Ahura-Mazda being counted as the seventh [see Yasna lvii., 13, 14, below]; 
but in the later mythology Ahura-Mazda : is no longer reckoned among 
the Amesha-.spentas, and »S'raosha (>S'rosh) completes the number." (vol. ii.,, 
29.) See Khordah-Avesta xxxv., 16 below, (vol. iii., page 127.) 
Amshaspands — The same as Amesha-spentas. 

Andervai — " The space between heaven and earth." (vol. iii., page 15.) 
Anra-mainyus — " The most wicked spirit." (See Yasna xxx., 3-6,) (vol. ii., 
page 85.) "While Ahtjra-Mazda works with perfect foresight of the re- 



140 Kant's Ethics. % 881 

26. The water carries him up, the water carries him down, the 
water washes him; 27. Afterward the birds eat him up. 28. 
There (in the other. world) he goes up and down by destiny. 29. 
Creator ! Does the fire destroy a man? 30. Then answered Ahura- 
. Mazda : Fire destroys no man. 31. A-sto- Vidhotus binds him, the 
birds carry away the bound one. 32. The fire burns his bones and 

suit, Anra-mainyus always works without forethought, and only becomes 
aware of his mistakes when too late to rectify them." (vol- ii., page 86.) [Cf. 
Ya.snalvi., (7), 6 (vol. ii., page 123).] See Yasna xxvii., 2. (vol ii., page 80.) 

Ardebihirst — The same as Asha-vahista. 

Ardvi-sura — " The personification of water." (vol. ii., page 10.) See Yasna lxiv. 
(vol. ii., page 131.) 

Armaiti — " Is sometimes the genius of the earth and sometimes wisdom personi- 
fied." (vol. ii.. page 82.) See .Spenta-armaiti. 

Asto-vidhotu — " The destroyer of the bones." (vol. i., page 47.) 
-Asha-vahista — "The genius of Fire, and the most powerful of the Amesha-spen- 
tas. Light and fire terrify all evil beings." (vol. iii., page 28.) (Of. vol. ii., 
pages 83 and 29.) (vol. iii., pages 156, 165.) 

"Ashis-vanuhi and Parendi are the genii of domestic prosperity and wealth." 
(vol. iii., page 51.) 

Aspandarmat — The same as .Spenta-armaiti. (Khordah-Avesta xlvii., 7.) (vol. 
iii., page 165.) 

Bahman — The same as Vohu-mano. 

Bahram — The same as Yerethraghna. 

Baodho-varsta — " Sins committed wilfully." (vol. i., page 66.) 

Baresma — A "bundle of twigs." (vol. ii., page 10.) Barsom. (vol. ii., page 122.) 

Chinvat — " Is the bridge to which all the souls must arrive. The good pass 
over it easily ; the wicked fall oft' into hell." (vol. ii., page 14.) See Yasna 
xlvii., 2, below (vol. ii., page 111); Khordah-Avesta xiv., 4, below (vol. iii., 
page 15) ; Vendidad xix., 96 (vol i., page 141.) 

praona — " Usually signifies a little round cake, eaten on certain ceremonial oc- 
casions." (vol. ii., page 60.) (vol. ii., page 3.) 

Drujas — " The Dnijas are considered by the Parsees as evil spirits which take 
up their abode inside of men and rule them. They can be expelled, or at 
least rendered powerless, by prayer and good works." (vol. ii., page 86.) 

Fravashis — [The angels who inhabit the soul.] " Signifies both the souls of the 
departed and the souls of those yet unborn." (vol. ii., page 14) ; " usually 
applied to the power which holds body and soul together." (vol. ii., page 79.) 
[Cf. St. Paul, I. Cor., vi., 19; iii, 16; Buddha Dharmapada, 62 (g 949 below); 
Confucius, Doctrine of the Mean, xvi., 2 (§871 page 112 above) ; and see the 
Khordah-Avesta, xxix., 157, below, (vol. iii., page 103.)] 

Garo-nmana — (See vol. i., page 144.) " Garo-nmanem is the dwelling of Ahuka- 
Mazda, the highest in the heavens." (vol. ii., page 14.) Garothman (Khor- 
dah-Avesta xlvii., 22.) (vol. iii., page 170.) 

Gayo-marathan — "(= mortal life) is the Primeval Man, created with the Bull.'' 
(vol. ii., page 64.) 

u Haoma — or Horn, which was the juice of a certain mountain plant, and held in 
the highest veneration as being the emblem of immortality." (vol. ii., p. 3.) 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 141 

his vital principle. 33. There (in the other world) he goes up and 
down by destiny, [vol. i., page 41.] 

54. The water bring I away, I Avho am Ahura-Mazda, from 
the sea Vouru-kasha with wind and clouds ; 55. I bring it to the 
corpses, I who am Ahura-Mazda ; I bring it to the Dakhma, I 
who am Ahura-Mazda; I bring it to uncleanness, I who am 

Haurvat — The lord of the waters, (vol. ii., page 29.) (Cf. vol.* ii., page 91.) 
Khordat. (vol. iii., pages 156, 160, 166.) One of the Amesha-.spentas. 

Isat-va.stfa — "Is the eldest son of Zarathustra. According to the Bundehesh, he 
died a hundred years after the promulgation of the law. He is regarded as 
the head of the priests." (vol. ii., page 79.) 

Ized — See Yazata. 

Kareshvares — " The seven parts which came into existence when the earth be- 
came softened by the water," etc. (vol. i., page 144.1 

Khordah-Avesta — " Little Avesta,'' (vol. iii., page 2.) 

Khshathra-vairya — " Is the lord and protector of metals;'' one of the Amesha- 
spentas. (vol. ii , page 29.) Shahrevar. (vol. iii, page 165.) Khordah-Aves- 
ta xlvii., 6 below. 

Khshnaothra— Signifies "the making contented,'' or "satisfying." (vol. ii., page 
18.) •' The technical expression for a particular kind of prayers." (vol. ii., 
page 43.) Translated passim "satisfaction'' or "contentment." (vol. ii., page 43.) 

Kingdom to Ahuka — (vol. ii., pages 71 and 69.) See the Khordah-Avesta ii. 
(vol. iii., page 3.) Ya.sna xxviii., 3. (vol. ii., page 81) and Ya.sna xix., 35. 

•Kusti — " The religious girdle of the Parsees." (vol. iii., page 4.) Kosti : Seethe 
Khordah-Avesta, xlv., 19 below, (vol. iii., page 157.) 

Manthra-spenta— The Holy Word. (vol. i., page 150); Vendidad, xix. 54, below 
(vol. i., page 139); Vispered, x., 29. (vol. ii., page 16); cf. Khordah-Avesta, 
xxix., 91 (vol. iii., page 91) etc. 

Mazda — •' My name is Great Wise One (Mazda)." (Khordah-Avesta, xvii, 14, 
below.) (vol. iii., page 23.) See Ahura-Mazda, above. 

Mazdaya.snian law — [The meaning of Ya.sna being "offering with prayers." (vol. 
ii., page 2.) I infer that the phrase which occurs so frequently may be 
rendered " the law of those who worship God."' For a brief statement of 
the law see Ya.sna, xlvii., 4, below, and cf. Ya.sna, xliv., 3. (vol. ii., pages 
106 and 111.) (Khordah-Avesta, xlvii., 1.)] 

Mithra — " The lord of light," (vol. ii., page 30.) "typified as the first sunbeams 
which illumine the mountain tops" (vol. iii., page 58) ; "the divinity who 
presides over contracts " (vol. i., page 31), " so that ; to lie to Mithra ' and 
'to break a contract or promise' are identical." (vol. i., page 31.) Vendidad, 
iv. (vol. i., page 30) and Khordah-Avesta, xxvi., below (vol. iii., page 57) 
Mithra-druja, breach of contract, (vol. i., page 30.) [Honesty the best 
policy: see the Khordah-Avesta, xxvi., 106, 116, below (vol. iii., pages 69, 
70.) In the Mihr-Yasht (xxvi., 100,) (vol. iii.. page 68), it is said : "On 
his right side marches the good .S'raosha, the holy ; on his left side marches 
Kashnus, the great, powerful." " Rashnu-razista is the genius of justice '' 
(vol. ii., page 14), and -S'raosha is Obedience, hearing (Ya.sna, Ixv., below) 
(vol. ii., page 121); " In the older period »S'raosha was sometimes held to be 
an invisible warning voice" (vol. ii., page 31) ; consequently we may see 



142 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

Ahura-Mazda ; I pour it over the bones, I who am Ahura-Mazda; 
I bring it away secretly, I who am Ahura-Mazda. 56. I bring 
these things to the sea Puitika : they are seething in the midst of 
the sea. 57. Purified do the waters flow from out the sea Puitika 
to the sea Vouru-kasha. 58. To the Tree Hvapa. 59. There grow 
my trees, all, of all kinds. 60. These 1 cause to be rained down 

here a picture of Fidelity supported by Justice and Conscience.] " Mithra, 
>S'raosha, and Kashnu, are the three judges who are to judge the souls at the 
Bridge Chinvat." (vol. iii., page 155.) [The Mithra-liar (Khordah-Avesta, 
xxvi., 19, 38, below) (vol. iii., pages 59, 61), abhorred by every nation, may 
well feel doubt of heavenly protection.] 

Myazda— " In the Avesta it is particularly employed of the flesh offered to 
Ahura-Mazda and the genii " (vol. ii., page 39) [but it is expressly stated 
(vol. ii., page 2) that "the Parsees have no 'sacrifice' in the Jewish sense of 
that term."] 

Ormazd — The same as Ahura-Mazda. 

Parendi — ''The goddess who presides over hidden treasures.'' (vol. ii., pages 14, 
15.) See Ashis-vanuhi, above. 

.S'aoshyans — See note to Yendidad, xix.. 18, page 148 below (vol. i., page 143.) 

(Spendarmat — The same as Npenta-armaiti. (Khordah-Avesta, xlv., 14) (vol. iii., 
page 156.) 

" .S'penta-armaiti is ' perfect wisdom,' as well as tho genius of the earth." (vol. ii., 
page 10.) One of the Amesha-spentas. "In the older writings, she is 
especially the goddess of wisdom." (vol. ii., page 29.) [The increase of good- 
ness. (See in note tt, vol. i., page 138.)] 

Spenta-Mainyu — [Hoi}' Spirit], Mazda-Ahura, see Yasna, xlvi, below (vol. ii., 
page 110); " as .Spenta-mainyu upholds the heaven," etc. (Khordeh-Avesta, 
xxix., 28) (vol. iii., page 84.) See Yendidad, xix., 33 (vol. i.. page 138) and 
Yasna. xxvii., 7 (vol. ii., page 80.) 

»S'raosha — Obedience (Yasna, lix., 8) (vol. ii., page 128) ; hearing (Yasna, lv., i.) 
(vol. ii., page 121.) See Amesha-spentas and Mithra above. 

Shahrevar — The same as Khshathra-vairya, 

Verethraghna — Victory, (vol. ii., page 7.) 

Vohu-mano — '■ Usually signifies one of the Amesha-spentas (Bahman) " (vol, i., 
page 143), " the protector of all living creatures." (vol. ii. page 29). "In 
this, [Haoma], as well as in many other cases in the Avesta, the same word 
is at once a genius, and the thing which is under the especial protection of 
the genius. Thus Vohu-mano may stand for either an Amesha-spenta or 
the living creation." (vol. ii., page 54.) "Although Vohu-mano is the 
highest of the creatures of Ahura-Mazda, it is nowhere said that he him- 
self has the power of creating." (vol. ii., page 18.) See the Khordah-Avesta, 
xvii., 37 : " Here is Vohu-mano. My creature, Zarathustra." (vol. iii., 
page 24.) Man: (Vendidad, xix., 82) (vol. i., page 140.) "' The understand- 
ing of Vohu-maho ' signifies ' goodmindedness,' that is, a disposition to per- 
form good actions" (vol. ii., page 82) (Yasna. xxviii., l)"the way of 
Vohu-mano " (Yasna, xxxiv., 13, below) (vol. ii., page 94.) " Destroy with 
evil deeds, from ignorance of Vohu-mano " (Yasna, xxxiv., 9) " Through 
Vohu-mano," etc. (Yasna, xlii., 13, below, an important passage) (vol. ii., 



•'§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 143 

from thence, I who am Ahura-Mazda ; 61. As food for the pure 
man, as fodder for the cow created by the good ((principle, Ahura- 
Mazda)) .62. The corn may men eat, the pastures are for the cow 
created by the good ((principle)). 63. This is the Good, this is the 
Beautiful, as Thou who art pure sayest. [vol. i., page 42.] 

64. By these words the pure Ahura-Mazda rejoiced him, the 
pure Zarathustra. 65. Purity is the best thing for men after birth.* 
66. This is purity, O Zarathustra ! the Mazdayasnian law. 67. He 
who keeps himself pure by good thoughts, words, and deeds. 

168. For Ahura-Mazda does not throw away even things of the 
smallest value; 169. Not of the value of a thread ; not even so 

page 102.) "That desire I from Thee, through Vohu-mano." (Ya.sna, xlv., 9 ( 
below) (vol. ii., page 108,) Cf Ya.sna, xlv., 12. [Wisdom comes to men 
through good will. — Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, xxi. (§871, 
page 11 6 above).] " Thou, the Holy, knowest also the hidden teachings, 
• and he who resembles Thee, Mazda, through the understanding of, Vohu- 
mano. Whoso makes the mind better, and performs good works, he 
acts according to the law with word and deed." (Ya.sna xlvii., 3, 4) 
(vol. ii.. page 111.) " Who possesses the law through goodmindedness," 
(Ya.sna, xlviii., 5) (vol. ii., page 112) "take to themselves contentment 
through Vohu-mano," (Ya.sna, xlvii., 12) (vol. ii., page 112.) " He is the 
holy man of wisdom, according to knowledge, words, and deeds, (to whom) 
according to the law, holy purity through Vohu-mano, the kingdom 
Ahura-Mazda has given," etc. (Ya.sna, 1., 21) (vol. ii., page 117) [That 
is to say, in Kantic terminology) " good will (by which is not meant a wish" 
(Ethics \ 3 above: Semple, page 2) (" natio gratis anhelans, multa agendo, 
nihil agens " — Phaedrus, quoted by Kant in \ 926)), good will, the way 
of the Law, the door of the Kingdom, the Life everlasting.] " I believe in 
the pure law ; by every good work seek I forgiveness for all sins." (Khor- 
dah-Avesta, xiv., 5, below) (vol. iii., page 15.) " The knowledge which con- 
cerns the Manthra-Spenia praise- we. The Heavenly Understanding, 
created by Mazda, praise we. The Understanding gifted with ears, cre- 
ted by Mazda, praise we" (Khordah-Avesta, xliv., (ii.), 29, below) (vol. 
iii., page 152.) 

Ya.sna — "Offering with prayers." (vol. ii., page 2.) 

Yazata — ! " Worthy of honor,' is the modern Persian Ized." (vol. i., page 19.) 

" Yima was so pure that he could look at the sun, which blinds other men who 
are less pure" (vol. ii., page 55) — "became a sinner on account of 
pride and selfexultation [exaltation ?], whereupon Ahura-Mazda aban- 
doned him," etc. (vol. ii., page 55.) 

Zaota — Priest, (vol. ii., page 35.) 

Zaothra — " Holy water " (vol. ii., page 3), " over which certain prayers have been 
recited at a particular time " (vol. ii , page 10) — " with the Zaothras of good- 
mindedness," etc., " of good speech," etc., "of goo 1 works" (Ya.sna, lxvii.i 
6-8) "seems here to be used for offering in general." (\ol. ii., page 134.) 

* Verse 65 is evidently an interpolation, and is written in the dialect of the sec- 
ond part of the Ya.sna. [vol. i., page 48.] 



144 Kanfs Ethics. § 881 

much in value : 170. As a single reel throws off in quantity. 171.. 
If the Mazdayasnians throw on a dead* body 172. As much as a 
reel yields in quantity, 173. Then are they not pure in life, and 
after death they take no share in Paradise. 174. They fill up the 
place which is appointed for the wicked, 175. The dark, which 
comes from darkness. 176. Darkness. 177. This place ye make, 
ye who are wicked, through your own deeds and your own law, 
the worst of places, [vol. i.. page 47.] 

VI., 54. Creator! If the Mazdayasnians, ((whilst)) going a-foot, 
running, riding, or driving, come to a dead body floating in the 
water : 55. How shall the Mazdayasnians act ? 56. Then an- 
swered Ahura-Mazda : Laying aside their shoes, pulling off their 
clothes, 57. They shall remain there, O Zarathustra : 58. They 
shall go in, they shall drag the dead out of the water, Zarathus- 
tra. [vol. i., page 53.] 

92. Creator ! Where shall we carry the bodies of the dead, O 
Ahura-Mazda ! where shall we lay them down ? 93. Then 
answered Ahura-Mazda : On the highest place, O holy Zarathus- 
tra ! 94. Where they are most perceived by carnivorous dogs and 
birds. 95. The Mazdayasnians shall fasten these dead bodies by 
their own feet and hair, 96. With iron, stone, or lead. 97. If 
not, then will the carnivorous dogs and birds carry away ((some)) 
of the bones to the water and to the trees. 98. Creator ! if they do. 
not fasten them, and the carnivorous dogs and birds take some of 
the bones to the water and the trees ; 99. What is the punishment 
for this? 100. Then answered Ahura-Mazda : Strike their sinful 
bodies two hundred strokes with the horse-goad, two hundred with, 
the >S'raosho-charana. 101. Creator ! Where shall we bring the 
carcasses of the dead, O Ahura-Mazda ! where shall we lay them 
down? 102. Then answered Ahura-Mazda : They shall turn them 
upward ((or, place them up high)), 103. Above the dogs, above 
the panthers, above the wolves, 104. So that they cannot be 
rained upon from above by the rain. 105. If the Mazdayasnians 
can, they shall lay them on stone, mortar, or carpet: 106. If they 
cannot, then they shall lay them down on the earth, on their own 
bed, and their own mat, exposed to the light, looking toward the 
Sun. [vol. i., pages 54, 55.] 

VIII., 74. Creator! When any one emits his seed unwillingly, 75- 
What is the punishment for this? 76. Then answered Ahura- 
Mazda : Let them strike eight hundred strokes with the horse- 
goad, eight hundred with the $raosho-charana. 77. Creator ! If 

*[Cf, Deutejrjnp.my, xxvi., 14 (page 94 above).J 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 145' 

he willingly emits his seed, 78. What is the punishment for this ? 
79. What is the atonement for this ? 80. What is the purification; 
for this? 81. Then answered Ahura-Mazda ; For this there is no. 
punishment, for this there is no atonement, for this there is no. 
purification ; 82. For these deeds which are inexpiable forever. 

98. Creator ! Who is a Daeva? who a Daeva- worshiper? 99.. 
Who a companion of the Daevas? who a vessel of the Daevas ?. 100.. 
Who a concubine of the Daevas? who a Daeva himself? 101. Who 
((is)) wholly a Daeva? who is already before death a Daeva? who is 
after death a spiritual Daeva? 102. Then answered Ahura- 
Mazda : He who practices forbidden intercourse with men, or al- 
lows the same from them, O holy Zarathustra: 103. Such a one is. 
a Daeva, such a one is a worshiper of the Daevas, such a one is a 
companion of the Daevas, such a one is a vessel of the Daevas,.. 
104. Such a one is a paramour of the Daevas, such a one is a Daeva 
himself, such a one is wholly a Daeva, 105. Such a one is already 
before death a Daeva, he becomes after death a spiritual Daeva ; 
106. He who lies with man as man, or takes away seed from a 
man. [vol. i., page 73.] [1 omit verses 107-310.] 

IX., 161. For unwillingly, O holy Zarathustra, shines the sun 
upon the unclean, unwillingly the moon, unwillingly these stars. 
162. For he who purifies makes content, he who removes the Xasus 
from the unclean, O holy Zarathustra; 163. He makes the fire 
content, he makes the water content, he makes the earth content, 
he makes the cattle content, he makes the trees content, he makes 
the pure man content, he makes the pure woman content, [vol. i., 
page 88.] [I omit verses 164-196.] 

X., 35. Purity is the best thing for men after birth. 36. This is 
purity, O Zarathustra, the Mazdayasnian law. 37. He who keeps 
himself pure by good thoughts, words, and works. 38. As to the 
right purity of one's own body, that is the purification of every one 
in this corporeal world for his own state. 39. When he keeps him- 
self pure by good thoughts, words, and works, [vol. i., page 93.] 

XIII., 97. Creator! If a dog in a Mazdayasnian dwelling is not 
in his right senses and right understanding, 98. How shall the 
Mazdayasnians behave themselves ? 99. Then answered Ahura- 
Mazda : They shall seek remedies for him just as for any pure 
man. 100. Creator! If he will not take it willingly, 101. How 
shall the Mazdayasnians act? 102. Then answered Ahura-Mazda : 
They shall put a piece of hewn wood on his head, they shall muz- 
zle his mouth with it ; the size of a bone of hard wood, double the 
size of soft ; they shall bind him fast thereto, they shall chain him 
up; otherwise if this dog who is not in his right senses falls into a, 



146 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

cistern, a well, a pitfall, a stream, or running water, 103. And re- 
ceives injury thereby ; 104 If he injures himself thereby; 105. 
Then are they (the Mazdayasnians) sinners and Peshotanus there- 
by. 106. The dog have 1 made, O Zarathustra, with his own 
clothing and his own shoes ; 107. With keen scent and sharp 
teeth. 108. Faithful to men, as a protection to the folds. 109. 
For I have made the dog, I who am Ahura-Mazda. [vol. i., page 
107.] [I omit verses 110-174.] 

XV, 36. He who goes with a maiden (who is still with her par- 
ents or who is no longer with her parents, who is betrothed or not 
betrothed, and makes the same pregnant); 37. Then this maiden 
must not from shame of men inflict an injury herself upon the fruit 
of her body. 38. If this maiden from shame of men inflicts an in- 
jury on the fruit of her body. 39. Then she commits a sin for the 
parents, she wounds for the parents, for the parents shall they 
atone for the wound of the wounded with the punishment of the 
Baodho-varsta. 40. He who goes with a maiden, 41. (Who is 
still with her parents or no longer with her parents, who is be- 
trothed or not betrothed, and makes her pregnant) ; If the maiden 
says : " The child is begotten by this man." 42. If then this man 
says : " Seek to make thyself friends with an old woman and ask 
her." 43. If then this maiden makes friends with an old woman 
and asks her ; 44. And this old woman brings Bana or Shaeta, 
45. Or Grhnana or Fraspata, or any one of the trees which make 
loose (the embryo) ; 46. (Saying) : " Seek to kill this child." 47. 
If then this maiden seeks to kill the child, 48. Then the maiden, 
the man, and the old woman are alike guilty, [vol. i., page 116.] [I 
omit verses 49-137.] 

XVIII., 11. He who lies the whole night without praising or 
without hearing ; 12. Without reciting, without working, without 
learning, without teaching, desiring to win the soul ; 13. He calls 
himself falsely an Athrava ; do not call such a man an Athrava — 
thus spake Ahura-Mazda — O pure Zarathustra. 14. Call him an 
Athrava — thus spake Ahura-Mazda — O pure Zarathustra ; 15. 
Who the whole night through asks the pure understanding ; 16. 
(The understanding) whieh purifies from sins, which makes (the 
heart) large, and affords rewards at the bridge Chinvat ; 17. Which 
makes us to reach the place, the purity, and.the goodness of Paradise. 
18. Ask Me, O pure! 19. Me, the Creator, the Holiest, Wisest, 
who willingly gives an answer when he is asked. 20. So will it be 
well with thee, so wilt thou attain to purity if thou askest Me. 

51. Then this holy *Sraosha wakes up the bird which bears the 
name of Parodars, O holy Zarathustra ; 52. Whom evil-speaking 



■'§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 147 

men call Kahrkatas. Then lifts up this bird his voice at every 
divine dawn : " Sfcand up, ye men, praise the best purity, destroy 
the Daevas, there runs up to you the Daeva Bushyansta with long 
hands, this sends to sleep again the whole corporeal world when it 
is awakened. Long sleep, O man, becomes thee not. Turn your- 
selves not away from the three best things, good thought, word, and 
work ; turn yourselves away from the three evil things, evil 
thought, word, and work." 53. Then speaks he: " Friend, arise," 
to those who lie on the bed. 54. "Arise, it is day." (?) 55. 
Whoso first arises, he comes to Paradise. 56. Whoso first brings 
pure fire- wood to the fire (the son) of Ahura-Mazda, with washed 
hands, 57. Him will the fire bless, contented without hate, and sat- 
isfied, [vol. i., page 129.] 

70. The holy $raosha asked the Drukhs, 71. With club uplifted 
((?'. e. threatening her with his club) : 72. " Drukhs, thou who eat- 
est not and workest not," 73 "Art thou it alone in the corporeal 
world, which becomes pregnant without cohabitation?" 74. To 
him answered this Drukhs : $raosha, Holy, Beautiful ! 75. I do 
not in the whole corporeal world become pregnant without cohab- 
itation. 76. There are four men like me ; 77. These cover me as 
other men cover women by lying with (them). 78. The holy 
$raosha asked the Drukhs. with club uplifted : Drukhs, thou who 
eatest not and laborest not, who is the first of these men ? 79. 
Then answered him the Daevi Drukhs : $raosha, Holy, Beautiful ! 
80. This is the first of these men : 81. If a man does not give the 
"worthless garments, when he is begged for them,* to a pure man 
in purity and goodness, [vol. i., page 130.] 

113. The holy #raosha asked the Drukhs, with club uplifted : 
Drukhs, thou who eatest not and laborest not, who is the fourth of 
these men ? 114. Then answered him the Daevi Drukhs : $raosha, 
Holy, Beautiful! this is the fourth of these men. 115. If a man 
who is above fifteen years practices unchastity without Kosti and 
band : Immediately after the fourth pace we occupy him, his tongue 
and his feet.f 116. (Such men) are afterward able to go along in 
the world of purity as sorcerers, and to kill the corporeal world of 
purity. 117. The holy *Sraosha asked the Drukhs, with club up- 
lifted : Drukhs, thou who eatest not and laborest not, what is the 
atonement for him? 118. Hereupon answered him the Daevi 
Drukhs: $raosha, Holy, Beautiful! 119. There is not an atone- 

® If a man having means to give and does not give. — Gujerati Translation. 
fThe Sad-der; Porta lxix., says : " It is enjoined that thou beware of having 
■intercourse with a. harlot. Whoever has lain once with a harlot, intellect and 
knowledge will depart from him during forty dags," etc. [vol. i., page 136.] 



148 Kanfs Ethic*. % 881 

merit for him. 120. If a man after his fifteenth year rushes for- 
ward as a paramour without Kosti and band : when he has made 
four steps immediately we do occupy him, his tongue and his feet - 
121. He is afterward able to go along in the corporeal world as a 
slayer and a sorcerer, he slays the corporeal world of purity, [vol. 
i., page 132.] [I omit verses 122-152.] 

XIX., 16. Zarathustra informed Anra-mainyus : " Evil-witting 
Anra-mainyus ! 17. I will smite the creation which was created 
by the Daevas, t will smite the Xa.sus which the Daevas have 
created. 18. I will smite the Pari whom one prays to (?)* until 
>Saoshyanst (i- e. the Profiting) is born, the victorious, out of the 
water Kansaoya. 19. From the east region, from the eastern re- 
gions." 20. Him answered Anra-mainyus, who has created the 
wicked creatures : 21. "Do not slay my creatures, O pure Zara- 
thustra! 22. Thou art the son of Pourushaspa, and hast life from 
a (mortal) mother. 23. Curse]; the good Mazdayasnian law. obtain 
happiness as Vadhaghna, the lord of the regions, has obtained it." 
24. Him answered the holy Zarathustra : 25. " I will not curse the 
good Mazdayasnian law; 26. Not if bones, soul, and vital-power, 
were to separate themselves asunder." 27. Him answered Anra- 
mainyus who has created the evil creatures : 28. By whose word 
wilt thou smite, by whose word wilt thou annihilate, by what well- 
made arms (smite) my creatures, Anra-mainyus ? " 29. Him an- 
swered the holy Zarathustra : 30. " Mortar, cup, Haoma, and the 
words which Ahura-Mazda has spoken : 31. These are my best 
weapons ; 32. By this word will I smite, by this word will I an- 
nihilate, by these well-formed weapons (smite) O evil Anra-main- 
yus. 33. Which *Spenta-mainyus (i. e. Ahura-Mazda) created ; he 
created in the infinite time." [vol. L, pages 137, 138.] 

36. The pure Zarathustra spake : This, I ask thee : tell me the 
right, O Lord ! 39. How shall I protect them from this Drukhs, 
from the evil Anra-mainyus ! || 40. How shall I take away the 
uncleanness, that of ((a man's)) self, how the uncleanness through 
others, how the Nasus from this Mazdayasnian dwelling-place? 41. 
How shall I purif}? the pure man, how shall 1 bring purification to 
the pure woman? [vol. i., page 138.] 

42. Then answered Ahura-Mazda : " Praise thou, O Zarathustra, 
the good Mazdayasnian law. 43. Praise thou, O Zarathustra, these 

*Idol worship. — Guj. Tr. t^'aoshyans is the future part, of su = " to profit," 
and denotes the King, the Savior, who is expected by the Parsees to come at the 
end of all things and accomplish the resurrection, after which he, will establish, 
a kingdom full of untroubled happiness, [vol. i., page 143.} f Forsake.: — &ML'- 
Tr. j| Evil understanding. — Guj. Tr. 



•§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 149 

Amesha-spentas (which rule) over the earth, consisting of seven 
Keshvars [Kareshvares]. 44. Praise thou, O Zarathustra, the self- 
created firmament, the infinite time, the air, which works on high. 
45. Praise thou, O Zarathustra, the swift wind created by Ahura- 
Mazda ; #penta-armaiti, the fair daughter of Ahura- Mazda. 46. 
Praise thou, O Zarathustra, my Fravashis (Ferver) Ahura- Mazda's; 
47. The greatest, best fairest, strongest, most understanding, best 
formed, highest in holiness ; 48. Whose soul is the holy word. 49. 
Of thyself, praise thou, O Zarathustra, this creation of Ahura- 
Mazda's. [vol. i., pages 138, 139.] 

50. Zarathustra gave me for answer : 51. I praise Ahura-Mazda, 
the Creator of the pure creation. 52. I praise Mithra who has a 
great territory, the victorious, the most brilliant of the victorious, 
the most victorious of the victorious. 53. I praise $raosha, the 
holy, beautiful, who holds a weapon in his hands against the head 
of the Daevas. 54. I praise the holy word,* the very brilliant. 55. 
I praise the heaven, the self-created, the never-ending time, the 
air which works above. 56. I praise the wind, the swift, which 
Ahura-Mazda has created, and iSpenta (Armaiti), the fair daughter 
of Ahura-Mazda. 57. I praise the good Mazdayasnian law, the 
law against the Daevas from Zarathustra. [vol. i., page 139.] 

67. Zarathustra asked Ahura-Mazda : All- wise Ahura-Mazda ! 
68. Thou art without sleep, Thou art without drunkenness, Thou 
who art Ahura-Mazda ! 69. Vohu-mano (man) denies (himself) 
directly. Vohu-mano defiles (himself) indirectly, by the body 
which the Daevas have slain, by the Daeva he defiles (himself) 
((how)) is Vohu-mano (man) clean ?f [vol. i.,page 140.] [The for- 
mal directions for purification, verses 70-80, I omit.] 

81. Let Vohu-mano (the man) fumigate it (the garment.) 82. 
Purified is Vohu-mano, purified is • the man. 83. Let Vohu-mano 
lift up (the garment) with the left arm on the right, with the right 
arm on the left. 84. Let Vohu-mano say : Praise to Ahura-Mazda, 
praise to the Amesha-spentas, praise to the rest of the pure. 

85. Zarathustra asked Ahura-Mazda : All-wise Ahura-Mazda! 
86. Shall I invite| the ncuv man, shall I invite the holy woman, 
shall I invite the sinful of the evil-Daeva- worshiping men ? 87. 
Shall they spread abroad over the earth running water, growing 
fruits of the field, and other goods ?| | 88. Then answered Ahura- 
Mazda ! Invite,^] O pure Zarathustra. [vol. i., pages 140-141 ] 

*The Manthra .S'penia. — Ghij. Tr. tThe chief difficulty of this verse lies in 
the word Vohu-mano, which usually signifies one of the Amesha-spentas (Bah- 
man). The Huz. Tr. explains it hy "man," but the word should be translated 
here "the good-minded." [page 144.] JWill they rise? (An allusion to the 
resurrection.)— Guj^ Tr. ||And him who spreads, etc., running water, him 
who grows fruit, etc. — Gnj. Tr. fThey shall rise. — Guj. Tr. 



150 Kant's Ethics. §881 

89. Creator ! Where are those tribunes, where do they assemble, 
where do they come together, at which a man of the corporeal 
world gives account for his soul ?* 90. Then answered Ahura- 
Mazda : After the man is dead, after the man is departed, after his 
going, the wicked evil-knowing Daevas do work (?). 91. In the 
third night, after the coming and lighting of the dawn. 92. And 
when the victorious Mithra places himself on the mountains with 
pure splendor ; 93. And the brilliant sun arises ; 94. Then the 
Daeva Yizaresho by name, O holy Zarathustra, leads the souls 
bound, the sinful-living, of the wicked Daeva- worshiping men. 
95. To the ways which were created by Time, comes he who is god- 
less and he who is hoty. 96. To the bridge Chinvat (comes he) 
the created by Ahura-Mazda, where they interrogate the con- 
sciousness and the soul regarding the conduct 97. Practiced in 
the corporeal world. 102. Vohu-mano arises from his golden 
throne. 103. Yohu-mano speaks : How hast thou, O Pure ! come 
hither? 104. From the perishable world to the imperishable 
world ? 105. The pure souls go contented, 106. To the golden 
thrones of Ahura-Mazda, of the Amesha-spentas ; 107. To Garo- 
nemana, the dwelling of Ahura-Mazda, the dwelling of the 
Amesha-spentas, the dwelling of the other pure. 108. The smell 
of the soul of the pure man, who has purified himself, does so- 
affright the bad evil-witting Daevas, 109. As sheep enclosed by- 
wolves do dread these wolves. 110. The pure men are together 
with him; 111. Nairyosanha is together with him. 112. A mes- 
senger of Ahura-Mazda is Nairyosanha. 113. Of thyself praise,, 

Zarathustra, the Creation of Ahura-Mazda. 

114. Zarathustra gave me for answer: 115. I praise Ahura- 
Mazda, who has made the pure creation. 116. I praise the earth 
which Ahura bas created, the water which Ahura has created,, 
and the pure trees: 117. I praise the sea, Vouru-kasha; 118. 

1 praise the shining heaven ; 119. 1 praise the lights without a be- 
ginning^ the self-created ; 120. I praise the best place of the 
pure (Paradise), the shining, adorned with all brightness. 121. L 
praise Garo-nmana, the abode of Ahura-Mazda, the abode of the 
Amesha-spentas, the abode of the other pure. 122. I praise the 
mid- world, the self-created, and the bridge Chinvat created by 
Ahura-Mazda. [vol. i., page 142..] [I omit verses 123-147, and the 
whole of Fargards xx.-xxii.] 

*This passage is an important one, and, taken in conjunction with verge 26, is 
a proof that at the time the Vendidad was composed the resurrection of the body 
was not recognized by the Parsees. The souls of the pious go direct to Paradise, 
and the souls of the wicked to hell. In the Khordah-A vesta, xxxviii., there is 
a similar account of the future state,, but with many amplifications, [page 144.]j 
"[Innumerable. — Guj. Tr. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 15T 

EXTRACTS FROM THE VISPERED. 

II., 8. Here by means of the Zaotbra and Baresma I wish hither 
with praise : him who thinks on the lord,* the pure man who holds 
fast (in remembrance), 9. The well thinking in thoughts, the well- 
speaking in speech, the well-doing in works. 10. He who holds 
fast (in remembrance) <Spenta-armaiti,f namely, the Manthra of 
the profiting. J 11. Through whose deeds the worlds of the pure 
increase. 18. Here by means of the Zaothra and Baresma I wish 
hither with praise: the pure lord of purity, provided with overseers 
and lords, for this is the Lord and Master, Ahura- Mazda, [vol.. 
ii., page 9.] [Omit verses 19-34]. 

III., 18. The young man who thinks well, speaks well, acts well, 
who is devoted to the law, I desire. I desire the youth who utters 
the words. 1 1 Those who have married amongst kindred I desire. 
19.1 invite the furtherers of the region, I desire the willing worship- 
ers. I desire the mistresses of the house. 20. I desire the woman 
who especially thinks good, speaks good, does good, lets herself be 
commanded well, who obeys her lord, the pure. 22. I desire the 
pure man, who especially thinks, speaks and does good. 23. Who- 
knows the faith, does not know sins. 24. Through whose deeds 
the worlds increase in purity, [vol. ii., page 11.] [Omit verses 25-31.] 

V., 1. We praise that which is thought in the soul, 2. And the 
good knowledge, the good holiness, the good wisdom, the good 
steadfastness, [vol. ii., page 12.] [I omit verses 3-6.] 

X., 28. For the helpful purity, the helpful prayer at the right 
time. 29. For the Manthra-spenta, for the Mazdayasnian law, for 
the prayer of praise belonging to the Yasna. 30. For all times, for 
all prayers at the right time. 31. For the whole world of purity,, 
for offering, prayer, pacification and praise. May the hearing be 
here as in the beginning so in the end. [vol. ii., page 16.] 

XIV., 5. We teach the well-arranged adorations. 6. Of the 
Ahuna-vairya [Khordah-Avesta, ii., below] which is now recited 
with purity, which will be recited in future. 8. The right-spoken 
discourses, the Zarathustrian prayers, the well-performed actions, 
the Baresmas which are bound together in purity, the Haomas pre- 
pared with purity, the prayers which are employed in the Yasna, 

*That is, he who has the holy writings in his memory, and hence keeps 
them before his eyes. There is no single equivalent word" in any European 
language, "f^'penta-armaiti is "perfect wisdom," as well as the genius of the- 
earth. In both capacities she is. feminine. In this verse the former meaning 
of the word must be adopted. % By " the profitable '•' (.S'aoshyanto) is meant & 
kind of prophets, or persons who have devoted themselves particularly to the- 
Zarathustrian doctrines, [vol. ii., page 10.] ||That is, prayers. 



152 Kant's Ethics-. § 881 

the thoughts, words, and deeds of the Mazdayasnian law, 9. 
May they now be salutary to us ; we give these salutary (things) 
to the creatures, we announce these salutary (things), 
we think on these salutary (things), which Ahura-Mazda, the 
Pure, has created, [vol. ii., page 20.] [1 omit verses 10-17.] 

XV., 1. As pure we praise Ahura-Mazda, as pure we praise the 
Amesha-spentas, as pure we praise the true discourse ; 2. As pure 
we praise all Manthras, (as pure) we praise Zarathustra, who is 
provided with Manthras. [vol. ii., page 21.] [I omit verses 3-7.] 

XVI., 1. With the efficacious prayers, with the texts, with the 
commentaries, 2. With questions, with counter questions, with 
measured texts, 3. The well-spoken, 4. Those which shall be 
well spoken, 5. The well-praised, 6. Those which shall be well 
praised, 7. According to the own wisdom, 8. According to the own 
publishing, 9. According to the own will, 10. According to the 
own rule, 11. According to the own supremacy, 12. According 
to the own wish, 13. Of Ahura-Mazda, let one speak, (I praise) 
for increase for the believing mind, from the memory.* 

XVII., 1. Ahuna-vairya, the pure lord of purity, we praise. 2. 
Him who possesses rulers and lords we praise, the pure Lord of 
purity, for he is the Lord and Master. Ahura-Mazda. [vol. ii., 
page 21.] [I omit verses 3, 4.] 

XVIII. , 1. Keep ready feet, hands, and understanding, Maz- 
dayasnians, Zarathustrians, 2. For the performance of good works 
according to the lawf and the commandment, 3. For the avoid- 
ance of unlawful, forbidden, wicked works. 4. Accomplish here 
good deeds. 5. Afford help to the helpless, [vol. ii., page 22.] [I 
omit verses 6-16.] [See Yasna, xlvii., 4, below.] 

XXL, 3. Happiness for the pure man praise we. 4. The 
entire prosperity praise we, the coming to nought! is for wicked 
men. [vol. ii., page 23.] [I omit verse 5„] 

XXIII. , 2. The right-spoken discourse praise we, the victorious 
(words) which smite the Daevas praise we. 3. This reward praise 
we, this health praise we, 4. This remedy we praise. 5. This ad- 
vancement we praise, this spreading abroad we praise, this victory 
we praise, 6. Which is in (the Gatha) Vohu-khshathra and Va- 
histoisti. 7. In order, through the utterance of good thoughts, 

*]S"ot clear; in fact, the whole chapter is full of difficulties. f[See Yasna, xlvii., 
4, below.] |[Cf. Deuteronomy, xxxiii., 26, 27. (Douay ed.) : " There is no other God 
like the God of the rightest : he that is mounted upon the heaven is thy helper- 
By his magnificence the clouds run hither and thither. His dwelling is above, 
-and underneath are the everlasting arms: he shall cast out the enemy from be- 
fore thee, and shall say: Be thou brought to nought.'' Cf. page 101 above.] 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 153 

woi'ds and works, 8. To withstand evil thoughts, words, and 
works, 9. For an atonement for my false thoughts, words, and 
works. [Omit verse 10, and all of Vispered, xxiv.-xxvii.] 

EXTRACTS PROM THE YA-SNA. 

I., 1. I invite and announce *to: the Creator Ahura-Mazda, the 
Brilliant, Majestic, Greatest, Best, Most Beautiful, 2. The Strong- 
est, Most Intellectual, of the best body, the highest through holi- 
ness ; 3. Who is very wise, who rejoices afar, 4. Who created 
us, who formed us, who keeps us, the Holiest among the heavenly. 

47. I invite and announce to : the Fravashis of the pure, the 
strong, very mighty, the Fravashis of those who had the first be- 
lief the Fravashis of the nearest relations, the Fravashi of (my) 
own soul. 48. I invite and announce to : all lords of purity. 49. 
I invite and announce to : all those who have good wisdom, the 
genii of heaven, and the world worthy of adoi-ation, who are to be 
worshiped and praised on account of the best purity. 

56. If I have pained thee, 57. Be it with thoughts, be it with 
words, be it with works, 58. Be it willingly, be it against (my) 
will, 59. I praise thee (now) there-for ; I invite thee, if I have 
neglected thee in praise and prayer. 60. All ye lords, greatest, 
pure, lords of purity. 61. If I have pained you, 62. Be it with 
thoughts, be it with words, be it with works, 63. Be it willingly, 
be it unwillingly, 64. I praise you (now) there-for, I invoke you, 
if I have neglected you in praise and prayer. 65. I profess (my- 
self) as a Mazdayasnian, a follower of Zarathustra, an adversary of 
the Daevas, a worshiper of Ahitra. [vol. ii., pages 28, 29.] [I omit 
verses 66-68.] 

III., 16. The well-thought, well-spoken, and well-perfbrmedf 
words, I wish hither with praise. 17. The singing of the Grathas, 

*The sense appears to be this : " I invite the spiritual presence of Ahuea- 
Mazda and all the good Genii, and I announce to them that I am about to per- 
form the proper religious rites." The first word of the Vispered, Nivaedhayemi 
(or nivedhyemi) has been variously translated, " I invite," and " I invoke." The 
second word, Hankarayemi (or hankaryemi), is rendered by Professor Spie- 
gel, " Ieh thue es kund," " Ich verkuendige es," and ' : Ich verkuende es," which 
are almost synonymous phrases, signifying, " I make known to," " I announce 
to." " I proclaim to," etc. Neriosengh has, " I accomplish," or " I make per- 
fect; " and the Sanskrit gloss explains this of the accomplishment of the sacrifice, 
or the celebration of the Yasna in honor of Hormazd. Wilson {The Parsi Re- 
ligion, etc.) translates, " I celebrate," but this is certainly erroneous. [Note to 
Yispered, i., 1 (vol. ii., page 5), which is referred to at this place.] fSee note to 
Vispered, xxii., 6, [where it will be seen that "well-performed Manthras" (vol. 
ii., passe 24) is equivalent to "actions agreeing with the Manthras and their 
precepts."] 

11 



154 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

I wish hither with praise.* 18. The well-made Manthras, I wish 
hither with praise. 19. The lordship, holiness, righteousness, and 
the prayer at the right time, I wish hither with praise. 20. For 
contentment of the pure Yazatas, heavenly and earthly, for the 
satisfaction of (my) own soul, [page 36.] [I omit verses 21-71.] 

VI., 37. Ahura-Mazda, the brilliant, majestic, praise we. 38. 
The good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise we. 39. Thee, 
the fire, the son of Ahura-Mazda, the pure, lord of purity, praise 
we ; together with all fires. 40. The good waters, the best, created 
by Mazda, pure, praise we. All waters created by Mazda, pure, 
praise we ; all trees created by Mazda, pure, praise we. 41. The 
Manthra-spenta, the very shining, praise we. 42. The law, that 
given against the Daevas, praise we. 43. The Zarathustrian law 
praise we. 44. The long precept praise we, the good Mazdayas- 
nian law praise we. [vol. ii., pages 44, 45.] [I omit verses 45-56] 

YIL, 9. "With purity I offer : well-thought, well-spoken, well-per- 
formed words. 10. With purity I offer : the recitation of the 
Gathas. 11. With purity I offer: the well-made Manthra. 12. 
With purity I offer : this lordship, holiness, punctuality, the right 
prayer, for the satisfaction of the heavenly and earthly, pure Yaz- 
atas, for the satisfaction of our own soul. [vol. ii., page 46] [Omit 
verses 13-69.] 

VIII., 10. According to desire, and with happiness, mayest Thou 
rule over Thy creatures, Ahura-Mazda. 11. Over the water, as 
Thou wilt over the trees, as Thou wilt over all good that has a pure 
origin. 12. Make that the pure may rule, the impure may not 
rule. 13. May the pure rule as he will, may the godless not rule 
as they will. 14. May the foe disappear, driven away by the 
creatures of $penta-mainyus, conquered, not ruling as he would. 
15. I urge, I who am Zarathustra, the first of the families, clans, 
societies, regions,f 16. To thinking, speaking, and acting, accord- 
ing to this law which originates from Ahura and Zarathustra. 17. 
The wide extent and brightness of the whole creation of purity, I 
bless. 18. The narrowness and trouble of the whole evil creation, 
I bless, [vol. ii., pages 49-50.] 

IX., 86. What man in this house, this clan, this society, this re- 
gion, is revengeful ? 87. From his feet take away strength, 88. 
Cast a shadow on his spirit, 89. Inflict a blow on his spirit. 

*The words, " I wish hither with praise," run in the translations, " I wish 
hither for this offering, or in this offering. 1 ' Amongst the Parsees, " offering " 
and " worship " are so closely connected that it is difficult to find a suitable ex- 
pression in another language. [Extract from the note (vol. ii., page 35) to Yasna, 
ii., 1-10.] | Although these words are placed in the mouth of Zarathustra, it is 
more than doubtful whether they belong to him. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 155 

97. Against the head of the wicked, profligate, hindering men, 
98. Come hither with a weapon for the pure, to protect the body, 

golden Haoma. 99. Against the very wicked, impure destroyer 
of the world, who certainly has in remembrance the words of this 
law, but dobs not perform, 100. Come hither with a weapon for 
the pure, to protect the body, O golden Haoma. [vol. ii.. page 54.] 
[I omit verses 101-103.] 

X., 45. To five I belong, to five I belong not. 46. I belong to 
those who think good ; to those who think evil I belong not. 47. 

1 belong to those who speak good ; to those who speak evil I be- 
long not. 48. I belong to those who do good : to those who do evil 
I belong not. 49. I belong to those who hear, not to those who 
hear not. 50. I belong to the pure, not to the bad. [vol. ii., page 
58. [I omit verses 51-65.] 

XI., 1. Three beings, manifestly pure, which bring words of 
blessing with them, curse : 2. The cow, the horse, and Haoma. 3. 
The cow curses him who keeps her : 4. Mayest thou remain with- 
out posterity, ever continuing of evil report, 5. Thou who dost not 
distribute to me food, 6. And yet causest me to labor for thy wife, 
thy children, and thine own belly, [vol. ii., page 60.] [I omit 
verses 7-27.] 

XII., 1. I praise the well-thought, well-spoken, well-performed 
thoughts, words, and works. 2. I lay hold on all good thoughts, 
words, and works. 3. I abandon all evil thoughts, words, and 
works. 4. I bring to you, O Aniesha-spentas, 5. Praise and 
adoration, 6. With thoughts, words, and works, with heavenly 
mind, the vital strength of my own body. [vol. ii., page 62.] [Of 
Bomans, xii., 1, 2.] 

XIII., 3. To Ahura-Mazda, the good, indued with good wisdom^ 
I offer all good. 4. To the Pure, Bich, Majestic : 5. Whatever are 
the best goods to Him, to whom the cow, to whom purity belongs, 
from whom arises the light, the brightness which is inseparable 
from the lights. 6. /Spenta-armaiti, the good, choose 1, may she 
belong to me. 7. By my praise will I save the cattle from theft 
and robbei'y, 8. (To keep far off) hurt and affliction from the 
Mazdayasnian clans. 9. I promise to the heavenly free course, 
dwelling according to their desire. 10. That they may dwell on 
this earth with the cattle. 12. Maj~ 1 not hereafter bring harm and 
affliction on the Mazdayasnian clans. 13. Not on account of love 
for the body, not for the love of life. 16. I deny to the Daevas, to 
those possessed with Daevas, to the sorcerers, the possessed by 
sorcerers, to all evil beings : 17. I deny with thoughts, words, 
works, and tokens, rule to those that are bad and fearful. 18. Thus 



156 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

has Ahura-Mazda commanded Zarathustra, 19. In all question- 
ings, in all meetings in which Ahura-Mazda and Zarathustra con- 
versed with one another. 20. So also has Zarathustra renounced 
the rule of the Daevas, 21. In all questionings, in all meetings in 
which Ahura-Mazda and Zarathustra conversed with one another. 
22. Thus I also, as a Mazdayasnian, a follower of Zarathustra, re- 
nounce the rule of the Daevas, as the pure Zarathustra has re- 
nounced them. 27. I praise the well-thought sentiment, the well- 
spoken speech, the well-performed action. 1 praise the good 
Mazdayasnian law, the free from doubt, removing strife. 29. To 
Ahura-Mazda I offer every good. Let this be the land of the 
Mazdayasnian law. [vol. ii., pages 62, 63.] 

XIV., 1. I invoke Ahura-Mazda, the Lord of the head of the 
house, the Lord of the lord of the clan, the Lord of the chief of 
the confederacy, the Lord over the lord of the regions. 12. Thus 
thinks the heavenly, so he speaks, so he acts, 13. As Thou, O 
Ahura-Mazda, hast thought, spoken, created, and made what is 
good ; 14. So we also give to Thee, offer, and praise, drawing 
nigh; 15. So we adore Thee, so we pray to Thee, O Ahura-Mazda. 
16. Through the existence of the good self, the good holiness, come 
we to Thee. [vol. ii., pages 63, 64.] [I omit verses 17-19.] 

XVIL, 9. The law of Zarathustra praise we. 10. The faith and 
the forthcoming* of Zarathustra we praise. 11. The pure- wishing, the 
fore- created, f pure creatures in both worlds, we praise. 12. The Crea- 
tor Ahura-Mazda, the Bright, Majestic, we praise. 34. The Crea- 
tor, Ahura-Mazda, praise we. 35. The good Mazdayasnian law 
praise we. 38. The heavens praise we. 39. The earth, the well- 
ereated, praise we. 40. The Manthra-spenta praise we. 41. The 
|)eginningless lights, the illimitable, praise we. J 42. The brilliant 
deeds of purity praise we, 43. At which the souls of the deceased 
rejoice, the Fravashis of the pure. 44. We praise the best place of 
the pure, the illumining, wholly brilliant. 50. We praise all waters, 
we praise all trees, 51. We praise all good men, we praise all good 
women. 52. We praise all heavenly Yazatas and all earthly, the 
well-created, pure. 53. We praise thee (our) dwelling-place, 
#§penta-armaiti (earth). 54. We praise Thee, Lord of the dwel- 

*The two words rendered " faith " and " forthcoming " are almost synony- 
mous. Perhaps the former refers to spiritual belief, and the latter to the practice- 
of religion. jThat is, those who taught prior to the coming of Zarathustra. 
^Besides all the good lights of the creation of Ahura-Mazda, the Mazda- 
yasnians honor the " Primeval Light," from which all the others are derived,, 
and in which, according to the Bundehesh, Ahura-Mazda himself dwells. Op- 
posed to this was " Primeval Darkness," the abode of Anra-mainyus. The- 
Aryan race appear to have devoted themselves especially to the worship of light. 



■■;g 881 The Clavis to an Index. 157 

ling-place, Pure Ahura-Mazda. [vol. ii., pages QQ, 67.] [1 omit 
verses 55-74.] 

XIX., 27. This speech* was taught for us, for every being, to 
learn and to meditate, on account of the best purity. 28. He who 
utters this, 29. He who recognizes Him as Lord and Master, who 
teaches Him, Ahura-Mazda, to the creatures, who are the first in 
understanding. 30. He who resigns himself to Him, the Greatest 
of all, he teaches also His creatures to know Him as the Greatest. 
35. He brings " the kingdom of Ahura," — it is thy kingdom. O 
Mazda, he prays consequently " food for the poor." [vol. ii., page 69.] 

37. All the words which are uttered, every word springs from 
Ahura-Mazda. 38. The Best Ahura-Mazda has spoken the 
Ahuna-vairya, the Best has made it perfect. 39. Swiftly went the 
bad away, when it was spoken against the bad. 40. On account 
of this utterance against them 41. May they (the bad spirits) 
neither to our souls, nor teaching, nor to our understanding, 42. 
Nor to our faith, nor to our prayers, nor to actions, 43. Nor to 
our law, nor to our souls, adhere, [vol. ii., pages 69, 70.] 

44. This speech which Ahura-Mazda has spoken contains three 
heads, four professions, five rulers, it is brought to the end through 
the offering.f 45. Which are the heads? To think, speak, and 
do good.! 46. Which the professions ? Priests, warriors, husband- 
men, and artizans.|| 47. All renown unites itself with the pure 
man through true thinking, speaking, and acting ; 48. As it is 
taught by the lord according to the teaching of the law. 49. 
Through his deeds the worlds increase in purity, [vol. ii., page 70.] 

53. What is well thought? Purity, by the beings first in under- 
standing. 54. What well-spoken ? The Manthra-spenta. 55. What 
well done? (What is done) with hymns by the beings first in 
purity. 56. Ahura-Mazda has spoken (the Ahuna-vairya), to 
whom has he spoken ? To the pure in heaven and in the world. 

57. In what capacity has he spoken the speech? As best king. 

58. To whom ? To the best pure, not ruling at will. 

XXV., 17. The most righteous wisdom, created by Mazda, pure, 
praise we, the good Mazdayasnian law praise we. 18. The Man- 
thra-spenta, the very brilliant, praise we, the law against the 
Daevas praise we, the Zarathustrian law praise we, the long pre- 

• s [The prayer Ahuna-vairya. (Khordah-Avesta, ii., below).] t Perhaps the 
meaning is that the Ahuna-vairya contains all the fundamental regulations of the 
Zarathustrian state, and at the end of the prayer charity is inculcated, i [That 
• is, I suppose, these are •• the works in the world for Mazda," stated generally.] 
II [That is, I suppose, the prayer Ahuna-vairya, which (like the Law itself) 
knows no distinction of persons, is to be spoken by all professions and by all 
rulers. (Cf. St. Luke, \\\, 21 : Deuteronomy, x.. 17; §519).] 



158 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

cept praise we, the good Mazdayasnian law praise we, the spread- 
ing abroad of the Manthra-spenta praise we, the keeping in mind 
the good Mazdayasnian law praise we, the knowledge of the Man- 
thra-spenta praise we, the heavenly wisdom created by Mazda 
praise we, the wisdom heard with the ears, created by Mazda, 
praise we. [vol. ii., pages 77, 78.] [I omit verses 19-24.] 

XX Yl., 1. The good, mighty, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise 
I, 2. Invoke I, make I my own ; — I praise (the Fravashis) of the 
dwellings, clans, confederacies, regions, those of the priests. 3. , 
All the earlier Fravashis praise we here : the Fravashi of Ahura- 
Mazda, 4. The Greatest, Best. Fairest, 5. The Strongest, Most 
Intelligent, Best Formed. 6. The Highest on account of His purity. 
7. The good, mighty, holy Fravashis of the pure praise we. 8. Of. 
the Amesha-*S'pentas, the kings, beholding at will, 9. The great, 
mighty, strong, proceeding from Ahura, 10. Who are imperish- 
able, the pure of the first faith, the first disciples. 11. We praise 
the place, the law, the consciousness, the souls, the Fravashis of the 
pure men and women here,* 12. Who were protectors of purity. 
21. We praise the souls of the pure deceased here, which aref Fra- 
vashis of the pure. 22. We praise the Fravashis of all the pure re- 
lations, the Aethrapaitis,J deceased in this dwelling, of the disciples, 
of the men and women, the pure here. 23. The Fravashis of all 
pure Aethrapaitis praise we. 24. The Fravashis of all pure dis- 
ciples praise we. 25. The Fravashis of all pure men praise we. 26. 
The Fravashis of all pure women praise we. 27. The Fravashis 
of all youths, 1 1 the pious, pure, praise we. 28. The Fravashis of 
all the pure who belong to the region, praise we. 29. The Fra- 
vashis of all the pure beyond the region, praise we. 30. The Fra- 
vashis of the pure men praise we. 31. The Fravashis of the pure 
women praise we. 32. All the good, mighty, holy Fravashis of the 
pure, praise we, 33. From Gayo-marathan unto $aoshyans, the 



*" The pure men and women here," signifies "those who were pure during 
their lives in this world." In this verse we find a three-fold division of the soul. 
Baodho is " spiritual activity ; "' Urvan (= " the soul ") is the Will, or the ability 
to choose between good and bad'; Fravas7ii, which is usually applied to the 
power which holds body and soul together, seems here to be equivalent to " the 
conscience."' In the later systems the soul was made to consist of Jive parts. 
t[Cf. Confucius, Analects, XI., xi.; Doctrine of the Mean, xvi., 2 (§871, pages 
112, 129 above).] iAethrapaiti (= Herbed) signifies properly "the lord of the 
precept," and the phrase is applied to one who has given proofs of bis acquaint- 
ance witb the truths of the Zarathustrian religion. |j By "the pious youths," are 
meant those who, though not of sufficient age to understand all the duties of a 
Mazdayasnian, are nevertheless learning and practicing them to the best of" 
their ability. 



§ 881 The Glavis to an Index. 159' 

victorious. 34. All Fravashis of the pure praise we. 35. The 
souls of the deceased praise we, which are the Fravashis of the 
pure. [See verse 21 above.] [vol. ii., pages 78, 79.] 

Extracts from the Gathas.* — I. Gatha Ahunavaiti. 

YA&NA, XXVIII. (Good is the thought, good the speech, good 
the work of the pure Zarathustra. — May the Amesha-spentas accept 
the Gathas, — Praise be to you, pure songs.)f 

1. 1 desire by my prayer with uplifted hands this joy : 
First the entirely pure works of the Holy Spirit, Mazda, 
(Then) the understanding of Vohu-mano,! (and that) which 

rejoices the soul of the Bull.|| 

2. I draw near to You,§ O Ahura-Mazda, with good-minded- 

NESS, 

Give me for both these (worlds), the corporeal as well as the 

spiritual, 
Gifts arising out of purity, which make joyful in brightness. ^j 

3. I praise you first, O Asha and Vohu-mano, 

And Ahura-Mazda, to whom belongs an imperishable king- 
dom, 

*We now commence what is termed the second part of the Yasna, which is 
written in a dialect older than the language of the rest of the Avesta. It has 
already been mentioned [vol. ii., page 2] that the Gathas are a species of religi- 
ous Hymns, bearing more or less resemblance to the Yedic Hymns. They are, 
h wever, extremely difficult and obscure ; and the translator regrets that many 
passages are quite unintelligible, and more very nearly so. Still further ob- 
scurity arises from the necessity of translating each line separately, so as to make 
it correspond exactly with the original Zend. In Professor Spiegel's translation 
this difficulty is less felt, because the German case-system enables the reader to 
perceive at a glance which are nominatives and which accusatives, etc., and 
which are the adjectives belonging to their respective nouns; whereas in English 
the slightest inversion, or transposition, loads to inevitable confusion. The 
translator wishes to state that he has made this part of the translation as strictly 
literal as possible, not presuming to hazard conjectures of his own. He hopes 
however, that Professor Spiegel's " Commentary " will render the Gathas at least 
tolerably intelligible, which is more than can be said of them at present, [vol. 
ii., page 81.] |["The Revealed Thought, the Revealed Word, the Revealed 
Deed of Zarathustra the Holy; the Archangels first sang the Gathas." Heading 
of the first Gatha, a translation which I find in Chambers' Encyclopedia (vol. 
x., page 343, ed., 1874) art. Zendavesta.] [In a note here (Bleeck, vol. ii., page 
82) it is stated that] the words in parentheses do not belong to the Gathas ; they 
appear to be a liturgical addition. J" The understanding of Vohu-mano," sig- 
nifies " goodinindedness," that is, a disposition to perform good actions. || Ac- 
cording to the Gloss, the soul of the Bull is desired to be rejoiced, that it may 
protect the herds. § The plural of " You " is employed because Ahura-Mazda 
is reckoned amongst the Amesha-.spentas, of whom he is Supreme Lord. *That 
is, gifts which will rejoice us in the other world. 



160 Kant's Ethic*. § 881 

May Armaiti, to grant gifts, come hither at my call. 

4. I who have entrusted the soul to heaven with good disposition, 
Acquainted with the reward for the actions of Ahura-Mazda, 
So long as I can and am able will 1 teach acording to the wish 

of the pure. [vol. ii., page 81.] 

5. Asha!* when shall I behold thee and Yohu-mano with knowl- 

edge ? 
(When shall I see) the place which belongs to Ahura-Mazda, 

the Most Profitable, which is shown by #raosha? 
These Manthras are the greatest thing, we teach them to those 

of evil tongue, [vol, ii.. page 82.] 
11. I keep for ever purity and good-mindedness. 

Teach Thou me, Mazda-Ahura, from out Thyself, 

From heaven through Thy mouth whereby the world first 

arose. 
XXIX., 4. Mazda is it, who remembers best the words which 

He has made before, 
Ere Daevas and men were, and which He will make again 

hereafter. 
Ahura has the determination, may it happen with us as He 

will. 

5. Now call I with uplifted hands zealously to Ahura-Mazda : 
For my soul and that of the three-year-old bull : for wisdom 

in doubtful questions. 
May he not perish who leads a pure life, not the active with- 
out the wicked. 

6. Then spake Ahura-Mazda, who knows the impure through 

His wisdom : 
"Not can a lord be found, nor a master who proceeds from 

purity, 
I, the Creator, have created thee for the industrious and for 

the active." [vol. ii., pages 83, 84.] [Stanzas 7-11 I omit.] 
XXX., 1. I announce this for those who desire after what Mazda 

created for the prudent : 
The praises for Ahura which are to be sounded by man, 
Those to be well thought with purity, the beautiful through 

their brightness, the friendly. 
2. Let him hear the best with the ears, let him see the clear with 

the soul, 
To determine the desirable, man by man, for himself, 
Ere the great deedf (occurs) must those teach us who know it. 

*Asha seems to stand here for Asha-vahista, though the word may also be 
taken as an adjective (O Pure !) referring to Ahura-Mazda. tTlie tradition 
understands by "the great deed/' the resurrection. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 161 

9. May Ave belong to Thee, we who seek to further this world. 

May the wise lords bring help through Asha. 

Whoso is obedient here, he will there* unite himself with 

wisdom. 

11. Teach both the Perfectionsf which Mazda has given to men, 

Of themselves as many as there are who long time wound the 

wicked. 
They are profit to the pure, through them will hereafter come 
(to them) happiness, [vol. ii., page 86.] 
XXXI., 1. Reciting to you these Perfections, which have not yet 
been beard, we teach the words 
Against those who destroy the world of purity with the teach- 
ing of the Drujas, 
Thus the best for those who give their heart to Mazda. 

2. If the good holds fast without doubt to that which cannot be 

perceived with the eyes, [Cf. § 853, above.] 
Then comes he to you all, since he desires Ahura-Mazda, 
The Lord of these good things, from purity, through which 

we live. 

3. What Thou in heavenly way, through the fire, and Asha, 

givest as wisdom for the warriors :% 
As perfection for the intelligent, that announce to us, O 

Mazda, that we may know it, 
With the tongue of Thy mouth, that 1 may teach it to all 

living. 

7. He came as the first fashioner, (when) brightness mingled 

itself with the lights; 
He (fashioned) the pure creation, He upholds the best soul 

with His understanding ; 
Thou causest both|| to increase in heavenly way, O Mazda- 

Ahura, Thou who art also now the Lord. 

8. Thee have I thought, O Mazda, as the first to praise with the 

soul, 
As the Father of Vohu-mano, since I saw Thee with eyes, 
The active Creator of purity, the Lord of the world in deeds. 

9. To Thee belonged Armaiti, with Thee was the understanding 

which fashioned the Cow, 
When Thou. Mazda-Ahura, the Heavenly, createdst ways for 
Her, 

*Here — there — " the present and future worlds." |"The two perfections," 
are perhaps the "A vesta " and the " Zend,'' i. e. the holy Scriptures and the oral 
Tradition. .{Perhaps "the warriors " arc- the spiritual adversaries of Anra-main- 
.yus. |! By " both " is meant the heavenly as well as the earthly creation. 



162 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

From the active proceeds also he who himself is not active. 

10. Of them hast Thou chosen for it (the earth) the active working, 
As the pure lord over the good things of Vohu-mano. 

The inactive did not, O Mazda, impart the precept to the bad. 

11. When Thou, Mazda, first createdst the world for us, and the 

laws, 
And the understanding, through Thy spirit, when Thou 

clothedst the vital powers with bodies, 
And createdst deeds and teaching to satisfy the wish for the 

world to come. 

12. Thither turns his voice the liar as the truth speaker, 
The wise as the unwise, in his heai*t and his soul : 

He who holds fast to wisdom asks after the heavenly abodes. 

13. What questions (he) asks as manifest, O MAZDA,what as furtive, 
Who commits great sins in order to cover little ones, 

All that seest Thou, O Lord, Pure with thine eyes. 

14. Both these I ask Thee, O Lord, what there is and what will 

yet come : 
What debt* do they pay for judgment to the pure, 
What to the godless, when these (judgments) shall be con- 
cluded ? 

15. Concerning this I ask Thee, what may be the punishment (for 
him) who prepares the kingdom for the wicked ? 

(For him) who through evil deeds does not increase life even 
a little, 

For the tormentors of the active, and those who do not tor- 
ment men and cattle. 

16. I ask Thee of this : The wise, who the dominion of the dwel- 

ling, 
Or of the confederacy, or of the region, strove to increase with 

purity, 
Is he like Thee, O Mazda-Ahura, if he (resembles Thee) 

IN DEEDS ? 

17. Which is greater, what the pure or what the impure believes? 
May the wise say it to the wise, — may there be no more here- 
after one who knows it not. 

Teach us, Mazda-Ahura, the tokens of good-mindedness. 

18. May no one of you hear the Manthras of the evil and their 

teaching, 
For to the dwelling, to the clan, to the confederacy, or to the 
region, brings he down 

^Perhaps by " debt " is implied that Paradise is due to pure men who have 
earned aright to it by their good deeds. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 163' 

Wickedness which (conducts) to death. Drive them away- 
then with strokes. 

19. He will be heard who has ascribed purity to both worlds ; the 

Wise Ahura, 
Who rules with true spoken words, who has power in his 

tongue,* 
Through thee, the red fire, Mazda gives the decision of the 

battle. 

20. Whoso then brings about that the pure is defrauded, he has 

afterward the dwelling 
Of darkness a long time, bad food, unbecoming speech. f 
To this place, ye wicked, the law conducts you by reason of 

YOUR OWN DEEDS. 

21. Mazda- Ahura created fullness and immortality, 

Unto the perfection of the pure, He, the Head of His kingdom, 
The fullness of Vohu-mano for him who through heavenly 
deeds is His friend. 

22. Manifestly are both of these to the wise, namely, to him who 

knows through his soul. 

He is the good king (who) promotes purity with word and 
deed. 

Such a one is to Thee, Mazda-Ahura, the most helpful as- 
sistant, [vol. ii., page 89.] 
XXXII., 1. May the alliedl desire Him, His deeds, with obedi- 
ence. 

According to His mind are we, ye Daevas, the rejoicers of 
Ahura, 

May we be thy messengers, the restraining, who torment you. 
2. To them answered Mazda-Ahura, ruling through Vohu- 
mano, 

From his kingdom, the very friendly with the shining Asha, 

The perfect Armaiti teach we to you to know. May she be 
ours. 
4. What ever is good that evil men pervert, 

They are called friends of the Daevas, revolted from Vohu- 
mano, 

*That is, perhaps, he has only to speak and it- is done, "fit is stated in the 
Mkh. that when the souls of the wicked arrive at the abode of darkness, the 
Daevas give them bad or poisonous food, and receive them with mocking speech. 
See also Yasna, xlviii., 11, and Khordah-A. vesta, xxxviii J Of all the difficult 
chapters in the second part of the Yasna this is the most difficult, and much of 
it can only be translated at all by the help of tradition. The phrase, "the 
allied," refers perhaps to one who is, as it were, intimately in communion with 
Ahum-Mazda. 



1-64 Kant 8 Ethics. § 881 

Kemoving themselves from the understanding of Ahura- 
Mazda and of purity. 

5. Of both does he defraud men : of fullness and immortality. 
When to you, Daevas, Aka-mainyu, through evil mind, 
Teaches evil deeds and words, — dominion for the wicked. 

6. Much punishment does man obtain, if thus as He has an- 

nounced, 
Ahtjra should reckon openly, He who is aware through the 

best spirit. 
In thy kingdom, O Mazda, is the Precept of Asha known.* 
9. The false prayers, they slay through their teaching the soul 

of life. 
They take away my good that is hotly desired by Vohu-mano. 
With these prayers of my soul entreat I you, Mazda and Asha. 

10. He slays my words, who there utters what is evil to see 

For the Cow with the eyes, and for the Sun, whoso gives gifts 

to the wicked, 
Who changes the pastures into deserts, and who openly injures 

the J) ure. 

11. He slays me, who thinks the life of the bad as the greatest, 
(So that) cheerful possession is taken away from the masters 

of houses and the mistresses of houses, 
He who, Mazda, wishes to wound the best pure soul. 

12. The men who by their teaching hinder from good deeds, 

To these has Mazda announced evil, to them who slay the Soul 

of the Cow with friendly speech. f 
To whom morsels are dearer than purity, £ the Karapas 

among those who wish dominion in evil way. 

13. Whoso wishes the rending of the kingdom, he belongs to the 

abode of the most wicked spirit. 
As the destroyer of this world, and he who wishes, O Mazda, 

weeping, 
He who wishes to keep the messengers of Thy Manthras far 

from beholding purity. 
16. All that comes from the best, which teaches good to the soul' 
Ahura-Mazda rules over that which is manifest to me, and 

what is hidden, 
What is presented as punishment for the wicked . . . . || 

*Gloss, " When thy rule shall be perfect then will each know justice.'' Per- 
haps this has a reference to the time of the last things, f" Mazda has announced 
evil," i. e. punishment to those who maintain that, by slaying the cow, good 
-will be produced. j. " To whom pieces," etc. Gloss, "they prefer riches to good 
works." The Karafas seem to be the deaf who cannot hear the words of Ahura- 
Mazda. The remainder of the chapter is all but unintelligible. |] The rest is 
•uni>ntelli>nble. 



\ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 165 

XXXIII., 1. As is right, so does He who created the first place, 
The Master, the most righteous deeds for the evil as for the 

good, 
What is false, that mixes itself with that which he possesses 

of good. 

5. I to thy /S'raosha, as the greatest of all, call for help : 
Give ns long life in the kingdom of Yohu-mano, 

Unto the pure paths of purity, in which Ahura-Mazda dwells. 

6. What Zaota (walks) in the pure (paths) of purity he desires 

after the heavenly Paradise, 
From him has he help through the Spirit, who thinks the 

works which are to be done, 
These are desired by Thee, Ahura-Mazda, for seeing and 

conversation, [vol. if, page 92.] 
9. May the dominion greatly increase to Thee, Mazda, (and) to 

this heavenly (Vohu-mano); 
May there come brightness, enduring, wisdom through the 

best spirit, 
Accomplishment of that whereby the souls cohere. 

10. All the enjoyments of life, which were and still are, 

And which will be, these distribute according to Thy will ; 
May I increase through Yohu-mano, Khshathra and Asha in 
happiness for the body. 

11. Ahura-Mazda, Thou who art the Most Profitable, and 

Armaiti 

And Asha who furthers the world, and Khshathra and Yohu- 
mano ; 

Hear me and pardon me all whatever it may be. 

12. Purify me, O Lord, through Armaiti give me strength. 
Holiest, Heavenly Mazda, . give me at my supplication in 

goodness. 
Through Asha strong power, through Vohu-mano fullness of 
good. 

13. To teach afar for (Thy) rejoicing give me certainty, 

That from the kingdom, O Ahura, which belongs to the 

blessings of Yohu-mano. 
Teach us, O >Spenta-arrnaiti, the law with purity. 

14. Zarathustra gives as a gift the soul from his body, 
(Give to him) the precedence of good mind, O Mazda, 
Purity in deed and in word, obedience and dominion. 

XXXIV., 2. And so to Thee, by means of the soul, are also given 
all good things of Yohu-mano, 



166 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

As also through the actions of the pure man. whose soul is 
bound with purity. 

I come to your adoration, O Mazd\, with full prayers. 
3. So offer we Myazda to Thee with prayer. O Ahura, and to 
Asha, 

May all good things which are nourished by Yohu-mano, be 
in Thy kingdom, 

For he is wholly wise who ever brings profit to such as You. 
9. Those who the holy wisdom, which is desired by them that 
know Thee, 

Destroy with evil deeds, prom ignorance of Vohu-mano, 

From them purity flies far away, so long as they are thereby 
wicked and corrupt. 
10. Let the wise announce the laying hold on Yohu-mano WITH 
THE DEED, [Cf. §§706, 723, 846, 821, above.] 

(Let) him who knows (announce) the holy Wisdom, the skil- 
ful, the abode of purity, 

Bat all that,* O Mazda, may they drive out from Thy king- 
dom. 

12. What is Thine ordination, what Thy wish, be it praise, be it 

offering? 

Let it be announced, O Mazda, say who fulfils Your com- 
mand the purest. 

Teach us, Asha, the paths which belong there to Yohu-mano. 

13. The way op Yohu-mano of which Thou hast spoken to me, 
The law of the Profitable, in which he who does right from 

purity, pinds it is well with him. 
Where the reward which Thou hast promised to the wise is 
given to Thine. 

14. This wish, O M \Zda, grant to the soul endowed with body: 
Works op Yohu-mano, for those who labor with the walking 

cow, 
Your wisdom, O Ahura, efficacy of the soul which furthers 
purity. 

15. Mazda ! announce to me the best words and deeds, 

These are to Thee, together with Yohu-mano and Asha, the 

debt of praise, 
Through Thy realm makest Thou, Ahura, increasing at will. 

the place mani est. [vol. ii., page 95.] 

II. Yasna Haptanhaiti. 

XXXY1. (2)., 9. O fire, son of Ahura-Mazda, we draw near to 
thee 10. With good mind, with good purity, 11. With deeds and 

*The words, "all that," refer to Anra-mainj'us a>d his companions. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 167 

words of good wisdom draw we near to thee. 12. We praise Thee, 
we acknowledge ourselves as Thy debtors, Mazda-Ahura. 13. 
With all good thoughts, with all good words, with all good works, 
we draw nigh unto Thee. [vol. ii., page 96.] [1 omit verses 14-16, 
and all of Yasna, xxxv., (1).] 

XXXVII. (3)., 1. Here praise I now Ahura-Mazda, who has 
created the cattle, who has created purity, the water and the good 
trees. 2. Who created the splendor of light, the earth, and all 
good. 3. To Him belongs the kingdom, the might, the power. 6. 
Him praise we with Ahurian name, Mazda, 7. With our own 
bodies and life praise we Him. 10. What is fairest, what pure, 
what immortal, 11. What brilliant, all that is good : 12. The 
good spirit we honor, the good kingdom we honor, 13. And the 
good law, and the good rule, and the good wisdom. 

XXXIX. (5)., 5. Then we praise the souls of the pure, who have 
ever been born, men and women, 6. Whose good laws one honors, 
will honor, and has honored, [vol. ii., p. 98.] [I omit verses 7-14.] 
XL. (6)., 1. From place to place, Mazda-Ahura, will I bring 
forth wisdom and fullness, 2. As gifts for Thee, Lord of the un- 
derstanding, on account of that which is above. * 3. What reward 
Thou hast given to those of the same law as myself, Mazda-Ahura, 
4. That give also to us for this world, and that beyond. 5. May 
we thus attain to that which is so, 6. To union with Thy purity 
to all eternity. 7. Let the pure men, Mazda-Ahura, who desire 
after purity, 8. Warriors as well as husbandmen, be long mighty, 
long rejoiced. 9. For us to our joy. 10. So may relationship, 
worship, and friendship be, 11. That we may lift ourselves up and 
be Yours, Mazda-Ahura, as pure and truthful, with sacrifice and 
offering, [vol. ii., pages 98, 99.] 

XLI. (7)., 1. Hymns, reverential adoration, to Ahura-Mazda 
and Asha-Yahista, 2. We give, we spread abroad, and we make 
known. 3. May we attain Thy good kingdom, Mazda-Ahura, for 
ever. 4. Thou art our Ruler, possessed of the good kingdom, for 
men as well as for women, 5. The Wisest among beings in both 
worlds. 6. The good increase we bestow on Thee, the worthy of 
adoration, the Friend of purity. 7. May est Thou be to us life and 
body, 8. Thou, the Wisest among the creatures in both worlds. — 

9. May we show ourselves worthy, may we live, Ahura-Mazda, 

10. In joy in Thee a long life, may we desire after Thee and be 
mighty. 11. Eejoice us long and well, O Wisest among beings. 12. 
As Thy praisers and psalmists, O Ahura-Mazda, 13. We come, 
we desire, and we obey. 14. What reward Thou hast given to my 

*That is, according to the Gloss, the law. 



168 Kanfs Ethics. § 881 

equal according to the law, O Ahura, 15. That give to me also 
for earth as well as for heaven. 16. May we thus come 17. Under 
Thy rule, Pure, for all eternity. [I omit verses 18-36.] 

III. Gatha Ustavaiti. 

XLII. (Praise to you, the Pure G-athas.) 

1. Hail to him who suffices for happiness to each ! 
May Ahura create, ruling after his own wish ! 

May power and strength (come to me) according to Thy will : 
That I may be able to maintain purity, give me that, O 

Armaiti : 
(Namely) kingdom, blessing, and the life of Vohu-mano. 

2. To the man full of brightness may the brightness 
Which is the best of all, be given ! 

Manifest Thyself, O Holiest, Heavenly Mazda, 

Thou who createdst, O Pure, the good things of Vohu-mano, 

Day by day from love for long life,* 

3. May every man attain the best, 

Who teaches us to know the right paths for profit, 
For this corporeal world as well as for the spiritual. 
The manifest toward the worlds in which Ahura dwells, 
(And) the offerer, who is like Thee, wise, holy, O Mazda ! 

4. Thee thought I as the Strong as well as the Holy, O Mazda, 
As Thou with thine own hand protectest 

The blessing, which thou hast created for the good as well as 

for the wicked : 
The warmth of Thy fire, indued with pure strength. 
When there came to me a robber of Yohu-mano. 

5. For the Holy one held I Thee, Mazda-Ahura, 
When I first saw Thee at the origin of the world, 

As Thou effectest that deeds and prayers find their reward. 

Evil for the evil, good blessings for the good, 

At the last dissolution of the Creation through Thy virtue. 

6. At this dissolution there will come to Thy kingdom, 

Holy, Heavenly Mazda, through good-mindedness, 
He through whose deeds the world increases in purity. 
Armaiti teaches them, the leaders 
Of Thy spirit, whom no one deceives.f 

7. For the Holy one held I Thee, Mazda-Ahura, 



*That is from love for the long life of the pure man, since Ahtjka must de- 
sire the pure man to remain long in life. |Here the singular changes abruptly 
to the plural, which, however, .is easily understood, since the singular is used col- 
lectively. The construction is, Armaiti . . . the leader, etc. 



; f$ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 169 

As it came to me through Yohu-mano, 

And asked me, "Who art thou, to whom dost thou belong?" 
How shall I atthe question teach to know the signs of the day, 
In reference to Thy worlds and the bodies ?* 
8. Then spake Zarathustra to Him first : 

Since manifest torments are desirable for the wicked, 
So may I suffice for strong joy to the pure, 
Since I will bring knowledge in the power of the Euler, 
So will I, as long as I exist, laud and praise Thee, Mazda. 

10. Give Thou to me perfect purity, since I desire it for myself, 
Thou who art bound with wisdom. 

Ask us the questions which thou hast for us, 
For thy questions are those of the mighty, f 
Since to thee the Euler gives strength at will. 

11. As the Holy One thought I Thee, Mazda, 
When it came to me through Yohu-mano. 
When it was first taught me through Your prayer. 

That the spreading abroad of the Law through me among men 
was something difficult. 

That will 1 do which was said to me as the best. 
13. As the Holy One though t f I Thee, Mazda, 

When it came to me through Yohu-mano, 

(That) I should teach the right guidance op the will. Give 
me the (reward) 

Of a long life, as no one obtains from you, 

Among the desirable of creation, who are named in Thy king- 
dom, [vol. ii., page 102.] [I omit stanzas 14-16.] 
XLLTL, 1. That ask 1 Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura, 

Unto the praise of Your praise mayest Thou. 

O Mazda, teach me, the friend 

Through purity may friendly helpers be our portion 

Until he shall come to us through Yohu-mano. 
2. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura, 

How is the beginning of the best place (Paradise), 

How is it to profit (him) who desires after both?! 

For Thou art through purity — the Holy over the wicked — 

The Euler over all, the Heavenly, the Friend for both worlds, 
Mazda ! 

*This latter question must be ascribed to Zarathustra, not to Ahura- Mazda. 
t Gloss, " thou becomest mighty when thou utterest the law." It is difficult 
to say what is the meaning of this strophe, since we do not know to whom it is 
addressed, i " Both " = " The A vesta and Zend." 

12 



170 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

3. That ask I Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura ! 

Who was the father of the pure creatures at the beginning ? 

Who has created the way of the Sun, of the Stars ? 

Who (other than) Thou (causest) that the Moon waxes and'. 

wanes ? 
That, Mazda, and other ((things)) I desire to know. 

4. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O A hura ! 
Who upholds the earth, and the unsupported?* 
So that they fall not, — who the waters and trees ? 

Who has united swiftness with the winds and the clouds ? 
Who, Mazda, is the creator of Vohu-mano (mankind) ? 

5. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura! 
Who, working good, has made light as well as darkness? 
Who, working good, sleep and waking? 

Who the morning dawns, the noons, the nights ? 
Who (him) who considers the measures of the law ? 

6. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, Ahura ! 
These sayings — are they also clear? 

Does Armaiti increase purity through deeds ? 

Does the kingdom belong to Thine on account of their good- 

MINDEDNESS ? , 

For whom hast thou made the going cow, as a gracious 
gift? 

7. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, Ahura ! 

Who has created the desired wisdom, together with the king- 
dom? 
Who created through His purity the love of father to son ? 
For these things turn I myself most to Thee. 
Heavenly, Holy, Creator of all things. 
9. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura ! 
How shall I maintain pure for myself the pure Law, 
Which the Lord of the wise realm teaches ? 
Truthful kingdoms (possessest Thou): swiftness, O Mazda, 
Thou who rejoicest the dwelling with Asha and Vohu-mano.. 

10. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura ! 
About the Law which is the best for beings, 
Which furthers me continually the worlds in purity, 
Makes right with the words and deeds of perfect wisdom — 
For my wisdom 1 desire Thy gifts of fortune, O Mazda! 

11. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O Mazda ! 
How does a share in wisdom come to those 

To whom, O Mazda, Thy law is announced? 

*The " unsupported " means probably the heavenly bodies. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 171 

1 desire to know Thee first of them, 

All the others will I watch from hate of the (evil) spirit. 

13. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura ! 
How shall we drive away the Drujas from here? 
Away to those who are the champions of disobedience ; 

Who do not unite themselves to the pure when they mark him 7 
Do not desire after that for which the pure spirit asks. 

14. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura ! 

How shall I through purity get the Drujas into my power? 
In order to slay them with the Manthras of Thy precept, 
Bring forth a mighty overthrow among the wicked, 
(Bring it) to the deceivers and godless that they may not 
come again. 

15. That wall I ask Thee, tell me the right, O Ahura ! 
Whether Thou rulest openly in that time with purity/ 
When both the imperishable hosts come together ? * 
According to those laws which Thou, Mazda, teachest. 
Where, and to which of both, givest Thou the victory ? 

16. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, Ahura ! 

Who is the victoriously smiting, through (Thy) powerful 

word, (those) who are ? f 
Make manifest to me a wise lord for the creatures in both worlds. 
May obedience come, through the good spirit, 
To that one whomsoever Thou wilt, O Mazda ! | 
XLIV.. 2. Now will I announce : the two Heavenly Ones at the 

beginning of the world,- — 
Of these Two thus spake the Holy to the Evil : 
" Not do our souls, not our doctrines, not our understanding. 
Not our wishes, not our sayings, not our works, 
Not the laws, not the souls unite themselves. "|| 

;;; 'The tradition refers this to the time of the Resurrection, when the hosts 
of Ahura-Mazda and those of Anra-mainyus will encounter each other, and 
the former prove victorious, t" Those who are/' according to the Glosses, are the 
evil-doers. |[I omit stanzas 17-20. (vol. ii., pages 105, 106).] || [" The contrast 
between good and evil is strongly and sharply marked in the Gathas ; the writers 
continually harp upon it;, their minds are evidently struck with this sad anti- 
thesis, which colors the whole moral world to them ; they see everywhere a strug- 
gle between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, purity and impurity appar- 
ently they are blind to the evidence of harmony and agreement in the universe,- 
discerning nothing anywhere but strife, conflict, antagonism." — (But see Yasna, 
xliii.. 5, and xxxi., 7, pages 170 and 161 above.) — "Nor is this all. They go a 
step further, and personify the two parties to the struggle. One is a ' white ' or 
holy 'Spirit' (.Spento-mainyus), and the other a 'dark spirit' (angro-mainyus). 
But this personification is merely poetical or metaphorical, not real. The ' white 
spirit ' is not Ahura-Mazda, and the ' dark spirit ' is not a hostile intelligence. 
Both resolve themselves, on examination, into mere figures of speech — phantoms 
of poetic imagery — abstract notions, clothed by language with an apparent, not 
a real, personality." — George Rawlinson's Ancient Monarchies (Media, ch. iv.) r 
vol. ii., pages 331, 332 (ed. Scribner, 1871).] 



172 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

3. Now will I say to you what as the first in the world 
The Wise Ahura-Mazda has said to me : 
" He among you who will not act according to this Manthra, 
Namely, according to the spirit as well as the word, 
To him will the end of the world turn to downfall." 

6. Now will I say to you, the greatest thing of all : 

Praise with purity (of him), the wise there, (of those) who are. 

May Holiest, Heavenly Ahura-Mazda, hear it, 

He to Whom praise is asked by good mind, 

May He through His understanding teach me the best. 

7. He for whose profit desire all the offerers, 
Who were ever living or are so still. 
Immortality is the wish of the soul of the pure, 
(And) strength, which is a weapon against the wicked, 
(And) the kingdom, (whose) Creator is Ahura-Mazda. 

8. Him will we serve with praiseworthy prayers, 
For now is it evident to the eyes, 

He who in works and words of the good Spirit 

Knows purity, he (knows) Ahura-Mazda. 

His praise also will we lay down in G-aro-nemana. 

9. Him will we content with good-mindedness. 

Who made the rejoicing and the unjoyful serviceable to us. 
May Mazda-Ahura make kingdoms serviceable to us, 
Our cattle, our men, so that they may increase 
Through the purity of Vohu-mano, unto the good birth. 

10. To Him desire I to draw near with the offering of Armaiti, 
Who is called with name as the Wise Lord.* 

He who announces Him with purity and good-mindedness, 
To him will Haurvat and Ameretat in the kingdom 
Continually give power and strength. 

11. May there come to the Daevas,f then to men, 
Scorn, if they scorn Him, 

The contrary if they highly esteem Him: 
To the serviceable wise is through the Holy Spirit, 
Friend, Brother, Father, Ahura-Mazda. 
XL V., 1. What land shall I praise, whither shall I go praying, 
After that I have imparted individuality and obedience. 
Those do not make me contented who act after their own 
pleasure, 



*[Attlie risk of misleading the reader here, I venture to say that George 
Rawlinson (Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii., page 324, ed Scrihner), quotes from Dr. 
Haug's essays (page 33) the following definition of the Name Ahixka-Mazda : — 
" the Living Wise. ."] t[" Devas — 'fiends' or 'devils.'" Kawlinson's Ancient 
Monarchies, vol. ii., page 330 (ed. Scrihner, 1873).] 



§ 881 The Mavis to an Index. 173 

.Nor again the evil oppressors of the region. 
How shall I satisfy Thee, Mazda- Ahura ? 

5. Whoso as Euler gives not to him who brings hurt — 
Skilled, from the law, or from the covenant, 

Whoso as a right liver, ((and)) pure (does not give) to the 

wicked, 
He is intelligent, he shall speak forth for himself. 
He is raised, Mazda- Ahura, above oppression. 

6. What man does not willingly approach him, 

He goes openly over to the creation of the Drujas, 
For he is a wicked one who is the best for the wicked. 
The pure, to whom the pure is friendly, 
So long as the first law endures, O, Ahura ! 

7. Whom has Mazda appointed as protector for my fellows, 

If the wicked chooses me for vengeance ? [Cf. page 128 above.] 
What other than thee, the fire and the spirit, 
Through both of whose deeds purity is increased, 
This help for the law tell me. 

8. He who commits these earthly goods to the foe, 

My punishment will not strike him for these shameful deeds,* 
Through tormenting there comes to him that 
To ((his)) body which drives him away from the good life, 
(But) not ever from the wicked, through hatred against 
Mazda. f [vol. ii., page 108.] 

9. Who is the offerer, who first teaches me 
How I may exalt Thee according to wish , 

In (my) doing, (Thee) the Holy, Pure Ahura ? 

What thou (possessest) pure, what the Maker of the Cow said 

pure, 
That desire I from Thee, through Yohu-mano. 

10. What man or what woman, O Mazda-Ahura, 

Gives me in this world the best that thou knowest : \ 

Blessing for purity, the kingdom through Yohu-mano, 
And (for those) whom I exhort to Your praise, 
With all these go I forward to the bridge Chinvat. 

11. To empire have the Karapas and KavisJ united themselves 
In order through wicked deeds to destroy the world for men, 

^Extremely olscure. fThe meaning is: It is not Ahuea-Mazda who 
punishes the wicked, hut his (the wicked man's) own hatred toward a good life 
which drives him to a had life, and so occasions his punishment, [vol. ii., page 
108.] [Cf. Yas-na, xxxiii., 1 (page 165 above). This is the most ancient theodicy 
I know of.] % The translations make the Karapas and Kavis to signify "the 
deaf" and " the blind; " that is, metaphorically, those who will not hear or re- 
gard the law of Ahura-Mazba. 



174 Kanfs Ethics. § 881 

Whose own souls, whose own state, becomes hard.* 
If they come thither where the bridge Chinvat is, 
So will they for ever place themselves in the abode of the 
Drujas. 
12. "When purity in the families and races 

Of the relations arises at the speech of the kinsmen,f 
Which increases the world through the activity of Armaiti, 
Then dwells with them together through Yohu-mano, 
To them for joy commands Ahura-Mazda. 

18. Whoso for my sake here continually does the best 

To him grant I of my goods through Vohu-mano (reward), 
Oppressing him who oppresses us. 
Mazda and Asha. in your desire I find contentment, 
That is the decision of my understanding and soul. 

19. He who to me from holiness thus works openly 

That which according to his will is the first to Zarathustra, 
To him they grant as reward the world beyond, 

Together with all good things known to me J 

That hast thou said to me, Mazda, Thou who knowest it best. 

IV. Gatha Spenta-mainyu. 
XL VI. (Praise be to you, pure Gathas.) 
.1. Through the holiest Spirit, and through the best-minded- 

NESS. 

Which springs from purity with words and works, 

'To us has given fullness and immortality, 
'Good things and understanding, Mazda-Ahuba. 
2. Of this holiest Spirit best does he, 

The best through the loud prayers by means of the mouth of 
Vohu-mano, 

With the hands of Armaiti performs he pure deeds, 

Through His own wisdom is Mazda the Father of purity. 
S.jThou who art also the Holy in Heaven, 

Thou who has created the cow as a helpful gift. 

Thou who givest her fodder and delight according to Thy 
wisdom, 

When thou, Mazda, hast consulted with Yohu-mano. 
4. Hurt arises from this Spirit, the wicked, 

Not so from the Pure Holy Mazda. 

Even in a small thing man desires for the pure,|| 

•-Precisely as vre speak of hardness of heart. Cf. Yendidad v. 13. fThat is, 
perhaps, if, through the conversation of helievers, the faith is spread abroad 
amongst the tribe, i Quite unintelligible. |J Gloss, " Even in small things he 
performs good works.'" 



*§ 881 The Clavis to cm Index. 175 

In a great one, if he is able, the bad for the evil. 
5. That, #penta-Mainyu, Mazda- Ahura, 

Mayest Thou give to the pure, what is best. 

Without Thy will the wicked takes a share 

In his* works ; he who springs from the dwelling of Ako-mano.f 
<6. That hast Thou created, £penta-Mainyu. Mazda-Ahura, 

Through the fire gives He decision for the combatants, % 

Through the greatness of Armaiti and Asha, 

For this teaches perfectly him who wishes it. 
XLVIL, 1. When the coming Asha shall smite the Drukhs,|| 

When there comes what was announced as delusive : 

Immortality for men and Daevas, 

Then shall Thy profitable laud increase, O Ahura ! § 

2. Tell me, For Thou knowest it, O Ahura ! 

Before that (the man) reaches to the double^ bridge, 
How shall the pure, Mazda, smite the wicked ? 
For that is acknowledged in the world as a good accomplish- 
ment. 

3. To know as the best of teachings are 

(Those) which the wise Ahura teaches with purity. 
Thou, the Holy, knowest (also) the hidden teachings, 
(And) he who resembles Thee, Mazda, through the un- 
derstanding of Vohu-mano. [vol. ii., page 111.] 

4. Whoso makes the mind better, and performs good works, 
He (acts) according to the law** with word and deed, 
Wealth unites itself with him according to ((his)) desire and 

will, 
According to Thy mind is at last everyone. 

7. Drive away wrath, drive away hatred, 

(Ye) who are created for the bringing-up of Vohu-mano, 
For that pure, pleasant thing that the holy man should know, 
So becomes this creation Thy creation, O Mazda. ff 

9. How shall I know whether Ye rule over something, 
Mazda and Asha, whereof a doubt comes to me ? %% 

*That is, the pure man's. |[" Ako-mano stands in direct antithesis to Vohu- 
mano, as 'the bad mind,' or. more literally, 'the naught mind' — -for the Zoroas- 
trians, like Plato, regarded good and evil as identical with reality and unreal- 
ity." — Rawlinson's Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii., page 335 (ed. Scribner, 1873).] 
i Perhaps by " the combatants,'" the good and the bad are meant. |j [" Driikhs— 
'Destruction.'' Rawlinson's Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii., page 337 (ed. Scrib- 
ner, 1873).] I The Gloss refers this to the Pvesurrection. «The bridge (Chinvat) 
may be regarded as " double,'' because it conducts to both heaven and hell. 
**[Cf. Buddha, Dharniapada, 183 (£ 949 below) cf. §821 (page 04 above.)] 
tt This verse is extremely difficult and obscure, jj According to this tradition : ..- 
" "When shall I know when the time arrives when You rule." (An allusion, 
-apparently, to the Resurrection.) 



176 Kant's Ethics, § 881 

The weightiest life is the destruction of Vohu-mano,* 
Let the profitable know how he may attain to purity. 
12. They are the Profitable of the regions, 

Who take to themselves contentment through Yohu-mano, 
With the works of Thy teaching, O pure Mazda, 
These are created as adversaries against the will . . . f 
XL VIII., 1. Protect me so long as the perishable world endures 
as the greatest, 
I who teach holiness to the wickedly brought up, O Mazda, 
From goodness come hither to those displeasing to me, 
May I work their destruction through Vohu-mano. 
2. To this perishableness fetters me 

The bad according to the law, % the deceitful, who is wounded 

by the Holy, 
He does not hold upright perfect wisdom for this world, 
He does not ask, O Mazda, with good mind, 

4. They who with evil mind increase Aeshma, the wrathful, || 
With their tongues, — inactive among the active, 

They desire not after good deeds, but after evil, 

They give themselves to the wicked Daevas through their law. 

5. May he, Mazda, possess sweetness and fatness 
Who possesses the law through good-mindedness. 
Eveiy one is wise through the purity of Armaiti, 
Ail that ((is)) in Thy kingdom, Ahura ! § 

6. I pray from You, Mazda and Asha, let it be said : 

What through the spirit which comes from Your understanding 
Shall be rightly de't ermined, that we may announce it, 
The law, (namely), Yours, O Ahura! 
9. May the active, created for profit, hear the precepts. 

Mayest Thou not give the true words as dominion to the 

wicked, 
For with the law is bound the best reward 
(What) with purity the Avarlike Jamaspa bound. ^] 

*If the translation is correct, these words must signify that the true life will 
only commence at the time of the Resurrection, when this present world is 
annihilated, t The last word is unintelligible. % The tradition explains " the 
bad according to the law,'' to signify the unjust judge. The Gloss adds that such 
will be wounded (£. e. punished) when righteous judgment is passed. || Or, 
Aeshma and Rama, the second word being taken as a noun, signifying the demon 
of envy. [" Aeshemo — ' rapine.' " — -Rawlinson's Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii.; 
page 337 (ed. Scribner, 1873).] § xVccording J o the tradition : " Through perfect 
wisdom every OBe possesses the knowledge of purity ; all these make thy king- 
dom, Ahura ! " r [I omit stanzas 10-12. (vol. ii., page 113).] 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 177 

XLIX., 6. Whoso, O Mazda, spreads abroad the words of the 
Mantbra : 
The friend Zarathustra with pure prayer, 
Let him make his tongue to the way of understanding, 
May he teach me the secrets through Yohu-mano. 

8. With hymns which are spoken on account of fullness* 
Come I to You Mazda, with uplifted hands, 
To You, with the pure prayer of the offering,-}: 

To YOU, WITH THE VIRTUES OP YOHU-MANO. 

11. Thy praise will I announce, O Mazda, with the mouth 
So long as I, O Asha,| can and am able, 
Let the Creator of the world bestow through Yohu-mano v 
What is best for the wish of those working openly. 

V, Gatha Vohu-Khshathra. 

L., (Praise to you, pure G-athas.) 

1. The best kingdom, the unbounded, the portion which must be 
given. 1 1 

To the distributor of gifts (which) he distributes with right- 
eousness, 

The best through deeds, that (give) us now to cultivate. 

3. To You come listening they who rule through Your deeds, 
Ahura and Asha, with the prayers op Yohu-mano, 
Which Thou, Mazda, hast first taught. 

4. Where is the Lord of fullness, where is pardon found ? 

■ Where does one attain to Asha, where is /S'penta-armaiti ? 
Where is Yohu-mano, where are Thy realms, O Mazda? 

5. After all this asks, to support the Cow, from Asha, 

The active, the pure, with deeds, the wise with prayers, 
Who is mighty and holy, and announces to the created the 
right guide, 

6. Who gives better than the good, who grants to him according 

to wish, 
To Ahura-Mazda the kingdom, but him who (arises) from 

the bad as Holy, 
Does not requite (until) the final dissolution of the world..§ 

*That is, perhaps, on account of the fullness of good things which I have 
obtained, t That is, probably, with prayers accompanied with sacrifices and 
offerings. % [See the note to Yasna, xxviii., 5, page 160 above.] ~|j Or, •' which 
was given (at the commencement of the world)." The sense of the whole verse 
appears to be, that dominion in the world belongs properly to him only who 
distributes the good things of the world with justice. § That is, the wicked will 
not be fully punished until the Day of Judgment. 



178 Kant's Ethic*. § 881 

7. Give me, Thou who hast created the Cow and the water, and 

the trees, 
Immortality and fullness, Holiest, Heavenly Mazda, 
Power and strength, instruction through the Best Spirit. 

8. Thy sayings, Mazda, may the man announce for knowledge 
As something hurtful for the wicked, for health (to him) who 

maintains purity, 
For he rejoices the Manthra, who utters it for knowledge. 

9. The wisdom which Thou givest to the warriors through Thy 

red fire, 
Through the metal, that give as a token in both worlds, 
To wound the wicked, to profit the pure. 
13. The law thinks openly of the wicked as well as the good, 
Whose soal trembles on the bridge Chinvat, the notorious, 
Wishing to attain through their deeds and tongue the path of 
purity.* [vol. ii., page 116.] 
21. He is the holy man of wisdom, according to knowledge, words, 
and deeds. 
(To whom) according to the law, holy purity through Vohu- 

mano, the kingdom 
Ahura-Mazda has given, to this pray we for his good blessing.f 
VII. AIEYAMA ISHYO. (YA&NA LIU.), 1. May the desir- 
able obedience come hither, for joy to the men and women of Zara- 
thustra, 2. For joy to Vohu-mano, may he grant the reward to 
be desired according to the law. 3. 1 wish the good purity of the 
pure. Great be Ahura-Mazda ! [vol. ii., page 119.] 

LIV., 6. These Gathas are for our soul both : food and raiment. 
7. May they bring us good reward, much reward, pure reward, 8- 
For the next world, after the separation of the vital powers and 
consciousness. 9. May they to us as strength, as victory, 10. As 
health, as remedy, 11. As advancement, as enlargement, 12. As 
help, as defense, 13. As wise, as very pure. 14. As offering ; may 
they for those who know 15. Come to light, the praiseworthy 
prayers, as Ahura-Mazda has created them, 16. The Most Profit- 
able, Victorious, the Furtherer of the world, 17. For the protec- 
tion of purity in the world, for ruling over purity in the world, 
for those who profit and will profit, 18. And for the whole world 
of purity. Give to every pure one who comes hither with this dis- 
tinguished sheltering prayer, good thoughts, words, and actions. 
[vol. ii., page 120.] [I omit verses 19-24.] 

*The meaning appears to be : The Law remembers the- deeds of men in this 
"world, when they arrive at the Bridge Chinvat, and endeavor to reach Paradise. 

t[I omit stanza 22 (vol. ii., page 11").] 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 179 

LV.,* 1. May hearing here have place, for praise to Ahura- 
Mazda, the Most Profitable,. Pure, Who is desired by us from the 
beginning even to the end. [vol. ii., page 121.] [I omit verses 2-8.] 

LVIL, 1. This profit, this victory give we : namely, the prayer 
which has a good seed. 2. Which is united with purity, united 
with wisdom, 3. Whose seeds are good thoughts, words, and 
works. 4. May this prayer protect against torment from the 
Daevas and the (bad) men. [vol. ii., page 126.] 

10. O Father over the cattle, and over those who belong to the 
Holy One : the pure, and those wishing purity in the world. 11. 
Thou open driver of good ! Whose greatness, goodness, and beauty 
amongst you we desire. 12. May he shelter us, the rich in goods, 
control us with purity, with activity, with liberality, with knowl- 
edge, with gentleness, with the fire of Ahura-Mazda. 13. As you 
created us, O Amesha-.spenta, so support us. 14. Support us ; good 
men, support us : good women, support us, Amesha-spenta, good 
Euler, wise. 15. I know no one save you, ye pure ; therefore sup- 
port us. 16. Thoughts, words, and works, cattle and men, com- 
mit we to #penta-mainyu. [vol. ii., p. 126.] [I omit verses 17-24.] 

LIX., 1. May that man obtain the best, 

Who teaches us to know the right path to profit 

For this world, the bodily as well as for the spiritual 

The manifest away to the worlds where Ahura is enthroned, 

And the offerer, like Thee, a wise, holy one, O Mazda ! 

2. May there now come to this dwelling, contentment, blessing, 
guilelessness, and wisdom of the pure. May there appear for this 
clan : Purity, dominion, profit, majesty, and brightness, 3. Long- 
dominion of the law, the Ahurian. Zarathustrian. 4. Quickly 
may cattle arise out of this clan, 5. Quickly purity, quickly 
the strength of the pure man, 6. Quickly Ahurian Custom. 7. 
May there come hither the good, strong, holy Fravashis of the 
pure, bound with the remedies of purity, according to the breadth 
of the earth, the length of a river, the height of the Sun, with de- 
sire after good things, for withstanding against the foes, for in- 
crease for riches and brightness. 8. May >S'raosha (obedience) in 
this dwelling smite disobedience, peace dissension, liberality avarice, 
wisdom slighting, truthful speech the lie, which hates purity. 16. 
According to wish mayest Thou Ahttra-Mazda, etc. ( Cf Yasna 
viii., 10.) [page 154 above.] 17. That joyful may be our mind, 

*This chapter seems to be an introduction to the following Srosh-Yasht 
[Yasna, IvL] It is worthy of notice that the traditions here expressly translate 
the word Sraoslui by "hearing" (or "obedience"'), thus supplying another 
• sxample of the mode in which abstract ideas and persons are interchanged. 



180 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

happy our souls 18. Indued with brilliant bodies for Paradise, 
19. So may there openly come hither, O Ahura-Mazda, the best 
purity, the fairest purity. 20. May we see Thee, attain to Thee, 
to Thy perfect friendship, [vol. ii., page 128.] 

LXI., 7. Mayest thou burn in this dwelling, ever mayest thou 
burn in this dwelling, mayest thou be in brightness in this dwell- 
ing, mayest thou be in increase in this dwelling: 8. Throughout 
the long time, until the perfect resurrection, the perfect good resur- 
rection included. 9. Give me, O fire, son of Ahura-Mazda, 10 
Swift brightness, swift nourishment, swift blessings of life, 11. 
Greatness in holiness, fluency for the tongue, but for the soul sense 
and understanding, which afterward increases, not diminishes, — 
then manly courage, 12. Activity, sleeplessness the third part of 
the night, easy going, watchfulness, 13. Well-nourished, heavenly 
posterity, which makes a circle, collects itself together, 14. Which 
grows up, is enduring, pure from crime, and manly, 15. Which 
can help me in the house, in the clan, in the confederacy, in the 
region, in the district. 16. Give me, O fire, son of Ahura-Mazda, 
what instructs me now and for all time concerning the best place 
of the pure, the shining, wholly brilliant. 17. May 1 attain good 
reward, good renown, good sanctification, for the soul. [vol. ii.' 
page 130.] [I omit verses 18-30.] 

LXIV., 24. May our water not appertain to him who thinks, 
speaks, or does evil, or to the unbelievers, 25. Not to him who 
torments the friend, torments the companion, torments the neigh- 
bor, torments the relation. 26. May our good, best water, created 
by Mazda, pure, not be helpful to him 27. Who seeks to injure 
our uninjured goods. 28. May our good, best water, created by 
Mazda, pure, not be helpful to him 29. Who seeks to harm our 
unharmed bodies, who is a thief, a robber, a criminal, a murderer 
of a pure man, 30. Who is a wizard, or one who buries the dead, 
a foe, a miser, or a wicked sinner, [vol. ii., page 132.] [I omit 
verses 31-61.] 

LX1X., 2. I lay hold on this God, this Lord we praise : Ahura- 
Mazda, 3. The Creator, the Eejoicer, the Maker of all good 
things. 13. That we may employ fruitful speech, that we as profit- 
able to the regions 14. May emploj 7 profitable speech, that we 
may be profitable, victorious ; be friends of Ahura-Mazda ; may 
have vigorous bodies, 15. As pure men, who think good, speak 
good, do good, 16. That we may attain through Yohu-mano 
(good-mindedness) to rejoice in good things, to obtain them. 

20. For the praise, adoration, satisfaction, and laud of the whole 
world of purity, may hearing find place. 21. iS'raosha. the holy, 



I 881 The Clavis to an Index. 181 

praise we. The great Lord praise we, namely Ahura-Mazda, 22. 
Who is the Highest of purity, the most Helpful of purity. 23. All 
sayings of Zarathustra praise we. All well-done actions praise we, 
as well those already done as those which will yet.be done. 

LXX., 4. Zarathustra the pure, lord of purity, praise we. 5. 
The Fravashi of the pure Zarathustra praise we. 6. The 
Amesha-spentas, the pure, praise we. 7. The good, strong, holy 
Fravashis of the pure, praise we. 8. The earthly and the heavenly, 
9. The highest of the lords praise we. The most helpful of 
the Yazatas, the most worthy, most desirable of the lords of purity, 
the most helpful prayer at the right time, for the pure lords of 
purity, praise we. 10. Ahura-Mazda, the Pure, Lord of purity, 
praise we. 13. All lords of purity praise we. 14. The whole 
Mazdayasuian law praise we. 15. All efficacious prayers praise we. 
16. The whole Manthra-spentas praise we. 17. The whole law, 
which is created against the Daevas, praise we. 18. The col- 
lected long precept praise we. 19. All pure, the Yazatas, heav- 
enly and earthly, praise we. 20. All good, strong, holy Fra- 
vashis of the pure, praise v r e. 21. All creatures, created by 
Mazda, pure, praise we. 22. Which are purely created, purely 
formed, 23. Have pure conduct, pure offering, 24. Which are 
pure before the pure, which are manifest among the jmre. 25. All 
five Gathas, the pure, praise we. 26. The whole Yasna praise we, 
the going forward, going backward, and arriving (of the same). 
27. All the #taota-yasnyas praise we. All words spoken by Mazda 
praise we, 28. Which best smite the wicked thoughts, 29. Which 
best smite the wicked sayings, 30. Which best smite the wicked 
actions, 31. Which mark the wicked thoughts, 32. Which mark 
the wicked sayings, 33. Which mark the wicked actions, 34. 
Which exterminate all wicked thoughts, 35. Which exterminate 
all wicked sayings. 36. Like as the fire, dry, pure, sought out 
wood 37. Destroys, devours and burns up. 38. The strength, 
victoriousness, majesty and might of all these sayings praise we. 
39. All waters, the fountains as well as those flowing down in 
streams, praise we. 40. All trees, the growing, adorned with tops, 
praise we. 41. The whole earth praise we. 42. The whole heaven 
praise we. 43. All Stars, the Moon and Sun, praise we. 44. All 
lights, without beginning, praise we. 45. All cattle, that which 
lives under the water, under the heaven, the birds, the wide-step- 
ping, the beasts with claws, praise we. 46. All the good pure 
creatures, working well for Ahura-Mazda, praise we, 47. Through 
which He created fullness and blessings, 48. Which are to be 
praised and adored on account of the best purity. 



182 Kant's Ethics. § 

60. This pure Zarathustra — (him) let one wish for a friend (and) 
protector, 61. Thee call I pure, as the pure, to distribute blessing, 
as a friend who is better than (every) friend, for that is the best. 
62. For he is a wicked one who is the best for the wicked, 63. 
But he is a pure one to whom the pure is dear. 73. The acting 
and the good-mindedness praise we. The good-mindedness and 
the acting praise we. 93. The souls of the departed praise we, 
which are the Fravashis of the pure. 94. The great Lord praise 
we, namely, Ahura-Mazda. 95. Who is the Highest of purity, 
the Most Helpful of purity. 96. All sayings of Zarathustra praise 
we. All well-done actions praise we. [vol. ii., pages 140, 141.] [I 
omit Yasna lxxi.] 

EXTRACTS FROM THE KHORDAH-AVESTA.* 

I. ASHEM-YOHIL.-j- 1. Purity is the best good. 2. Happiness, 
happiness is to him : 3. Namely, to the best pure in purity, [vol. 
iii., page 3.] [See the Khordah-Avesta, xxxvii., below (vol. iii., 
page 135).] 

II. YATHA AHU YAIRYO.,J 1. As is the will of the Lord, 
so (is He) the Euler out of purity. 2. From Yohu-mano (will one 
receive) gifts for the works (which one does) in the world for 
Mazda. 3. And the kingdom (we give) to Ahura when we afford 
succor to the poor. [vol. iii., page 3.] [Cf. Yasna xix., 27, and 
xxviii., 3 (pages 157, 159 above).] 

*As the Yasna, etc., was to be recited principally by the priests, so the 
Khordah-Avesta was intended for the use of the laity, and all the daily prayers 
are contained in it. Of these prayers the greater part are in the same language 
as the rest of the Avesta — not unfrequently, indeed, consisting of extracts from 
different chapters of the Yasna — but a considerable number, including the 
Patets, or confessional prayers, are written in Parsi, and hence belong, in their 
present shape at least, to a comparatively modern period. In order that the 
reader may perceive at a glance to which language the several prayers, or por- 
tions of prayers, belong, everything written in Parsi js printed in italics [in 
Bk'eck's edition ; but hereinafter, everything written in Parsi is printed in the 
ordinary roman type enclosed within triple parentheses, (((thus))).] — Extract 
from BleecKs introduction, t This well-known prayer, sometimes called also 
Asharvahista in the Avesta, has been translated into Huzvaresh and Sanskrit as 
well as into Gujerati. The two first-named versions agree essentially with that 
in our text; but the Gujerati translation differs somewhat from all the above, 
particularly in the third line, which it renders, "Whoso is an announcer of 
justice, he is also very pure and good/'. It does not seem possible to find such a 
meaning in the original words. ((In line 2 the word usta = " Happiness," " Pros- 
perity,'' " Felicity," or "Hail! ")) % This is the second of the three most cele- 
brated Zarathustrian prayers, and is generally called Ahuna-vairya. Like the 
Ashem-vohu, it has been translated into Huzvaresh, Sanskrit, and Gujerati ; the 
two former translations agreeing with our own and the latter differing from it 
completely. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 18-S" 

VII. QABSET NYAYIS. (((In the name of God. I praise and 
exalt (Thee) the Creator Ormazd, the Brilliant, Majestic, Omni- 
scient, the Perfecter of deeds, the Lord of Lords, the Prince over all 
princes, the Protector, the Creator of the created, the Giver of daily 
food, the Powerful, Good, Strong, Old, Forgiving, Granter of for- 
giveness, Eich in Love, Mighty and Wise, the pure Supporter. 
May Thy right rule be without ceasing. — Ormazd King! Increaser! 
May there attain to great Majesty : the Sun, the immortal, shining, 
with excellent steeds, may he come hither. Of all my sins repent 
I with Patet. For all evil thoughts, words, and works which 1 
have thought, spoken and clone in the world, which I have com- 
mitted, which cleave to my nature, for all sinful thoughts, words, 
works, bodily or mental, earthly or heavenly, I pray, O Lord, for 
forgiveness, and repent of them with the three words.))) [vol. iii., 
page 6.] [I omit the remainder of the prayer.] 

XI. ATAS-BEHEAM^NYAYIS., 1. (((In the name of God, Or- 
mazd, the Euler, the Increaser of great majesty. May the Fire 
Behram increase (the Fire) Adarfra. Of all my sins, etc.))) 

2. Purify me, God, give me strength through Armaiti. 

Holiest, Heavenly Mazda, give me at my prayer in goodness, 
Strong power through Asha, fullness of blessings through 

VOHU-MANO. 

To teach afar for (Thy) joy give me certainty, 
That from the kingdom, O Ahura, which belongs to the bless- 
ings of Yohu-mano. 
Teach, O $peiita-armaiti, the law with purity. 
Zarathustra* gives as a gift the soul from his body. 
(Give to him) the precedence op a good mind, Mazda, 
Purity in deed and word, obedience and rule.f 

XIII. VI,SPA HUMATA., 1. All good thoughts, words, and. 
works, are done with knowledge. 2. All evil thoughts, words, and 
works are not done with knowledge. 3. All good thoughts, words, 
and works lead to Paradise. 4. All evil thoughts, words, and works 
lead to hell. 5. To ail good thoughts, words, and works (belongs) 
Paradise — so (is it) manifest to the pure. — Ashem-vohu. [vol. iii. , 
page 14.] [Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, xxi. (§871, page 
116 above.) Cf. Xen. Mem. IV., i„ 5.] 

XIV. N ANM-£TAISNI.,t 1. (((In the name of God, the^Giver, 
Forgiver, Eich in Love. Praise be to the name of Ormazd, the 
God with the name, " Who always was, always is, and always will 

* [Psalm xci., 14.] t Cf. Yasna, xxxiii., 12-14 [page 165 above]. [I omit 
verses 3-10 (vol. iii., pages 12, 13).] % Nanm-stalsni = " Praise to the 'Name 
(of Ormazd). 



184 Kant's Ethics. §881 

be." /Spenta-mainyus, the Heavenly amongst the Heavenly,* with 
the name, " From whom alone is derived rule." Ormazd is the 
Greatest Euler, Mighty, "Wise, Creator, Supporter. Eefuge, De- 
fender, Completer of good works, Overseer, Pure, Good and Just. 
2. With all strength (bring I) thanks : to the Great among beings, 
who created and destroyed,! and through His own determination 
of time,! strength, wisdom, is higher than the six Amshaspands, 
and the many Yazatas, the shining Paradise Garothman, the cir- 
cumference of Heaven, the shining Sun, the brilliant Moon, the 
numerous Stars, the wind, the Andervai,H the water, the fire, the 
earth, the trees, the cattle, the metals, mankind. 3. Offering and 
praise to that Lord, the Completer of good works, who made men 
greater than all earthly beings, and through the gift (?) of speech 
created them to rule and appoint ibr the creatures, as warriors 
against the Daevas. 4. Praise to the Omniscience of God, who 
hath sent through the holy Zarathustra, with pure Frohar, peace 
for the creatures, the wisdom of the law — the enlightening derived 
from the heavenly understanding, and heard with the ears — wisdom 
and guidance for all beings who are, were, and will be, (and) the 
wisdom of wisdoms, the Manthra-spenta, who effeets freedom from 
hell for the soul at the bridge (Chinvat), and leads it over to that 
Paradise the brilliant, sweet-smelling of the pure. 5. All good do 
I accept at Thy command, O God, and think, speak, and do it. 1 

BELIEVE IN THE PURE LAW, BY EVERY GOOD WORD SEEK I FORGIVE- 
NESS for all sins.§ I keep pure for myself the serviceable work 
and abstinence (from the unprofitable). (I keep) pure the six 
powers: thought, speech, work, memory, mind and understanding. 
According to Thy will am I able to accomplish, O Accomplisher of 
good, Thy honor with good thoughts, good words, good works. 6. 
I enter on the shining way (to Paradise) ; may the fearful terror 
of hell not overcome me ! May I step over the bridge Chinvat, 
may I attain Paradise with much perfume, and all enjoyments, and 
all brightness. 7. Praise to the Overseer, the Lord, who rewards 
those who accomplish good deeds according to (His own) wish, 
purifies at last the obedient, and, (at last) purifies (even) the 
wicked out of hell. — All praise be to the Creator Ormazd, the All- 
wise, Mighty, Eich in might, to the seven Amshaspands, to Ized 
Bahram, the victorious annihilator of foes.))) [vol. iii., pages 14, 15.] 

*Accorning to the Guj. Tr., " Invisible amongst the invisible.' 1 ' The Parsees 
believe that Ahitra-Mazda can make himself invisible when He will, even to 
the Amesha-spentas. f This passage is doubtful. The term " destroyed " must 
refer to the production of Ahriman. i The word rendered " determination of 
time" is very obscure. \\Andervai is the space between heaven and earth. 
g[See Yasna xlvii., 4 (page 175 above .] 



-§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 185' 

XVIL (1) ORMAZD-YASHT. (((In the name of God, Ormazd, 
the Lord of Increasing. May the Creator Ormazd increase in 
great brilliancy ; the Bright, the Majestic, Heavenly of the Heavenly, 
may He the Highest come (to our help). Of all sins I repent, 
etc.))) [vol iii., page 21.] 

6. Then answered Ahura-Mazda : My Name is : The to be 
questioned, O pure Zarathustra; the second : the Gatherer: the 
third : the Spreader abroad ; the fourth : Best Purity ; the fifth : 
All good things created by Mazda which have a pure origin ; the 
sixth: I am the Understanding; the seventh : I am Endowed with 
understanding ; the eighth : I am Wisdom ; the ninth : I am En- 
dowed with Wisdom ; the tenth : I am the Increaser ; the eleventh : 
I am Endowed with Increase ; the twelfth : the Lord ; the thir- 
teenth : the Most Profitable ; the fourteenth : He who is without 
harm ; the fifteenth : the Steadfast ; the sixteenth : the Reckoner 
of service ; the seventeenth : the All-observing ; the eighteenth : 
the Healing ; the nineteenth : that 1 am the Creator ; the twentieth : 
that I bear the Name Mazda. 7. Praise me, Zarathustra, day and 
night with gifts which are brought hither midst prayers. 8. 1 
will come to thee for protection and joy, I who am Ahura-Mazda ; 
there shall come to thee for protection and joy : the good /Sraosha, 
the holy ; there shall come to thee for protection and joy : 
Water, trees, and the Fravashis of the pure. [vol. iii., page 22.] 

12. These Names preserve, (and) utter them day and night. 13. 
I am the Protector, I am the Creator, I am the Nourisher, 1 am the 
Knowing, I am the Holiest Heavenly One. 14. My name is : The 
Healing ; my name is : The Most Healing ; my name is : The 
Priest ; my name is : The Most Priestly ; my name is : Cod (Ahura)- 
my name is : Great Wise One (Mazda) ; 15. My name is : The 
Pure ; my name is : The Purest ; I am called, The Majestic ; I am 
called The Most Majestic ; 16. I am called, The Much-seeing ; I 
am called, The Most Much-seeing; I am called, The Far-seeing; I 
am called, The Most Far-seeing ; 17. I am called, The Watcher •. 
I am called, The Desirer ; I am called, The Creator; I am called 
The Protector ; I am called, The Nourisher ; I am called, The 
Knower ; I am called, The Most Knowing ; 18. I am called, The 
Augmenter ; I am called, Possessing increasing Manthras ; I am 
called, The Ruler at Will ; I am called, The Most Ruling at Will ; 
19. I am called, The Ruling with Name ; I am called, The Most 
Ruling with Name ; I am called, The Not to be Deceived ; I am 
called, The Undeceived ; 20. I am called, The Protecting ; I am 
called, The Tormentor of Torment ; I am called, The Smiting here; 
I am called, The All-smiting; I am called, The All-creating ; 21„ 

13 



186 Kant's Ethic*. % 881 

I am called, The All-Majestic ; I am called. Indued with much 
Majesty ; I am called. The Very Majestic ; I am called, Indued 
with Very Great Majesty ; I am called. The Effecting-profit ; I am 
called, The Working-gain ; 1 am called, The Profitable ; 22. I am 
called, The Strong ; I am called, The Most Profitable ; I am called 
The Pure ; I am called, The Great ; 23. I am called, The Kingly; 
1 am called, The Most Kingly; I am called, The Well-wise; I am 
called, The Well-wisest; I am called, The Par-seeing. 24.. These 
my names — he who in the corporeal world, holy Zarthustra 
maintains and speaks these my names : 25. By day and night,, 
standing or sitting, sitting or standing, girt with the Aiwyaonhana 
(i. e. Kosti), or drawing off the Aiwyaonhana, 26. Going forward 
out of the house, going forward out of the confederacy, going for- 
ward out of the region, coming into a region, 27. Such a man the 
points of the Drukks-souled, proceeding from Aeshma, will not in- 
jure in that day or that night, not the slings, not the arrows, not 
knives, not clubs, the missiles will not penetrate, (and) he be in- 
jured. 28. And on account of accepting (it) the same take upon 
themselves with names to be a support and wall against the invisi- 
ble Drukhs, the Varenian, wicked. 29. Against the striving to 
hurt, greedy of revenge, all slaying, wholly evil Anra-mainyus. 30. 
Like as a thousand men can control one single man. 

31. Who is the victoriously smiting? etc. (Yasna xliii., 16.) 
[page 171 above.] 32. Praise to the kingly majesty, praise to 
Airyana-vaeja, praise to the profit created by Ahura-Mazda, praise 
to the water Daitya, praise to the water Ardvi-sura the pure, praise 
to the whole world of purity. 33. Yatha ahu vairyo (10). Ashem- 
vohu (10). The Ahuna-vairya praise we. Asha-vahista, the fairest 
Amesha-spenta, praise we. Strength, might, power, victorious- 
ness, and strength, praise we. Ahura-Mazda, the Shining, Ma- 
jestic, praise we. [vol. iii., page 24.] 

34. Protect the kinsmen evermore, O Zarathustra, from the hos- 
tile evil-minded. 35. Do not abandon the friend to the stroke, not 
to the enduring of evil, not to the touching of harm. 36. Do not 
wish a gift for the man who, instead of the greatest offering-, offers us 
the least ; of that which is to be offered, complete praise for us, the 
Amesha-spentas.* 37. Here is Vohu-mano, my creature, O Zara- 
thuBtra ; Asha-vahista, my creature, O Zarathustra ; Khshathra- 
vairya, my creature, O Zarathustra ; #penta-armaiti, my creature, 
O Zarathustra ; here are Haurvat and Ameretat, my creatures, O 



® The meaning seems to be, that a man must expect no gifts who, in return 
for the blessings bestowed upon him, endeavors to acquit himself of his duties 
in the easiest and least costly manner. 



§ 881 The Claris to an Index. 187 

.'Zarathustra, which are a reward for the pure who attain to ineor- 
poreality. 38. Know also how it (is), pure Zarathustra : through 
My wisdom, through which was the beginning of the world, so also 
its end shall be. [vol. iii., pages 24, 25.] 

39. A thousand remedies, ten thousand remedies (3). Come to 
my help, O Mazda. — To strength, the well-created, beautiful, and 
the victory created by Mazda, and the smiting which comes from 
above, and $penta-armaiti. 40. O .Spenta-armaiti ! smite their 
torments, surround their understanding, bind their hands, summer 
and winter smite, restrain the hinderers. 41. When, O Mazda, 
will the pure smite the wicked, when the pure the Drukhs, when 
the pure the evil? 42. The understanding of Ahura-Mazda we 
praise, to lay hold of the Manthra-spenta. The understanding of 
Ahura-Mazda we praise, to maintain the Manthra-spenta in re- 
membrance. The tongue of Ahura-Mazda we pi - aise, to be able to 
utter the Manthra-.spenta. This mountain praise we, Ushi-darena, 
bestowing understanding, day and night, with gifts brought 
amidst prayers, [vol. iii., page 25.] [I omit the remainder of this 
Yasht.] 

XVIII. (2)., YASHT OF THE SEVEN AMSHASPAXDS. (((In 
the name of G-od, the Lord Ormazd, the Tncreaser. May the seven 
Amshaspands increase to great brilliancy, may they come. — Of all 
my sins, etc.))) [vol. iii., page 25.] 

6. Ahura-Mazda. the Shining, Majestic, praise we. The 
Amesha-spentas, the good, wise kings praise we. The Amesha- 
spenta Vohu-mano, praise w T e. Peace, the victoriously smiting, 
praise we, which is set above other creatures. The heavenly un- 
derstanding, created by Mazda, praise we. The understanding 
which is heard with the ears, created by Mazda, praise we. 7. 
Asha-vahista, the fairest Amesha-spenta. praise we. The Airyama- 
ishya,* praise we ; the Strong, created by Mazda, praise we. 
$aoka, the good, gifted with far-seeing eyes, created by Mazda, 
pure, we praise. Khshathra-vairya. the Amesha-spenta, praise 
we. Metal praise' we. Charity, which feeds the poor, praise 
we. [vol. iii., page 26.] [I omit the remainder of this Yasht.] 

XIX. (3)., YASHT AKDIBLHIST. 3. I will praise Asha-va- 
hista : if I praise Asha-vahista, then praise I him as the helper of 
the other Amesha-spentas, whom Mazda protects through good 
thoughts, whom Mazda protects through good works, whom 
Mazda protects through good words. 4. To the pure man belongs 
Garo-nemana, none of the wicked can approach to Garo-nemana, to 

* Airyama-ishya is the prayer in Yasna liii., which commences with those 
. '■words, [page 178 above.] 



188 Kanfs Ethics. § 881 

the dwelling pure in joy. manifest, Ahura-Mazda. [vol. iii., page 
28.] [I omit verses 5-17.] 

XXVI. (10) M1HE-YASHT. (((In the name of God, the Lord 
Ormazd, the Increaser. May there increase to great brightness : 
Mihr, who possesses wide pastures ; may the righteous judge come.. 
Of all sins, etc.))) 

(1.*) Khshnaothra for Ahura-Mazda, etc. Praise to Mithra, 
who possesses wide pastures, who lias a thousand ears, ten thousand 
eyes, the Yazata with named name, and Kama-qastra. Khshna- 
othra, etc. 

1. Ahura-Mazda spake to the holy Zarathustra : When I created 
Mithra, who possesses wide pastures, q holy, I created him as 
worthy of honor, as praiseworthy, as I Myself, Ahura-Mazda. 2. 
The destroying defrauder of Mithra slays the whole region : he 
slays as many pure ones as a hundred evil doers. Slay not the 
Mithra, O holy, which thou desirest from the evil, not from the 
good, devoted to his own teaching. For the Mithra is for both, for 
the wicked as well as for the pure.f [vol. iii., page 57.] 

17. Mithra, etc., who lies for no one, not for the lord of the 
house, not for the lord of the clan, not for the lord of the confeder- 
acy, not for the lord of the region. 18. But if one lies to him, be 
it the lord of the house, the lord of the clan, the lord of the con- 
federacy, the lord of the region, then Mithra, the wrathful, offended, 
destroys the dwelling, the clan, the confederacy, the region, and 
the lords of the dwelling, the lords of the clan, the lords of the con- 
federacy, the lords of the region, or the chiefs of the regions. 19. To 
that side comes Mithra, wrathful and offended, on which side is the 
Mithra-liar ; he does not make them sure with heavenly protection. 

22. Mithra, etc., who when he is not lied to, takes men out of 
trouble, takes them away from destruction. 23. Away from trouble, 
away from the troublei^s, bring us, Mithra, thou who art not lied 
to. Thou bringest thereby fear to the own bodies of Mithra-lying 
men ; from their arms thou, O Mithra, who art grim and strong,, 
takest away might, strength from their feet, sight from their eyes r 
hearing from their ears. 24. Never does a well-hurled lance, or a 
flying arrow penetrate his limbs, to whom Mithra comes as protec- 
tion, as increase to his limbs, he who spies with ten thousand (eyes), 
the strong, all-knowing, not to be lied to. For his brightness, etc. 

* [i. e. section 1. — The verses of the Mihr-Yasht are divided into sections.; 
but as the verses are numbered consecutively, I call no further attention to the- 
sections — and this remark applies to the ^rosh-Yasht, Farvardin-Yasht, Din- 
Yasht, and Zamyad-Yasht below.] t That is, contracts are to be observed faith- 
fully, even when they are made with a wicked and godless man. Respecting th& 
Mithra-Druia, see Vendidad iv. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 189 

25. Mitkra, etc , the lord, tke profiting, strong, bestower of profit, 
tke gatkerer, wko receives adoration, the strong, gifted witk tke 
virtues of purity, wkose body is the Mantkra, tke strong-armed 
warrior. 26. Tke smiter of tke skulls of tke Daevas, tke worst for tke 
culpable, (?) tke adversary of tke Mitkra-lying men, tke foe of tke 
Pairikas, wko, if lie is not lied to, affords tke highest strength to 
the region, who if he is not lied to, affords the highest victory to the 
region. 27. Who takes away from a godless region the straightest 
(ways), turns away brigktness, takes away victory, does not pro- 
tect purposely, delivers up tke slayers of ten thousand, ke who 
sees with ten thousand eyes, the strong, all-knowing, not to be 
lied to. For his brightness, etc. [vol. iii., page 60.] 

32. / Hear, O Mitkra, our offering, be content, O Mitkra, witk our 
offering, come to our offering, accept our alms, accept tke offered 
gifts, carry tkem togetker to tke gathering place* (Chinvat), lay 
'tkem down in the place of praise (G-aro-nemana). 33. Give us the 
favors we pray thee for, O Hero, in accordance witk tke given 
prayers : Kingdom, strength, victoriousness, fullness, and sanctifi- 
cation, good fame, and purity of soul, greatness, and knowledge of 
koliness, victory created by Ahtjra, tke blow wkick springs from 
above, from tke best purity, instruction in tke koly word. 

35. Mitkra, etc., tke debt-paying, host- desiring, gifted witk a 
tkousand strengtks, ruling, migkty, all- wise. 36. Wko leads for- 
ward in tke fight, stands in the fight, who, placing himself in the 
fight, breaks tke lines of battle. Tkey figkt at all ends of tke line 
of battle wkick is led to battle ; but ke confounds tke middle of 
tke kostile kosts. 37. To tkem brings ke, tke mighty, punishment 
and fear ; he sweeps away the heads of the Mitkra-lying men, ke 
carries away tke keads of tke Mitkra-lying men. 38. Horrible are 
tke dwellings, tke abodes not blessed with offspring, in wkick dwell 
tke Mitkra-liars, tke wicked wko openly slay tke pure. In a hor- 
rible manner goes the cow, walking on hoofs on the wrong way, 
who has crawled into the narrow passes of the Mitkra-lying men. 
In tkeir chariots stand teams pouring out tears, wkick run down 
into tkeir moutks. [vol. iii., page 61.] 

102. Mitkra, etc., witk skining steeds, sharp lance, long hilt, ar- 
rows gliding-home, f the far-seeing, bold warrior. 103. Whom 
Ahura-Mazda created as ruler and overseer of all living nature, he 
is ruler and overseer of all living nature, he who without sleeping 
protects tkrougk kis watckfulness tke creatures of Ahuba-Mazda, 
wko witkout sleeping guards tkrougk kis watcking tke creatures 
■of Ahura-Mazda. For kis brigktness, etc. [vol. iii., page 68.] 

"^Instead of "to the gathering-place," the word may also he rendered "for joy." 
t That is, attaining their mark. 



190 Kanfs Ethics. § 881 

104. Mithra, etc., whose long arms grasp forward here with 
Mithra -strength : that which is in Eastern India he seizes, and that 
which in the Western he smites, and what is on the Steppes of 
Kanha, and what is at the ends of this earth.* 105. Thou, O 
Mithra, seizing together, far out with the arms. The unrighteous 
destroyed through the just, is gloomy in soul. Thus thinks the 
unrighteous: Mithra, the artless, does not see all these evil 
deeds, all these lies. 106. But I think in my soul : No earthly man 
with a hundred-fold strength thinks so much evil as Mithra with 
heavenly strength thinks good. No earthly man with a hundred- 
fold strength speaks so much evil as Mithra with heavenly strength 
speaks good. No earthly man with a hundred-fold strength does 
so much evil as Mithra with heavenly strength does good. 107. 
With no earthly man is the hundred-fold greater heavenly under- 
standing allied as the heavenly understanding allies itself to the 
heavenly Mithra, the heavenly. No earthly man with a hundred- 
told strength hears with the ears as the heavenly Mithra who hears 
with the ears, possesses a hundred strengths, sees every liar. 
Mightily goes forward Mithra, powerful in rule inarches he onward, 
fair visual power, shining from afar, gives he to the eyes. 

115. Mithra, etc. O Mithra, with many pastures, Lord over the 
dwellings, clans, confederacies, regions, High-priest! 116. Twenty- 
fold is Mithra among friends through firmness, thirty-fold among 
the laboring, forty-fold amongst those who sit on hurdles, f fifty- 
fold amongst the good offerers, sixty-fold among the disciples, 
seventy-fold amongst teachers and disciples, eighty-fold among 
children-in-law and parents-in-law, ninety-fold among brethren. 
117. A hundred-fold among father and son, a thousand-fold among 
the regions, ten-thousand-fold is Mithra with him who holds fast to 
the Mazdayasnian law. then here b} r day arms himself for victory (?) J 
[vol. iii., page 70.] [I omit verses 118-145.] 

^ XNVII. (11) ,S'KOSH-YASHT-HAI)OKHT. (((In the name of 
God, Ormazd, the Euler, Increaser. May there increase in great 
majest}?" : /S'rosh the pure, the swift, whose body is the Manthra, 
whose weapons are terrible, who is gifted with mighty weapons,, 
the ruler of the creatures of Ormazd, may he come. — Of all sins, etc.))) 

* Eastern India is no doubt the country which we call by the same name. 
Western India may perhaps be Babylonia. The Steppes (plains) of Kanha, i. e. 
the Jaxartes, [see note to Khordah-Avesta xxviii., 19 (vol. iii., page 78)] seem to 
be regarded as the boundary toward the Korth, — the Southern boundary is, 
naturally, the sea. t That is, sheep-fold- or cattle-pens. \ These words are ob- 
scure. It is worthy of note that Mithra's connection with the region, i. e.. 
the political district, is placed higher than his relation to families. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 191 

Khshnaothra to Ahura-Mazda, etc. Satisfaction for the holy 
#raosha, the firm, whose body is the Manthra, whose weapons are 
terrible, praise for the Almrian, etc. [vol. iii., page 74.] 

1. ^S'raosha the holy, beautiful, victorious, promoting the world, 
pure, lord of purity, praise we. Good adoration, best adoration, O 
Zarathustra, (be) for the worlds. 2. This holds back the friend of 
the wicked among the wicked, this surrounds completely the eyes 
and understanding, ears, hands, feet of the evil man, as well as the 
evil woman, and their mouth with bands : — the good prayer, the 
unerring, not tormented, the shield for man, a cuirass against the 
Drujas, an averter. 3. #raosha the holy is he who most nourishes 
the poor, he is the victorious, who most slays the Drujas. Also the 
pure man who most utters blessings is, through victory, the most 
victorious, (for) the Manthra-spenta most drives away the in- 
visible Drujas. The Ahuna-vairya [see page 182 above] is the 
most victorious among prayers. The right-spoken speech is the 
most victorious in congregations. The Mazdayasnian law is in all 
disputations, in all good things, in all those which spring from pure 
seed, manifestly the most legal, and so appointed by Zarathustra. 

20. All dwellings protected by $raosha we praise, where >Sraosha, 
beloved as a friend, receives, where the pure man especially thinks 
purity, especially speaks purity, especially does purity, [vol. iii., 
page 76.] [I omit verses 21, 22.] 

XXIX. (13) FAEYAEDIX-YASHT. (((In the name of God, 
the Lord Ormazd, the Increaser. May they increase in great 
brightness, the high Frohars ; may they come. — Of all my 
sins, etc.))) [vol. iii., page 80.] 

Khshnaothra for Ahura-Mazda, etc. Khshnaothra for the Fra- 
vashis of the pure, the strong, storming, the Fravashis of the for- 
mer Custom, the Fravashis of the nearest relations, for praise, etc.. 

1. Ahura-Mazda spake to the holy Zarathustra : I declare thus 
to thee, the might, strength, majesty, help, and joy of the Fravashis 
of the pure, pure, holy (Zarathustra), the mighty, storming, how 
they bring help to me, how they secure assistance to me, the strong 
Fravashis of the pure. 2. Through their brightness and majesty 
I uphold the heaven, O Zarathustra, which shines above and is fair, 
which goes round about this earth. 3. It is likened to a bird which 
stands fast, heavenly-made, having far boundaries, with a body of 
shining ore, shining on the third (of the earth), which Ahura- 
Mazda clothes with a star-sown garment, one made in heavenly 
guise ; in company with him is Mithra, together with Eashnu and 
Armaiti-spenta, whose (heaven's) boundaries can be seen on no 
side. 4. Through their brightness and majesty, O Zarathustra, I 



192 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

maintain Ardvi-sura the Spotless, the full-flowing, healing, averse 
to the Daevas, attached to the law of Ahura, the praiseworthy for 
the corporeal world, the pure for those who promote life, the pure 
for those who advance the cattle, the pure for those who advance 
the kingdom, the pure for the advancers of the region. 9. Through 
their brightness and majesty, O Zarathustra, I support the broad 
earth created by Ahura. great, wide, the mother of the fair abund- 
ance, which bears the whole corporeal world, the living and dead, 
and the high mountains with many pastures, abounding in water. 
10. On which flowing waters hasten, going in many streams, on 
which trees of many kinds spring out of the earth, for the nourish- 
ment of cattle and men, for the nourishment of the Arian 
region, for the nourishment of the cattle that is harnessed on 
the ways, for the protection of the pure men. 17. They 
are an assistance in fierce combats, the wisest Fravashis 
of the pure. The Fravashis of the pure are the strongest, 
O holy ; those of the former law or those of the yet unborn 
men, the forward-stepping, profitable. Then of the others, 
O Zarathustra, the Fravashis of living men are stronger than those 
of the dead. 18. What man treats them well, the Fravashis of the 
pure, while he lives : the ruler of a region, alike in kingdom,* he 
lives long, is mighty, — (just so) every man who treats Mithra 
with wide pastures well, Arstat who furthers the world and in- 
creases the world. 19. Thus I announce to thee the strength, 
might, majesty, protection and joy of the Pravashis of the jmre, O 
pure Zarathustra, the strong, storming ; they come to my help, 
they bring me assistance, the strong Fravishis of the pure. 

20. Ahura-Mazda spake to the holy Zarathustra : If, O holy 
Zarathustra, there come before thee on the ways in this corporeal 
world, fearful terrors, fearful events, if they (come) for the frighten- 
ing of bodies, then shalt thou recite these words, utter these prayers, 
the victorious, O Zarathustra : 21. The good, strong, holy Fra- 
vashis of the pure, I praise, I invoke, I make ((them)) my own, I 
offer to them ; the Fravashis of the dwellings, of the clans, of the 
confederacies, of the regions, the Zarathustrian ; those which are 
amongst those now living, which are amongst the former living, 
which are among those about to live hereafter, of the pure, all 
(Fravashis) of all regions, the friendly, the kindred regions. 23. 
"Which endure much, which are above all strong, high of themselves, 
high on chariots, above all mighty, above all powerful, which are 
strong in blessings, strong in victory, strong in fight. 21. The 
givers of victory to the implorers, the givers of favor to the marks- 
men (?), the givers of health to the working (?), the givers of much 



§ -881 The Clavis to an Index. 193 

brightness to those offering to them, who pray to them, contenting 
them, bringing gifts, the pure. 25. Who here go most thither 
where pure men are, who most keep purity in mind where they are 
most honored, where the pure is contented, where the pure is not 
plagued, [vol. iii., page 83.] 

42. Who if well-invoked are the best of the heavenly, if well- 
invoked, SENT FROM HEAVEN. THEY GO FORWARD TO THE HEIGHT OF 

that heaven, heaping up strength, the well-created, and victory 
'created by Ahura, and the blow that comes from on high, and 
brings profit to the kingdoms, brings the pure favor and the 
praiseworthy fullness, worthy of honor, which springs from the 
best purity, [vol. iii., pages 85, 86."] 

82. The good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure praise we, those 
■of the Aniesha-spentas, the shining, with efficacious eyes, great, 
helpful, mighty, Ahurian, imperishable, pure. 83. Who are all 
:seven of like mind, all seven of like speech, all seven like-acting. 
Like is their mind, like their word, like their actions, like i» their 
Father and Ruler, namely, the Creator Ahura-Mazda. 84. Of 
whom one sees the soul of another: how it thinks on good 
thoughts, how it thinks on good words, how it thinks on good 
works, how it thinks on Graro-nemana. Their ways are shining 
when they fly hither to the offering-gifts, [vol. iii., page 90.] 

88* The Fravashi and the holiness of the holy Zarathustra, the 
pure here, praise we. Who first thought the good, spoke the good, 
performed the good, to the first priest, to the first warrior, to the 
first husbandman, to the first announcer to whom it was first an- 
nounced, to the first vouchsafed, who has first vouchsafed : Cow, 
purity, word, hearing the word, rule, and all good things created 
by Mazda, which have a pure- origin. 91. In whom the whole 
Manthra, the pure Word was announced, the lord and master 
of the worlds, the praiser of purity, the greatest, best, fairest, 
the asker for the law, which is the best for beings. 92. Whom 
the Amesha-spentas desired, who have all like wills with the 
Sun, — for increase of the soul from believing heart, — as lord and 
master for the worlds, as questioner concerning the law which 
is best for beings. 93. At whose birth and growth the waters 
and trees increased, at whose birth and growth the waters and trees 
augmented, at whose birth and growth all the creatures 
created by the Holy One announced to themselves Hail ! * 94. 
(Saying) : " Hail to us ! the priest is born, the holy Zarathustra : 
He will offer for us with gifts. — Zarathustra is provided with 
Baresma spread abroad : hereafter will the Mazdayasnian law 

* Or, happiness. 



194 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

spread itself abroad over the seven Kareshvares. 95. Here will in 
future Mithra, who possesses broad pastures, bring forth every- 
thing which is chiefest for the regions, and rejoice those* who 
unite themselves. Here will in future the Navel of the Waters, 
the strong, promote all that is chiefest for the regions, and those 
who keep themselves allied.' - — The holiness and the Fravashi of 
Maidhyo-mao, the son of Arasta, praise we, who first heard from 
Zarathustra the Manthra and his teaching, [vol. iii.. pages 91, 92.] 
■ 145. All the good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise 
we, from Gayo-marathan to the victorious >S'aoshyan.s. May the 
Fravashis of the pure soon desire lor us here, may they come to 
us for protection. 146. They support us, who are in misfortune, 
with provident help, protected by Ahura-Mazda, and by the holy, 
strong #raosha, and by the Manthra-spenta, the wise, which is 
the greatest adversary of the Daevas amongst the adversaries of 
the Daevas, a friend of Ahura-Mazda, which Zarathustra praised 
as like himself for the corporeal world. 147. Rejoice yourselves 
here below, ye blessings : Waters, Trees, and the Fravashis of the 
pure ! Be contented, accepting here in this house. Here are the 
Athravas of the regions, honored with good, with purity. Lift up 
your hands for our protection, ye Strong; at your offering, ye 
most Profitable. 148. The Fravashis of all pure men and women 
praise we here, whose souls are worthy-of- offering, (?) whose Fra- 
vashis are mighty. The Fravashis of all pure men and women 
praise we here, from whom Ahura-Mazda announced to us good 
in offering. Of all these have we heard, Zarathustra is the first 
and best lord as to what concerns the Ahurian faith. 149. We 
praise the lord, the law, the consciousness, the soul, and the 
Fravashi of the pure men and women here amongst the Paoiryo- 
tkaeshasf who first heard the precepts, who have done battle for 
purity. We praise the lord, the law, the consciousness, the souls 
and the Fravashis of the pure men and women here amongst the 
NabanazdistasJ who have warred for purity, [vol. iii., page 102.] 
153. This earth praise we. That heaven praise we. Those 
good things praise we which stand between (both), the praise- 
worthy, worthy of adoration, worthy of offering, for the pure man. 
154. The sovds of the goers a-foot and of the riders praise we. 
The souls of the pure praise we. The souls of the pure men and 
women born anywhere praise we, who (possess) very good law, 

* That is, the regions. This is an exhortation to the various Mazdaya.snian 
tribes to dwell harmoniously together, f Probably, " those of the former faith," 
or "the Patriarchs." Cf. Weber s Ind. Stud, iii., 448. % ((Professor Spiegel 
-elsewhere translates this word " nearest relations.")), 



§ 881 The Olavis to cut, Index. 195 

(who) war, or shall war, or have warred. 155. The lord, the law, 
the consciousness, the soul, the Fravashi of the pure men and 
women here, — of the warring, of those who will war, or have 
warred, praise we. 156. The Fravashis of the pure Fravashis, the 
strong, storming-up, the hold, victorious, of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas, 
of the Nabanazclistas, shall come hither contented to this dwelling, 
go about in this dwelling. 157. Contented may they, blessing, 
wish hither in this dwelling Ashi-vanuhi, the steadfast; may they 
go away contented from this dwelling, may they take away with' 
them praise and adoration for the Creator Ahura-Mazda and the 
Amesha-spentas. May they never go away from this dwelling- 
weeping over any one of us Mazdayasnians. Offering, praise, etc. 

XXXII. (16) LLN-YASHT. (((In the name of Goo, Ormazd 
the Lord, the Increaser. May the good Mazdayasnian law increase 
in great majesty, may it come. — Of all sins, etc.))) Satisfaction to 
Ahura-Mazda. Ashem-Vohu. — I confess (myself), etc. Satisfac- 
tion to the rightest Wisdom created by Mazdas pure, the good 
Mazdaya-snian Law for praise, adoration, satisfaction, and laud. — 
Yatha ahu vairyo. [vol. iii., page 116.] 

1. The rightest Wisdom created by Mazda, pure, praise we; (the 
good Mazdayasnian law praise we) ; the good provision for the 
way,* the swift hastening, very pardoning, gift bringing, pure, 
virtuous, renowned, swift working, soon working, averting of itself, 
pure of itself, the good Mazdayasnian Law. 2. To which Zarathus- 
tra offered (saying), " Lift up thyself from the throne, come forth 
from (thy ) dwelling Rightest Wisdom, created by Mazda, pure. If 
thou art before, then wait for me ; if thou art behind, then come 
to me. 3. Then shall there be peace, that the ways may be pro- 
tected of themselves, the mountains to be visited of thetnselves, 
the woods to be run through of themselves, the flowing waters easy 
to step over on account of this protection ; for announcing the 
speech, the further to be thought of. 4. For Its brightness, for Its 
majesty, will I praise It with audible praise, the Rightest Wisdom 
created by Mazda, pure, with offerings. We praise the Rightest 
Wisdom created by Mazda, pure. With Haoma. etc. [vol. iii., 
pages 116, 117.] [I omit verses 5-20.] 

XXXV. (19) ZAMYAD-YASHT., 9. The strong Kingly Majesty 
created by Mazda, praise we, the much-obtaining, working on 
high, salutary, shining, possessing strength, which is placed over 
other creatures, 10. Which belongs to Ahura-Mazda. Ahura- 

* The Mazdayasnian Law is called '-the good provision for the way " {hu~ 
path-ma inyo) because it is most fitted to strengthen men on their way to 
Paradise. [Cf. Buddha, Dharmapada, 235 (£949 below.)] 



196 Kant's Ethics. § 881 

Mazda created the creatures very good, very fair, very high, very 
furthering, very lofty. 11. That they might make the world pro- 
gressive, not growing old, not dying, not becoming corrupt and 
stinking, but ever-living, ever-profiting, — a kingdom as one wishes 
it ; that the dead may arise, and there may come Immortality for 
the living, which furthers the world at will. 12. The worlds which 
teach purity will be immortal, the Drukhs will disappear at the 
time. As soon as it comes to the pure to slay him and his hun- 
dred-fold seed, then is it (ripe) for dying and fleeing away. Yatha 
ahu vairyo. 13. For its brightness, etc. [vol. iii., page 126.] 

14. The strong Kingly Majesty, etc. 15. Which belongs to the 
Amesha-spentas, the shining, having efficacious e} r es, great, helpful, 
strong, Ahurian, — who are imperishable and pure. 16. Which 
are all seven of like mind, like speech, all seven doing alike, like is 
their mind, like their word, like is their action, like their Father 
and Ruler, namely, the Creator Ahttra-Mazda. 17. Of whom one 
sees the soul of the other, how it thinks on good thoughts, how it 
thinks on good words, how it thinks on good deeds, thinking on 
Garo nemana. Their ways are shining when they come hither to 
the offering-gifts. 18. Which are there the creators and the de- 
stroyers of the creatures of Ahura-Mazda, their creators and over- 
seers, their protectors and rulers. 19. They it is who further the 
world at will so that it does not grow old and die, does not become 
corrupt and stinking, but ever-living, ever-profiting, a kingdom as 
one wishes it, that the dead may arise, and Immortality for the 
living may come, which gives according to wish furtherance for the 
world. 20. The worlds which teach purity will be immortal, the 
Drukhs will disappear at the time. So soon as it comes to the pure 
to slay him and his hundred-fold seed, then is it (ripe) for dying 
and fleeing away. Yatha ahu vairyo. For its brightness, etc. 

30. The strong Kingly Majesty, etc. 31. Which united itself 
with Yima, the shining, possessing a good congregation, for a long 
time when he ruled over the seven-portioned earth, over men and 
Daevas, over sorcerers and Pairikas, over #atkras, Kaoyas, and 
Karapanas. 32. He took away from the Daevas both blessings 
and profits, both fatness and herds, both food and praise, in whose 
rule were poured out for the body imperishable foods, immortal 
were men and beasts, the water and trees not dried up. 33. In 
his rule was no cold, no heat, no old age, no death, no envy created 
by the Daevas, on account of the absence of the Lie, formerly be- 
fore he (himself) untrue, began to love lying speech. 34. Then 
when he, untrue, began to love lying speech, then flew away vis- 
ibly from him the Majesty, with the body of a bird. When the 



§ SSL The Clavis to an Index. 197 

ruler Yinia, the shining, with good congregation, no longer saw the 
Majesty, then Yima displeased, staggered away to evil thoughts, 
he fell affrighted down on the earth, [vol. iii., page 128.] 

78. The strong Kingly Majesty, etc. 79. Which attached itself 
to the pure Zarathustra for thinking the law, speaking the law, 
fulfilling the law, because he was of the whole corporeal world, in 
purity the purest ; in rule the best ruling ; in brightness the most 
shining ; in majesty the most majestic ; in victory the most victori- 
ous. 80. Visibly flew before him the Daevas, visibly furthered he 
the sciences, surely then hunted these the Jainis away from men, 
then they did violence to them tearful, weeping, to the Daevas. 

83. The strong Kingty Majesty. 84. Which attached itself to 
Kavi Vista$pa for thinking the law, speaking the law, for fulfilling 
the law, when he praised this law, di'iving away the evil-minded, 
the Daevas, the impure. 85. Who with the much-penetrating 
weapon of purity made a broad way, who with the much -penetrat- 
ing weapon of purity announced a broad way, who threw himself 
beneath as arm and protection of this Ahurian, Mazdayasnian law t 

91. The strong, Kingly Majesty, etc. 92. When Astvat-ereto* 
uplifts himself from the water Kansuya, a messenger of Ahura- 
Mazda, son of Vispa-taurvi, who purifies the victorious wisdom. 
Which the strong Thraetaono bore (possessed) when Azhis-dahaka 
was slain. 93. Which the Turanian Franrace bore when the 
wicked was slain, the Cow was slain, — which Kava Husrava bore 
when the Turanian Franrace was slain, — which Kava Vistaspa bore 
when he set piirity before the wicked hosts, drove these away to 
the Druja out of the worlds of purity. This (Astvat-ereto) will see 
with the eyes of understanding, he will view all creatures, the 
images of the wicked seed. . He will see the whole corporeal 
world with the eyes of fullness, beholding he will make the 
whole corporeal world immortal'. 95. The companions of 
this A-stvat-ereto go forward victorious, thinking good, speak- 
ing good, perfecting good deeds, attached to the good 
law, speaking no lie. They have their own tongue, before 
them Aeshma, with terrible weapon, with evil brightness, 
bows himself. He (Astvat-ereto) will smite the very wicked 
Drukhs, which proceeds from wicked seed out of darkness. 96. 
Vohu-mano will smite Ako-mano, the truth smites the lie. Haur- 
vatat, and Ameretat subdue hunger and thirst ; the ev ; l-doer Anra- 
mainyu bows himself robbed of the rule. Yatha ahu vairyo. [I 
omit the remainder of this verse.] [vol. iii. page 134.] 

* The future savior. 



193 Kanfs Ethics. §881 

XXX VII. (21) FRAGMENT., 1. Zarathustra asked Ahura- 
Mazda : Ahura-Mazda, Heavenly, Holiest, Creator of the cor- 
poreal world, Pure ! Wherein alone (is contained) Thy word, 
which expresses all good, all that springs from purity ? 2. Him 
answered Ahura-Mazda: The prayer Ashem, [see page 182 above] 
O Zarathustra. 3. Whoso utters the prayer Ashem with believing 
mind, from the memory, he praises Me, Ahura-Mazda ; he praises 
the water, he praises the earth, he praises the Cow, he 
praises the trees, he praises all good things created by Mazda, 
which have a pure origin. 4. For this speech, the right spoken, O 
Zarathustra, when it is spoken, (reaches to) the prayer Ahuna- 
vairya, the out-spoken, one furthers (?-) strength and victorious- 
ness for the pure soul and the law. 5. For it is worth, holy 
Zarathustra, the mere prayer Ashem, as a Khshnaothra of the pure, 
a hundred sleep-(prayers), a thousand flesh meals, ten thousand 
head of small cattle, all that is come from bodies to incorporeality. 

6. What is that prayer Ashem- vohu which in greatness, goodness, 
and beauty is worth as much as ten other prayers, Ashem-vohu? 
7. Him answered Ahura-Mazda : That, O pure Zarathustra, which 
a man eating prays with purit}^ for Haurvat and Ameretat, prais- 
ing good thoughts, words, and works, putting away all evil thoughts, 
words, and works. 

8. Which is that one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, 
goodness, and beauty is worth a hundred other prayers Ashem- 
vohu? 9. Him answered Ahura-Mazda : That, O pure Zarathus- 
tra, which a man after having eaten of the prepared Haoma, prays 
with purity, praising good thoughts, words, and works ; putting 
away evil thoughts, words and works. 

10. Which is the one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, 
goodness, and beauty, is worth a thousand other prayers Ashem- 
vohu? 11. Him answered AhUra-Mazd a : That one, O pure Zara- 
thustra, which a man stretched out for sleep, speaks waking with 
purity, praising the good thoughts, words and works ; removing 
evil thoughts, words, and works. 

12. Which is the one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, 
goodness, and beauty, is worth ten thousand other prayers Ashem- 
vohu ? 13. Him answered Ahura-Mazda : That one, O pure Zara- 
thustra, which a man waking from sleep, prays with purity, lifting 
himself up, praising good thoughts, words, and works ; putting 
away evil thoughts, words, and works. 

14. Which is the one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, 
goodness, and beauty, is worth as much as the whole Karashvare 
Qaniratha, with cattle, with chariots, with men? 15. Him answered 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 199 

Ahura-Mazda : That one, O pure Zarathustra, which a man at the 
latter end of his life prays with purity, praising all good thoughts, 
words, and works ; putting away all evil thoughts, words, and 
works. 

16. Which is the one pra} T er Aslieni-vohu, which in greatness, 
goodness, and beauty, is worth all that is between heaven and 
earth, and this earth, those Lights, and all good things created by 
Mazda which have a pure origin? 17. Him answered Ahura- 
Mazda : That one, O pure Zarathustra, when one renounces all 
evil thoughts, words, and works, [vol iii., pages 135, 136.] 

XXXVIII. (22) FRAGMENT., 1. Zarathustra asked Ahura- 
Mazda : Ahura-Mazda, Heavenly, Holiest, Creator of the cor- 
poreal world, Pure ! When a pure man dies, where does his soul 
dwell during this night ? 2. Then answered Ahura-Mazda : 
Near its head it sits itself down, reciting the Gatha Ustavaiti, 
praying happiness for itself: -' Happiness be to the man who con- 
duces to the happiness of each. May Ahura-Mazda create, ruling- 
after his wish." On this night the soul sees as much joyfulness as 
the whole living world possesses, [see page 168, above.] 

5. Where does his soul stay throughout the third night? 6. 
Then answered Ahura-Mazda : Near its head it sits itself, etc 
(as in verse 2). Also in this night this soul sees as much joyful- 
ness as the whole living world (possesses"). 7. When the lapse of 
the third night turns itself to light, then the soul of the pure man 
goes forward, recollecting itself at the perfume of plants. A wind 
blows to meet it from the mid-day region, from the mid-day regions, 
a sweet-scented one, more sweet-scented than the other winds. 8. 
Then it goes forward, the soul of the pure man, receiving the wind 
in the nose (saying) : Whence blows this wind, the sweetest-scented 
which I ever have smelt with the nose ? 9. In that wind (?) there 
comes to meet him his own law* in the figure of a maiden, one 
beautiful, shining, with shining arms ; one powerful, well-grown, 
slender, with large breasts, praisworthy body ; one noble, with 
brilliant face, one of fifteen years, as fair in her growth as the fair- 
est creatures. 10. Then to her (the maiden) speaks the soul of the 
pure man, asking : What maiden art thou whom I have seen here 
as the fairest of maidens in body? 11. Then replies to him his own 
law: I am, O youth, thy good thoughts, words, and works, thy 
good law, the own law of thine own body. Which would be in 
reference to thee (like) in greatness, goodness, and beauty, sweet- 
smelling, victorious, harmless, as thou appearest to me. 12. Thou 
art like me, O well-speaking, well-thinking, well-acting youth, de- 

55 That is. the rule of life to which he has conformed. 



200 Kant's Ethics. § 881'. 

voted to the good law, so in greatness, goodness, and beauty as 1 
appear to thee. 13. If thou hast seen one there practice witch- 
craft, practice unlawfulness and bribery, fell trees, then thou didst 
set thyself down whilst thou recitedst the Gathas, offeredst to the 
good waters and to the fire of Ahura-Mazda, whilst thou didst 
seek to satisfy the pure man who came near and from far. 14 
Thou hast (made) the pleasant 'yet more pleasant to me, the fair 
yet fairer, the desirable yet more desirable, that sitting" in a high 
place, sitting in a yet higher place, in these (Paradises) Humata, 
Hukta, Hvarsta. Afterward men praise me, and ask Ahura- 
Mazda, praised long ago. 

15. The soid of the pure man goes the first step and arrives in 
(the Paradise) Humata ; the soul of the pure man takes the second 
step and arrives at (the Paradise) Hukhta ; it goes the third step 
and arrives at (the Paradise) Hvarsta ; the soul of the pure man 
takes the fourth step and arrives at the Eternal Lights. 16. To it 
speaks a pure one deceased before, asking it: How art thou, O 
pure deceased, come away from the fleshly dwellings, from the 
earthly possessions (?), from the corporeal world, hither, to the in- 
visible, from the perishable world hither to the imperishable, has it 
happened to thee — to whom (be) Hail ! — long ? 17. Then speaks 
Ahura-Mazda : Ask not him whom thou askest, (for) he is come 
on the fearful, terrible, trembling way, the separation of body and 
soul. 18. Bring him hither of the food, of the full fatness, that is the 
food for a youth who thinks, speaks, and does good, who is devoted 
to the good law after death, that is the food for the woman who 
especially thinks good, speaks good, does good, the following, obedi- 
ent, pure, after death. 

19. Zarathustra asked Ahura-Mazda : Ahura-Mazda, Heavenly, 
Holiest, Creator of the corporeal world, Pure ! when a wicked one 
dies where does the soul dwell throughout this night ? 20. Then 
answered Ahura-Mazda : There, O pure Zarathustra, near the 
head it runs about whilst it utters the prayer Ke manm, etc. 
(Yasna xlv.,) [page 172 above]. " Which land shall I praise, 
whither shall I go praying, O Ahura-Mazda? " In this night the 
soul sees as much displeasing as the whole living world. 

23. Where does this soul keep itself the third night ? 24. 
Throughout the third night it runs, etc. (as in verse 20). 25. When 
Jie lapse of the third night approaches toward light, O pure Zara- 
thustra, then goes the soul of the wicked man to the impure place, 
recollecting itself continually by the stench. To it comes a wind 
blowing from the North region, from the North Eegion, an 
evil-smelling one, more evil-smelling than other winds. 26. When 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 201 

the soul of the wicked man receives this wind into the nose it goes 
(saying) Whence comes this wind which I smell with the nose as 
the most evil-smelling wind ? 33. The fourth step takes the soul 
of the wicked man and arrives at the darknesses without beginning. 
34. To it speaks a formerly deceased wicked one, asking it : How, 
O deceased wicked one, art thou come away from the Drukhs, from 
the fleshly abode, from the earthly possessions, from the corporeal 
world to the spiritual, from the perishable world to the imperish- 
able, how long — woe to thee ! — was it ? 35. Then speaks Anra- 
mainyu : Ask it nothing, it whom thou askest which has wandered 
on the fearful, terrible, trembling way, the separation of body and 
soul. 36. Bring hither food, poison, and mixed with poison, for 
that is the food for a youth who thinks, speaks, and does evil, be- 
longs to the wicked law, after his death. This is the food for a 
harlot who most thinks, speaks, and does evil, is indocile and dis- 
obedient, the wicked, after her death. 

38. The understanding of Ahura- Mazda praise we, to inculcate 
the Manthra-spenta ; the understanding of Ahura-Mazda praise 
we, to maintain the Manthra-spenta ; the tongue of Ahura-Mazda 
praise we, to be able to utter the Manthra-spenta ; the mountain, 
Ushi-darena, which bestows understanding, praise we, by day and 
by night, with gifts offered amidst prayers, [vol. iii., pp. 136-139.] 
"XLI. AFKIGAN GAHANBAB , 3. Offer, ye Mazdayasnians, 
at this time Myazda, to Maidhyo-zaremaya : the young of a cow, a 
sound one, milk-giving, if it can be done. 4. But if it cannot, then 
give so much Hura, and honor this on account of $raosha (saying): 
O wisest, most truth-speaking, purest in purity, mightiest in rule, 
most sinless (?), most far-rejoicing, most merciful, most supporting 
the poor, most learned in purity, bringing the treasures which are 
bound with women, — if this can be done. 5. If not, then shall 
they bring well-cleaved, selected wood in loads, or more than this, 
into the house of the lord, if it can be done. But if not, then they 
shall bring into the house of the lord selected, well-split wood, as 
much as reaches to the ears, as much as goes on the arms (?), as 
much as they can carry in the hands, — if they can. 6. But if they 
cannot, then shall they impart the kingdom to the best Buler, to 
Ahura-Mazda (saying): "Let the kingdom belong to the '^best 
Buler. wherefore we give it to Him, impart, offer ((it)) to Ahura- 
Mazda, to Asha-vahista." Then is the Myazda given to him which 
satisfies him at the right time. [1 omit verses 7-19.]* 

* [Cf. Hosea vi., 6 : " For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice : and the knowl- 
edge of God more than holocausts." — (Douay version.) Cf. Deuteronomy xxvi., 
2 (page 93 above).] [In a note (vol. iii., page 140) there is a reference to the 

14 



202 Kant's Ethic*. § 881 

XL1V. SIEOZAH, II., 1. Ormazd. Ahura-Mazda, the Shining, 
Majestic, praise we. The Aruesha-spentas, the good rulers, the 
wise, praise we. 8. Dai-pa-Adar. The Creator Ahura-Mazda, the 
Shining, Majestic, praise we. The Amesha-spentas, the good kings, 
the wise, praise we. 15. Dai-pa-Mihr. The Creator Ahura-Mazda, 
the Shining, Majestic, praise we. The Aruesha-spentas, the good 
kings, the wise, praise we. 23. Dai-pa-din. The Creator Ahura- 
Mazda, the Shining, Majestic, praise we. The Amesha-spentas,. 
the good kings, the wise, praise we. 24. Din. The Eightest Wis- 
dom created by Mazda, pure, praise we. The good Mazdayasnian 
law praise we. 29. Manserspant. The Manthra-spenta, with much 
brightness, praise we. The law given against the Daevas praise 
we. The Zarathustrian law praise we. The long-teaching praise 
we. The good Mazdayasnian law praise we. The maintaining in 
heart the Manthra-spenta praise we. The keeping the Mazdayas- 
nian law in mind praise we. The knowledge which concerns the 
Manthra-spenta praise we. The Heavenly Understanding, created 
toy Mazda, praise we. The Understanding gifted with ears, created 
by Mazda, praise we. [vol. iii., pages 148-152.] [I omit verse 30.] 

XLY. PATET ADEEBAT* Yatha ahu vairyo (5). (((I re- 
pent of all sins. All wicked thoughts, words, and works which I 
have meditated in the world, — thoughts, words, and works, cor- 
poreal, spiritual, earthly, and heavenly, I repent of, in your pres- 
ence, ye believers. O Lord, pardon through the three words. f))) 

Yatha ahu vairyo (5). Ashem-vohu (3). I confess myself a 
Mazdayasnian, a Zarathustrian, an opponent of the Daevas, de- 
voted to belief in Ahura, for praise, adoration, satisfaction, and 
laud. To >Sraosha the holy, strong, whose body is the Manthra, 
with strong weapons, Ahurian, — Khshnaothra, for praise, adora- 
tion, satisfaction, and laud. As it is the will of God, let the Zaota 
say to me, thus announces the Lord, the Pure out of Holiness. Let 
the wise speak: (Yatha ahu vairyo). [vol. iii., page 153.] 

1. (((I praise all good thoughts, words, and works through 
thought, word, and deed. I curse all evil thoughts, words, and 

note to Yispered, i., 2-7 (vol. ii., page 7), where it is stated that " the Gahanbars, 
or great annual festivals, are described in the Sad-der Bundehesh, which says 
that God created the world in the space of a year, and hence men ought to keep 
gix festivals yearly, and bestow alms to the poor. The festivals are as follows: 
1. Maidhyo-zaremaya, in commemoration of the creation of heaven, in the month 
Ardibehist," etc.] [In a note here (vol. iii., page 141) it is said that " the foregoing- 
verses appear to refer to the reward which was to be given to the priest on the 
occasions of the Gahanbars."] 

* The Patets are formularies of confession. They are written in Parni with 
occasional passages inserted in Zend, t That is, Thoughts, words, and works. 



.§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 203 

works away from thought, word, and deed. I lay hold on all 
good thoughts, words, and works, with thoughts, words, and works, 
i. e. I perform good actions. I dismiss all evil thoughts, words, and 
works, from thoughts, words, and works, i. e. 1 commit no sins.*))) 

3. (((I praise the best purity, I hunt away the Devs, I am thank- 
ful for the good of the Creator Ormazd, with the opposition and 
unrighteousness which come from Gana-mainyo, am I contentedf 

and agreed in hope of the resurrection. The Zarathustrian law 
created by Ormazd, uprightness and righteousness, the actions of 
the Paoiryo-tkaeshas I take as a plummet. For the sake of this 
way! I repent of all sins.))) [vol. iii., pages 153, 154.] 

4. (((I repent of the sins which can lay hold of the character of 
men, or which have laid hold of my character,|| small and great (?), 
which are committed amongst men, the three *S'raosho-charananm 
ganah§ the meanest sin, to a thousand times a thousand Marger- 
zan,^] as much as is (and) can be, yet more than this, namely : all 
evil thoughts, words and works which (I have committed) for the 
sake of others, or others for my sake, or if the hard (?) sin has 
seized the character of an evil doer on my account, — such sins, 
thoughts, words, and works, corporeal, mental, earthly, heavenly, 
I repent of with the three words: pardon, O Lord, I repent of 
the sins with Patet.))) [vol. iii., page 154.] 

6. (((The sins against father, mother, sister, brother, wife, child, 
against spouses, against the superiors, against my own relations, 
against those living with me, against those who possess ecpial 
property, against the neighbors, against the inhabitants of the same 
town, against servants, every unrighteousness through which I 
have become amongst sinners; of these sins repent I with thoughts, 
words, and works, corporeal as spiritual, earthly as heavenly, with 
the three words: Pardon, O Lord, I repent of sins.))) 

8. (((That which was the wish of Ormazd the Creator, and I 
ought to have thought and have noi thought, what I ought to have 
spoken and have not spoken, what I ought to have done and have 
not done ; of these sins repent I with thoughts, words, and works, 
corporeal as well as spiritual, earthly as well as heavenly, with the 
three words : Pardon, O Lord, I repent of sin. 9. That which 

* The words " i. e. I perform good actions," and •■ i. e. I commit no sins," 
may also be rendered, " that I may perform good actions," and " that I may 
commit no sin/' Cf.Ya.sna xii. [page 155 above] with verses 1 and 2 t See 
note to verse 22. J That is, if I have deviated from the right way. || The Guj. 
Tr. has "sins from my birth/' etc., which would signify hereditary sins. 
\ That is, sins which are to be punished with three strokes of the Sraosho-charana. 

"ff " Margerzan " signifies "sins worthy of death:'' but these, however, can 

••always be atoned for in other ways. 



204 Kant's Elides. § 881 

was the wish of Ahriman, and I ought not to have thought and yet. 
have thought, what I ought not to have spoken and yet have 
spoken, what I ought not to have done and yet have done ; of these 
sins repent I with thoughts, words, and works, corporeal as well as 
spiritual, earthly as well as heavenly, with the three words : Par- 
don, O Lord, I repent of sin. 10. Of all and every kind of sin, of 
all kinds of crimes worthy of death, of all kinds of deeds not yet 
atoned for, of all kinds of repeated sins, all sins which are upon 
sins,* which I have committed against Ormazd, men, and the kinds 
of men, I repent.))) [vol. iii., page 156.] 

19. (((Of pride, haughtiness, covetousness, slandering the dead,, 
anger, envy, the evil eye, shamelessness, looking at with evil in- 
tent, looking at with evil concupiscence,f stiffneckedness, discon- 
tent with the godly arrangements,'! selfwilledness. sloth, despising 
others, mixing in strange matters, unbelief, opposing the Divine 
powers, 1 1 false witness, false judgment, idol-worship, running without 
Kosti, running naked, running with one shoe, the breaking of the 
low (midday) prayer, the omission of the (midday) prayer, theft, 
robbery, whoredom, witchcraft, worshiping with sorcerers, unchas- 
tity, unchastity with boys, allowing unchastity with myself, tearing 
the hair,§ as well as all other kinds of sin which are enumerated in 
this Patet, or not enumerated, which I am aware of, or not aware 
of, which are appointed or not appointed, which I should have 
bewailed with obedience before the Lord and the Destur of the 
law, and have not bewailed, — of these sins repent I with thoughts 5 _ 
words, and works, corporeal as spiritual, earthly as heavenly. O 
Lord, pardon, I repent with the three words, with Patet.))) 

21. (((I remain standing fast in the statutes of the law which 
Ormazd gave to Zarathustra, Zarathustra to Gustasp, that in the 
family (of these two) then came to Ader-bat, son of Mahrespand 
who (again) made it right and purified it. I desire much after 
purity from love to my soul. As long as the life of my vital powers 
endures will I stand fast in good thoughts in my soul, in good 
words in my speech, in good deeds in my actions ; I remain stand- 
ing in the good Mazdaya.snian law. 22. With all good deeds am I 
in agreement, with all sins am I not in agreement, for the good am 
I thankful, with iniquity am I contented.^ With the punishment 

*That is, which are greater than other sins. tThat is, coveting the wife or 
property of another, i Or murmuring over one's own condition as compared! 
with that of others. || This sin, in the original A.smoi, consists in speaking evil 
of Ormazd to his Genii, creating strife, and designedly perverting the meaning; 
of the Avesta. \ That is, on the occasion of the loss of a relative. Excessive 
lamentation is prohibited in the Mazdaya.snian religion. Cf. Vendidad iii., 36- 7> 
•,[ Because suffering is necessary in the order of the world, in order that finallyr 
the resurrection may take place. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. . 205 

at the bridge, with the bonds and tormentings and chastisements 
■of the mighty of the law, with the punishment of the three nights* 
(after) the fifty-seven years am I contented and satisfied. 23. This 
JPatet have I made in my soul from great hope of the pure deed,f 
from vehement fear of hell, from love for jjurity of soul. The good 
works which I have hitherto done, which I shall do hereafter (are 
done) for the continual subsistence of good works, for the passing 
by of sins, for the purification of the soul. If anything still re- 
mains over, so that my sins are not yet atoned, then am I contented 
and agreeing with the punishment of the three nights for it.))) 
[vol. iii., page 158.] [I omit verse 24.] 

XL VI. PATET QOD., 1. (((I praise the good thoughts, words, 
and works, with thoughts, words, and works. I curse wicked 
thoughts, words, and works, away from thoughts, words, and 
works. I lay hold on all good thoughts, words, and works. 1 
renounce all evil thoughts, words, and works. I give to 
you, ye Amshaspands, offering and praise, with thoughts, 
words, and works, with my life and my vital powers. My property 
possess I in dependence upon the Yazatas, if one of the things come 
that I must give this body for the sake of the soul, then I give it to 
them. I praise the best purity, I hunt away the Devs, I confess 
myself a Mazdayasnian, a follower of Zarathustra, an opponent 
of the Devs, devoted to the faith in Ormazd. Of all kinds of sins, 
all evil thoughts, all evil speech, all evil actions, all Margerzans, 
especially all bad withholding^ which the wicked Ahriman pro- 
duced in opposition to the creatures of Ormazd; Ormazd has de- 
clared as sins, whereby men become sinners and may come to hell ; 
if I have thereby become a sinner, in what kind soever 1 have 
sinned, against whomsoever I have sinned, however 1 have sinned, 
I repent of it with thoughts, words, and works : pardon! 2. Before 
the Creator Ormazd and the Amshaspands, the face of the right- 
believing Mazdaj^asnians, before Mihr, Sros, and Easn,|| before the 
heavenly Yazatas, before the earthly Yazatas, before the lord and 
Destur of the law, before the Frohar of the immortal soul of Zar- 
tusht, before my own believing soul, before the faithful am I here 
come, and repent with thoughts, words, and works : pardon !))) 

16. (((My sins which I have committed against those in author- 
ity, the lords, the Desturs, and Mobeds, etc. 17. My sins which 

* According to the Parsees, on the Day of Judgment the souls which have 
not atoned for their sins will be sent back to hell, and tormented during three 
days and nights Avith torments surpassing the usual torments of hell itself. Cf. 
Tradit. Lit. der Parsen, ii., 117. t That is, in the hope that my good works will 
conduct me to Paradise. J That is, the withholding debts which are due. 
I! [Mithra, .S'raosha, and Eashnu. See page 142, line 8 above.] 



206 Kanfs Ethics. § 

I have committed against father, mother, sister, brother, wile, 
child, relations, descendants, family, friends, and other near rela- 
tions, etc. 18. If I have broken the whispered prayer, eaten with- 
out the whispered prayer, etc. 19a. If I have gone without Kosti, 
1 repent it. 19b. If I have defiled my feet, I repent it. 20. De- 
ceit, contempt, idol-worship, lies, I repent of. 21. I repent of 
paederastism, going with menstruous women, whoredom, un- 
natural intercourse with beasts. 22. Of all wicked deeds 1 repent. 
23. Pride, despite, scoffing, revenge, and lust, I repent of. 24. All 
that I ought to have thought and have not thought, all that I 
ought to have spoken and have not spoken, all that I ought to have 
done and have not done ; pardon, I repent with Patet. 25. All 
that I ought not to have thought and yet have thought, all that I 
ought not to have spoken and yet have spoken, all that 1 ought not 
to have done, and yet have done ; pardon, I repent with Patet. 26. 
All and every kind of sin which men have committed because of 
me, or which I have committed because of men ; pardon, I, etc. 
27. All kinds of sins which the evil Ahriman produced amongst 
the creatures of Ormazd in opposition ((and)) Ormazd has declared 
as sins, through which men become sinners and may come to hell, 
if they have at all laid hold of my character ; I repent of them. 28. 
I believe in the existence, the purity, and unboubtedness of the 
good Mazdayasnian faith, and in the Creator Ormazd, and the 
Amshaspands, the furthering of righteousness, and in the resur- 
rection and the new body. In this faith I remain and recognize 
the undoubtedness of the same, as Ormazd has imparted it to 
Zertusht, Zertusht to Frashaostra and Janiasp, as Aderbat the son 
of Mahrespand rectified and purified it, how the righteous Paoiryo- 
tkaeshas and the Desturs in succession have brought it to us, and I 
am wise therein. Of all kinds of sins of which mention is made in 
this law, and which I have committed, from the least to three 
>Sraosho-charanas, to countless sins, which have been, thought, 
spoken, done by me, I repent with thoughts, words, and works.))) 
[vol. iii., pages 161, 162.] [I omit the 29th verse.] 
" XLVII. PATET EBANL, 1. (((I praise all good thoughts, 
words, and works, with thoughts, words, and works. I curse all 
evil thoughts, words, and works, away from thoughts, words, and 
works, I lay hold on all good thoughts, words, and works, 
that is, I do good works, I renounce all evil thoughts, words, and 
works ; that is, I commit no sins. I am constant in right-doing, in 
pure actions, I remain in the pure Mazdayasnian law, in that law 
remain I which the Euler Ormazd and the Amshaspands have 
taught to Zertusht with praised Frohar, tfcejdieaeendant.ojL/Spitama 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 207 

and Zertusht has taught the king Yistaspa, the king Yistaspa to 
Frashaostra and Jamasp and Asfendiyar, and these have taught 
to all the believers in the world, which came in succession to Ader- 
bat, the son of Mahrespand, the restorer of purity, who restored it 
and purified it, and stood before (?) it. I am steadfast in this faith 
and turn myself not away from it for the sake of a good life, or for 
the sake of a longer life, nor for rule, nor for kingdom, out of love 
for purity. — If I perhaps must give up my body for the sake of my 
soul, I give it with contentment. I turn myself not away from 
this law and have laid hold of all good thoughts, words, and works, 
the good law and all uprightness. I renounce all evil thoughts, 
words, and works, the evil law, and all wickedness ; that is, I am 
with knowledge believing in the law of Ormazd, and in Zertusht 
the newer. I am wholly without doubt in the existence of the 
good Mazdayasnian faith, in the coming of the resurrection and the 
later body, in the stepping over the bridge Chinvat, in an invari- 
able recompense of good deeds and their reward, and of bad deeds 
and their punishment, as well as in the continuance of Paradise, 
in the annihilation of Hell and Ahriman and the Devs, that the 
God Ormazd will at last be victorious and Ahriman will perish, 
together with the Devs and the off-shoots of darkness.))) 

2. (((All that I ought to have thought and have not thought, all 
that I ought to have said and have not said, all that I ought to have 
done and have not done, all that I ought to have ordered and have 
not ordered ; (further) all that I ought not to have thought and yet 
have thought, all that I ought not to have spoken and yet have 
spoken, all that I ought not to have done and yet have done, all 
that I ought not to have ordered and yet have ordered ; for 
thoughts, words and works, bodily and spiritual, earthly and 
heavenly, pray I for forgiveness, 'and repent of it with Patet.))) 

3. (((All kinds of sins which I have committed in reference to 
Heaven against the Creator Ormazd, in reference to the World 
against men and all kinds of Men ; if I have smitten Men, injured, 
hurt them with words, if I have harmed the pure, the lords, the 
Mobeds, the Desturs and Herbads, and withheld from them the 
gifts which it was incumbent on me to give them, if I have granted 
no place to a stranger who came into the town, if I have not taken 
heed for men before the fire, the cold, and the heat, have done 
evil to men ; if I have requited the men who stand under my 
dominion with evil, have not bestowed on them affection and good 
things, so that at like time the good things and the Creator 
Ormazd have been injured through me, and were not contented 
with me ; I repent with thoughts, words, and works, etc. 6. Of all 



208 Kant's Ethics. % 881 

kinds of sins which I have committed in reference to Heaven 
against the Metals and the various kinds of Metals, if I have not 
kept the Metal pure and clean, if I have laid it in a damp place so 
that rust has laid hold of it, if 1 have taken it out of the protection 
of the good, if I have not purified in the lawful manner, metal out of 
which a woman has eaten anything during menstruation, if I have 
given gold, silver, ore, copper, iron, brass, and bronze, to sinners, 
so that they commit sin therewith and great profit might accrue to 
them there-from, and whereby I myself have become an evil-doer, 
so that alike the good things and the Amshaspand Shahrevar have 
been thereby injured and displeased, I repent, etc. 7. Of all kinds 
of sins which I have committed in reference to Heaven against the 
Amshaspand Aspandarmat, and in reference to the world against 
the Earth, and the various kinds of Earth ; if I have not kept the 
earth pure and cultivated, if I have not removed the holes of the 
Kharfesters, if I have made fruitful land waste, or have not made 
waste land fruitful, if I have gone on the earth afoot with only one 
shoe on, if I have buried corpses in the Earth, if I have not dug up 
what was buried, if I as a menstruous woman have gone on the 
Earth without shoes, if I have thrown seed upon the Earth, if I 
have treated ill the land which was under my protection, so that 
alike all good things and Aspendarmat have been injured by me 
and not contented with me, I repent, etc. 9. Of all kinds of sins 
which I have committed in reference to Heaven against the Am- 
shaspand Arnerdat, in reference to the world against the Trees and 
the kinds of Trees ; if I have cut round young Trees, if I have col- 
lected unripe fruits, if I have kept back medicine and -healing- 
remedies from the worthy and given them to the unworthy, if I 
have given food to eat to sinners and taken it away from the pure, 
so that alike all good things and the Amshaspand Arnerdat, etc. 
11. Of all kinds of sins ; the sins against towns, lands, against souls, 
the sins Kaidhyozat, Kaidhyo-hvarest, Vaidhyozat, Magh, Bagh, 
Astars, Asvartuann, sins which draw after them the high punish- 
ment, the utterance of incantations, the striking with terror, the 
desire to requite wound with wound, the frequent sins, the separa- 
ting from the pure, Navid-nasast, Aclut-as-aosma, the sins which 
bear the name of three Craosho-charanas, generally, of all kinds of 
sins, repent I, with thoughts, words, and works, etc. 12. Of wrong 
thought, wrong speech, wrong action, unrighteous questioning, 
speaking before or after without grounds,* theft, lie, false witness, f 
violent judgment, shamelessness, pride, thanklessness, mocking, 

"*' Anquetil : " to question and answer without reason." f Lit., " violence- 
witness'," that is, perhaps, witness extorted from another by oppression. 



§ 881 The Clavis to an Index. 209 

insatiability, self-exaltation, disobedience against the law. conten- 
tiousness, hard-hearted ness, wrathfulness, revenge, envy, excessive 
lamentation, approbation of sins, disapprobation of a good deed, 
friendship with sinners, self-will, witchcraft, honoring sorcerers, 
teaching sorcery, enmity toward the Yazatas, hostility toward the 
law, hostility toward the Desturs, the calling the names of the 
Yazatas together with those of the Devs, or the names of the Devs 
with those of the Yazatas, unnatural sins with women, boys, or 
cattle, unchastity, paederasty, going with menstruous women, adult- 
ery with the wives of others, going with one shoe, going with- 
out Kosti, interrupting the low prayer (at eating), the omission of 
the low prayer at eating, the satisfying natural wants without 
prayer, if I have made water standing upright, if I have honored 
the Devs, thought on them, brought them offering, have broken the 
adoption, I repent, etc.))) [vol. iii., pages 164-167.] 

15. C((If I have not helped the poor, have not observed the man- 
ner and custom of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas, the feast of blessings, the 
Nauroz, the Mihir-jan, if I have not displayed friendship to man- 
kind, so repent I with thoughts, etc. 18. Every Avesta that I have 
not spoken, read, learned, — the Avesta -i-jamas, the Khorda-A vesta, 
— if I have not rightly learned or recited the Avesta, or if I have 
forgotten again what was learned, so repent I with thoughts, etc. 
20. On account of a crime worthy of death — if, perhaps, evil Ahri- 
man and the Devs should have prevailed over me — am 1 contented, 
if it is fitting, to atone for it by death, (I am contented) that the 
Destur should take away from me what lies upon me and free me 
from sin, namely, from ^he Margerzans from one to ten, from ten 
to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, from a thousand to 
ten thousand, from ten thousand to countless (?) Margerzans. Of 
all evil thoughts, words, and works whereby men may become 
sinners, whereby I have become a sinner, rejjent I with thoughts, 
etc. 21. Of all kinds of sins which the Creator Ormazd has de- 
clared as sins in the good Mazdayasnian law, at which, if one com- 
mits them, the Yazatas feel pain, the Devs joy ; of that which I 
have thought, committed, 8j>oken, done, whereby I have become a 
sinner, what has been enumerated by me and not enumerated, 
what was known to me by name and what was not known to me, 
what I do not yet know, what I have committed on account of 
others, what others have committed on my account, everything 
whereby I am a sinner, in reference to everything whereby I have 
become a sinner, for every sin, for everything kept back, repent I 
a thousand times and ten thousand times before the ruler Ormazd, 
the Accomplisher of good deeds, the Shining, Majestic, the First of 



210 Kant's Ethics. § 

the Heavenly and earthly (Genii), before the Amshaspands, and 
before every other heavenly good being, before Mihr, #ros, and. 
Rasn-rast, before Adar-qara, Adar-Gusasp, Adar-burzin-mihr, be- 
fore the Frohar of Zartusht the descendant of $pitama, before the 
Law and mine own soul, before every good thing before which I 
come, with thoughts, etc.))) [vol. iii., pages 168-170.] 

22. (((With three words, with a hundred words, with a thousand 
words, with ten thousand words am I a right-believing good Maz- 
dayasnian, I am in that faith which the Lord Ormazd and the Am- 
shaspands have given to Zartusht with holy Frohar, the son of. 
*Spitama, Zartusht to the king Vistasp, Vistasp to Frashaostra and 
Jamasp and Aspendyar, and these have taught to the good in the 
world, until in succession of descent it came to the restorer of 
purity, Aderbat, the son of Mahre.spand, who made it right and 
purified it. I stand in the faith and will not be unbelieving, not. 
for good life, nor for longer life, nor for dominion, nor possessions. 
From love toward purity do I not depart, and if thereby my head 
is cut off so depart I not from this belief, for I am affrighted before 
the terror of the punishment, and the requital of hell. I am full 
of hope for that attaining to Paradise and the shining Garothman,. 
which possesses all majesty. I accomplish this Patet in the thought 
that as I hereafter may become more zealous to accomplish good 
works, I may also keep myself more from sin and that my good- 
deeds may serve for the lessening of sin, for the increase of good, 
works,* until the resurrection and the last body comes to me. I 
cherish hope in the coming of the last body to behold Ormazd and 
the Amshaspands. I have wrought and still work for this, that 
when that time arrives, and my mouth is in bonds through the 
smiting of the wicked Gana-mainyo, A-sto-vahat, and the bad Bird, 
ye may declare my thoughts, and if I with my own tongue can no., 
longer speak the Patet, the Amshaspands, in friendship to my soul, 
may cause this Patet to arrive and bestow it on my soul that my 
soTilmay attain to the light place and not arrive at the dark place,, 
and the wicked Ahriman and the diminishers may not torment 
my soul and not cause sorrow to it. On account of every sin 
which has remained in the world without atonement, am I con- 
tented and agreeing to give retribution and atonement with thrice 
cutting off the head, only (?) I pray from the Highest Creator,. 
Ormazd, the Supporter, Forgiver, and Pardoner, that the Yazatas 

* We see in this Patet that good deeds are not regarded merely from an in- 
dividual point of view, but as tending to the result that ultimately the total of 
good deeds will outweigh the total of bad ones, and the superiority of Ormazik 
over Ahriman be manifest. [Cf. \ "751.] 



§ 881 The Olavis to an Index. 211 

may throw to us and give us an equipment. If any one after my 
departure, out of love to my soul, or if my son performs the Patet 
before one of those set over who is at the place, so am I agreed 
thereto. Maj^ Ormazd and the Amshaspands and the other Heav- 
enly come to my soul for good help and companionship, and loose it 
from anguish and fear and affliction, from Ahriman and the Devs 
and from the coming to the terrors of Hell. In these thoughts 
have I laid hold on all good thoughts, words, and works ; in 
this mind have I renounced all evil thoughts, words, and works 
from thoughts, words, and works.))) [vol. iii., pages 170, 171.] [I 
omit verse 23.] 

XLIX. NIKAH OE MAEKIAG-E-PKAYER, 4. (((Do ye both 
accept the contract for life with honorable mind, that pleasure may 
increase to you twain ?))) 

5. (((In the name and friendship of Ormazd. Be ever shining, 
be very enlarged ! Be increasing ! Be victorious ! Learn purity I 
Be worthy of good praise! May the mind think good thoughts, 
the words speak good, the works do good! May all wicked 
thoughts hasten away, all wicked words be diminished, all wicked 
works be burnt up. Let them praise purity and thrust away 
sorcery. (Let them read :) Be a Mazdayasnian, accomplish works 
according to thy ruind.* Win for thyself property by right-deal- 
ing. Speak truth with the rulers and be obedient. Be 
modest with friends, clever, and well-wishing. Be not cruel. Be 
not wrathful-minded. Commit no sin through shame. Be not 
covetous. Torment not. Cherish not wicked envy, be not haughty, 
treat no one despitefully, cherish no lust. Bob not the property 
of others, keep thyself from the wives of others. Do good works 
with good activity. Impart to the Yazatas and the faithful (of 
thine own). Enter into no strife with a revengeful man. Be no 
companion to a covetous one. Go not on the same way with a 
cruel one. Enter into no agreement with one of ill-fame. Enter 
not into work in common with an unskilful one. Combat the ad- 
versaries with right. Go with friends as is agreeable to friends. 
Enter into no strife with those of evil repute. Before an assembly 
speak only pure words. Before kings speak with moderation. 
From ancestors inherit (good) names. In no wise displease thy 
mother. Keep thine own body pure in justice.))) [vol. iii., page 
174.] [I omit verses 6-12.] 

L. AFERIN OF THE SEVEN AMSHASPANDS., 10. (((May 
the praisworthy souls possess all might, who believing to the last 
in righteousness and well-doing, have spread abroad law and equity. 

* These words are not clear in the original, Anquetil translates, " Being cl. 
Mazdayasnian, think and do good.' 1 



212 Kant's Ethics. 

11. May there possess all might: the Lord, the King of Kings. 
May the Great Commander possess all might. 16. May each from 
the midst (of us) suffer harm from idol-worship, be it in body, or 
in property, or in soul. He who must have more (than he has) let 
him have more ; he who must have good things, let him have good 
things ; he who must have a wife, let him have a wife ; he who must 
have a son, let him have a son. May the earthly be so as the body 
desires it in righteousness ; may the heavenly be as the soul desires 
it in purity. 18. May good deeds increase through prayers and 
words ; may sins become utterly annihilated. May the world be 
good, the Heaven be good, at last may the good purity increase, the 
souls come to G-arothman. Be pure, live long !))) So may it come 
as I wish. Good thoughts, etc. Yatha ahu vairyo (21). To Him 
belongs brightness, etc. [vol. iii., pages 177-179.] 

LI. AFEBIN GAHANBAB., 1. (((Be wholly strength, be 
wholly pure. May all strength, all blessings be present. May the 
Creator Ormazd possess all strength, the Shining Ormazd, the 
Majestic Ormazd, and the Amshaspands. May the Aderan's and 
Ateshans possess all strength. May the Pravashis of the pure pos- 
sess all strength. May the good Mazdayasnian Law possess all 
strength. May the good in the seven Keshvars of the cattle pos- 
sess all strength, who are believing according to the law, according 
to the kind of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas,* and who are constant in the 
pure good Mazdayasnian law, that with us, that with us.f))) [vol. 
iii., page 179.] [I omit verses 2-21.] 

LII. PEAYEE AT EATING. (((In the Name of God, the 
Forgiver, Pardoning, Loving, — the Euler Ahura- Mazda. Here 
praise I now Ahura-Mazda who has created the cattle, has created 
purity, the water and the good trees, who created the splendor of 
light, the earth, and all good. Ashem-vohu (3). (Hereupon the 
person eats and after eating prays as follows) : ))) Yatha ahu 
vairyo (2). Ashem-vohu (1). To him belongs brightness, etc. A 
thousand, etc. Come, etc. For reward, etc.! Ashem-vohu (1). 

LXVI CONFESSION OF FAITH. (((The good, righteous, 
right Eeligion which the Lord has sent to the creatures i» that 

* [See note t, page 194 above.] t The author of this passage understands 
by the Seven Keshvars the often-named seven divisions, each of which is a world 
in itself, and separated from the rest. All the known land belongs to Qaniras, 
and hence comprises only one seventh of the world. As Zartusht and his Law 
were only sent to Qaniras, the faithful in the rest of the world cannot be dis- 
ciples of Zartusht, but are only believers after the way of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas :• 
that is, they were created pure by Ormazd, and continue to preserve this purity. 
Hence they live according to the Law, but without knowing it. They form 
therefore, as it were, an invisible community with the true Parsees. [Of. #810.] 
i [Cf. Khordah-Avesta, v., and xvii./39 (page 187 above).] 



The Clavis to an Index. 218 

which Zartusht has brought. The religion is the religion of Zar- 
tusht, the religion of Ormazd, given to Zartusht.))) Ashem-vohu. 

§ 882. — Embodied* in the Christian creed, (page 188, line 1.) 

§ 883. — Symbol may fitly suggest to us the whole of pure moral 
religion, (page 188, line 11.) 

§ 884. — While in a theoretical respect surpassing all our notions, 
(page 189, line 15.) 

§ 885.— Mystery of our calling, (page 190, line 4.) Cf. § 2361. Cf.. 
I. Thessalonians, ii., 12. 

§ 886. — Mystery of redemption, (page 190, line 29.) 

§ 887.— Mystery of election, (page 191, line 14.) Cf. II. Thessa- 
lonians, ii., 13. 

§ 888. — Arcanum that must ever remain hidden, (p. 191, 1. 30.) 

§ 889. — God's will amply revealed to us by the moral law. (page 
192, line 7.) 

§ 890. — God is love, — a principle of religious faith, rising out of 
the love of the law. (p. 193, 1. 16.) Loved by God himself: cf. § 2441 o 

§ 891. — Notion of a Benignant Judge issues out of love combined 
with reverence, (page 194, line 12.) Cf. Matthew xxv., 31, 32 ; Acts 
x., 42 ; II. Cor., v., 10 ; II. Timothy, iv., 1 ; John xvi., 8. [Opinions : 
cf. § 2524.] 

Book IV. — Of the True and False Worship of God under 
the Sway of the Good Principle Victress ; or of Religion and 
Ecclesiastical Despotism (§g 892-983 inclusive.) 

Exordium. (U 892-895 inclusive.) 

§ 892. — Advent of the kingdom of G-od. (page 199, line 4. ) [Intel- 
ligential : Milton is quoted by Webster as authority for the use of 
this word.] Duty of its own kind : see § 799. 

§ 893. — Idea of His kingdom -must serve as the pattern of our 
combination ecclesiastical, (page 200, line 12.) 

§ 894. — True service of the church must be such as perpetually to 
approach the belief taught by pure reason, (page 201, line 12.) 

§ 895.^ — Spurious service, wherein a church faith frustrates the 
pure worship of God. (page 202, line 11.) 

APOTOME I. -OE THE RELIGIOUS WORSHIP OF THE DEITY. 

(§3 896-918 inclusive.) 

§896. — Religion, subjectively considei-ed, is the acknowledge- 
ment and recognition of all our duties as if they were divine com- 
mandments, (page 203, line 3.) Cf. §§ 627-631, 529. 

§ 897. — Religion does not assert the existence of God ; the possi- 
bility that there may be a God is enough, (page 203, line 6.) Cfi 
§§ 2595, 1428, 1178. 

* [That is, the belief in God as (1) Omnipotent Creator, (2) Benignant Gov- 
ernor, (3.) Kighteous Judge. See $ 879 (page 137 above), and cf. § 3064.] 



214 Kant's Ethic*. 

§ 898. — Eeligion does not mean an aggregate of certain fixed 
duties to be rendered toward God (offices of divine worship.) (page 
.203, line 23.) Cf. §§ 537, 541, 449. 

§899. — Conflicting positions of the pure rationalists and super- 
naturalists, (page 204, Me 8.) 

§ 900. — Eeligion, abstract from its first origin and inward ground, 
.is either natural or else a learned religion, (page 205, line 13.) 

§ 901. — Although a religion be natural, it may notwithstanding 
have moreover been revealed, (page 205, line 30.) Cf. § 1017. 

§ 902. — Every, even a revealed religion, must present the linea- 
ments of a natural religion, (page 206, line 26.) 

§ 903. — Eevelation and philosophy having but one common end 
"(viz., forwarding the culture of the moral good), let us scrutinize 
the principles of Christianity, (page 207, line 5.) Intromit : in 
Scottish law, to intermeddle with the effects of another. — (Webster.) 

Chapter I.— Christianity as Natural Religion. (§g 904-911 inclusive.) 

§ 904. — Natural religion possesses the first requisite of a true 
church (universal validity § 812). (page 208, line 9.) 

§905. — Must be superadded sundry statutable authoritative 
edicts, to bring about a permanent and abiding union of mankind 
in a visible church universal, (page 209, line 1.) 

§ 906. — Jesus the founder of the true catholic church, (page 210, 
line 4.) Cf. §§ 864, 773. -[Irregressible : from which there is no re- 
turn. — Andrews' Latin Lexicon, "And Jesus said unto him, No 
man, having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit 
for the kingdom of God." St. Luke ix., 62.] Mis sayings: cf. the 
following extracts from the Gospel according to St. Matthew :* 

V., 1. And seeing the multitudes, he went up into the mountain ; 
and he having sat down, his disciples came to him. 2. And he 
opened his mouth, and taught them, saying: 

3. Happy the poor in spirit ; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 

4. Happy they that mourn ; for they shall be comforted. 

5. Happy the meek ; for they shall inherit the earth. 

6. Happy they that hunger and thirst after righteousness ; for 
they shall be filled. 

7. Happy the merciful ; for they shall obtain mercy. 

8. Happy the pure in heart ; for they shall see God. 

9. Happy the peacemakers ; for they shall be called sons of God. 

10. Happy they who are persecuted for righteousness' sake : 
for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 

11. Happy are ye, when they shall revile and persecute you, and 
shall say all evil against you falsely, for my sake. 12. Eejoice, and 

* American Bible Union, second revision: New York, 1869. 



The Clavis to an Index. 215 

exult ; because great is your reward in heaven, for so they perse- 
cuted the prophets that were before you. 

13. Ye are the salt of the earth ; but if the salt become tasteless, 
"wherewith shall it be salted ? It is thenceforth good for nothing, 
but to be cast out, and to be trodden under foot by men. 

14. Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill 
"can not be hid. 15. Nor do they light a lamp and put it under the 
bushel, but on the lamp-stand ; and it shines to all that are in the 
house. 16. Thus let your light shine before men, that they may 
•see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven. 

17. Think not that I came to destroy the law, or the prophets; 
1 came not to destroy, but to fulfil. 18. For verily I say to you, 
till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall not pass from 
the law, till all be fulfilled. 19. Whoever therefore shall break one 
of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be 
called the least in the kingdom of heaven ; but whoever shall do 
-and teach them, he shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. 

20. For I sa} r to you, that except your righteousness shall ex- 
ceed that of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the 
kingdom of heaven. 

21. Ye heard that it was said to those of old : Thou shalt not 
kill ; and whoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment. 

22. But I say to you, that every one who is angry with his brother, 
without cause, shall be in danger of the judgment ; and whoever 
shall say to his brother, Raca ! shall be in danger of the council ; 
and whoever shall say, Thou fool ! shall be in danger of hell-fire. 

23. Therefore if thou bringest thy gift to the altar, and there re- 
memberest that thy brother has aught against thee; 24. leave 
there thy gift before the altar, and go, first be reconciled to thy 
brother and then come and offer thy gift. 

25. Agree with thine adversary quickly, while thou art in the 
way with him ; lest haply the adversary deliver thee to the judge, 
and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into 
prison. 26. Verily I say to thee, thou shalt not come out thence, 
till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing. 

27. Ye heard that it was said : Thou shalt not commit adultery. 

28. But I say to you, that every one who looks on a woman, to lust 
after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart. 

29. And if thy right eye causes thee to offend, pluck it out and 
cast it from thee ; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy mem- 
bers perish, and not thy whole body be cast into hell. 30. And if 
thy right hand causes thee to offend, cut it off and cast it from 
thee ; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members perish, 
and not thy whole body be cast into hell. 



216 Kant's Ethics. §906 

31. And it was said : Whoever shall put away his wife, let him 
give her a writing of divorcement. 32. But I say to you, that 
whoever shall put away his wife, save for the cause of fornication, 
makes her commit adultery ; and whoever shall marry her when 
put away, commits adultery. 

33. Again ye heard, that it was said to those of old : Thou shalt 
not swear falsely, but shalt perform to the Lord thine oaths. 34. 
But I say to you, swear not at all ; neither by heaven, for it is 
God's throne ; 35. nor by the earth, for it is his footstool ; nor by 
Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. 36. Nor shalt thou 
swear by thy head; because thou canst not make one hair white or 
black. 37. But let your word be, Yea, yea, Nay, nay ; for that 
which is more than these comes of evil. 

38. Ye heard that it was said : An eye for an eye and a tooth for 
a tooth. 39. But I say to you, that ye resist not evil ; but whoever 
shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. 40. 
And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take thy coat, let him 
have thy cloak also. 41. And whoever shall compel thee to go one 
mile, go with him two. 42. Give to him that asks of thee, and 
from him that would borrow of thee turn not away. 

43. Ye heard that it was said : Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and 
shalt hate thine enemy. 44. But I say to you, love your enemies, 
and pray for those who persecute you ; 45. that ye may be sons of 
your Father who is in heaven ; for he causes his sun to rise on 

THE EVIL AND THE GOOD, AND SENDS RAIN ON THE JUST AND THE UN- 
JUST. 46. For if ye love those who love you, what reward have 
ye ? Do not also the publicans the same ? 47. And if ye salute 
your brethren only, what do ye that excels ? Do not also the 
heathen thus ? 48. Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father 
who is in heaven is perfect. 

YL, 1. Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men, 
to be seen by them ; otherwise ye have no reward with your Father 
who is in heaven. 2. Therefore when thou doest alms, do not 
sound a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues 
and in the streets, that they may have glory of men. Yerily I say 
to you, they have in full their reward. 3. But when thou doest 
alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand does ; 4. 
that thine alms may be in secret ; and thy Father who sees in 
secret will himself reward thee. 

5. And when ye pray, ye shall not be as the hypocrites ; for 
they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corners of 
the streets, that they may be seen by men. Verily I say to you,, 
they have in full their reward. 6. But thou, when thou pray est, 



§ 906 The Clavis io an Index. 217 

enter into thy closet, and having shut thy door, pray to thy Father 
who is in secret ; and thy Father who sees in secret will reward 
thee. 

7. But when ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the heathen 
do ; for they think that they shall he heard for their much speak- 
ing. 8. Be not ye therefore like to them ; for your Father knows 
what things ye have need of, before ye ask him. 9. Do ye, there- 
fore, pray after this manner : 

Our Father who. art in heaven, hallowed be thy name. 

10. Thy kingdom come; thy will be done, as in heaven, so also 
on the earth. 

11. Give us this day our daily bread. 

12. And forgive us our debts, as also we forgave our debtors. 

13. And bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. 

14. For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father 
will also forgive you; 15. but if ye forgive not men their trespas- 
ses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. 

16. And when ye fast, be not as the hypocrites, of a sad coun- 
tenance ; for they disfigure their faces, that they may appear to 
men to fast. "Verily I say to you, they have in full their reward. 
17. But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head, and wash thy 
face ; 18. that thou appear not to men to fast, but to thy Father 
who is in secret ; and thy Father who sees in secret will reward 
thee. 

19. Lay not up for yourselves treasures on the earth, where moth 
and rust consume, and where thieves break through and steal. 20. 
But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth 
nor rust consumes, and where thieves do not break through nor 
steal. 21. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. 

22. The lamp of the body is the eye. If therefore thine eye be 
single, thy whole body will be light ; 23. but if thine eye be evil, 
thy whole body will be dark. If therefore the light that is in thee 
is darkness, how great the darkness ! 24. No man can serve two 
masters ; for either he will hate the one, and love the other, or he 
will hold to one and despise the other. Ye can not serve God 
and Mammon. 

25. For this cause I say to you, take not thought for your life,, 
what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink : nor for your body, what 
ye shall put on. Is not the life more than food, and the body than 
raiment? 26. Behold the birds of the air, that they sow not, nor 
reap, nor gather into fe^rns ; and your heavenly Father feeds them. 
Are ye not much better than they ? 27. And which of you by 

15 " 



218 Kant's Ethic*. § 906 

taking thought can add one cubit to his stature ? 28. And why 
take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how 
they grow. They toil not, nor spin ; 29. and I say to you, that 
even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. 
30. And if God so clothes the grass of the field, which to-day is, and 
to-morrow is cast into the oven, will he not much more you, ye of 
little faith? 31. Take not thought therefore, saying ; What shall 
•we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewith shall we be 
clothed ? 32. For after all these do the Gentiles seek. For your 
heavenly Father knows that ye have need of all these. 33. But 

SEEK FIRST THE KINGDOM OF GOD, AND HIS RIGHTEOUSNESS ; and all 

these shall be added to you. 34. Take not thought, therefore, for 
the morrow ; for the morrow will take thought for itself. Sufficient 
for the day is the evil thereof. 

V1L, 1. Judge not, that ye be not judged. 2. For with what 
judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged ; and with what measure ye 
mete, it shall be measured to you. 3. And why beholdest thou the 
mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is 
in thine own eye ? 4. Or how wilt thou say to thy brother : Let me 
cast out the mote from thine eye ; and behold, the beam is in thine 
own eye ? 5. Hypocrite ! first cast out the beam out of thine own 
eye ; and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy 
brother's eye. 

6. Give not that which is holy to the dogs, nor cast your pearls 
before the swine ; lest they trample them with their feet, and turn 
and rend you. 

7. Ask, and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; knock, 
and it shall be opened to you. 8. For every one that asks receives ; 
and he that seeks finds; and to him that knocks it shall be opened. 
9. Or what man is there of you, of whom if his son ask bread, 
will he give him a stone ? 10. And if he ask a fish, will he give 
Mm a serpent? 11. If ye then, being evil, know how to give good 
gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in 
heaven give good things to those who ask him? 12. Therefore all 

THINGS WHATEVER YE WOULD THAT MEN SHOULD DO TO YOU, SO ALSO 

do ye to them ; for this is the law and the prophets. 

13. Enter in through the strait gate ; because wide is the gate, 
and broad the way, that leads to destruction, and many are they 
who go in thereat. 14. Because strait is the gate, and narrow the 
way, that leads to life, and few are they who find it. 

15. Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's cloth- 
ing, but inwardly are ravening wolves. 



■§ 906 The Glavis to an Index. 219 

16. Ye shall know them from their fruits. Do men gather grapes 
from thorns, or figs from thistles? 17. So every good tree brings 
forth good fruit ; but the corrupt tree brings forth evil fruit. 18. A 
good tree can not bring forth evil fruit, nor a corrupt tree bring forth 
good fruit. 19. Every tree that brings not forth good fruit is cut 
down, and cast into the fire. 20. So then, from their fruits ye shall 
know them. 

21. Not every one that says to me. Lord, Lord, shall enter into 
the kingdom of heaven : but he that does the will of my Father 
who is in heaven. 22. Many will say to me in that day : Lord, 
Lord, did we not prophesy in thy name, and in thy name cast out 
demons, and in thy name do many miracles? 23. And then 
will I profess to them, I never knew you; depart from me, ye who 
work iniquity. 

24. Every one, therefore, who hears these sayings of mine, and 
does them, I will liken him to a wise man, who built his house on 
the rock. 25. And the rain descended, and the streams came, and 
the winds blew, and fell upon that house ; and it did not fall, for it 
had been founded on the rock. 26. And every one who hears these 
sayings of mine, and does them not, shall be likened to a foolish 
man, who built his house on the sand. 27. And the rain descended, 
and the streams came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that 
house, and it fell ; and great was the fall of it. 

IX., 9. And Jesus, passing on from thence, saw a man named 
Matthew^ sitting at the place of receiving custom ; and he says to 
him: Follow me. And he rose up and followed him. 10. And it 
came to pass that, as he reclined at table in the house, behold, many 
publicans and sinners came and reclined at table with Jesus and 
his disciples. 11. And the Pharisees, seeing it, said to his disciples r 
"Why does your teacher eat with the publicans and the sinners ? 12„ 
And Jesus hearing it, said : They who are well need not a physi- 
cian, but they who are sick. 13. But go, and learn what this 
means : I desire mercy and not sacrifice ; for I came not to call 
righteous men, but sinners. 

35. And Jesus went about all the cities and villages, teaching in 
their synagogues, and preaching the good news of the kingdom, 
and healing every sickness and every infirmity. 36. And seeing' 
the multitudes, he was moved with compassion for them, because 
they were harassed, and scattered, as sheep having no shepherd, 
37. Then he says to his disciples : The harvest indeed is great, but 
the laborers are few. 38. Pray therefore the Lord of the harvest^ 
that he will send forth laborers into his harvest. 



220 Kant's Ethics. § 906 

X., 1. And calling to him his twelve disciples, he gave them 
authority over unclean spirits, so as to cast them out, and to heal 
every sickness and every infirmity. 

2. And the names of the twelve apostles are these : first Simon, 
who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother; James the son of 
Zebedee, and John his brother ; 3. Philip, and Bartholomew ; 
Thomas, and Matthew the publican ; James the son of Alpheus, and 
Lebbeus surnamed Thaddeus ; 4. Simon the Cananite, and Judas 
Iscariot, who also betrayed him. 

5. These twelve Jesus sent forth, and charged them, saying : Go 
not into the way to the Gentiles, and into a city of Samaritans enter 
not. 6. But go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. 7. 
And as ye go, preach, saying : The kingdom op heaven is at hand. 
8. Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out demons. 
Freely ye received, freely give. 9. Provide not gold, nor silver, nor 
brass in your girdles ; 10. nor bag for the journey, nor two coats, 
nor sandals, nor staff; for the laborer is worthy of his living. 11. 
And into whatever city or village ye shall enter, inquire who in it 
is worthy ; and there abide till ye go thence. 12. But when ye 
come into the house, salute it. 13. And if the house be worthy, 
let your peace come upon it ; but if it be not worthy, let your peace 
return to you. 14. And whoever shall not receive you, nor hear 
your words, when ye go out of that house or city, shake off the 
dust of your feet. 15. Verily I say to you, it shall be more toler- 
able for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, 
than for that city. 

16. Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves ; be 
therefore wise as serpents, and simple as doves. 17. But beware 
of men ; for they will deliver you up to councils, and will scourge 
you in their synagogues ; 18. and before governors also and kings 
will ye be brought for my sake, for a testimony to them and to the 
Gentiles. 

19. But when they deliver you up, take not thought how or what 
ye shall speak ; for it shall be given you in that hour what ye shall 
speak. 20. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your 
Father that speaks in you. 

21. And the brother will deliver up the brother to death, and the 
father the child ; and children will rise up against parents, and 
cause them to be put to death. 22. And ye will be hated by all 
for my name's sake ; but he that has endured to the end, the same 
shall be saved. 

23. But when they'persecute you in this city, flee into the other ; 
for verily I say to you, ye shall not have gone over the cities of 
Israel, till the Son of man come. 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 221 

24. A disciple is not above the teacher, nor the servant above his 
lord. 25. It is enough for the disciple that he be as his teacher, 
and the servant as his lord. If they called the master of the house 
Beelzebul, how much more those of his household! 

26. Fear them not therefore ; for there is nothing covered that 
shall not be revealed, and hid that shall not be known. 27. What 
I say to you in the darkness, that speak ye in the light ; and what 
ye hear in the ear, that proclaim upon the house-tops. 28. And be 
not afraid of those who kill the body, but are not able to kill the 
soul ; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body 
in hell. 

29. Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? And one of .them 
shall not fall on the ground without your Father. 30. But the 
very hairs of your head are all numbered. 31. Fear not therefore; 
ye are of more value than many sparrows. 

XII., 1. At that time Jesus went on the sabbath through the 
grain-fields ; and his disciples were hungry, and began to pluck 
ears of grain, and to eat. 2. And the Pharisees seeing it said to 
him : Behold, thy disciples are doing that which it is not lawful to 
do on the sabbath. 3. And he said to them : Have ye not read 
what David did, when he hungered, himself and those with him ; 
4. how he entered into the house of G-od, and ate the show-bread, 
which it was not lawful for him to eat, nor for those with him, but 
for the priests alone? 5. Or have ye not read in the law, that on 
the sabbath the priests in the temple profane the sabbath, and are 
blameless ? 6. But I say to you, that a greater than the temple is 
here. 7. But if ye had known what this means, I desire mercy and 
not sacrifice, ye would not have condemned the blameless. 8. For 
the Son of man is Lord of the sabbath. 

XIII. , 1. And on that day Jesus went out of the house, and sat 
by the sea-side. 2. And great multitudes were gathered together 
to him, so that he went into the ship and sat down ; and all the 
multitude stood on the beach. 3. And he spoke many things to 
them in parables, saying : 

4. Behold, the sower went forth to sow. And as he sowed, some 
fell by the way-side, and the birds came and devoured them. 5. 
And others fell on the rocky places, where they had not much 
earth ; and forthwith they sprang up, because they had not depth 
of earth. 6. And when the sun was lip, they were scorched ; and 
because they had not root, they withered away. 7. And others 
fell upon the thorns ; and the thorns came up, and choked them. 8. 
And others fell on the good ground, and yielded fruit, some a hun- 
dredfold, some sixty, some thirty. 9. He that has ears to hear, let 
bim hear. 



222 Kant's Ethics. § 906 

10. And the disciples came and said to him : "Why dost thou 
speak to them in parables ? 11. And he answering said to them: 
To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven 
hut to them it is not given. 

18. Hear therefore the parable of the sower. 19. When any one 
hears the word of the kingdom, and understands not, then comes 
the evil one and snatches away what was sown in his heart. This 
is that which was sown by the way-side. 

20. And that sown on the rocky places, this is he that hears the 
word, and immediately with joy receives it ; 21. and has not root 
in himself, but is only for a time ; and when tribulation or persecu- 
tion arises because of the word, immediately he is offended. 

22. And that sown among the thorns, this is he that hears the 
word, and the care of this world and the cleceitfulness of riches 
choke the word, and it becomes unfruitful. 23. And that sown on 
the good ground, this is he that hears the word and understands ; 
who bears fruit, and produces, some a hundredfold, some sixty,, 
some thirty. 

24. Another parable he put forth to them, saying : The kingdom 
of heaven is likened to a man that sowed good seed in his field. 25. 
But while men slept, bis enemy came and sowed darnel among the 
wheat, and went away. 26. And when the blade sprang up and 
produced fruit, then appeared the darnel also. 27. And the ser- 
vants of the householder came and said to him : Sir, didst thou not 
sow good seed in thy field ? From whence then has it darnel ? 28. 
He said to them : An enemy did this. The servants said to him : 
Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up ? 29. He said : 
'N&j, lest while ye gather up the darnel, ye root up the wheat with 
them. 30. Let both grow together until the harvest. And in 
time of harvest 1 will say to the reapers : Gather up first the dar- 
nel, and bind them in bundles to burn them ; but gather the wheat 
into my barn. 

31. Another parable he put forth to them, saying : The kingdom 
of heaven is like to a grain of mustard, which a man took and 
sowed in his field. 32. Which is the least indeed of all seeds ; but 
when it is grown, it is greater than the herbs, and becomes a tree. 
so that the birds of the air come and lodge in its branches. 

33. Another parable he spoke to them : The kingdom of heaven 
is like to leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of 
meal, till the whole was leavened. 

36. Then having sent away the multitudes, he went into the 
house. And his disciples came to him, saying : Explain to us the 
parable of the darnel of the field. 37. And answering he said to 
them : 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 223 

He that sows the good seed is the Son of man. 38. The field is 
the world. The good seed, these are the sons of the kingdom ; but 
the darnel are the sons of the evil one, 39. and the enemy that 
sowed them is the Devil. The harvest is the end of the world ; and 
the reapers are angels. 40. As therefore the darnel are gathered 
up and are burned with fire, so shall it be in the end of the world. 
41. The Son of man will send forth his angels, and they will gather 
out of his kingdom all the causes of offense, and those who do in- 
iquity, 42. and will cast them into the furnace of fire ; there will 
be the wailing, and the gnashing of teeth ! 43. Then will the 
righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. 
He that has ears to hear, let him hear. 

44. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like to a treasure hidden in 
the field, which a man found and concealed ; and for joy thereof, 
he goes and sells all that he has, and buys that field. 

45. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like to a merchant seeking' 
goodly pearls ; 46. and having found one pearl of great price, he 
went and sold all that he had, and bought it. 

47. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like to a net, cast into the 
sea, and gathering together of every kind. 48. Which, when it was 
filled, they drew up upon the beach, and sat down and gathered the 
good into vessels, but cast the bad away. 49. So will it be in the 
end of the world. The angels will go forth, and will separate the 
wicked from among the just, 50. and will cast them into the fur- 
nace of fire ; there will be the wailing, and the gnashing of teeth ! 

XV., 10. And calling to him the multitude, he said to them : 
Hear, and understand. 11. Not that which enters into the mouth 
defiles the man ; but that which comes out of the mouth, this defiles 
the man. 

12. Then came to him his disciples, and said to him : Knowest 
thou that the Pharisees, when they heard the saying, were offended? 
13. And he answering said : Every plant, which my heavenly 
Father planted not, shall be rooted up. 14. Let them alone ; they 
are blind leaders of the blind ; and if the blind lead the blind, both 
will fall into the ditch. 

15. And Peter answering said to him : Explain to us this par- 
able. 16. And he said : Are ye also even yet without understand- 
ing ? 17. Do ye not yet understand, that whatever enters into the 
mouth goes into the belly, and is cast out into the drain ? 18. But 
the things that proceed out of the mouth come forth out of the 
heart; and they defile the man. 19. For out of the heart proceed 
evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false-wit- 
nessings, blasphemies. 20. Thes* are the things that defile the 
man ; but to eat with unwashen hands defiles not the man. 



224 Kant's Ethics. § 906 

XVIII., 1. At that time came the disciples to Jesus, saying : 
Who then is greatest in the kingdom of heaven? 

2. And Jesus calling a little child to him, placed it in the midst 
of them, 3. and said: Verily I say to you, if ye do not turn and 
become as the little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of 
heaven. 4. Whoever therefore shall humble himself as this little 
child, he is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. 5. And who- 
ever shall receive one such little child, in my name, receives me. 
6. But whoever shall cause one of these little ones that believe on 
me to offend, it were better for him that an upper millstone were 
hanged about his neck, and he were plunged in the depth of the sea. 

7. Woe to the world, for causes of offense ! For it must needs be 
that causes of offense come ; but woe to that man, through whom 
the cause of offense comes ! 8. But if thy hand or thy foot causes 
thee to offend, cut it off, and cast it from thee. It is better for thee 
to enter into life lame or maimed, than having two hands or two 
feet to be cast into the everlasting fire. 9. And if thine eye causes 
thee to offend, pluck it out and cast it from thee. It is better for thee 
to enter into life with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into 
hell-fire. 

10. Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones ; for I 
say to you, that their angels in heaven always behold the face of 
my Father who is in heaven. 11. For the Son of man came to save 
that which was lost, 

12. What think ye ? If a man has a hundred sheep, and one of 
them is gone astray, does he not leave the ninety and nine upon 
the mountains, and go and seek that which is gone astray? 13. 
And if it be that he find it, verily I say to you, he rejoices over it 
more than over the ninety and nine that went not astray. 14. So 
it is not the will of your Father who is in heaven, that one of these 
little ones perish. 

15. But if thy brother shall sin against thee, go show him his 
fault between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou hast 
gained thy brother. 16. But if he hear not, take with thee one or 
two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word 
may be established. 17. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell 
it to the church ; and if he neglect to hear the church also, let him 
be to thee as a heathen and a publican. 18. Verily I say to you : 
whatever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in. heaven; and 
whatever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. 

19. Again I say to you, that if two of you shall agree on earth, 
concerning any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them 
by my Father who is in heaven. 20. For where two or three are 
gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them. 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 225 

21. Then Peter came to him, and said : Lord, how often shall my 
brother sin against me, and I forgive him ? Until seven times ? 
22. Jesus says to him : I say not to thee, until seven times, but until 
seventy times seven. 

23. Therefore is the kingdom of heaven likened to a certain 
kiug, who desired to make a reckoning with his servants. 24. And 
when he had begun to reckon, there was brought to him one, who 
owed ten thousand talents. 25. But as he was not able to pay, his 
lord commanded him to be sold, and his wife, and children, and all 
that he had, and payment to be made. 26. The servant therefore, 
falling, prostrated himself before him, saying : Have patience with 
me, and I will pay thee all. 27. And the lord of that servant, 
moved with compassion, released him, and forgave him the debt. 
28. But that servant went out, and found one of his fellow-servants, 
who owed him a hundred denaries ; and laying hold of him he 
took him by the throat, saying : Pay me that thou owest. 29. 
Therefore his fellow-servant fell down and besought him, saying : 
Have patience with me, and I will pay thee. 30. And he would 
not ; but went and cast him into prison, till he should pay the debt. 
31. And his fellow-servants, seeing what was done, were very sorry, 
and came and disclosed to their lord all that was done. 32. Then 
having called him, his lord says to him : Thou wicked servant ; I 
forgave thee all that debt, because thou beso lightest me. 33. 
Shouldest not thou also have had pity on thy fellow- servant, as I 
too had pity on thee? 34. And his lord was angry, and delivered 
him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due to him. 
35. So also will my heavenly Father do to you, if ye from your 
hearts forgive not every one his brother. 

XIX., 1. And it came to pass, when Jesus finished these sayings, 
that he departed from Galilee, and came into the borders of Judsea 
beyond the Jordan. 2. And great multitudes followed him, and he 
healed them there. 

3. And the Pharisees came to him, tempting him and saying: 
Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause ? 

4. And he answering said to them: Have ye not read, that he 
who made them from the beginning made them male and female, 
5. and said : For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, 
and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh. 6. So 
that they are no longer two, but one flesh. "What therefore God 
joined. together, let not man put asunder. 

7. They say to him : Why then did Moses command to give a 
writing of divorcement, and to put her away ? 8. He says to 
them : Moses, for your hardness of heart, suffered you to put away 



226 Kant's Ethics. § 906 

your wives ; but from the beginning it was not so. 9. And I say 
to you, that whoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, 
and shall marry another, commits adultery ; and whoever marries 
her when put away, commits adultery. 

16. And, behold, one came to him and said : Teacher, what good 
shall I do, that I may have eternal Life ? 17. And he said to him : 
Why dost thou ask me concerning good ? One is the Good. But 
if thou desirest to enter into life, keep the commandments. 18. He 
says to him, Which ? Jesus said : Thou shalt not kill ; Thou shalt 
not commit adultery ; Thou shalt not steal ; Thou shalt not bear 
false- witness ; 19. Honor thy father and thy mother ; and, Thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. 20. The young man says to 
him : All these I kept ; what do I yet lack? 21. Jesus said to him : 
If thou desirest to be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to 
the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven ; and come, follow 
me. 22. But when the 3 7 oung man heard this saying, he went 
away sorrowful ; for he had great possessions. 

23. And Jesus said to his disciples : Verily I say to you, that a 
rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven. 24. And 
again I say to you : It is easier for a camel to go through the eye 
of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God, 
25. And the disciples, hearing it, were exceedingly amazed, saying : 
Who then can be saved? 26. But Jesus, looking on them, said to 
them: With men this is impossible ; but* with God all things are 
possible. 

XX., 1. For the kingdom of heaven is like to a householder, 
who went out early in the morning to hire laborers into "his vine- 
yard. 2. And having agreed with the laborers for a denary a day, 
he sent them into his vineyard. 

3. And he went out about the third hour, and saw others stand- 
ing idle in the market-place. 4. And to them he said : Go ye also 
into the vineyard, and whatever is right I will give you. And they 
went their way. 

5. Again he went out about the sixth and ninth hour, and did 
likewise. 

6. And about the eleventh he went out, and found others stand- 
ing, and says to them : Why stand ye here all the day idle ? 7. 
They say to him : Because no one hired us. He says to them : Go 
ye also into the vineyard. 

8. And when evening was come, the lord of the vineyard says 
to his steward : Call the laborers, and pay them the hire, begin- 
ning from the last, unto the first. 9. And they of the eleventh 
hour came, and received every man a denary. 10. But when the 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 227 

first came, they supposed that they should receive more ; and they 
also received each one a denary. 11. And on receiving it, they 
murmured against the householder, 12. saying : These last labored 
one hour, and thou madest them equal to us, who bore the burden 
of the day, and the burning heat. 

13. But he answering said to one of them : Friend, I do thee no 
wrong. Didst thou not agree with me for a denary ? 14. Take 
what is thine, and go. But I will give to this last, even as to thee. 
15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with my own ? Is 
thine eye evil, because I am good ? 

16. So will the last be first, and the first last ; for many are called, 
but few are chosen. 

17: And Jesus, going up to Jerusalem, took the twelve disciples 
apart ; and in the way he said to them : 18. Behold, we are going 
up to Jerusalem ; and the Son of man will be delivered to the 
chief priests and scribes, and the}'' will condemn him to death, 19. 
and will deliver him to the Gentiles to mock and scourge and 
crucify ; and on the third day he will rise again. 

20. Then came to him the mother of the sons of Zebedee, with 
her sons, bowing down and asking a certain thing of him. 21. And 
he said to her : What wilt thou ? She says to him : Command that 
these my two sons shall sit, one on thy right hand, and one on thy 
left, in thy kingdom. 22. But Jesus answering said : Ye know 
not what ye ask. Are ye able to drink of the cup that I shall drink 
of? They say to him : We are able. 23. And he says to them ' 
Ye shall drink indeed of my cup ; but to sit on my right hand, and 
on my left, is not mine to give, but is for them for whom it has 
been prepared by my Father. 24. And the ten, hearing it, were 
much displeased with the two brothers. 25. , But J esuSj having 
.called them to him, said : Ye know that the rulers of the Gentiles 
exercise lordship over them, and they that are great exercise 
authority over them. 26. JSTot so shall it be among you ; 27. but 
whoever would become great among you, let him be your minister; 
and whoever would be first among you, let him be your servant ; 
28. even as the Son of man came not to be ministered to, but to 
minister, and to give his life a ransom for many. 

XXI., 23. And when he had come into the temple, the chief 
priests and the elders of the people came to him as he was teach- 
ing, and said : By what authority doest thou these things ; and who 
gave thee this authority? 24. And Jesus answering said to thenar 
I also will ask you one thing, which if ye tell me, I too will tell you 
by what authority I do these things. 25. John's immersion, 
whence was it ? From heaven, or from men? And they reasoned 



228 Kanfs Mines. § 906 

among themselves, saying ; If we say, From heaven, he will say to 
ns : Why then did ye not believe him? 25. But if we say, From 
men, we fear the multitude ; for all hold John as a prophet. 27- 
And they answered Jesus, saying : We do not know. And he said 
to them : Neither do I say to you, by what authority 1 do these 
things. 

28. But what think ye ? A man had two sons ; and he came 
to the first, and said : Son, go work to-day in the vineyard. 29. 
And he answering said : I will not : but afterward he repented, and 
went. 30. And he came to the other, and said likewise. And he 
answering said : I will, sir ; and went not. 31. Which of the two 
did the father's will ? They say to him : The first. Jesus says to 
them : Verily I say to you, that the publicans and the harlots go 
into the kingdom of God before you. 32. For John came to you in 
the way of righteousness, and ye did not believe him ; but the pub- 
licans and the harlots believed him ; and ye, when ye had seen it, 
repented not afterward, that ye might believe him. 

33. Hear another parable. There was a householder, who planted 
a vineyard, and put a hedge around it, and dug a winepress in it, 
and built a tower, and let it out to husbandmen, and went abroad. 
34. And when the season of fruits drew near, he sent his servants 
to the husbandmen, to receive his fruits. 35. And the husband- 
men taking his servants, beat one, and killed another, and stoned 
another. 36. Again he sent other servants, more than the first ; 
and they did to them likewise. 37. And afterward he sent to them 
his son, saying : They will reverence my son. 38. But the hus- 
bandmen, seeing the son, said among themselves : This is the heir; 
come, let us kill him, and have his inheritance. 39. And taking 
him, they cast him out of the vineyard, and killed him. 40. When 
therefore the lord of the vineyard comes, what will he do to those 
husbandmen ? 41. They say to him : He will miserably destroy 
those wicked men, and will let out the vineyard to other husband- 
men, who will deliver over to him the fruits in their seasons. 42. 
Jesus says to them : Did ye never read in the Scriptures : 

The stone which the builders disallowed, 

The same is become the head of the corner ; 

This is from the Lord, 

And is wonderful in our eyes. [Fs. cxviii., 22. Is. xxviii., 16.] 

43. Therefore I say to you, that the kingdom of God- shall be taken 
from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof. 

44. And he that falls upon this stone will be broken ; but on whom- 
soever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder. 



§ 906 The Clavis to cm Index. 229' 

45. And the chief priests and Pharisees, hearing his parables, 
knew that he spoke of them. 46. And they sought to lay hold of 
him, but feared the multitudes, since they held him as a prophet. 

XXIII., 1. Then Jesus spoke to the multitudes, and to his dis- 
ciples, 2. saying : The scribes and the Pharisees sat down in 
Moses' seat. 3. All, therefore, whatever they bid you, do and ob- 
serve ; but do not according to their works, for they say and do 
not. 4. For they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne r 
and lay them on men's shoulders, but will not move them with 
their finger. 5. But all their works they do to be seen by men ; 
they make broad their phylacteries, and enlarge the fringes ; 6. 
and love the first place at feasts, and the first seats in the syna- 
gogues, 7. and the greetings in the markets, and to be called by 
men, Eabbi, Eabbi. 8. But be not ye called Babbi ; for one is your 
Teacher, and all ye are brethren. 9. And call not any your father 
on the earth ; for one is your Father, he who is in heaven. 10. 
Neither be called leaders ; for one is your leader, the Christ. 11. 
But the greatest of you shall be your servant. 12. And whoever 
shall exalt himself shall be humbled; and he that shall humble him- 
self, shall be exalted. 

13. But woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! because 
ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men ; for ye go not in, 
nor suffer those who are entering to go in. 

15. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! because ye 
traverse sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, 
ye make him twofold more a child of hell than yourselves. 

16. Woe to you, blind guides, who say : Whoever shall swear by 
the temple, it is nothing; but \j$4$ever shall swear by the gold of 
the temple, he is bound. 17. r ools. and blind ; for which is greater, 
the gold, or the temple that sanctifies the gold? 18. And, Who- 
ever shall swear by the altar, it is nothing; but whoever shall 
swear by the gift that is upon it, he is bound. 19. Fools and blind : 
for which is greater, the gift, or the altar that sanctifies the gift? 

20. He therefore who swears by the altar, swears by it, and by 
all things thereon. 21. And he that swears by the temple, swears 
by it, and by him who dwells therein. 22. And he that swears by 
heaven, swears by the throne of Gfod, and by him who sits 
thereon. 

23. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! because ye 
pay tithe of the mint and the dill and the cumin, and omitted the 
weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith ; these 
ought ye to have done, and not leave those undone. 



230 Kant's Ethics. $ 906 

24. Blind guides! that strain out the gnat, and swallow the 
camel. 

25. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! because ye 
cleanse the outside of the cup and the platter, but within they are. 
full of rapacity and excess. 26. Blind Pharisee! Cleanse first 
the inside of the cup and the platter, that its outside also may be- 
come clean. 

27. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! because ye 
are like to whited sepulchres, which outwardly indeed appear beau- 
tiful, but within are full of bones of the dead, and of all unclean- 
ness. 28. So also ye outwardly indeed appear righteous to men, 
but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity. 

29. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! because ye 
build the sepulchres of the prophets, and adorn the tombs of the 
righteous, and say : 30. If we had been in the days of our fathers, we 
would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the 
prophets. 31. So that ye witness to yourselves, that ye are sons of 
those who killed the prophets ; 32. and fill ye up the measure of 
your fathers ! 

33. Serpents ! Brood of vipers ! How can ye escape the judg- 
ment of hell ? 

34. Therefore, behold, 1 send forth to you prophets, and wise 
men, and scribes; and some of them ye will kill and crucify, and 
some of them ye will scourge in your synagogues, and persecute 
from city to city ; 35. that on you may come all the righteous 
blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel to the 
blood of Zechariah, son of Barachiah, whom ye slew between the 
temple and the altar. 36. Verily 1 say to you, all these things 
shall come upon this generation. 

37. Jerusalem ! Jerusalem ! that killest the prophets, and stonest 
those sent to her ; how often would I have gathered thy children 
together, as a hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and ye 
would not ! 38. Behold, your house is left to you desolate. 39. 
For I say to you, ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say : 
Blessed is he that comes in the name of the Lord. 

XXV., 1. Then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened to ten 
virgins, who took their lamps, and went out to meet the bridegroom. 
2. And five of them were wise, and five foolish. 3. The foolish, 
taking their lamps, took no oil with them ; 4. but the wise took 
oil in their vessels with their lamps. 5. While the bridegroom 
tarried, they all slumbered and slept. 6. And at midnight a cry 
was made: Behold, the bridegroom! G-o out to meet him. 7. 
Then all those virgins arose, and trimmed their lamps. 8. And the 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 281 

foolish said to the wise : Give us of your oil, for our lamps are 
going out. 9. But the wise answered, saying : Not so ; there will 
not be enough for us and you. Go rather to those who sell, and 
buy for yourselves. 10. And while they went to buy, the bride- 
groom came ; and they who were ready went in with him to the 
marriage; and the door was shut. 11. And afterward come also 
the rest of the virgins, saying: Lord j Lord, open to us. 12. But 
he answering said : Yerily 1 say to you, I know you not. 

13. Watch, therefore ; because ye know not the day, nor the 
hour ! 

14. For as a man going abroad called his own servants, and de- 
livered to them his goods; 15. and to one gave five talents, to 
another two, and to another one, to each according to his own 
.ability; and straightway went abroad. 16. And he that received 
the five talents went and traded with them, and gained other five 
talents. 17. Likewise also he that received the two gained other 
two. 18. But he that received the one went away and digged in 
the earth, and hid his lord's money. 19. After a long time the 
lord of those servants comes, and reckons with them. 20. And he 
that received the five talents came and brought other five talents, 
saying : Lord, thou deliveredst to me five talents : behold, 
I gained other five talents beside them. 21. His lord, said 
to him: Well done, good and faithful servant; thou wast faithful 
over a little, I will set thee over much. Enter thou into the joy of 
thy lord. 22. And he also that reeeived the two talents came and 
said : Lord, thou deliveredst to me two talents ; behold, I gained 
other two talents beside them. 23. His lord said to him : Well 
done, good and faithful servant ; thou wast faithful over a little, I 
will set thee over much. Enter thou into the joy of thy lord. 24. 
And he also that received the one talent came and said : Lord, I 
knew thee that thou art a hard man, reaping where thou didst' not 
sow, and gathering where thou strewedst not. 25. And fearing, 
I went and hid thy talent in the earth. Lo, thou hast thine own. 
26. And his lord answering said to him : Wicked and slothful ser- 
vant ! Thou knewest that I reap where I did not sow, and gather 
where 1 strewed not ? 27. Thou oughtest therefore to have put 
my money to the exchangers ; and when ] came, I should have re- 
ceived nry own with interest. 28. Take therefore the talent from 
him, and give to him that has the ten talents. 29. For to every 
one that has shall be given, and he shall have abundance ; but 
from him that has not, even what he has shall be taken away. 30. 
And cast forth the unprofitable servant into the outer darkness. 
There will be the weeping, and the gnashing of teeth! 



282 Kant's Ethics. § 906 

31. And when the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all 
the angels with him, then will he sit on his throne of glory. 32. 
And before him shall be gathered all the nations ; and he will 
divide them one from another, as the shepherd divides the sheep 
from the goats. 33. And he will set the sheep on his right hand, 
but the goats on the left. 

34. Then will the King say. to those on his right hand : Come, 
blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from 
the foundation of the world. 35. For I was hungry, and ye gave 
me to eat ; 1 was thirst}-, and ye gave me drink ; I was a stranger 
and ye took me in, 36. naked and ye clothed me; I was sick, and 
ye visited me ; I was in prison, and ye came to me. 

37. Then will the righteous answer him, saying : Lord, when saw 
we thee hungering and fed thee, or thirsting and gave thee drink ? 
38. And when saw we thee a stranger and took thee in, or naked 
and clothed thee ? 39. And when saw we thee sick, or in prison, 
and came to thee ? 40. And the King will answer and say to them : 
Verily I say to yon, inasmuch as ye did it to one of the least of 
these my brethren, ye did it to me. 

41. Then will he say also to those on the left hand : Depart from 
me, accursed, into the everlasting fire, prepared for the Devil and his 
angels. 42. For I was hungry, and ye did not give me to eat ; I 
was thirsty, and ye did not give me drink ; 43. I was a stranger, 
and ye did not take me in ; naked, and ye did not clothe me ; sick, 
and in prison, and ye did not visit me. 

44. Then will they also answer, saying : Lord, when saw we thee 
hungering, or thirsting, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in 
prison, and did not minister to thee ? 45. Then will he answer 
them, saying : Verily I say to you, inasmuch as ye did it not to 
one of the least of these, ye did it not to me. 

46. And these shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the 
righteous into everlasting life. 

EXTRACTS FROM MARK. 

II. , 23. And it came to pass, that he went through the grain- 
fields on the sabbath; and his disciples began to go forward, pluck- 
ing the ears of grain. 24. And the Pharisees said to him : Behold, 
why do they on the sabbath that which is not lawful ? 25. And 
he said to them: Did ye never read what David did, when he had 
need and hungered, himself and they who were with him ; 26. 
how he went into the house of G-od, in the days of Abiathar the 
high priest, and ate the show-bread, which it is not lawful to eat 
but for the priests, and gave also to those who were with him ? 27. 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 233 

And he said to them : The sabbath was made for man, and not 
man for the sabbath. 28. So that the Son of man is Lord also of 
the sabbath. 

IY., 26. And he said : So is the kingdom of God, as when a man 
has cast the seed upon the earth, 27. and sleeps and rises night 
and day, and the seed sprouts and grows up. ha knows not how. 
28. For the earth brings forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then 
•the ear, then the full grain in the ear. 29. But when the fruit 
permits, immediately he puts forth the sickle because the harvest 
is come. 

YIL, 1. And there come together to him the Pharisees and cer- 
tain of the scribes, who came from Jerusalem. 2. And seeing some 
of his disciples eating bread with defiled (that is, unwashen) hands, 
they found fault. 3. For the Pharisees, and all the Jews, except 
they carefully wash their hands, do not eat, holding the tradition 
of the elders. 4. And coming from the market, except they im- 
merse themselves, they do not eat. And there are many other 
things which they received to hold, immersions of cups, and pots, 
and brazen vessels, and couches. 5. And the Pharisees and the 
scribes ask him : Why do not thy disciples walk according to the 
tradition of the elders, but eat bread with defiled hands ? 6. And 
he said to them : Well did Isaiah prophesy concerning you hypo- 
crites ; as it is written : 

This people honor me with their lips, 
But their heart is far from me. 
7. But in vain they worship me, 

Teaching as doctrines commandments of men. 

8. For laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tra- 
dition of men, immersions of pots and cups ; and many other such 
things ye do. 9. And he said to them : Well do ye reject the com- 
mandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition ! 10. For 
Moses said : Honor thy father and thy mother ; and he that curses 
father or mother, let him surely die. 11. But ye say: If a man 
say to his father or his mother, It is Corban (that is, a gift) what- 
ever thou mightest be profited with from me — ;* 12. and ye suffer 
him no more to do aught for his father or his mother, 13. an- 
nulling the word of God by your tradition, wdiich ye handed down. 
And many such things ye do. 

14. And again calling to him the multitude, he said to them : 
Hearken to me every one, and understand. 15. There is nothing; 

* The conclusion. " He is bound : ' (by Lis vow), and so freed from the duty 
to his parents, is left to be inferred from the speaker's silence; compare th« 
similar use of this figure of speech in Exodus, xxxii., 32; Luke, xiiL 9; Acts, 
xxiii., 9. 

16 



234 Kant's Ethics. §906 

from without a man, that entering into him can defile him ; hut 
. the things that come out of him, these are they that defile the man. 
16. If any one has ears to hear, let him hear. 

X., 13. And they brought little children to him, that he might 
touch them ; and the disciples rebuked those who brought them. 
14. But Jesus seeing it, was much displeased, and said to them : 
Suffer the little children to come to me ; forbid them not, for to 
such belongs the kingdom of God. 15. Verily I say to you, who- 
ever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, shall not 
enter therein. 16. And he folded them in his arms, put his hands 
on them, and blessed them. 

17. And as he was going forth into the way, there came one run- 
ning, and kneeling to him, and asked him : Good Teacher, what 
shall I do that I may inherit eternal life ? 18. And Jesus said to 
him : Why callest thou me good ? There is none good but one, 
God. 19. Thou knowest the commandments : Do not commit 
adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, De- 
fraud not, Honor thy father and mother. 20. And he answering 
said to him : Teacher, all these I kept from my youth. 21. And 
Jesus beholding him loved him, and said to him : One thing thou 
lackest ; go, sell whatever thou hast, and give to the poor, and 
thou shalt have treasure in heaven ; and come, take up the cross, 
and follow me. 22. And he became sad at that saying, and went 
away sorrowful ; for he had great possessions. 

23. And looking around, Jesus says to his disciples : How hardly 
shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God ! 24. 
And the disciples were astonished at his words. But Jesus answer- 
ing again says to them : Children, how hard it is for those who 
trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God ! 25. It is easier 
for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man 
to enter into the kingdom of God. 26. And they were exceedingly 
amazed, saying among themselves : Who then can be saved? 27. 
And Jesus, looking on them, says : With men it is impossible, but 
not with God ; for with God all things are possible. 

XII., 28. And one of the scribes came to him, and having heard 
them reasoning together, and perceiving that he answered them 
well, asked him : Which commandment is first of all ? 29. And 
Jesus answered him : First is, Hear, O Israel ; the Lord is our God, 
the Lord is one ; 30. and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with 
all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and 
with all thy strength. This is the first commandment. 31. Second 
is this : Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. There is no 
other commandment greater than these. 32. And the scribe said 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 235 

to him : Well, Teacher ; thou saiclst truly that he is one, and there 
is no other beside him : 33. and to love him with all the heart, 
and with all the understanding, and with all the soul, and with all 
the strength, and to love his neighbor as himself, is more than all 
the whole-burnt- offerings and sacrifices. 34. And Jesus, seeing 
that he answered intelligently, said to him : Thou art not far from 
the kingdom of Grod. And no one dared any longer to question him. 

38. And he said to them in his teaching : Beware of the scribes, 
who love to go about in long robes, and love greetings in the mar- 
kets, 39. and the first seats in the synagogues, and the first places 
at the feasts ; 40. who devour widows' houses, and for a pretense 
make long prayers ; these shall receive greater condemnation. 

41. And sitting over against the treasury, he beheld how the 
people cast money into the treasury ; and many that were rich 
cast in much. 42. And one poor widow came, and cast in two 
mites, which are a farthing. 43. And calling to him his disciples, 
he said to them : Yerily I say to you, that this poor widow cast in 
more than all who are casting into the treasury. 44. For all cast 
in out of their abnndance ; but she, out of her want, cast in all that 
she had, her whole living. 

XIII., 31. Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words 
shall not pass away. 

32. But of that day or hour no one knows, not even the 
angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father. 33. Take heed, 
watch ; for ye know not when the time is. 34. As a man who is 
abroad, having left his house, and given authority to his servants, 
to each one his work, also commanded the porter that he should 
watch ; 35. watch therefore, for ye know not when the master of 
the house comes, at evening, or at midnight, or at the cock-crow- 
ing, or in the morning ; 36, lest coming suddenly he find you 
sleeping. 37. And what I say to you, I say to all, Watch. 

EXTRACTS FROM LUKE. 

VI., 20. And he, lifting up his eyes on his disciples, said : Happy 
are ye poor ; for yours is the kingdom of God. 21. Happy are ye 
that hunger now ; for ye shall be filled. Happy are ye that weep 
now; for ye shall laugh. 

22. Happy are ye, when men shall hate you, and when they 
shall separate you from them, and shall reproach you, and cast out 
your name as evil, for the sake of the Son of man. 23. Eejoice in 
that day, and leap for joy ; for, behold, your reward is great in 
heaven ; for in the same manner did their fathers to the prophets. 

24. But woe to you that are rich ; for ye have received your 
consolation. 25. Woe to you that are full; for ye shall hunger. 



236 Kant's Ethic*. § 905 

Woe to you that laugh now ; for ye shall mourn and weep. 
26. Woe ! when all men shall speak well of you; for in the same 
manner did their fathers to the false prophets. 

27. But I say to you who hear : Love your enemies, do good to 
those who hate you, 28. bless those who curse you, pray for 
those who abuse you. 29. To him who smites thee on the cheek 
offer also the other ; and him who takes away thy cloak forbid not 
to take thy coat also. 

30. Give to every one that asks of thee ; and of him who takes 
away thy goods demand them not again. 31. And as ye would 
that men should do to you, do ye also in like manner to them. 

32. For if ye love those who love you, what thanks have ye ? 
For even the sinners love those who love them. 33. And if ye do 
good to those who do good to you, what thanks have ye ? For 
even the sinners do the same. 34. And if ye lend to those of 
whom ye hope to receive, what thanks have ye? And sinners lend 
to sinners, that they may receive as much in return. 

35. But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for 
nothing in return ; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall 
be sons of the Highest ; for he is kind to the unthankful and evil. 
36. Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful. 

37. And judge not, and ye shall not be judged ; condemn not, 
and ye shall not be condemned ; acquit, and ye shall be acquitted. 

38. Give, and it shall be given to you; good measure, pressed down, 
shaken together, running over, shall they give into your bosom. 
For with the same measure with which ye mete it shall be measured 
to you again. 

39. And he spoke also a parable to them : Can the blind lead the 
blind ? Shall they not both fall into the ditch ? 40. A disciple is 
not above the teacher ; but every one shall be perfected as his 
teacher. 

41. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's 
eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye ? 42. 
How canst thou say to thy brother : Brother, let me cast out the 
mote that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam 
that is in thine own eye ? Hypocrite ! cast out first the beam out 
of thine eye, and then thou shalt see clearly to cast out the mote 
that is in thy brother's eye. 

43. For there is no good tree that bears corrupt fruit, nor cor- 
rupt tree that bears good fruit. 44. For every tree is known from 
its own fruit. For from thorns they do not gather figs, nor from 
a bramble bush do they harvest grapes. 45. The good man out of 
the good treasure of his heart brings forth that which is good ; 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 237 

and the evil, out of the evil, brings forth that which is evil; for out 
of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaks. 

46. And why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things 
which I say ? 47. Every one that comes to me, and hears my 
sayings, and does them, I will show you to whom he is like. 48. 
He is like a man building a house, who digged deep, and laid a 
foundation on the rock. And when a flood arose, the stream burst 
upon that house, and could not shake it ; because it was well 
builded. 49. But he that hears, and does not, is like a man that 
built a house upon the earth without a foundation ; on which the 
stream burst, and immediately it fell ;. and the ruin of that house 
was great. 

VIII., 4. And a great multitude coming together, of those also 
who came to him out of every city, he spoke by a parable : 5. The 
sower went forth to sow his seed. And as he sowed, one fell by 
the wayside ; and it was trodden down, and the fowls of the air 
devoured it. 6. And another fell upon the rock ; and springing 
up, it withered away, because it had no moisture. 7. And another 
fell among the thorns ; and the thorns sprang up with it, and 
choked it. 8. And another fell into the good ground, and sprang 
up, and bore fruit a hundredfold. 

And saying these things, he cried : He that has ears to hear, let 
him hear. 

9. And his disciples asked him, what this parable was. 10. And 
he said : To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom 
of God ; but to the rest in parables, that seeing they may not see, 
and hearing they may not understand. 

11. Now the parable is this : The seed is the word of God. 12. 
Those by the wayside are they that hear ; after that comes the 
Devil, and takes away the word from their heart, that they may 
not believe and be saved. 13. Those on the rock are they who, 
when they hear, with joy receive the word ; and these have no 
root, who for a while believe, and in time of temptation fall away. 
14. And that which fell among the thorns, these are they who have 
heard, and going forth are choked with the cares and riches and 
pleasures of life, and bring no fruit to perfection. 15. But that in 
the good ground, these are they who, in an honest and good heart, 
having heard, hold east the word, and bring forth fruit with 
patience. 

16. No one, having lighted a lamp, covers it with a vessel, or puts 
it under a bed ; but puts it on a lamp-stand, that they who enter in 
may behold the light. 17. For nothing is secret, that shall not be 
made manifest, nor hidden, that shall not be known and come 



238 Kant's Ethics. § 906 

abroad. 18. Take heed therefore how ye hear. For whoever has, 
to him shall he given ; and whoever has not, even what he seems to 
have shall be taken from him. 

19. And his mother and his brothers came to him ; and they 
could not come near him on account of the multitude. 20. And it 
was told him, saying : Thy mother and thy brothers are standing 
without, desiring to see thee. 21. And he answering, said to 
them : My mother and my brothers are these, who hear and do 
the word of God. 

IX., 57. And as they were going in the way, a certain one said 
to him: I will follow thee withersoever thou goest. 58. And Jesus 
said to him : The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have 
nests ; but the Son of man has not where to lay his head. 

59. And he said to another : Follow me. But he said : Lord, 
permit me first to go and buiy my father. 60. And he said to him : 
Let the dead bury their own dead ; but do thou go and announce 
the kingdom of God. 

61. And another also said: I will follow thee, Lord; but first 
permit me to bid farewell to those in my house. 62. And Jesus 
said to him : No one. having put his hand to the plow, and looking 
back, is fit for the kingdom of God. 

X.. 1. After these things the Lord appointed also seventy others, 
and sent them two and two before his face, into every city and 
place, whither he himself was about to come. 2. And he said to 
them : The harvest indeed is great, but the laborers are few. Pray 
therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he will send forth laborers 
into his harvest. 3. Go your ways; behold, I send you forth as 
lambs among wolves. 4. Carry neither purse, nor bag, nor san- 
dals ; and salute no one by the way. 5. And into whatever house 
ye enter, first say : Peace be to this house. 6. And if a son of 
peace be there, your peace shall rest upon it ; and if not, it shall 
return to you. 7. And in that house remain, eating and drinking 
such things as they give ; for the laborer is worthy of his hire. Go 
not from house to house. 8. And into whatever city ye enter and 
they receive you. eat what is set before you ; 9. and heal the sick 
that are therein, and say to them : The kingdom of God has come 
nigh unto you. 

16. He that hears you, hears me ; and he that rejects you, rejects 
me; and he^that rejects me, rejects him who sent me. 

25. And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, tempting him, say- 
ing: Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life ? 26. He said 
to him : "What is written in the law? How readest thou? 27. And 
he answering said : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 



§ 906 The Claris to an Index. 239 

heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with 
all thy mind ; and thy neighbor as thyself. 28. And he said to 
him: Thou answeredst rightly. This do, and thou shalt live. 29. 
But he, desiring to justify himself, said to Jeaus : Who then is my 
neighbor ? 

30. And Jesus answering said : A certain man was going down 
from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among robbers, who stripped 
him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him 
half dead. 31. And by chance a certain priest was going down 
that way ; and seeing him, he passed by on the other side. 32. 
And in like manner also a Levite, arriving at the place, came and 
saw, and passed by on the other side. 

33. And a certain Samaritan, as he was journeying, came where 
he was, and seeing him had compassion ; 34. and coming to him, 
bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine ; and setting him on 
his own beast, he brought him to an inn, and took care of him. 35. 
And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two denaries 
and gave to the' host, and said : Take care of him ; and whatever 
thou spendest more, when I come again I will repay thee. 

36. Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbor to 
him that fell among the robbers ? 37. And he said : He that had 
mercy on him. And Jesus said to him : Go, and clo thou likewise. 

XL, 33. JSTo one, having lighted a lamp, puts it in a secret place, 
or under the bushel, but on the lamp-stand, that they who come in 
may see the light. 34. The lamp of the body is thine eye. When 
thine eye is single, thy whole body also is light ; but when it is 
evil, thy body also is dark. 35. Take heed therefore, lest the light 
that is in thee is darkness. 86. If therefore tlry whole body is 
light, having no part dark, it shall be all light as ( when the lamp, 
with its bright shining, gives thee light. 

37. And as he was speaking, a Pharisee asked him to dine with him; 
and he went in, and reclined at table, 38. And the Pharisee, see- 
ing it, wondered that he did not first immerse himself before din- 
ner. 39. And the Lord said to him : Now ye Pharisees cleanse 
the outside of the cup' and the platter ; but your inward part is full 
of rapacity and wickedness. 40. Fools ! Did not he, who made 
the outside, make the inside also? 41. But give that which ye 
have in alms ; and, behold, all things are clean to you. 

XII. , 13. And a certain one of the multitude said to him : Teach- 
er, speak to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me. 
14. And he said to him : Man, who made me a judge or a divider 
over you? 15. And he said to them : take heed, and beware of all 
covetousness ; because a man's life consists not in the abundance 
of his possessions. 



£40 Kant's Ethics. § 906 

16. And he spoke a parable to them, saying : The ground of a 
certain rich man brought forth plentifully. 17. And he thought 
within himself, saying : What shall I do, because I have not where 
to store my fruits ? 18. And he S'aid : This will I do ; 1 will pull 
down my barns, and will build greater; and there I will store all 
my fruits and my goods. 19. And I will say to my soul: Soul, 
thou hast many goods laid up for many years ; take thine ease, 
eat, drink, be merry. 20. But God said to him : Fool! this night 
thy soul shall be required of thee ; and whose shall those things 
be, which thou clidst provide ? 21. So is he that lays up treasure 
for himself, and is not rich toward God. 

22. And he 'said to his disciples : Therefore I say to you, take 
not thought for the life, what ye shall eat, nor for the body, what 
ye shall put on. 23. The life is more than food, and the body than 
raiment. 24. Consider the ravens, that they sow not nor reap ; 
which have neither storehouse nor barn ; and God feeds them. 
How much better are ye than the birds! 25. And which of you 
by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature ? 26. If therefore 
ye can not do even that which is least, why take ye thought for 
the rest ? 

27. Consider the lilies, how they grow ; they toil not, nor spin ; 
and I say to you, that even Solomon, in all his glory, was not ar- 
rayed like one of these. 28. And if God so clothes the grass, which 
to-day is in the field, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how 
much more you, ye of little faith ? 29. And ye, seek not what ye 
shall eat, or what ye shall drink, and be not of a doubtful mind. 
30. For all these things do the nations of the world seek after; and 
your Father knows that ye have need of these. 31. But seek his 
kingdom, and these things shall be added to you. 

32. Fear not, little flock ; for it is your Father's good pleasure to 
give you the kingdom. 33. Sell what ye have, and give alms ; pro- 
vide yourselves purses that wax not old, a treasure unfailing in 
the heavens, where a thief approaches not, nor moth corrupts. 34. 
For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. 

35. Let your loins be girded about, and your lamps burning : 
36. and ye like men waiting for their lord, when he shall return 
from the wedding ; that, when he comes and knocks, they may 
open to him immediately. 37. Happy those servants, whom their 
lord when he comes shall find watching ! Verily I say to you, that 
he will gird himself, and make them recline at table, and will come 
forth and serve them. 38. And if he shall come in the second 
watch, or in the third watch, and find it so, happy are those ser- 
vants. 39. And this know, that if the master of the house had 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 241 

known at what hour the thief is coming, he would have watched, 
and not have suffered his house to he broken through. 40. Be ye 
also ready ; for at an hour when ye think not, the Son of man 
comes. 

41. And Peter said to him : Lord, speakest thou this parable to 
us, or also to all ? 42. And the Lord said : Who then is the faith- 
ful, the wise steward, whom his lord will set over his household, to 
give the portion of food in due season ? 43. Happy that servant, 
whom his lord when he comes shall find so doing! 44. Of a truth 
1 say to you, that he will make him ruler over all his goods. 

45. But if that servant say in his heart : My lord delays his com- 
ing; and shall begin to beat the men-servants and maid-servants, 
and to eat and drink, and to be drunken ; 46. the lord of that ser- 
vant will come in a day when he looks not for it, and in an hour 
when he is not aware, and will cut him asunder, and appoint his 
portion with the faithless. 

47. And that servant, who knew his lord's will, and prepared 
not, nor did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; 
48. but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall 
be beaten with few. For to whomsoever much was given, of him 
much will be required ; and to whom they committed much, of him 
they will require the more. 

XIV., 1. And it came to pass, as he went into the house of one 
of the chief of the Pharisees to eat bread on the sabbath, that they 
watched him. 2. And, behold, there was a certain man before him 
who had the dropsy. 3. And Jesus answering spoke to the lawj^ers 
and Pharisees, saying : Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath, or not? 
And they were silent. 4. And taking hold of him, he healed him, 
and let him go. 5. And to them, he said : Who is there of you, 
whose ox or ass shall fall into a pit, and he will not straightway 
draw him up on the sabbath day ? 6. And they could not answer 
him again to these things. 

7. And he spoke a parable to those who were bidden, when he 
marked how they chose out the first places ; saying to them : 8. 
When thou are bidden by any one to a wedding, recline not in the 
first place at table, lest one more honorable than thou may have 
been bidden by him ; 9. and he that bade thee and him shall come 
and say to thee, Give place to this man ; and then thou shalt begin 
with shame to take the lowest place. 10. But when thou art bid- 
den, go and recline in the lowest place ; that when he that bade thee 
comes, he may say to thee, Friend, go up higher. Then shalt thou 
have honor in the presence of those who recline at table with thee. 
11. For every one that exalts himself shall be humbled ; and he 
that humbles himself shall be exalted. 



242 Kant's Ethics. § 906 

12. And he said also to him who bade him : When thou* makest 
a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brothers- nor thy 
kinsmen, nor rich neighbors ; lest they also bid thee again, and a 
recompense be made thee. 13. But when thou makest a feast, call 
the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind. 14. And happy shalt 
thou be, because they can not recompense thee ; for thou shalt 
be recompensed at the resurrection of the righteous. 

15. And a certain one of those who reclined at table with him, 
hearing these things, said to him : Happy is he, who shall eat bread 
in the kingdom of God! 16. And he said to him: A certain man 
made a great supper, and bade many. 17. And he sent his servent, 
at the hour of the supper, to say to those who were bidden : Come, 
for all things are now ready. 18. And they all, with one mind, 
began to excuse themselves. The first said to him: I bought a 
piece of ground, and I must needs go out and see it ; I pray thee 
let me be excused. 19. And another said: I bought five yoke of 
oxen, and 1 am going to make trial of them ; I pray thee let me be 
excused. 20. And another said : I married a wife ; and therefore 
I can not come. 

21. And the servant came, and reported these things to his lord. 
Then the master of the house, being angry, said to his servant : Go 
out quickly into the streets and lanes of the city, and bring in 
hither the poor, and maimed, and lame, and blind. 22. And the 
servant said : Lord, it is done as thou didst command, and yet there 
is room. 23. And the Lord said to the servant : Go out into the 
highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house 
may be filled ; 24. for I say to you, that none of those men who 
were bidden shall taste of my supper. 

XV., 1. And there were drawing near to him all the publicans 
and the sinners to hear him. 2. And the Pharisees and the scribes 
murmured, saying : This man receives sinners, and eats with them. 

3. And he spoke this parable to them, saying : 4. What man of 
you having a hundred sheep, and having lost one of them, does not 
leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which 
is lost, until he finds it? 5. And having found it, he lays it on his 
shoulders, rejoicing. 6. And coming home, he calls together his 
friends and neighbors, saying to them : Eejoice with me ; because 
I found my sheep which was lost. 7. 1 say to you, that so there 
will be joy in heaven over one sinner that repents, more than over 
ninety and nine just persons, who have no need of repentance. 

8. Or what woman having ten pieces of silver, if she lose one 
piece, does not light a lamp, and sweep the house, and seek care- 
fully till she finds it ? 9. And having found it, she calls her friends 



§ 906 The Cldvis to an Index. 243 

aud neighbors together, saying : Rejoice with me ; because I found 
the piece which I lost/ 10. So, I say to you, there is joy in the 
jjresence of the angels of G-od over one sinner that repents. 

11. And he said : A certain man had two sons. 12. And the 
younger of them said to his father : Father, give me the portion of 
the property that falls to me. And he divided to them his living. 
13. And not many days after, the younger son gathered all together, 
and went abroad into a far country, and there wasted his substance in 
riotous living. 14. And when he had spent all, there arose a griev- 
ous famine in that country; and he began to be in want. 15. And 
he went and joined himself to one of the citizens of that country ; 
and he sent him into his fields to feed swine. 16. And he would 
fain have filled his belly with the husks which the swine ate ; and 
no one gave to him. 17. And coming to himself, he said : How 
many hired servants of my father have bread enough and to spare, 
and I perish here with hunger! 18. I will arise and go to my 
father, and will say to him : Father, I sinned against heaven, and 
before thee. 19. I am no longer worthy to be called thy son ; 
make me as one of thy hired servants. 

20. And he arose, and came to his father. But when he was yet 
a great way off, his father saw him and had compassion, and ran 
and fell on his neck, and kissed him. 21. And the son said to him : 
Father, I sinned against heaven, and before thee ; I am no longer 
worthy to be called thy son. 22. But the father said to his ser- 
vants : Bring forth a robe, the best, and put it on him : and put a 
ring on his hand, and sandals on his feet ; 23. and bring the fatted 
calf, and kill it ; and let us eat and be merry. 24. Because this 
my son was dead and is alive again, was lost and is found. And 
they began to be merry. 

25. ~Now his elder son was in the field. And as he came, and 
drew near to the house, he heard music and dancing. 26. And 
calling to him one of the servants, he inquired what these things 
meant. 27. And he said to him : Thy brother is come ; and thy 
father killed the fatted calf, because he received him back, safe and 
sound. 28. And he was angry, and would not go in ; and his 
father came out and entreated him. 29. And he answering said to 
his father : Lo, so many years do I serve thee, and never trans- 
gressed thy command ; and to me thou never gavest a kid, that I 
might make merry with my friends. 30. But when this thy son 
came, who devoured thy living with harlots, thou didst kill for him 
the fatted calf. 31. And he said to him : Child, thou art ever with 
me, and all that I have is thine. 32. It was meet that we should 
make merry, and be glad ; because this thy brother was dead and 
is alive again ; and was lost, and is found. 



244 Kant 8 Ethics. § 906 

XVI., 19. There was a certain rich man, who was clothed in 
purple and fine linen, and fared sumptously every day. 20. And 
there was a certain beggar named Lazarus, who was laid at his 
gate, full of sores, 21. and desiring to be fed with the crumbs that 
fell from the rich man's table. Moreover the dogs came and licked 
his sores. 22. And it came to pass, that the beggar died ; and he 
was borne away by the angels into Abraham's bosom. The rich 
man also died, and was buried ; 23. and in the under-world, lift- 
ing up his eyes, being in torments, he sees Abraham afar off, and 
Lazarus in his bosom. 24. And he cried and said : Father Abraham, 
have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of 
his finger in water, and cool my tongue ; for I am tormented in this 
flame. 25. But Abi-aham said : Child, remember that in thy life- 
time thou receivedst thy good things in full, and Lazarus in like 
manner his evil things ; but now here, he is comforted and thou 
art tormented. 26. And besides all this, between us and you a 
great gulf is fixed ; that they who would pass from hence to you 
may not be able, nor those from thence pass over to us. 27. And 
he said : I pray thee therefore, father, that thou wouldst send him 
to my father's house. 28. For I have five brothers ; that he may 
testify to them, that they may not also come into this place of tor- 
ment. 29. Abraham says to him : They have Moses and the 
prophets ; let them hear them. 30. And he said : Nay, father 
Abraham ; but if one, should go to them from the dead, they will re- 
pent. 31. And he said to him : If they hear not Moses and the 
prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one should ris& 
from the dead. 

XVII., 7. And who of you, having a servant plowing, or feeding 
cattle, will say to him immediately, when he has come in from the 
field, Come and recline at table ; 8. and will not rather say to him, 
Make ready wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself and serve me, 
till I have eaten and drunken, and afterward thou shaft eat and 
drink? 9. Does he thank that servant, because he did the things 
that were commanded? I think not. 10. So also ye, when ye 

SHALL HAVE DONE ALL THE THINGS THAT WERE COMMANDED yOU, 

say, We are unprofitable servants : we have done that which was. 

OUR DUTY to do. 

20. And being asked by the Pharisees, when the kingdom of Cod 
would come, he answered them and said : The kingdom op Cod 
comes not with observation ; 21. nor shall they say, Lo here ! 
or, Lo there ! for, behold, the kingdom of Cod is within you. 

XVIII. , 9. And he spoke this parable to some who trust in 
themselves that they are righteous, and despise others. 10. Two 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 245 

men went up into the temple to pray; one a Pharisee, and the 
other a publican. 11. The Pharisee stood, and prayed thus with 
himself: God, 1 thank thee, that I am not as other men, extortion- 
ers, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican. 12. I fast twice in 
the week ; I give tithes of all that I possess. 13. And the publican, 
standing afar off, would not even lift up his eyes to heaven, but 
smote upon his breast, saying : God be merciful to me, the sinner. 
14. I say to you, this man went down to his house justified, rather 
than the other. For every one that exalts himself shall be hum- 
bled ; and he that humbles himself shall be exalted. 

XIX., 47. And he was teaching daily in the temple; and the 
chief priests and the scribes and the chief of the people were seek- 
ing to destroy him, 48. and could not find what they might do ; 
for all the people hung, listening, upon him. 

• XX., 20. And watching him, they sent forth spies, feigning 
themselves to be just men, that they might take hold of his words, 
in order to deliver him up to the magistracy, and to* the authority 
of the governor. 21. And they asked him, saying: Teacher, we 
know that thou sayest and teachest rightly, and regardest not the 
person of any, but teachest the way of God truly. 22. Is it lawful 
that we should give tribute to Caesar, or not ? 23. And perceiving 
their craftiness, he said to them : 24. Show me a denary. Whose 
image and inscription has it ? And answering they said : Caesar's. 

25. And he said to them : Eender therefore to C^sar the 

THINGS THAT ARE CESAR'S, AND TO GOD THE THINGS THAT ARE God's. 

26. And they could not take hold of his words before the people ; 
and they marveled at his answer, and held their peace. 

27. And some of the Sadduces, who deny that there is a resur- 
rection, coming to him, asked him, 28. saying : Teacher, Moses 
wrote to us, if a man's brother die, having a wife, and he die child- 
less, that his brother should take his wife, and raise up seed to his 
brother. 

9 

29. There were therefore seven brothers ; and the first took a 
wife, and died childless ; 30. and the second and the third took 
her ; 31. and in like manner also the seven left no children, and 
died. 32. At last the woman also died. 33. In the resurrection, 
therefore, of which of them is she wife ? For the seven had her 
for a wife. 

34. And Jesus answering said to them : The sons of this world 
marry, and are given in marriage. 35. But they who are accounted 
worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, 
neither marry, nor are given in marriage ; 36. for neither can they 
die any more ; for they are equal to the angels and are sons of God, 
being sons of the resurrection. 



246 Kan? 8 Ethics. § 906 

37. Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed, at The 
Bush, when he calls the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of 
Isaac, and the God of Jacob. 38. For he is not a God of the dead, 
but of the living ; for to him all live. 

39. And some of the scribes answering said : Teacher, thou saidst 
well. 40. For they no longer dared to ask him any question. 

XXII., 1. Now the feast of unleavened bread was drawing near, 
which is called the Passover ; 2. and the chief priests and the 
scribes were seeking how they might kill him ; for they feared the 
people. 

14. And when the hour came, he reclined at table, and the apos- 
tles with him. 15. And he said to them : I earnestly desired to 
eat this passover with you before I suffer. 16. For I say to you, I 
shall eat of it no more, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God. 

24. And there arose also a contention among them, which 
of them should be accounted the greatest. 25. And he said to them: 
The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them ; and they 
who exercise authority over them are called benefactors. 26. But 
ye are not so ; but let the greatest among you become as the 
younger, and he that is chief as he that serves. 27. For which is 
Greater, he that reclines at table, or he that serves? Is not he that 
reclines at table ? But I am in the midst of you as he that serves. 

XXIII., 1. And the whole multitude of them arose,, and led him 
unto Pilate. 2. And they began to accuse him, saying : "We found 
this man perverting our nation, and forbidding to give tribute to 
Cgesar, saying that he himself is Christ, a king. 3. And Pilate 
asked him, saying : Art thou the King of the Jews ? And he an- 
swering said to him : Thou sayest it. 4. And Pilate said to the 
chief priests and the multitudes : I find no fault in this man. 5. 
And they were the more violent, saying : He stirs up the people, 
teaching, throughout all Judsea, beginning from Galilee, iinto this 
place. 

20. Again, therefore, Pilate spoke to them, desiring to release 
Jesus. 21. But they cried, saying : Crucify, crucify him. 22. And 
a third time he said to them : "What evil then has this man done ? 
I found no cause of death in him. I will therefore chastise, and re- 
lease him. 23. And they were urgent with loud voices, requiring 
that he should be crucified. And their voices and those of the chief 
priests prevailed. 24. And Pilate gave sentence, that what they 
required should be done. 

32. And there were also two others, malefactors, led with him to 
be put to death. 33. And when they had gone away to the place 
which is called A Skull, there they crucified him, and the malefac- 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 247 

tors, one on the right hand, and the other on the left. 34. And 
Jesus said : Father, forgive them ; for they know not what 

THEY DO. 

EXTRACTS FROM JOHN. 

III., 1. There was a man of the Pharisees, named Nicodemus, a 
ruler of the Jews. 2. The same came to him by night, and said to 
him: Rabbi, we know that thou hast cornea teacher from God; 
for no one can do these signs Avhich thou doest, except God be 
with him. 

3. Jesus answered and said to him : Yerily, verily, I say to thee, 
except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God. 
4. Nicodemus says to him : How can a man be born when he is 
old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb, and 
be born ? 

5. Jesus answered : Verily, verily, I say to thee, except a man be 
born of water and the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of 
God. 6. That which is born of the flesh is flesh ; and that which is 
born of the Spirit is spirit. 7. Marvel not that I said to thee : Te 
must be born again. 

8. The wind blows where it will, and thou hearest the sound 
thereof, but knowest not whence it comes, and whither it goes. So 
is every one that is born of the Spirit. 

9. JSTicodemus answered and said to him : How can these things 
be? 10. Jesus answered and said to him : Art thou the teacher of 
Israel, and knowest not these things ? 11. Yerily, verily, I say to 
thee, we speak that which we know, and testify that which we 
have seen ; and ye receive not our testimony. 12. If I told you 
the earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell 
you the heavenly things ? 13. And no one has ascended up into 
heaven, but he who came down out of heaven, the Son of man who 
is in heaven. 14. And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilder- 
ness, so must the Son of man be lifted up ; 15. that every one 
who believes on him may have everlasting life. 16. For God so 
loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whoever 
believes on him should not perish, but may have everlasting life. 
17. For God sent not his Son into the world to judge the world ; 
but that the world through him might be saved. 18. He that be- 
lieves on him is not judged ; but he that believes not has already 
been judged, because he has not believed on the name of the only- 
begotten Son of God. $0. And this is the judgment, that light has 
come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the 
light ; for their deeds were evil. 20. For every one that does evil 
hates the light, and comes not4o the light, lest his deeds should be 



248 Kant s Ethics. § 906 

reproved. 21. But he that does the truth comes to the light, that 
his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in G-od. 

IV., 1. When therefore the Lord knew that the Pharisees heard, 
that J esus made and immersed more disciples than John (2. though 
Jesus himself immersed not, but his disciples), 3. he left Judaea, 
and departed again into Galilee. 4. And he must go through 
Samaria. 5. He comes therefore to a city of Samaria, called Sychar, 
near to the parcel of ground that Jacob gave to his son Joseph. 6. 
And Jacob's well was there. Jesus therefore, being wearied with 
the journey, sat down thus on the well. .It was about the sixth 
hour. 

7. There comes a woman of Samaria to draw water. Jesus says 
to her : Give me to drink. 8. For his disciples had gone away into 
the city to buy food. 9. The Samaritan woman therefore says to 
him : How is it that thou, being a Jew, askest drink of me, being a 
Samaritan woman ? For Jews do not associate with Samaritans. 
10. Jesus answered and said to her : If thou knewest the gift of 
God, and who it is that says to thee, Give me to drink, thou 
wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living 
water. 11. The woman says to him : Sir, thou hast nothing to 
draw with, and the well is deep. From whence then hast thou the 
living water. 12. Art thou greater than our father Jacob, who 
gave us the well, and drank thereof himself, and his children, and 
his cattle? 13. Jesus answered and said to her : Every one that 
drinks of this water shall thirst again. 14. But whoever drinks of 
the water that I shall give him shall never thirst ; but the water 
that 1 shall give him shall become in him a well of water, springing 
up into everlasting life. 15. The woman says to him : Sir, give 
me this water, that I may not thirst, nor come hither to draw. 

16. Jesus says to her : Go, call thy husband, and come hither. 
17. The woman answered and said : I have no husband. Jesus says 
to her : Thou saidst well, I have no husband. 18. For thou hast 
had five husbands; and he whom thou now hast is not thy husband. 
That thou hast spoken truly. 

19. The woman says to him : Sir, I perceive that thou art a 
prophet. 20. Our fathers worshiped in this mountain ; and ye say, 
that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship. 21. 
Jesus says to her : Woman, believe me, an hour is coming, when 
ye shall neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem worship the 
Father. 22. Ye worship that which ye know not ; we worship 
that which we know ; because salvation is of the Jews. 23. But 
an hour is coming, and now is, when the true worshipers shall 
worship the Father in spirit and in truth ; for such the Father 



'§ 006 The Claris f an Index. 249 

•seeks to worship him. 24. God is spirit ; and that they worship 
him, must worship in spirit and in truth. 

31. In the meanwhile the disciples prayed him, saying: Master, 
eat. 32. But he said to them : I have food to cat that ye know not 
of. 33. Therefore said the disciples one to another: Has any one 
brought him aught to eat? 34. Jesus says to thorn : My food is to 
do the will of him who sent me, and to finish his work. 35. Do ye 
not say, that there are yet four months, and then comes the har- 
vest? Behold, I say to you, lift up your eyes and look on the 
fields, that they are already white for harvest, 3G. And he that 
reaps receives wages, and gathers fruit unto lii'e eternal; that both 
he that sows and he that reaps may rejoice together. 

V., 1. After these things there was a feast of the Jews ; and Jesus 
went up to Jerusalem. 2. And there is in Jerusalem by the sheep- 
gate a pool, which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having 
five porches. 5. And a certain man was there, Who had an infirm- 
ity thirty and eight years. 6. Jesus seeing this man lying, and 
knowing that he had been already a long time thus, saj's to him : 
Dost thou desire to be made whole ? 7. The infirm man answered 
him: Sir, I have no man, when the water is troubled, to put me 
into the pool ; but while I am coming, another goes down before 
me. 8. Jesus says to him : Else, take up thy bed, and walk. 9. 
And immediately the man was made whole, and took up his bed 
and walked. 

And on that day was the sabbath. 10. The Jews therefore said 
to him that was cured: It is the sabbath ; it is not lawful for thee 
to carry the bed. 11. He answered them : He who made me whole, 
the same said to me : Take up thy bed, and walk. 12. They asked 
him therefore : Who is the man that said to thee : Take up thy bed 
and walk? 13. And he who was healed knew not who it was ; for 
Jesus conveyed himself away, there being a multitude in the place. 

14. Afterward Jesus finds him in the temple. And he said to 
him : Behold, thou hast been made whole ; sin no more, lest some- 
thing worse befall thee. 15. The man departed, and told the Jews 
that it was Jesus Avho made him whole. 16. And for this the Jews 
persecuted Jesus, because he did these things on the sabbath. 17. 
But Jesus answered them : My Father works hitherto, and I work. 
18. For this therefore the Jew T s sought the more to kill him, be- 
cause he not only broke the sabbath, but also called God his Father, 
making himself equal with God. 

19. Jesus therefore, answered and said to them : Verily, verily, 
I say to you, the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees 
the Father do ; for what things soever he does, these also does the 

17 ■ 



250 Kant' 8 Ethic*. ■ § 90ft 

Son in like manner. 20. For the Father loves the Son, and shows 
him all things that he himself does ; and greater works than these 
will he show him, that ye may marvel. 

24. Verily, verily, I say to you, he that hears my word, and be- 
lieves him who sent me, has everlasting life, and comes not intO' 
judgment, but has passed out of death into life. 25. Verily, verily, 
I say to you, an hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall 
hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. 
26. For as the Father has life in himself, so he gave also to the Son_ 
to have life in himself. 27. And he gave him authority to execute 
judgment also, because he is a son of man. 28. Marvel not at this; 
for an hour is coming, in which all that are in the graves shall hear 
his voice, 29. and shall come forth; they that did good, to the 
resurrection of life, and they that did evil, to the resurrection of' 
judgment. 

30. 1 can of myself do nothing. As I hear, I judge ; and my 
judgment is just ; because I seek not my own will, but the will of" 
him who" sent me. 

VII , 14. But when it was already the midst of the feast, Jesus 
went up into the temple and taught. 15. And the Jews wondered, 
saying : How knows this man letters, having never learned? 16. 
Jesus therefore answered them, and said: My teaching is not 
mine, but his who sent me. 17. If any one desires to do his will,. 
he shall know of the teaching, whether it is of God, or whether I 
speak from myself. 18. He that speaks from himself seeks his own 
glory ; but he that seeks the glory of him who sent him, the same 
is true, and there is no unrighteousness in him. 

VIII., 2. And early in the morning he came again into the tem- ; 
pie, and all the people came to him ; and having sat down, he was 
teaching them. 3. And the scribes and the Pharisees bring to him 
a woman taken in adultery ; and having placed her in the midst. 
4. they say to him : Teacher, this woman was taken in adultery, in 
the very act. 5. Now in the law Moses commanded us, that such 
should be stoned ; what then dost thou say? 6. This they said, 
tempting him, that they might have whereof to accuse him. But 
Jesus, having stooped down, was writing with his finger in the 
ground. 7. And as they continued asking him, raising himself up, 
he said to them : He that is without sin among you, let him first 
cast the stone at her. 8. And again stooping down, he wrote in 
the ground. 9. And they hearing it, and being convicted by their 
conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, unto the 
last ; and Jesus^was left alone, and the woman standing in the 
midst. 10. And Jesus raising himself up, and seeing none but the :; 



§ 906 The Claim to an Index. 251 

woman, said to her : Woman, where are they, thine accusers ? Did 
no one condemn thee? 11. She said : No one, Lord. And Jesus 
said to her : Neither do I condemn thee ; go, and sin no more. 

12. Again therefore Jesus spoke to them, saying : I am the light 
of the world ; he that follows me shall not walk in the darkness, 
but shall have the light of life. 13. The Pharisees therefore said 
to him : Thou Dearest witness of thyself; thy witness is not true. 
14 Jesus answered and said to them : Though I bear witness of 
myself, my witness is true ; because 1 know whence 1 came, and 
whither I go ; but ye know not whence I come, or whither 1 go. 
15. Ye judge according to the flesh ; I judge no one. 16. And even 
if I judge, my judgment is true ; because 1 am not alone, but I and 
the Father who sent me. 17. It is written also in your law, that 
the witness of two men is true. 18. I am one that bear witness of 
myself, and the Father who sent me bears witness of me. 19. They 
said therefore to him : Where is thy Father ? Jesus answered : 
Ye know neither me, nor my Father. If ye knew 7 me, ye would 
know my Father also. 

20. These words he spoke in the treasury, while teaching in the 
tample ; and no one laid hands on him, because his hour had not 
yet come. 

21. Again therefore he said to them : I go away, and ye will seek 
me, and shall die in your sin. Whither I go, ye can not come. 22. 
The Jews therefore said : Will he kill himself? because he says : 
Whither I go, ye can not come. 23. And he said to them : Ye 
are from beneath ; I am from above. Ye are of this world ; I am 

, not of this world. 24. 1 said therefore to you, that ye shall die in 
your sins ; for if ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your 
sins. 25. Therefore they said to him : Who art thou ? And Jesus 
said to them : That which I also say to you from the beginning. 
26. I have many things to say, and to judge concerning you. But 
he who sent me is true ; and the things which 1 heard from him, 
these I speak to the world. 27. They understood not that he spoke 
to them of the Father. 

28. Therefore Jesus said to them : When ye shall have lifted up 
the Son of man, then ye shall know that I .am he ; and of myself I 
do nothing, but as the Father taught me, those things I speak. 29. 
And he who sent me is with me. He has not left me alone ; because 
I do alwaj^s the things that please him. 30. As he spoke these 
words many believed on him. 

31. Jesus therefore said to those Jews who have believed him : 
If ye continue in my word, ye are truly my disciples ; 32. and ye 
shall know the truth, and the truth will make you free. 33. They 



252 Kant' a Ethics. § 906 

answered him : Wo are Abraham's seed, and have never been in 
bondage to any one. How sayest thou : Ye shall be made free ? 
34. Jesus answered them : Verily, verily, I say to you, every one 
who commits sin is a servant of sin. 35. And the servant abides 
not in the house forever. 36. The Son abides forever ; if therefore 
the Son shall make you free, ye will be free indeed. 37. I know 
that ye are Abraham's seed ; but ye seek to kill me, because my 
word has no place in you. 38. I speak what 1 have- seen with my 
Father ; and ye therefore do what ye have heard from your father. 

39. They answered and. said to him : Our father is Abraham. 
Jesus says to them : If you were children of Abraham, ye would 
do the works of Abraham. 40. But now ye seek to kill me, a man 
who has spoken to you the truth, which I heard from God. This 
.Abraham did not. 41. Ye do the works of your father. They 
said to him : We were not born of fornication ; we have one father, 
God. 42. Jesus said to them : If God were your father, ye would 
love me ; for from God 1 came forth, and am come ; neither have I 
come of myself, but he sent me. 43. Why do ye not understand 
my speech? Because ye cannot hear my word. 44. Ye are of 
your father the Devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He 
was a murderer from the beginning, and abides not in the "truth, 
because truth is not in him. When he speaks a lie, he speaks of 
his own ; because he is a liar, and the father of it. 45. And because 
I speak the truth, ye believe me not. 

46. Which of you convicts me of sin ? If 1 speak truth, why do 
ye not believe me? 47. He that is of God hears God's words ; ye 
therefore hear not, because ye are not of God. 

48. The Jews answered and said to him : Say we not well, that 
thou art a Samaritan, and hast a demon? 49. Jesus answered: I 
have not a demon ; but I honor my Father, and ye dishonor me. 
50. And 1 seek not my own glory; there is one that seeks, and 
judges. 51. Verily, verily, I say to you, if any one keep my say- 
ing, he shall not see death, forever. 52. The Jews said to him: 
Now we know that thou hast a demon. Abraham is dead, and 
the prophets ; and thou sayest : If a man keep my saying, he shall 
not taste of death, forever. 53. Art thou greater than our father 
Abraham, who is dead? And the prophets are dead. Whom makest 
thou thyself ? 54. Jesus answered : If I honor myself my honor 
is nothing. It is my Father that honors me, of whom ye say, that 
he is your God. 55. And ye know him not; but I know him. 
And if I say, I know him not, I shall be a liar like to you. But I 
know him, and I keep his word. 



§ 906 The Claris to an Index. 253 

IX , 1. And passing - along, he saw a man blind from his birth. 
2. And his disciples asked him, saying : Master, who sinned, this 
man or his parents, that he should be horn blind? 3. Jesus an- 
swered : Neither this man sinned, nor his parents, but that the 
works of God should be made manifest in him. 4. 1 must work 
the works of him who sent me, while it is day. Night is coming, 
when none can work. 5. As long as I am in the world, 1 am the 
light of the world. 

6. Having thus spoken, he spit on the ground, and made clay of 
the spittle, and anointed the eyes of the blind man with the clay, 
7. and said to him : Go, wash in the pool of Siloam (which is in- 
terpreted, Sent). He went away therefore, and washed, and came 
seeing. 

8. The neighbors therefore, and they who before had seen him 
that he was a beggar, said : Is not this he that sits and begs ? 9. 
Some said : This is he ; and others : He is like him ; he said : I am 
he s 10. Therefore they said to him: How were thine eyes opened? 
11. He answered : A man called Jesus made clay, and anointed 
mine eyes, and said to me : Go to the pool of Siloam, and wash. 
And I went away and washed, and received sight. 12. They said 
to him : Where is he ? He said : I know not. 

13. They bring to the Pharisees him who before was blind. 14. 
And it was the sabbath when Jesus made the clay, and opened his 
eyes. 15. Again therefore the Pharisees also asked him, how he re- 
ceived sight. He said to them : He put clay upon mine eyes ; and 
I washed, and do see. 16. Therefore some of the Pharisees said : 
This man is not from God, because he keeps not the sabbath. 
Others said: How can a man that is a sinner do such signs? And 
there was a division among them. -17. They say to the blind man 
again : What sayest thou of him, seeing that he opened thine eyes? 
He said : He is a Prophet. 

18. The Jews therefore did not believe concerning him, that he 
was blind and received sight, until they called the parents of 
him that received sight. 19. And they asked them, saying : 
Is this your son, who ye say was born blind ? How then does he 
now see ? 20. His parents answered them and said: We know 
that this is our son, and that he was born blind. 21. But by what 
means he now sees, we know not; or who opened his eyes, we 
know not. He is of age; ask him. He shall speak for himself. 
22. These words spoke his parents, because they feared the Jews ; 
for the Jews had agreed already, that if any one acknowledged him 
as Christ, he should be put out of the synagogue. 23. Therefore 
his parents said : He is of age; ask him. 



254 Kant's Ethics. ■ § 906 

24. They therefore called a second time the man that was blind, 
and said to him : G-ive glory to God ; we know that this man is a 
sinner. 25. He answered therefore : "Whether he is a sinner, I 
know not; one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see. 
26. They therefore said to him: What did he to thee? How 
•opened he thine eyes ? 27. He answered them : I told yon already, 
and ye did not hear. Wherefore would ye hear again ? Will ye 
also become his disciples? 28. They reviled him, and said : Thou 
art his disciple ; but we are Moses' disciples. 29. We know that 
<xod has spoken to Moses ; but this man we know not, whence he 
is. 30. The man answered and said to them : Why herein is a 
marvelous thing, that ye know not whence he is, and he opened 
mine eyes. 31. Now we know that God hears not sinners. But 
if any one is a worshiper of God, and does his will, him he hears. 
32. Since the world began, it was not heard that any one opened 
the eyes of one born blind. 33. If this man were not from God, he 
could do nothing. 34. They answered and said to him : Thou 
wast altogether born in sins, and dost thou teach us? And they 
cast him out. 

39. And Jesus said : For judgment came I into this world ; that 
they who see not may see, and that they who see may become 
blind. 40. And some of the Pharisees who were with him heard 
these words, and said to him : Are we also blind? 41. Jesus said 
to them : If ye were blind, ye would not have sin. But now ye 
say : We see. Your sin remains ! 

X , 11. I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down 
his life for the sheep. 12. But he that is a hireling, and not a 
shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, sees the wolf coming, and 
leaves the sheep, and flees ; and the wolf catches them, and scatters 
the sheep. 13. The hireling flees, because he is a hireling, and 
cares not for the sheep. 14. 1 am the good shepherd ; and I know 
mine, and am known by mine, 15. as the Father knows me, and 
I know the Father ; and I lay down my life for the sheep. 16. And 
•other sheep I have, which are not of this fold. Them also I must 
bring, and they shall hear my voice ; and there shall be one flock, 
one shepherd. 17. For this the Father loves me, because I lay 
down my life, that I may take it again. 18. No one takes it from 
me, but I lay it down of myself. I have authority to lay it down, 
and I have authority to take it again. This commandment I re- 
ceived from my Father. 

19. Again there arose a division among the Jews because of these 
words. 20. And many of them said : He has a demon, and is mad ; 
why do ye hear him ? 21. Others said: These are not the words 
•of one that has a demon. Can a demon open the eyes of the blind? 



:§ 906 The Claris to an Index. 255 

22. And there came the feast of the dedication, in Jerusalem ; 
and it was winter. 23. And Jesus was walking in the temple, in 
the porch of Solomon. 24. The Jews therefore came around him. 
and said to him : How long dost thou hold us in doubt? If thou 
art the Christ, tell us plainly. 

25. Jesus answered them : I told you, and ye do not believe. 
The works that I do in my Father's name, these bear witness of 
me. 26. But ye do not believe ; for ye are not of my sheep, as I 
said to you. 27. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and 
they follow me; 28. and I give to them eternal life ; and they 
shall never perish, nor shall any one pluck them out of my hand. 
29. My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all ; and 
no one is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand. 30. I and 
the Father are one. 

31. The Jews therefore took up stones again to stone him. 32. 
Jesus answered them ; Many good works have I showed you from 
my Father; for which of those works do ye stone me? 33. The 
Jews answered him : For a good work we stone thee not, but for 
blasphemy, and because thou, being man, makest thyself God. 34. 
Jesus answered them : Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are 
gods ? 35. If he called them gods to whom the word of God came, 
and the Scripture can not be broken, 36. say ye of him, whom 
the Father sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, 
because I said, I am the Son of God ? 37. If 1 do not the works of 
my Father, believe me not. 38. But if I do, though ye believe not 
me, believe the works ; that ye may learn and know, that the 
Father is in me, and I in the Father. 39. Therefore they sought 
again to seize him, and he went forth, out of their hand. 

XII., 44. And Jesus cried and said : He that believes on me, be- 
lieves not on me but on him who sent me. 45. And he that be- 
holds me beholds him who sent me. 46. I have come a light into 
the world, that whoever believes on me may not abide in the dark- 
ness. 47. And if any one hear my words, and keep them not, I do 
not judge him ; for I came not to judge the world, but to save the 
world. 48. He that rejects me, and receives not my words, has 
one that judges him. The word that I spoke, that shall judge him 
in the last day. 49. Because I spoke not from myself; but the 
Father who sent me, he has given me a commandment, what I 
should say, and what 1 should speak. 50. And I know that his 
commandment is everlasting life. "What things I speak therefore, 
as the Father has said to me, so I speak. 

XIII. , 1. And before the feast of the passover, Jesus knowing 
that his hour has come that he should depart out of this world to 



256 Kane a Ethics. § 906 : 

the Father, having loved his own who were in the world, loved 
them to the end. 2. And supper heing served, the Devil having 
already put into the heart of Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, to betray 
him ; 3. knowing that the Father has given all things into his 
hands, and that he came out from God, and is going to God, 4. 
he rises from the supper, and lays aside his garments, and taking 
a towel he girded himself. 5. After that he pours water into the 
basin, and began to wash the feet of his disciples, and to wipe them 
with the towel with which he was girded. 

12. When therefore he had washed their feet, he took his gar- 
ments, and reclining again at table, said to them : Know ye what 
I have done to you? 13. Ye call me the Teacher, and the Master; 
and ye say well, for so I am. 14. If I then, the Master and the 
Teacher, washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's, 
feet. 15. For I gave you an example, that as I did to you, ye also 
should do. 16. Verily, verily, I say to you, a servant is not greater 
than his lord, nor one that is sent greater than he who sent him. 
17. If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them. 

33. Children, yet a little while I am with you. Ye will seek me; 
and as I said to the Jews, whither I go ye can not come, so now I 
say to you. 34. A new commandment I give to you, that ye love 
one another ; as I loved you, that ye also love one another. 35. By 
this shall all know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one 
toward another. 

XIV., 1. Let not your heart be troubled. Believe on God, and 
believe on me. 2. In my Father's house are many mansions : if 
it were not so, I would have told you ; because I go to prepare a 
place for you. 3. And if V go and prepare a place for you, I will 
come again, and will receive you to myself; that where I am ye 
may be also. 4. And ye know the way whither I go. 

5. Thomas says to him : Lord, we know not whither thou goest; 
and how do we know the way? 6. Jesus says to him: I am the 
way, the truth, and the life. 'No one comes to the Father, but by 
me. 7. If ye knew me, ye would know my Father also ; and from 
henceforth ye know T him, and have seen him. 

8. Philip sa} T s to him: Lord, show us the Father, and it suffices 
us. 9. Jesus says to him : Am I so long time with you, and dost 
thou not know me, Philip? He that has seen me has seen the 
Father ; and how sayest thou : Show us the Father ? 10. Be- 
lievest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? 
The words that I speak to you I speak not of myself; but the 
Father who dwells in me, he does the works. 11. Believe me, that 
I am in the Father, and the Father in me ; or else believe for the; 
very works' sake. 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 257 

12. Verily, verily, I say to you, he that believes on me, the works 
that I do he shall do also, and greater than these shall he do, be- 
cause I go to the Father. 13. And whatever ye shall ask in my 
name, that I will do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. 
14. If ye shall ask anything in my name, I will do it. 

15. If ye love me, keep my commandments. 16. And I will ask 
of the Father, and he will give you another Comforter, that he may 
be with you forever; 17. the Spirit of truth, whom the world can 
not receive, because it sees him not, neither knows him; but ye 
know him, because he abides with you, and shall be in you. 18. I 
will not leave you bereaved ; 1 will come to you. 

19. Yet a little while, and the world sees me no more ; but ye 
see me ; because I live, ye shall live also. 20. In that day ye shall 
know that 1 am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you. 21 He 
that has my commandments, and keeps them, he it is that loves 
me ; and he that loves me shall be loved by my Father, and I will 
love him, and will manifest myself to him. 

22. Judas says to him (not Iscariot) : Lord, how is it that thou 
wilt manifest thyself to us, and not to the world? 23. Jesus 
answered and said to him : If any one loves me, he will keep my 
word ; and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and 
make our abode with him. 24. He that loves me not, keeps not 
my words ; and the word which ye hear is not mine, but the 
Father's who sent me. 

25. These things have I spoken to you, while abiding with you. 
26. But the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send 
in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your re- 
membrence all things which I said to you. 

27. Peace 1 leave with you, my peace I give to you ; not as the 
world gives, give I to you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither 
let it be afraid. 28. Ye heard how J said to you : I go away ; and 
I come to you. If ye loved me, ye would have rejoiced that I go to 
the Father; because the Father is greater than I. 29. And now I 
have told you before it comes to pass, that when it is come to pass, 
ye may believe. 

30. I will no longer talk much with you ; for the prince of the 
world comes, and in me he has nothing. 31. But that the world 
ma}^ know that I love the Father, and as the Father gave me com- 
mandment, so I do. Arise, let us go hence. 

• XV., 1. 1 am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. 
2. Every branch in me that bears not fruit, he takes it away ; and 
every one that bears fruit, he cleanses it, that it may bear more 
fruit. 3. Ye are already clean, through the word which I have 
spoken to you. 



258 Kanfs Ethics. § 906 

4. Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch can not bear fruit 
of itself, if it abide not in the vine, so neither can ye, if ye abide 
not in me. 5. I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abides 
in me a«d I in him, the same bears much fruit ; because without 
me ye can do nothing. 6. If any one abide not in me, he is cast 
forth as the branch, and is withered ; and they gather them, and 
•cast them into the fire, and they are burned. 7. If ye abide in 
me, and my words abide in you, ask whatever ye will, and it shall 
be done to you. 

8. Herein is niy Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit ; and 
ye shall become my disciples. 9. As the Father loved me, I also 
loved you ; abide in my love. 10. If ye keep my commandments, 
ye shall abide in my love ; as I have kept my Father's command- 
ments, and abide in his love. 

11. These things I have spoken to you, that my joy may be in 
you. and your joy be made full. 12. This is my commandment, 
that ye love one another, as I loved you. 13. Greater love has no 
one than this, that one lay down his life for his friends. 14. Ye are 
my friends, if ye do whatever I command you. 

15. No longer do I call you servants ; because the servant knows 
not what his lord does. But I have called you friends ; because 
all things that I heard from my Father I made known to you. 16. 
Ye did not choose me, but I chose you, and appointed you that ye 
may go and bear fruit, and that your fruit may remain ; that 
whatever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, he may give 
it you. 

17. These things I command you, that ye love one another. 18. 
If the world hates you, ye know that it has hated me before it 
hated you. 19. If ye were of the world, the world would love its 
•own; but because ye are not of the world, but I chose you out of 
the world, for this the world hates you. 20. Remember the word 
that I said to you : A servant is not greater than his lord. If they 
persecuted me, they will also perscute you ; if they kept my saying, 
they will keep yours also. 21 . But all these things they will do to 
you for my name's sake, because they know not him who sent me. 

22. If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have 
sin ; but now they have no cloak for their sin. 23. He that hates 
me hates my Father also. 24. If I had not done among them the 
works which no other one has done, they would not have sin ; but 
now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father. 25. 
But this comes to pass, that the word might be fulfilled that is 
written in their law : They hated me without a cause. 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 259 

26. But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send to you 
from the Father, the Spirit of truth, which proceeds from the 
Father, he will bear witness of me. 27. And ye also shall bear 
witness, because ye are with me from the beginning! 

XVI , 1. These things I have spoken to you, that ye should not 
be offended. 2. They will put you out of the synagogues ; yea, a 
time is coming, that every one who kills you will think he makes 
an offering to God. 3. And these things they will do to you, be- 
cause thej^ have not known the Father, nor me. 4. But these 
things I have spoken to you, that when the time shall come, ye 
may remember that J told you. And these things I told }~ou not 
from the beginning, because I was with you. 

5. And now I go to him who sent me ; and none of you asks me : 
Whither goest thou ? 6. But because I have spoken these things 
to you, sorrow has filled your heart. 7. But 1 tell you the truth, 
it is expedient for you that I depart ; for if I depart not, the Com- 
forter will not come to you ; but if I go, I will send him to you. 8. 
And when he is come, he will convict the world, in respect of sin, and 
of righteousness, and of judgment; 9. of sin, in that they believe 
not on me ; 10. of righteousness, in that I go to my Father, and 
ye behold me no more; 11. of judgement, in that the prince of 
this world has been judged. 

12. I have yet many things to say to you, but ye can not bear 
them now. 13. But when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he will 
guide you into all the truth ; for he will not speak from himself, 
but whatever he shall hear, that will he speak, and he will tell you 
the things to come. 14. He will glorify me; because he will re- 
ceive of mine, and will tell it to you. 

25. These things I have spoken to you in parables. A time is 
coming, when I will no more speak to you in parables, but 1 will 
tell you plainly of the Father. 26. In that day ye shall ask in my 
name. And 1 say not to you, that I will pray the Father for you ; 
27. for the Father himself loves you, because ye have loved me, 
and have believed that I came forth from God. 28. I came forth 
from the Father, and have come into the world ; again, I leave the 
world, and go to the Father. 

29. His disciples say to him : Lo, now thou speakest plainly, and 
speakest no parable. 30. Now we know that thou knowest all 
things, and heedest not that any one should ask thee. By this we 
believe that thou earnest forth from God. 

31. Jesus answered them : Do ye now believe? 32. Behold, an 
hour is coming, and has come, that ye will be scattered, each one 
to his own, and will leave me alone ; and I am not alone, because 
the Father is with me. 



260 Kant's Ethics. § 006; 

33. These things I have spoken to you, that in me ye may have 
peace. In the world ye have tribulation ; but be of good cheer, I 
have overcome the world. 

XVII., 1. These words spoke Jesus, and lifted up his eyes to 
heaven, and said : Father, the hour has come ; glorify thy Son, that 
thy Son may glorify thee; 2. as thou gavest him authority over 
all flesh, that as many as thou hast given to him, to them he should 
give eternal life. 3. And this is the eternal life, that they know 
thee the only true G-od, and Jesus Christ, whom thou didst send. 
4. I glorified thee on the earth ; I finished the work which thou 
hast given me to do. 5. And now, Father, glorify thou me with 
thine own self, with the glory which 1 had with thee before the 
world was. 6. I manifested thy name io the men whom thou hast 
given me out of the world. Thine they were, and thou hast given 
them to me ; and they have kept thy word. 7. X 1 ow they know 
that all things whatever thou hast given me arc from thee ; 8. 
because the words which thou gavest me I have given to them, and 
the} r received them, and knew in truth that I came forth from thee, 
and believed that thou didst send me. 9. I pray for them ; I pray 
not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me ; because 
they are thine. 10. And all things that are mine are thine, and 
thine are mine ; and I am glorified in them. 

11. And I am no longer in the world ; and these are in the world, 
and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep those in thy name whom 
thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are. 12. While 
I was with them, I kept them in thy name. Those whom thou 
hast given rue 1 watched over and none of them perished, except 
the son of perdition, that the scripture might be fulfilled. 13. And 
now I come to thee ; and these things I speak in the world, that 
they may have my joy made full in them. 14. I have given them 
thy word; and the world hated them, because they are not of the 
world, as I am not of the world. 15. I pray not that thou shouldest 
take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from 
the evil. 16. They are not of the world, as I am not of the world. 
17. Sanctify them in the truth; thy word is truth. 18. As thou 
didst send me into the world, I also sent them into the world. 19. 
And for their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also may be sancti- 
fied in the truth. 20. And I pray not for these only, but also for 
those who believe on me through their word ; 21. that all may be 
one ; as thou. Father, in me and I in thee, that they also may be 
in us ; that the world may believe that thou didst send me. 22. 
And the glory which thou hast given to me I have given to them, 
that they may be one, as we are one ; 23. I in them, and thou in. 



§ 906 The Clqvis to an Index. 2(31 

me, that they may be perfected into one ; that the world may know 
that thou didst send me, and lovedst them as thou lovedst me 

24. Father, those whom thou hast given me, I will that where I am 
they also be with me ; that they may behold my glory, which thou, 
hast given me ; because thou lovedst me before the foundation of the 
'world. 25. Righteous Father ! And the world knew thee not ! But 
I knew thee, and these knew that thou didst send me ; 26. and I 
made known to them thy name, and will make it known ; that the 
love wherewith thou lovedst me ma} r be in them, and I in them. 

XVIII. , 1. Having spoken these words, Jesus went out with his 
disciples beyond the brook Kedron, where was a garden, into which 
he entered and his disciples. 2. And Judas also, his betrayer knew 
the place ; because Jesus ofttimes resorted thither with his disciples. 

3. Judas therefore, having received the band and officers from 
the chief priests and Puarisees, conies thither with torches and 
lamps and weapons. 4. Jesus therefore, knowing all the things 
that were coming upon him, went forth and said to them : Whom 
do ye seek? 5. They answered him : Jesus the rlazarene. Jesus 
says to them : I am he. And Judas also, his betrayer, was standing- 
wit h them. 

6. When therefore he said to them, I am he, they went backward, 
and fell to the ground. 

7. Again therefore he asked them: Whom do ye seek? And 
they said : Jesus the JSlazarene. 8. Jesus answered : I told you that 
I am he ; if therefore ye seek me, let these go their way ; 9. that 
the saying might be fulfilled, which he spoke : Of those whom thou 
hast given me, I lost none. 

10. Then Simon Peter, having a sword, drew it and smote the 
-servant of the high priest, and cut off his right ear. The servant's 
name was Malchus. 11. Jesus therefore said to Peter: Put up thy 
sword into the sheath. The cup which my Father has given me, 
shall I not drink it ? 

12. So the band, and the captain, and the officers of the Jews, 
took Jesus and bound him, 13. and led him away to Annas first ; 
for he was father-in-law of Caiaphas, who was high priest that 
year. 11. And it was Caiaphas who counseled the JeAvs, that it is 
expedient that one man should die for the people. 

19. The high priest therefore asked Jesus concerning his disciples, 
and concerning his teaching. 20. Jesus answered him: I have spoken 
openly to the world ; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the 
temple, where all the Jews assemble; and I spoke nothing in secret. 
21. Why askest thou me? Ask those who have heard, what I spoke 
to them. Behold, these know what things I said. 



262 Kant's Ethics. § 906- 

22. And when he had said this, one of the officers who was stand- 
ing by gave Jesus a hlow on the face, saying : Answerest thon the 
high priest so? 23. Jesus answered him: If I spoke evil, bear 
witness of the evil ; but if well, why dost thou smite me? 

28. Then they lead Jesus from Caiaphas into the Governor's 
palace ; and it was early ; and they themselves went not into the 
palace, that they might not be defiled, but might eat the passover. 
29. Pilate therefore went out to them, and said : What accusation 
do }^e bring against this man ? 30. They answered and said to 
him : If this man were not a malefactor, we would not have de- 
livered him up to thee. 31. Pilate therefore said to them : Do ye 
take him, and judge him according to your law. The Jews there- 
fore said to him : It is not lawful for us to put any one to death ; 
32. that the saying of Jesus might be fulfilled, which he spoke, 
signifying by what manner of death he should die. 

33. Pilate therefore entered into the palace again, and called 
Jesus, and said to him : Art thou the King of the Jews ? 34. 
Jesus answered : Dost thou say this of thyself, or did others tell 
thee concerning me ? 35. Pilate answered : Am I a Jew ? Thine 
own nation, and the chief priests, delivered thee up to me. What 
didst thou? 36. Jesus answered: My kingdom is not of this 
world. If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would 
fight, that I might not be delivered up to the Jews : but now is my 
kingdom not from hence. 37. Pilate therefore said to him : Art thou 
a king then ? J esus answered : Thou sayest it ; because I am a 
king. To this end have I been born, and to this end have I come 
into the world, that L ma}?- bear witness to the truth. Every one 
that is of the truth hears my voice. 

38. Pilate says to him : What is truth ? And having said this, 
he went out again to the Jews, and says to them : I find no fault 
in him. 39. But ye have a custom, that I should release to you 
one at the passover. Do ye desire therefore that I release to you 
the King of the Jews ? 40. They all therefore cried out again, 
saying : Not this one, but Barabbas. Now Barabbas was a robber. 

XIX., 1. Then therefore Pilate took Jesus, and scourged him. 
2. And the soldiers platted a crown of thorns, and put it on his 
head, and put on him a purple robe ; and. they came to him, 3. 
and said : Hail, King of the Jews ! And they gave him blows on 
the face. 

4. Pilate went forth again, and says to them : Behold, I bring 
him forth to you, that ye may know that I find no fault in him. 5. 
Jesus therefore came forth, wearing the crown of thorns, and the 
purple robe. And he says to them : Behold the man ! 



§ 906 The Clavis to an Index. 263. 

6. When therefore the chief priests and the officers saw him, they 
cried out, saying : Crucify him, crucify him. Pilate says to them : 
Do ye take him, and crucify him : for I find no fault in him. 7. 
The Jews answered him : We have a law, and by our law he ought 
to die, because he made himself the Son of God. 

8. When therefore Pilate heard this saying, he was the more 
afraid. 9. And he went again into the palace, and says to Jesus : 
Whence art thou ? But Jesus gave him no answer. 10. Then 
says Pilate to him : Dost thou not speak to me ? Knowest thou 
not that I have power to release thee, and have power to crucify 
thee ? 11. Jesus answered : Thou wouldst have no power against 
me, except it were given thee from above. Therefore he that de- 
livers me to thee has the greater sin. 12. Thenceforth Pilate sought 
to release him. But the Jews cried out, saying : If thou let this 
man go, thou art not a friend of Csesar. Whoever makes himself a 
king speaks against Caesar. 

13. When therefore Pilate heard these words, he brought Jesus 
forth, and sat down on the judgment seat in a place called the Pave- 
ment, and in Hebrew, Gabbatha. 14. And it was the preparation 
of the passover, and about the sixth hour. And he says to the 
Jews: Behold your king! 15. But they cried out: Away with 
him, away with him, crucify him. Pilate says to them : Shall I 
crucify your king ? The chief priests answered : We have no king 
but Caesar. 16. Then therefore he delivered him to them to be cru- 
cified. And they took Jesus, and led him away. 

17. And bearing his cross he went forth into the place called 
Place of a skull, which in Hebrew is called Golgotha ; 18. where 
they crucified him, and two others with him, on either side one, 
and Jesus in the midst. 19. And Pilate wrote also a title, and put 
it on the cross. And the writing' was : JESUS THE NAZARENE 
THE KING OF THE JEWS. 

20. This title therefore many of the Jews read ; because the place 
where Jesus was crucified was nigh to the city, and it was written 
in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin. 21. Therefore said the chief 
priests of the Jews to Pilate : Write not, The King of the Jews ; 
but that he said, I am King of the Jews. 22. Pilate answered : 
What I have written, I have written. 

25. And there were standing by the cross of Jesus his mother, 
and his mother's sister, Mary the wife of Clopas, and Mary the 
Magdalene. 26. Jesus therefore seeing his mother, and the dis- 
ciple whom he loved standing by, says to his mother : Woman, be- 
hold thy son ! 27. Then he says to the disciple : Behold thy 
mother ! And from that hour the disciple took her to his own 
home. 



-264 Kant's Ethics. 

28. After this, Jesus knowing that all things were now finished, 
that the scripture might be accomplished, says : I thirst. 29. Now 
there was set a vessel full of vinegar; and they, having filled a 
sponge with vinegar, and put it on a hyssop-stalk, bore it to his 
mouth. 30. When Jesus therefore received the vinegar, he said: 
It is finished ; and he bowed his head, and gave up his spirit. 

§ 907. — Jesus taught pure honest moral mindedness, veracity, 
placability, and beneficence, (page 211, line 21.) [Assume of a wit- 
ness that he is, etc : that he is not. — (Semple's erratum.)] 

§ 908. — Jesus taught that good works are the only admissible 
proof of pure morality within, and that the want of good deeds can 
not be compensated by a diligent observance of church duty, (page 
212, line 13.) Of. §§821, 330, 3053, 3054, 3056. 

§ 909. — Jesus taught not merely laws of virtue, but behests of 
holiness (indicating the unattainable ideal), (page 213, line 22.) 
Of. Matthew, v., 44, 4S ; John, xii., 44-50 ; and Mark, xii., 28-34. 

§ 910. — Jesus, when speaking of rewards in a world to come, did 
not intend them to incline the will to action, (page 214. line 23.) 
[Outwardly conformable to the Law : not the act of the steward, but 
the selfish charity which it figuratively illustrates.] Of. § 3055. 

§ 911. — Outline of a religion that can be brought home to the 
convictions and conceptions of every one. (page 216, line 11.) 

Chapter II.— Christianity as a Learned Religion, (g^ 912-918 inclusive.) 

§ 912. — Sacred goods, intrusted to the guardianship of the 
learned, (page 217, line 8.) 

§ 913. — Christian faith partly rational (fides elicita), and partly 
revealed (fides imperata). (page 217, line 25.) Of. § 3096. 

§ 914. — Christian worship consequently presents a twofold aspect : 
(1) historical; (2) ethical, (page 218, line 14.) 

§ 915. — Christianity, if imperatively binding upon every one, 
would be a blind and servile faith (fides servilis). (p. 218, 1. 28.) 

§ 916. — Christianity must at all times be taught and propounded 
as fides historice elicita, (page 219, line 18.) [So also Clement of 
Alexandria (strom. i., 6. quoted by Blunt) : " As we assert that a 
man may be a believer without learning, so also we assert that it is 
impossible for a man without learning to comprehend the things 
which are declared in the faith."] 

§ 917. — When i*evelation is placed before religion, then is the 
church service a false and spurious worship, (page 220, line 13.) 

§ 918. — Church creed fabricated ; now hermeneutically treated, 
either by learning, or by this last's antagonist, the inward light, 
(page 221, line 17.) [Wisely suggested: strike out wisely. Wisdom 
justifies no stratagem.] [The sacred books of this race: omit the 



The Clavis to an Index. 265 

paragraph, six lines.] [Probably prudent, or even necessary in their 
day : strike it out.] [Hermeneutically : according to the acknowl- 
edged principles of just interpretation. Here used probably to sig- 
nify an art.] [Not within : the inward light being only relatively 
internal, and not proper.] 

APOTOME II— OF THE SUPERSTITIOUS WORSHIP OF GOD IK A. 
STATUTABLE RELIGION. (§§919-961 inclusive.) 

§919. — Delusion of deeming a statutable faith essential to the 
worship of God. (page 224, line 4.) 

§ 920. — Delusion is that deception whereby a man regards the 
representation of a thing as equivalent to the thing itself, (page 
224, line 16.) 
Chapter I.— Of the Subjective Ground of a Delusion in Religion. (§§921-923.) 

§ 921.— Anthropomorphism, theoretically harmless, practically 
dangerous to our morality, (page 225, line 6.) Cf. § 748. 

§ 922. — Every person must, according to his moral notions, 
figure to himself a Supreme Illimitable Moral Agent, (p. 225, 1. 18.) 

§ 923. — Devotion made to stand in room of godliness. — (A fixed- 
maxim to ascribe to the means the worth of the end.) (p. 226, L°4,) 

Chapter II.— Of the Moral Principle which Reason Opposes to all Delusions 
in Religion. (§§ 924-932 inclusive.) 

§ 924. — Everything mankind fancies he can do, over and above good 
moral conduct, in order to make himself acceptable to God, is mere 
false worship of the Deity, (page 228, line 4.) 

§ 925. — Hope that what lies beyond his power will be supplied 
by the Supreme Wisdom, (page 229, line 3.) Cf. §§ 706, 723, 759. 

§ 926. — Ancient boundary and landmarks of pure reason disap- 
pear, (page 230. line 6.) 

§ 927. — Whatever the surrogatum of the ethic-worship of God 
be, is quite immaterial, and rested on the same groundless flams, 
(page 230, line 24.) [Crass: gross, dense, uncultivated. Flams: 
illusory pretexts. See Webster.] 

§ 928. — No delusion to attach supreme worth to virtue, (page 231, 
line 18.) 

§ 929. — Nature and grace not unfrequently opposed to one 
another [by churchmen], (page 232, line 7.) Cf. §§651,687; IX 
Corinthians, xii., 9. 

§ 930. — Imagination that a man can detect or beget within him- 
self effects of grace, is fanaticism, (page 232, line 17.) John, iii. 7 8~ 

§ 931. — Imagination that justification can be achieved by estab- 
lishing a hidden intercourse and communion with God, constitutes 
religious fanaticism (the death of moral reason), (page 233, line 
7.) Cf. § 235. 

18 



286 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 932. — Principle preventing and eventually extirpating all de- 
lusions in religion, (page 234, line 6.) 

Chapter III.— Of Priestdom (i. e. Sacerdotal Despotism) : An Order of 
Things Based upon the False Worship of the Good Principle. (3g 983-950.) 

§ 933. — Priestdom, denoting the authority of a spiritual father, 
suggests the still further idea of spiritual tyranny, (p. 234, 1. 21.) 

§ 934. — Worship of mighty invisible beings first arose, (page 
234, line 19.) 

§ 935. — Belong to the class of those who place the worship 
.of the Deity in those outward rites that can not morally amend 
our species, (page 235, line 14.) 

§ 936. — Design that all spurious worshipers aim at accomplishing, 
{page 236, line 14.) 

§ 937. — Actions that in themselves are void of moral worth, can 
only be admitted into religion with this proviso, that they are found 
means of forwarding that which in other actions is immediately and 
unconditionally good, (page 236, line 31.) 

§ 938. — Whoever imagines that he can employ actions devoid in 
themselves of moral worth, as a mean fitted for procuring the 
Divine favor, converts the worship of God into feticism. (page 
238, line 4.) 

§ 939. — Fancies he can work upon the preternatural by using 
formulas of invocation, confessions of church creeds, and observing 
rites ecclesiastical, (page 238, line 24.) 

§ 940. — Yoke of a statutable law substituted in room of the 
freedom of the children of God. (page 239, line 32.) Cf. James i., 
25 ; Galatians v., 1 ; Matthew xi., 30; Acts xv., 10. 

§ 941. — Whenever the free homage due to the moral law is not 
first and supreme, then a servile worship, based on a fetich creed, 
prevails, (page 241, line 9.) 

§ 942. — Not merely the wise, or the disputer of this world, is 
called to be illuminated touching the nature of his true bliss, 
(page 242, line 31 .) [Not absolutely necessary : I can not see the ne- 
cessity for such remarks. Omit the whole sentence.] 

§ 943. — Practical knowledge, based entirely upon reason, need- 
ing no historic authentication, lying so near everyone, even the 
most simple, that it looks as had it been written in detail on the 
tablets of his heart.* (page 244, line 8.) Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the 

* The entire text of §§ 943-948 appears in the Journal of Speculative Philos- 
ophy, vol. x., pages 428-430. Section 943 begins with page 428, line 13; \ 944, 
•with line 45 ; g 945, with page 429, line 3 ; \ 946, in line 25 ; §947, page 430, in 
line 11 ; § 948, in line 33. Page 430, in line 13, for of read by ; in line 25, for 
to the appropriation, read to appropriation ; page 429, line 42, for exculpted, 
read exsculpted ; line 5, for moods, read mental moods; page 425, the quotation 



The Claris to an Index. 267 

Mean, xiii., 1 (page 110, above): "The path is not far from man." 
Cf. Deuteronomy xxx., 14. (page 100, above.) 

§ 944. — Whether the lectures publicly delivered in a church 
■ought mainly to set forth doctrines of godliness or those of pure 
virtue, (page 245, line 12.) [This climax (§§ 943-948 inclusive) 
deserves the closest attention.] 

which ends in line 25, should begin with the word be, at the end of line 23; page 
426, the quotation which begins in line 32, should end with the word things, in 
line 36; page 427, the quotation which ends in line 6, should begin with the 
word the, in line 5; page 416, the quotation in Journal § 101, is from Acts xvii.. 
28 ; the quotation in Journal § 102, is from Clayis § 952, and is an instance of the 
want of conscientiousness which I so frequently exhibit, the statement by Kant 
being not assertorical, but hypothetical, a fact which I should have caused to 
appear; with Journal § 103, cf. §§ 642, 877; with Journal § 104, page 417, cf. 

■§§ 748, 921, 2828 ; with Journal § 106, cf. §§ 656, 698, 671, 678, 661 ; page 418, line 
27, /or (g§ 56, 58) read (§§ 56-58) ; the quotation at the bottom of page 418 is 
from Romans vii., 21-23; the quotation at the bottom of page 419. is from II. 
Cor., iv.. 7 ; with Journal § 108, cf. g§ 673, 674, 672, 684 ; with Journal § 109, cf. 

'Clavis §# 5, 7, 704; with Journal § 110, page 420, cf. §§ 67 L. 672, 682 ; with Jour- 
nal §111, cf. §§697,701; the quotation in note t is from §664; with Journal 
§112, cf. §§680,691,682; with Journal §113, page 421, cf. §§687, 731; page 
422, line 17, for maxims, which, read maxims), (which; with Journal § 114, cf 
§689; with journal § 115, cf. §2 707. 711, 613, 701. 709, 714, 712, 692, 682; with 
Journal § 116, cf. § 713, and Romans xii , 1, 2, and James i., 22-25; with Journal 
§ 117, c'. §§ 722, 700, 701; page 423, line 38, for orginary, read originary ; with 
Journal §118, page 424, cf. §§721,719, 715,217, 616; with Journal §119, cf. 
|§ 925, 706, 724, Matthew, ch. v., verse 18 ; page 424, last line, for possible, read 
possessed ; page 425, note * see Romans ii., 12 ; with Journal § 120, cf. Romans 
viii., 37-39, I. Cor. xiii., 13, xiv., 1. Romans xiii., 10, and iii., 23, and §§ 230, 726, 

■925, 963, 913 et seqq.; with Journal § 121, page 426, cf. §§ 721, 930, 964, 728, 783, 
Romans, iii., 28, 31 ; with Journal § 122, cf. §§ 819, 877, 878, et seqq., 896, Mark, 
xii., 32-34; with Journal §123, page 427, cf. §§924, 966; page 427, line 39, for 

■only, read both ; with Journal § 124, cf. I Cor. xiv., 8, Ephesians, vi., 13. 

In Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. viii., page 339, with Journal §85, cf. §§ 249, 140, 467, 
183, 232, 533, 47 (Clavis numbers); with Journal §86, page 340, cf. §§454, 384, 

■612, 470, 429, 456, 278, 550; with Journal §87, cf. §§435, 225, 241, 197, 532. 416, 
417, 467, 232, 227, 451, 511, 182 ; page 341, note *, see § 1896; with Journal §88, 

■cf. §§ 560, 549, 424, 420, 444, 413, 331, 343, 328, 547; with Journal §89, page 342, 

■cf. §§735, 3102, 421, 442, 954, 234, 435; page 343, line 2, before the word We, 
insert The motive of the act thus establishes the fact of the lie, and; line 4, for 
map, read maps; with Journal § 91, cf. §§422, 191; with Journal §93, page 344, 
cf. §§386, 433, 401, 412, 72 (Clavis numbers) ; with Journal §94, cf. §§ 186, 178; 
with Journal §95, page 345, cf. § 184; page 345, line 39, for cannot only, read 
-can not only ; with Journal § 96, cf. §§ 174, 431 ; page 348, line 4, see Schwegler's 
Hist. Phil., ed. Seelye, page 155; page 348, line 37, for its, read it is; page 349, 
line 8, after humiliation, insert § 11 ; page 349, line 13, for could, read would; 
page 349, note f, see Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. iv., pages 293 and 297, "the Finite and 

-the Infinite," by Francis A. Henry ; page 350, line, 9, see Dr. Henry Calder- 



268 Kant's Ethics. : 

§ 945. — Godliness may be figured as containing under it two dif- 
ferent mental moods : (1) fear op God ; (2) love of God. (page 
245, line 18.) [Anthropomorphously : cf. §§ 748, 2439, 2573.] 

§ 946. — Godliness can not by itself be the end and aim of moral- 
ity, but can only serve as a mean, (page 246, line 10.) 

§ 947. — Godliness exposed to the risk of sliding into an abject, 
servile, and adulatory submission to the will of a despot, (page 
247, line 17.) 

wood's introduction to Semple's translation of Kant's Ethics, ed. 1869, page x.; 
with Journal §97. page 346, cf. §§526. 194, 524; page 347, line 37, for " who all 
rose to their feet" read who all rose to their feet"; page 347, last line, add 
"Egypt 3300 Years Ago," pages 130, 133, 136, 138, where I obtained my facts- 
and references ; page 347, line 2, see Schwegler's Hist. Phil., ed. Seelye, 1864,. 
pages 157, 155; page 350 line 24, for Siniatic, read Sinaitic ; line 33, cf. Liddell 
and Scott's Greek Lexicon, article sophos ; line 26, see §280; line 19, cf. §25- 
(Clavis number); page 351, line 9, Psalm lxxxvi., 8-10, Dr. Conant's translation,. 
American Bible Union, New York, 1871. 

In Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., paga-27, with Journal §1, cf. §§1516, 1521, 1896 r 
2920, 1645, 1856, and Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. viii., page 341, note *; in Journal § It 
(page 27, lines 16 and 18) for noumena, read things in themselves (for the reason 
explained in the Clavis at §2920); with Journal §-2, cf. §§ 337, 291, 203, 220,. 
226; at Journal §3, refer to §§337. 338; with Journal §4, page 29, cf. §§ 237, 
223, 455, 532, 715, 891, and Arist. Nic. Eth. VI., ii., 4 (§ 1040 below) ; at Journal 
§ 5, refer to Journal §§ 57, 58. 94, 96, 47 ; with Journal § 7, cf. §§ 891, 645, 234 :: 
with Journal §8 (page 30), cf. Semple's translation of the Ethics, page viii.; with 
Journal §10, page 31, cf. §§611, 219, 100 (Clavis numbers) ; with Journal § 11,. 
cf. §225; at Journal § 1 2, refer to Dr. Calderwood's introduction (page xv.) to 
Semple's translation of the Ethics (ed. 1869); with the last part of Journal §12,.. 
page 32, cf. §§ 2141, 2435 ; with Journal § 14, cf. §§ 31 (Clavis number), 199, 1734,.. 
177, and Habakkuk, ii., 2; with Journal §15, page 33, cf. § 1603 ; with Journal 
§16, cf. §§ 1599-1615, 952, 1608, 2026, 2782, 1634, 1605, 2137; with Journal § 17,.. 
page 34, cf. §§ 2527, 141, 142. 2472 ; page 34, line 26, for Mr. Seattle, read Dr. 
Calderwood (and at page 31, line 33, as to which see Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. x.. 
pages 430, 431) ; page 34, line 27, for the common, read a ; in Journal § 18, omit 
the first word, (Such) and read Students of the progressive development of the 
human mind (page 35, line 1) will readily admit, etc., (page 35, line 8) omitting: 
seven lines; with Journal §19 (page 35) cf. Fischer's Commentary on Kant's- 
Critique (tr. Mahaffy, ed. 1866, Longmans) page 24; with Journal §20, cf.' 
§§2560, 174, 64 (Clavis numbers), 180, 191, 2242, 2201, 2086, 2083, 1716, 1735 j: 
with Journal §22 (ad fin., page 37) cf. §§ 178, 174. 

In Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 108, with Journal §25, cf. §§ 132, 133, 134,. 
480, 117 (Clavis numbers); with Journal §27, cf. (Clavis numbers) §§98, 125,. 
143, 210; with Journal §30. page 109, cf. (Clavis numbers) ■§§ 104, 106, 107, 123,. 
105 ; with Journal § 32, page 110, cf. §§164, 177, 333, 3036 ; with Journal § 33, cf. 
§§291, 299, 275, 468, 470; with Journal § 34, cf. § 127; with Journal §36, page 111, 
cf. § 2944. and see Monck (Introduction to the Critical Philosophy, Dublin, 1874) 
page 60 ; with Journal § 39, cf. §§ 1676, 1681 ; with Journal § 41, cf. §§ 119 (Clavis- 
number), 1627, 1609, 2901, 1729; with Journal §42. page 113, cf. §§1631, 1628. 



The Clavis to an Index. 269 

§ 948. — Grodliness the plenary consummation of virtue, crowning- 
it with hope, (page 248, line 10.) 

§ 949. — False and abject humility, placing the whole of religion 
in a principle of passive resignation, where all moral good is ex- 
pected from above, (page 248, line 26.) [Judaism : see § 858.] 
{Mohammedanism: see §968.] [Christianity: see §906.] The 
Hindu persuasions: Cf. the following extracts from Buddha's 
Dharmapada :f 

CHAPTEE, I. — the twin verses. 1. All that we are is the re- 
sult of what we have thought: it is founded on our thoughts, it is 

2902, 2904, 2906, 1639, 1598. (I do not doubt that I was wrong) ; with Journal § 
43, cf. § 243 ; with Journal g 44, cf. §§ 443, 444, 953, 954 ; with Journal § 49, page 
116, cf. §§543, 248, 243, and Prof. Fischer (see above) page 8; with Journal § 51, 
page 117, cf. §§2212 et seqq., 291, 244, 251 ; with Journal § 52, cf. §§ 140, 247, 248; 
with Journal § 28, page 109, cf. § 132 ; with Journal § 29, cf.,§ 687. 

In Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 289, with Journal § 54, cf. §§ 174, 172, 171 ; 
with Journal §55, cf. §§163, 157, 142, 109 (Clavis numbers), 2245, 247, 248, 152, 
717; with Journal § 56, cf. §§2560,123, 108fc(Clavis numbers); with Journal 
.§ 58, page 290, cf. §§ 173, 177, 197, 198, 1583, 244, 431 ; with Journal § 59 (p. 291), 
cf. §§ 1665, 1666, 1668, 1673, 1674; with Journal §60, cf. §§ 1686, 210, 1669, Psal. 
xxxvii., 37 ; with Journal §§ 61, page 292, cf. § 125 (Clavis number) ; with Jour- 
nal §62, cf. §§ 147, 176, 54 (Clavis numbers) ; with Journal §63, page 293, cf. 
gg 152, 153, 1583, 2683, 2684, 2451,430,330; with Journal §64, page 294, cf. 
§§168, 332, 430; with Journal §65, cf. §§350, 347, 221, 3113, 586, 517, 362, 73 
(Clavis numbers), and St. Paul (Titus ii., 15 : " Let no one despise thee "); with 
Journal §66, cf. §§386, 388, 400, 374, 303, 345, 391, 396; with Journal §67, page 
296, cf. §§306, 305, 301, 291, 428, and for judicial, read juridical; with Journal 
§68, cf. §£304, 342, 343, 391, 346; with Journal §69, page 297, cf. §411 ; with 
Journal §70, cf. §§ 409, 73, 97 (Clavis numbers) ; with Journal §71, cf. §§494, 
496, 497, 242, 483, 420, 418, 73, 86 (Clavis numbers), and St. Paul (I. Tim., v., 
22 : " Keep thyself pure ; ') ; at Journal § 72, see § 183 ; with Journal § 73, page 
299, cf. §§2465, 2466, 1583, 1674, 2456, 1661, 2464, 1074, 277, 30, 31 (Clavis num- 
bers) ; with Journal § 76. cf. .(with I.) § 147, (with II.) § 153, (with III.) § 156, 
.{with IV.) §157, (VIII.) §168, {with IX.) §171, (with X.) §172; page 302, 
tlo. V., the apodict, like the axiom, must be pointed out, whereupon it is im- 
mediately accepted by every rational agent (the apodict is the logical correlate 
of the mathematical axiom ; .see § 1245) ; with Journal § 77, page 304, cf. §§ 312, 
316; with Journal §79, cf. §§380, 427; with Journal §81, page 306, cf. §381; 
with Journal §82, cf. §426:; with Journal §84, page 307, cf. §§445, 523. 

t" Lectures on the Science of Religion; with a paper on Buddhist Nihilism, 
and a translation of the Dhammapada, or 'Path of Virtue,' by Max Mueller. 
M. A." Xew York, Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1872. See page 193, et seqq., 
for the Dharmapada, with notes, by Mueller. The verses being numbered con- 
secutively, I have not deemed it necessary to insert references to the paging, or, 
except in one or two instances, to call attention to portions which I have 
omitted. The reader will not have the slightest difficulty in finding any de- 
sired place, by observing the numbering of the verses. 



270 Kant 1 8 Ethics. § 949 

made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil 
thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of him who 
draws the carriage. 2. All that we are is the result of what we 
have thought : it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our 
thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness 
follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him. 

3. " He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me," — 
hatred in those who harbor such thoughts will never cease. 4. •' He 
abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me," — hatred in 
those who do not harbor such thoughts will cease. 5. For hatred 
does not cease by hatred at any time : hatred ceases by love ; 
this is an old rule. 6. And some do not know that we must all 
come to an end here; but others know it, and hence their quarrels, 
cease. 

7. He who lives looking for pleasures only, his senses uncon- 
trolled, immoderate in his enjoyments, idle, and weak, Mara (the 
tempter) will certainly overcome him, as the wind throws down a 
weak tree. 8. He who lives without looking for pleasures, his. 
senses well controlled, in his enjoyments moderate, faithful and 
strong, Mara will certainly not overcome him, any more than the 
wind throws down a rocky mountain. 9. He who wishes to put on 
the sacred orange-colored dress* without having cleansed himself 
from sin, who disregards also temperance and truth, is unworthy 
of the orange-colored dress. 10. But he who has cleansed himself 
from sin. is well grounded in all virtues, and regards also temper- 
ance and truth, is indeed worthy of the orange-colored dress. 

15. The evil-doer mourns in this world, and he mourns in the 
next ; he mourns in both. He mourns, he suffers when he sees the 
evil of his own work. 16. The virtuous man delights in this world, 
and he delights in the next ; he delights in both. He delights, he 
rejoices, when he sees the purity of his own work. 17. The evil- 
doer suffers in this world, and he suffers in the next ; he suffers in 
both. He suffers when he thinks of the evil he has done ; he suf- 
fers more when going on the evil path. 18. The virtuous man is 
happy in this world, and he is happy in the next; he is happy in 
both. He is happy when he thinks of the good he has done; he is 
still more happy when going on the good path. 

19. The thoughtless man, even if he can recite a large portion 
(of the law), but is not a doer of it, has no share in the priesthood, 
but is like a cowherd counting the cows of others. 2.0. The fol- 

* The saffron dress, of a reddish-yellow or orange color, the Kasava or Ka- 
shaya, is the distinctive garment of the Buddhist priests. — Extract from Muel- 
ler's note. 



§ 949 The Clavis to an Index. 271 

lower of the law, even if he can recite only a small portion (of the 
law), but, having forsaken passion and hatred and foolishness, pos- 
sesses true knowledge and serenity of mind, he, caring for nothing* 
in this world, or that* to come, has indeed a share in,the priesthood, 

CHAPTEK II. — on reflection. 21. Eeflection is the path of 
immortality, thoughtlessness the path of death. Those who re- 
fleet do not dief, those who are thoughtless are as if dead already, 
22. Having understood this clearly, those who are advanced in re- 
flection, delight in reflection, and rejoice in the knowledge of the 
Ariyas (the Elect). 23. These wise people, meditative, steady, 
always possessed of strong powers, attain to Nirvana, the highest 
happiness. 24. If a reflecting person has aroused himself, if he is 
not forgetful, if his deeds are pure, if he acts with consideration, 
if he restrains himself, and lives according to law, — then his glory 
will increase. 25. By rousing himself, by reflection, by restraint 
and control, the wise man may make for himself an island which 
no flood can overwhelm. 

26. Fools follow after vanity, men of evil wisdom. The wise- 
man possesses reflection as his best jewel. 27. Follow not after 
vanity, nor after the enjoyment of love and lust ! He who reflects 
and meditates, obtains anrple joy. 29. Reflecting among the 
thoughtless, awaked among the sleepers, the wise man advances ; 
like a racer leaving behind the hack. 30. By earnestness did 
Maghavan (Indra) rise to the lordship of the gods. People praise 
earnestness; thoughtlessness is always blamed. 31. A Bhikshu 
(mendicant) who delights in reflection, who looks with fear on 
thoughtlessness, moves about like fire, burning all his fetters, small 
or large. 32. A Bhikshu (mendicant) who delights in reflection,, 
who looks with fear on thoughtlessness, will not go to destruction 
— he is near to Nirvana. 1 1 

* [Every aposteriori motive, be it ever so refined and psychical, is material 
and not moral. See verse 417 below, and cf. §§155, 256 (pages 19, 25 above).]; 
t[Cf. St. Paul (Romans, viii., 6) §281.] + [Cf. Confucius (Analects, V., ix., 1, 
page 124 above), and Zoroaster (Vendidad, xviii., 11, page 146 above).] 

[I No person who reads with attention the metaphysical speculations on the 
Nirvana contained in the third part of the Buddhist Canon, can arrive at any 
other conviction than that expressed by Burnouf, namely, that Nirvana, the - 
highest aim, the summum bonum of Buddhism, is the absolute nothing. 

Burnouf adds, however, that this doctrine appears in its crude form in the' 
third part only of the canon, the so-called Abhidharma, but not in the first andJ 
second parts, in the Sutras, the sermons, and the Vinaya, the ethics, which to- 
gether bear the name of Dharma, or Law. He next points out that, according 
to some ancient authorities, this entire part of the canon was designated as not 
" pronounced by Buddha. 1 ' — (Max Mueller's Chips, 2d ed., vol. i., p. 285, note.) 



-272 Kant's Ethics. § 949 

CHAPTER III. — thought. 33. As a fletcher makes straight 
Ms arrow, a wise man makes straight his trembling and unsteady 
thought, which is difficult to keep, difficult to turn. 34. As a fish 
taken from his watery home and thrown on the dry ground, our 
thought trembles all over in order to escape the dominion of Mara 
(the tempter). 35. It is good to tame the mind, which is difficult 
to hold in and flighty, rushing wherever it listeth ; a tamed mind 
brings happiness. 38. Let the wise man guard his thoughts, for 
they are difficult to perceive, very artful, and they rush wherever 

These are, at once, two important limitations. I add a third, and maintain that 
sayings of Buddha occur in the Dhammapada, which are in open contradiction 
to this metaphysical nihilism. 

Now. first, as regards the soul, or the self, the existence of which, according 
to the orthodox metaphysics, is purely phenomenal,** a sentence attributed to 
the Buddha [Dhammapada, verse 160) says, "Self is the Lord of Self, who else 
could be the Lord ? " And again, [Dhammapada, v. 323) "A man who con- 
trols himself enters the untrodden land through his own self-controlled self." 
But this untrodden land is the Nirvana. 

Nirvana certainly means extinction, whatever its later arbitrary interpreta- 
tions may have been, and seems therefore to imply, even etymologicaily, a real 
blowing out or passing away. But Nirvana occurs also in the Brahmanic writ- 
ings as synonymous with Moksba, Nirvritti, (see Dhamviapada, v. 89, 92) and 
other words, all designating the highest stage of spiritual liberty and bliss, but 
not annihilation. Nirvana may mean the extinctio7i of many things, — of self- 
ishness, desire, and sin, without going so far as the extinction of subjective con- 
sciousness. Further, if we consider that Buddha himself, after he had already 
seen Nirvana, still remains on earth until his body falls a prey to death ; that in 
the legends Buddha appears to his disciples even after his death, it seems to me 
that all these circumstances are hardly reconcilable with the orthodox metaphys- 
ical doctrine of Nirvana. 

But I go even further and maintain that, if we look in the Dhammapada at 
every passage where Nirvana is mentioned, there is not one which would re- 
quire that its meaning should be annihilation, while most, if not all, would be- 
come perfectly unintelligible if we assigned to the word Nirvana the meaning 
which it has in the Abhidharma or the metaphysical portions of the canon. 

"What does it mean, when Buddha (verse 21), calls reflection the path to im- 
mortality, .thoughtlessness the path of death? Buddhaghosha does not hesitate 
to explain immortality by Nirvana, and that the same idea was connected with 
it in the mind of Buddha is clearly proved by a passage immediately following 
.{verse 23) : "These wise people, meditative, steady, always possessed of strong 
powers, attain to Nirvana, the. highest happiness." In the last verse, too, of the 
same chapter we read, "A Bhiskshu who delights in reflection, who looks with 
fear on thoughtlessness, will not go to destruction — he is near to Nirvana." If 
the goal at which the followers of Buddha have to aim had been in the mind of 
Buddha perfect annihilation, "amata," i. e. immortality, would have been the 
very last word he could have chosen as its name. 

** See Wassiljew, Der Buddhinmus, p. 296, (269) ; and Bigandet's Life of Gandama, p. 
479. " The things that I see and know, are not myself, nor from myself, nor to myself. 
What seems to be myself is in reality neither myself nor belongs to myself." 



■§ 949 The Claim to an Index. 273 

they list ; thoughts well guarded bring happiness. 37. Those who 
bridle their mind which travels far, moves about alone, is without 
a body, and hides in the chamber (of the heart), will be free from 
the bonds of Mara (the tempter). 

38. If a man's thoughts are unsteady, if he does not know the true 
law, if his peace of mind is troubled, his knowledge will never be 
perfect. 40. Knowing that this body is (fragile) like a jar, and 
making this thought firm like a fortress,, one should attack Mara 
{the tempter) with the weapon of knowledge, one should watch 

In several passages of the Dhammapada, Nirvana occurs in the purely 
■ethical sense of rest, quietness, absence of passion ; e. g. (verse 134), " If, like a 
trumpet trampled under foot, thou utter not, then thou hast reached Nirvana ; 
anger is not known in thee." . In verse 184 long-suffering (titiksha) is called 
the highest Nirvana. While in verse 202 we read that there is no happiness 
like rest (santi) or quietness, we read in the next verse that the highest happi- 
ness is Nirvana. Inverse 285, too, "santi" seems to be synonymous with 
Nirvana, for the way that leads to " santi," or peace, leads also to Nirvana, as 
■shown by Buddha. In verse 369 it is said, " When thou hast cut off passion 
and hatred, tliou wilt go to Nirvana;" and in verse 225 the same thought is 
expressed, only that instead of Nirvana we have the expression of unchangeable 
place: "The sages who injure nobody, and who always control their body, they 
will go to the unchangeable place, where, if they have gone, they will suffer no 
more." 

In other passages Nirvana is described as the result of right knowledge. 
Thus we' read (verse 203), " Hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the great- 
est of pains; if one knows this truly, that is Nirvana, the highest happiness." 
* A similar thought seems contained in verse 374: "As soon as a man has 
perceived the origin and destruction of the elements of the body (khandha), he 
finds happiness and joy, which belong to those who know the immortal (Nir- 
vana); or which is the immortality of those who know it, namely, the transitory 
character of the body." In verse 372 it is said that he who has knowledge and 
meditation is near unto Nirvana. 

Nirvana is certainly more than heaven or heavenly joy. "Some people are 
born again" (on earth) says Buddha, verse 126, "evil doers go to hell; right- 
eous people go to heaven ; those who are free from all worldly desires enter 
Nirvawa." The idea that those who had reached the haven of the gods were 
still liable to birth and death, and that there is a higher state in which the 
power of birth and death is broken, existed clearly at the time when the verses 
of the Dhammapada were composed- Thus we read (verse 238), "When thy 
impurities are blown away, and thou art free from guilt, thou wilt not enter 
again into birth and decay." And in the last verse (423) the highest state that 
a Brahmana can reach is called "the end of births," ^atikshaya. 

There are many passages in the Dhammapada where we expect Nirvana, 
but where, instead of it, other word's are used. Here, no doubt, it might be said 
that something different from Nirvana is intended, and that we have no right 
to use such words as throwing light on the original meaning of Nirvana. But, 
on the other hand, these words, and the passages where they occur, must mean 
something definite; they can not mean heaven or the world of the gods, for 



274 Kant's Ethics. § 949 

him when conquered, and should never cease (from the fight). 
42. Whatever a hater may do to a hater, or an enemy to an enemy , 
a wrongly-directed mind will do us greater mischief. 43. Not a 
mother, not a father will do so much, nor any other relative ; a 
well-directed mind will do us greater service. 

CHAPTER IV. — flowers. 44. Who shall overcome this earth, 
and the world of Yama (the lord of the departed), and the world 
of the gods ? Who shall find out the plainly shown path of virtue } . 
as a clever man finds out the (right) flower? 45. The disciple 



reasons stated above; and if they do not mean Nirvana, they would have no 
meaning at all. There may be some doubt whether '"para," the shore, and par- 
ticularly the other shore, stands always for Nirvana, and whether those who are 
said to have reached the other shore are to be supposed to have entered Nirvana., 
It may possibly not have that meaning in verses 384 and 385, but it can hardly 
have another in places such as verses 85, 86, 347, 348, 355, 414. There is less doubt, 
however, that other words are used distinctly as synonyms of Nirvana. Such 
words are, the quiet place (santam padam, verses 368, 381); the changeless 
place (a&yutam sthanam, verse 225, compared with verse 226); ihe immortal 
place (amatam padam, verse 114) ; also simply that which is immortal (verse 
374). In verse 411 the expression occurs that the wise dives into the immortal. 
Though, according to Buddha, everything that has been made, everything 
that was put together, resolves itself again into its component parts and passes 
away (verse 277, sarve samskara anityaA), he speaks nevertheless of that which 
is not made, i. e., the uncreated and eternal, and uses it, as it would seem, synony- ' 
mously with Nirvana (verse 97). Nay, he sajs (verse 383), "When you have- 
understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which 
was not made." This surely shows that even for Buddha a something existed 
which is not made, and which, therefore, is imperishable and eternal. 

On considering such sayings, to which many more might be added, one recog- 
nizes in them a conception of Nirvana, altogether irreconcilable with the nihilism 
of the third part of the Buddhist Canon. It is not a question of more or less,, 
but of aut — aid. Nirvana can not, in the mind of one and the same person,, 
mean black and white, nothing and something. If these sayings, as recorded in 
the Dhammapada, have maintained themselves, in spite of their being in open 
contradiction to orthodox metaphysics, the only explanation, in my opinion, is,, 
that they were too firmly fixed in the tradition which went back to Buddha and 
his disciples. What Bishop Bigandet and others represent as the popular view 
of Nirvana, in contradistinction to that of the Buddhist divines, was, in my 
opinion, the conception of Buddha and his disciples. It represented the en- 
trance of the soul into rest, a subduing of all wishes and desires, indifference to 
joy and pain, to good and evil, an absorption of the soul in itself,, and a freedom 
from the circle of existences from birth to death, and from death to a new birth.. 
This is still the meaning which educated people attach to it, whilst to the minds 
of the larger masses (Bigandet, The Life of Gaudama, p. 320 note ; Bastian, 
Die Voelger des oestlichen Asien, vol. iii., p. 353) Nirvana suggests rather the 
idea of a Mohammedan paradise or of blissful Elysian fields. 

Only in the hands of the philosophers, to whom Buddhism owes its meta- 
physics, the N'rvana, through constant negations carried to an indefinite degree,. 



§ 949 The Clavis to mi Index. 275 

will overcome the earth, and the world of Yama, and the world of 
the gods. The disciple will find out the plainly shown path of 
virtue, as a clever man finds out the (right) flower. 46. He who 
knows that this body is like froth, and has learnt that it is as un- 
substantial as a mirage, will break the flower-pointed arrow of 
Mara, and never see the King of Death. 47. Death carries off a 
man who is gathering flowers and whose mind is distracted, as a 
flood carries off a sleeping village. 48. Death subdues a man who 
is gathering flowers, and whose mind is distracted, before he is 
satiated in his pleasures. 

49. As the bee collects nectar and departs without injuring the 
flower, or its color and scent, so let the sage dwell on earth. 50. TSot 
the failures of others, not their sins of commission or omission, but 

through the excluding and abstracting of all that is not Nirvana, at last became 
an empty Nothing, a philosophical myth. There is no lack of such philosophi- 
cal myths either in the East or in the West. What has been fabled by philos- 
ophers of a Nothing, and of the terrors of a Nothing, is as much a myth as the 
myth of Eos and Tithonus. There is no more a Nothing, than there is an Eos- 
or a Chaos. All these are sickly, dying or dead wu-ds, which, like shadows and 
ghosts, continue to haunt language, and succeed in deceiving for a while even 
the healthiest intellect. 

Even modern philosophy is not afraid to say that there is a Nothing. We 
find passages in the German mj^stics, such as Eckhart and Tauler, where the 
abyss of the Nothing is spoken of quite in a Buddhist style. If Buddha had 
said, like St. Paul, ' that what no eye hath seen, nor ear heard, neither has it 
entered into the heart of man/' was prepared in the Nirvana for those who kadi 
advanced to the highest degree of spiritual perfection, such expressions would 
have been quite sufficient to serve as a proof to the philosophers by profession 
that this Nirvana, which could not become an object of perception by the senses, 
nor of conception by the categories of the understanding, — the anakkhata, the 
ineffable, as Buddha calls it (verse 218),— could be nothing more nor less than 
the Nothing. Could we dare with Hegel to distinguish between a Nothing 
(Nichts) and a Not (Nicht), we might say that the Nirvana had, through a 
false dialectical process, been driven from a relative Nothing to an absolute Not. 
This was the work of the theologians and of the orthodox philosophers. But a 
religion has never been founded by such teaching, and a man like Buddha, who 
knew mankind, must have known that he could not, with such weapons, over- 
turn the tyranny of the Brahmans. Either we must bring ourselves to believe 
that Buddha taught his disciples two diametrically opposed doctrines on Nir- 
vana, say an exoteric and esoteric one, or we must allow that view of Nirva?ia 
to have been the original view of the founder of this marvelous religion, which 
we find recorded in the verses of the Dhammapada.and which corresponds best with 
the simple, clear, and practical character of Buddha. — [Extract from Max Muel- 
ler's preface to Capt. Rogers' translation of Buddhaghosha's Parables (it appears 
from the publishers' remark ; see page 151 of Scribner's edition of the Dharma- 
pada, referred to above, page 269). This extract is taken from pages 179-186- 
of Scribner.] 



276 Kant's Ethic*. § 949 

his own misdeeds and negligences should the sage take notice of. 
51. Like a beautiful flower, full of color, but without scent, are the 
fine but fruitless words of him who does not act accordingly. 52. 
But like a beautiful flower, full of color and full of scent, are the 
fine and fruitful words of him who acts accordingly. 53. As many 
kinds of wreaths can be made from a heap of flowers, so many 
good things may be achieved by a mortal if once he is born. 

54. The scent of flowers does not travel against the wind, nor 
(that of) sandal- wood, or of a bottle of Tagara oil ; but the odor of 
good people travels even against the wind; a good man pervades 
every place. 57. Of the people who possess these excellencies, 
who live without thoughtlessness, and who are emancipated 
through true knowledge, Mara, the tempter, never finds the way. 
58, 59. As on a heap of rubbish cast upon the highway the lily 
will grow full of sweet perfume and delightful, thus the disciple of 
the truly enlightened Buddha shines forth by his knowledge 
among those who are like rubbish, among the people that walk in 
darkness. 

CHAPTER V. — the fool. 60. Long is the night to him who 
is awake ; long is a mile to him who is tired ; long is life to the 
foolish who do not know the true law. 62. •' These sons belong to 
me, and this wealth belongs to me ; " with such thoughts a fool 
is tormented. He himself does not belong to himself; how much 
less sons and wealth? 

66. Fools of little understanding have themselves for their greatest 
enemies, for they do evil deeds which must bear bitter fruits. 67. 
That deed is not well done of which a man must repent, and 
the reward of which he receives crying and with a tearful face. 
68. JSTo, that deed is well done of which a man does not repent, 
and the reward of which he receives gladly and cheerfully. 69. 
As long as the evil deed clone does not bear fruit, the fool thinks it 
is like honey ; but when it ripens, then the fool suffers grief. 70. 
Let a fool month afte/ month eat his food (like an ascetic) with the 
tip of a blade of Kusa grass, yet is he not worth the sixteenth particle 
of those who have well weighed the law. 

71. An evil deed does not turn suddenly, like milk ; smouldering 
it follows the fool, like fire covered by ashes. 72. And when the 
evil deed, after it has become known, brings sorrow to the fool, 
then it destroys his bright lot, nay it cleaves his head. 73. Let 
the fool wish for a false reputation, for precedence among the 
Bhikshus, for lordship in the convents, for worship among other 
people ! 74. " May both the layman and he who has left the world 
think that this is done by me ; may they be subject to me in every- 



§ 949 The Clavis to an Index. 277 

thing which is to be done or is not to be done ; " thus is the mind 
of the fool, and his desire and pride increase. 

75. " One is the road that leads to wealth, another the road that 
leads to Nirvana; " if the Bhikshu, the disciple of Buddha, has 
learnt this, he will not yearn for honor, he will strive after separa- 
tion from the world. 

CHAPTEB VI. — the wise man. 76. If you see an intelligent 
man, who tells you where true treasures are to be found, who shows 
what is to be avoided, and who administers reproofs, follow that 
wise man ; it will be better, not worse, for those who follow him. 
77. Let him admonish, let him command, let him hold back from 
what is improper ! — he will be beloved of the good, by the bad he 
will be hated. 78. Do not have evil-doers for friends, do not 
have low people : have virtuous people for friends, have for friends 
the best of men. 79. He who drinks in the Law lives happily 
with a serene mind : the sage rejoices always in the Law, as 
preached by the elect. 

80. Well-makers lead the water (wherever they like) ; fletchers 
bend the arrow; carpenters bend a log of wood ; wise people fash- 
ion themselves.* 81. As a solid rock is not shaken by the wind, 
wise people falter not amidst blame and praise. 82. Wise people, 
after they have listened to the laws, become serene, like a deep, 
smooth, and still lake. 83. Good people walk on, whatever befall, 
the good do not murmur, longing for pleasure ; whether touched 
by happiness or sorrow, wise people never appear elated or de- 
pressed. 84. If, whether for his own sake, or for the sake of others, 
a man wishes neither for a son, nor for wealth, nor for lordship, 
and if he does not wish for his own success by unfair means, then 
he is good, wise, and virtuous. • 

85. Few are there among men who arrive at the other shore • 
the other people here run up and down the shore. 86. But those 
who, when the Lawf has been well preached to them, follow the 
Law, will pass across the dominion of death, however difficult to 
overcome. 89. Those whose mind is well grounded in the ele- 
ments of knowledge, who have given up all attachments, and re- 
joice without clinging to anything, those whose frailties have been 
conquered, and who are foil of light, are free (even) in this world. 

CHAPTEB VII.— the venerable. [90,| 91 £J. 92. They who 
have no riches, who live on authorized food,|| who have perceived 
the Void, the Unconditioned, the Absolute, their way is difficult to 
understand, like that of birds in the ether. 93. He whose passions 

* [Philippians, ii., 12.] t [See verse 183 below, without delay.] % [I omit 
verses 90, 91.] || [Deuteronomy, viii., 3 ; Matthew, iv., 4.] 



278 Kant's Ethics, § 949 

are stilled, who is not absorbed in enjoyment, who has perceived 
the Yoid, the Unconditioned, the Absolute, his path is difficult to 
understand, like that of the birds in the ether. 94. The gods even 
envy him whose senses have been subdued, like horses well broken 
in by the driver, who is free from pride, and free from frailty. 95. 
Such a one who does his duty is tolerant like the earth, like In- 
dra'sbolt; he is like a lake without mud; no new births are in 
store for him. 96. His thought is quiet, quiet are his word and 
deed, when he has obtained freedom by true knowledge, when he 
has thus become a quiet man. 97. The man who is free from cred- 
ulity, but knows the Uncreated, who has cut all ties, removed all 
temptations, renounced all desires, he is the greatest of men. 

CHAPTER VIII. — the thousands. 100. Even though a speech 
be a thousand (of words), but made up of senseless words, one 
word of sense is better, which if a man hears, he becomes quiet. 
101. Even though a Gatha (poem) be a thousand (of words), but 
made up of senseless words, one word of a Gatha is better, which 
if a man hears, he becomes quiet. 102. Though a man recite a 
hundred Gathas made up of senssless words, one word of the 
Law is better, which if a man hears, he becomes quiet. 

103. If one man conquer in battle a thousand times thousand 
men, and if another conquer himself, he is the greatest of con- 
querors. 104, 105. One's own self conquered is better than all 
other people ; not even a god, a Gandharva, not Mara with Brah- 
man could change into defeat the victory of a man who has van- 
quished himself, and always lives under restraint. 106. If a man 
for a hundred years sacrifice month after month with a thousand, 
and if he but for one moment pay homage to a man whose soul is 
grounded (in true knowledge), better is that homage than a sacri- 
fice for a hundred years. 107. If a man for a hundred years wor- 
ship Agni (fire) in the forest, and if he but for one moment pay 
homage to a man whose soul is grounded (in true knowledge), 
better is that homage than sacrifice for a hundred years. 108. 
Whatever a man sacrifice in this world as an offering or as an ob- 
lation for a whole year in order to gain merit, the whole of it is 
not worth a quarter ; reverence shown to the righteous is better. 

109. He who always greets and constantly reveres the aged, four 
things will increase to him, namely life, beauty, happiness, power. 

110. But he who lives a hundred years, vicious, and unrestrained, 
a life of one day is better if a man is virtuous and reflecting. 111. 
And he who lives a hundred years, ignorant and unrestrained, a 
life of one day is better, if a man is wise and reflecting. 112. And he 
who lives a hundred years, idle and weak, a life of one day is better, 



§ 949 The Clavis to an Index. 279 

if a man has attained firm strength. 113. And he who lives a 
hundred years, not seeing beginning and end, a life of one day is 
better if a man sees beginning and end. 114. And he who lives a 
hundred years, not seeing the immortal place, a life of one day is 
better if a man sees the immortal place. 115. And he who lives 
a hundred years, not seeing the highest law, a life of one day is 
better if a man sees the highest law. 

CHAPTER IX.— evil. 116. If a man would hasten toward the 
good, he should keep his thoughts away prom evil ; if a man 
does what is good slothfully, his mind delights in evil. 117. If a 
man commits a sin, let him not do it again ; let him not delight in 
sin : pain is the outcome of evil. 118. If a man does what is 
good, let him do it again; let him delight in it: happiness is the 
outcome of good. 119. Even an evil-doer sees happiness as long 
as his evil deed has not ripened ; but when his evil deed has 
ripened, then does the evil-doer see evil. 120. Even a good man 
sees evil days, as long as his good deed has not ripened ; but when 
his good deed has ripened, then does the good man see happy days. 

121. Let no man think lightly of evil, saying in his heart. It 
will not come near unto me. Even by the falling of water-drops 
•& water-pot is filled ; the fool becomes full of evil, even if he 
gathers it little by little. 122. Let no man think lightly of good, 
saying in his heart, It will not benefit me. Even by the falling of 
water-drops a Vaterpot is filled ; the wise man becomes full of 
good, even if he gather it little by little. 123. Let a man avoid 
evil deeds, as a merchant if he has few companions and carries 
much wealth avoids a dangerous road ; as a man who loves life 
avoids poison. 124. He who has no wound on his hand, may 
touch poison with his hand ; poison does not affect one who has no 
wound ; nor is there evil for one who does not commit evil. 

125. If a man offend* a harmless, pure, and innocent person, the 
evil falls back upon that fool, like light dust thrown up' against the 
wind. 126. Some people are born again ; evil-doers go to hell; 
righteous people go to heaven ; those who are free from all worldly 
desires enter . Nirvana. 127. Not in the sky, not in the midst of 
the sea, not if we enter into the clefts of the mountains, is there 
known a spot in the whole world where a man might be freed from 
an evil deed. 

CHAPTER X. — punishment. 129. All men tremble at punish- 
ment, all men fear death ; remember that you are like unto them, 
and do not kill nor cause slaughter. 130. All men tremble at 
punishment, all men love life ; remember that thou art like unto 

* [1. Corinthians, viii., 13.] 



280 Kant's Ethics. § 949 

them, and do not kill, nor cause slaughter. 131. He who for his 
own sake punishes or kills beings longing for happiness, will not. 
find happiness after death. 132. He who for his own sake does 
not punish or kill beings longing for happiness, will find happiness 
after death. 

133. Do not speak harshly to anybody ; those who are spoken 
to will answer thee in the same way. Angry speech is painful, 
blows for blows will touch thee. 134. If, like a trumpet trampled 
under foot, thou utter not, then thou hast reached Nirvana ; anger 
is not known in thee. 

136. A fool does not know when he commits his evil deeds : but 
the wicked man burns by his own deeds, as if burnt by fire. 137, 
He who inflicts pain on innocent and harmless persons, will soon 
come to one of these ten states : 138. He will have cruel 
suffering, loss, injury of the body, heavy affliction, or loss of mind, 
139. Or a misfortune of the king, or a fearful accusation, or loss of 
relations, or destruction of treasures, 140. Or lightning-fire will 
burn his houses ; and when his body is destroyed, the fool will go 
to hell. . 

141. Not nakedness, not platted hair, not dirt, not fasting, or 
lying on the earth, not rubbing with dust, not sitting motionless, 
can purify a mortal who has not overcome desires. 142. He 
who, though dressed in fine apparel, exercises tranquility, is quiet, 
subdued, restrained, chaste, and has ceased to find fault with all 
other beings, he indeed is a Brahma?ia, an ascetic (£ramana), a friar 
(bhikshu). 143. Is there in this world any man so restrained by 
humility that he does not mind reproof, as a well-trained horse the 
whip ? 144. Like a well-trained horse when touched by the whip, 
be ye active and lively, and by faith, by virtue, by energy, by med- 
itation, by discernment of the law you will overcome this great 
pain (of reproof), perfect in knowledge and in behavior, and 
never forgetful. 

CHAPTER XI. — old age. 146. How is there laughter, how is 
there joy, as this world is always burning ? Why do you not seek 
a light, ye who are surrounded by darkness? 151. The brilliant 
chariots of kings are destroyed, the body also approaches destruc- 
tion, but the virtues of good people never approach destruction, 
thus do the good say to the good. 152. A man who has learnt 
little, grows old like an ox ; his flesh grows, but his knowledge 
does not grow. 

CHAPTER X1L— self. 157. If a man hold himself dear, let 
him watch himself carefully ; during one at least out of the three 
watches a wise man should be watchful. 158. Let each man first 



§ 949 The Clavis to an Index. 281 

direct himself to what is proper, then let him teach others ; thus a 
wise man will not suffer. 159. Let each man make himself as he 
teaches others to he; he who is well subdued may subdue (others); 
one's own self* is difficult to subdue. 160. Self is the lord of self, 
who else could ba the lord ? With self well-subdued, a man finds 
a lord such as few can find. 

161. The evil done by one's self, self-begotten, self-bred, 
crus*hes the wicked, as a diamond breaks a precious stone. 162. 
He whose wickedness is very great brings himself down to that 
state where his enemy wishes him to be, as a creeper does with the 
tree which it surrounds. 163. Bad deeds, and deeds hurtful to 
ourselves, are easy to do ; what is beneficial and good, that is very 
difficult to do. 164. The wicked man who scorns the rule of the 
venerable (Arahat), of the elect (Ariya), of the virtuous, and fol- 
lows false doctrine, he bears fruit to his own destruction, like the 
fruits of the Kaft/iaka reed. 165. By one's self the evil is done, 
by one's self one suffers ; by one's self evil is left undone, by 
one's self one is purified. Purity and impurity belong to one's 
self, no one can purify another. 

166. Let no one forget his own duty for the sake of another's, 
however great ; let a man, after he has discerned his own duty, be 
always attentive to his duty. 

CHAPTEE XIII.— the world. 167. Do not follow the evil 
law ! Do not live on in thoughtlessness ! Do not follow false 
doctrine ! Be not a friend of the world. 

168. Bouse thyself ! do not be idle ! Follow the law of virtue! 
The virtuous lives happily in this world and in the next. 169. 
Follow the law of virtue ; do not follow that of sin. The virtuous 
lives happily in this world and in the next. 170. Look upon the 
world as a bubble, look upon it as a mirage : the king of death 
does not see him who thus looks down upon the world. 

171. Come, look at this glittering world, like unto a royal char- 
iot; the foolish are immersed in it, but the wise do not cling to it. 

172. He who formerly was reckless and afterward became sober 
brightens up this world, like the moon when freed from 'clouds. 

173. He whose evil deeds are covered b} 7 good deeds, brightens up 
this world, like the moon when freed from clouds. 174. This 
world is dark, few only can see here ; a few only go to heaven, 
like birds escaped from the net. 175. The swans go on the path of 
the sun, they go through the ether by means of their miraculous 
power ; the wise are led out of this world, when they have con- 
quered Mara and his train. 

* [Cf. Confucius. Analects, XII., i., 1 (page 120 above).} 

19 



282 Kant's Ethic*. § 949 

176. If a man has transgressed one law, and speaks lies, and 
seoffs at another world, there is no evil he will not do. 

177. The uncharitable do not go to the world of the gods ; fools 
only do not praise liberality ; a wise man rejoices in liberality, and 
through it becomes blessed in the other world. 

178. Better than sovereignty over the earth, better than going 
to* heaven, better than lordship over all worlds, is the reward of 
the first step in holiness. 

CHAPTEE XIV. — the awakened (buddha). 179. He whose 
conquest is not conquered again, whose conquest no one in 
this world escapes, by what path can you lead him, the 
Awakened, the Omniscient, into a wrong path? 180. He 
whom no desire with its snares and poisons can lead astray, by 
what path can you lead him, the Awakened, the Omniscient, 
into a wrong path? 182. Hard is the conception of men, hard is 
the life of mortals, hard is the hearing of the True Law, hard is 
the birth of the Awakened (the attainment of Buddhahood). 

183. Not to commit any sin, to do good, and to purify one's 
mind, that is the teaching of the Awakened. f 184. The Awakened 
call patience the highest penance, long-suffering the highest Nir- 
vana ; for he is not an anchorite (Pravragita) who strikes others, 
he is not an ascetic (<S'ramana) who insults others. 185. Not to 
blame, not to strike, to live restrained under the law, to be moder- 
ate in eating, to sleep and eat alone, and to dwell on the highest 
thoughts, — this is the teaching of the Awakened. 186. There is no 
satisfying lusts, even by a shower of gold pieces ; he who knows 
that lusts have a short taste and cause pain, he is wise. 187. Even 
in heavenly pleasures he finds no satisfaction, the disciple who is 
fully awakened delights only in the destruction of all desires. 

188. Men, driven by fear, go to many a refuge, to mountains and 
forests, to groves and sacred trees. 189. But that is not a safe 
refuge, that is not the best refuge ; a man is not delivered from all 
pains after having gone to that refuge. 194. Happy is the arising 
of the Awakened, happy is the teaching of the True Law, happy 
is peace in the church, happy is the devotion of those who are at 
peace. 

CHAPTEE XV.— happiness. 197. Let us live happily, then, 
not hating those who hate us ! let us dwell free from hatred among 
men who hate ! 198. Let us live happily then, free from ailments 
among the ailing! let us dwell free from ailments among men who 

*[See verse 20 (page 271 above).] f [Cf. §821 (page 64 above); cf. Con- 
fucius, Analects, Book IX., ch. xxiii., (page 128 above); cf. Zoroaster, Avesta, 
Ya.sna, xlvii., 4 (page J. 75 above).] 



:§ 949 The Clavis to an Index. 283 

are ailing- ! 199. Let us live happily, then, free from greed among 
the greedy ! let us dwell free from greed among men who are 
greedy ! 200. Let us live happily, then, though we call noth- 
ing our own! We shall be like the bright gods, feeding on 
happiness ! 

201. Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy. He 
who has given up both victory and defeat, he, the contented, is 
happy. 202. There is no fire like passion : there is no unlucky die 
like hatred ; there is no pain like this body ; there is no happiness 
like rest. 203. Hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the 
greatest of pains ; if one knows this truly, that is Nirvana, the 
highest happiness. 204. Health is the greatest of gifts, contented- 
ness the best riches ; trust is the best of relatives, Nirvana, the 
highest happiness. 205. He who has tasted the sweetness of soli- 
tude and tranquility, is free from fear and free from sin, while he 
tastes the sweetness of drinking in the Law. 

206. The sight of the elect (Arya) is good, to live with them is 
always happiness ; if a man does not see fools, he will be truly 
happy. 207. He who walks in the compan} r of fools suffers a long 
way; company with fools, as with an enemy, is always painful; 
company with the wise is pleasure, like meeting with kinsfolk. 
208. Therefore,"* one ought to follow the wise, the intelligent, the 
learned, the much enduring, the dutiful, the elect; one ought to 
follow a good and wise man, as the moon follows the path of the 
stars. 

CHAPTEE XVI.— pleasure. 209. He who gives himself to 
vanity, and does not give himself to meditation, forgetting the real 
aim (of life) and grasping at pleasure, will in time envy him who 
has exerted himself in meditation. 217. He who possesses virtue 
;and intelligence, who is just, speaks the truth, and does what is 
his own business, him the world will hold dear. 218. He in whom 
a desire for the Ineffable (Nirvana) has sprung up, who is satisfied 
in his mind, and whose thoughts are not bewildered by love, he 
is called TJrdhvawisrotas (carried upward by the stream). 219. 
Xinsfolk, friends and lovers salute a man who has been long away, 
and returns safe from afar. 220. In like manner his good works 
receive him who has done good, and has gone from this world to 
the other ; as kinsmen receive a friend on his return. 

CHAPTEE XVII.— anger. 221. Let a man leave anger, let 
him forsake pride, let him overcome all bondage ! No sufferings 
befall the man who is not attached to either body or soul, and who 
calls nothing his own. 222. He who holds back rising anger like 
a rolling chariot, him I call a real driver ; other people are but 



284 Kant's Ethic*. § 94& 

holding the reins. 223. Let a man overcome anger by love, let- 
him overcome evil By good ; let him overcome the greedy by lib- 
erality, the liar by truth ! 

224. Speak the truth, do not yield to anger ; give, if thou 
art asked, from the little thou hast; by those steps thou wilt go< 
near the gods. 225. The sages who injure nobody, and who always 
control their body, they will go to the unchangeable place (Nir- 
vana), where if they have gone, they will suffer no more. 226.. 
Those who are always watchful who study day and night, and who 
strive after Nirvana, their passions will come to an end. 

228. There never was, there never will be, nor is there now, a 
man who is always blamed, or a man who is always praised, 229 r 
230. But he whom those who discriminate praise continually day 
after day, as without blemish, wise, rich in knowledge and virtue, 
who would dare to blame him, like a coin made of gold from the 
trambu river? Even the gods praise him, he is praised even by 
Brahman. 

231. Beware of bodily anger, and control thy body ! Leave the 
sins of the body, and with thy body practice virtue ! 232. Be- 
ware of the anger of the tongue, and control thy tongue ! Leave ■ 
the sins of the tongue, and practice virtue with thy tongue ! 233.. 
Beware of the anger of the mind, and control thy mind ! Leave 
the sins of the mind, and practice virtue with thy mind ! 234. 
The wise who control their body, who control their tongue, the 
wise who control their mind, are indeed well controlled. 

CHAPTER XV1J I.— impurity. 235. Thou art now like a sear 
leaf, the messengers of Death (Yama) have come near to thee ; 
thou standest at the door of thy departure, and thou hast no pro- 
vision* for thy journey. 236. Make thyself an island, work hard, 
be wise ! When thy impurities are blown away, and thou art free 
from guilt, thou wilt enter into the heavenly world of the Elect 
(Ariya). 

237. Thy life has come to an end, thou art come near to Death 
(Yama), there is no resting-place for thee on the road, and thou 
hast no provision for thy journey. 238. Make thyself an island, 
work hard, be wise ! When thy impurities are blown away, and 
thou art free from guilt, thou wilt not enter again into birth and 
decay. 239. Let a wise man blow off the impurities of his soulj. 
as a smith blows off the impurities of silver, one by one, little by 
little, and from time to time. 240. Impurity arises from the iron r 
and, having arisen from it, it destroys it ; thus do a transgressor's 
own works lead him to the evil path. 

* [Cf. Zoroaster, Khordah-Avesta, xxxii., 1 (§881, page 195 above).] 



<§ 949 The Clavis to an Index. 285 

241. The taint of prayers is non-repetition; the taint of houses, 
non-repair ; the taint of the body is sloth, the taint of a watchman 
thoughtlessness. 242. Bad conduct is the taint of woman, greedi- 
ness the taint of a benefactor ; tainted are all evil ways, in this 
world and in the next. 243. But there is a taint worse than all 
taints, ignorance is the greatest taint. O mendicants! thi*ow off 
that taint, and become taintless ! 

246. He who destroys life, who speaks untruth, who takes in this 
world what is not given him, who takes another man's wife; 247. 
-And the man who gives himself to drinking intoxicating liquors, 
he, even in this world, digs up his own root. 

248. O man, know this, that the unrestrained are in a bad state ; 
"take care that greediness and vice do not bring thee to grief, for a long 
time ! 249. The world gives according to their faith or according to 
'their pleasure : if a man frets about the food and the drink given 
to others, he will find no rest either by day or by night. 250. 
He in whom that feeling is destroyed, and taken out with the very 
root, finds rest by day and by night. 251. There is no fire like 
passion, there is no shark like hatred, there is no snare like folly, 
there is no torrent like greed. 

252. The fault of others is easily perceived, but that of one's 
-self is difficult to perceive; the faults of others one lays open as 
much as possible, but one's own fault one hides as a cheat hides 
the bad die from the gambler. 253. If a man looks after the faults 
of others, and is always inclined to detract, his own weaknesses 
will grow, and he is far from the destruction of weakness. 254. 
There is no path through the air, a man is not a 5rainana by out- 
ward acts. The world delights in vanity, the Tathagatas (the 
JBuddhas) are free from vanity. 255. There is no path through 
the air, a man is not a /Sramana by outward acts. No creatures 
are eternal ; but the Awakened (Buddha) are never shaken. 

CHAPTEB XIX.— the just. 256, 257. A man is not a just 
judge if he carries a matter by violence; no. he who distinguishes 
both right and wrong, who is learned and leads others, not by vio- 
lence, but by law and equity, he who is a guardian of the law and 
intelligent, he is called Just. 258. A man is not learned because 
Tie talks much ; he who is patient, free from hatred and fear, he is 
called learned. 259. A man is not a supporter of the law because 
he talks much ; even if a man has learned little, but sees the law 
bodily, he is a supporter of the law, a man who never neglects the 
law. 260. A man is not an elder because his head is gray ; his age 
-may be ripe, but he is called " Old in-vain." 261. He in whom 
there is truth, virtue, love, restraint, moderation, he who is free 



28(5 Kant's Ethics. § 949" 

from impurity and is wise, he is called an " Elder." 262. An en- 
vious, greedy, dishonest man does not become respectable by 
means of much talking only, or by the beauty of his complexion. 
263. He in whom all this is destroyed, taken out with the very root, 
he, freed from hatred and wise, is called " Bespectable." 

264. Not by tonsure does an undisciplined man who speaks 
falsihood, become a $rama?ia; can a man be a #ramana who is 
still held captive by desire and greediness? 265. He who always 
quiets the evil, whether small or large, he is called a $rama?ia (a 
quiet man), because he has quieted all evil. 266. A man is not a 
rnedieant (Bhikshu). simply because he asks others for alms; he 
who adopts the whole law is a Bhikshu, not he who only begs. 
268, 269. A man is not a Muni because he observes silence (mona, 
i. e. mauna), if he is foolish and ignorant; but the wise who, tak- 
ing the balance, chooses the good and avoids evil, he is a " Muni," : 
and is a " Muni " thereby : he who in this world weighs both sides, 
is called a '■' Muni." 270. A man is not a Elect (Ariya) because he 
injures living creatures ; because he has pity on all living creatures,, 
therefore is a man called " Ariya " 271, 272. Not only by disci- 
pline and vows, not only by much learning, not by entering into a 
trance,* not by sleeping alone, do I learn f the happiness % of re 
lease which no worldling can know.|| A Bhikshu receives con- 
fidence § when he has reached the complete destruction of all 
desires ! 

CHAPTEE XX.— the way. [273,^[ 274, 275.] 276. You 
yourself must make an effort. The Tathagatas (Buddhas) are 
only preachers. The thoughtful who enter the way are freed from 
the bondage of Mara. 277. " All created things perish," he who* 
knows and sees this becomes passive in pain ; this is the way to 
purity. 280. He who does not rise when it is time to rise, who, ; 
though young and strong, is full of sloth, whose will and thought 
are weak, that lazy and idle man will never find the way to knowl- 
edge. 

281. Watching his speech, well restrained in mind, let a man: 
never commit any wrong with his body ! Let a man but keep- 
these three roads of action clear, and he will achieve the way which 
is taught by the wise. 282. Through zeal knowledge is- gotten,, 
through lack of zeal knowledge is lost ; let a man who knows this 
double path of gain and loss thus place himself that knowledge 
may grow. 283. Cut down the whole forest of lust,, not the tree I 
From lust springs fear. When you have cut down every tree ancL 

* [Jeremiah, xxiii., 28. t Colossians, i., 27. % Isaiah, xxvi, 3.] || [St. John,, 
xvii., 25.1 # [Proverb*, ii.. 1-5.] *i [I have omitted verses, 273^-2.75.] 



§ : 949 The Clavis to an Index. 287 

every shrub, then, Bhikshus, you will be free ! 285. Cut out the 
love of self, like an autumn lotus, with thy hand ! Cherish the 
road of peace. .Nirvana has been shown by Sugata (Buddha). 

286. " Here I shall dwell in the rain, here in winter and sum- 
mer," thus meditates the fool, and does not think of his death. 
287. Death comes and carries off that man, surrounded by chil- 
dren and flocks, his mind distracted, as a flood carries off a sleeping 
village. 288. Sons are no help, nor a father, nor relations ; there 
is no help from kinsfolk for one whom Death has seized. 289. A 
wise and good man who knoAvs the meaning of this, should quickly 
clear the way that leads to Nirvana. 

CHAPTEK XXI. — 290. If by leaving a small pleasure one sees 
a great pleasure, let a wise man leave the small pleasure, and look 
to the great. 291. He who, by causing pain to others, wishes to 
obtain pleasure himself; he, entangled in the bonds of hatred, will 
never be free from hatred. 292. What ought to be done is neg- 
lected, what ought not to be done is done ; the sins of unruly, 
thoughtless people arc always increasing. 293. But they whose 
whole watchfulness is always directed to their bodj", who do not 
follow what ought not to be done, and who steadfastly do what 
ought to be done, the sins of such watchful and wise people will 
come to an end. 

297. The disciples of G-otama are always well awake, and their 
thoughts day and night are always set on the Law. 298. The 
disciples of Gotama are always well awake, and their thoughts 
day and night are always set on the Church. 300. The disciples 
of Gotama are always well awake, and their mind day and night 
always delights in compassion. , 

CHAPTEK XXII. — THE DOWNWARD COURSE. 306.* He who 
says what is not, goes to hell ; he also who, having done a thing, 
says I have not done it. After death both are equal, they are 
men with evil deeds in the next world. 307. Many men whose 
shoulders are covered with the orange gown are ill-conditioned and 
unrestrained ; such evil-doers by their evil deeds go to hell. 

311. As a grass blade, if badly grasped, cuts the arm, badly- 
practiced asceticism leads to hell. 312. An act carelessly per- 
formed, a broken vow, and hesitating obedience to discipline, all 
this brings no great reward. 313. If anything is to be done, let a 
man do it, let him attack it vigorously ! A careless pilgrim only 

* I translate " niraya," the exit, the downward course, the evil path, by 
" hell," because the meaning assigned to that ancient mythological name by 
Christian writers comes so near to the Buddhist idea of " niraya," that it is dif- 
ficult not to believe in some actual contact between these two streams of thought.. 
See also Mdhabh, xii., 7176 — Mueller's note. 



'288 Kant's Ethics. % 949 

scatters the dust of his passions more widely. 314. An evil deed 
is better left undone, for a man repents of it afterward; a good 
deed is better done, for having done it, one does not repent. 315. 
Like a well-guarded frontier fort, with defenses within and with- 
out, so let a man guard himself. Not a moment should escape, for 
they who allow the right moment to pass, suffer pain when they 
are in hell. 

316. They who are ashamed of what they ought not to be 
ashamed of, and are not ashamed of what they ought to be ashamed 
of, such men, embracing false doctrines, enter the evil path. 317. 
They who fear when they ought not to fear, and fear not when they 
ought to fear, such men, embracing false doctrines, enter the evil 
path. 318. They who forbid when there is nothing to be forbid- 
den, and forbid not when there is something to be forbidden, such 
men, embracing false doctrines, enter the evil path. 319. They 
who know what is forbidden as forbidden, and what is not forbid- 
den as not forbidden, such men, embracing the true doctrine, enter 
the good path. 

CHAPTER XXIII.— the elephant. 320. Silently shall 1 en- 
dure abuse as the elephant in battle endures the arrow sent from 
the bow : for the world is ill-natured. 321. A tamed elephant they 
lead to battle, the king* mounts a tamed elephant ; the tamed is 
the best among men, he who silently endures abuse. 322. Mules 
are good, if tamed, and noble Sindhu horses, and elephants with 
large tusks ; but he who tames himself is better still. 323. For 
with these animals does no man reach the untrodden country 
(Nirvana), where a tamed man goes on a tamed- animal, namely on 
his own ^veil-tamed self. 

325. If a man becomes fat and a great eater, if he is sleep^y and rolls 
bimself about, that fool, like a hog fed on wash, is born again and 
again. 326. This mind of mine went formerly wandering about as 
it liked, as it listed, as it pleased ; but I shall now hold it in 
thoroughly, as the rider who holds the hook holds in the furious 
elephant. 327. Bs not thoughtless, watch your thoughts! Draw 
yourself out of the evil way, like an elephant sunk in mud. 

328. If a man find a prudent companion who walks with him, is 
wise, and lives soberly, he may walk with him, overcoming all 
clangers, happy, but considerate. 329. If a man find no prudent 
companion who walks with him, is wise, and lives soberly, let him 
walk alone, like a king who has left his conquered country behind, 
— like a lonely elephant. 330. It is better to live alone, there is 

*£I. Corinthians, iii., 16; St. John, xiv.. 2.] 



•'§ 949 The Olavis to an Index. 289 

no companionship with a fool; let a man walk alone, let him com- 
mit no sin, with few wishes, like the lonel} T elephant. 

331. If an occasion arises, friends are pleasant ; enjoyment is 
pleasant if it is mutual ; a good work is pleasant in the hour of 
death ; the giving up of all grief is pleasant. 333. Pleasant is vir- 
tue lasting to old age, pleasant is a faith firmly rooted ; pleasant is 
attainment of intelligence, pleasant is avoiding of sins. 

CHAPTER XXIV.— thirst. 334. The thirst of a thoughtless 
man grows like a creeper; he runs hither and thither, like a mon- 
key seeking fruit in the forest. 335. Whom this fierce thirst over- 
comes, full of poison, in this world, his sufferings increase like the 
abounding Bira/ia grass. 338. He who overcomes this fierce thirst, 
difficult to be conquered in this world, sufferings fall off from him, 
like water-drops from a lotus leaf. 337. This salutary word I tell 
you, as many as are here come together : " Dig up the root of 
thirst, as he who wants the sweet-scented Usira root must dig up 
;the Birana grass, that Mara (the tempter) may not crush you again 
and again, as the stream crushes the reeds." 

344. He who in a country without forests (i. 'e. after having 
reached Nirvana) gives himself over to forest-life (i. e. to lust), 
and who, when removed from the forest (i. e. from lust), runs to 
the forest (i. e to lust), look at that man! though free, he runs into 
bondage.* 345. Wise people do not call that a strong fetter which 
is made of iron, wood or hemp ; far stronger is the care for prec- 
ious stones and rings, for sons and a wife. 346. That fetter do 
wise people call strong which drags down, yields, but is difficult to 
undo : after having cut this at last, people enter upon their pil- 
grimage, free from cares, and leaving desires and pleasures behind. 

347. Thosa who are slaves to passions, run up and down the stream 
(of desires) as a spider runs up and down the web which he has 
made himself ; when they have cut this, people enter upon their 
pilgrimage,f ^ ree f rom cares, leaving desires and pleasures behind. 

348. Give up what is before, give up what is behind, give up what 
is in the middle, when thou goest to the other shore of existence ; 
if thy mind is altogether free, thou wilt not again enter into birth 
and decay. 

354. The gift of the law exceeds all gifts ; the sweetness of the 
law exceeds all sweetness ; the delight in the law exceeds all de- 

* This verse seems again full of puns, all connected with the twofold mean- 
ing of " vana," forest and lust. By replacing " forest" by " lust;" we may trans- 
late : "He who, when free from lust, gives himself up to lust, who, when re- 
moved from lust runs into lust, look at that man," etc. " Nibbana," though 
Avith a short a, may be intended to remind the hearer of Nibbana. — Mueller's 
note, t [Hebrews, xi., 14.] 



290 Kant's Ethics. §949 = 

lights; the extinction of thirst overcomes all pain. 355. Pleasures 
destroy the foolish, if they look not for the other shore ; the foolish 
by his thirst for pleasures destroys himself, as if he were his own 
enemy. 

CHAPTER XX V.— the bhikshu (mendicant). 360. Restraint 
in the eye is good, good is restraint in the ear, in the 
nose restraint is good, good is restraint in the tongue. 

361. In the body restraint is good, good is restraint in 
speech, in thought restraint is good, good is restraint in all 
things. A Bhikshu, restrained in all things, is freed from all pain. 

362. He who controls his hand, he who controls his feet, he who 
controls his speech, he who is well controlled, he who delights in- 
wardly, who is collected, who is solitary and content, him they 
call Bhikshu. 363. The Bhikshu who controls his mouth, who 
speaks wisely and calmly, who teaches the meaning and the Law, 
his word is sweet. 

364. He who dwells in the Law, delights in the Law, meditates 
on the Law, follows the Law, that Bhikshu will never fall away 
from the true Law. 365. Let him not despise what he has re- 
ceived, nor ever envy others : a mendicant who envies others does 
not obtain peace of mind. 366. A Bhikshu who, though he re- 
ceives little, does not despise what he has received, even the gods 
will praise him, if his life is pure, and if he is not slothful. 

367. He who never identifies himself with his body, and soul, 
and does not grieve over what is no more, he indeed; is called a 
Bhikshu. 368. The Bhikshu who acts with kindness,; who is calm 
in the doctrine of Buddha, will reach the quiet place (Nirvana), , 
cessation of natural desires, and happiness. . 369. . O Bhikshu. . 
empty this boat ! if emptied, it will go quickly/; having cut off pas- 
sion and hatred, thou wilt go to Nirvana.. 370. Cut off the five 
(senses), leave the five, rise above the five? M Bhikshu, who has 
escaped from the five fetters, he is called. ©ghiatinna, " Saved from 
the flood." 

371. Meditate, O Bhikshu. and be nof heedless ! Ho not direct 
thy thought to what gives pleasure !: that thoumayest not for thy 
heedlessness have to swallow tbe iron ball (in hell), and that thou 
mayest not cry out when burning, " This is pain." 372. Without 
knowledge there is no meditation, without meditation there is no 
knowledge : he who has knowledge and meditation is near unto 
Nirvana. 373. A Bhikshu who has entered his empty house, and 
whose mind is tranquil,* feels a more than human delight when he^ 

*[Cf. H 66 (page 38 above).] 



§ 949 The Clavis to an Index. 291 

sees the law clearly. 374. As soon as he has considered the origin 
and destruction of the elements (khandha) of the body, he finds 
happiness and joy which belong to those who know the immortal 
(Nirvana). 

375. And this is the beginning here for a wise Bhikshu : watch- 
fulness over the senses, contentedness, restraint under the Law ; 
keep noble friends whose life is pure, and who are not slothful. 
376. Let him live in charity, let him be perfect in his duties ; then 
in the fullness of delight he will make an end of suffering. 

377. As the Vassika-plant sheds its whithered flowers, men 
should shed passion and hatred, O ye Bhikshus ! 379. Bouse thy- 
self by thyself, examine thyself by thyself, thus self-protected and 
attentive wilt thou live happily, O Bhikshu ! 380. For self is the 
lord of self, self is the refuge of self, therefore curb thyself as the 
merchant curbs a good horse. 381. The Bhikshu, full of delight 
who is calm in the doctrine of Buddha will reach the quiet place 
(Nirvana), cessation of natural desires and happiness. 382. He 
who, even as a young Bhikshu, applies himself to the doctrine of 
Buddha, brightens up this world, like the moon when free from 
clouds. 

CHAPTER XXVI.— the brahmana. 383. Stop the stream 
valiantly, drive away the desires, O Brahmana ! When you have 
understood the destruction of all that was made, you will under- 
stand that which was not made.* 384. If the Brahmana has 
reached the other shore in both laws (in restraint and contempla- 
tion), all bonds vanish from him who has obtained knowledge. 
385. He for whom there is neither this nor that shore, nor both, 
him, the fearless and unshackled, I call indeed a Brahmana. 386. 
He who is thoughtful, blameless, settled, dutiful, without passions, 
and who has attained the highest end, him I call indeed a Brah- 
mana. 387. The sun is bright by day, the moon shines by night, 
the warrior is bright in his armor, the Brahmana is bright in his 
meditation; but Buddha, the Awakened, is bright with splendor 
day and night. 

388. Because a man is rid of evil, therefore he is called Brah- 
mana ; because he walks quietly, therefore he is called $ramana : 
because he has sent away his own impurities, therefore he is called 
Pravra^rita (a pilgrim). 389. No one should attack a Brahmana, 
but no Brahmana (if attacked) should let himself fly at his aggres- 
sor ! Woe to him who strikes a Brahmana, more woe to him who 
flies at his aggressor ! 390. It advantages a Brahmana not a little 

* [Romans, i., 20.] 



292 Kant's Ethics. 

if he holds his mind back from the pleasures of life ; when all wish 
to injure has vanished, pain will cease. 391. Him I call indeed a 
Brahmana who does not offend by body, word, or thought, and is 
controlled on these three points.* 

392. After a man has once understood the Law as taught by the 
Well-awakened (Buddha), let him worship it carefully, as the 
Brahmana worships the sacrificial fire. 393. A man does not be- 
come a Brahmana by his platted hair, by his family, or by both ; 
in whom there is truth and righteousness, he is blessed, he is a 
Brahmana. .'194. What is the use of platted hair,'0 fool ! what of 
the raiment of goatskins ? Within thee there is ravening, but the 
outside thou makest clean. f 

399. He who, though he has committed no offense, endures re- 
proach, bonds, and stripes, him, strong in endurance and powerful, 
I call indeed a Brahmana. 400. He who is free from anger, duti- 
ful, virtuous, without weakness, and subdued, who has received his 
last body, him I call indeed a Brahmana. .401. He who does not 
cling to pleasures, like water on a lotus-leaf like a mustard seed 
on the point of an awl, him 1 call indeed a Brahmana. 

403. He whose knowledge is deep, who possesses wisdom, who 
knows the right way and the wrong, who has attained the highest 
end, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 404. He who keeps aloof both 
from laymen and from mendicants, goes to no house to beg, and 
whose desires are small, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 405. He 
who finds no fault with other beings, whether weak or strong, who 
does not kill nor cause slaughter, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 
406. He who is tolerant with the intolerant, mild with fault-finders, 
free from passion among the passionate, him I call indeed a Brah- 
mana. 407. He from whom anger and hatred, pride and envy have 
dropt like a mustard seed from the point of an awl, him I call in- 
deed a Brahmana. 

408. He who utters true speech, instructive and free from harsh- 
ness, so that he offend no one, him 1 call indeed a Brahmana. 410 
He who fosters no desires for this world or for the next, has no 
inclinations, and is unshackled, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 411. 
He who has no interests, and when he has understood (the truth), 
does not say How, how?| — he who can dive into the Immortal, him 

* [Cf. Zoroaster, Avesta, Vispered, ii., 9 (page 151 above).] fl have not 
copied the language of the Bible more than I was justified in. The words are " ab- 
bhantaran te gahanam, bahiram parima^asi," interna est abyssus, externum 
mundas. — Mueller'' s note. % [He who understands the Law, abides thereby, and 
follows no path but the path of virtue. He Avho foolishly asks how or why God 
established the Law, has not completely comprehended his own reason ; else 
would he know that no answer is possible It is the self-restrained ''doer or 
work" (James, i., 25) — not the idle speculator — who has truly dived into the 
immortal."] 



The Clavis to an Index. 293 

I call indeed a Brahniarca. 414. He who has traversed this mazy, 
impervious world and its vanity, who is through, and has reached 
the other shore, is thoughtful, guileless, free from doubts, free from 
attachment, and content, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 415. He 
who, leaving all desires, travels about without a home, in whom 
all concupiscence is extinct, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 416. 
He who, leaving all longings, travels about without a home, in 
whom all covetousness is extinct, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 
417. He who, after leaving all bondage to men, has risen above all 
bondage to the gods,* who is free from every bondage, him I call 
indeed a Brahmawa. 423. He who knows his former abodes, who 
sees heaven and hell, has reached the end of births, is perfect in 
knowledge and a sage, he whose perfections are all perfect, him I 
call indeed a Brahma/ia. 

§ 950, — Virtue, together with its main constituent valor (§ 729) 
has thus been forced to yield place to false devotion, (page 249, 
line 30.) Mohammed : see § 968. 

Chapter IV.— Of the clue whereby Conscience can thread every Possible 
Labyrinth of Faith ^Ecclesiastical. (■+§ 951-961 inclusive.) 

§ 951 — Conscience is its own general and leader, (p. 250, 1. 28.) 

§ 952. — Conscientiousness is a state of consciousness which to 
possess is at all times our incumbent duty, (page 251, line 4.) Cf. 
§§2782, 2026, 2013. [Cf. Confucius, in the Doctrine of the Mean, 
xx., 18, (page 115 above); cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. x., pages 416, 420.] 

§ 953. — Consciousness that any action I am about to perform is 
right, is in itself a most immediate and imperative duty, (page 
251 line 13.) Cf. §§ 443, 444. 

§ 954. — Conscience does not sit in judgment on actions, so as to 
decide whether they are cases . falling under the moral law 
or beyond it; that is determined by reason, (page 251, line 29.) 
Cf. §442. [Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 114.] 

§ 955. — Want of conscientiousness exemplified by the inquisition, 
(page 252, line 14.) [Bewray : " Thy speech bewrayeth thee." See 
Matthew (to whom Webster refers) xxvi., 73 ; Isaiah, xvi., 3.] 

§ 956. — Want of consciousness exhibited by clerical superiors. 
(page 254, line 7.) [Sciolist: a pretender to science; "a smatterer," 
Webster calls him.] 

§ 957. — Begun to awake to freedom of cogitation, (p. 255, 1. 14.) 

§ 958. — Peril arising out of the improbity of his profession — 
the lesion of conscience, (page 256, line 6.) [Molested : heavily 
loaded or burdened.] Lesion : hurt, or injury. Improbity : want of 
rectitude of principle. — Webster. 

* [Neither the hope of heaven nor the fear of hell is a moral motive. See 
g'228 (page 23 above).] 



■294 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 959. — Eeal moral safety, viz.: that conscience be not violated, 
(page 256, line 28.) 

§ 960. — Boldest preacher of belief must tremble, (p. 257, 1. 18.) 
§ 961. — Let us throw back an eye on the education given us in 
youth, (page 258, line 19.) [Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean., 
xx., 18, xxi., xxv. (pages 115, 116 above.)] [Astrcea : The goddess 
of justice ; lived on the earth during the golden age, and was the 
last of the immortals . to leave the earth. See Anthon's Classical 
Dictionary; (ed. Harper, 1862, page 219).] Cf §504. 

GENERAL SCHOLION.-MEANS OF GEACE. (gjj 962-983 inclusive.) 

§ 962. — Nature, in contradistinction from that good which 
(springing from preternatural aid) niay be called grace, (page 
259, line 2.) [Gnomon: (gnonai, i. e. to know) a brief reflection, or 
maxim; knowledge personified; an imaginary guardian, Webster 
has it of gnome.'] 

§ 963. — Impossibility of such superadded aid can not be evinced, 
(page 259, line 18.) 

§ 964.— Touching the laws of any preternatural assistance, we 
are left altogether in the dark, (page 260, line 14.) 

§ 965. — Arises the notion of means of grace; (page 261, line 9.) 

§ 966. — Ceremonials that symbolically suggest to us our offices 
as servants of the Most High, become confounded with those offi- 
ces themselves, (page 261, line 30.) 

§ 967. — Kites which have been found serviceable to rouse and 
sustain our attention to what is the true worship of Cod : (1) 
private prayer (§ 970) ; (2) assembling together in church (§ 977) ; 
(3) baptism (§ 978) ; (4) communion (§ 979). (page 262, line 17.) 

§ 968. — Mankind have, in every variety of public faith, excogi- 
tated sundry usages as means of grace, although these last are not 
always (as has been the case with Christianity) related to the ideas 
of pure practical reason, (page 263, line 18.) Mohammedan com- 
mandments : cf. the following extracts from the Koran.* 

* The text of the following extracts from the Koran is taken out of the 
English version of George Sale (Lippincott's edition, Philadelphia, 187], of 
which the paging is hereinafter indicated by the letter S.), except in two places 
(xxxiii., 35; xl., 41-45) where I have preferred the translation of the Kev. J. M. 
Rodwell (Williams and Norgate's edition, London and Edinburgh, 1861, of 
which the paging is hereinafter marked by the letter R.), although I do not 
know Arabic. I have appended in seventeen instances a part (at least once the 
whole) of Rodwell's rendering, for which credit is in each case expressly given, 
and in one instance a reading (by Sale's editors) from Savary's French version. 
I am also under obligation to Rodwell for a parenthesis, with which I have 
punctuated Sale's translation of xxv., 68-71. The numbering of the chapters is 
according to Sale, and that of the verses according to Rodwell. The use' of 
italics to distinguish (I suppose) Sale's amplifications, is retained, and also the 
small capitals which set forth the names of the Deity (God, the Lord). 



The Clavis to an Index. 295 

XLYII. — -In the name op the most merciful God. 1. God will 
render of none effect the works of those who believe not, and who 
turn away men from the way of God : 2. but as to those who be- 
lieve, and work righteousness, and believe the revelation which 
hath been sent down unto Mohammed (for it is the truth from 
their Lord), he will expiate their evil deeds from them, and will 

• dispose their heart aright. (The beginning of the xlvii. chapter, 
Including the whole of the first two verses; S. 410; R. 489,490.) 

V, 18.* — Now is light and a perspicuous book of revelations come 
■ unto you from God. Thereby will God direct him who shall fol- 
low His good pleasure, into the paths of peace ; and shall lead them 
out of darkness into light, by His will, and shall direct them in the 
right way. (v., last part of verse 18; S. 83, 84; R. 635.) 

XL., 60. — The blind and the seeing shall not be held equal ; 
nor they who believe and work rigeiteousness. and the evil doer : 
how few revolve these things in their mind ! (xl., 60 , S. 387; 
R.-300.) 

XVII., 9. — Verily this Koran directeth unto the way which is 

most right, and declareth unto the faithful, 10. who do good 

works, that they shall receive a great reward ; 11. and that for 

ithose who believe not in the life to come, we have prepared a 

grievous punishment, (xvii., 9-11 inclusive; S. 228; R. 191.) 

V., 52. f — Unto every of you have we given a law, and an 
i open path ; 53. and if God had pleased, he had surely made you 
i one people ; but he hath thought fit to give you different laws, that he 
might try you in that which he hath given you respectively. There- 
fore strive to excel each other in good works : unto God shall 
ye all return, and then will he declare unto you that concern- 
ing which ye have disagreed, (v., last part of verse 52 and all of 
53 ; S. 88; R. 64Q.) 

X., 26. — God inviteth unto the dwelling of peace, and directeth 
whom he pleaseth into the right way. 27. They who do right 
shall receive a most excellent reward, and a superabundant addition; 
neither blackness nor shame shall cover their faces. These shall 

• be the inhabitants of paradise ; they shall continue therein forever. 
28. But they who commit evil shall receive the reward of evil, 
equal thereunto, and they shall be covered with shame, (for they 
shall have no protector against God) ; as though their faces were 

^covered with the profound darkness of the night. These shall be 
the inhabitants of hell fire; they shall remain therein forever, (x., 
.26-28 inclusive; S. 168 ; R 345, 346.) 

* [I omit the first part of verse 18.] t [I omit the first part of verse 52.] 



296 Kant's Ethics. . , § 968 

X., 9. — But as to those who believe, and work righteousness, their 
Lord will direct them because of their faith; they shall have rivers, 
flowing through gardens of pleasure. 10. Their prayer therein 
shall be, Praise be unto thee, O God ! and their salutation therein 
shall be Peace! 11. and the end of their prayer shall be, Praise. 

BE UNTO GOD, THE LORD OF ALL CREATURES.' (X., 9-11 inclusive;. 

S. 166, 167 ; E. 343.) 

IV., 33. — O true believers, consume not your wealth among 
yourselves in vanity; unless there be merchandizing among you 
by mutual consent: neither slay yourselves; for God is merciful to- 
ward you: 34. and whoever doth this maliciously and wickedly, 
he will surely cast him to be broiled in hell fire; and this is easy 
with God. (iv., 33, 34; S. 64; E. 534. E. has, "0 believers! de- 
vour not each other's substance in mutual frivolities; unless there 
be a trafficking among you by your own consent: and commit not 
suicide.") 

IV., 40. — Serve God, and associate no creature with him; and 
show kindness unto parents, and relations, and orphans, and the 
poor, and your neighbor who is of kin to you, and also your neigh- 
bor who is a stranger, and to your familiar companion, and the 
traveler, and the captives whom your right hands shall possess; for 
God loveth not the proud or vain-glorious, 41. who are covet- 
ous, and recommend covetouene3S unto men, and conceal that 
which God of his bounty hath given them; (we have prepared a 
shameful punishment for the unbelievers;) 42. and who bestow 
their wealth in charity to be observed of men. and believe not in 
God, nor in the last day; and whoever hath Satan for a companion, 
an evil companion hath he ! (iv., 40-42 inclusive; S. 65; E. 535.) 

XIX., 94. — Verily there is none in heaven or on earth but shall 
approach the Merciful as his servant. He encompasseth them by 
his knowledge and power, and numbereth them with an exact com- 
putation: 95. and they shall all come unto him on the day of 
resurrection, destitute both of helpers and followers. 96. But as for 
those who believe and do good works, the Merciful will bestow 
on them love, (xix., 94-96 inclusive; S. 255; E, 135.) 

II., 224. — Make not God the object of your oaths, that ye will 
deal justly, and be devout, and make peace among men; for God is 
he who heareth and knoweth. 225. God will not punish you for 
an inconsiderate word in your oaths; but he will punish you for 
that which your hearts have assented unto : God is merciful and 
gracious, (ii., 224, 225; S. 26; E. 462. E. reads as follows : Swear 
not by God, when ye make oath, that ye will be virtuous and fear 
God, and promote peace among men ; for God is He who Heareth, 



§ 968 The Clavis to an Index. 297 

Knoweth. God will riot punish you for a mistake in your oaths: 
but He will punish you for that which your hearts have done. 
God is Gracious, Merciful.) 

VII., 53. — Call upon your Lord humbly and in secret; for he 
loveth not those who transgress. 54. And act not corruptly in the 
earth, after its reformation; and call upon him with fear and de- 
sire : for the mercy of God is near unto the righteous, (vii., 53, 
54; S. 121; E: 374.) 

XXII., 35.* — Your God is one God : wherefore resign yourselves 
wholly unto him. And do thou bear good tidings unto those 
who humble themselves; 36. whose hearts, when mention is 
made of God, are struck with fear; and unto those who patiently 
endure that which befalleth them; and who duly perform their 
prayers, and give alms out of what we have bestowed on them, 
(xxii., last part of verse 35 and all of verse 36; S. 277; E. 591.) 

XIV., 36. — Speak unto my servants who have believed, that they 
be assiduous at prayer, and give alms out of that which we have 
bestowed on them, both privately and in public; before the day 
cometh, wherein there shall be no buying nor selling, neither any 
friendship, (xiv., 36; S. 207; E. 278.) 

IX., 60. — Alms are to be distributed only unto the poor, and the 
needy, and those who are employed in collecting and distributing 
the same, and unto those whose hearts are reconciled, and for the 
redemption of captives, and unto those who are in debt and insol- 
vent, and for the advancement of God's religion, and unto the trav- 
eler. This is an ordinance from God: and God is knowing and 
wise, (ix., 60; S. 156; E, 620.) 

III., 86. — Ye will never attain unto righteousness until ye give 
in alms of that which ye love: and whatever ye give, God knoweth 
it. (iii., 86; S. 47; E, 507.) 

XVI., 92. — Verily God commandetii justice, and the doing of 
good, and the giving unto kindred what shall be necessary; and he 

EORBIDDETH WICKEDNESS, AND INIQUITY, AND OPPRESSION: he ad- 

monisheth you that ye may remember, (xvi., 92; S. 221; E. 248.) 
VII., 28. — Say, My Lord hath commanded me to observe justice; 
therefore set your faces to pray at every place of worship, and call 
upon him, approving unto him the sincerity of your, religion. As 
he produced you at first, so unto him shall ye return. A part of 
mankind hath he directed; and a part hath been justly led into error, 
because they have taken the devils for their patrons besides God, 
and imagine they are rightly directed. 29. O children of Adam, 
take your decent apparel at every place of worship, and eat and 

* [I omit the first part of verse 35.] 

20 



2 r J8 Kant's Ethics. % 968 

drink, but be not guilty of excess; for he loveth not those who are 
.guilty of excess. (viL, 28, 29; S. 118; R. 370.) 

II.. 172. — It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces in prayer 
toward the east and the west, but righteousness is of him who be- 
lieveth in God and the last day, and the angels, and the scriptures, 
and the prophets; who giveth money for God's sake unto his 
kindred, and unto orphans, and the needy, and the stranger, 
and those who ask, and for redemption of captives; who is con- 
stant at prayer, and giveth alms; and of those who perform 
their covenant, when they have covenanted, and who behave 
themselves patiently in adversity, and hardships, and in time 
of violence: these are they who are true, and these are the} 7 who 
fear God. (ii , 172; S. 20, 21; R. 453, 454. R. reads, near the end 
of the verse, "these are they who are just.") 

V., 11. — O true believers, observe justice when ye appear as 
witnesses before God, and let not hatred toward any induce you to 
do wrong: hut act justly; this will approach nearer unto piety; and 
fear God, for God is fully acquainted with what ye do. 12. God 
bath promised unto those who believe, and do that which is 
right, that they shall receive pardon and a great reward, (v., 11, 
12; S. 82; R. 633. R. reads. " O Believers ! stand up as witnesses 
for God by righteousness : and let not ill-will at any, induce you 
not to act uprightly. Act uprightly. Next will this be to the fear 
of God. And fear ye God: verily, God is apprized of what ye 
do." v., verse 11.) 

IV., 134. — O true believers, observe justice when ye bear wit- 
ness before God, although it be against yourselves, or your parents, 
or relations, whether the party be rich, or whether he be poor; for 
God is more worthy than them both : therefore follow not your own 
lust in bearing testimony so that ye swerve from justice. And whether 
ye wrest your evidence, or decline giving it, God is well acquainted 
with that which ye do. (iv., 134; S. 76; R. 548, 549.) 

XXXI., 13. — We have commanded man concerning his parents 
(his mother carrieth him in her womb with weakness and faintness, 
and he is weaned in two years), saying, Be grateful unto me, and 
to thy parents. Unto me shall all come to be judged. 14. But if 
thy parents endeavor to prevail on thee to associate with me that 
concerning which thou hast no knowledge, obey them not: bear 
them company in this world in what shall be reasonable; but fol- 
low the way of him who sincerely turneth unto me. Hereafter 
unto me shall ye return, and then will I declare unto you that 
which ye have done, (xxxi., 13, 14; S. 336: R. 332, 333.) 

II., 184. — Consume not your wealth among yourselves in vain; 
nor present it unto judges, that ye may devour part of men's sub- 



§ 90S The Clavis to an Index. 299 

stance unjustly, against your own consciences, (ii., 184; S. 22; 
B. 456. E. has "among yourselves in vain things.") - 

II., 264. — They who lay out their substance for the religion of 
God, and afterward follow not what they have so laid out by re- 
proaches or mischief, they shall have their reward with their Lord; 
upon them shall no fear come, neither shall they be grieved. 265. 
A fair speech and to forgive, is better than alms followed by mis- 
chief. God is rich and merciful, (ii., 264, 265; S. 32; E. 470.) 

Y. — In the name of the most merciful God. 1. true believers, 
perform your contracts.* (The opening words of the fifth chapter; 
S. 81; E, 631.) 

IV., 61. — Moreover God commandeth you to restore what ye 
are trusted with, to the owners : and when ye judge between 
men, that ye judge according to equity: and surely an excellent 
virtue it is to which God exhorteth you; for God both heareth and 
seeth. (iv., 61; S. 67, 68; E. 538.) 

V., 42. — If a man or a woman steal, cut off their hands, in ret- 
ribution for that which they have committed; this is an exemplary 
punishment appointed by God; and God is mighty and wise. 43. 
But whoever shall repent after his iniquity, and amend, verily 
God will be turned unto him, for Goo is inclined to forgive, and 
merciful, (v. 42, 43; S. 86; E. 638.) 

II., 277. — God shall take his blessing from usury, and shall in- 
crease alms: for God loveth no infidel, or ungodly person. But 
they who believe and do that which is right, and observe the 
stated times of prayer, and pay their legal alms, they shall have 
their reward with their Lord: there shall come no fear on them, 
neither shall they be grieved. 278. O true believers, fear God, and 
remit that which remaineth of usury, if ye really believe; 279. 
but if ye do it not, hearken unto war. which is declared against you 
from God and his apostle: yet if ye repent, ye shall have the cap- 
ital of your money. Deal not unjustly with others, and ye shall 
not be dealt with unjustly. 280. If there be any debtor under a 
difficulty of paying his debt, let his creditor wait till it be easy for 
him to do it; but if ye remit it as alms, it will be better for you, if 
ye knew it. 281. And fear the day wherein ye shall return unto 
God; then shall every soul be paid what it hath gained, and they 
shall not be treated unjustly, (if, 277-281: S. 34; E. 472, 473.) 

XXX., 37. — Give unto him who is of kin to thee his reasonable 
due; and also to the poor, and the stranger : this is better for those 
"who seek the face of God; and they shall prosper. 38. Whatever 

* [I omit the remainder of the first verse.] 



300 Kant's Ethics. % 968' 

ye shall give in usury,* to be an increase of men's substance, shall 
not be increased by the blessing of God : but whatever ye shall give 
in alms, for God's sake, they shall receive a two-fold reward.' (xxx.,. 
37, 38: S. 333; E. 257. E, reads the last words, " shall be doubled 
to you.") 

IV., 122. f — Whoso doth evil shall be rewarded for it; and shall 
not find any patron or helper, beside God; 123. but whoso doth 
good works, whether he be male or female, and is a true believer; 
they shall be admitted into paradise, and shall not in the least be 
unjustly dealt with, (iv., last part of verse 122, and all of 123; S. 
75; E. 547.) 

IV., 172. — Unto those who believe, and do that which is right,, 
he shall give their rewards, and shall superabundantly add unto 
them of his liberality : but those who are disdainful and proud, he 
will punish with a grievous punishment; 173. and they shall not 
find any to protect or to help them, besides God. 174. O men, now 
is an evident proof come unto you from your Lord, and we have 
sent down unto you manifest light. They who believe in God 
and firmly adhere to him, he will lead them into mercy from him, 
and abundance; and he will direct them in the right way to him- 
self, (iv., 172-174 inclusive; S. 80; E, 553, 554.) 

V., 92. — O true believers, surely wine, and lots, and images, and 
divining arrows, are an abomination of the work of Satan; there- 
fore avoid them that ye may prosper. 93. Satan seeketh to sow 
dissension and hatred among you, by means of wine and lots, and 
to divert you from remembering God, and from prayer: will ye 
not therefore abstain from them f Obey God, and obey the apostle,, 
and take heed to yourselves : but if ye turn back, know that the 
duty of our apostle is only to preach publicly. 94. In those who 
believe and do good works, it is no sin that they have tasted wine- 
or gaming before they were forbidden; if they fear God, and believe,. 
and do good works, and shall for the future fear God, and believe, 
and shall persevere to fear him, and to do good; for God loveth those 
who do good, (v., 92-94 inclusive; S. 93, 94; E. 647. E reads, 
verse 94 as follows : " ISTo blame shall attach to those who believe 
and do good works, in regard to any food they have taken, in case 
they fear God and believe, and do the things that are right, and 
shall still fear God and believe, and shall still fear him, and do 
good; for God loveth those who do good.") 

VI., 67. — When thou seest those who are engaged in caviling at r 
or ridiculing our signs, depart from them, until they be engaged in 
some other discourse : and if Satan cause thee to forget this precept, 

* Or by way of bribe. The word may include any sort of extortion or illicit 
ain. — Sale's note. t[I omit the first part of verse 122.] 



■§ 968 The Clavis to an Index. 301 v 

do not sit with the ungodly people after recollection. 68. They 
who fear God are not at all accountable for them, but their duty is 
to remember that they may take heed to themselves. 69. Abandon 
those who make their religion a sport and a jest; and whom the 
present life hath deceived : and admonish them by the Koran, that 

A SOUL BECOMETH LIABLE TO DESTRUCTION FOR THAT WHICH IT com- 
mitteth : it shall have no patron nor intercessor besides God; and 
if it could pay the utmost price of redemption, it would not be ac- 
cepted from it.* (vi., 67, 68, and the first part of verse 69; S. 104; 
E. 407. 408.) E. reads verse 68 as follows: "Not that they who 
fear God are to pass any judgment upon them, but the object of 
recollection is that they may continue to fear Him. ") 

IV., 107. — Dispute not for those who deceive one another, for 
God loveth not him who is a deceiver or unjust. 108. Such con- 
ceal themselves from men, but they conceal not themselves from 
God; for he is with them when the} 7 imagine by night a saying 
which pleaseth him not, and God comprehendeth what they do. 
109. Behold, ye are they who have disputed for them in this pres- 
ent life; but who shall dispute with God for them on the day of 
resurrection, or who will become their patron ? 110. yet he who 
doth evil, or injur eth his own soul, and afterward asketh pardon of 
God, shall find God gracious and merciful. 111. Whoso commit- 
teth wickedness, committeth it against his own soul: God is know- 
ing and wise. 112. And whoso committeth a sin or iniquity, and 
afterward la} T eth it on the innocent, he shall surely bear the guilt of 
calumny and manifest injustice, (iv., 107-112 inclusive; S. 73, 74; 
E. 545, 546. E. reads the first clause of verse 107, "And plead not 
with us for those who are self-deceivers." E. reads verse 112 as 
follows : "And whoever committeth an involuntary fault or a crime, 
and then layeth it on the innocent, shall surel} T bear the guilt of 
calumny and of a manifest crime.") 

VI., 152. — Say, Come; I will rehearse that which your Lord 
hath forbidden you; that is to say, that ye be not guilty of idolatry, 
and that ye show kindness to your parents, and that ye murder not 
your children for fear lest ye be reduced to poverty : we will pro- 
vide for you and them; and draw not near unto heinous crimes, 
neither openly nor in secret; and slay not the soul which God 
hath forbidden you to slay, unless for a just cause. This hath he 
enjoined you that ye may understand. 153. And meddle not 
with the substance of the orphan, otherwise than for the im- 
proving thereof, until he attain his age of strength : and use a full 
measure, and a just balance. We will not impose a task on 

* [I omit the last part of verse 69.] 



302 Kant's Ethics. § 963 

any soul beyond its ability. And when ye pronounce judgment 
observe justice, although it be for or against one who is near of 
kin. and fulfil the covenant of God. This hath G-od commanded 
you, that. ye may be admonished; 154. and that ye may know that 
this is my right way: therefore follow it, and follow not the path 
of others, lest ye be scattered from the path of God. This hath he 
commanded you that ye may take heed, (vi., 152-154 inclusive; 
S. 114, 115; E, 419, 420. Instead of " heinous crimes" etc., in 
verse 152, B. reads, " and that ye come not near to pollutions, out- 
ward or inward." S. says that •' the original word signifies pecu- 
liarly fornication and avarice.") 

VII. , 31. — Say, Verily my Lord hath forbidden filthy actions,. 
both that which is discovered thereof, and that which is concealed, 
and also iniquity, and unjust violence; and hath forbidden you to 
associate with Hod that concerning which he hath sent you down 
no authority, or to speak of God that which ye know not. (vif r 
31; S. 118, 119; E. 371.) 

XVIII., 23 — Say not of any matter, 1 will surely do this to- 
morrow; unless thou add, If God please. And remember thy 
Lord, when thou forgettest, and say, My Lord is able to direct me 
with ease, that 1 may draw near unto the truth of this matter 
rightly, (xviii., 23; S. 240; E. 214, 215.) 

XVII , 16. — -He who shall be rightly directed, shall be directed to 
the advantage only of his own soul; and he who shall err shall en- 
only against the same : neither shall any laden soul be charged 
with the burden of another.* (xvii.. part of the 16th verse; S. 228, 
229; E. 192.) 

IV., 88. — When ye are saluted with a salutation, salute the per- 
son with a better salutation, or at least return the same; for God 
taketh an account of all things, (iv., 88; S. 71; E. 541.) 

IV., 147. — God loveth not the speaking ill of any one in pub- 
lic, unless he who is injured call for assistance; and God heareth 
and knoweth : 148. whether ye publish a good action, or conceal 
it. or forgive evil, verily God is gracious and powerful, (iv., 147,. 
148; S. 78; E, 550.) 

VII., 198. — Use indulgence, and command that which is just, and 
withdraw far from the ignorant. 199. And if an evil suggestion 
from Satan be suggested unto thee, to divert thee from thy duty,. 
have recourse unto God: for he heareth and knoweth. (vii., 198,. 
199; S. 137, 138; E. 393.) 

IX., 72. — And the faithful men, and the faithful women, are 
friends one to another : they command that which is just, and- 

*[I omit the last part of verse 16.] 



§ 968 The Clavis to an Index. 303 

they forbid that which is evil; and they are constant at prayer, 
and pay their appointed alms; and they obey God and his apostle : 
unto these will God he merciful; for he is mighty and wise. 73. 
God promiseth unto the true believers, both men and women, gar- 
dens through which rivers flow, wherein they shall remain for ever; 
and delicious dwellings in the gardens of perpetual abode: but 
good will from God shall he their most excellent reward. This will 
be great felicity, (ix., 72, 73; S. 157; B. 622. B, reads at the close 
of the 73d verse, " But best of all will be God's good pleasure in 
them. This will be the great bliss/') 

XL, 113. — But unto everyone of them will thy Lord render the re- 
ward of their works: for he well knoweth that which they do. 
114. Be thou steadfast, therefore, as thou hast been commanded; 
and let him also be steadfast who shall be converted with thee; and 
transgress not: for he seeth that which ye do. 115. And incline 
not unto those who act unjustly, lest the fire of hell touch you : for 
ye have no protectors, except God; neither shall ye be assisted 
against- him. 116. Pray regularly morning and evening; and in 
the former part of the night, for good works drive away evils. 
This is an admonition unto those who consider: 117. wherefore 
persevere with patience; for God suffereth not the reward of the 
righteous to perish', (xi.. 113-117 inclusive; S. 186; B. 273.) 

XIII;", 19.* — The prudent only will consider; 20. who fulfil 
the covenant of God, and break not their contract; 21. and who 
join that which God hath commanded to be joined,f and who fear 
their Lord, and dread an ill account; 22. and who persevere out 
of a sincere desire to please their Lord, and observe the stated 
times of prayer, and give alms out of what we have bestowed on 
them, in secret and openly, and who turn away evil with good : 
the reward of these shall be paradise, 23. gardens of eternal 
abode, which they shall enter, and also whoever shall have 
acted uprightly, of their fathers, and their wives, and their pos- 
terity : and the angels shall go in unto them by every gate, 24. 
saying, Peace be upon you, because ye have endured with 
patience; how excellent a reward is paradise! (xiii., last clause 
of the 19th verse, and verses 20-24 inclusive; S. 202; E. 425.) 

XVII. , 24.— Thy Lord hath commanded that ye worship none 
besides him; and that ye shoic kindness unto your parents, whether 
the one of them, or both of them attain to old age with thee. 
Wherefore, say not unto them, Fie on yon ! neither reproach 

*[I omit the first part of verse 19.] f By believing in all the prophets with- 
out exception, and joining thereto the continual practice or their 



duty, both toward God and man. — Sal 



e's note. 



'304 Kanfs Ethics. § 968 

them, but speak respectfully unto them; 25. and submit to be- 
have humbly toward them, out of tender affection, and say, O 
Lord, have mercy on them both, as they nursed me when I was 
little. 26. Your Lord well knoweth that which is in your souls ; 
whether ye be men of integrity : 27. and he will be gracious unto 
those who sincerely return unto htm. 28. And give unto him who 
is of kin to you his due, and also unto the poor, and the traveler. 
And waste not thy substance profusely: 29. for the profuse are 
Brethren of the devils : and the devil was ungrateful unto his 
Lord. 30. But if thou turn from them, in expectation of the 
mercy which thou hopest from thy Lord; at least, speak kindly 
unto them. 31. And let not thy hand be tied up to thy neck; 
neither open it with an unbounded expansion,* lest thou become 
worthy of reprehension, and be reduced to poverty. 32. Yerily 
thy Lord will enlarge the store of whom he pleaseth, and will be 
sparing unto whom he pleaseth; for he knoweth and regardeth his 
servants. 33. Kill not your children for fear of being brought 
to want; we will provide for them and for you: verily the killing 
them is a great sin. 34. Draw not near unto fornication; for it 
is wickedness, and an evil way." (xvii., 24-34' inclusive; S. 229, 
230; E, 193, 194.) 

XVII., 36. — And meddle not with the substance op the or- 
phan, unless it be to improve it, until he attain his age of strength: 
and perform your covenant; for the performance of your covenant 
shall be inquired into hereafter. 37. And give full measure, when 
you measure aught; and weigh with a just balance. This will 
be better, and more easy for determining every man's due. 38. And 
follow not that whereof thou hast no knowledge ; for the hearing, 
and the sight, and the heart, every of these shall be examined at 
the last day. 39. Walk not proudly in the land, for thou canst 
not cleave the earth, neither shalt thou equal the mountains in 
stature. 40. All this is evil, and abominable in the sight of thy 
Lord. 41. These precepts are a part of the wisdom which thy 
Lord hath revealed unto thee. Set up not any other god as equal 
unto GrOD, lest thou be cast into hell, reproved and rejected, (xvii., 
36-41 inclusive; S. 230; R. 194.) 

XVIII., 29. — As to those who believe, and do good works, we 
will not suffer the reward of him who shall work righteousness to 
perish, (xviii., 29; S. 241; R. 216.) 

XVIIL, 107. — But as for those who believe and do good works,' 
they shall have the gardens of paradise for their abode; 108. they 

*■ That is, Be neither niggardly nor profuse, but observe the mean between 
the two extremes, wherein consists true liberality.— -Sale's note. 



§ 968 The Clavis to an Index. 305 

shall remain therein forever; they shall wish for no change therein. 
109. Say, If the sea were ink to write the words of my Lord, verily 
the sea would fail, before the words of my Lord would fail; al- 
though we added (mother sea like unto it as a further supply. 110. 
Say, Verily I am only a man as ye are. It is revealed unto me 
that your God is one only God: let him therefore who hopeth to 
meet his Lord work a righteous work; and let him not make any 
other to partake in the worship of his Lord, (xviii., 107-110; S. 
248; E. 224.) 

XIX., 59,* — When the signs of the Merciful were read unto 
them, they fell down, worshiping, and wept : 60. but a succeeding 
generation have come after them, who neglect prayer, and follow 
their lusts; and they shall surely fall into evil : 61. except him 
who repenteth, and believeth, and doih that which is right; 
these shall enter paradise, and they shall not in the least be 
wronged : 62. gardens of perpetual abode shall be their reward, 
which the Merciful hath promised unto his servants, as an object 
■of faith; for his promise will surely come to be fulfilled. 63. Therein 
shall they hear no vain discourse, but peace; and their provision 
shall be prepared for them therein morning and evening, (xix., 
last part of verse 59, and verses 60-63; S. 252, 253; E 132, 133.) 

XX V., 64. — The servants of the Merciful are those who walk 
meekly on the earth, and when the ignorant speak unto them, 
answer, Peace: f 65. and who pass the night adoring their Lord, 
and standing up to pray unto him; 66. and who say, O Lord, 
avert from us the torment of hell, for the torment thereof is per- 
petual; verily the same is a miserable abode and a wretched station: 
67. and who, when they bestow, are neither profuse nor niggardly; 
but observe a just medium between' these; 68. and who invoke not 
another god together with the true God; neither slay the soul which 
God hath forbidden to be slain, unless for a just cause : and who are 
not guilty of fornication. (But he who shall do this shall meet the 
reward of his wickedness: 69. his punishment shall be doubled 
unto him on the day of resurrection; and he shall remain therein, 
covered with ignominy, for ever: 70. except him who shall re- 
pent and believe, and shall work a righteous work; unto them 
will God change their former evils into good; for God is ready to 
forgive, and merciful. 71. And whoever repenteth, and doth that 
which is right; verily he turneth unto God with an acceptable 
conversion.). 72. And they who do not bear false witness; and 

* [I omit the first part of verse 59.] t This is intended here, not as a salu- 
tation, but as a waiving all further discourse and communication with the idola- 
ters. — Sale's note. 



306 Kant's Ethics. % 968 

when they pass by vain discourse, pass by the same with decency; 
73. and who, when they are admonished by the signs of their 
Lord, fall not down as if they were deaf and blind, but stand up 
and are attentive thereto : 74. and who say, O Lord, grant us of 
our wives and our offspring such as may be the satisfaction of 
our eyes; and make us patterns unto those who fear thee. 75. 
These shall be rewarded with the highest apartments in paradise, 

BECAUSE THEY HAVE PRESEVERED WITH CONSTANCY; and they shall 

meet therein with greeting and salutation; 76. they shall remain 
in the same for ever : it shall be an excellent abode, and a delightful 
station, (xxv., 64-76 inclusive; S. 300, 301; E. 188-190. I am in- 
debted to Eodwell for the parenthesis in which I have enclosed the 
last clause of verse 68 and the whole of verses 69-71 inclusive.) 

XXIII. , 53. — O apostles, eat of those things which are good; 
and work righteousness : for I well know that which ye do. 54. 
This your religion is one religion; and I am your Lord : wherefore 
fear me. (xxiii., 53, 54; S. 283; E. 166. 167.") 

XXVI II., 51. — And now have we caused our word to come unto 
them, that they may be admonished. 52. The} 7 unto whom we 
have given the scriptures which were revealed before it, believe in 
the same; 53. and when it is read unto them, say, We believe 
therein; it is certainly the truth from our Lord : verily we were 
Moslems before this. 54. These shall receive their reward twice, 
because they have persevered, and repel evil by good, and dis- 
tribute alms out of that which we have bestowed on them; 55. 
and when they hear vain discourse, avoid the same, saying, We 
have our works, and ye have your works; peace be on you; we 
covet not the acquaintance of the ignorant, (xxviii., 51-55 inclusive; 
S. 321; E. 309. E. reads the 52d verse, "They to whom we gave the 
scriptures before IT, do in IT believe.") 

XXVIII. , 83. — As to this future mansion of paradise, we will 
give it unto them who seek not to exalt themselves in the earth, or 
to do wrong; for the happy issue shall attend the pious. 84. Whoso 
doth good shall receive a reward which shall exceed the merit 
thereof: but as to him who doth evil, they who work evil shall be re- 
warded according to the merit only of that which they shall have 
wrought, (xxviii, 83, 84; S. 324; E. 313.) 

XXIX., 44. — Eehearse that which hath been revealed unto thee 
of the book of the Koran: and be constant at prayer; for prayer 
preserveth a man from filthy crimes, and from that which is blam- 
able; and the remembering of God is surely a most important duty. 
God knoweth that which ye do. 45. Dispute not against those 
who have received the scriptures, unless in the mildest manner : 



§908' The Clavis to an Index. 807 

except against such of them as behave injuriously toward you: and 
say, We believe in the revelation which hath been sent down unto 
us, and also in that which hath been sent down unto you; our God 
and your God is one, and unto him are we resigned, (xxix., 44, 
45; S. 328; E. 327, 328. E. reads in the middle of the 45th verse. 
" We believe in what hath been sent down to us and hath been 
sent down to you.") 

XXIX., 57. — Every soul shall taste death : afterward shall ye 
return unto us; 58. and as for those who shall have believed, and 
wrought righteousness, we will surely lodge them in the higher 
apartments of paradise; rivers shall flow beneath them, and they 
shall continue therein for ever. How excellent will be the reward 
of the workers of righteousness ; 59. who persevere with patience, 
and put their trust in their Lord! (xxix., 57-59; S. 329; E, 329.) 

XXXJ , 15. — Oh my son, verily every matter, whether good or bad, 
though it be of the weight of a grain of mustard-seed, and be hid- 
den in a rock, or in the heavens, or in the earth, God will bring the 
same to light; for God is clear-sighted and knowing. 16. Oh my 
son, be constant at prayer, and command that which is just, and 
forbid that which is evil: and be patient under the afflictions which 
shall befall thee; for this is a duty absolutely incumbent on all men. 
17. Distort not thy face out of contempt to men, neither walk in the 
earth with insolence; for God loveth no arrogant, vain-glorious 
person, (xxxi., 15-17 inclusive; S. 336, 337; E. 333.) 

XXXIII., 35. — Truly the men who resign themselves to God 
(Muslims), and the women who resign themselves, and the believ- 
ing men and the believing women, and the devout men and the 
devout women, and the men of truth, and the women of truth, and 
the patient men and the patient women, and the humble men and 
the humble women, and the men who give alms and the women who 
give alms, and the men who fast and the women who fast, and the 
chaste men and the chaste women, and the men and the women 
who oft remember God : for them hath God prepared forgiveness 
and a rich recompense, (xxxiii., 35; E. 566, the above is Eodwell's 
version; S. 346.) 

XXXIX., 9. — If ye be ungrateful, verily God hath no need of 
you; yet he liketh not ingratitude in his servants : but if ye be 
thankful, he will be well pleased with you. A burdened soul shall not 
bear the burden of another : hereafter shall ye return unto your 
Lord, and he shall declare unto you that which ye have wrought, 
and will reward you accordingly; 10. for he knoweth the innermost 
parts of your breasts, (xxxix., 9, 10; S. 377; E. 315.) 

XL., 41. — And he who believed said, "O my people ! follow me : 
into the right way will I guide you. 42. O my people ! this pres- 



308 Kant's Ethics. § 968 

■ent life is only a passing joy, but the life to come is the mansion 
that abideth. 43. Whoso shall have wrought evil shall not be re- 
compensed but with its like ; but whoso shall have done the 
things that are right, whether male or female, and is a believer — 
these shall enter paradise : good things unreckoned shall they en- 
joy therein. 44. And, O my people ! how is it that I bid you to 
salvation, but that ye bid me to the fire ? 45. Ye invite me to deny 
God, and to join with him gods of whom I know nothing; but I in- 
vite you to the Mighty, the Forgiving, (xl., 41-45 inclusive; R. 
298, the version above is Rodwell's; S. 386,) 

XLL, 30. — As for those who say, Our Lord is God, and who be- 
have uprightty; the angels shall descend unto them, and shall say, 
Fear not, neither be ye grieved; but rejoice in the hopes of para- 
dise which ye have been promised. 31. We are your friends in 
this life, and in that which is to come : therein shall ye have 
that which your souls shall desire, and therein shall ye obtain 
whatever ye shall ask for; 32. as a gift from a gracious and mer- 
ciful God. 33. Who speaketh better than he who inviteth unto 
God, and worketh righteousness, and saith, I am a Moslem? 34. 
Good and evil shall not be held equal. Turn away evil with that 
which is be tter; and behold, the man between whom and thyself 
■there was enmity shall become, as it were, thy warmest friend : 35. 
but none shall attain to this perfection, except they who are patient; 
nor shall any attain thereto, except he who is indued with a great 
happiness of temper. 36. And if a malicious suggestion be offered 
unto thee from Satan, have recourse unto God; for it is he who 
heareth and knoweth. (xli., 30-36 inclusive; S. 391; R. 231.) 

XLL, 46. — He who doth right, doth it to the advantage of his 
own soul; and he who doth evil, doth it against the same: for thy 
Lord is not unjust toward Ms servants, (xli., 46; S, 392; R. 233.) 

XL1L, 23.* — If God pleaseth, he will seal up thy heart: and 
God will absolutely abolish vanity, and will establish the truth in 
his words; for he knoweth the innermost part of men's breasts. 24. 
It is he who accepteth repentance from his servants, and forgiveth 
sins, and knoweth that which ye do. 25. He will incline his ear 
unto those who believe and work righteousness, and will add 
unto them above what they shall ask or deserve, of his bounty : but 
the unbelievers shall suffer a severe punishment, (xlii., last part 
of the 23d verse, and the whole of verses 24, 25; S. 395; R. 338, 339.) 

XLII., 34. — Whatever things are given you, they are the pro- 
vision of this present life : but the reward which is with God is 
better, and more durable, for those who believe, and put their trust 

*[I omit the first part of verse 23] 



§ 968 The Clavis to an Index. 309' 

in their Lord; 35. and who avoid heinous and filthy crimes, 
and when they are angry, forgive; 36. and who hearken unto 
their Lord, and are constant at prayer, and whose affairs are di- 
rected by consultation among; themselves, and who give alms out of 
what we have bestowed on them; (xlii., 34-36; S. 396; E. 339, 340.) 

XLII., 39. — And whoso shall avenge himself, after he hath been 
injured; as to these, it is not lawful to punish them for it: 40. but it 
is only lawful to punish those who wrong men, and act insolently 
in the earth, against justice; these shall suffer a grievous punish- 
ment. 41. And whoso beareth injuries patiently, and forgiv- 
eth; verily this is a necessary work, (xlii., 39-41; S. 396; E. 340.) 

XLIX., 9. — If two parties of the believers contend with one 
another, do ye endeavor to compose the matter between them : and 
if the one of them offer an insult unto the other, fight against that 
party which offered the insult, until they return unto the judgment 
of God; and if they do return, make peace between them with 
equity: and act with justice; for God loveth those who act justly. 
10. Verily the true believers are brethren; wherefore reconcile 
your brethren; and fear God, that ye may obtain mercy, (xlix, 9, 
10; S. 418; E, 609. E, reads at the beginning of verse 10, " Only 
the faithful are brethren; wherefore make peace between your 
brethren; " etc.) 

XLIX., 11. — O true believers, let not men laugh other men to scorn; 
who peradventure may be better than themselves: neither let 
women laugh other women to seorn; who may possibly be better 
than themselves. Neither defame one another; nor call one another 
by opprobrious appellations. An ill name it is to be charged with 
wickedness, after having embraced, the faith : and whoso repenteth 
not. they will be the unjust doers.- 12. O true believers, carefully 
avoid entertaining a suspicion of another : for some suspicions are a 
crime. Inquire not too curiously into other men's failings : neither 
let the one of you speak ill of another in his absence. Would any 
of you desire to eat the flesh of his dead brother? Surely ye 
would abhor it. And fear God; for God is easy to be reconciled, 
and merciful, (xlix., 11, 12; S. 418, 419; E. 609; 610.) 

LV1IL, 10. — O true believers, when ye discourse privily to- 
gether, discourse not of wickedness, and enmity, and disobedi- 
ence toward the apostle; but discourse of justice and piety: and 
fear God, before whom ye shall be assembled. 11. Verily the 
clandestine discourse of the infidels proceedeth from Satan, that he 
may grieve the true believers : but there shall be none to hurt 
them in the least, unless by the permission of God; wherefore, in 
God let the faithful trust. (Iviii., 10, 11; S. 442; E 585. In this. 



-310 Kant's Ethics. § 968 

place is a note appended to Sale's version by the editors, giving 
Savary's reading of the opening of the 11th verse, as follows, "The 
clandestine assemblies are prompted by Satan." Eodwell reads, 
■" Only of Satan is this clandestine talk.") 

LXXXLX, 14. — Moreover man, when his Lord trieth him by 
jjros'perity, and honoreth him, and is bounteous unto him, 15. saith, 
My Lord honoreth me; 16. but when he proveth him by afflictions, 
and withholdeth his provisions from him, 17. he saith, My Lord 
despiseth me, 18. By no means:* but ye honor not the orphan, 
19. neither do ye excite one another to feed the poor; 20. and ye 
devour the inheritance of the weak, with Undistinguishing greedi- 
ness, 21. and ye love riches with much affection, (lxxxix., 14- 
21 inclusive; S. 489; E. 45, 46.) 

LXXY., 20. — But ye love that which hasteneth away, 21. and 
neglect the life to come. 22. Some countenances on that day shall 
be bright, 23. looking toward their Lord: 24. and some counten- 
ances, on that day. shall be dismal : 25. they shall think that a 
crushing calamity shall be brought upon them. (Ixxv., 20-25 in- 
clusive; S. 473; B. 47.) 

XC1II., 3. — Thy Lord hath not forsaken thee, neither doth he 
hate thee. 4. Verily the life to come shall be better for thee than 
this present life : 5. and thy Lord shall give thee a, reward where- 
with thou shaft be well pleased. 6. Did he not find thee an 
orphan, and hath he not taken care of thee f 7. And did he not 
find thee wandering in error, and hath he not guided thee into the 
truth? 8. And did he not find thee needy, and hath he -not en- 
riched thee ? 9. Wherefore, oppress not the orphan : 10. neither 
repulse the beggar: 11. but declare the goodness of thy Lord. 
(xciii., 3-11, being the whole chapter except the first two verses; 
S 492; B. 9, 10.) 

II., 89.f — God knoweth the wicked doers; 90. and thou shalt 
surely find them of all men the most covetous of life, even more 
than the idolaters : one of them would desire his life to be pro- 
longed a thousand years, but none shall reprieve himself from 
punishment, that his life may be prolonged : God seeth that which 
they do. (if, last clause of the 89th verse and the whole of the 
90th; S. 13; B. 442.) 

III., 109. — Yet they are not all alike: there are of those who have 
received the scriptures, upright people; they meditate on the signs 
of God in the night season, and worship; 110. they believe in God, 
and the last day; and command that which is just, and forbid 

* For worldly prosperity or adversity is not a certain mark either of the 
favor or disfavor of God. — Sale's note. t[I omit the first part of the 89th verse.} 



§ 968 The Clavis to an Index. 311 

that which is unjust, and zealously strive to excel in good works; 
these are of the righteous. 111. And ye shall not be denied the re- 
ward of the good which ye do; for Clod knoweth the pious, (iii., 
109-111 inclusive; S. 49; B. 509, 510.) 

XXIX. — In the name op the most merciful God. 1.* Do men 
imagine that it shall be sufficient for them to say, We believe; will 
they not be proved ? 2. We heretofore proved those who were 
before them; for God will surely know them who are sincere, and 
he will surely know the liars. 3. Do they who work evil think 
that they shall prevent us from taking vengeance on them? An ill 
judgment do they make. 4. Whoso hopeth to meet God, verily 
God's appointed time will certainly come; and he both heareth and 
knoweth. 5. Whoever striveth to promote the true religion, striveth 
for the advantage of his own soul; for God needeth not any of his 
creatures : 6. and as to those who believe and work righteous- 
ness, we will expiate their evil deeds from them; and we will give 
them a reward according to the utmost merit of their actions. 7. 
We have commanded man to show kindness toward his parents : 
but if they endeavor to prevail with thee to associate with me 
that concerning which thou hast no knowledge, obey them not. 
Unto me shall ye return; and I will declare unto you what ye 
have done. 8. Those who shall believe, and shall work right- 
eousness, we will surely introduce into paradise, among the up- 
right, (xxix., verse 1, except the introductory letters, and all of 
verses 2-8 inclusive; S. 325; E. 322, 323.) 

II., 75.— Yerily whoso doth evil, and is encompassed by his in- 
iquity, they shall be the companions of hell fire, they shall remain 
therein for ever : 76. but they who believe and do good works, 
they shall be the companions of paradise, they shall continue 
therein for ever, (ii., 75, 76; S. 11; B. 439.) 

LXXXIII. — In the name of the most merciful God. 1. Woe 
be unto those who give short measure or weight: 2. who, when 
they receive by measure from other men, take the full; 3. but 
when they measure unto them, or weigh unto them, defraud! 4. 
Do not these think they shall be raised again, 5. at the great day, 
6. the day whereon mankind shall stand before the Lord of all 
creatures? (lxxxiii., 1-6 inclusive; S. 482; E. 48, 49.) 

III., 20. — And unto those who believe not in the signs of God, 
and slay the prophets without a cause, and put those men to death 
who teach justice; denounce unto them a painful punishment. 21. 
These are they whose works perish in this world, and in that which 
is to come; and they shall have none to help them, (iii., 20, 21; S. 
37; E. 497.) '_ 

* [I omit the introductory letters.] 



312 Kant's Ethics. § 968 

XLIIL, 35. — Whoever shall withdraw from the admonition of 
the Merciful, we will chain a devil unto him; and he shall be his 
inseparable companion, (xliii., 35; S. 398, 399; E. 152.) 

IV., 21. — Verily repentance will be accepted with God, from those 
who do evil ignorant^, and then repent speedily; unto them will 
God be turned : for God is knowing and wise. 22. But no repent- 
ance shall be accepted from those who do evil until the time when 
death presenteth itself unto one of them, and he saith, Verily 1 re- 
pent now; nor unto those who die unbelievers; for them have we 
prepared a grievous punishment, (iv., 21, 22; S. 62: E. 531, 532.) 

XVIII., 44. — Wealth and children are the ornament of this pres- 
ent life : but good works, which are permanent, are better in the 
sight of thy Lord, with respect to the reward, and better with re- 
spect to hope. 45. On a certain day we will cause the mountains 
to pass away, and thou shalt see the earth appearing plain and even; 
and we will gather mankind together, and we will not leave any 
one of them behind. 46. And they shall be set before thy Lord in 
distinct order, and, he shall say unto them, Now are ye come unto us 
naked, as we created you the first time : but ye thought that we 
should not perform our promise unto you. 47. And the book 
wherein every one's actions are recorded shall be put into his hand; 
and thou shalt see the wicked in great terror, because of that 
which is written therein, and they shall say, Alas for us! what 
meaneth this book ? it omitteth neither a small action nor a great 
one, but it compriseth the same; and they shall find that which 
they have wrought, present before their eyes : and thy Lord will 
not deal unjustly with any one. (xviii., 44-47 inclusive; S. 242, 
243; E. 217,218.) 

XX., 107. — On that day mankind shall follow the angel who will 
call them to judgment, none shall have power to turn aside from him; 
and their voices shall be low before the Merciful, neither shalt 
thou hear any more than the hollow sound of their feet. 108. 
On that day, the intercession of none shall be of advantage unto 
another, except the intercession of him to whom the Merciful shall 
grant permission, and who shall be acceptable unto him in Avhat 
he saith. 109. God knoweth that which is before them, and that 
which is behind them; but they comprehend not the same by their 
knowledge: 110. and their faces shall be humbled before the 
living, the self-subsisting God; and he shall be wretched who 
shall bear Ms iniquity. 111. But whosoever shall do good 
works, being a true believer, shall not fear any injustice, or 
any diminution of his reward from God. 112. And thus have we 
sent down this book, oeing a Koran in the Arabic tongue; and we 



§ 968 ' The Clavis to an Index. 813 

have inserted various threats and promises therein, that men may 
fear God, or that it may awaken some consideration in them : 113. 
-wherefore, let God be highly exalted, the King, the Truth !* (xx., 
107-112 inclusive, and the first part of verse 113; S. 262, 263; E. 
106. E. reads the 109th and 110th verses as follows: "He know- 
^th their future and their past; but in their own knowledge they 
comprehend it not: — And humble shall be their faces before Him 
that Liveth, the Self-subsisting : and undone he, who shall bear 
; v he burden of iniquity ; ") 

LXXVI.,4. — Verily we have prepared for the unbelievers chains, 
and collars, and burning fire. 5. But the just shall drink of a cup 
■of wine, mixed with the water of Cafiir, 6. a fountain whereof the 
servants of God shall drink; they shall convey the same by channels 
whithersoever they please. 7. These fulfil their vow, and dread the 
day, the evil whereof will disperse itself far abroad; 8. and give 
food unto the poor, and the orphan, and the bondman, for his sake, 
9. saying, We feed you for God's sake only: we desire no recompense 
from you, nor any thanks : 10. verily we dread, from our Lord, 
a dismal and calamitous day. 11. Wherefore, God shall deliver 
them prom the evil or that day, and shall cast on them bright- 
ness of countenance, and joy; (lxxvi., 4-11 inclusive; S. 474, 475; 
E. 87, 88.) 

XXVIII., 65. — On that day, God shall call unto them and shall 
say, What answer did ye return to our messengers? 66. But they 
shall not be able to give an account thereof on that day; neither 
shall they ask one another for inform ition. 67. Howbeit whoso 
shall repent and believe, and shall do that which is right, may 
expect to be happy, (xxviii., 65-67 inclusive; S. 322; E. 311.) 

LX VII., 22. — Is he, therefore, who goeth groveling upon his face, 
better directed than he who walketh upright in a straight way? 
23. Say, It is he who hath given you being, and indued you with 
hearing, and sight, and understanding; yet how little gratitude 
have ye ! 24. Say, It is he who hath sown you in the earth, and 
unto him shall ye be gathered together. 25. They say, When shall 
this menace be put in execution, if ye speak truth? 26. Answer, 
The knowledge of this matter is with God alone : for I am only a 
public warner. Clxvii., 22-26 inclusive; S. 459; E. 162.) 

LXXVI., 24. — Wherefore, patiently wait the judgment of thy 
Lord; and obey not any wicked person or unbeliever among them. 
25. And commemorate the name of thy Lord, in the morning, and 
in the evening : 26. and during some part of the night worship 
bim, and praise him a long part of the night. 27. Verily these 

* [I omit the remainder of verse 113.1 

21 



314 Kant's Ethics. § 968: 

men love the transitory life, and leave behind them the heavy day 
of judgment. 28. We have created them, and have strengthened 
their joints; and when we please, we will substitute others like unto 
them, in their stead. 29. Verily this is an admonition : and who- 
so willeth, taketh the way unto his Lord : 30. but ye shall not 
will, unless God willeth: for Clod is knowing and wise. 31. He 
leadeth whom he pleaseth into his mercy; but for the unjust hath 
he prepared a grievous punishment, (lxxvi , 24-31; S. 475; R. 89.), 

XXXV., 5. — O men, verily the promise of God is true : let not 
therefore the present life deceive you, neither let the deceiver deceive 
you concerning God : 6. for Satan is an enemy unto you; where- 
fore, hold him for an enemy : he only inviteth his confederates to 
be the inhabitants of hell. 7. For those who believe not there is-. 
prepared a severe torment : 8. but for those who shall believe and 
do that which is right, is prepared mercy and a great reward., 
(xxxv., 5-8 inclusive; S. 357, 358; E. 362.) 

XXXIX., 47. — Say, God, the creator of heaven and earth, who 
knowest that which is secret, and that which is manifest; thou 
shalt judge between thy servants concerning that wherein they 
disagree. 48. If those who act unjustly were masters of what- 
ever is in the earth, and as much more therewith, verily they 
w^ould give it to ransom themselves from the evil of the punish- 
ment, on the day of resurrection : and there shall appear unto 
them, from God, terrors which they never imagined; 49. and there 
shall appear unto them the evils of that which they shall have- 
gained; and that which they mocked at shall encompass them, 
(xxxix., 47-49 inclusive; S. 380, 381; R. 319.) 

XLV, 13. — Speak unto the true believers, that they forgive those 
who hope not for the days of God, that he may reward people ac- 
cording to what they shall have wrought. 14. Whoso doeth 
that which is right doth it to the advantage of his own soul; and 
whoso doeth evil dotli it against the same : hereafter shall ye re- 
turn unto your Lord, (xlv., 13, 14; S. 405; R, 235, 236.) 

XLV., 19. — This Koran delivereth evident precepts unto man- 
kind; and is a direction, and a mercy, unto people who judge 
aright. 20. Do the workers of iniquity imagine that we will deal 
with them as with those who believe and do good works; so that 
their life and their death shalt be equal? An ill judgment do they 
make. 21. God hath created the heavens and the earth in truth; 
that he may recompense every sOul according to that which it 
shall have wrought: and tlt^"' ^vall ' J! :fi'6"t^"^e' '*' 't?fB'^Lt'2>B : '""linj listly - . 
22. What thinkest thou? He' who taketh his own lust for his 
God, and whom God causeth knowingly to eiT, and whose ears and 



§ 968 The Clavis to an Index. 315 

whose heart he hath sealed up, and over whose eyes he hath cast a 
veil; who shall direct him, after G-od shall have forsaken himf 
Will ye therefore not be admonished? (xl v., 19-22 inclusive; S; 
405; E. 236, 237. E. reads in the 22d verse, "He who hath made 
a God of his passions, and whom G-od eauseth willfully to err,") 

XL VI., 18. — For every one is prepared a certain degree of happi- 
ness or misery, according to that which they shall have, 
wrought: that God may recompense them for their works: and. 
they shall .not be treated unjustly. 19. On a certain day, the un- 
believers shall be exposed before the lire of hell; and it shall be 
said unto them, Ye received your good things in your lifetime,, 
while ye were in the world; and ye enjoyed yourselves therein : 
wherefore this day ye shall be rewarded with the punishment of 
ignominy; for that ye behaved insolently in the earth, with- 
out justice, and for that ye transgressed, (xlvi., 18, 19; S. 408; 
E. 396, 397.) 

LIIL, 30. — Wherefore, withdraw from him who turneth away 
from our admonition, and seeketh only the present life. 31. This 
is their highest pitch of knowledge. Verily thy Lord well know- 
eth him who erreth from his way; and he well knoweth him who 
is rightly directed. 32. Unto God belongeth whatever is in heaven, 
and earth: that he may reward those who do evil, according to- 
that which they shall have wrought; and may reward those 
who do well, with the most excellent reward. 33. As to those who 
avoid great crimes, and heinous sins, and are guilty only of lighter- 
faults; verily thy Lord will be extensive in mercy toward them. He. 
well knew you when he produced you out of the earth, and when, 
ye were embryos in your mothers' wombs: wherefore, justify not 
yourselves : he best knoweth the man who feareth him. (liii., 30- 
33; S. 428; E. 66, 67.) 

LXIV, 9.* — And whoso shall believe in God, and shall do that 
which is right, from him will he expiate his evil deeds, and he 
will lead him into gardens beneath which rivers flow, to remain 
therein for ever. This will be great felicity. 10. But they who 
shall not believe, and shall accuse our signs of falsehood, those 
shall be the inhabitants of hell fire, wherein they shall remain for 
ever ; and a wretched journey shall it be thither ! 11. No misfor- 
tune happeneth but by the permission of God; and whoso believeth 
in God, he will direct his heart : and God knoweth all things. 12. 
Wherefore, obey God, and obe} T the apostle : but if ye turn back 
verily the duty incumbent on our apostle is only public preaching. 
13. God ! there is no God but he : wherefore, in God let the 

* [I omit the first part of verse 9.] 



316 Kant's Mines. § 968 

faithful put their trust, (lxiv., last part of the 9th verse, and 
verses 10-13 inclusive; S. 453; R 477.) 

XIV. — In the name of the most merciful God. 1.* — This book 
have we sent down unto thee, that thou mayest lead men forth 
from darkness into light, by the permission of their Lord, into the 
glorious and laudable way. (xiv., the first verse, omitting the in- 
troductory letters; S. 204, 205; R. 274.) 

X., 108. — Say, O men, now hath the truth come unto you from 
your Lord. He therefore who shall be directed, will be directed 
to the advantage of his own soul : but he who shall err, will err only 
against the same. I am no guardian over you. 109. Do thou, O 
prophet, follow that which is revealed unto thee : and persevere 
with patience, until God shall judge; for he is the best judge, 
(x., 108, 109; S. 174; R. 354.) 

IV., 81. — Whatever good befalleth thee, O man, it is from God; 
and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from thyself We have sent 
thee an apostle unto men, and God is a sufficient witness thereof. 
,(iv., 81; S. 70; R. 540, 541. R. omits O man.) 

XIII., 27. — The infidels say, Unless a sign be sent down unto him 
from his Lord, we will not believe. Answer, Verily God will lead 
into error whom he pleaseth, and will direct unto himself him who 
repenteth, 28. and those who believe, and whose hearts rest se- 
curely in the meditation of God; shall not men's hearts rest securely 
in the meditation of God? They who believe and do that which 
is right shall enjoy blessedness, and partake of a happy resurrec- 
tion, (xiii., 27, 28; S. 202, 203; R. 426.) 

XIII., 43. — The unbelievers will say, Thou art not sent of God. 
Answer, God is a sufficient witness between me and you, and he 
who understandeth the scriptures, (xiii., 43; S. 204; R. 428.) 

VII., 186. — They will ask thee concerning the last hour; at what 
time its coming is fixed ? Answer, Verily the knowledge thereof 
is with my Lord; none shall declare the fixed time thereof, except 
he. The expectation thereof is grievous in heaven and on earth : it 
shall come upon you no otherwise than suddenly. 187. They will 
ask thee, as though thou wast well acquainted therewith. Answer, 
Verily the knowledge thereof is with God alone : but the greater 
part of men know it not. 188. Say, I am able neither to procure 
advantage unto myself, nor to avert mischief from me, but as God 
pleaseth. If I knew the secrets of God, I should surely enjoy 
abundance of good, neither should evil befall me. Verily I am no 
other than a denouncer of threats, and a messenger of good tidings 
unto people who believe, (vii , 186-188; S. 136, 137; R. 391, 392.) 

" S ;[I omit the introductory letters.] 



§ 968 The Clavis to an Index. 317 

III., 73. — It is not -fit for a man that God should give him a book 
of revelations, and wisdom, and prophecy; and then he should say 
unto men, Be ye worshipers of me, besides God; but he ought to say, 
Be ye perfect in knowledge and in works, since ye know the 
scriptures, and exercise yourselves therein, (iii., 73; S. 46: R, 505.) 

XLI., 5. — Say, Verily I am only a man like you. It is revealed 
unto me, that your God is one God : wherefore, direct your way 
straight unto him ; and ask pardon of him for what is past. And 
woe be to the idolaters : 6. who give not the appointed alms, and 
believe not in the life to come! 7. Hut as to those who believe 
and work righteousness, they shall receive an everlasting reward 
(xli., 5-7 inclusive; S. 389; R. 228, 229.) 

II., 105. — They say, Verily none shall enter paradise, except 
they who are Jews or Christians: this is their wish. Say, Produce 
your proof of this, if ye speak truth. 106. Nay, but he who re- 
signeth himself to God, and doth that which is right, he shall 
have his reward with his Lord : there shall come no fear on them, 
neither shall they be grieved, (ii., 105, 106; S. 14, 15; R, 444.) 

XX1IL, 98. — Turn aside evil with that which is better: we 
well know the calumnies which they utter against thee. 99. And say, 
O Lord, I fly unto thee for refuge, against the suggestions of the 
devils: 100. and I have recourse unto thee, O Lord, to drive them 
away, that they be not present with me. (xxiii., 98-100 inclusive; 
S. 285; R. 170.) 

XX., 130. — Wherefore, do thou, O Mohammed, patiently bear 
that which they say; and celebrate the praise of thy Lord before, 
the rising of the sun, and before the setting thereof, and praise 
him in the hours of the night, and in the extremities of the day, 
that thou mayest be well-pleased with the prospect of receiving 
.favor from God. 131. And cast not thine eyes on that which we 
have granted divers of the unbelievers to enjoy, namely, the splen- 
dor of this present life, that we may prove them thereby; for the 
provision of thy Lord is better, and more permanent. 132. Com- 
mand thy family to observe prayer; and do thou persevere therein. * 
(xx., 130, 131, and the first part of verse 132; S. 264; R. 108.) 

XXV., 58. — We have sent thee to be no other than a bearer of 
good tidings, and a denouncer of threats. 59. Say, I ask not of 
you any reward for this my preaching; besides the conversion of him 
who shall desire to take the way unto his Lord. 60. And do thou 
trust in him who liveth, and dieth not; and celebrate his praise : 
(he is sufficiently acquainted with the faults of his servants) :f 
(xxv., 58, 59, and the first part of verse 60; S. 300; R. 188.) 

* [I omit the remainder of verse 132.] t [I omit the remainder of verse 60.] 



318 Kant's Ethics. 

LI., 50. — Fly, therefore, unto God; verily I am a public Warner 
unto you, from him. 51. And set not up another god with the true 
God: verily I am a public warner unto you, from him. (li., 50, 51; 
S. 424; E. 56.) 

XXXIX.. 54. — Say, O my servants who have transgressed 
against your own souls, despair not of the mercy of God : seeing 
that God forgiveth all sins, for he is gracious and merciful. 55. 
And be turned unto your Lord, and resign yourselves unto him, 
before the threatened punishment overtake you ; for then ye shall 
not be helped. 56. And follow the most excellent instructions 
which have been sent down unto you from your Lord, before the 
punishment come suddenly upon you, and ye perceive not the ap- 
proach thereof; (xxxix., 54-56 inclusive; S. 381; E. 320.) 

XLIL, 14. — Wherefore, invite them to receive the sure faith, and 
be urgent with them, as thou hast been commanded; and follow not 
their vain desires : and say, I believe in all the scriptures which 
God hath sent down; and I am commanded to establish justice 
among you: God is our Lord and your Lord: unto us will our 
works be imputed, and unto you will your works be imputed: let 
there be no wrangling between us and you; for God will assemble 
us all at the last day, and unto him shall we return, (xlii., 14; S. 
394; E. 337.) 

LXVII. — In the name op the most merciful God. 1. Blessed 
be he in whose hand is the kingdom, for he is almighty ! 2. Who 
hath created death and life, that he might prove you, which of you 
is most righteous in his actions: and he is mighty, and ready to 
forgive, (lxvii., 1, 2; S. 458; E. 160.) 

XXIII., 117.*— Wherefore, let God be exalted, the King, the 
Truth ! There is no God besides him, the Lord of the honorable 
throne. Whoever together with the true God shall invoke another 
god, concerning whom he hath no demonstrative proof, shall surely 
be brought to an account for the same before his Lord. Verily 
the infidels shall not prosper. 118. Say, O Lord, pardon, and 
show mercy: for thou art the best of those who show mercy. 
(The close of the twenty-third chapter, last part of the 117th 
-verse, and the whole of verse 118; S. 286; E. 171.) 

L , 44. — We well know what the unbelievers say; and thou art not 
isent to compel them forcibly to the faith. 45. Wherefore, warn, 
by the Koran, him who feareth my threatening. (The close of 
the fiftieth chapter, including all of verses 44, 45; S. 422; E. 97.) 

§ 969. — Kinds of elusorj 7 belief are threefold : (1) miracles; (2) 
mysteries; (3) means of grace, (page 264, line 26.) Cf. § 725. 

* fl omit the first part of verse 117.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 319 

'[Also see as to (1) §§ 777-787; (2) §§ 872-891; and as to the oper- 
ations OF GRACE §§ 705-728] 

§ 970. — Prayer is a mean awakening and quickening our moral 
mindedness or intent— not a mean of* grace (page 265, line 19.) 

§ 971. — Sincerity in a verbally pronounced prayer not so un- 
questionable as in one which confines itself to prayer's spirit. 
<page 266, line 6.) 

§ 972. — Jesus expressed the spirit of prayer most admirably, 
'(page 266, line 31.) See Luke, xi., 2-4; Matthew, vi., 8-15 (page 
217, above). Cf. Job, xxxiv., 31, 32 : 

31. " Surely, to God it should be said : 

I have borne it; I will not be perverse. 

32. Beyond what I see do Thou teach me; 

If I have done evil, I will do it no more.""' 

§ 973. — No prayer (unless when directed toward a moral object) 
~vvill certainly be heard, (page 267, line 13.) 

§ 974. — Miraculous faith, said to be able to move mountains, 
(page 267, line 36.) 

§ 975. — Public prayer rests upon a deeper ground of reason than 
private supplications, (page 268, line 22.) 

§ 976. — Prayer rather weakens than strengthens the sensitive 
effect of the ethical idea, (page 269, line 4.) 

§ 977. — Assembling together in church is a mean of edification, 
not a mean of celestial grace. (Edification is the ethical purchase 
that devotion takes upon- the actual amendment and building up 
of the moral character.) (page 270, line 21.) [Webster (article 
Purchase) says : " pourchasser is to pursue to the end or object, and 
hence to obtain."] [Exodus, xx., 4.] [Moral maxims: see §328 
(page 29 above).] 

§ 978. — Baptism is no mean of grace, (page 272, line 1.) \_A 
pillar in the Divine state : cf Eevelations, iii., 12.] 

§ 979. — Communion is a good mean, well fitted for carrying for- 
ward the congregation in the culture of that moral and brotherly 
love which is thereby so prominently represented; but it is not a 
mean of grace, (page 272, line 19.) 

§ 980. — Sacerdotal despotism under the sway of a cleriarchy. 
(page 273, line 7.) 

§ 981. — Mankind, instead of becoming conformable to the sacro- 
sanct requirements of the Divine Holiness, address themselves 
to the Divine Benignity, (page 273, line 15.) 

* •' The Book of Job. From the original Hebrew, on the basis of the com- 
mon and earlier English versions. New York: American Bible Union," etc 
( Dr.. Cojiant's translation.) 



320 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 982. — Instead of virtue, presses after piety (passive venera- 
tion instead of active obedience.) (page 274, line 15.) 

§ 983. — Commencing with virtue, thence rise to the condonation 
of divine grace, (page 275, line 15.) 

I desire to add one suggestion further. After completing the 
logical division (I do not mean of this clavis, but of the text itself),, 
the ethical — at least the groundwork — should be immediately care- 
fully reviewed. The difference (in respect of the first reading) 
will be like that between the twilight of the Gothic cathedral 
which Schwegler sees in Boehme's writings, " where the light falls 
through variegated windows," (Schwegler's .Hist. Phil., J. H. 
Seelye tr., Appleton, New York, 1864, page 170), and the resplend- 
ence of the same sacred edifice full of ten thousand lights 
and resounding with the march of the church militant up the nave 
on the way toward the altar of God. 

" Send out Thy light and Thy truth; 

They shall guide me; 

They shall bring me to Thy holy mount, 

And to Thy tabernacles. 

And I shall come to the altar of God, 

To God, my exceeding joy." — Psal. xliii.* 

SECOND GENERAL DIVISION. 

How can I be Free? (§§984-3000.) 
VOLUME III.— LOGIC. 

Translated from the German of Immanuel Kant, M. A., Doctor and late- 
Regius Professor :: of Pure Philosophy in the University of Koenigsberg, and 
Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin. By John Richardson. 
(§§984-1398 inclusive.) Paging of the edition of Simpkin and Marshall, 
London, 1819. Mr. Richardson has annexed to his translation of the Logic 
a sketch of Kant's life and writings, from which sketch an extract will be 
found in Appendix vii., below. [It appears from a note to Richardson's pre- 
face (page iii.), that the Logic was edited by Dr. G. B. Fesche; but Ueber- 
weg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., page 153) says that the Logik was edited, 
by J. B. Jaesche. Perhaps the disagreement is due to a typographical error .J 

INTRODUCTION. (§§984-1168.) 
Chapter I.— Conception of Logic. (§§984-1001 inclusive.) 

§ 984. — Everything in nature happens according to rules, (page' 
9, line 4.) 

*"The Psalms! The Common Version revised for the American Bible 
Union, with an Introduction and Occasional Notes, by Thomas- .L Consult."' 
New York, 1871. 



The Clavis to an Index. 321 

§ 985. — Exercise of our powers takes place according to rules, 
(jpage 9, line 16.) 

§ 986. — Understanding is bound in its operations to rules, (page 
10, line 4.) 

§ 987. — .Rules of the understanding can be investigated, (page 
10, line 17.) 

§ 988. — Eules of the understanding are either necessary or con- 
tingent, (page 10, line 23.) 

§ 989. — Necessary rules of the understanding can be known 
apriori, and are merely formal, (page 11, line 11.) 

§ 990. — Logic is the science of the necessary laws of the under- 
standing and of reason in general, (page 12, line 4.) 

§ 991. — Logic (1) is the foundation of all the other sciences, 
(page 12, line 8.) 

§ 992. — Logic (2) can not be an organon of the sciences, (page 

12, line 13.) [Logic is not an organon of science, but its canon. 
But logic is an organon of wisdom, whose only canon is the Law. 
That is to say, the whole of logic, and along with it the whole of 
language, words and the uses of words, must be subordinated to- 
the total end of the whole use of reason. For the behoof of the- 
true life, all (theoretic) science must be subordinated to logic as its 
supreme canon, but also at the same time all of science, and with 
it logic itself as the organon of wisdom, to philosophy as the su- 
preme science. If logic proclaims itself the canon of life and 
erects itself into a philosophy, it is mere logomachy, inevitably 
transcendent, and practically worthless, and worse than worthless, 
positively evil in practical tendency. Instances are the systems of 
Fichte and Hegel, both thoroughly and radically wikantic. The 
moment you depart from practical ground, you depart from Kant. 
See § 1031, and cf. §§ 1530, 1543.] ' 

§ 993. — Logic (3) is a canon, and comprehends nothing but laws 
apriori. (page 13, line 9.) 

§ 994. — Logic can not presuppose psychological princij)les. (page 

13, line 21.) " 

§ 995. — Logic (4) is a science of reason as to the matter, not 
merely as to the form, (page 14, line 11.) [Cf. Campanella (Ten- 
nemann, Hist. Phil:, eel. Morell; § 318, Bohn's page 289).] 

§ 996. — Logic (5) is, as to both the matter and the form, a doc- 
trine, or demonstrated theory, (page 14, line 27.) 

§ 997. — Logic (as a canon) is essentially distinguished from, 
aesthetic (as mere criticism of taste), (page 15, line 7.) Cf. § 1529. 

§ 998. — iEsthetic takes its rules aposteriori. (page 15, line 25.) 

§ 999. — Logic is more than mere criticism ; it is a canon, which 
afterward serves for a criticism, (page 16, line 7.) 



322 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1000. — Universal logic distinguished from transcendental. 
<page 16, line 13.) Cf. § 1535, 1536. 

§ 1001. — Logic is a science of the right use of the understanding 
and of reason in general, (page 16, line 19.) [Cf. Abelard (Leber - 
weg, Hist. Phil., tr. Morris, § 94, vol. L, page 391, line 41).] 

Chapter II.— Principal Divisions of Logic— Propounding— Use of this Science — 
Sketch of a History of it. (^ 1002-1015 inclusive.) 

§1002 — Logic is divided into the analytic and the dialectic. 
(page 17, line 5.) 

§ 1003. — Dialectic arises from a mere abuse of the analytic, (page 
17, line 17.) Cf. § 1542. 

§ 1004. — Dialectic, as an art of disputation, unworthy of a philos- 
opher, (page 17, line 26.) Cf. § 1543. 

§ 1005. — -Dialectic of great use as a cathartic of the understand- 
ing, (page 18, line 17.) 

§ 1006. — Division of logic into natural and artificial (J.ogica scho- 
lastica) is improper, (page 18, line 24.) 

§ 1007. — Division of logic into theoretical and practical is wrong, 
(page 19, line 10.) 

§1008. — Logic has a dogmatical and a technical part: (1) 
doctrine of elements; (2) doctrine of method, (page 19, line 22.) 

§ 1009. — Logic (subjectively) may be divided into pure and ap- 
plied. But applied logic is a psychology, (page 20, line 2.) Cf. §§ 
1531-1534. 

§ 1010. — Technic must be propounded in every science, not in 
applied logic only, (page 20, line 25.) 

§ 1011. — Logic can not be divided into that of the common and 
that of the sj)3culative understanding, (page 21, line 1.) 

§ 1012. — Propounding of logic may be either scholastic or popu- 
lar, (page 21, line 21.) 

.§ 1013. — Propounding distinguished from method, (p. 22, 1. 8.) 

§ 1014. — Value of the science of logic and the use of its study, 
(page 22, line 18.) 

§ 1015. — History of logic. (Aristotle, Leibnitz, Wolf, etc.) (page 
23, line 3.) 

Chapter III.— Conception of Philosophy in General— Philosophy considered 
according to both the scholastic and the mundane conception— Essential 
requisites and ends of philosophizing— Tne most general and the chief 
problems of this science. (i,i 1016-1032 inclusive.) 

§ 1016. — Philosophical cognitions belong to the cognitions of 
reason, (page'25, line 8.) 

§ 1017. — Cognition may arise from reason (objectively), and yet 
(subjectively) be historical, (page 25, line 20.) Cf. §§ 2602, 2603. 



The Otavis to an Index. 323 

§ 1018. — Pernicious to know some rational cognitions merely 
historically, (page 26, line 13.) 

§ 1019. — One may learn philosophy in a certain respect without 
being able to philosophize, (page 26, line 20.) 

§ 1020. — Specific distinction between philosophy and mathe- 
matics, (page 26, line 28 ) Cf. §2452, et seqq. 

§ 1021. — Philosophy is the cognition of reason from mere con- 
ceptions, (page 27, line 15.) 

§ 1022. — Cognitions of mathematics are intuitive; those of phil- 
osophy discursive, (page 27, line 29.) 

§ 1023. — Philosophy is the science of the ultimate ends of human 
reason, (p. 23, 1. 6.) Cf. §§ 1024, 2804. (The cosmical conception.) 

§ 1024. — Philosophy in the scholastic sense is a doctrine of ad- 
dress ; in the cosmic sense, it is a doctrine of wisdom, (page 28, 
line 15.) See § 1023. 

§ 1025. — Philosophy in the scholastic sense is the science of the 
systematic conjunction of the cognitions of reason in the idea 
of a whole, (page 29, line 8.) Cf. § 2604. 

§ 1026. — Philosophy in the cosmic sense is the science of the 
reference of all cognition and of all use of reason to the scope of 
human reason, (page 29, line 18.) Cf. § 2605. 

§ 1027. — Questions which the philosopher must be able to deter- 
mine, (page 29, line 29.) [It will be seen that the especial pro- 
vince of philosophy is to answer the question i£ what ought we 
to do?"] Cf. §2557. 

§ 1028. — Two things requisite to a philosopher: (1) culture; (2) 
use. (page 30, line 20.) Cf. Arist. Me. Eth., II., i., 4. §1040. 

§ 1029. — Mathematics mny be learned ; philosophy, on the con- 
trary, must be practised, (page 31, line 5.) [You may learn sur- 
veying (theoretically) without going into the field with the chain 
and compass ; but you can not learn wisdom Avithout actually lay- 
ing upon the field of your daily life the chain of the Law, aligned 
by the compass of reason.] Cf. § 2604. See § 298. 

§ 1030. — True philosopher must make a free (not an imitative) 
use of his reason, but not a dialectical use. (page 31, line 23.) 

§ 1031. — Science is of an intrinsic value as an organon of wisdom 
only, (page 32, line 1.) 

§ 1032. — Consider more the method of our use of reason, than 
the propositions themselves at which we arrive by it. (p. 32, 1. 18.) 

Chapter IV.— Light Sketch of a History of Philosophy. (§§1033-1049.) 

§ 1033. — Philosophical cognition commences when the common 
use of reason begins to make essays in the knowledge of the uni- 
versal in the abstract, (page 32, line 25.) 



324 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1034. — Greeks began the first to philosophize, (page 33, line- 
7.) With regard to the mathematics, too, the Greeks are the first 
that cultivated this part of the cognition of reason after a specula- 
tive scientific method. [Chinese: cf. § 871.] [Indians: cf. § 949.] 
[Zoroaster's Zend-Avesta : cf. § 881.] 

§ 1035. — Thales and the lonians. (page 34, line 8.) 

§ 1036— Eleatic philosophy, (page 34, line 26.) 

§ 1037. — Dialectic; and the Sophists, (page 35, line 5 ) 

§ 1038 — Pythogoras. (page 35, line 22.) 

§ 1039. — Socrates gave the philosophic spirit and all the specu 
lative heads quite a new practical direction, (page 37, line 1.) [Cf.. 
§§ 614, 1397, 1430.] He is almost the only one among mankind, whose 
conduct approaches nearly to the idea of that of a sage : cf. the fol- 
lowing extracts from Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates : * 

BOOK 1., Chapter L, §1.1 have often wondered by what ar- 
guments the accusers of Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he 
deserved death from the state ; for the indictment against him was 
to this effect : Socrates offends against the laws in not paying 

RESPECT TO THOSE GODS WHOM THE CITY RESPECTS, AinD INTRODUCING 
OTHER NEW DEITIES ; HE ALSO OFFENDS AGAINST THE LAWS IN COR- 
RUPTING THE YOUTH. 

2. In the first place, that he did not respect the gods whom the city 
respects, what proof did they biing? For he was seen frequently 
sacrificing at home, and frequently on the public altars of the city;, 
nor was it unknown that he used divination ; as it was a common 
subject of talk that " Socrates used to say that the divinity in- 
structed him;" and it was from this circumstance, indeed, that 
they seem chiefly to have derived the charge of introducing new 
deities. 3. He however introduced nothing newer than those who,, 
practicing divination, consult auguries, voices, omens, and sacri- 
fices ; for they do not imagine that birds, or people who meet them, 
know what is advantageous for those seeking presages, but that 
the gods, by their means, signify what will be so ; and such was 
the opinion that Socrates entertained. 4. Most people say that 
they are diverted from an object, or prompted to it, by birds, or by 

* " The Anabasis, or Expedition of Cyrus, unci the Memorabilia of Socrates. 
Literally translated from the Greek of Xenophon. By the Rev. J. S. Watson, 
M. A., M. R. S. L. With a Geographical Commentary, by W. F. Ainsworth, 
Esq., F. S. A., F. R. G. S., F. G. S." (In Harper's Classical Library. See page- 
349 et seqq. for the Memorabilia of Socrates, with notes.) I have not inserted 
references to the paging, inasmuch as the numbering of the books and chapters 
will enable the reader to find quickly any place sought. Except in III., ix., 4, 
I. have substituted double parentheses ((thus)) for brackets which I found in the 
text [thus]. I have retained many of the notes. 



The Claim to an Index. 325 

* 

the people who meet them ; but Socrates spoke as he thought, for 
he said it was the divinity that was his monitor. He also told 
many of his friends to do certain things, and not to do others, in- 
timating that the divinity had forwarned him ; and advantage at- 
tended those who obeyed his suggestions, but repentance, those 
who disregarded them. 

5. Yet who would not acknowledge that Socrates wished to ap- 
pear to his friends neither a fool nor a boaster ? But he would have 
seemed to be both, if, after saying that intimations were given him 
by a god, he had then been proved guilty of falsehood. It is man- 
ifest, therefore, that he would have uttered no predictions, if he 
had not trusted that they would prove true. But who, in such 
matters, would trust to any one but a god? And how could he, 
who trusted the gods, think that there were no gods ? 

6. He also acted toward his friends according to his convictions, 
for he recommended them to perform affairs of necessary conse- 
quence* in such a manner as he thought that they would be best 
managed; but concerning those of which it was doubtful how they 
would terminate, he sent them to take auguries whether they 
should be done or not. 7. Those who would govern families or 
cities well, he said, had need of divination ; for to become skillful 
in architecture, or working in brass, or agriculture, or in command- 
ing men, or to become a critic in any such arts, or a good reasoner, 
or a skillful regulator of a household, or a well-qualified general, 
he considered as wholly matters of learning, and left to the choice 
of the human understanding ; 8. but he said that the gods re- 
served to themselves the most important particulars attending such 
matters, of which nothing was apparent to men ; for neither was 
it certain to him who had sown his field well, who should reap the 
fruit of it ; nor certain to him who had built a house well, who 
should inhabit it ; nor certain to him who was skilled in general- 
•ship, whether it would be for his advantage to act as a general ; 
nor certain to him who was versed in political affairs, whether it 
would be for his profit to be at the head of the state ; nor certain 
to him who had married a beautiful Avife in hopes of happiness, 
whether he should not incur misery by her means ; nor certain to 
him who had acquired powerful connections in the state, whether 
he might not be banished by them : 9. and those who thought 

* Things of which the event is certain, because necessary, as Ernesti in- 
terprets.— Schneider. [Anthon (Harper, 18G8, page 146) says, '"the things 
that were necessary to be done,' i. e. whatever might be their issue. The refer- 
ence is to things that must be clone, as a matter of course, and which are re- 
quired either by duty, or sound reason, or necessity."] 



326 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 • 

that none of these things depended on the gods, but that all were 
dependent on the human understanding, he pronounced to be insane; 
as he also pronounced those to be insane who had recourse to> 
omens respecting matters which the gods had granted to men to 
discover by the exercise of their faculties ; as if, tor instance, a man 
should inquire whether it would be better to take for the driver of 
his chariot one who knows how to drive, or one who does not 
know ; or whether it would be better to place over his ship one 
who knows how to steer it, or one who does not know ; or if men 
should ask respecting matters which they may learn by counting,, 
or measuring, or weighing ; for those who inquired of the gods 
concerning such matters he thought guilt} 7 of impiety, and said, 
that it was the duty of men to learn whatever the gods had en- 
abled them to r>o by learning, and to try to ascertain from the gods 
by augury whatever was obscure to men ; as the gods always af- 
ford information to those to whom they are rendered propitious. 

10. He was constantly in public, for he went in the morning to 
the places for walking and the gymnasia ; at the time when the 
market was full he was to be seen there ; and the rest of the day 
he was where he was likely to meet the greatest number of people;; 
he was generally engaged in discourse, and all who pleased were 
at liberty to hear him ; 11. yet no one ever either saw Socrates 
doing, or heard him saying, airything impious or profane ; for he 
did not dispute about the nature of things as most other philoso- 
phers disputed, speculating how that which is called by sophists 
the world was produced, and by what necessary laws every thing 
in the heavens is effected, but endeavored to show that those who^ 
chose such subjects of contemplation were foolish ; 12. and used 
in the first place to inquire of them whether they, thought that: 
they already knew sufficient of human affairs, and therefore pro- 
ceeded to such subjects of meditation, or whether, when they 
neglected human affairs entirely, and speculated on celestial 
matters, they thought that they were doing what became them. 
13. He wondered, too, that it was not apparent to them that it is 
impossible for man to satisfy himself on such points, since even 
those who pride themselves nivst on discussing them, do not hold 
the same opinions one with another, but are, compared with each 
other, like madmen ; 14. for of madmen some have no fear of 
what is to be feared, and others fear what is not to be feared ; some 
think it no shame to say or do any thing whatever before men r 
and others think that they ought not to go among men at all : some 
pay no respect to temple, or altar, or any thing dedicated to the 
gods, and others worship stones, and common stocks, and beasts : 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 327 

so of those who speculate on the nature of the universe, some 
imagine that all that exists is one, others that there are worlds in- 
finite in number ; some that all things are in perpetual motion, 
others that nothing is ever moved ; some that all things are gener- 
ated and deca} T , and others that nothing is either generated or 
decays. 

15. He would ask, also, concerning such philosophers, whether, 
as those who have learned arts practiced by men, expect that they 
will be able to carry into effect what they have learned, either for- 
themselves, or for any one else whom they may wish, so those who 
inquire into celestial things, imagine that, when they have dis- 
covered by what laws every thing is effected, they will be able to 
produce, whenever they please, wind, rain, changes of the seasons, 
and whatever else of that sort they may desire, or whether they 
have no such expectation, but are content merely to know how 
every thing of that nature is generated. 16. Such were the ob- 
servations which he made about those who busied themselves in 
such speculations ; but for himself, he would hold discourse, from 
time to time, on what concerned mankind, considering what was 
pious, what impious ; what was becoming, what unbecoming ; what 
was just, what unjust ; what was sanity, what insanity ; what was 
fortitude, what cowardice ; what a state was, and what the charac- 
ter of a statesman ; what was the nature of government over men, 
and the qualities of one skilled in governing them ; and touching 
on other subjects, with which he thought that those who were 
acquainted were men of worth and estimation, but that those Avho 
were ignorant of them might justly be deemed no better than slaves. 

17. As to those matters, then, on which Socrates gave no intima- 
tion what his sentiments were, it is not at all wonderful that his 
judges should have decided erroneously concerning him ; but is it 
not wonderful that they should have taken no account of such 
things as all men knew? 18. For when he was a member of the sen- 
ate, and had taken the senator's oath, in which it was expressed that 
he would vote in accordance with the laws, he, being president in the 
assembly of the people when they were eager to put to death 
Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and all the nine generals, by a single vote 
contrary to the law. refused, though the multitude were enraged at 
him, and many of those in power uttered threats against him, to 
put the question to the vote, but considered it of more importance 
to observe his oath than to gratify the people contrary to what was 
right, or to seek safety against those who menaced him ; 19. for 
he thought that the gods paid regard to men, not in the way in 
which some people suppose, who imagine that the gods know some; 



•328 Kant 8 Ethics. % 1039 

things and do not know others, but he considered that the gods 
know all things, both what is said, what is done, amd what is 
meditated in silence, and are present every where, and give ad- 
monitions to men concerning every thing human. 

20. I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians were ever persuaded 
that Socrates had not right sentiments concerning the gods ; a man 
who never said or did anything impious toward the gods, but spoke 
and acted in such a manner with respect to them, that any other 
who had spoken and acted in the same manner, would have been, 
and have been considered, eminently pious. 

I., ii., 1. Jt also seems wonderful to me, that any should have 
been persuaded that Socrates corrupted the youth ; Socrates, who, 
in addition to what has been said of him, was not only the most 
rigid of all men in the government of his passions and appetites, 
but also most able to withstand cold, heat, and every kind of labor; 
and, besides, so inured to frugality, that, though he possessed very 
little, he very easily made it a sufficiency. 2. How, then, being of 
such a character himself, could he have rendered others impious, 
or lawless, or luxurious, or incontinent, or too effeminate to endure 
labor? On the contrary, he restrained many of them from such 
vices, leading them to love virtue, and giving them hopes, that if 
they would- take care of themselves, they would become honorable 
and worthy characters. 3. Not indeed that he ever professed to 
be an instructor in that way, but, b} T showing that he was himself 
such a character, he made those in his society hope that, by imitat- 
ing him, they would become such as he was. 

4. Of the body he was not neglectful, nor did he commend those 
who were. He did not approve that a person should eat to excess, 
and then use immoderate exercise, but recommended that he should 
work off, by a proper degree of exercise, as much as the appetite 
received with pleasure ; for such a habit, he said, was peculiarly 
conductive to health, and did not prevent attention to the mind. 
5. He was not, however, fine or ostentatious in his clothes or san- 
dals, or in any of his habits of life; yet he did not make those 
about him lovers of money,* for he checked them in this as well 
as other passions, and asked no remuneration from those who de- 
sired his company. (3. By refraining from such demand, he thought 
that he consulted his liberty, and called those who took money for 
their discourses their own enslavers, since they must of necessity 
hold discussions with those from whom they received pay. 7. He 
expressed wonder, too, that any one who professed to teach virtue, 

* Though he was not extravagant, he was not avaricious; nor had his cov- 
wersation a tendency to make others avaricious. 



§'1039 The Clavis to an Index. 329 

should demand money, and not think that he gained the greatest 
profit in securing a good friend, but fear that he whom he had 
anade an honorable and worthy character would not retain the 
greatest gratitude toward his greatest benefactor* 

9. "But assuredly," said the accuser, "he caused those who convers- 
ed with him to despise the established laws, by saying how foolish it 
was to elect the magistrates of a state by beans, f when nobody 
would be willing to take a pilot elected by beans, or an architect, 
or a flute-player, or a person in any other profession, which, if er- 
roneously exercised, would cause far less harm than errors in the 
administration of a state; " and declared that "such remarks ex- 
cited the young to contemn the established form of government, 
and disposed them to acts of violence." 10. But 1 think that 
young men who exercise their understanding, and expect to be- 
come capable of teaching their fellow-citizens what is for their inter- 
est, grow by no means addicted to violence, knowingthat on violence 
attend enmity and danger, but that, by persuasion, the same re- 
sults are attained without peril, and with good will ; for those who 
are compelled by us, hate us as if despoiled of something, while 
those who are persuaded by us, love us as if they had received a 
favor. It is not the part, therefore, of those who cultivate the in- 
tellect to use violence ; for to adopt such a course belongs to those 
who possess brute force without intellect. 11. Besides, he who 
would venture to use force, had need of no small number of allies, 
but he who can succeed with persuasion, has need of none, for, 
though left alone, he would think himself still able to persuade ; 
and it by no means belongs to such men to shed blood, for who 
would wish to put another man to death rather than to have him 
as a living subject persuaded to obey ? 

'12. "But," said the accuser, " Critias and Alcibiades, after hav- 
ing been associates of Socrates, inflicted a great number of evils on 
the state ; for Critias was the most avaricious and violent of all 
that composed the oligarchy, and Alcibiades was the most intem- 
perate, insolent, and turbulent of all those in the democracy." 
13. For whatever evil they did the state, I shall make no apology ; 
Taut as to their intimacy with Socrates, I will state how it took 
place. 14. These two men were by nature the most ambitious of 
all the Athenians, and wished that everything should be done by 
their means, and that they themselves should become the most 
celebrated of all men. But they knew that Socrates lived with the 
utmost contentment on very small means, that he was most abstin- 

* [I omit section 8.] t Black and white beans were used in voting for the 
magistrates at Athens. 

22 



330 Kant's Ethics. § 1039* 

ertt from every kind of pleasure, and that he swayed those with 
whom he conversed just as he pleased by his arguments ; 15. and, 
seeing such to be the case, and being such characters as they have 
just been stated to be, whether will any one say that they sought 
his society from a desire to lead such a life as Socrates led, and to 
practice such temperance as he practiced, or from an expectation 
that, if they associated with him, they would become eminently 
able to speak and act ? * 

17. Perhaps some one may observe on this point, that Socrates 
should not have taught his followers politics before he taught them 
self-control. To this remark 1 make no reply at present ;f but I 
see that all teachers make themselves examples to their pupils how 
far they pi i actice what they teach, and stimulate them by precepts ; 
18. and I know that Socrates made himself an example to those 
who associated with him as a man of honorable and excellent 
character, and that he discoursed admirably concerning virtue and 
other things that concern mankind. 1 know, too, that those men 
exercised self-control as long as they conversed with Socrates, not 
from fear lest they should be fined or beaten by him, but from a 
persuasion at the time that it was best to observe such conduct. 

19. Perhaps, however, many of those who profess to be philoso- 
phers, may say that a man once just, can never become unjust, or 
once modest, immodest ; and that, with regard to any other quali- 
fication (among such as can be taught), he who has once learned it 
can never become ignorant of it. But regarding such points 1 am 
not of that opinion ; for I see that as those who do not exercise 
the body can not perform what is proper to the body, so those 
who can not exercise the mind, can not perform what is proper to 
the mind; for they can neither do that which they ought to do, 
nor refrain from that from which they ought to refrain. 20. For, 
which reason fathers keep their sons, though they be of a virtuous 
disposition, from the society of bad men, in the belief that associa- 
tion with the good is an exercise of virtue, but that association 
with the bad is the destruction of it. One of the poets also bears, 
testimony to this truth, who says, u From good men you will learn 
what is good; but if you associate with the bad, you will lose the 
understanding which is in you."J|| 21. I also concur :§ for I see 

* [I omit section 16.] t Xenophon leaves this point for the present, in- 
tending to reply to it in IV., iii. — Kiiehner. % [Watson appends here a note- 
by Kuehner, of which the following is the greater part:] This distich is taken 
from Theognis [B. C. 54S-485] v. 35, 3«. That Socrates was fond of quoting 
it, appears-also from Xen. Symp. ii., 4, and Plato, Menon, p. 95, D; : '- : jf{T omit. 
the remainder of section 20.] g[I omit part of section 21 at this point.] 



§ 1039 The Glacis to an Index. 331 

that as people forget metrical compositions when they do not prac- 
tice the repetition of them, so forgetfulness of precepts of instruc- 
tion is produced in those who neglect them. But where a person 
forgets moral admonitions, he forgets also what the mind felt when 
it had a desire for self-government; and when be forgets this, it is not 
at all wonderful that he forgets self-government also.* 23. How is it 
impossible,then, that he who has once had a control over himself, may 
afterward cease to maintain it, and that he who was once able to ob- 
serve justice, may subsequently become unable? To me everything 
honorable and good seems to be maintained by exercise, and self- 
control not the least; for sensual desires, generated in the same 
body with the soul, are constantly exciting it to abandon self-con- 
trol, and to gratify themselves and the body as soon as possible. 

24. Critias and Alcibiades, then, as long as they associated with 
Socrates, were able, with the assistance of his example, to main- 
tain a mastery over their immoral inclinations ; but, when they 
were separated from him, Critias, fleeing to Thessaly, formed con- 
nections there with men who practiced dishonesty rather than jus- 
tice ; and Alcibiades also, being f corrupted by many men, who 
were well able to seduce him by their flattery, on account of his 
influence in the city and among the allies, and being also honored 
by the people, and easily obtaining the pre-eminence among them^. 
became like the wrestlers in the gymnastic games, who, when they 
are fairly superior to others, neglect their exercise; so he grew 
neglectful of self-control. 25. When such was their fortune, and. 
when they were proud of their birth, elated with their wealth, 
puffed up with their power, corrupted by many associates, demor- 
alized by all these means, and long absent from Socrates, what 
wonder is it if they became headstrong ? 26. And then, if they 
did any thing wrong, does the accuser blame Socrates for it ? and 
does Socrates seem to the accuser deserving of no praise, for hav- 
ing, when they were young, and when it is likely that they were 
most inconsiderate and intractable, rendered them discreet ? 27. 
Yet other affairs are not judged of in such a way ; for what flute- 
player, or what teacher of the harp, or what other instructor, if he 
produces competent pupils, and if they, attaching themselves to> 
other masters, become less skillful, is blamed for their deterioration ? 
Or what father, if his son, while he associated with one man, should 
be virtuous, but afterward, on uniting himself to some other per- 
son, should become vicious, would blame the former of the two ? 
would he not rather, the more corrupt his son became with the 
second, bestow the greater praise on the first ? Not even parents 

* [I omit section 22.] j[l omit a part of section 24 at this point.] 



332 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

themselves, when they have their sons in their society, are blamed 
if their sons do any thing wrong, provided they themselves are 
correct in their conduct. 28. In the same manner it would be riffht 
to judge of Socrates ; if he had done any thing immoral, he would 
justly be thought to be a bad man ; but if he constantly observed 
morality, how can he reasonably bear the blame of vice which was 
not in him?* 

47. When Alcibiades and Critias, therefore, began to think them- 
selves superior to those who were then governing the state, they 
no longer attended Socrates (for he was not agreeable to them in 
other respects, and they were offended, if they went to him at all, at 
being reproved for any error that they had committed), but devoted 
themselves to political employments, with a view to which they 
had at first associated with Socrates. 48. But Crito was also an 
attendant on Socrates, as well as Chserephon, Chaerecrates, Hermo 
•crates, Simmias, Cebes, and Phsedondes, who, with others that at- 
tended him, did not seek his society that they might be fitted for 
popular orators or forensic pleaders, but that, becoming honorable 
and good men, they might conduct themselves irreproachably to- 
ward their families, connections, dependents, and friends, as well 
as toward their country and their fellow-citizens ; and no one of 
;all these, whether in youth or at a more advanced age, either was 
guilty, or was accused, of any crime. 

49. "But Socrates," said the accuser, "taught children to show 
contempt for their parents, persuading his followers that he ren- 
dered them wiser than their fathers, and observing that a son was 
allowed by the law to confine his father on convicting him of being 
deranged, using that circumstance as an argument that it was law- 
ful for the more ignorant to be confined by the wiser." 50. But 
what Socrates said was, that he thought he who confined another 
for ignorance, might justly be himself confined by those who knew 
w T hat he did not know ; and, with a view to such cases, he used to 
consider in what respect ignorance differed from madness, and ex- 
pressed his opinion that madmen might be confined with advan- 
tage to themselves and their friends, but that those who did not 
know what they ought to know, might reasonably learn from 
those who did know. 

51. "But Socrates," proceeded the accuser, "not only caused 
parents, but other relations, to be held in contempt by his follow- 
ers, saying that relatives, as relatives, were of no profit to people 
who were si?k, or to people going to law, but that physicians aided 
Ihe one, and lawyers the other." 52. The accuser asserted, too, 

* [I omit sections 29-46.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 333 

that Socrates said concerning friends that "it was of no profit that 
they were well disposed, unless they were able also to assist ; and 
that he insisted that those only were deserving of honor who knew 
what was for the advantage of others, and could make it intelligi- 
ble to them ; and that by thus persuading the young that he him- 
self was the wisest of mankind, and most capable of making others 
wise, he so disposed his pupils toward him, that other people were 
of no account with them in comparison with himself." 53. I am 
aware, indeed, that he did express himself concerning parents and 
other relatives, and concerning friends, in such a manner as this : 
and used to say, besides, that when the soul has departed, in which 
alone intelligence exists, men take away the body of their dearest 
friend, and put it out of sight as soon as possible.* 55. But such 
observations Socrates uttered, not to teach any one of his followers 
to bury his father alive, or to cut himself to pieces, but, by show- 
ing that what is senseless is worthless, he exhorted each to study 
to become as intelligent and useful as possible, so that, whether he 
wished to be honored by his father, by his brother, or by any one 
else, he might not be neglectful of himself through trusting to his 
relationship, but might endeavor to be serviceable to those by 
whom he desired to be respected. 

56. The accuser also said that Socrates, selecting the worst pas- 
sages of the most celebrated poets, and using them as arguments, 
taught those who kept him company to be unprincipled and tyran- 
nical. The verse of Hesiod, for example, u Work is no disgrace, 
but idleness is a disgrace," they say that he used to explain as in- 
timating that the poet bids us abstain from no kind of work, dis- 
honest or dishonorable, but to do such work for the sake of profit. 
57. But when Socrates maintained that to be busy was useful and 
beneficial for a man, and that to be unemployed was noxious and 
ill for him, that to work was a good, and to be idle an evil, he at 
the same time observed that those only who do something good 
really work, and are useful workmen, j but those who gamble 
or do anything bad and pernicious, he called idle ; and in this view 
the sentiment of the poet will be unobjectionable. " Work is no 
disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace." 

58. That passage of Homer, too, the accuser stated that he often 
used to quote, in which (II., ii., 188, seqq.) it is said that Ulysses, 

Whatever king or eminent hero he found, 

Stood beside him, and detained him with gentle word? : 

" Illustrious chief, it is not fit that you should shrink back as a coward ; 

Sit down yourself, and make the rest of the people sit down." 

But whatever man of the people he noticed, and found clamoring, 

- [I omit section 54.] f Compare III., ix., 9, [below.] 



334 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

iHe struck him with his staff, and rebuked him with words : 
""Worthless fellow, sit down in peace, and hear the exhortations of others. 
Who are much better than you ; fir you are unwarlike and powerless, 
"Neither to be numbered in the field nor in the council." 

59. And he said that he used to explain it as if the poet recom- 
mended that plebeians and poor p>eople should be beaten. Socrates, 
however, said no such thing (for he would thus have given an 
opinion that he himself ought to be beaten), but what he did say 
was, that those who benefited others neither byword nor deed, 
and who were incapable of serving the army, or the state, or the 
common people, if they should ever be called upon to serve, should- 
especially if, in addition to their incapacity, they were of an in- 
solent spirit, be curbed in every way, even though they might be 
ever so rich. 60. But, contrary to the charge of the accuser, Soc- 
rates was evidently a friend to the common people, and of a liberal 
disposition ; for though he received numbers of persons desirous 
to hear him discourse, as well citizens as foreigners, he never re- 
quired payment for his communications from any one, but imparted 
to every one in abundance from his stores, of which some* receiv- 
ing fragments from him for nothing, sold them at a great price to 
others, and were not, like him, friends to the common people, for 
they declined to converse with such as had not money to give them. 
•61. But Socrates, in the eyes of other men, conferred glory on the 
city, far more than Lichas, who was celebrated in this respect, on 
that of the Lacedaemonians ; for Lichas indeed entertained the 
strangers that visited Lacedsemon at the G-ymnopsedias, but Socra- 
tes through the whole course of his life freely imparted whatever 
he had to bestow, and thus benefited in the highest degree all who 
were willing to receive from him, making those who associated with 
him better before he let them go. 

62. To me, therefore, Socrates, being a man of such a character, 
appeared to be worthy of honor rather than of death ; and any 
one, considering his case according to the laws, would find such to 
be the fact ; for, by the laws, death is the punishment for a man if 
he be found stealing, or stripping people of their clothes, or cutting 
purses, or housebreaking, or kidnapping, or sacrilege, of which 
crimes Socrates was the most innocent of all men. 63. Nor was 
he ever the cause of any war ending unfortunately for the state, or 
of any sedition or treachery ; nor did he ever, in his private trans- 
actions, either deprive any man of what was for his good, or in- 
volve him in evil ; nor did he ever lie under suspicion of any of 
the crimes which I have mentioned. 

* Xenophon alludes to other hearers of Socrates, but especially to Aristippus, 
who was the first of the Socratic philosophers that taught for hire. — Ruhnken. 
See Diog. Laert., ii., 65. 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 835 

64. How then could he have been guilty of the charges brought 
against him ? a man who, instead of not acknowledging the gods, as 
^vvas stated in the indictment, evidently paid respect to the gods 
more than other men ; and instead of corrupting the youth, as the 
accuser laid to his charge, plainly led such of his associates as had 
vicious inclinations, to cease from indulging them, and exhorted 
them to cherish a love of that most honorable and excellent virtue, 
by which men successfully govern states and families. How then, 
pursuing such a course of conduct, was he not deserving of great 
honor from the city ? 

I., iii., 1 But to show how he appeared to improve those who as- 
sociated with him, partly by showing them what his character was, 
and partly by his conversation, I shall record whatever I can re- 
member of him relating to these points. 

As to what had reference to the gods, then, he evidently acted 
and spoke in conformity with the answer which the priestess of 
Apollo gives to those who inquire how they ought to proceed with 
regard to a sacrifice, to the worship of their ancestors, or to any 
such matter ; for the priestess replies that they will act piously, if they 
act in agreement with the laic of their country; and Socrates both 
acted in this manner himself, and exhorted others to act similarly; 
and such as acted in any other way he regarded as doing what was 
not to the purpose, and guilty of folly. 

2. To the gods he simply prayed that they would give him good 
things, as believing that the gods knew best what things are good: and 
those who prayed for gold, or silver, or dominion, or' any thing of 
that kind, he considered to utter no other sort of requests than if 
they were to pray that they might play at dice, or fight, or do 
any thing else of which it is. quite uncertain what the result 
will be. 

3. When he offered small sacrifices from his small means, he 
thought that he was not at all inferior in merit to those who offered 
numerous and great sacrifices from ample and abundant means ; 
for he said that it would not become the gods to delight in large 
rather than in small sacrifices ; since, if such were the case, the of- 
ferings of the bad would oftentimes be more acceptable to them 
than those of the good ; nor would life be of any account in the 
eyes of men, if oblations from the bad were better received by 
the gods than oblations from the good ; but he thought that the 
gods had most pleasure in the offerings of the most pious. He 
also used to quote, with approbation, the verse, "Perform sacrifices 
to the gods according to your ability,"* and used to say that it was 

«[Cf. St. Paul (II. Cor., viii., 12); Khordah-Avesta, xli. (page 201, above.) 
See Book IV., chapter iii., section 16, below.] 



336 Kant's Ethics. § 1039* 

a good exhortation to men, with regard to friends, and guests, and 
all other relations of life, to perform according to their ability. 

4. If anything appeared to be intimated to him from the gods,. 
he could no more have been persuaded to act contrary to such in- 
timation, than any one could have persuaded him to take for hi& 
guide on a journey a blind man, or one who did not know the way,, 
instead of one who could see, and did know it ; and he condemned, 
the folly of others, who act contrary to what is signified by the 
gods, through anxiety to avoid the ill opinion of men. As for 
himself, he undervalued every thing human, in comparison with 
counsel from the gods. 

5. He disciplined his mind and body by such a course of lifer 
that he who should adopt a similar one, would, if no supernatural 
influence prevented, live in good spirits and uninterrupted health; 
nor would he ever be in want of the necessary expenses for it. So 
frugal was he, that I do not know whether any one could earn so 
little by the labor of his hands, as not to procure sufficient to have 
satisfied Socrates. He took only so much food as he could eat with 
a keen relish ; and, to this end, he came to his meals so disposed 
that the appetite for his meat was the sauce to it. Every kind of 
drink was agreeable to him, because he never drank unless he was 
thirsty. 6. If he ever complied with an invitation to go to a feast,. 
he very easily guarded, what is extremely difficult to most men, 
against loading his stomach to excess. Those who were unable to 
do so, he advised to be cautious of taking any thing that would 
stimulate them to eat when they were not hungry, and to drink 
when they were not thirsty : for he said that those were the things 
that disordered the stomach, the head and the mind.* • 

I., iv., 1. But if airy suppose that Socrates, as some write and 
speak of him on conjecture, was excellently qualified to exhort 
men to virtue, but incapable of leading them forward in it, let them 
consider not only what he said in refutation, by questioning, of 
those who thought that they knew everything (refutations intended 
to check the progress of those disputants), but what he used to say- 
in his daily intercourse with his associates, and then form an. 
opinion whether he was capable of making those who conversed 
with him better. 2. I will first mention what I myself once heard 
him advance in a dialogue with Aristodemus, surnamed The Little, f 
concerning the gods; for having heard that Aristodemus neither- 
sacrificed to the gods, nor prayed to them, nor. attended to auguries,, 
but ridiculed those who regarded such matters, he said to him,, 

* [I omit sections 7-15.] f An Athenian whom Plato names in his Sympos- 
ium, a constant auditor of Socrates, and a man of much austerity." — Schneider.. 



§ 1039 The Clams to an Index. 337 

" Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any men for their genius?"' 
*' I do," replied he. " Tell us their names, then," said Socrates. 3.. 
" In epic poetry 1 most admire Homer, in dithyrambic Melanip- 
pides, in tragedy Sophocles, in statuary Polycletus, in painting 
Zeuxis." 4. "And whether do those who form images without 
sense and motion, or those who form animals endowed with; 
sense and vital energy, appear to you the more worthy of ad- 
miration? " " Those who form animals,* for they are not produced 
by chance, but by understanding." '-And regarding things of 
which it is uncertain for what purpose they exist, and those evi- 
dently existing for some useful purpose, which of the two would you 
say were the productions of chance, and which of intelligence?" 
" Doubtless those which exist for some useful purpose must be the 
productions of intelligence." 5. "Does not he, then," proceeded 
Socrates, " who made men at first, appear to you to have given 
them, for some useful purpose, those parts by which they perceive 
different objects, the eyes to see what is to be seen, the ears to hear 
what is to be heard ? What would be the use of smells, if no nos- 
trils had been assigned us ? What perception would there have 
been of sweet and sour, and of all that is pleasant to the mouth, if 
a" tongue had not been formed in it to have a sense of them? 6. 
In addition to these things, does it not seem to you like the work 
of forethought, to guard the eye, since it is tender, with eyelids,, 
like doors, which, when it is necessary to use the sight, are set 
open, but in sleep are closed ? To make the ej-elashes grow as a 
screen, that winds may not injure it ? To make a coping on the 
parts above the eyes with the eye-brows, that the perspiration from 
the head may not annoy them? To provide that the ears may re- 
ceive all kinds of sounds, yet never be obstructed ?f — can you doubt 
whether such a disposition of things, made thus apparently with 
attention, is the result of chance or of intelligence?" 7. "No, in- 
deed," replied Aristodemus, " but to one who looks at those matters 
in this light, they appear like the work of some wise maker who 
studied the welfare of animals ? "J 

8. "And do you think that you yourself have any portion of in- 
telligence?" " Question me, at least, and I will answer." "And 
can you suppose that nothing intelligent exists any where else ? 
When you know that you have in your body but a small portion 
of the earth, which is vast, and a small portion of the water, 
which is vast, and that your frame is constituted for you 
to receive only a small portion of each of other things, that, 

* [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] t [I omit part of section 6, at this- 
point.]:" ± [Iomit the remainder of section 77] 



338 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

are vast, do you think that you have seized for yourself, by some 
extraordinary good fortune, intelligence alone which exists nowhere 
■else, and that this assemblage of vast bodies, countless in 
number, is maintained in order by some thing void of reason ? " 9.* 
*" 1 do not see the directors, as I see the agent of things which are 
done here." " Nor do you see your own soul, which is the director 
of your body; so that, by like reasoning, you may say that you 
yourself do nothing with understanding, but every thing by 
chance." 

10. "However, Socrates," said Aristodemus, "1 do not despise the 
gods, but consider them as too exalted to need my attention." 
" But," said Socrates, " the more exalted they are, while they 
deign to attend to you, the more ought you to honor them." 11. 
•" Be assured," replied Aristodemus, "that if I believed the gods 
took any thought for men, I would not neglect them." "Do you 
not, then, believe that the gods take thought for men ? the gods 
who, in the first place, have made man alone, of all animals, up- 
Tight (WHICH UPRIGHTNESS ENABLES HIM TO LOOK FORWARD TO A 
GREATER DISTANCE, AND TO CONTEMPLATE BETTER WHAT IS ABOVE, 

and renders those parts less liable to injury in which the gods have 
placed the eyes, and ears, and mouth) ; and in the next place, have 
given to other animals only feet, which merely give them the ca- 
pacity of walking, while to men they have added hands, which ex- 
ecute most of those things through which we are better off than 
they. 12. And though all animals have tongues, they have made 
that of man alone of such a nature, as by touching sometimes one 
part of the mouth, and sometimes another, to express articulate 
sounds, and to signify everything that we wish to communicate 
•one to another. f 13. Nor did it satisfy the gods to take care of 
the body merely, but, what is most important of all, they implanted 
in him the soul, his most excellent part. For what other animal 
has a soul to understand, first of all, that the gods, who have ar- 
ranged such a vast and noble order of things, exist ? What other 
species of animal, besides man, offers worship to the gods ? What 
other animal has a mind better fitted than that of man, to 
guard against hunger or thirst, or cold or heat, or to relieve dis- 
ease, or to acquire strength by exercise, or to labor to obtain 
knowledge ; or more capable of remembering whatever it has 
heard, or seen, or learned? 14. Is it not clearly evident to you, 
Hiat in comparison with other animals, men live like gods, excel- 
ling them by nature, both in body and mind ? For an animal, 
.having the body of an ox, and the understanding of a man, would 

* [I omit the first part of section 9.] j [ omit the remainder of section 12.] 



§ 1039 The Claris to an Index. 339 

be unable to execute what it might meditate ; and animals which 
have hands,* but are without reason, have no advantage over others; 
and do you, who share both these excellent endowments, think 
that the gods take no thought for you ? What then must they do, 
before you will think that they take thought for you?" 15. "I 
will think so," observed Aristodemus, '-when they send me, as you 
say that they send to you, monitors, to show what I ought, and 
what I ought not, to do." '• But when they send admonitions to 
the Athenians, on consulting them by divination, do you not think 
that they admonish you also ? Or when they give warnings to the 
Greeks by sending portents, or when they give them to the whole 
human race, do they except you alone from the whole, and utterly 
neglect you? 16 Do you suppose, too, that the gods would have 
engendered a persuasion in men that they are able to benefit or in- 
jure them, unless they were really able to do so, and that men, if 
they had been thus perpetually deluded, would not have become 
sensible of the delusion ? Do you not see that the oldest and wisest 
of human communities, the oldest and wisest cities and nations, 
are the most respectful to the gods, and that the wisest age of man 
is the most observant of their worship ? 17. Consider also, my 
good youth," continued Socrates, ',' that your mind, existing within 
your body, directs your body as it pleases; and it becomes you 
therefore to believe that the intelligence pervading all things directs 
all things as may be agreeable to it, and not to think that while 
your eye can extend its sight over many furlongs, that of the di- 
vinity f is unable to see all things at once, or that while your mind 
can think of things here, or things in Egypt or Sicily, the mind of 
the deity is incapable of regarding every thing at the same time. 
18. If, however, as you discover, by paying court to men, those 
who are willing to pay court to' you in return, and, by doing favors 
to men, those who are willing to return your favors, and as, by 
asking counsel of men, you discover who are wise, you should, in 
like manner, make trial of the gods by offering worship to them, 
whether they will advise you concerning matters hidden from man, 
you will then find that the divinity is of such power, and of such 
a nature, as to see all things and hear all things at once, to be pres- 
ent every where, and to have a care for all things at the same 
time. 

* Apes have hands resembling those of men, bat are not on that account 
equal to men in ability. — Schneider. | Xenophon sometimes makes (Socrates 
use the singular in speaking of the gods. But it is not hence to bo inferred 
that he insinuated that there was only one god; for the Greeks frequently used 
the singular when they might have been expected to use the plural. Compare 
IV., iii., 14. 



340 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

19. By delivering such sentiments, Socrates seems to me to have 
led his associates to refrain from what was impious, or unjust, or 
dishonorable, not merely when they were seen by men, but when 
they were in solitude, since they would conceive that nothing that 
they did would escape the knowledge of the gods. 

BOOK I., Chapter V., §1. If temperance, moreover, be an 
honorable and valuable quality in a man, let us consider whether 
he at all promoted its observance by reflections of the following 
kind concerning it. " If, my friends, when a war was coming 
upon us, we should wish to choose a man by whose exertions we 
might ourselves be preserved, and might gain the mastery over our 
enemies, should we select one whom we knew to be unable to re- 
sist gluttony, or wine, or sensuality, or fatigue, or sleep? How 
could we think that such a man would either serve us, or conquer 
our adversaries ? 2. Or if, being at the close of life, we should 
wish to commit to any one the guardianship of our sons, or the 
care of our unmarried daughters, or the preservation of our prop- 
erty, should we think an intemperate man worthy of confidence 
for such purposes ? Should we intrust to an intemperate slave our 
herds, our granaries, or the superintendence of our agriculture ? 
Should we be willing to accept such a slave as an agent, or pur- 
veyor, even for nothing ? 3. But if we would not even accept an 
intemperate slave, how can it be otherwise than important for 
every man to take care that he himself does not become such a 
character? For the intemperate man is not injurious to his neigh- 
bor and profitable to himself (like the avaricious, who, by despoil- 
ing others of their property, seem to enrich themselves), but, while 
he is mischievous to others, is still more mischievous to himself, for 
it is, indeed, mischievous in the highest degree, to ruin not only 
his family, but his body and mind. 4. In society, too, who could 
find pleasure in the company of such a man, who, he would be 
aware, felt more delight in eating and drinking than in intercourse 
with his friends, and preferred the company of harlots to that of 
his fellows? Is it not the duty of every man to consider that tem- 
perance is the foundation of every virtue, and to establish the ob- 
servance of it in his mind before all things? 5. For who, without 
it, can either learn any thing good, or sufficiently practice it ? 
Who, that is a slave to pleasure, is not in an ill condition both as 
to his body and his mind?"* 

6. While such were the remarks that he made, he proved him- 
self more a friend to temperance by his life than by his words ; 
for he was not only superior to all corporeal pleasures, but also to 

* [I omit the remainder of section 5.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 341 

those attendent on the acquisition of money ; thinking that he 
wdio received money from any one * set up a master over himself, 
.and submitted to a slavery as disgraceful as any that could be. 

I., vi., 1. It is due to Socrates, also, not to omit the dialogues 
•which he held with Antipho the sophist. Antipho, on one occasion, 
vrishing to draw away his associates from him, came up to Socrates 
when they were present, and said, 2. " I thought, Socrates, that 
those who studied philosophy were to become happier than other 
men ; but you seem to have reaped from philosophy fruits of an 
opposite kind ; at least you live in a way in which no slave would 
-continue to live with his master ; you eat food, and drink drink, 
of the worst kind ; you wear a dress, not only bad, but the same 
both summer and winter, and you continue shoeless and coatless.f 
3. Money, which cheers men when they receive it, and enables 
those who possess it to live more generously and pleasantly, you 
do not take ; and if, therefore, as teachers in other professions 
make their pupils imitate themselves, you also shall produce a 
similar effect on your followers, you must consider yourself but a 
teacher of wretchedness." 4. Socrates, in reply to these remarks, 
said, " You seem to me, Antipho, to have conceived a notion that 1 
live so wretchedly, that I feel persuaded you yourself would rather 
choose to die than pass your life as I pass mine. Let us then con- 
sider what it is that you find disagreeable in my mode of life. 5. 
Is it that while others, who receive money, must perform the ser- 
vice for which they receive it. while I, who receive none, am under 
no necessity to discourse with any one that I do not like ? Or do 
you despise my way of living, on the supposition that I eat less 
wholesome or less strengthening food than yourself? Or is it that 
my diet is more difficult to procure than yours, as being more rare 
and expensive ? Or is it that what you procure for yourself is 
more agreeable to you than what I provide for myself is to me ? 
Do you not know that he who eats with the most pleasure is he 
who less requires sauce, and that he who drinks with the 
greatest pleasure is he who least desires other drink than 
that which he has? 6. You know that those who change 
their clothes, change them because cf cold and heat, and 
that men put on sandals that they may not be prevented from 
walking through annoyances to the feet ; but have you ever ob- 
served me remaining at home, on account of cold, more than any 
•other man, or fighting with any one for shade because of heat, 

* From any one that happened to present himself: from any one indis- 
criminately, t He wore onlj the inner tunic, not having the upper [it is here 
stated in a mote from Ernesti]. 



3-tt Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

or not walking wherever I please because my feet suffer? 7. 
Do you not know that those who are by nature the weakest, be- 
come, by exercising their bodies, stronger in those things in which 
they exercise them, than those who neglect them, and bear the 
fatigue of exercise with greater ease ? And do you not think that 
I, who am constantly preparing my body by exercise to endure 
whatever may happen to it, bear everything more easily than you 
who take no exercise ? 8. And to prevent me from being a slave 
to gluttony, or sleep, or other animal gratifications, can you imagine 
any cause more efficient than having other objects of attention 
more attractive than they, which not only afford pleasure in the 
moment of enjoying them, but give hopes that they will benefit me 
perpetually ? You are aware of this also, that those who think them- 
selves successful in nothing, are far from being cheerful, but that 
those who regard their agriculture, their seamanship, or whatever 
other occupation they pursue, as goingon favorably for them, are de- 
lighted as with present success ? 9. But do you think that from 
all these gratifications so much pleasure can arise as from the con 
sciousness that you are growing better yourself, and are acquiring 
more valuable friends ? Such is the consciousness, then, which I 
continue to enjoy. 

"But if there should be occasion to assist our friends or our 
country, which of the two would have most leisure to attend to 
such objects, he who lives as I live now, or he who lives, as you 
think, in happiness? Which of the two would most readily seek 
the field of battle, he who can not exist without expensive dishes, 
or he who is content with whatever comes before him ? Which 
of the two would sooner be reduced by a siege, he who requires 
what is most difficult to be found, or he who is fully content with 
what is easiest to be met with? 10. You, Antipho, seem to think 
that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance; but I think 
that to want nothing is to resemble the gods, and that to want as 
little as possible is to make the nearest approach to the gods ; that 
the Divine nature is perfection, and that to be nearest to the Divine 
nature is to be nearest to perfection."* 

I., vii., 1. Let us consider also, whether, by dissuading his 
followers from ostentation, he excited them to pursue virtue. He 
always used to say that there was no better road to honorable 
distinction, than that by which a person should become excellent in 
that in which he wished to appear excellent. 

2. That he said w T hat was just, he used to prove by the following 
arguments: "Let us consider," he would say,' "what a person 

* [I emit sections 11-15.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index.' 343 

must do, if, not being a good flute-player, he should wish to appear- 
so ? Must he not imitate good flute -players in the adjuncts of their 
art? In the first place, as flute-players procure fine dresses, and 
go about with a great number o± attendants, he must act in a sim- 
ilar manner ; and as many people applaud them, he must get many 
to applaud him ; yet he must never attempt to play, or he will 
at once be shown to be ridiculous, and not only a bid flute- player, 
but a vain boaster. Thus, after having been at great expense 
without the least benefit, and having, in addition, incurred evil re- 
pute, how will he live otherwise than in uneasiness, unprofitable- 
ness, and derision? 

3. "In like manner, if any one should wish to be thought a good 
general, or a good steersman of a ship, without being so, let us re- 
flect what would be his success. If, when he longed to seem capa- 
ble of performing the duties of those characters, he should be un- 
able to persuade others of his capability, would not this be a 
trouble to him? and, if he should persuade them of it, would it. 
not be still more unfortunate for him ? For it is evident that he 
who is appointed to steer a vessel, or to lead an army, without 
having the necessary knowledge, would be likely to destroy those 
whom he would not wish to destroy, and would come off himself 
with disgrace and suffering." 

4. By similar examples he showed that it was of no profit for a 
man to appear rich, or valiant, or strong, without being so ; for he 
said that demands were made upon such persons too great for their 
abilit} 7 , and that, not being able to comply with them, when they 
seemed to be able, they met with no indulgence. 

5. He called him, also, no small impostor^ who, obtaining money 
or furniture from his neighbor by persuasion, should defraud him ; 
but pronounced him the greatest of all imposters, who, possessed 
of no valuable qualifications, should deceive men by representing 
himself capable of governing his country. To me he appeared, 
by discoursing in this manner, to deter his associates from vain 
boasting. 

BOOK II., chapter i.. § 1. He appeared also to me, by such 
discourses as the following, to exhort his hearers to practice tem- 
perance in their desires for food, drink, sensual gratification, and 
sleep, and endurance of cold, heat, and labor. But finding that 
one of his associates was too in temperately disposed with regard 
to such matters, he said to him, " Tell me, Aristippus,* if it were 

® Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaic sect of philosophers, 
who thought pleasure the greatest good, and pain the greatest evil. See b. III., 
ch. viii. 



344 Kant's Ethics. % 1039 

required of you to take two of our youths and educate them, the 
one in such a manner that he would be qualified to govern, and 
the other in such a manner that he would never seek to govern, 
bow would you train them respectively? Will you allow us to 
consider the matter by commencing with their food, as with the 
first principles ? " " Food, indeed," replied Aristippus, " appears 
to me one of the first principles; for a person could not even live 
if he were not to take food," 2. " It will be natural for them both, 
then," said Socrates, " to desire to partake of food when a certain 
hour comes." " It will be natural," said Aristippus. "And which 
of the two, then," said Socrates, ''should we accustom to prefer the 
discharge of any urgent business to the gratification of his ap- 
petite?" "The one, undoubtedly," rejoined Aristippus, " who is 
trained to rule, that the business of the state may not be neglected 
during his administration." "And on the same person," continued 
Socrates, " we must, when they desire to drink, impose the duty 
of being able to endure thirst? " "Assuredly/' replied Aristippus. 
3. "And on which of the two should we lay the necessity of being 
temperate in sleep, so as to be able to go to rest late, to rise early, 
or to remain awake if it should be necessary? " "Upon the same, 
doubtless." "And on which of the two should we impose the ob- 
ligation to control his sensual appetites, that he may not be hin- 
dered by their influence from discharging whatever duty may be 
required of him ? " "Upon the same." "And on which of the 
two should we enjoin the duty of not shrinking from labor, but 
willingly submitting to it ? " " This also, is to be enjoined on him 
who is trained to rule." "And to which of the two would it more 
properly belong to acquire whatever knowledge would assist him 
to secure the mastery over his rivals ? " " Far more, doubtless, to 
him who is trained to govern, for without such sort of acquire- 
ments there would be no profit in any of his other qualifications."* 
6.. "And since the greater part of the most necessary employments 
of life, such as those of war and agriculture, and not a few others, 
are to be carried on in the open air, does it not appear to you to 
show great negligence, that the majority of mankind should be 
wholly unexercised to bear cold and heat ? " Aristippus replied in 
the affirmative. " Does it not then appear to you that we ought 
to train him who is intended to rule, to bear these inconveniences 
also without difficulty ? " " Doubtless," answered Aristippus. 7. 
•" If. therefore, we class those capable of enduring these things 
among those who are qualified to govern, shall w T e not . class such 
as are incapable of enduring them among those who will not even 

* [I omit sections 4 and 5.] 



§ 1039 The Claris to cm Index. 345 

aspire to govern ? " Aristippus expressed his assent. "In con- 
clusion, then, since you know the position of each of these classes 
of men, have you ever considered in which of them you can rea- 
sonably place yourself? " 8. " I have indeed," said Aristippus, 
"and I by no means place myself in the class of those desiring to 
rule ; for it appears to me that, when it is a task of gi'eat difficulty 
to procure necessaries for one's self, it is the mark of a very foolish 
man not to be satisfied with that occupation, but to add to it the 
labor of procuring for his fellow-countrymen whatever they need. 
And is it not the greatest folly in him, that while many things 
which he desires are out of his reach, he should, by setting him- 
self at the head of the state, subject himself, if he does not accom- 
plish all that the people desire, to be punished for his failure ? 9. 
For the people think it right to use their governors as I use my 
slaves ; for I require my slaves to supply me with the necessaries 
of life in abundance, but to take no part of them themselves; and 
the people think it the duty of their governors to supply them 
with as many enjoyments as possible, but themselves to abstain 
from all of them. Those, therefore, who wish to have much 
trouble themselves, and to give trouble to others* I would train in 
this manner, and rank among those qualified to govern ; but my- 
self I would number with those who wish to pass their lives in the 
greatest possible ease and pleasure." 

10. Socrates then said, " Will you allow us to consider this point 
also, whether the governors or the governed live with the greater 
pleasure? ' " By all means,'" said Aristippus. " In the first place, 
then, of the nations of which we have any knowledge, the Per- 
sians bear rule in Asia, and the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians 
are under subjection ; the Scythians govern in Europe, and the 
Maeotianst are held in subjection ; the Carthaginians rule in Africa, 
and the Libyans are under subjection. Which of these do you re- 
gard as living with the greater pleasure ? Or among the Greeks, 
of whom you yourself are, which of the two appear to you to live 
more happily, those who rule, or those who are in subjection? " 
11. " Yet, on the other hand,"| said Aristippus, " I do not consign 
. . % 

* He that holds the reins of government, must not only undergo much toil 
and trouble himself, but must also enjoin many tasks and duties on others, and 
incite them to exertion and industry. [I omit the remainder of this note, at 
the end of which Mr. Watson appends the name of] — Kuehner. t The people 
bordering on the lake Maeotis, which was in Sarmatia Europffia, and is now 
called the sea of Azov. — Kuehner. i Compare section 8, where Aristippus 
says that he does not rank himself among those who wish to rule; here he states 
that, on the other hand, he does not wish to be a slave. 

23 



B46 Kant's Ethics. § 103:0 

myself to slavery ; but there appears to me to be a certain middle 
path between the two, in which I endeavor to proceed, and which 
leads, not through slavery, but through liberty, a path that most 
surely conducts to happiness." 12. " If this path of yours, in- 
deed," said Socrates, " as it lies neither through sovereignty nor 
servitude, did not also lie through human society, what you say 
would perhaps be worth consideration ; but if, while living among 
mankind, you shall neither think proper to rule nor to be ruled, 
and shall not willingly pay respect to those in power, I think that 
you will see that the stronger know how to treat the weaker as 
slaves, making them to lament both publicly and privately. 13. 
Do those escape your. knowledge who fell and destroy the corn and 
trees of others that have sown and planted them, and who assail 
in every way such as are inferior to them, and are unwilling to 
natter them, until they prevail on them to prefer slavery to carry- 
ing on war against their superiors? In private life, too, do you 
not see that the spirited and strong enslave the timorous and weak, 
and enjoy the fruits of their labors?" "But for my part," an- 
swered Aristippus, " in order that I may not suffer such treatment, 
I shall not shut myself up in any one state, but shall be a traveler 
-everywhere." 14. " Doubtless," rejoined Socrates, " this is an ad- 
mirable plan that you propose ; for since Sinnis, and Sciron, and 
Procrustes* were killed, nobody injures travelers. Yet those who 
manage the government in their several countries, even now make 
laws, in order that they may not be injured, and attach to them- 
. selves, in addition to such as are called their necessary connections, 
other supporters ; they also surround their cities with ramparts, 
and procure weapons with which they may repel aggressors, secur- 
ing, besides all these means of defense, other allies from abroad; 
and yet those who have provided themselves with all these bul- 
warks, nevertheless suffer injury ; 15. and do you, having no pro- 
tection of the sort, spending a long time on roads on which a very 
great number are outraged, weaker than all the inhabitants of 
whatever city you may arrive at, and being such a character! as 
those who are eager to commit violence most readily attack, think, 
nevertheless, that you will not be wronged because you are a 
stranger ? Or are you without fear, because these cities proclaim 

^Celebrated robbers, put to death by Theseus. This is a pleasant irony, says 
Weiske, in the remark of Socrates: though Sinnis, Sciron, and Procrustes no 
longer rob on the highways, yet there is no lack of successors to them, t A per- 
son without any settled abode, without friends or supporters: not under the pro- 
tection of any particular state, but wandering from one state to another. — 
Kuehner. 



§ 1039 The -Clams to an Index. 847 

safety to any one arriving or departing? Or because you think 
that you would prove a slave of such a character as would profit 
no master, for who, you perhaps ask yourself, would wish to keep 
in his house a man not at all disposed to labor, and delighting in 
the most expensive fare? 16. But let us consider how masters 
treat slaves of such a sort. Do they not tame down their fondness 
for dainties by hunger ? Do they not hinder them from stealing 
by excluding them from every place from whence they may take 
anything? Do they not prevent them from running away by 
putting fetters on them ? Do they not overcome their laziness 
with stripes? Or how do you yourself act, when you find any 
one of your slaves to be of such a disposition ? " 17. " I chastise 
him," said Aristippus, "with every kind of punishment, until I 
compel him to serve me. But how do those. Socrates, who are 
trained to the art of ruling, which you seem to me to consider as 
happiness, differ from those who undergo hardships from necessity, 
since they will have (though it be with their own consent) to en- 
dure hunger, and thirst, and cold, and want of sleep, and suffer all 
other inconveniences of the same kind? 18. For I, for my own 
part, do not know what difference it makes to a man who is 
scourged on the same skin, whether it be voluntarily or involun- 
tarily, or, in short, to one who suffers with the same body in all 
such points, whether he suffer with his consent or against it, ex- 
cept that folly is to be attributed to him who endures troubles vol- 
untarily." " What then. Aristippus," said Socrates, k ' do not vol- 
untary endurances of this kind seem to you to differ from the in- 
voluntary, inasmuch as he who is hungry from choice may eat 
when he pleases, and he who is thirsty from choice may drink 
when he pleases, the same beingthe case with regard to other vol- 
untary sufferings, while he who endures such hardships from 
necessity has no liberty to relieve himself from them when he 
wishes? Besides, he who undergoes trouble willingly, is cheered 
in undergoing it with some expectation of good, as the hunters of 
wild animals bear fatigue with pleasure in the hope of capturing 
them. 19. And such rewards of toil are indeed but of small 
worth ; but as for those who toil that they may acquire valuable 
friends, or that they may subdue their enemies, or they may, by 
becoming vigorous in body and mind, manage their own house- 
hold judiciously, and be of service to their friends and of advan- 
tage to their country, how can you think that they labor for such 
objects otherwise than cheerfully, or that they do not live in happi- 
ness, esteeming themselves, and being praised and envied by others? 
20. But indolence, moreover, and pleasures enjoyed at the moment 



348 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

of desire, are neither capable of producing a good constitution of 
body, as the teachers of gymnastic exercises say, nor do they bring 
to the mind any knowledge worthy of consideration ; but exer- 
cises pursued with persevering labor lead men to the attainment 
of honorable and valuable objects, as worthy men inform us ; and 
Hesiod somewhere says, 'Vice it is possible to find in abundance 
and with ease; for the way to it is smooth, and lies very near. 
But before the temple of Virtue the immortal gods have placed 
labor, and the way to it is long and steep, and at the commence- 
ment rough ; but when the traveler has arrived at the summit, it 
then becomes easy, however difficult it was at first.' A sentiment 
to which Epicharmus gives his testimony in this verse, ' The gods 
for labor sell us all good things ; ' and in another place he says, 
O wretched mortal, desire not what is soft, lest you find what is 
hard.' 

21. " Prodicus the sophist, also, in his narrative concerning Her- 
cules, which indeed he declaims to most people as a specimen of 
his ability, expresses a similar notion respecting virtue, speaking, 
as far as I remember, to the following effect : For he says that Her- 
cules, when he was advancing from boyhood to manhood, a period 
at which the young, becoming their own masters, begin to give 
intimations whether the} 7 will enter on life by the path of virtue 
or that of vice, went fevrth into a solitary place, and sat down, per- 
plexed as to which of these two paths he should pursue ; 22. and 
that two female figures, of lofty stature, seemed to advance toward 
him, the one of an engaging and graceful mien, gifted by nature 
with elegance of form, modesty of look, and sobriety of demeanor, 
and clad in a white robe ; the other fed to plumpness and softness,. 
but assisted by art both in her complexion, so as to seem fairer and 
rosier than she really was, and in her gesture, so as to seem taller 
than her natural height.* 23. As they approached nearer to Her- 
cules, she whom I first described came forward at the same pace, 
but the other, eager to get before her, ran up to Hercules, and ex- 
claimed, 'I see that you are hesitating, Hercules, by what path you 
shall enter upon life ; if, then, you make a friend of me, I will 
conduct you by the most delightful and easy road, and you shall 
taste of every species of pleasure, and lead a life free from every 
sort of trouble. 24. In the first place, you shall take no thought 
of wars or state affairs, but shall pass your time considering what 
meat or drink you may find to gratify your appetite, what you 
may delight yourself by seeing or hearing, what you may be 
pleased with smelling or touching, with what objects of affection 

* [I omit the remainder ot section 22.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 349 

you may have most pleasure in associating, how you may sleep 
most softly, and how you may secure all these enjoyments with 
the least degree of trouble. 25. If an apprehension of want of 
means, by which such delights may be obtained, should ever arise 
in you, there is no fear that I shall urge you to procure them by 
toil or suffering either of body or mind ; but you shall enjoy what 
others acquire by labor, abstaining from nothing by which it may 
be possible to profit, for I give my followers liberty to benefit 
themselves from any source whatever.' 

26. " Hercules, on hearing this address, said, 'And what, O 
woman, is your name ? ' 'My friends,' she replied, 'call me Hap- 
piness, but those who hate me, give me, to my disparagement, the 
name of Vice.' 

27. " In the mean time the other female approached, and said, 
* I also am come to address you, Hercules, because I know your 
parents, and have observed your disposition in the training of your 
childhood, from which I entertain hopes that, if you direct your 
steps along the path that leads to my dwelling, you will become an 
excellent performer of whatever is honorable and noble, and that I 
shall appear more honorable and attractive through your illus- 
trious deeds. I will not deceive you, however, with promises of 
pleasure, but will set before you things as they really are, and as 
the gods have appointed them; 28. for of what is valuable and 
excellent, the gods grant nothing to mankind without labor and 
care ; and if you wish the gods, therefore, to be propitious to you, 
you must worship the gods; if you seek to be beloved by your 
friends, you must serve your friends ; if you desire to be honored 
by any city, you must benefit that city ; if you long to be admired 
by all Greece for your merit, you must endeavor to be of advan- 
tage to all Greece ; if you are anxious that the earth should yield 
you abundance of fruit, you must cultivate the earth ; if you 
think that you should enrich yourself from herds of cattle, you 
must bestow care upon herds of cattle; if you are eager to increase 
your means by war, and to secure freedom to your friends and sub- 
due your enemies, you must learn the arts of war, and learn them 
from such as understand them, and practice how to use them with 
advantage ; or if you wish to be vigorous in body, you must ac- 
custom your body to obey your mind, and exercise it with toil and 
exertion.' 

29. " Here Yice, interrupting her sjDeech, said, (as Prodicus re- 
lates), ' Do you see, Hercules, by how difficult and tedious a road 
this woman conducts you to gratification, while I shall lead you, 
by an easy and short path, to perfect happiness? ' 



350 Kane 8 Ethics. § 1039 

30. '"Wretched being,' rejoined Virtue, 'of what good are you in 
possession ? Or what real pleasure do you experience, when you 
are unwilling to do anything for the attainment of it? You, who 
do not even wait for the natural desire of gratification, but fill 
yourself with all manner of dainties before you have an appetite 
for them, eating before you are hungry, drinking before you are 
thirsty, procuring cooks that you may eat with pleasure, buying 
costly wines that you may drink with pleasure, and running about 
seeking for snow* in summer ; while, in order to sleep with 
pleasure, you prepare not only soft beds, but couches, and rockers 
under your couches, for you do not desire sleep in consequence of 
labor, but in consequence of having nothing to do.f 31. Though 
you are one of the immortal, you are cast out from the society of 
the gods, and despised by the good among mankind ; the sweetest 
of all sounds, the praises of yourself, you have never heard, nor 
have you ever seen the most pleasing of all sights, for you have 
never beheld one meritorious work of your own hand. Who would 
believe you when you give your word for any thing ? Or who 
would assist you when in need of any thing? Or who, that has 
proper feeling, would venture to join your company of revelers ? 
for while they are young they grow impotent in body, and when 
they are older they are impotent in mind ; they live without labor, 
and in fatness, through their youth, and pass laboriously, and in 
wretchedness, through old age ; ashamed of what they have done; 
oppressed with what they have to do, having run through their 
pleasures in early years, and laid up afflictions for the close of life. 
32. But I am the companion of the gods ; I associate with virtuous 
men ; no honorable deed, divine or human, is done without me ; I 
am honored, most of all, by the deities, and by those among men 
to whom it belongs to honor me, being a welcome co-operator 
with artisans, a faithful household guardian to masters, a benevo- 
lent assistant to servants, a benign promoter of the labors of peace, 
a constant auxiliary to the efforts of war, an excellent sharer in 
friendship. 33. My friends have a sweet and untroubled enjoyment 
of meat and drink, for they refrain from them till they feel an ap- 
petite. They have also sweeter sleep than the idle; and are 
neither annoyed if they lose a portion of it, nor neglect to do their 
duties for the sake of it. The young are pleased with praises from 
the old ; the old are delighted with honors from the young. They 
remember their former acts with pleasure, and rejoice to perform 
their present occupations with success ; being, through my influ- 

* To cool wine [it is explained in a note here], t [I omit the remainder of 
section 30.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis io an Index. 351 

ence, dear to the gods, beloved by their friends, and honored by 
their country. And when the destined end of life comes, they do 
not lie in oblivion and dishonor, but, celebrated with songs of 
praise, nourish forever in the memory of mankind. By such a 
course of conduct, O Hercules, son of noble parents, you may 
secure the most exalted happiness.' 

34. " Nearly thus it was that Prodicus related the instruction of 
Hercules by Virtue ; adorning the sentiments, however, with far 
more magnificent language than that in which I now give them. 
It becomes you, therefore, Aristippus, reflecting on these admon- 
itions, to endeavor to think of what concerns the future period of 
your life." 

II., ii., 1. Having learned, one day, that Lamprocles, the eldest* 
of his sons, had exhibited anger against his mother, " Tell me, my 
son," said he, '• do you know that certain persons are called un- 
grateful ? " " Certainly," replied the youth. "And do you under- 
stand how it is they act that men give them this appellation?" " I 
do," said Lamprocles, " for it is those that have received a kindness, 
and that do not make a return when they are able to make one, 
whom they call ungrateful." " They then appear to you to class 
the ungrateful with the unjust?" " I think so." 2. "And have 
you ever considered whether, as it is thought unjust to make slaves 
of our friends, but just to make slaves of our enemies, so it is unjust 
to be ungrateful toward our friends, but just to be so toward our 
enemies?" "I certainly have," answered Lamprocles, "and from 
whomsoever a man receives a favor, whether friend or enemy, and 
does not endeavor to make a return for it, he is in my opinion 
unjust." 

3. " If such, then, be the case," pursued Socrates, " ingratitude 
must be manifest injustice?". Lamprocles expressed his assent. 
" The greater benefits, therefore, a person has received, and makes 
no return, the more unjust he must be? " He assented to this po- 
sition also. " Whom, then," asked Socrates, " can we find receiv- 
ing greater benefits from any persons than children receive from 
their parents? children whom their parents have brought from 
non-existence into existence, to view so many beautiful objects, 
and to share in so many blessings, as the gods grant to men; bless- 
ings which appear to us so inestimable, that we shrink, in the 
highest degree, from relinquishing them ; and governments have 
made death the penalty for the most heinous crimes, in the suppo- 
sition that they could not suppress injustice by the terror of any 
greater evil.f 5. The man maintains her who joins with him to 

* Socrates had three sons, Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, and Menexenus. See 
Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 57. — Kuehner. f [I omit section 4.] 



352 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

produce offspring, and provides, for the children that are likely to 
he born to him, whatever he thinks will conduce to their support, 
in as great abundance as he can ; while the woman receives and 
bears the burden, oppressed and endangering her life, and impart- 
ing a portion of the nutriment with which she herself is supported; 
and at length, after bearing it the full time, and bringing it forth 
with great pain, she suckles and cherishes it, though she has re- 
ceived no previous benefit from it, nor does the infant know by 
whom it is tended, nor is it able to signifj^ what it wants, but she, 
conjecturing what will nourish and please it, tries to satisfy his 
calls, and feeds it for a long time, both night and day, submitting 
to the trouble and not knowing what return she will receive for it. 
6. Nor does it satisfy the parents merely to feed their offspring, 
but as soon as the children appear capable of learning any thing, 
they teach them whatever they know that may be of use for their 
conduct in life ; and whatever they consider another more capable 
of communicating than themselves, they send their sons to him at 
their own expense, and take care to adopt every course that their 
children may be as much improved as possible." 

7. Upon this the young man said, " But, even if she has done 
all this, and many times more than this, no one, assuredly, could 
endure her ill humor." "And which do you think," asked Socrates, 
" more difficult to be endured, the ill-humor of a wild beast, or that 
of a mother? " " I think," replied Lamprocles, "that of a mother, 
at least of such a mother as mine is." " Has she ever then in- 
flicted any hurt upon you, by biting or kicking you, as many have 
often suffered from wild beasts ? " 8. " No ; but* she says such 
things as no one would endure to hear for the value of all that he 
possesses." "And do you reflect," returned Socrates, " how much 
grievous trouble you have given her by your peevishness, by voice 
and by action, in the day and in the night, and how much anxiety 
you have caused her when you were ill?" "But I have never 
said or done any thing to her," replied Lamprocles, '• at which she 
could feel ashamed." 9. " Bo you think it, then," inquired Soc- 
rates, "a more difficult thing for you to listen to what she says, 
than for actors to listen when they utter the bitterest reproaches 
against one another in tragedies? " " But actors, I imagine, en- 
dure such reproaches easily, because they do not think that, of the 
speakers, the one who utters reproaches, utters them with intent 
to do harm, or that the one who utters threats, utters them with 
any evil purpose." " Yet you are displeased at your mother, al- 
though you well know that whatever she says, she not only says 

* [I have omitted part of section 8 at this point.] 



§ 1039 The Claim to an Index. 353 

nothing with intent to do you harm, but that she wishes you more 
good than any other human being. Or do you suppose that your 
mother meditates evil toward you?" "No, indeed," said Lam- 
procles, " that I do not imagine." 10. " Do you then say that this 
mother," rejoined Socrates, "who is so benevolent to you, who, 
when you are ill, takes care of you, to the utmost of her power, 
that you may recover your health, and that you may want noth- 
ing that is necessary for you, and who, besides, entreats the gods 
for many blessings on your head, and pays vows for you, is a 
harsh mother ? For my part, I think that if you can not endure 
such a mother, you can not endure any thing that is good. 11. 
But tell me," continued he, " whether you think that you ought to 
pay respect to any other human being, or whether you are resolved 
to try to please nobody, and to follow or obey neither a general nor 
any other commander? " " No, indeed," replied Lamprocles, " I 
have formed no such resolutions," 12. "Are you then willing," 
inquired Socrates, " to cultivate the good will of your neighbor, 
that he may kindle a fire for you when you want it, or aid you in 
obtaining some good, or. if you happen to meet with any misfor- 
tune, may assist you with willing and ready help ? " " I am," re- 
plied he. " Or would it make no difference," rejoined Socrates, 
" whether a fellow-traveler, or a fellow- voyager, or any other per- 
son that you met with, should be your friend or enemy ? Or do 
you think that you ought to cultivate their good will ? " "I think 
that ] ought," replied LamprocJes. 13. "You are then prepared," 
returned Socrates, " to pay attention to such persons; and do you 
think that you ought to pay no respect to your mother, who loves 
you more than any one else? Do you not know that the state 
takes no account of any other species of ingratitude, nor allows 
any action at law for it, overlooking such as receive a favor and 
make no return for it, but that if a person does not pay due regard 
to his parents, it imposes a punishment on him, rejects his services, 
and does not allow him to hold the archonship, considering that 
such a person can not piously perform the sacrifices offered for the 
country, or discharge any other duty with propriety and justice? 
Indeed, if any one does not keep up the sepulchers of his dead 
parents, the state inquires into it in the examinations of candidates 
for office. 14. You therefore, my son, if you are wise, will entreat 
the gods to pardon you if you have been wanting in respect to- 
ward your mother, lest, regarding you as an ungrateful person, 
they should be disinclined to do you good ; and you will have 
regard, also, to the opinion of men, lest, observing you to be neg- 
lectful of your parents, they should all condemn you, and you 



354 Kanfs Ethics. § 1039 

should then be found destitute of friends ; for if men surmise that 
you are ungrateful toward your parents, no one will believe that 
if he does you a kindness he will meet with gratitude in return." 

II , iii., 1. Socrates, having observed that Chserephon and Chse- 
recrates, two brothers well known to him, were at variance with 
each other, and having met with Chserecrates, said, " Tell me, 
Chserecrates, you surely are not one of those men, are you, who 
think wealth more valuable than brothers, when wealth is but a 
senseless thing, and a brother endowed with reason, when wealth 
needs protection, while a brother can afford protection, and when 
wealth, besides, 'is plentiful, and a brother but one? 2. It is won- 
derful, too, that a man should consider brothers to be a detriment 
to him, because he does not possess his brothers' fortunes, while 
he does not consider his fellow-citizens to be a detriment, because 
he does not possess their fortunes ; but, in the latter case, he can 
reason with himself, that it is better for him, living in society with 
many, to enjoy a competency in security, than, living alone, to> 
possess all the property of his fellow-citizens in fear of danger,, 
while, with regard to brothers, he knows not how to apply such 
reasoning. 3. Those who are able, too,* procure friends, as being in 
need of supporters, while they neglect their brothers, as if friends 
could be made of fellow-citizens, but could not be made of brothers.. 
4. Yet it surely conduces greatly to friendship to have been born 
of the same parents, and to have been brought up together, since, 
even among brutes, a certain affection springs up between those 
that are reared together. In addition to these considerations, men 
pay more respect to those who have brothers than to those who 
have none, and are less forward to commit aggression on them." 

5. To this Chserecrates made answer, " If, indeed, Socrates, the 
dissension between us were not great, it might perhaps be my duty 
to bear with my brother, and not shun his society for slight causes ; 
for a brother, as you say, is a valuable possession, if he be such as 
he ought to be ; but when he is nothing of the sort, and is indeed 
quite the reverse of what he should be, why should I attempt im- 
possibilities ? " 6. "Whether, then, Chserecrates, " rejoined Soc- 
rates, " is Chserephon unable to please any body, as he is unable to' 
please you, or are there some whom he certainly can please?"' 
"Yes," replied Chserecrates, " for it is for this very reason that I 
justly hate him, that he can please others, while to me. he is on all 
occasions, whenever he comes in contact with me, a harm rather 
than a good, both in word and deed." 7. " Is the case then thus," 
said Socrates, " that as a horse is a harm to him who knows not 

* [I omit part of section 3 at this point.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 855- 

how to manage him, and yet tries to do so, so a brother is a harm, 
when a person tries to manage him without knowing how to do 
it ? " 8. " But how can I he ignorant," replied Chserecrates, " how 
to manage my brother, when I know how to speak well of him 
who' speaks well of me, and to do well to him who does well to 
me ? As to one, however, who seeks to vex me both by word and 
deed, I should not be able either to speak well of him, or to act 
well toward him, nor will I try." 9. " You speak strangely, 
Chasrecrates," rejoined Socrates, " for if a dog of yours were of 
service to watch your sheep, and fawned upon your shepherds, but 
snarled when you approached him, you would forbear to show 
any ill feeling toward him, but would endeavor to tame him by 
kindness; but as for your brother, though you admit that he would 
be a great good to you if he were such as he ought to be, and 
though you confess that you know how to act and speak well with 
respect to him, you do not even attempt to make him of such ser- 
vice to you as he might be." 10. " 1 fear, Socrates," replied Chsere- 
crates, " that 1 have not wisdom enough to render Chserephon such 
as he ought to be toward me." " Yet there is no need to contrive 
any thing artful or novel to act upon him," said Socrates, " as it 
appears to me ; for I think that he may be gained over by means 
which you already know, and may conceive a high esteem for 
you." 11. " Tell me first," said the other, " whether you have ob- 
served that I possess any love-charm, which I was not aware that 
I knew?" "Answer me this question," said Socrates: " If you 
wished to induce any one of your acquaintance, when he offered 
sacrifice, to invite you to his feast, what would you do?" " I 
should doubtless begin by inviting him when 1 offered sacrifice." 
12. ''And if you wished to prevail on any of your friends to take 
care of your property, when- you went from home, what would 
you do ? " "1 should certainly first offer to take care of his prop- 
erty, when he went from home." 13. "And if you wished to in- 
duce an acquaintance in a foreign land to receive you hospitably 
when you visited his country, what would you do ? " "I should 
unquestionably be the first to receive him hospitably when he came 
to Athens ; and if I wished him to be desirous to effect for me the 
objects for which I went thither, it is clear that 1 must first confer 
a similar service on him." 14. " Have you not long been un- 
awares acquainted, then, with all the love charms that exist among 
mankind? Or are you afraid," continued Socrates, "to make the 
first advances, lest you should seem to degrade yourself, if you 
should be the first to propitiate your brother ? Yet he is thought 
to be a man deserving of great praise, who is the first to do harm 



356 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

to the enemy, and to do good to his friends. If, then, Chserephon 
had appeared to me more likely to bring you to this frame of mind, 
I would have endeavored to persuade him first to try to make you 
his friend ; but, as things stand, you seem more likely, if you take 
the lead, to effect the desired object." 15. " You speak unreason- 
ably, Socrates," rejoined Chaerecrates, "and not as might be ex- 
pected from you, when you desire me, who am the younger, to 
take the lead ; for the established practice among all men is quite 
the reverse, being that the elder should always be first, both to 
act and speak." 16. "How," said Socrates, " is it not the custom 
every where that the younger should yield the path to the elder 
when he meets him, rise from his seat before him, honor him with 
the softest couch, and give place to him in conversation ? Do not 
therefore hesitate, my good young friend, but endeavor to conciliate 
your brother, and he will very soon listen to you. Do j r ou not see 
how fond of honor, and how liberal-minded he is ? Mean-minded 
persons you can not attract more effectually than by giving them 
something ; but honorable and good men you may best gain by 
treating them in a friendly spirit." 17. " But what if he should 
become no kinder," said Chaerecrates, " after I have done what you 
advise ? " " It will be of no consequence," replied Socrates, '.' for 
what other risk will you run but that of showing that you are 
kind and full of brotherly affection, and that he is mean-spirited 
and unworthy of any kindness ? But I apprehend no such result; 
for I conceive that when he finds you challenging him to such a con- 
test, he will be extremely emulous to excel you in doing kindnesses 
both by word and deed. 18. At present, you are in the same case 
as if the two hands, which the gods have made to assist each other, 
rshould neglect this duty, and begin to impede each other; or as if 
the two feet, formed by divine providence to co-operate with one 
another, should give up this office, and obstruct one another. 19. 
Would it not be a great folly and misfortune to use for our hurt 
what was formed for our benefit ? And indeed, as it appears to 
me, the gods have designed brothers to be of greater mutual ser- 
vice than the hands, or feet, or eyes, or other members which they 
have made in pairs for men ; for the hands, if required to do things, 
at the same time, at greater distance than a fathom, would be un- 
able to do them ; the feet can not reach two objects, at the same 
time, that are distant even a fathom ; and the eyes, which seem to 
reach to the greatest distance, can not, of objects that are much 
nearer, see at the same time those that are before and behind 
them ; but brothers, if they are in friendship, can, even at the 
greatest distance, act in concert and for mutual benefit." 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 357 

II., iv., 1. I heard him, also, on one occasion, holding a dis- 
course concerning friends, by which, as it seems to me, a person 
might be greatly benefited, both as to the acquisition and use of 
friends; for he said that he had heard many people observe that a 
true and honest friend was the most valuable of all possessions, 
but that he saw the greater part of mankind attending to any 
thing rather than securing friends. 2. He observed them, he 
added, industriously endeavoring to procure houses and lands, 
slaves, cattle, and furniture ; but as for a friend, whom they called 
the greatest of blessings, he saw the majority considering neither 
how to procure one, nor how those whom they had might be re- 
tained. 3. Even when friends and slaves were sick, he said that 
he noticed people calling in physicians to their slaves, and care- 
fully providing other means for their recovery, but paying no at- 
tention to their friends ; and that, if both died, they grieved for 
their slaves, and thought that they had suffered a loss, but consid- 
ered that they lost nothing in losing friends. Of their other pos- 
sessions they left nothing untended or unheeded, but when their 
friends required attention, they utterly neglected them. 

4. In addition to these remarks he observed that he saw the 
greater part of mankind acquainted with the number of their other 
possessions, although they might be very numerous, but of their 
friends, though but few, they were not only ignorant of the num- 
ber, but even when they attempted to reckon it to such as asked 
them, they set aside again some that they had previously counted 
among their friends ; so little did they allow their friends to occupy 
their thoughts. 5. Yet in comparison with what possession, of 
all others, would not a good friend appear far more valuable ? 
What sort of horse, or yoke of oxen, is so useful as a truly good 
friend ? What slave is so well disposed or so attached, or what 
other acquisition so beneficial? 6. For a good friend is ready to 
supply whatever is wanting on the part of his friend, whether in 
his private affairs, or for the public interests ; if he is required to 
do a service to any one, he assists him with the means ; if any ap- 
prehension alarms him, he lends him his aid, sometimes sharing 
expenditure with him, sometimes co-operating with him, some- 
times joining with him to persuade others, sometimes using force 
toward others ; frequently cheering him when he is successful, and 
frequently supporting him when he is m danger of falling. 7. 
What the hands do, what the eyes foresee, what the ears hear, 
what the feet accomplish, for each individual, his friend, of all 
such services, fails to perform no one ; and oftentimes, what a per- 
son has not effected for himself, or has not seen, or has not 



358 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

heard, or has not accomplished, a friend has succeeded in executing 
for his friend ; and yet, while people try to foster trees for the sake 
of their fruit, the greater portion of mankind are heedless and 
neglectful of that most productive possession which is called a 
friend. 

BOOK II., Chapter V., §1. I heard one day another disser- 
tation of his, which seemed to me to exhort the hearer to examine 
himself, and ascertain of how much value he was to his friends. 
Finding that one of his followers was neglectful of a friend who 
was oppressed with poverty, he asked Antisthenes, in the presence 
of the man that neglected his friend, and of several others, saying, 
"Are their certain settled values for friends. Antisthenes, as there 
are for slaves? 2. For, of slaves, one, perhaps, is worth two 
minae, another not even half a mina, another five minae, another 
ten. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is said to have bought an over- 
seer for his silver mines at the price of a whole talent. I am there- 
fore considering whether, as there are certain values for slaves, 
there are also certain values for friends." 3. " There are, undoubt- 
edly." replied Antisthenes ; " at least I, for my part, should wish 
one man to be my friend rather than have two minae; another 
1 should not value even at half a mina ; another I should prefer 
to ten minae ; and another I would buy for my friend at the sacri- 
fice of all the money and revenues in the world." 4. '■ If such be 
the case, therefore," said Socrates, " it would be well for each of 
us to examine himself, to consider of what value he is in the esti- 
mation of his friends ; and to try to be of as much value to them 
as possible."* 

IF., vi., 1. He appeared to me. also, to make his followers wise 
in examining what sort of persons it was right to attach to them- 
selves as friends, by such conversations as the following: '-Tell 
me, Critobulus," said he, " if we were in need of a good friend, 
how should we proceed to look for one ? Should we not, in the 
first place, seek for a person who can govern his appetite, his in- 
clination to wine or sensuality, and abstain from immoderate 
sleep and idleness? for one who is overcome by such propensities 
would be unable to do his duty either to himself or his friend." 
'•Assuredly he would not," said Critobulus. " It appears then to 
you that we must avoid one who is at the mercy of such inclina- 
tions ? " " Undoubtedly," replied Critobulus. 2. " Besides," con- 
tinued Socrates, " does not a man who is extravagant and yet un- 
able to support himself; but is always in want of assistance from 
his neighbor, a man who, when he borrows, can not pay, and when 

is [I omit the remainder of section 4, and the whole of section 5.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 359 

he can not borrow, hates him who will not lend, appear to you to 
ka dangerous friend?" "Assuredly," replied Critobulus. "We 
must therefore avoid such a character? " " We must indeed." 3. 
"Again : what sort of friend would he be who has the means of 
getting money, and covets great wealth, and who, on this account, 
as a driver of hard bargains, and delights to receive, but is unwill- 
ing to pay ? " " Such a person appears to me," said Critobulus, 
'• to be a still worse character than the former." 4. " What then 
•do you think of him, who, from love of getting money, allows him- 
self no time for thinking of any thing else but whence he may ob- 
tain it ? " " We must avoid him, as it seems to me ; for he would 
be useless to any one that should make an associate of him." 
"And what do you think of him who is quarrelsome, and likely to 
iraise up many enemies against his friends ? " " We must avoid 
him also."* " But if a man have none of these bad qualities, but 
is content to receive obligations, taking no thought of returning 
them?" " Ho also would be useless as a friend. But what sort 
of person, then, Socrates, should we endeavor to make our friend?" 
•5. "A person, I think, who, being the reverse of all this, is proof 
against the seductions of bodily pleasures, ie upright and fair in his 
•dealings, and emulous not to be outdone in serving those who serve 
him, so that he is of advantage to those who associate with him." 
6. " How then shall we find proof of these qualities in him, So- 
crates, before we associate with him ? " " We make proof of statu- 
aries," rejoined Socrates, "not by forming opinions from their 
words, but whomsoever we observe to have executed his previous 
statues skillfully, we trust that he will execute others well." 7. 
" You mean, then, that the man who is known to have served his 
former friends, will doubtless be likely to serve such as may be his 
friends hereafter? " " Yes ; for whomsoever I know to have pre- 
viously managed horses with skill, 1 expect to manage other horses 
with skill." 

8. "Beit so," said Critobulus; " but by what means must we 
make a friend of him who appears to us worthy of our friend- 
ship ? "j- 9. "Assuredly," returned Socrates, "he is not to be 
caught by tracking him like the hare, or by wiles, like birds, or by 
making him prisoner by force, like enemies ; for it would be an 
arduous task to make a man your friend against his will, or to hold 
him fast if you were to bind him like a slave ; for those who suffer 
such treatment are rendered enemies rather than friends. "£ 14. 
" You appear to me to mean, Socrates, that if we would attach to 

* [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] t [I omit the remainder of section 
8.] i [I omit sections 10-13.] 



360 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

us any good person as a friend, Ave ourselves should be good both 
in speaking and acting." "And did you think it possible," said 
Socrates, " for a bad person to attach to himself good men as his 
friends?"* 

17. " What perplexes you,. Critobulus, is, that you often see men 
who are honorable in their conduct, and who refrain from every 
thing disgraceful, involved, instead of being friends, in dissensions 
with one another, and showing more severity toward each other 
than the worthless part of mankind." 18. " Nor is it only private 
persons," rejoined Critobulus, "that act in this manner, but even 
whole communities, which have the greatest regard for what is 
honorable, and are least inclined to any thing disgraceful, are often 
hostilely disposed toward one another. 

19. " When I reflect on these differences," continued Critobulus, 
" 1 am quite in despair about the acquisition of friends, for I see 
that the bad can not be friends with one another ; for how can the 
ungrateful, or careless, or avaricious, or faithless, or intemperate, 
be friends to each other? indeed the bad appear to me to be al- 
together disposed by nature to be mutual enemies rather than 
friends. 20. Again, the bad, as you observe, can never harmonize 
in friendship with the good ; for how can those who commit bad 
actions be friends with those who abhor such actions? And yet,. 
if those also who practice virtue fall into dissensions with one 
another about pre-eminence in their respective communities, and 
even hate each other through envy, who will ever be friends, or 
among what class of mankind shall affection and attachment be 
found? " 21. " But these affections act in various ways," rejoined 
Socrates, "for men have by nature inclinations to attachment, 
since they stand in need of each other, and feel compassion for 
each other, and co-operate for mutual benefit, and, being conscious 
that such is the case, have a sense of gratitude toward one another; 
but they have also propensities to enmity, for such as think the 
same objects honorable and desirable, engage in contention for 
them, and, divided in feelings, become enemies. Disputations and 
anger lead to war ; the desire of aggrandizement excites ill-will ; 
and envy is followed by hatred. 22. But, nevertheless, friendship, 
insinuating itself through all these hinderances, unites together the 
honorable and good; for such characters, through affection for virtue, 
prefer the enjoyment of a moderate competency without strife, to 
the attainment of unlimited power by means of war ; they can 
endure hunger and thirst without discontent, and take only a fair 
share of meat and drink, and, though delighted with the attractions 

* [I o:nit sections 15 and 16.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 361 

of youthful beauty, they can control themselves, so as to forbear 
from offending those whom they ought not to offend. 23. By 
laying aside all avaricious feelings too, they can not only be satis- 
fied with their lawful share of the common property, but can even 
assist one another. They can settle their differences, not only 
without mutual offense, but even to their mutual benefit. They 
can prevent their anger from going so far as to cause them* repent- 
ance ; and envy they entirely banish, by sharing their own prop- 
erty with their friends, and considering that of their friends as 
their own. 

24. " How, then, can it be otherwise than natural, that the hon- 
orable and good should be sharers in political distinctions, not only 
without detriment, but even with advantage to each other ? Those 
indeed who. covet honor and power in states, merely that they may 
be able to embezzle money, to do violence to others, and to live a 
life of luxury, must be regarded as unprincipled and abandoned 
characters, and incapable of harmonious union with other mem 
25. But when a person wishes to attain honors in a community, 
in order, not merely that he may not suffer wrong himself, but 
that he may assist his friends as far as is lawful, and may en- 
deavor, in his term of office, to do some service to his country, 
why should he not, being of such a character, form a close union 
with another of similar character ? Will he be less able to benefit 
his friends if he unite himself with the honorable and good, or 
will he be less able to serve his country if he have the honorable 
and good for his colleagues ? " 

33.* " When, therefore, Critobulus," said Socrates, "you wish to 
become a friend to any one, will you permit me to say to him con- 
cerning you, that you admire him, and desire to be his friend ? " 
" You may say so," answered Critobulus, " for I have never 
known any one dislike those who praised him.'-' 34. " But if 
I say of you, in addition, that, because you admire him, you 
feel kindly disposed toward him, will you not think that 
false information is given of you by me ? " " No : for a kind feel- 
ing springs up in myself also toward those whom I regard as- 
kindly disposed toward me." 35. " Such information, then," con- 
tinxied Socrates, " I may communicate regarding you to such as 
you may Avish to make your friends : but if you enable me also to 
say concerning you, that you are attentive to your friends ; that 
you delight in nothing so much as in the possession of good friends ;. 
that you pride yourself on the honorable conduct of your friends 
not less than on your own ; that you rejoice at the good fortune of 

* [I omit sections 26-32, and also the first sentence of section 33.} 

24 



362 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

your friends not less than at your own ; that you are never weary 
of contriving means hy which good fortune may come to your 
friends ; and that you think it the great virtue of a man to sur- 
pass his friends in doing them good and his enemies in doing them 
harm, I think that I shall be a very useful assistant to you in gain- 
ing the affections of worthy friends."* 37. " You are, therefore,'^ 
returned Critobulus, " a friend of such a kind to me, Socrates, as 
to assist me, if I have myself any qualities adapted to gain friends; 
but if not, you would not be willing to invent any thing to serve 
me." "And whether, Critobulus," said Socrates, " should I appear 
to serve you more by extolling you with false praises, or by per- 
suading you to endeavor to become a truly deserving man? 38. 
If this point is not clear to you, consider it with the following il- 
lustrations : If, wishing to make the owner of a ship your friend, 
I should praise you falsely to him, pronouncing you a skillful pilot, 
and he, believing me, should intrust his ship to you to steer when 
you are incapable of steering it, would you have any expectation 
that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship ? Or if, 
by false representations, I should persuade the state, publicly, to 
intrust itself to you as a man skilled in military tactics, in judicial 
proceedings, or in political affairs, what do you think tbat jour- 
self and the state would suffer at your hands ? Or if, in private 
intercourse, I should induce any of the citizens, by unfounded 
statements, to commit their property to your care, as being a good 
and diligent manager, would you not, when you came to give 
proof of your abilities, be convicted of dishonesty, and make 
yourself appear ridiculous ? 39. But the shortest, and safest, and 
best way, Critobulus, is to strive to be really good in that in which 
you wish to be thought good. Whatever are called virtues among 
mankind, you will find, on consideration, capable of being in- 
creased by study and exercise. I am of opinion, that it is in ac- 
cordance with these sentiments, that we ought to endeavor to ac- 
quire friends ; if you know any other way, make me acquainted 
with it." " I should be indeed ashamed," replied Critobulus, " to 
.say any thing in opposition to such an opinion ; for I should say 
what was neither honorable nor true." 

II., vii., 1. — Such difficulties of his friends as arose from ignor- 
ance, he endeavored to remedy by his counsel ; such as sprung 
from poverty, by admonishing them to assist each other according 
to their means. With reference to this point, I will relate what I 
know of him from having been an ear-witness of what he said. 

* [I omit section 36.] 



§ 1039 The Olavia to an Index. 363 

Observing Aristarchus, on one occasion looking gloomily, " You 
seem," said he, "Aristarchus, to be taking something to heart ; but 
you ought to impart the cause of your uneasiness to your friends ; 
for perhaps we may by some means lighten it." 2. " 1 am indeed, 
Socrates," replied Aristarchus, "in great perplexity; for since the 
city has been disturbed, and many of our people have fled to the 
Piraeeus, my surviving sisters, and nieces, and cousins have 
gathered about me in such numbers, that there are now in my 
house fourteen free-born persons. At the same time, we receive 
no profit from our lands, for the enemy are in possession of them ; 
nor any rent from our houses, for but few inhabitants are left in 
the city ; no one will buy our furniture, nor is it possible to borrow 
money from any quarter ; a person, indeed, as it seems to me, 
would sooner find money by seeking it on the road, than get it by 
borrowing it. It is a grievous thing to me, therefore, to leave my 
relations to perish ; and it is impossible for me to support such a 
number under such circumstances." 3. Socrates, on hearing this, 
replied, "And how is it that Ceramon. yonder, though maintaining 
a great number of people, is not only able to procure what is 
necessary for himself and them, but gains so much more, also, as 
to be positively rich, while you, having many to support, are 
afraid lest you should all perish for want of necessaries ? " " Be- 
cause, assuredly," replied Aristarchus, " he maintains slaves, while 
I have to support free-born persons." 4. "And which of the two," 
inquired Socrates, "do you consider to be the better, the free-born 
persons that are with you, or the slaves that are with Ceramon? " 
" I consider the free persons with me as the better." " Is it not 
then a disgrace that he should gain abundance by means of the in- 
ferior sort, and that you should be in difficulties while having with 
you those of the better class? " " Such certainly is the case ; but 
it is not at all wonderful ; for he supports artisans ; but I, persons 
of liberal education." 5. "Artisans, then," asked Socrates, "are 
persons that know how to make something useful ? " "Unques- 
tionably," replied Aristarchus. "Is barley-meal, then, useful ? " 
" Very." " Is bread ? " " Not less so." " And are men's and wo- 
men's garments, coats, cloaks, and mantles, useful ? " " They are 
all extremely useful." "And do those who are residing with you, 
then, not know how to make any of these things ? " " They know 
how to make them all, as I believe." 6. "And are you not aware 
that from the manufacture of one of these articles, that of barley- 
meal, Nausicydes supports not only himself and his household but 
a great number of swine and oxen besides, and gains, indeed, so 
much more than he wants, that he often even assists the government 



364 # Kant's Ethics. § 1039- 

with his money ? Are you not aware that Cyrebus, by making 
bread, maintains his whole household, and lives luxuriously ; that 
Demea, of Collytus, supports himself by making cloaks, Menon 
by making woolen cloaks, and that most of the Megarians live by- 
making mantles?" " Certainly they do," said Aristarchus ; "for 
they purchase barbarian slaves and keep them, in order to force^ 
them to do what they please ; but I have with me free-born per- 
sons and relatives." 7. u Then," added Socrates, " because they 
are free and related to you, do you think that they ought to do 
nothing else but eat and sleep ? Among other free persons, do 
you see that those who live thus spend their time more pleasantly,, 
and do you consider them happier, than those who practice the 
arts which they know, and which are useful to support life? Do 
you find that idleness and carelessness are serviceable to mankind r 
either for learning what it becomes them to know, or for remem- 
bering what they have learned, or for maintaining the health and 
strength of their bodies, or for acquiring and preserving what is 
useful for the support of life, and that industry and di'igence ar& 
of no service at all ? 8. And as to the arts which you say they 
know, whether did they learn them as being useless to maintain, 
life, and with the intention of never practicing any of them, or,. 
on the contrary, with a view to occupy themselves about them, 
and to reap profit from them ? In which condition will men be 
more temjoerate, living in idleness, or attending to useful employ- 
ments? Jn which condition will they be more honest, if they 
work, or if they sit in idleness meditating how to procure neces- 
saries? 9. Under present circumstances, as I should suppose, you 
neither feel attached to your relatives, nor they to you, for you. 
find them burdensome to you, and they see that you are annoyed 
with their company. For such feelings there is danger that dis- 
like may grow stronger and stronger, and that previous friendly 
inclination may be diminished. But if you take them under your 
direction, so that they may be employed, you will love them, when 
you see that they are serviceable to you, and they will grow at- 
tached to you, when they find that you feel satisfaction in their 
society ; and remembering past services with greater pleasure, you 
will increase the friendly feeling resulting from them, and conse- 
quently grow more attached and better disposed toward each 
other. 10. If, indeed, they were going to employ themselves in. 
any thing dishonorable, death would be preferable to it ; but the 
accomplishments which they know, are, as it appears, such as are 
most honorable and 'becoming to women ; and all people execute 
what they know with the greatest ease and expedition, and witk 



§ 1039 The Claim to an Index. 365 

"the utmost credit and. pleasure. Do not hesitate, therefore." con- 
cluded Socrates, " to recommend to them this line of conduct, 
which will benefit both you and them ; and they, as it is probable, 
will cheerfully comply with your wishes."* : 

12. The necessary means were accordingly provided; wool was 
bought ; and the women took their dinners as they continued at 
work, and supped when they had finished their tasks ; they be- 
came cheerful instead of gloomy in countenance, and, instead of 
regarding each other with dislike, met the looks of one another 
with pleasure ; they loved Aristarchus as their protector, and he 
loved them as being of use to him. At last he came to Socrates, 
.and told him with delight of the state of things in his house ; add- 
ing that " the women complained of him as being the only person 
in the house that ate the bread of idleness."! 

BOOK III., chapter i., §1.1 will now show that Socrates 
was of great service to those who aspired to posts of honor, by 
rendering them attentive to the duties of the offices which they 
sought. 

Having heard that Dionysodorus had arrived at the city, offer- 
ing to teach the art of a general, he said to one of those who were 
with him, whom he observed to be desirous of obtaining that honor 
in the state, 2. "It is indeed unbecoming, young man, that he 
who wishes to be commander of an army in his country should 
neglect to learn the duties of that office when he has an opportu- 
nity of learning them ; and such a person would be far more 
justly punished by his country than one who should contract to make 
statues for it, when he had not learned to make them ; 3. for as 
the whole state, in the perils of war, is intrusted to the care of the 
general, it is likely that great advantages will occur if he act well, 
and great evils if he fall into' error. How, then, would not he, 
who neglects to learn the duties of the office, while he is eager to 
be elected to it, be deservedly punished?" By making such ob- 
servations, he induced the young man to go and learn. J 

III , ii., 1. Having met, on some occasion, a person who had 
been elected general, Socrates said to him, " Why is it, do you 
think, that Homer has styled Agamemnon ' Shepherd of the peo- 
ple ? ' Is it not for this reasoiij that as a shepherd must be careful 
that his sheep be safe, and have food, and the object may be ef- 
fected for which they are kept, so a general must take care that 
his soldiers be safe, and have provisions, and that the object be ef- 
fected for which they serve ? and they serve, no doubt, that they 

*[I omit section 11.] t [I omit sections 13, 14, and the whole of chapters 
-viii., ix., x.] % [I omit sections 4-11.] 



366 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

may increase their gratifications by conquering the enemy.* 3. 
For a man is chosen king, not that he may take good care of him- 
self, but that those who have chosen him may prosper by his 
means ; and all men, when they take the field, take it that their 
lives may be rendered as happy as possible, and choose generals 
that they may conduct them to the accomplishment of that ob- 
ject. 4. It is incumbent on the leader of an army, therefore, 
to carry into execution the views of those who have chosen him 
their leader. Nor is it easy to find any thing more honorable 
than such exertion, or more disgraceful than an opposite course of 
conduct. " 

Thus considering what was the merit of a good leader, he 
omitted other points in his character, and left only this, that he 
should render those whom he commanded happy. f [Cf. §§403, 423; 
cf. Confucius, Analects, "VI., xxviii. (pages 125, 126 above), and 
Great Learning, x., 21 (page 108 above).] 

III., iv., 1. Seeing Nicomachides, one day, coming from the 
assembly for the election of magistrates, he asked him, " Who 
have been chosen generals, Nicomachides? " "Are not the Athen- 
ians the same as ever, Socrates?" he replied; "for they have 
not chosen me, who am worn out with serving on the list, both as 
captain and centurion, and with having received so many wounds 
from the enemy " (he then drew aside his robe, and showed the 
scars of the wounds), "but have elected Antisthenes, who has never 
served in the heavy-armed infantry, nor done any thing remark- 
able in the cavalry, and who indeed knows nothing, but how to 
get money." 2. " Is it not good, however, to know this," said Soc- 
rates, "since he will then be able to get necessaries for the troops ? " 
" But merchants," replied Nicomachides, " are able to collect 
money ; and yet would not, on that account, be capable of leading 
an army." 3. "Antisthenes, however," continued Socrates, "is 
given to emulation, a quality necessary in a general. Do you not 
know that whenever he has been chorus-manager he has gained 
the superiority in all his choruses? " " But,J" rejoined Nicoma- 
chides, " there is nothing similar in managing a chorus and an 
army." 4. "Yet Antisthenes," said Socrates, "though neither skilled 
in music nor in teaching a chorus, was able to find out the best 
masters in these departments." " In the army, accordingly," ex- 
claimed Nicomachides, " he will find others to range his troops for 
him, and others to fight for him ! " 5. "Well, then," rejoined Soc- 
rates, " if he find out and select the best men in military affairs, 
as he has done in the conduct of his choruses, he will probably at- 

* [I omit section 2.] f [I omit chapter iii.] % [I omit part of section 3 here.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 367 

tain sirperiority in this respect also ; and it is likely that he will 
be more willing to spend money for a victory in war on behalf of 
the whole state, than for a victory with a chorus in behalf of his 
single tribe." 6. " Do you say, then, Socrates," said he, " that it 
is in the power of the same man to manage a chorus well, and to 
manage an army well? " " I say," said Socrates, " that over what- 
ever a man may preside, he will, if he knows what he needs, and 
is able to provide it, be a good president, whether he have the di- 
rection of a chorus, a family, a city, or an army." 7. " * Soc- 
rates," cried Nicomachides, " I should never have expected to 
hear from you that good managers of a family would also be good 
generals." " Come, then," proceeded Socrates, " let us consider 
what are the duties of each of them, that we may understand 
whether they are the same, or are in any respect different." "By 
all means," said he. 8. " Is it not, then, the duty of both," asked 
Socrates, " to render those under their command obedient and sub- 
missive to them? " " Unquestionably." " Is it not also the duty 
of both to intrust various employments to such as are fitted to ex- 
ecute them?" " That is also unquestionable." "To punish the 
had, and to honor the good, too, belongs, I think, to each of them." 
"Undoubtedly." 9. "And is it not honorable in both to render 
those under them well-disposed toward them?" "That also is 
certain." "And do you think it for the interest of both to gain 
for themselves allies and auxiliaries, or not?" "It assuredly is 
for their interest." " Is it not proper for both also to be careful of 
their resources ? " "Assuredly." "And is it not proper for both, 
therefore, to be attentive and industrious in their respective duties?" 
10. "All these particulars," said Nicomachides, " are common alike 
to both ; but it is not common to both to fight." " Yet both have 
doubtless enemies," rejoined Socrates. " That is probably the 
case," said the other. " Is it not for the interest of both to gain 
the superiority over those enemies ? " 11. " Certainly ; but to say 
nothing on that point, wiiat, I ask, will skill in managing a house- 
hold avail, if it be necessary to fight? " "It will doubtless, in that 
case, be of the greatest avail," said Socrates ; "for a good manager 
of a house, knowing that nothing is so advantageous or profitable 
as to get the better of your enemies when you contend with them,, 
nothing so unprofitable and prejudicial as to be defeated, will zeal- 
ously seek and provide everything that may conduce to victory, 
will carefully watch and guard against whatever tends to defeat,, 
will vigorously engage if he sees that his force is likely to con- 
quer, and, what is not the least important point, will cautiously 

* [I omit part of section 7 at this point.] 



368 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

avoid engaging if he finds himself insufficiently prepared. 12. Do 
not, therefore, Nieomachides," he added, " despise men skillful in 
managing a household ; for the conduct of private affairs differs 
from that of public concerns only in magnitude ; in other respects 
they are similar ; hut what is most to be observed, is, that neither 
of them are managed without men, and that private matters are 
not managed by one species of men, and public matters by 
another ; for those who conduct public business make use of men 
not at all differing in nature from those whom the managers of 
private affairs employ ; and those who know how to emplo}" them 
conduct either public or private affairs judiciously, while those 
who do not know will err in the management of both." 

Bk. III., ch. V., § 1. Conversing on one occasion with Pericles, 
the son of the great Pericles, Socrates said, " I have hopes, Pericles, 
that under your leadership the city will become more eminent and 
famous in military affairs, and will get the better of her enemies." 
(i I wish, Socrates," said Pericles, " that what you say may happen; 
but how such effects are to be produced, I can not understand." 
"Are you willing, then," asked Socrates, " that we should have 
some conversation on these points, and consider how far there is 
a possibility of effecting what we desire ? " " I am quite willing," 
replied Pericles. 2. "Are you aware, then," said Socrates, "that 
the Athenians are not at all inferior in number to the Boeotians ? " 
" 1 am," said Pericles. "And whether do you think that a greater 
number of efficient and well-formed men could be selected from 
the Boeotians, or from the Athenians ? " " The Athenians do not 
appear to me to be inferior in this respect." "And which of the 
two peoples do you consider to be more united among themselves ?" 
" 1 think that the Athenians are ; for many of the Boeotians, being 
oppressed by the Thebans, entertain hostile feelings toward them. 
But at Athens 1 see nothing of the kind." 3. " But the Athenians 
are, moreover, of all people most eager for honor and most friendly 
in disposition ; qualities which most effectually impel men to face 
danger in the cause of glory and of their country." " The Athen- 
ians are certainly not to be found fault with in these respects." 
"And assuredly there is no people that can boast of greater or 
more numerous exploits of their ancestors than the Athenians ; 
a circumstance by which many are prompted and stimulated to 
cultivate manly courage and to become brave."* 13. " 1 wonder, 
indeed, Socrates," said Pericles, "how our city ever degenerated." 
" I imagine," said Socrates, " that as some other nations have 
grown indolent through excessive exaltation and power, so like- 

*[I omit sections 4-12.] 



§ 1039 The Glavis to an Index. 369 

"wise the Athenians, after attaining great pre-eminence, grew neg- 
lectful of themselves, and consequently became degenerate." 

14. "By what means, then," said Pericles, " could they now re- 
-cover their pristine dignity? *' " It appears to me," replied Soc- 
rates, " not at all difficult to discover ; for I think that if they 
learn what were the practices of their ancestors, and observe them 
not less diligently than they, they will become not at all inferior 
to them ; but if they do not take that course, yet, if they imitate 
those who are now at the head of Greece, adhere to their institu- 
tions, and attend to the same duties with diligence equal to theirs, 
they will stand not at all below them, and, if they use greater ex- 
ertion, even above them." 15. "You intimate," returned Pericles, 
" that honor and virtue are far away from our city ; for when will 
the Athenians reverence their elders as the Spartans do, when they 
begin, even by their own fathers, to show disrespect for older men ? 
■Or when will they exercise themselves like them, when they not 
•only are regardless of bodily vigor, but deride those who cultivate 
it? 16. Or when will they obey the magistrates like them, when 
they make it their pride to set them at naught? Or when will 
they be of one mind like them, when, instead of acting in concert 
for their mutual interests, they inflict injuries on one another, and 
■envy one another more than they envy the rest of mankind? 
More than any other people, too, do they dispute in their private 
and public meetings ; they institute more law- suits against one 
another, and prefer thus to prey upon one another than to unite 
for their mutual benefit. They conduct their public affairs as if 
the}' were those of a foreign state ; they contend about the man- 
agement of them, and rejoice, above all things, in having power 
to engage in such contests. 17. From such conduct much ignor- 
ance and baseness prevail in the republic, and much envy and 
mutual hatred are engendered in the breasts of the citizens ; on 
which accounts I am constantly in the greatest fear lest some evil 
should happen to the state too great for it to bear." 18. " Do not 
by any means suppose, Pericles," rejoined Socrates, " that the 
Athenians are thus disordered with an incurable* depravity. Do 
you not see how orderly they are in their naval proceedings, how 
precisely they obey the presidents in the gymnastic games, and 
how, in the arrangement of the choruses, they submit to the direc- 
tions of their teachers in a way inferior to none ?" 19. " This is 
indeed surprising," said Pericles, " that men of that class should 
obey those who are set over them, and that the infantry and cav- 
alry, who are thought to excel the ordinary citizens in worth and 

* [Sanabilibus aegrotamus malis. — Seneca, quoted by Kant, in §652.] 



370 Kant's Ethics. § 1039> 

valor, should be the least obedient of all the people." 20. " The 
council of the Areopagus, too," said Socrates, " is it not composed 
of men of approved character?" " Undoubtedly," replied Per- 
icles. "And do you know of any judges who decide causes and 
conduct all their business with more exact conformity to the laws r 
or with more honor and justice?" " I find no fault with them," 
said Pericles. " We must not, therefore, despair," said Socrates, 
" as if we thought that the Athenians are not inclined to be lovers 
of order. " 21. "Yet in military affairs," observed Pericles, " in 
which it is most requisite to act with prudence, and order, and 
obedience, they pay no regard to such duties." " It may be so,"" 
returned Socrates, " for perhaps in military affairs men who are 
greatly deficient in knowledge have the command of them. Do 
you not observe that of harp-players, choristers, dancers, wrest- 
lers, or pancratiasts, no one ventures to assume the direction who 
has not the requisite knowledge for it, but that all who take the 
lead in such matters are able to show from whom they learned the 
arts in which they are masters ; whereas the most of our generals, 
undertake to command without previous study ? 22. I do not, 
however, imagine you to be one of that sort ; for I am sensible 
that you can tell when you began to learn generalship not less. 
certainly than when you began to learn wrestling. I am sure, too, 
that you have learned, and keep in mind, many of your father's 
principles of warfare, and that you have collected many others 
from every quarter whence it was possible to acquire any thing 
that would add to your skill as a commander. 23. I have no 
doubt that you take great care that you may not unawares be ig- 
norant of any thing conductive to generalship, and that, if you 
have ever found yourself deficient in any such matters, you have 
applied to persons experienced in them, sparing neither presents 
nor civilities, that you might learn from them what you did not 
know, and might render them efficient helpers to you." 24. "You 
make me well aware, Socrates," said Pericles, " that you do not 
say this from a belief that I have diligently attended to these mat- 
ters, but from a wish to convince me that he who would be a gen- 
eral must attend to all such studies ; and I indeed agree with you 
in that opinion."* 

III., vi., 1. When Glaucon,f the son of Ariston, attempted to 
harangue the people, from a desire, though he was not yet twenty 
years of age, to have a share in the government of the state, no 

* [I omit sections 25-28.] | This Glaucon Was the brother of Plato the 
philosopher. See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen., p. 66. On the other Glaucon, see 
III., vii., 1, [page 374 below.] — Kuehner. 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 371 

one of his relatives, or other friends, could prevent him from get- 
ting himself dragged down from the tribunal, and making himself 
ridiculous ; but Socrates, who had a friendly feeling toward him 
on account of Charmides the son of Glaucon, as well as on account 
of Plato, succeeded in prevailing on him, by his sole dissuasion,, 
to relinquish his purpose. 2. Meeting him by chance, he first 
stopped him by addressing him as follows, that he might be will- 
ing to listen to him : " Glaucon," said he, "have you formed an in- 
tention to govern the state for us? " " I have, Socrates," replied 
Glaucon. * " It is an honorable office, if any other among men be 
so ; for it is certain that, if you attain your object, you will be able 
yourself to secure whatever you may desire, and will be in a con- 
dition to benefit your friends ; you will raise your father's house, 
and increase the power of your country ; you will be celebrated, 
first of all in your own city, and afterward throughout Greece, 
and perhaps also, like Themistocles, among the Barbarians, and r 
wherever you may be, you will be an object of general admira- 
tion." 3. Glaucon, hearing this, was highly elated, and cheerfully 
staid to listen. Socrates next proceeded to say, " But it is plain, 
Glaucon, that if you wish to be honored, you must benefit the 
state." " Certainly," answered Glaucon. " Then,|" said Socrates, 
" do not hide from us how you intend to act, but inform us with 
what proceeding you will begin to benefit the state? " 4. But as 
Glaucon was silent, as if just considering how he should begin, 
Socrates said, "As, if you wished to aggrandize the family of a 
friend, you would endeavor to make it richer, tell me whether 
you will in like manner also endeavor to make the state 
richer?" "Assuredly," said he. 5. "Would it then be richer, if" 
its revenues were increased ? " " That is at least probable," said 
Glaucon. "Tell me then," proceeded Socrates, " from what the 
the revenues of the state arise, and what is their amount ; for you. 
have doubtless considered, in order that if any of them fall short, 
you may make up the deficiency, and that if any of them fail, you 
may procure fresh supplies." " These matters, $•' replied Glaucon, 
"I have not considered." 6. "Well then," said Socrates, if you 
have omitted to consider this point, tell me at least the annual ex- 
penditure of the state ; for you undoubtedly mean to retrench 
whatever is superfluous in it." " Indeed," replied Glaucon, " I 
have not yet had time to turn my attention to that subject." "We 
will therefore," said Socrates, " put off making our state richer for 
the present ; for how is it possible for him who is ignorant of its 

* [I omit a part of section 2, at this point.] t [I omit a part of section 3, at 
this point.] % [I omit a part of section 5, at this point.] 



■312 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

expenditure and its income to manage those matters? " 7. " But, 
Socrates," observed Glaucon, " it is possible to enrich the state at 
the expense of our enemies." " Extremely possible indeed," re- 
plied Socrates, " if we be stronger than they ; but if we be weaker, 
we may lose all that we have." " What you say is true," said 
G-laucon. 8. "Accordingly," said Socrates, " he who deliberates 
'with whom he shall go to war, ought to know the force both of his 
own country and of the enemy, so that, if that of his own country 
>be superior to that of the enemy, he may advise it to enter upon 
the war, but, if inferior, may persuade it to be cautious of doing 
so." "You say rightly," said Glaucon. 9. " In the first place, 
then," proceeded Socrates, "tell us the strength of the country by 
land and sea, and next that of the enemy." "But,*" exclaimed 
fGlaucon, " I should not be able to tell you on the moment, and at 
a word." " Well, then, if you have it written down," said Soc- 
.rates, " bring it, for I should be extremely glad to hear what it is." 
-" But to say the truth," replied G-laucon, " I have not yet written 
it down." 10. " We will therefore put off considering about war 
for the present,'' said Socrates, " for it is very likely that, on ac- 
« count of the magnitude of those subjects, and as you are just com- 
mencing your administration, you have not yet examined into 
them. But to the defense of the country, I am quite sure that you 
have directed your attention, and that you know how many gar- 
risons are in advantageous positions, and how many not so, what 
number of men would be sufficient to maintain them, and what 
number would be insufficient, and that you will advise your country- 
men to make the garrisons in advantageous positions stronger, and 
"to remove the useless ones." 11. "f I shall recommend them to re- 
move them all, as they keep guard so negligently that the prop- 
erty is secretly carried off out of the country," " Yet, if we re- 
move the garrisons," said Socrates, " do you not think that liberty 
-.will be given to any body that pleases to pillage? But," added 
he, " have you gone personally, and examined as to this fact, or 
how do you know that the garrisons conduct themselves with such 
negligence? " " I form my conjectures," said he. " Well then," 
inquired Socrates, " shall we settle about these matters also, when 
we no longer rest upon conjecture, but have obtained certain 
knowledge? " " Perhaps that," said Glaucon, "will be the better 
course." 12. " To the silver mines, however," continued Socrates, 
" I know that you have not gone, so as to have the means of tell- 
ing us why a smaller revenue is derived from them than came in 
some time ago." "I have not gone thither," said he. "Indeed 

* [I omit a portion of section 9 here.] "f [I omit a portion of section 1 1 here.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 373 

the place," said Socrates, " is said to be unhealthy, so that, when 
it is necessary to bring it under consideration, this will be a suf- 
ficient excuse for you." "You jest with me," said Grlaucon. 13. 
" I am sure, however," proceeded Socrates, " that you have not 
neglected to consider, but have calculated, how long the corn, 
which is produced in the country, will suffice to maintain the city,, 
and how much it requires for the year, in order that the city may 
not suffer from scarcity unknown to you, but that, from your own 
knowledge, you may be able, by giving your advice concerning 
the necessaries of life, to support the city, and preserve it.'' " You 
propose a vast field for me," observed Grlaucon, " if it will be neces- 
sary for me to attend to such subjects." 14. "Nevertheless," pro- 
ceeded Socrates, " a man can not order his house properly, unless 
he ascertains all that it requires, and takes care to supply it with 
every thing necessary ; but since the city consists of more than 
ten thousand houses, and since it is difficult to provide for so many 
at once, how is it that you have not tried to aid one first of all, 
suppose that c*f your uncle, for it stands in need of help ? If you 
be able to assist that one, you may proceed to assist more ; but if" 
you be unable to benefit one, how will you be able to benefit many ? 
Just as it is plain that, if a man can not carry the weight of a 
talent, he need not attempt to carry a greater weight." 15. " But 
I would improve my uncle's house," said Glaucon, "if he would but 
be persuaded by me." "And then," resumed Socrates, " when 
you can not persuade your uncle, do you expect to make all the 
Athenians, together with your uncle, yield to your arguments ? 
16. Take care, Grlaucon, lest, while you are eager to acquire glory,, 
you meet with the reverse of it. Do you not see how dangerous 
it is for a person to speak of, or undertake, what he does not un- 
derstand ? Contemplate, ariiong other men, such as you know to 
be characters that plainly talk of, and attempt to do 7 what they 
do not know, and consider whether they appear to you, by such 
conduct, to obtain more applause or censure ? whether they seem, 
to be more admired or despised ? 17. Contemplate, again, those 
who have some understanding of what they say and do, and you 
will find, 1 think, in all transactions, that such as are praised and 
admired are of the number of those who have most knowledge, 
and that those who incur censure and neglect are among those that 
have least. 18. If therefore you desire to gain esteem and repu- 
tation in your country, endeavor to succeed in gaining a knowl- 
edge of what you wish to do ; for if, when you excel others in this 
qualification, you proceed to manage the affairs of the state, I shall 
not wonder if you very easily obtain what you desire." 



374 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

III , vii.,1. Observing that Charmides, the son of G-laucon, a 
man of worth, and of far more ability than those who then ruled 
the state, hesitated to address the people, or to take part in the 
government of the city, he said to him, " Tell me, Charmides, if 
any man, who was able to win the crown in the public games, and, 
by that means, to gain honor for himself, and make his birth-place 
more celebrated in Greece, should nevertheless refuse to become a 
combatant, what sort of person would you consider him to be? " 
41 1 should certainly think him indolent and wanting in spirit," re- 
plied Charmides. 2. "And if any one were able," continued Soc- 
rates, " by taking part in public affairs, to improve the condition 
of his country, and thus to attain honor for himself, but should 
yet shrink from doing so, might not he be justly regarded as 
wanting in spirit ? " "Perhaps so," said Charmides; "but why 
do you ask me that question? " " Because," replied Socrates, " I 
think that you yourself, though possessed of sufficient ability, yet 
shrink from engaging even in those affairs in which it is your duty 
as a citizen to take a share." 3. " But in what transaction have 
you discovered my ability," said Charmides, "that you bring this 
charge against me?" "In those conferences," answered Socrates, 
" in which you meet those who are engaged in the government of 
the state ; for when they consult you on any point, I observe that 
you give them excellent advice, and that, when they are in any 
way in the wrong, you offer judicious objections." 4. " But it is 
not the same thing, Socrates," said he, "to converse with people 
In private, and to try one's powers at a public assembly." " Yet," 
said Socrates, " he that is able to count, can count with no less ex- 
actness before a multitude than alone, and those who can play 
the harp best in solitude are also the best performers on it in com- 
pany." 5. " But do you not see," said Charmides, " that bashful- 
ness and timidity are naturally inherent in mankind, and affect us 
far more before a multitude than in private conversations ? " "But 
lam prompted to remind you," answered Socrates, " that while 
you neither feel bashfulness before the most intelligent, nor timid 
before the most powerful, it is in the presence of the most foolish 
and weak that you are ashamed to speak. 6. And is it the fullers 
among them, or the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the copper- 
smiths, or the ship-merchants, or those who barter in the market, 
and meditate what they may buy for little and sell for more, that 
you are ashamed to address ? For it is of all such characters that 
the assembly is composed. 7. How then do you think that your 
conduct differs from that of a wrestler, who, being superior to 
well-practiced opponents, should yet fear the unpracticed? For 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 375 

is not this the case with you, that though you converse at your 
ease with those who have attained eminence in state affairs, and 
of whom some undervalue you, and though you are far superior 
to many who make it their business to address the people, you yet 
shrink from uttering your sentiments before men who have never 
thought of political affairs, and who have shown no disrespect for 
your talents, from an apprehension that you may be laughed at?" 
8. "And do not the people in the assembly," asked Charmides, 
* l appear to you often to laugh at those who speak with great judg- 
ment?" " Yes," said Socrates, " and so do the other sort of peo- 
ple j* and therefore I wonder at you, that you so easily silence one 
class of persons when they do so, and yet think that you shall not 
be able to deal with another ? 9. Be not ignorant of yourself, my 
friend, and do not commit the error which the majority of 
men commit; for most persons, though they are oager to look into the 
affairs of others, give no thought to the examination of their own. 
Do not you, then, neglect this duty, but strive more and more to 
cultivate your own powers ; and do not be regardless of the affairs 
of your country, if any department of them can be improved by 
your means; for, if they are in a good condition, not only the 
rest of your countrymen, but your own friends and yourself, will 
reap the greatest benefit." 

IIL, viii., 1. When Aristippus attempted to confute Socrates, 
as he himself had previously f been confuted by him, Socrates, 
wishing to benefit those who were with him, gave his answers, 
not like those who are on their guard lest their words be perverted, 
but like those who are persuaded that they ought above all things 
to do what is right. 2. What Aristippus had asked him, was, 
" whether he knew any thing good," in order that if he should 
say any such thing as food, or drink, or money, or health, or 
strength, or courage, he might prove that it was sometimes an 
evil. But Socrates, reflecting that if any thing troubles us we want 
something to relieve us from it, replied, as it seemed best to do, 
" Do you ask me whether I know anything good for a fever? " 3. 
"I do not." "Any thing good for soreness of the eyes?" "No." "For 
hunger?" "No, nor for hunger either." "Well then," concluded 
Socrates, " if you ask me whether I know any thing good that is 
good for nothing, I neither know any thing, nor wish to know." 

4. Aristippus again asking him whether he knew any thing beau- 
tiful, he replied, "Many things." "Are they then," inquired Aristip- 
pus, " all like each other? " " Some of them," answered Socrates, 

* Meaning those, says Kuehner, with whom he is mentioned as discoursing 
ki section -3. | Book II., chapter i., [page 343 above] 



376 Kant's Ethics. § 1039* 

". are as unlike one another as it is possible for them to be-"' 
" How then," said he, " can what is beautiful be unlike what is 
beautiful?" "Because, assuredly," replied Socrates, " one man,, 
who is beautifully formed for wrestling, is unlike another who. is- 
beautifully formed for running ; and a shield, which is beautifully 
formed for defense, is as unlike as possible to a dart, which is 
beautifully formed for being forcibly and swiftly hurled." 5.. 
" You answer me," said Aristippus, " in the same manner as when 
I asked you whether you knew anything good." "And do you 
imagine," said Socrates, " that the good is one thing, and the 
beautiful another? Do you not know that with reference to the 
same objects all things are both beautiful and good ? Virtue, for 
instance, is not good with regard to some things and beautiful with 
regard to others ; and persons, in the same way, are called beau- 
tiful and good with reference to the same objects ; and human 
bodies, too, with reference to the same objects, appear beautiful 
and good ; and in like manner all other things, whatever men 
use, are considered beautiful and good with reference to the ob- 
jects for which they are serviceable."* 7. "Do you say, then, that 
the same things may be both beautiful and ugly?" " Yes, un- 
doubtedly, and also that they may be good and bad; for oftentimes- 
what is good for hunger is bad for fever, and what is good for a 
fever is bad for hunger ; oftentimes what is beautiful in regard to 
running is the reverse in regard to wrestling, and what is beauti- 
ful in regard to wrestling is the reverse in regard to running ; for 
whatever is good is also beautiful, in regard to purposes for which 
it is well adapted, and whatever is bad is the reverse of beautiful, 
in regard to purposes for which it is ill adapted." 

8. When Socrates said, too, that the same houses that were beau- 
tiful were also useful, he appeared to me to instruct us what sort 
of houses we ought to build. He reasoned on the subject thus, 
" Should not he, who purposes to have a house such as it ought to 
be, contrive that it may be most pleasant, and at the same time 
most useful, to live in ? f 10. To sum up the matter briefly, that 
would be the most pleasant and the most beautiful residence, in 
which the owner, at all seasons, would find the most satisfactory 
retreat, and deposit what belongs to him with the greatest safety." 

Paintings, and colored decorations of the walls, % deprive us, he 
thought, of more pleasure than they give. 

* [I omit section 6.] t[T omit section 9.] J [In an explanatory note here 
the translator says that Kuehner] gives the following reason for the disappro- 
bation which Socrates expresses of them : " That those ornaments might not be 
injured by the rays of the sun, the parts of the house in which they were, were* 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 377 

The most suitable ground for temples and altars, he said, was 
such as was most open to view, and least trodden by the public ; 
for that it was pleasant for people to pray as they looked on them, 
and pleasant to approach them in purity. 

III., IX., 1. Being asked, again, whether Fortitude was a quality 
acquired by education, or bestowed by nature, " I think," said he, 
" that as one body is by nature stronger for enduring toil than 
another body, so one mind may be by nature more courageous in 
meeting dangers than another mind ; for I see that men who are 
brought up under the same laws and institutions differ greatly 
from each other in courage. 2. I am of opinion, however, that 
every natural disposition may be improved, as to fortitude, by 
training and exercise ; for it is evident that the Scythians and 
Thracians would not dare to take bucklers and spears and fight 
with the Lacedsemonians ; and it is certain that the Laeedsemoi- 
ians would not like to fight the Thracians with small shields and 
javelins, or the Scythians with bows. 3. In other things, also, I 
see that men differ equally from one another by nature, and make 
great improvements by practice ; from which it is evident that it 
concerns all, as well the naturally ingenious as the naturally dull, 
to learn and study those arts in which they desire to become 
worthy of commendation." 

4. Prudence and Temperance* he did not distinguish ; for he 
deemed that he who knew what was honorable and good, and how to 
practice it, and who knew what was dishonorable, and how to 
avoid it, was both prudent and temperate. Being also asked 
whether he thought that those who knew what they ought to do, 
but did the contrary, were prudent and temperate, he replied, 
" No more than I think the imprudent and intemperate to be so ;f 
for I consider that all persons' choose from what is possible what 
they judge for their interest, and d.0 it \ and I therefore deem 
those who do not act judiciously to be neither prudent nor 
temperate." 

so constructed as not to face the sun; and thus the inmates, in winter, were de- 
prived of the heat of the sun (tali modo homines hiberno tempore solis calore 
privabantur), and exposed to the cold winds from the north." * Sophia, wisdom 
or prudence, is, as Kuehner remarks, right judgment about what ought to be 
done ; sophrostjne is temperance, self-control, or self-regulation, in acting. 
The word sophia is used in another sense in Book IV., chapter vi., §7 [below]. 
" This subject, in conformity with the opinion of Socrates, is discussed in Plato's 
Charmides, ubi pariter iemperantia scientia contineri demonstratur." See 
Stallbaum on that Dialogue, p. 81, seqq. — Kuehner. [Anthon (Xen. Mem., 
Harper, 1868, page 307) translates "wisdom and temperance," and says that 
" by sophian is here meant the knowledge of virtue."] f Ii, qui sciunt quidem 

25 



378 Kan? s Ethics. § 1039 

5. He said, too, that justice, and every other virtue, was a ((part 
of)) prudence, for that every thing just, and every thing done 
agreeably to virtue, was honorable and good ; that those who coidd 
discern those things, would never prefer any thing else to them ; 
that those who could not discern them, would never be able to do 
them, but would even go wrong if they attempted to do them ; 
and that the prudent, accordingly, did what was honorable and 
good, but that the imprudent could not do it, but went wrong even 
if they attempted to do it; and that since, therefore, all just ac- 
tions, and all actions that are honorable and good, are done in 
agreement with virtue, it is manifest that justice, and every other 
virtue, is ((comprehended in)) prudence* 

6. The opposite to prudence, he said, was Madness ;f he did 
not, however, regard ignorance as madness ; though for a man to 
be ignorant of himself, and to fancy and believe that he knew 
what he did not know, he considered to be something closely bor- 
dering on madness. The multitude, he observed, do not say that 
those are mad who make mistakes in matters of which most people 
are ignorant, but call those only mad who make mistakes in affairs 
with which most people are acquainted. % 

9. Considering what Idleness was, he said that he found most 
men did something ; for that dice-players and buffoons did some- 
thing ; but he said that all such persons were idle, for it was in 
their power to go and do something better ; he observed that a 
man was not idle, however, in passing from a better employment 
to a worse, but that, if he did so, he, as he ((previously)) had oc- 
cupation, acted in that respect viciously. 

10. Kings and Commanders, he said, were not those who held 
scepters merely, or those elected by the multitude, or those who 
gained authority by lot, or those who attained it by violence or 
deceit, but those who knew how to command. 11. For when some 
admitted that it was the part of a commander to enjoin what 

bona, sed contraria faciunt, nihilo magis sapientes et temperantes sunt quam ii 
qui sunt insipientes et intemperantes. — Kuehner. The words in brackets are 
supplied as being necessary to the translation. [The words in brackets, here 
referred to, are omitted by me.] [Khordah-Avesta, xiii., page 183 above.] 

* [Cf. Cicero de Officiis, III., xvii.] |Mania, madness or insanity, is, accord- 
ing to the definition of Socrates, the contrary to wisdom or prudence. Madness 
is, therefore, ignorance of the virtues of justice, temperance, and fortitude; for 
prudence is manifested in the knowledge of these virtues. But the source and 
foundation, as it were, of prudence, is the knowledge of one's self. He, there- 
fore, that is destitute of this knowledge of himself is bordering on madness. 
The multitude, however, do not, like Socrates, consider ignorance of virtue to be 
madness, but apply that term only to gross ignorance or misconduct with re- 
gard to other matters. — Kuehner. J [I omit sections 7 and 8.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 379 

another should do, and the part of him who was commanded, to 
obey, be showed tbat in a ship the skillful man is the commander, 
and that the owner and all the other people in the ship were obedi- 
ent to the man of knowledge ; that, in agriculture, those who had 
farms, in sickness, those who were ill, in bodily exercises, those 
who practiced them, and indeed all other people, who had any bus- 
iness requiring care, personally took the management of it if they 
thought that they understood it, but if not, that they were not 
only ready to obey men of knowledge who were present, but even 
sent for such as were absent, in order that, by yielding to their 
directions, they might do what was proper.* 12. But if any one 
remarked in reply to these observations, that a tyrant is at liberty 
not to obey judicious advisers, he would say, "And how is he at 
liberty not to obey, when a penalty hangs over him that does not 
obey a wise monitor ? for in whatever affair a person does not 
obey a prudent adviser, he will doubtless err, and, by erring, will 
incur a penalty." 13. If any one also observed that a tyrant 
might put to death a wise counselor, "And do you think," he 
would say, " that he who puts to death the best of his allies will 
go unpunished, or that he will be exposed only to casual punish- 
ment ? Whether do you suppose that a man who acts thus would 
live in safety, or would be likely, rather, by such conduct, to bring 
immediate destruction on himself? " 

14. When some one asked him what object of study he thought 
best for a man, he replied, " good conduct." When he asked 
him again whether he thought " good fortune" an object of study, 
he answered, " 'Fortune' and 'Conduct' I think entirely opposed ; 
for, for a person to light on any thing that he wants without seek- 
ing it, I consider to be 'good fortune,' but to achieve any thing 
successfully by learning and study, I regard as 'good conduct ; ' 
and those who make this their object of study appear to me to do 
well. ' ' 

15. The best men, and those most beloved by the gods, he ob- 
served, were those who, in agriculture, performed their agricul- 
tural duties well, those who, in medicine, performed their medical 
duties well, those who, in political offices, performed their public 
duties well; but he who did nothing well, he said, was neither use- 
ful for any purpose, nor acceptable to the gods.f 

111= , xii., 1. Noticing that Epigenes, one of his followers, was 
both very young and weak in body, he said to him, " How very 
unlike an athlete you are in frame, Epigenes ! " "I am not an 
athlete, Socrates," replied he. " You are not less of an athlete," 

"*' [I omit the remainder of section 11.] f [I omit chapters x. and xi.] 



380 Kant' 8 Ethics. § 1039 

rejoined Socrates, " than those who are going to contend at the 
Olympic games. Does the struggle for life with the enemy, which 
the Athenians will demand of you when circumstances require, 
seem to you to be a trifling contest ? 2. Yet, in the dangers of war, 
not a few, through weakness of body, either lose their lives, or 
save them with dishonor ; many, from the same cause, are taken 
alive, and, as prisoners of war, endure for the rest of their lives, 
if such should be their fate, the bitterest slavery ; or, falling into 
the most grievous hardships, and paying for their ransom some- 
times more than they possess, pass the remainder of their exist- 
ence in want of necessaries, and in the endurance of affliction ; and 
many, too, incur infamy, being thought to be cowards merely from 
the imbecility of their bodily frame. 3. Do you think lightly of 
such penalties attached to weakness of body, or do you expect 
that you will endure such calamities with ease ? I believe that 
what he must bear who attends to the health of his body, is far 
lighter and more pleasant than such afflictions. Or do you sup- 
pose that an ill condition of body is more salutary and advantage- 
ous than a good condition ? Or do you despise the benefits secured 
by a good state of the body ? 4. Yet the lot which falls to those 
who have their bodies in good condition is exactly the reverse of 
that which falls to those who have them in ill condition ; for 
those who have their bodies in a good state are healthy and strong; 
and many, from being possessed of this advantage, save themselves 
with honor amid the struggles of war, and escape every peril ; 
many, also, assist their friends and benefit their country, and, for 
such services, are thought worthy of favor, acquire great glory, 
and attain the highest dignities ; and, on these accounts, pass the 
rest of their lives with greater pleasure and honor, and bequeath 
finer fortunes to their children. 5. Nor, because the city does not 
require warlike exercises publicly, ought we, on that account, to 
neglect them privately, but rather to practice them the more ; for 
be well assured that neither in any other contest, nor in any affair 
whatever, will you at all come off the worse because your body is 
better trained than that of other men ; since the body must bear 
its part in whatever men do ; and in all the services required from 
the body, it is of the utmost importance to have it in the best 
possible condition ; 6. for even in that in which you think that 
there is least exercise for the body, namely, thinking, who does 
not know that many fail greatly from ill-health? and loss of 
memory, despondency, irritability, and madness, often, from ill - 
health of body, attack the mind with such force as to drive out all 
previous knowledge. 7. But to those who have their bodies in 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 381 

good condition, there is the utmost freedom from anxiety, and no 
danger of suffering any such calamity from weakness of constitu- 
tion ; while it is likely, rather, that a healthy state of body will 
avail to produce consequences the reverse of those which result 
from an unhealthy state of it ; and, indeed, to secure consequences 
the reverse of what we have stated, what would a man in his 
senses not undergo ? 8. It is disgraceful, too, for a person to grow 
old in self neglect, before he knows what he would become by ren- 
dering himself well- formed and vigorous in body; but this a man 
who neglects himself can not know ; for such advantages are not 
wont to come spontaneously." 

III., xiii., 1. A person being angry, because, on saluting 
another, he was not saluted in return, " It is an odd thing," said 
Socrates to him, " that if you had met a man ill-conditioned in 
body you would not have been angry, but to have met a man 
rudely disposed in mind provokes you." 

2. Another person saying that he ate without pleasure, " Acumen- 
us," said Socrates, "prescribes an excellent remedy for that disease." 
The other asking, " What sort of remedy ? " " To abstain from 
eating," said Socrates ; " for he says that, after abstaining, you 
will live with more pleasure, less expense, and better health." 

3. Another saying that the water which he had to drink at his 
house was warm, " When you wish to bathe in warm water, then," 
said Socrates, " it will be ready for you." " But it is too cold to 
bathe in," said the other. "Are your slaves, then," asked Socrates, 
" inconvenienced by drinking or bathing in it ? " " .No, * " replied 
he ; " for I have often wondered how cheerfully they use it for 
both those purposes." "And is the water in your house," said 
Socrates, " or that in the temple of iEsculapius, the warmer for 
drinking?" "That at the temple of iEsculapius," replied he. 
"And which is the colder for bathing in, that at your house, or 
that in the temple of Amphiaraus ? " "That in the temple of 
Amphiaraus," said he. " Consider, then," said Socrates, "that you 
seem to be harder to please than your slaves or the sick." 

4. Another person beating his attendant severely, Socrates asked 
him why he was so" angry at the slave. "Because," said he, "he is 
very gluttonous and very stupid, very covetous and very idle." 
"And have you ever reflected," rejoined Socrates, " which of the 
two deserves the greater number of stripes, you or your slave?" 

5. A person being afraid of the journey to Olympia, " Why," 
said Socrates to him, "do you fear the journey? Do you not walk 
about at home almost all day ? And, if you set out thither, you 

* [I omit part of section 3 at this point.] 



382 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

will walk and dine, walk and sup, and go to rest. Do you not 
know that if you were to extend in a straight line the walks which 
you take in five or six days, you would easily go from Athens to 
Olympia? But it will be better for you to start a day too soon 
than a clay too late ; for to be obliged to extend your days' jour- 
neys beyond a moderate length is disagreeable ; but to spend one 
day more on the road gives great ease ; and it is better, therefore, 
to hasten to start than to hurry on the way." 

6. Another saying that he was utterly wearied with a long jour- 
ney, Socrates asked him whether he carried any burden. " No,*" 
said he, "I did not, except my cloak." "And did you travel 
alone," said Socrates, "or did an attendant accompany "you ? " 
"An attendant was with me." " Was he empty-handed, or did he 
carry any thing ? " " He carried, certainly, the bedding and other 
utensils." "And how did he get over the journey?" "He ap- 
peared tome to come otf better than myself." " If you, then, 
had been obliged to carry his burden, how do you imagine that 
you would have fared ? " " Very ill ;f or rather, I should not 
have been able to carry it at all." "And how can you think that 
it becomes a man trained to exercise to be so much less able to bear 
fatigue than a slave?" 

III., xiv., 1. When, among a number of persons who had met 
together to sup, some brought little meat, and others a great quan- 
tity, Socrates desired the attendant either to set the smallest dish 
on the table for common participation, or to distribute a portion of 
it to each. They, accordingly, who had brought a great deal, were 
ashamed not to partake of what was put on table for the company 
in general, and not, at the same time, to put their own on table in 
return. They therefore offered their own dishes for the participa- 
tion of the company ; and when they had no greater share than 
those who brought but little, they ceased to buy meat at great 
cost.J 7. He observed also that, "to fare well," was in the lan- 
guage of the Athenians called, "to eat;" and that the "well," 
was added to denote that we should eat such food as would disor- 
der neither mind nor body, and such as would not be difficult to 
be procured ; so that he applied, " to fare well," to those who fared 
temperately. 

BOOK IV., chapter i., § 1. So serviceable was Socrates to 
others, in every kind of transaction, and by every possible means, 
that to any one who reflects on his usefulness (even though he 
possess but moderate discernment), it is manifest that nothing 

* [I omit a portion of section 6 at this point.] | [I omit a portion of section 
6 at this point.] \ [I omit sections 2-6.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 383 

was of greater benefit than to associate with Socrates, and to con- 
verse with him, on any occasion, or on any subject whatever; 
since even the remembrance of him, when he is no longer with ns, 
benefits in no small degree those who are accustomed to enjoy his 
society, and heard him with approbation ; for he sought to im- 
prove his associates not less in his humorous than in his serious 
conversation. 2. He would often say that he loved some particu- 
lar person ; but he was evidently enamored, not of those formed 
by nature to be beautiful, but of those naturally inclined to virtue. 
He judged of the goodness of people's abilities from their quick- 
ness in learning the things to which they gave their attention, 
from their remembrance of what they learned, and from their de- 
sire for all those branches of knowledge .by means of which it is 
possible to manage a family or an estate well, and to govern men 
and their affairs with success ; for he thought that such characters, 
when instructed, would not only be happy themselves, and regulate 
their own families judiciously, but would be able to render other 
men, and other communities beside their own, happy. 3. He did 
not however make advances to all in the same manner. Those 
who thought that they had good natural abilities, but despised in- 
struction, he endeavored to convince that minds which show most 
natural power have most need of education, pointing out to them 
that horses of the best breed, which are high-spirited and obstinate, 
become, if they are broken in when young, most useful and valu- 
able, but if they are left unbroken, remain quite unmanageable 
and worthless ; and that hounds of the best blood, able to endure 
toil, and eager to attack beasts, prove, if they are well trained, 
most serviceable for the chase, and every way excellent, but, if un- 
trained, are useless, rabid, and disobedient. 4. In like manner, he 
showed that men of the best natural endowments, possessed of 
the greatest strength of mind, and most energetic in executing 
what they undertake, became, if well disciplined and instructed in 
what they ought to do, most estimable characters, and most bene- 
ficent to society (as they then performed most numerous and im- 
portant services), but that, if uninstructed, and left in ignorance, 
they proved utterly worthless and mischievous ; for that, not know- 
ing what line of conduct they ought to persue, they often entered 
upon evil courses, and. being haughty and impetuous, were difficult 
to be restrained or turned from their purpose, and thus occasioned 
very many and great evils. 

5. But those who prided themselves on their wealth, and 
thought that they required no education, but imagined that 
their riches would suffice to effect whatever they desired, and to 



384 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

gain them honor from mankind, he tried to reduce to reason by 
saying that the man was a fool who thought that he could distin- 
guish the good and the evil in life without instruction [cf. Con- 
fucian Doctrine of the Mean, xxi. (page 116 above), and Khordah 
Avesta, xiii. (page 183 above) ; and see Book IV., chapter vi. (be- 
low) immediately] ; and that he also was a fool who, though he 
could not distinguish them, thought that he would procure what- 
ever he wished, and effect whatever was for his interest, by means 
of his wealth. He also said that the man was void of sense who, 
not being qualified to pursue what was for his good, fancied that 
he would be prosperous in the world, and that every thing neces- 
sary for his comfort was fully, or at least sufficiently, provided for 
him ; and that he was equally void of sense who, though he knew 
nothing, thought that he would seem good for something because 
of his riches, and, though evidently despicable, would gain esteem 
through their influence. 

IV., ii., 1. I will now show how Socrates addressed himself to 
such as thought that they had attained the highest degree of 
knowledge, and prided themselves on their ability. Hearing that 
Euthydemus, surnamed the Handsome, had collected many writ- 
ings of the most celebrated poets and sophists, and imagined that 
by that means he was out striping his cotemporaries in ac- 
complishments, and had great hopes that he would excel 
them all in talent for speaking and acting, and finding, by his 
first inquiries about him, that he had not yet engaged in public 
affairs on account of his youth, but that, when he wished to do any 
business, he usually sat in a bridle-maker's shop near the Forum, 
he went himself to it, accompanied by some of his hearers ; 2. 
and as somebody asked, first of all, "whether it was from his inter- 
course with some of the wise men, or from his own natural talents, 
that Themistocles attained such a pre-eminence above his fellow- 
citizens, that the republic looked to him whenever it wanted the 
service of a man of ability," Socrates, wishing to excite the atten- 
tion of Euthydemus, said that " it was absurd to believe that men 
could not become skilled in the lowest mechanical arts without 
competent instructors, and to imagine that ability to govern a 
state, the most important of all arts, might spring up in men by 
the unassisted efforts of nature." 

3. On another occasion, when Euthydemus was one of the com- 
pany, and Socrates saw him leaving it, from apprehension lest he 
should seem to admire him for his wisdom, he observed, " It is evi- 
dent, my friends, from the studies that he pursues, that Euthyde- 
mus here, when he comes of age, and the government give liberty 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 385 

of discussion on any point, will not refrain from offering his coun- 
sel ; and I imagine that he has already framed an exordium for 
his public oration, taking precaution that he may not be thought 
to have learned any thing from any body ; and it is pretty certain, 
therefore, that when he begins to speak, he will make his opening 
thus : 4. 'I, O men of Athens, have never learned any thing from 
any person, nor, though I heard of some that were skilled in 
speaking and acting, have I sought to converse with them ; nor 
have I been anxious that any one of the learned should become 
my master ; but I have done the exact contrary ; for I have con- 
stantly avoided not only learning any thing from any one, but 
even the appearance of learning any thing ; nevertheless I will of- 
fer you such advice as may occur to me without premeditation.' 
5. So it might be proper for a person to commence a speech who 
desired to obtain a medical appointment from the government: ' I, 
O men of Athens, have never learned the medical art from any one, 
nor have been desirous that any physician should be my instructor ; 
for I have constantly been on my guard, not only against learning 
any thing of the art from any one, but even against appearing to 
have learned any thing ; nevertheless confer on me this medical 
appointment ; for I will endeavor to learn by making experiments 
upon you.' " At this mode of opening a speech all who were present 
burst out into laughter. 

6. As Euthydemus had now evidently begun to attend to what 
Socrates was saying, but was cautious of speaking himself, as think- 
ing by his silence to clothe himself with reputation for modesty, 
Socrates, wishing to cure him of that fancy, said, " It is indeed 
strange that those who desire to play on the lyre, or on the flute, 
or to ride, or to become expert in any such accomplishment, should 
endeavor to practice, as constantly as possible, that in which they 
desire to excel, and not by themselves merely, but with the aid of 
such as are considered eminent in those attainments, attempting 
and undergoing every thing, so as to do nothing without their 
sanction, as supposing that they can by no other means attain 
reputation ; but that of those who wish to become able to speak 
and act in affairs of government, some think that they will be 
suddenly qualified to achieve their object without preparation or 
study, and by their own unassisted efforts. 7. Yet these pursuits 
are manifestly more difficult of attainment than those, inasmuch 
as of the very many who attempt them a much smaller number 
succeed in them ; and it is evident, therefore, that those who pur- 
sue the one are required to submit to longer and more diligent study 
than those who pursue the other." 



386 Kant s Ethics. § 1039 

8. Socrates used at first to make such remarks, while Euthyde- 
mus merely listened ; but when he observed that he staid, while 
he conversed, with more willingness, and hearkened to him with 
more attention, he at last came to the bridle-maker's shop unat- 
tended. As Euthy dermis sat down beside him, he said, " Tell me, 
Euthydemus, have you really, as I hear, collected many of the 
writings of men who are said to have been wise." "I have in- 
deed, Socrates," replied he, " and I am still collecting, intending to 
persevere till I get as many as I possibly can." 9. * " I feel ad- 
miration for you, because you have not preferred acquiring treas- 
ures of silver and gold rather than of wisdom ; for it is plain you 
consider that silver and gold are unable to make men better, but 
that the thoughts of wise men enrich their possessors with virtue." 
Euthydemus was delighted to hear this commendation, believing 
that he was thought by Socrates to have sought wisdom in the right 
course. 10. Socrates, observing that he was gratified with the 
praise, said, "And in what particular art do you wish to become 
skillful, that you collect these writings ? "f " Do you wish, then," 
added Socrates, " to become a rhapsodist, for they say that you are 
in possession of all the poems of Homer?" " No, indeed," said 
he, " for I know that the rhapsodists, though eminently knowing 
in the poems of Homer, are, as men, extremely foolish." 11. 
" You are perhaps desirous, then," proceeded Socrates, "of attain- 
ing that talent by which men become skilled in governing states, 
in managing households, able to command, and qualified to benefit 
other men as well as themselves." " I indeed greatly desire," said 
he, " Socrates, to acquire that talent." J" You aspire to a most 
honorable accomplishment, and a most exalted art, for it is the art 
of kings, and is called the royal art. But," added he, "have you 
ever considered whether it is possible for a man who is not just to 
be eminent in that art?" "I have certainly," replied he; "and 
it is not possible for a man to be even a good citizen without jus- 
tice." 12. " Have you yourself, then, made yourself master of 
that virtue ?■" "I think," said he, " Socrates, that I shall be found 
not less just than any other man." "Are there then works of just 
men, as there are works of artisans? " " There are, doubtless," 
replied he. " Then," said Socrates, " as artisans are able to show 
their works, would not just men be able also to tell their works? " 
"And why should not I," asked Euthydemus, "be able to tell the 
works of justice ; as also indeed those of injustice; for we may 
see and hear of no small number of them every day ? " 

*[I omit part of section 9 at this point.] | [I omit part of section 10 at this 
point.] t[I omit part of section 11 at this point.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 387 

13. "Are you willing then," said Socrates, " that we should make 
a delta on this side, and an alpha* on that, and then that we should 
put whatever seems to us to be a work of justice under the delta, 
and whatever seems to he a work of injustice under the alpha ? " 
" If you think that we need those letters," said Euthydemus, 
" make them." 14. Socrates, having made the letters as he pro- 
posed, asked, " Does falsehood then exist among mankind? " " It 
does, assuredly," replied he. " Under which head shall we place 
it?" ''Under injustice, certainly." "Does deceit also exist?" 
"Unquestionably." "Under what head shall we place that?" 
"Evidently under injustice." "Does mischievousness exist?" 
" Undoubtedly." "And the enslaving of men? " " That, too, pre- 
vails." "And shall neither of these things be placed by us, under 
justice, Euthydemus? " " It would be strange if they should be," 
said he. 15. " But," said Socrates, " if a man, being chosen to 
lead an army, should reduce to slavery an unjust and hostile peo- 
ple, should we say that he committed injustice? " " No, certainly," 
replied he. "Should we not rather say that he acted justly?" 
"Indisputably." "And, if, in the course of the war with them, 
he should practice deceit? " " That also would be just," said he. 
"And if he should steal and carry off their property, would he not 
do what was just?" "Certainly," said Euthydemus; "but I 
thought at first that you asked these questions only with reference 
to our friends." " Then," said Socrates, " all that we have placed 
under the head of injustice, we must also place under that of jus- 
tice ? " " It seems so," replied Euthydemus. 16. " Do you agree, 
then," continued Socrates, "that, having so placed them, we should 
make a new distinction, that it is just to do such things with re- 
gard to enemies, but unjust to do them with regard to friends, and 
that toward his friends our general should be as guileless as pos- 
sible?" " By all means," replied Euthydemus. 17. "Well, then," 
said Socrates, " if a general, seeing his army dispirited, should tell 
them, inventing a falsehood, that auxiliaries were coming, and 
should, Jby that invention, check the despondency of his troops, 
under which head. should we place such an act of deceit? " " It 
appears to me," said Euthydemus, "that we must place it under 
justice." "And if a father, when his son requires medicine, and 
refuses to take it, should deceive him, and give him the medicine 
as ordinary food, and, by adopting such deception, should restore 
him to health, under which head must we place such an act of de- 
ceit ? " " It appears to me that we must put it under the same 
head." "And if a person, when his friend was in despondency, 

* D. for DiKAios="just ; : ' A. for Adikos=" unjust." 



388 Kan? s Ethics. § 1039 

should, through fear that he might kill himself, steal or take away 
his sword, or any other weapon, under which head must we place 
that act? " " That, assuredly, we must place under justice." 18. 
" You say, then," said Socrates, " that not even toward our friends 
must we act on all occasions without deceit? " " We must not in- 
deed," said he, " for I retract what I said before, if I may be per- 
mitted to do so." " It is indeed much better that you should be 
permitted," said Socrates, "than that you should not place actions 
on the right side. 19. But of those who deceive their friends in 
order to injure them (that we may not leave even this point un- 
considered), which of the two is the more unjust, he who does so 
intentionally or he who does so involuntarily?" " Indeed, Soc- 
rates," said Euthydemus, "I no longer put confidence in the an- 
swers which I give ; for all that I said before appears to me now 
to be quite different from what I then thought ; however, let me 
venture to say that he who deceives intentionally is more unjust 
than he who deceives involuntarily ? " 

20. " Does it appear to you, then, that there is a way of learning 
and knowing what is just, as there is of learning and knowing 
how to read and write ?" "I think there is." '-'And which should 
you consider the better scholar, him who should purposely write 
or read incorrectly, or him who should do so unawares ? " " Him 
who should do so purposely, for, whenever he pleased, he would 
be able to do both correctly." " He, therefore, that purposely 
writes incorrectly may be a good scholar, but he who does so in- 
voluntarily is destitute of scholarship ? " " How can it be other- 
wise ? " "And whether does he who lies and deceives intentionally 
know what is just, or he who does so unawares ? " " Doubtless he 
who does so intentionally." " You therefore say that he who 
knows how to write and read is a better scholar than he who 
does not know?" "Yes." "And that he who knows what, is 
just is more just than he who does not know?" "I seem 
to say so ; but I appear to myself to say this I know not 
how." 21. " But what would you think of the man, who, 
wishing to tell the truth, should never give the same account 
of the same thing, but, in speaking of the same road, should 
say at one time that it led toward the east, and at another 
toward the west, and, in stating the result of the same calculation, 
should sometimes assert it to be greater and sometimes. less, what, 
I say, would you think of such a man?" "It would be quite 
clear that he knew nothing of what he thought he knew."* 

* This is the conclusion to which Socrates wished to bring Euthydemus with 
regard to his own knowledge of justice ; and to exhort him, at the same time, 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index, 389 

22. "Do you know any persons called slave-like?"* " I do." 
" Whether for their knowledge or their ignorance ? " " For their 
ignorance, certainly." " Is it then for their ignorance of working 
in brass that they receive this appellation ? " " Not at all." " Is it 
for their ignorance of the art of building?" "Nor for that." 
" Or for their ignorance of shoemaking? " " Not on any one of 
these accounts ; for the contrary is the case, as most of those who 
know such trades are servile." "Is this, then, an appellation of 
those who are ignorant of what is honorable, and good and just? " 
" It appears so to me." 23. " It therefore becomes us to exert 
ourselves in every way to avoid being like slaves." " But,f Soc- 
rates," rejoined Euthydemus, " I firmly believed that I was pursu- 
ing that course of study, by which I should, as I expected, be 
made fully acquainted with all that was proper to be known by a 
man striving after honor and virtue ; but now, how dispirited 
must you think I feel, when I see that, with all my previous labor, 
I am not even able to answer a question about what 1 ought most 
of all to know, and am acquainted with no other course which I 
may pursue to become better ! " 

24. Socrates then said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever gone 
to Delphi ? " "Yes, twice," replied he. "And did you observe what 
is written somewhere on the temple wall, Know thyself ? " "I 
did." "And did you take no thought of that inscription, or did 
you attend to it, and try to examine yourself, to ascertain what 
sort of character you are ? " "I did not indeed try, for I thought 
that I knew very well already, since I should hardly know any 
thing else if I did not know myself." 25. " But whether does he 
seem to you to know himself, who knows his own name merely, 
or he who (like people buying, horses, who do not think that they 
know the horse that they want to know, until they have ascer- 
tained whether he is tractable or unruly, whether he is strong or 
weak, swift or slow, and how he is as to other points which are ser- 
viceable or disadvantageous in the use of a horse, so he,) having 
ascertained with regard to himself how he is adapted for the ser- 
vice of mankind, knows his own abilities? " " It appears to me, I 
must confess, that he who does not know his own abilities, does 
not know himself." 26. "But is it not evident," said Socrates, 
" that men enjoy a great number of blessings in consequence of 
knowing themselves, and incur a great number of evils, through 
being deceived in themselves? For they who know themselves 

to gain a knowledge of it. [I omit the remainder of this note.] * Compare I., 
i., 16. [page 327 above], and section 39 of this chapter, t [I omit part of sec- 
tion 23 at this point.] 



390 Kanfs Ethics. § 1039 

know what is suitable for them, and distinguish between what 
they can do and what they can not ; and, by doing what they 
know how to do, procure for themselves what they need, and are 
prosperous, and by abstaining from what they do not know, live 
blamelessly, and avoid being unfortunate. By this knowledge of 
themselves, too, they can form an opinion of other men, and, by 
their experience of the rest of mankind, obtain for themselves 
what is good, and guard against what is evil. 27. But they who 
do not know themselves, but are deceived in their own powers, are 
in similar case with regard to other men, and other human affairs, 
and neither understand what they require, nor what they are do- 
ing, nor the characters of those with whom . they connect them- 
selves, but, being in error as to all these particulars, they fail to 
obtain what is good, and fall into evil. 28. They, on the other 
hand, who understand what they take in hand, succeed in what 
they attempt, and become esteemed and honored ; those who re- 
semble them in character willingly form connections with them ; 
those who are unsuccessful in life desire to be assisted with their 
advice, and to prefer them to themselves ; they place in them their 
hopes of good, and love them, on all these accounts, beyond all 
all other men. 29. But those, again, who do not know what they 
are doing, who make an unhappy choice in life, and are unsuccess- 
ful in what they attempt, not only incur losses and sufferings in 
their own affairs, but become, in consequence, disreputable and 
ridiculous, and drag out their lives in contempt and dishonor. 
Among states, too, you see that such as, from ignorance of their 
own strength, go to war with others that are more powerful, are, 
some of them, utterly overthrown, and others reduced from free- 
dom to slavery." 

30. "Be assured, therefore," replied Euthyclemus, "that I feel 
convinced we must consider self-knowledge of the highest value ; 
but as to the way in which we must begin to seek self-knowledge, 
I look to you for information, if you will kindly impart it to me." 
31. " Well, then," said Socrates, " you doubtless fully understand 
what sort of things are good, and what sort are evil." " Yes,* " 
replied Euthydemus, " for if I did not understand such things, I 
should be in a worse condition than slaves are." " Come then," 
said Socrates, " tell me what they are." "That is not difficult," 
said he, " for, in the first place, health I consider to be a good, and 
sickness an evil, and, in the next, looking to the causes of each of 
them, as drink, food, and employments, I esteem such as conduce 
to health to be good, and such as lead to sickness to be evil." 32. 

* [I omit part of section 31 at this point.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 391 



* 



" Consequently," said Socrates, " health and sickness themselves, 
when they are the causes of any good, will he good, and when 
they are the causes of any evil, will he evil." "But when," exclaimed 
Euthydemus, " can health be the cause of evil, and sickness of 
good ? " " When, for example," said Socrates, " some portion of 
a community, from being in good health, take part in a disgrace- 
ful expedition by land, or a ruinous voyage by sea, or in any other 
such matters, which are sufficiently common, and lose their lives, 
while others, who are left behind from ill-health, are saved." 
" What you say is true," said Euthydemus, "but you see that some 
men share in successful enterprises from being in health, while 
others from being in sickness, are left out of them." " Whether 
then," said Socrates, " are those things which are sometimes bene- 
ficial, and sometimes injurious, goods, rather, or evils? " '-'Noth- 
ings-is to be settled with regard to them by considering thus. 33. 
But as to wisdom, Socrates, it is indisputably a good thing ; for 
what business will not one who is wise conduct better than one 
who is untaught?" "Have you not heard, then, of Daedalus," 
said Socrates, " how he was made prisoner by Minos and compelled 
to serve him as a slave ; how he was cut off, at once, from his 
country and from liberty, and how, when he endeavored to escape 
with his son, he lost the child, and was unable to save himself, but 
was carried away among barbarians, and made a second time a 
slave? " " Such a story is told, indeed," said Euthydemus. " Have 
you not heard, too, of the sufferings of Palamedes? for every body 
says that it was for his wisdom he was envied and put to death by 
Ulysses." " That, too, is said," replied Euthydemus. "And how 
many other men do you think have been carried off to the kingf 
on account of their wisdom, and made slaves there? " 

34. " But as to happiness, Socrates," said Euthydemus, " that at 
least appears to be an indisputable good." " Yes, Euthydemus," 
replied Socrates, " if we make it consist in things that are them- 
selves indisputably good." " But what," said he, " among things 
constituting happiness can be a doubtful good?" "Nothing," 
answered Socrates," unless we join with it beauty, or strength, or 
wealth, or glory, or any other such thing." 35. " But we must as- 
suredly join them with it," said Euthydemus, " for how can a per- 
son be happy without them?" " We shall then join with it, J" 
said Socrates, " things from which many grievous calamities hap- 
pen to mankind ; for many, on account of their beauty, are ruined 
by those who are maddened with passion for their youthful attrac- 

* [I omit part of section 32 at this point.] fThe king of Persia. J [I omit 
a part of section 35 at this point.] 



892 Kant's EtUcs. § 1039 

tions ; many, through confidence in their strength, have entered 
upon undertakings too great for it, and involved themselves in no 
small disasters ; many, in consequence of their wealth, have be- 
come enervated, been plotted against, and destroyed ; and many, 
from the glory and power that they have acquired in their coun- 
try, have suffered the greatest calamities." 36. " Well, then," 
said Euthydemus, " if 1 do not say what is right when I praise hap- 
piness, I confess that I do not know what we ought to pray for.*" 

"These points, however," proceeded Socrates, " you have per- 
haps not sufficiently considered, from too confident a belief that 
you were already well acquainted with them ; but since you in- 
tend to be at the head of a democratic government, you doubtless 
know what a democracy is." "Assuredly," said he. 37. " Do you 
think it possible for a person to know what a democracy is, with- 
out knowing what the Demos is?" "No, indeed." "And what 
do you conceive the Demos to be?" "I conceive it to be the 
poorer class of citizens." "Do you know, then, which are the 
poor?" " How can I help knowing ? " "You know then which 
are the rich?" "Just as well as I know which are the poor." 
" Which sort of persons then do jou call poor, and which sort 
rich?" "Those who have not sufficient means to pay for the 
necessaries of life, I regard as poor ; those who have more than 
sufficient, I consider rich." " Have you ever observed, then, that 
to some who have very small means, those means are not only suf- 
ficient, but that they even save from them, while, to many, very 
large fortunes are not sufficient? " " I have indeed," said Euthy- 
demus, " (for you very properly p U t me in mind of it), since I 
have known some princes, who, from poverty, have been driven 
to commit injustice like the very poorest people." 39. " Then," 
said Socrates, " if such be the case, we must rank such princes 
among the Demos, and those that have but little, we must rank, if 
they be good managers, among the rich?" "My own want of 
knowledge, indeed," said Euthydemus; " obliges me to admit even 
this; and I am considering whether it would not be best forme 
to be silent ; for I seem to know absolutely nothing." 

He went away, accordingly, in great dejection, holding himself 
in contempt, and thinking that he was in realit} r no better than a 
slave. 

40. Of those who were thus addressed by Socrates, many came 
to him no more ; and these he regarded as too dull to be improved. 
But Euthydemus, on the contrary, conceived that he could by no 
other means become an estimable character than by associating 

*[I omit part of section 36 at this point.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 393 

with Socrates as much as possible ; and he in consequence never 
quitted him, unless some necessary tmsiness obliged him to do so. 
He also imitated many of his habits. 

When Socrates saw that he was thus disposed, he no longer 
puzzled him with questions, but explained to him, in the simplest 
and clearest manner, what he thought that he ought to know, and 
what it would be best for him to study. 

IV., iii., 1. Socrates was never in haste that his followers should 
become skillful in speaking, in action, or in invention, but, previous 
to such accomplishments, he thought it proper that a love of self- 
control should be instilled into them; for he considered that those 
who had acquired those qualifications were, if devoid of self-con- 
trol, only better fitted to commit injustice and to do mischief. 2. 
In the first place, therefore, he endeavored to impress his associ- 
ates with right feelings toward the gods. Some, who were present 
with him when he conversed with others on this subject, have 
given an account of his discourses ; but I myself was with him 
when he held a conversation with Euthydemus to the following 
effect. 

3. " Tell me," said he " Euthydemus, has it ever occured to you 
to consider how carefully the gods have provided for men every 
thing that they require?" "It has indeed never occurred to me," 
replied he. ; ' You know at least," proceeded Socrates, " that we 
stand in need, first of all, of light, with which the gods supply us." 
" Yes,*" answered Euthydemus, "for if we had no light, we should 
be, as to the use of our eyes, like the blind." " But, as we re- 
quire rest, they afford us night, the most suitable season for re- 
pose." "That is assuredly," said Euthydemus, "a subject for 
thankfulness." 4. " Then because the sun, being luminous, shows 
us the hours of the day, and every thing else, while the night, 
being dark, prevents us from making such distinctions in it, have 
they not caused the stars to shine in the night, which show us the 
night-watches, and under the direction of which we perform many 
things that we require ? " " So it is, " said he. " The moon, too, 
makes plain to us not only the divisions of the night, but also of 
the month." "Assuredly," said he, 5. " But that, since we re- 
quire food, they should raise it for us from the earth, and appoint 
suitable seasons for the purpose, which prepare for us, in abund- 
ance and every variety, not only things which we need, 
but also things from which we derive pleasure, what do you 
think of such gifts?" "They certainly indicate love for 
man." 6. "And that they should supply us with water, an 

* [I omit part of section 3 at this point.] 

26 



394 Kant's Miles. § 1039 

element of such value to us, that it causes to spring up, and 
unites with the earth and the seasons in bringing to maturity, 
every thing useful for us, and assists also to nourish ourselves, 
and, being mixed with all our food, renders it easier of digestion, 
more serviceable, and more pleasant ; and that, as we require 
water in great quantities, they should supply us With it in such 
profusion, what do you think of such a gift? " " That also," said 
he, " shows thought for us." 7. " That they should also give us 
fire, a protection against cold and darkness, an auxiliary in every 
art and in everything that men prepare for their use (for, in a 
word, men produce nothing, among the various things necessary 
to life, without the aid of fire), what do you think of such a gift? " 
" That likewise," said he, gives eminent proof of regard for man."* 

11. " But that, since there are numberless beautiful and useful 
objects in the world, greatly differing from one another, the gods 
should have bestowed on men senses adapted to each of them, by 
means of which we enjoy every advantage from them ; that they 
should have implanted understanding in us, by means of which 
we reason about what we perceive by the senses, and, assisted by 
the memory, learn how far every thing is beneficial, and contrive 
many plans by which we enjoy good and avoid evil ; 12. and that 
they should have given us the faculty of speech, by means of 
which we convey information to one another, and mutually impart 
whatever is good, and participate in it, enact laws, and enjoy con- 
stitutional government, what think you of such blessings?" 
" The gods certainly appear, Socrates, to exercise the greatest care 
for man in every way." "And that, since we are unable to fore- 
see ' what is for our advantage with regard to the future, they 
should assist us in that, respect, communicating what will happen 
to those who inquire of them by divination, and instructing them 
how their actions may be most for their benefit, what thoughts 
does that produce in you ? " " The gods seem to show you, Soc- 
rates," rejoined he, " more favor than other men, since they indi- 
cate to you, without being asked, what you ought to do, and what 
not to do." 

13. "And that I speak the truth, f you yourself also will know, 
if you do not expect to see the bodily forms of the gods, but will 
be content, as you behold their works, to worship and honor them. 
Reflect, too, that the gods themselves give vis this intimation ; J for 
the other deities || that give us blessings, do not bestow any of 

* [I omit sections 8-10.] | In saying that the gods assist and admonish us. 
% That we must not expect, when we consult the gods, to see their shapes. — 
Kuehner. \\ Socrates and those who followed him. Plato, the Stoics, and Cicero, 



§ 1039 The Olavis to an Index. 395 

them by coming manifestly before our sight ; and he that orders 
and holds together the whole universe, in which are all things 
beautiful and good, and who preserves it always unimpaired, un- 
disordered, and undecaying, obeying his will swifter than thought 
and without irregularity, is himself manifested only in the per- 
formance of his mighty works, but is invisible to us while he reg- 
ulates them. 14. Consider also that the sun, which appears mani- 
fest to all, does not allow men to contemplate him too curiously, 
but, if any one tries to gaze on him steadfastly, deprives him of 
his sight. The instruments of the deities you will likewise find 
imperceptible ; for the thunder-bolt, for instance, though it is plain 
that it is sent from above, and works its will with every thing 
with which it comes in contact, is yet never seen either approach- 
ing, or striking, or retreating ; the winds, too, are themselves in- 
visible, though their effects are evident to us, and we perceive 
their course. The soul of man, moreover, which partakes of the 
divine nature if any thing else in man does, rules, it is evident, 
within us, but is itself unseen. Meditating on these facts, there- 
fore, it behooves you not to despise the unseen gods, but, estimating 
their power from what is done by them, to reverence what is 
divine." 

15. "I feel clearly persuaded, Socrates," said Euthydemus, " that 
I shall never fail, in the slightest degree, in respect for the divine 
power, but I am dejected at the thought that no one among man- 
kind, as it seems to me, can ever requite the favors of the gods 
with due gratitude." 16. " But be not dejected at that reflection, 
Euthydemus,'' said Socrates, ' ; for you know that the deity at 
Delphi, whenever any one consults him how he may propitiate 
the gods, answers, According. to the law of yottr country ; * and 
it is the law, indeed, every where, that every man should propiti- 
ate the gods with offerings according to hisf ability ; and how, there- 
fore, can any man honor the gods better or more piously, than by 
acting as they themselves direct ? 17. It behooves us, however, not 
to do less than we are able, for, when any one acts thus, he plainly 
shows that he does not honor the gods. But it becomes him who 
fails, in no respect, to honor the gods according to his means, to be 



were advocates of the opinion that, besides the one supreme God, there were 
others, far inferior to him, but immortal, and of great power and endowments, 
whom the supreme God employed, as his ministers, in the government of the 
world; a subject which I have discussed at some length in a treatise de M. T. 
Oiceronis in philosophiam meritis, Hamb. 1825. — Kuehuer. * See I., iii, } 2, 
[page 335 above], t [See 1., iii., 3 (page 335 above), and cf. Mark, xii., 43, (page 
235 above).] 



396 Kanfs Ethics. § 1039 

of good courage, and to hope for the greatest blessings; for no 
one can reasonably hope for greater blessings from others than 
from those who are able to benefit him most ; nor on any other 
grounds than by propitiating them ; and how can he propitiate 
them better than by obeying them to the utmost of his power? " 

18, By uttering such sentiments, and by acting according to 
them himself, he rendered those who conversed with him more 
pious and prudent. 

IV., iv., 1. Concerning justice, too, he did not conceal what 
sentiments he entertained, but made them manifest even by his 
actions, for he conducted himself, in his private capacity, justly 
and beneficently toward all men, and, as a citizen, he obeyed the 
magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, both in the city and on 
military expeditions, so that he was distinguished above other men 
for his observance of order. 2. When he was president in the 
public assembly, he would not permit the people to give a vote 
contrary to law, but opposed himself, in defense of the laws, to 
such a storm of rage on the part of the populace as I think that 
no other man could have withstood.* 3. When the Thirty Ty- 
rants commanded him to do any thing contrary to the laws, he re- 
fused to obey them ; for both when they forbade him to converse 
with the young, and when they ordered him, and some others of 
the citizens, to lead a certain person away to death, he alone did 
not obey, because the order was given contrary to the laws. 4. 
When he was accused by Meletus, and others were accustomed, 
before the tribunal, to speak so as to gain the favor of the judges, 
and to flatter them, and supplicate them, in violation of the laws, 
and many persons, by such practices, had often been acquitted by 
the judges, he refused, on his trial, to comply with any practices 
opposed to the laws, and though he might easily have been ac- 
quitted by his judges, if he had but in a slight degree adopted any 
of those customs, he chose rather to die abiding by the laws than 
to save his life by transgressing them. 

5. He held conversations to this effect with others on several oc- 
casions, and I know that he once had a dialogue of the following 
kind, concerning justice, with Hippias of Elis ; for Hippias, on his 
return to Athens after an absence of some time, happened to come 
in the way of Socrates as he was observing to some people how 
surprising it was that, if a man wished to have another taught to 
be a shoemaker, or a carpenter, or a worker in brass, or a rider, 
he was at no loss whither he should send him to effect his object;! 

* See I., i., 18 [page 327 above], t [I omit part of section 5 at this point ; see 
Mr. Watson ; s note.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 397 

while as to justice, if any one wished either to learn it himself, or 
to have his son or his slave taught it, he did not know whither he 
should go to obtain his desire. 6. Hippias, hearing this remark, 
said, as if jesting with him, " What ! are you still saying the same 
things, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?" "Yes," 
said Soci*ates, "and what is more wonderful, I am not only still 
saying the same things, but am saying them on the same subjects; 
but you, perhaps, from being possessed of such variety of knowl- 
edge, never say the same things on the same subjects." " Cer- 
tainly," replied Hippias, " I do always try to say something new." 
7. "About matters of which you have certain knowledge, then," 
said Socrates, " as, for instance, about the letters of the alphabet, if 
any one were to ask you how many and what letters are in the word 
'Socrates,' would you try to say sometimes one thing, and some- 
times another? or to people who might ask you about numbers, as 
whether twice five are ten, would you not give the same answer at 
one time as at another?" "About such matters, Socrates," re- 
plied Hippias, " I, like you, always say the same thing ; but con- 
cerning justice I think that I have certainly something to say now 
which neither you nor any other person can refute." 8. * " It is 
a great good that you say you have discovered, since the judges 
will now cease from giving contradictory sentences, the citizens 
will cease from disputing about what is just, from going to law, 
and from quarreling, and communities will cease from contending 
about their rights and going to war ; and I know not how I can 
part with 3^011 till I have learned so important a benefit from its 
discoverer." 9. " You shall not hear it,f " rejoined Hippias, "until 
you yourself declare what you think justice to be ; for it is enough 
that you laugh at others, questioning and confuting every body, 
while you yourself are unwilling to give a reason to any body, or 
to declare your opinion on any subject." 10. " What then, Hip- 
pias," said Socrates. " have you not perceived that I never cease 
declaring my opinion as to what I conceive to be just? " "And 
what is this opinion of yours?" said Hippias. " If I make it 
known to you, not by words merely, but by actions, do not deeds 
seem to you to be a stronger evidence than words?" "Much 
stronger,^" said Hippias, " for many who say what is just do what 
is unjust, but a man who does what is just can not be himself un- 
just." 11. " Have you ever then found me bearing false witness, or 
giving malicious information, or plunging my friends or the state 
into quarrels, or doing anything else that is unjust?" "I have 

* [I omit part of section 8 at this point.] t [I omit part of section 9 at this 
point.] X [I omit part of section 10 at this point.] 



398 Kanfs Ethics. § 1039 

not." "And do you not think it justice to refrain from injustice?" 
"You are plainly, now," said Hippias, " endeavoring to avoid ex- 
pressing an opinion as to what you think just ; for what you say 
is, not what the just do, hut what they do not do." 12. "But I 
thought," rejoined Socrates, " that to be unwilling to do injustice 
was a sufficient proof of justice. If this, however, does not satisfy 
you, consider whether what I next say will please you better ; for 
I assert that what is in conformity with the laws is just." " Do 
you say, Socrates, that to be conformable to the laws, and to be 
just, is the same thing?" "I do, indeed." 13. "1 am puzzled; 
for I do not understand what you call conformable to law, or what 
you call just." " Do you know the laws of the state? " said Soc- 
rates. "I do," said the other. "And what do you consider them 
to be ? " " What the citizens in concert have enacted as to what 

WE OUGHT TO DO, AND WHAT WE OUGHT TO AVOID DOING." " Would 

not he, therefore," asked Socrates, "be an observer of the laws 
who should conduct himself in the community agreeably to those 
enactments, and he be a violator of the laws who transgresses 
them?" "Undoubtedly," said Hippias. "Would not he, then, 
do what is just who obeys the laws, and he do what is unjust who 
disobeys them ? " " Certainly." " Is not he, then, just who does 
what is just, and he unjust who does what is unjust?" "How 
can it be otherwise? " " He, therefore, that conforms to the laws 
. is just," added Socrates, " and he who violates the laws, unjust." 

14. " But," objected Hippias, "how can any one imagine the 
laws, or obedience to them, to be a matter of absolute importance, 
when the very persons who make them often reject and alter 
them?" "That objection is of no consequence," said Socrates, 
" for states, which have commenced war, often make peace again." 
" Undoubtedly they do," said Hippias. " What difference will 
there be in your conduct, then, think you, if you throw contempt 
on those who obey the laws, because the laws may be changed, 
and if you blame those who act properly in war, because peace 
may be made ? Do you condemn those who vigorously support 
their country in war? " " I do not, indeed," replied Hippias. 15. 
" Have you ever heard it said of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian, 
then," said Socrates, " that he would not have made Sparta at all 
different from other states, if he had not established in it, beyond 
others, a spirit of obedience to the laws? Do you not know, too, 
that of magistrates in states, those are thought the best who are 
most efficient in producing obedience to the laws, and that that 
state in which the citizens pay most respect to the laws, is in the 
best condition in peace, and invincible in war ? 16. The greatest 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 399 

blessing to states, moreover, is concord ; and the senates and prin- 
cipal men in them often exhort the citizens to unanimity ; and 
every where throughout Greece it is a law that the citizens shall 
take an oath to observe concord, an oath which they every where 
do take ; but I conceive that this is done, not that the citizens may 
approve of the same choruses, or that they may praise the same 
flute -players, or that they may prefer the same poets, or that they 
may take delight in the same spectacles, but that they may obey 
the laws; for while the citizens adhere to these, states will be 
eminently powerful and happy ; but without such unanimity, no 
state can be well governed, nor any family well regulated. 17, 
As an individual citizen, too, how could any person render himself 
less liable to penalties from the government, or more likely to have 
honors bestowed upon him, than by being obedient to the laws? 
How else would he incur fewer defeats in the courts of justice, or 
how more certainly obtain sentence in his favor ? To whom would 
any one believe that he could more safely confide his money, or 
his sons or daughters ? Whom would the whole community deem 
more trustworthy than him who respects the laws ? From whom 
would parents, or relatives, or domestics, or friends, or citizens, or 
strangers, more certainly obtain their rights ? To whom would 
the enemy sooner trust in cessations of arms, or in making a 
truce, or articles of peace ? To whom would people more willingly 
become allies than to the observer of the laws, and to whom 
would the allies more willingly trust the leadership, or command 
of a fortress, or of a city ? From whom would any one expect to 
meet with gratitude, on doing him a kindness, sooner than from 
the observer of the laws ? Or whom would any one rather serve 
than him from whom he expects to receive a return ? To whom 
would any one more desire to be a friend, or less desire to be an 
enemy, than such a man ? With whom would any one be less in- 
clined to go to war, than with him to whom he would most wish 
to be a friend, and least of all an enemy, and to whom the greatest 
part of mankind would wish to be friends and allies, and but a 
small number to be antagonists and enemies? 18. I, therefore, 
Hippias, pronounce that to obey the laws and to be just is the 
same ; if you hold an opinion to the contrary, tell me." " Indeed, 
Socrates," rejoined Hippias, "I do not know that 1 entertain any 
sentiments opposed to what you have said of justice." 

19. " But are you aware, Hippias," continued Socrates, " that 
there are unwritten laws?" "You mean those," said Hippias, 
"that are in force about the same points, every where." "Can 
you affirm, then, that men made those laws ?" "How could they," 



400 Kant's Mines. § 1039 

said Hippias, " when they could not all meet together, and do not 
all speak the same language? " " Whom, then, do you suppose to 
have made these laws? " " I believe," said he, "that it was the 
gods who made these laws for men, for among all men the first 
law is to venerate the gods." 20. " Is it not also a law every 
where to honor parents ? " " It is so." " Is it not a law, too, that 
parents shall not intermarry with their children, nor children with 
their parents ? " " This does not, as yet, Socrates, appear to me to 
be a law of the gods." "Why?" "Because I find that some 
nations transgress it." 21. " Many others, too, they transgress," 
said Socrates ; " but those who violate the laws made by the gods 
incur punishment which it is by no means possible for man to escape, 
as many transgressors of the laws made by men escape punish- 
ment, some by concealment, others by open violence."* 

24. " Is it not every where a law, also," said Socrates, " that 
men should do good to those who do good to them?" " It is a 
law," answered Hippias, " but it is transgressed." " Do not those 
therefore who transgress it incur punishment," continued Socrates, 
" by being deprived of good friends, and being compelled to have 
recourse to those who hate them ? Are not such as do service to 
those who seek it of them good friends to themselves, and are not 
those who make no return to such as serve them hated by them 
for their ingratitude ; and yet, because it is for their advantage to 
have their support, do they not pay the greatest court to them ? " 
" Indeed, Socrates," replied Hippias, " all these things seem to suit 
the character of the gods; for that the laws themselves should 
carry with them punishments for those who transgress them, ap- 
pears to me to be the appointment of a lawgiver superior to man." 

25. " Whether, therefore, Hippias," added Socrates, " do you 
consider that the gods appoint as laws, what is agreeable to just- 
ice, or what is at variance with justice? " " Not what is at vari- 
ance with justice, certainly," said Hippias, " for scarcely would 
any other make laws in conformity with justice, if a god were not 
to do so." " It is the pleasure of the gods, therefore, Hippias," 
concluded Socrates, " that what is in conformity with justice should 
also be in conformity with the laws." 

By uttering such sentiments, and acting in agreement with 
them, he rendered those who conversed with him more observant 
of justice. 

BOOK IV., chapter V., § 1. I will now relate how he ren- 
dered his followers better qualified for the management of public 
business. Thinking it expedient that temperance should be ob- 

* [I omit sections 22 and 23.] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. ■ 401 

served by him who would succeed in anything honorable, he first 
made it evident to those who conversed with him, that he prac- 
ticed this virtue beyond all other men, and then, by his discourse, 
he exhorted his followers, above everything, to the observance of 
temperance. He continued always, therefore, to make allusions 
to whatever was conducive to virtue ; and I know that he once 
held a conversation on temperance with Euthydemus, to the fol- 
lowing effect : 2. "Tell me," said he, " Euthydemus, do you re- 
gard liberty as an excellent and honorable possession for an indi- 
vidual or a community?" -'The most excellent and honorable 
that can be," replied he. 3. " Do you consider him, then, who is 
held under control by the pleasures of the body, and is rendered 
unable, by their influence, to do what is best for him, to be free? " 
" By no means," replied Euthydemus. " Perhaps, then, to have 
the power or doing what is best seems to you to be freedom, but 
to be under influences which will hinder you from doing it, you 
consider to be want of freedom? " "Assuredly," said he. 4. "Do 
not the intemperate appear to you, then, to be absolutely without 
freedom ? " " Yes,* and naturally so." "And whether do the in- 
temperate appear to you to be merely prevented from doing what 
is best, or to be forced, also, to do what is most dishonorable?" 
"They appear to me," replied Euthydemus, "to be not less forced 
to do the one than they are hindered from doing the other." 5. 
"And what sort of masters do you consider those to be, who hin- 
der men from doing what is best, and force them to do what is 
worst?" "The very worst possible, f" replied he. "And what 
sort of slavery do you consider to be the worst ? " " That," said 
he, " under the worst masters ? " " Do not then the intemperate," 
said Socrates, " endure the very worst of slavery? " " It appears 
so to me," answered Euthydemus. 6. "And does not intemperance 
seem to you, by banishing from men prudence,! the greatest good, 
to drive them into the very opposite evil ? Does it not appear to you 
to hinder them from attending to useful things, and learning them, 
by drawing them away to pleasure, and frequently, by captivating 
those who have a perception of good and evil, to make them 
choose the worse instead of the better?" " Such is the case," 
said he. 

7. "And whom can we suppose, Euthydemus, to have less par- 
ticipation in self-control than the intemperate man? for assuredly 
the acts of self-control and of intemperance are the very opposite 

* [I omit a portion of section 4 at this point.] t[I omit a portion of section 
5 at this point.] J[Anthon (Harper, 1868, page 357) translates: "to shut 
out from men wisdom, the greatest good," etc.] 



402 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

to each other." " I assent to this also," said he. "And do you 
think that any thing is a greater hinderanee to attention to what 
is becoming, than intemperance?" "I do not." "And do you 
imagine that there is any greater evil to man, than that which 
makes him prefer the noxious to the beneficial, which prompts him 
to pursue the one and to neglect the other, and which forces 
him to pursue a contrary course of conduct to that of the wise?" 
" There is none," said Euthydemus. 

8. " Is it not natural, then." said Socrates, " that temperance 
should be the cause of producing in men effects contrary to those 
which intemperance produces?" "Undoubtedly," said Euthyde- 
mus. " Is it not natural, therefore, also, that what produces those 
contrary effects should be best for man ? " " It is natural," said he. 
" Is it not consequently natural then, Euthydemus, that temper- 
ance should be best for man ? " " It is so, Socrates," said he. 9. 
"And have }-ou ever reflected upon this, Euthydemus ? " " What? " 
"That even to those pleasures, to which alone intemperance seems to 
lead men, it can not lead them, but that, temperance produces greater 
pleasure than any thing else?" "How ?" said he. "Because intemper- 
ance, by not allowing men to withstand hunger, thirst, or the desire 
of sensual gratification; or want of sleep (through which privations 
alone is it possible for them to eat,and drink, and gratify other natural 
appetites, and go to rest and sleep with pleasure, waiting and re- 
straining themselves until the inclinations may be most happily 
indulged), hinders them from having any due enjoyment in acts 
most necessary and most habitual ; but temperance, which alone 
enables men to endure the privations which I have mentioned, 
alone enables them to find delight in the gratifications to which I 
have alluded." " What you say," observed Euthydemus, " is in- 
disputably true." 10. "From learning what is honorable and 
good, moreover, and from the study of those accomplishments by 
which a man may ably govern himself, judiciously regulate his 
household, become useful to his friends and the state, and gain the 
mastery over his enemies (from which studies arise not only the 
greatest advantages, but also the greatest pleasures), the temper- 
ate have enjoyment while they practice them, but the intemperate 
have no share in any of them ; for to whom can we say that it less 
belongs to participate in such advantages, than to him who has 
the least power to pursue them, being wholly occupied in atten- 
tion to present pleasures?" 11, "You seem tome, Socrates," 
said Euthydemus, " to say that the man who is under the influence 
of bodily pleasures, has no participation in any one virtue." 
" For what difference is there, Euthydemus," said he, " between an 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 403 

intemperate man and the most ignorant brute ? How will he, 
who has no regard to what is best, but seeks only to enjoy what is 
most seductive by any means in his power, differ from the most 
senseless cattle ? To the temperate alone it belongs to consider 
what is best in human pursuits, to distinguish those pursuits, ac- 
cording to experience and reason, into their several classes, and 
then to choose the good and refrain from the evil." 

12. Thus it was, he said, that men became most virtuous and 
happy, and most skillful in reasoning ; and he observed that the 
expression dialegesthai, '•' to reason," had its origin in people's 
practice of meeting together to reason on matters, and distinguish- 
ing them, dia-legontas, according to their several kinds. It was the 
duty of every one, therefore, he thought, to make himself ready 
in this art, and to study it with the greatest diligence • for that 
men, by the aid of it, became most accomplished, most able to 
guide others, and most acute in discussion. 

IV., vi., 1. I will now endeavor to show that Socrates rendered 
those who associated with him more skillful in argument. For he 
thought that those who knew the nature of things severally, would 
be able to explain them to others ; but as to those who did not 
know, he said that it was not surprising that they fell into error 
themselves, and led others into it. He therefore never ceased to 
reason with his associates about the nature of things. To go 
through all the terms that he denned, and to show how he de- 
finited them, would be a long task ; but I will give as many in- 
stances as I think will suffice to show the nature of his reasoning.* 

2. In the first jdace, then, he reasoned of piety, in some such 
way as this. " Tell me," said he, " Euthydemus, what sort of 
feeling do you consider piety to be?" "The most noble of all 
feelings," replied he. " Can you tell me, then, who is a pious 
man ? " " The man, I think, who honors the gods." " Is it allow- 
able to pay honor to the gods in any way that one pleases?" 
" No ; there are certain laws in conformity with which we must 
pay our honors to them." 3. " He, then, who knows these laws, 
will know how he must honor the gods?" "I think so." "He 
therefore who knows how to pay honor to the gods, will not think 
that he ought to pay it otherwise than as he knows ? " " Doubt- 
less not." " But does any one pay honors to the gods otherwise 
than as he thinks that he ought to pa}' them?" "I think not." 
4. " He therefore who knows what is agreeable to the laws with 
regard to the gods, will honor the gods in agreement with the 

* [This chapter is of the highest importance in establishing the principles 
of the Socratic philosophy. Cf. IV., i., 5 (page 383), and III., ix (page 377).] 



404 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

laws? " " Certainly." " Does not he, then, who honors the gods 
agreeably to the laws honor them as he ought? " " How can he 
do otherwise? " "And he who honors them as he ought, is pious?" 
" Certainly." " He therefore who knows what i3 agreeable to the 
laws with regard to the gods, may be justly defined by us as a 
pious man? " " So it appears to me," said Euthydemus. 

5. " Bat is it allowable for a person to conduct himself toward 
other men in whatever way he pleases ? " " No ; but with respect 
to men also, he who knows what is in conformity with the laws, 
and how men ought, according to them, to conduct themselves to- 
ward each other, will be an observer of the laws." " Do not those, 
then, who conduct themselves toward each other according to 
what is in conformity with the laws, conduct themselves toward 
each other as they ought? " " How can it be otherwise? " " Do 
not those, therefore, who conduct themselves toward each other as 
they ought, conduct themselves well? " "Certainly." " Do not 
those, then, that conduct themselves well toward each other, act 
properly in transactions between man and man ? " " Surely." 
" Do not those, then, who obey the laws, do what is just? " " Un- 
doubtedly." 6. "And do you know what sort of actions are called 
just?" "Those which the laws sanction." "Those, therefore, 
who do what the laws sanction, do what is just, and what they 
ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Those who do just 
things, therefore, are just ? " "I think so." " Do you think that 
any persons yield obedience to the laws who do not know what the 
laws sanction ? " " I do not." "And do you think that any who 
know what they ought to do, think that they ought not to do it? " 
"I do not think so." "And do you know any persons that do 
other things than those which they think they ought to do ? " "I 
do not." " Those, therefore, who know what is agreeable to the 
laws in regard to men. do what is just?" "Certainly." "And 
are not those who do what is just, just men? " " Who else can be 
so?" "Shall we not define rightly, therefore/' concluded Soc- 
rates, " if we define those to be just who know what is agreeable 
to the laws in regard to men?" "It appears so to me," said 
Euthydemus. 

7. "And what shall we say that wisdom is ? Tell me, whether 
do men seem to you to be wise, in things which they know, or in 
things which they do not know ? " " In what they know, cer- 
tainly ; for how can a man be wise in things of which he knows 
nothing? " " Those, then, who are wise, are wise by their knowl- 
edge ? " " By what else can a man be wise, if not by his knowl- 
edge ? " " Do you think wisdom, then, to be any thing else than 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 405 

that by which men are wise? " " I do not."' " Is knowledge, then, 
wisdom ? " "It appears so to me." " Does it appear to you, how- 
ever, that it is possible for a man to know all things that are ? " 
« No ;* not even, as I think, a comparatively small portion of them." 
" It is not therefore possible for a man to be wise in all things ? " 
" No, indeed." " Every man is wise, therefore, in that only of 
which he has a knowledge ?" " So it seems to me." 

8. " Shall we thus, too, Euthydemus," said he, " inquire what is 
good?" " How?" said Euthydemus. " Does the same thing ap- 
pear to you to be beneficial to every body ? " " No." "And does 
not that which is beneficial to one person appear to you to be 
sometimes hurtful to another? " "Assuredly." " Would you say, 
then, that any thing is good that is not beneficial? " " I would 
not." "What is beneficial, therefore, is good, to whomsoever it is 
beneficial? " " It appears so to me," said Euthydemvis. 

9. "And can we define the beautiful in any other way than if 
you term whatever is beautiful, whether a person, or a vase, or 
any thing else whatsoever, beautiful for whatever purpose you 
know that it is beautiful?" y " No, indeed," said Euthydemus. 
" For whatever purpose, then, anything may be useful, for that 
purpose it is beautiful to use it?" "Certainly." "And is any 
thing beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is 
beautiful to use it?" " For no other purpose," replied he. "What 
is useful is beautiful, therefore, for that purpose for which it is 
beautiful? " " So I think," said he. 

10. "As to courage, Euthydemus," said Socrates, " do you think 
it is to be numbered among excellent things?" " I think it one 
of the most excellent," replied Euthyclenius.J " Does it appear to 
you to be useful, with regard to formidable and dangerous things, 
to be ignorant of their character?" "By no means." "They, 
therefore, who do not fear such things, because the}- do not know 
what they are, are not courageous ? " " Certainly not ; for, in 
that case, many madmen and even cowards would be courageous." || 
11. " But do you think that any other persons are good, with ref- 
erence to terrible and dangerous circumstances, except those who 
are able to conduct themselves well under them?" " No, those 
only," said he. "And you think those bad with regard to them, 
who are of such a character as to conduct themselves badly under 
them?" "Whom else can I think so?" "Do not each, then, 
conduct themselves under them as they think they ought ? " "How 
can it be otherwise ? " " Do those, therefore, who do not conduct 

*[I omit part of section 7 at this point.] t Of. III., viii., 7 [page 376 above]. 
% [I omit part of section 10 at this point.] || [I omit the remainder of section 10.] 



406 Kane s Ethics. § 1039 

themselves properly under them, know how they ought to conduct 
themselves under them? " "Doubtless not." "Those then who 
know how they ought to conduct themselves under them, can do so?" 
"And they alone/' " Do those, therefore, who do not fail under 
such circumstances, conduct themselves badly under them? " " I 
think not." " Those then who do conduct themselves badly under 
them, do fail?" "It seems so." " Those, therefore, who know 
how to conduct themselves well in terrible and dangerous circum- 
stances are courageous, and those who fail to do so are cowards? " 
" They at least appear so to me," said Euthydemus. 

12. Monarchy and tyranny he considered to be both forms of 
government, but conceived that they differed greatly from one 
another ; for a government over men with their own consent, and 
in conformity with the laws of free states, he regarded as a mon- 
archy ; but a government over men against their will, and not ac- 
cording to the laws of free states, but just as the ruler pleased, a 
tyranny ; and wherever magistrates were appointed from among 
those who complied with the injunctions of the laws, he considered 
the government to be an aristocracy ; wherever they were ap- 
pointed according to their wealth, a plutocracy ; and wherever 
they were appointed from among the whole people, a democracy. 

13. Whenever any person contradicted him on any point, who 
had nothing definite to say, and who perhaps asserted, without 
proof, that some person, whom he mentioned, was wiser, or better 
skilled in political affairs, or possessed of greater courage, or worthier 
in some such respect, ((than some other whom Socrates had men- 
tioned)), he would recall the whole argument, in some such way 
as the following, to the primary proposition : 14. " Do you say 
that he whom you commend, is a better citizen than he whom I com- 
mend ? " "I do say so." " Why should we then not consider, in 
the first place, what is the duty of a good citizen ? " " Let us do 
so ." " Would not he then be superior in the management of the 
public money who should make the state richer?" "Undoubt- 
edly." "And he in war who should make it victorious over its 
enemies?" "Assuredly." "And in an embassy he who should 
make friends of foes ? " " Doubtless." "And he in addressing the 
people who should check dissension and inspire them with unani- 
mity?" " I think so." When the discussion was thus brought 
back to fundamental principles, the truth was made evident to 
those who had opposed him. 

15. When he himself went through any subject in argument, he 
proceeded upon propositions of which the truth Was generally ac- 
knowledged, thinking that a sure foundation was thus formed for 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 407 

his reasoning. Accordingly, whenever lie spoke, he, of all men 
that I have known, most readily prevailed on his hearers to assent 
to his arguments ; and he used to say that Homer had attributed 
to Ulysses the character of a sure orator, as being able to form his 
reasoning on points acknowledged by all mankind. 

IV., vii., 1. That Socrates expressed his sentiments with sin- 
cerity to those who conversed with him, is, I think, manifest from 
what I have said. I will now proceed to show how much it was 
his care that his followers should be competently qualified for em- 
ployments suited to their powers. Of all men that I have known, 
he was the most anxious to discover in what occupation each of 
those who attended him was likely to prove skillful ; and of all 
that it becomes a man of honor and virtue to know, he taught 
them himself, whatever he knew, with the utmost cheerfulness ; 
and what he had not sufficient knowledge to teach, he took them 
to those who knew, to learn. 

2. He taught them also how far it was proper that a well-edu- 
cated man should he versed in any department of knowledge. 
Geometry, for instance, he said that a man should study until he 
should be capable, if occasion required, to take or give land cor- 
rectly by measurement ; or to divide it or portion it out for culti- 
vation ; and this, he observed, it was so easy to learn, that he who 
gave any attention at all to mensuration, might find how large 
the whole earth was, and perfectly understand how it was meas- 
ured. 3. But of pursuing the study of geometry to diagrams hard 
to understand, he disapproved ; for he said that he could not see of 
what profit they were.* though he himself was by no means un- 
skilled in them ; but he remarked that they were enough to con- 
sume a man's whole life, and hinder him from attaining many 
other valuable branches of knowledge. 

4. He recommended his followers to learn astronomy also, but 
only so far as to be able to know the hour of the night, the 
month, and the season of the year, with a view to traveling 
by land or sea, or distinguishing the night-watches ; and to be 
competent, by knowing the divisions of the above-mentioned times, 
to profit by the signs for whatever other things are done at a cer- 

* Socrates did not altogether condemn the study of geometry and astronomy, 
but disapproved of the general practice of the philosophers of his own age, who 
devoted themselves wholly to difficult questions concerning the figure of the 
earth, etc., to the entire neglect of moral philosophy. Plato, Pha^d. c. 46, agrees 
with Xenophon ; and, indeed, an immoderate pursuit of such studies was al- 
together alien from the affairs of common life and morality, to which alone Soc- 
rates gave his serious attention. — Zeune. [I omit the remainder of this note.] 



408 Kant's Ethics. § 1039 

tain period of the night, or month, or year. These particulars, he 
said, were easily learned from men who hunted by night, from 
pilots, and from many others whose business it was to know them. 
5. But to continue the study of astronomy so far as to distinguish 
the bodies which do not move in the same circle with the heavens* 
the planets, and the irregular stars. f and to weary ourselves in in- 
quiring into their distances from the earth, the periods of their 
revolutions, and the causes of all these things, was what he greatly 
discountenanced ; for he saw, he said, no profit in these studies 
either,| though he had himself given attention to them ; since 
they also, he remarked, were enough to wear out the life of a 
man, and prevent him from attending to many profitable pursuits. 
6. Concerning celestial matters in general, he dissuaded every 
man from becoming a speculator how the divine power contrives 
to manage them ; || for he did not think that such points were dis- 
coverable by man, nor did he believe that those acted dutifully 
toward the gods who inquired into things which they did not wish 
to make known. He observed, too, that a man who was anxious 
about such investigations, was in danger of losing his senses, 
not less than Anaxagoras, who prided himself highly on explaining 
the plans of the gods, lost his. 7. For Anaxagoras, when he said 
that fire and the sun were of the same nature, did not reflect that 
people can easily look upon fire, but can not turn their gaze to 
the sun, and that men, if exposed to the rays of the sun, have 
complexions of a darker shade, but not if exposed to fire ; he 
omitted to consider, too, that of the productions of the earth, none 
can come fairly to maturity without the rays of the sun, while, if 
warmed by the heat of fire, they all perish ; and when he said that 
the sun was a heated stone, he forgot that a stone placed in the 
fire does not shine, or last long, but that the sun continues perpetu- 
ally the most luminous of all bodies. 

8. He advised his followers also to learn computations, but in these, 
as in other things, he exhorted them to avoid useless labor; as far 
as it was of any profit, he investigated every thing himself, and 
went through it with his associates. 

9. He earnestly recommended those who conversed with him to 
take care of their health, both by learning whatever they could 
respecting it from men of experience, and by attending to it, each 

• ;; Edwards refers to Diog. Laert. vii., 144, where it is said that some of the 
heavenly bodies are carried round with the heaven, without changing their place, 
while others have motions peculiar to themselves, t Schneider, Bornemann, and 
Kuehner, agree in understanding comets. % Any more than in difficult geomet- 
rical investigations. || [See I., i., 12 (page 326 above).] 



§ 1039 The Clavis to an Index. 409 

for himself, throughout his whole life, studying what food or drink, 
or what exercise, was most suitable for him, and how he might act 
in regard to them so as to enjoy the best health ; for he said it 
would be difficult for a person who thus attended to himself to -find 
a physician that would tell better than himself what was conducive 
to his health. * 

IV., viii., 1. But if any one thinks that he was convicted of 
falsehood with regard to his DiEMON, because sentence of death was 
pronounced on him by the judges although he said that the daemon 
admonished him what he ought and what he ought not to do, let 
him consider, in the first place, that he was already so advanced in 
years, f that he must have ended his life, if not then, at least not 
long after ; and, in the next, that he relinquished only the most 
burdensome part of life, in which all feel their powers of. intellect 
diminished, while, instead of enduring this, he acquired great glory 
by proving the firmness of his mind, pleading his cause above all 
men, with the greatest regard to truth, ingenuousness, and justice, 
and bearing his sentence at once with the utmost resignation and 
the utmost fortitude. 

2. It is indeed acknowledged that no man, of all that are re- 
membered, ever endured death with greater glory ; for he was 
obliged to live thirty days after his sentence, because the Delian 
festival happened in that month, and the law allowed no one to be 
publicly put to death until the sacred deputation should return 
from Delos ; and during that time he was seen by all his friends 
living in no other way than at any preceding period ; and, let it be 
observed, throughout all the former part of his life he had been ad- 
mired beyond all men for the cheerfulness and tranquillity with 
which he lived. 3. How could any one have died more nobly than 
thus? Or what death could be more honorable than that which 
any man might most honorably undergo ? Or what death could 
be happier than the most honorable ? Or what death more accept- 
able to the gods than the most happy ? 

4. I will also relate what I heard J respecting him from Hermo- 
genes, the son of Hipponicus, who said that after Meletus had laid 
the accusation against him, he heard him speaking on any subject 
rather than that of his trial, and remarked to him that he ought to 
consider what defense he should make, but that he said at 
first, "Do I n©t appear to you to have passed my whole life med- 
itating on that subject? " and then, when he asked him " How so? " 

* [I omit section 10.] j He was seventy years old, according to Diog. Laert. 
ii., 44, and Maxim. Tyr. ix., 8. i Xenophon himself was then with Cyrus in 
Asia. — Schneider. 

27 



410 Kant's Ethics. §1039- 

he said that " he had gone through life doing nothing but consid- 
ering what was just and what unjust, doing what was just and ab- 
staining from what was unjust, which he conceived to be the best 
meditation for his defense." 6.* "And do you think it strange,'" 
inquired Socrates, " that it should seem better to the divinity that. 
I should now close my life ? Do you not know, that, down to the 
present time, I would not admit to any man that he has lived 
either better or with more pleasure than myself? for I consider 
that those live best who study best to become as good as possible ; 
and that those live with most pleasure who feel the most assurance- 
that they are daily growing better and better. f 9. If I am to* 
die unjustly, my death will be a disgrace to those who unjustly 
kill me ; for if injustice is a disgrace, must it not be a disgrace to 
do anything unjustly ? But what disgrace will it be to me, that, 
others could not decide or act justly with regard to me? 10. Of 
the men who have lived before me, I see that the estimation left 
among posterity with regard to such as have done wrong, and such 
as have suffered wrong, is by no means similar ; and I know that 
I also, if I now die, shall obtain from mankind far different con- 
sideration from that which they will pay to those who take my 
life ; for I know that they will always bear witness to me that I 
have never wronged any man, or rendered any man less virtuous,, 
but that I have always endeavored to make those better who con- 
versed with me." . Such discourse he held with Hermogenes, and 
with others. 

11. Of those who knew what sort of man Socrates was, such as 
were lovers of virtue, continue to regret him above all other men, 
even to the present day, as having contributed in the highest de- 
gree to their advancement in goodness. To me, being such as I 
have described him, so pious that he did nothing without the sanc- 
tion of the gods ; so just, that he wronged no man even in the most 
trifling affair, but was of service, in the most important matters,, 
to those who enjoyed his society ; so temperate, that he never pre- 
ferred pleasure to virtue ; so wise, that he never erred in distin- 
guishing better from worse, needing no counsel from others, but be- 
ing sufficient in himself to discriminate between them ; so able to 
explain and settle such questions by argument ; and so capable of 
discerning the character of others, of confuting those who were in 
error, and of exhorting them to virtue and honor/he seemed to be 
such as the best and happiest of men would be. But if any one 
disapproves of my opinion, let him compare the conduct of others 
with that of Socrates, and determine accordingly. 

* [I omit section 5, and the first part of section 6.] t[I omit sections 7 and 8.]j 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 411 

§ 1040. — Aristotle and Plato, (page 37, line 7.) [Eximious : ex- 
cellent. See "Webster, who refers to Bacon.] Cf. §§ 511, 451, 
3054, and the following extracts from Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics : * 

book i.— of the summum boxum. 

I., i., 1. Every art and every scientific system, and in like man- 
ner every course of action and deliberate preference, seems to aim 
at some good ; and consequently " the Good " has been well defined 
as " that which all things aim at." 

2. But there appears to be a kind of difference in ends ; for some 
are energies ; others again beyond these, certain works ; but 
wherever there are certain ends besides the actions, there the 
works are naturally better than the energies.f 

3. Now since there are many actions, arts, and sciences, it fol- 
lows that there are many ends ; for of medicine the end is health ; 
of ship-building, a ship ; of generalship, victory ; of economy, 
wealth. 4. But whatever of such arts are contained under any 
one faculty, (as, for instance, under horsemanship is contained the 
art of making bridles, and all other horse furniture ; and this and 
the whole art of war is contained under generalship ; and in the 
same manner other arts are contained under different facilities ;} 
in all these the ends of the chief arts are more eligible than the. 
ends of the subordinate ones [cf. I., vii., 4]; because for the sake 

* <i The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Translated, with notes, original 
and selected ; an analytical introduction ; and questions for the use of students. 
By R. W. Browne, M.A., Professor of Classical Literature in King's College, 
London; and Prebendary of St. Paul's." (Bonn's Classical Library). [I have 
retained many of Prof. Browne's notes.] t The term energy, which I have re- 
tained as the translation of exergeia, requires some explanation. Energy, 
then, implies an activity or active state; it is opposed to duxamis, i. e. capacity, 
faculty, potentiality, inasmuch as the latter may be dormant, and though capa- 
ble of improvement, may be left unimproved; and it is possible for a thing to 
have the capacity of being, and yet not to be : as, for example, a coal has the 
capacity for burning, and yet it may perhaps never do so. Energy implies ac- 
tual and active existence, not a mere possible or potential one. It is opposed to 
'exis, habit, because by means of it habits are acquired and formed. Hence we 
can see the difference between an energy and a work (ergon) when considered 
as ends or final causes of action. Whenever we enter upon a course of action, 
we have one of two objects in view, — either the action itself, or some production 
or work to which it leads. For example, a painter paints either merely for the 
sake of painting, feeling an actual delight in this active exertion of his faculty 
for its own sake, or in order to produce a picture ; in the former case, his end 
(telos) is an energy, in the latter a work. An energy, therefore, is perfect and 
complete, and has its end in itself, it looks to nothing further, it is eligible for its- 
own sake. [I omit the remainder of this note.] 



412 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

of the former, the latter are pursued. 5. It makes, however, [in 
regard to the activity itself], no difference whether the energies 
themselves, or something else besides these, are the ends of actions, 
just as it would make no difference in the sciences above mentioned. 

I., ii., 1. If, therefore, there is some end of all that we do, which 
we wish for on its own account, and if we wish for all other things 
on account of this, and do not choose everything for the sake of 
something else (for thus we should go on to infinity, so that desire 
would be empty and vain), it is evident that this must be "the 
good," and the greatest good. 2. Has not, then, the knowledge 
of this end a great influence on the conduct of life ? and, like 
archers, shall we not be more likely to attain that which is right, 
if we have a mark ? If so, we ought to endeavor to give an out- 
line at least of its nature, and to determine to which of the sciences 
or faculties it belongs. 

3. Now it would appear to be the end of that which is especially 
the chief and master science, and this seems to be the political 
science ; for it directs what sciences states ought to cultivate, what 
individuals should learn, and how far they should pursue them. 
4. We see, too, that the most valued faculties- are comprehended 
under it, as, for example, generalship, economy, rhetoric. 5. Since, 
then, this science makes use of the practical sciences, and legis- 
lates respecting what ought to be done, and what abstained 
from, its end must include those of the others; so that this end 
must be the good of man. For although the good of an individual 
and a state be the same, still that of a state appears more import- 
ant and more perfect both to obtain and to preserve. 6. To dis- 
cover the good of an individual is satisfactory, but to discover that 
of a state or a nation is more noble and divine. This, then, is the 
object of my treatise, which is of a political kind. 

I, iii , 3.* We must be content, then, when treating of, and 
drawing conclusions from such subjects, to exhibit the truth 
roughly, and in outline ; and when dealing with contingent mat- 
ter, to draw conclusions of the same kind. 4. According to the 
same rule ought we to admit each assertion ; for it is the part of 
an educated man to require exactness in each class of subjects, 
only so far as the nature of the subject admits ; for it appears 
nearly the same thing to allow a mathematician to speak persua- 
sively, as to demand demonstrations from an orator. 

5. Now each individual judges well of what he knows, and of 
these he is a good judge. In each particular science, therefore, he 
is a good judge who has been instructed in them; and universally, 

* [I omit sections 1 and 2.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 418" 

he who has been instructed in all subjects. 6. Therefore a young 
man is not a proper person to study political science, for he is in- 
experienced in the actions of life : but these are the subjects and 
grounds of this treatise. Moreover, being inclined to follow the 
dictates of passion, he will listen in vain, and without benefit, since 
the end is not knowledge, but PKACTICE. 7. But it makes no 
difference, whether he be a youth in age, or a novice in character;, 
for the defect arises not from age, but from his life and pursuits 
being according to the dictates of passion ; for to such persons 
knowledge becomes useless, as it does to the incontinent; but to 
those who regulate their appetites and actions according to reason, 
the knowledge of these subjects must be very beneficial. Con- 
cerning the student, and in what manner he is to admit our argu- 
ments, and what we propose to treat of, let thus much be prefaced. 

I., iv., 1. But let us resume the subject from the commencement. 
Since all knowledge and every act of deliberate preference aims at 
some good, let us show what that is, which we say that the politi- 
cal science aims at, and what is the highest good of all things 
which are done. 2. As to its name, indeed, almost all men are 
agreed ; for both the vulgar and the educated call it happiness : 
but they suppose that to live well and do well are synonymous 
with being happy. 3. But concerning the nature of happiness 
they are at variance, and the vulgar do not give the same defini- 
tion of it as the educated ; for some imagine it to be an obvious 
and well-known object — such as pleasure, or wealth, or honor; 
but different men think differently of it : and frequently even the 
same person entertains different opinions respecting it at different 
times ; for, when diseased, he believes it to be health ; when poor,, 
wealth ; but, conscious of their own ignorance, they admire those 
who say that it is something great, and beyond them. 4. Some, 
again, have supposed that, besides these numerous goods, there is 
another self-existent good, which is to all these the cause of their 
being goods. jSTow, to examine all the opinions would perhaps be 
rather unprofitable ; but it will be sufficient to examine those which 
lie most upon the surface, or seem to be most reasonable. 

5. Let it not, however, escape our notice, that arguments from 
principles differ from arguments to principles ; for well did Plato 
also propose doubts on this point, and inquire whether the right 
way is from principles [deduction] or to principles [induction]; just 
as in the course from the starting-post to the goal, or the contrary. 
6. For we must begin from those things that are known ; and 
things are known in two ways ; for some are known to ourselves 
[aposteriori], others are generally known [apriori] ; perhaps, 



414 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

therefore, we should begin [inductively] from the things known to 
ourselves. 

7. Whoever, therefore, is to study with advantage the things 
which are honorable and just, and in a word the subjects of politi- 
cal science, must have been well and morally educated ; for the 
point from whence we must begin is the fact, and if this is satis- 
factorily proved, it will be unnecessary to add the reason [rule or 
principle]. Such a student either possesses, or would easily ac- 
quire, the principles. But let him who possesses neither of these 
qualifications, hear the sentiments of Hesiod : — 

" Far does the man all other men excel. 
Who, from his wisdom, thinks in all things well. 
Wisely considering, to himself a friend. 
All for the present best, and for the end. 
Nor is the man without his share of praise, 
Who well the dictates of the wise obeys: 
Cut he that is not wise himself, nor can 
Hearken to wisdom, is a useless man." 

Hesiod, Op. et DL, translated. 

Bk. I., Ch.. V., § 1. But let us return to the point where we com- 
menced this digression ; for men seem not unreasonably to form 
their notion of ' : the good," and of happiness, from observing the 
different lives which men lead. The many and most sordid class 
suppose it to be pleasure, and therefore they are content with a 
life of enjoyment.* 4. But those who are educated, and fond of 
active pursuits, suppose it to be honor, for this may be almost said 
to be the end of political life ; but it appears to be too superficial 
for the object of our inquir}' ; for it seems to reside rather in those 
who confer, than in those who receive, honor : but we have a 
natural conception, that " the good " is some thing peculiarly one's 
own, and difficult to be taken away. 5. Moreover, men seem to 
pursue honor in order that they may believe themselves to be 
good ; at any rate they seek to be honored by wise men, and by 
their acquaintances, and on account of virtue : it is plain, there- 
fore, that, at least in their opinion, virtue is superior. f 

8. But the money-getting life does violence to our natural in- 
clinations ; % and it is obvious that riches are not the good which 
we are in search of ; for they are merely useful, and for the sake 
of some other end.|| 

I,, vii., 1. Now let us again return to the good we are in search 
of, and inquire what it is ; for it seems to be different in different 

** [I omit sections 2 and 3.] t [I omit sections 6 and 7.] i "Which lead us to 
look upon money as a means, and not an end ; whereas the man who devotes 
himself to getting money generally learns to consider it as an end. [Extract 
from the translator'snote.] |[ [I omit the remainder of section 8, and the whole 
of chapter vi.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 415 

courses of action and arts ; for it is different in the art of medicine, 
in generalship, and in like manner in the rest. What then is the 
good in each ? Is it not that, for the sake of which the other 
things are done ? Kow in the art of medicine this is health ; in 
the art of generalship, victory; in architecture, a house; in differ- 
ent arts, different ends. 2. But in every action and deliberate 
preference, it is the end; since for the sake of this all men do 
everything else. So that, if there is any end of all human actions, 
this must be the practical good ; but if more ends than one, these 
must be it. By a different path, therefore, our argument has 
arrived at the same point [ch. ii.] ; and this we must attempt to 
explain still further. 

3. Since ends appear to be more than one, and of these we 
choose some for the sake of others, as, for instance, riches, musical 
instruments, and universally all instruments whatever, it is plain 
that they are not all perfect. But the chief good appears to be 
something perfect ; so that if there is some one end which is alone 
perfect, that must be the very thing which we are in search of; 
but if there are many, it must be the most perfect of them. 4. 
Now we say, that the object pursued for its own sake is more 
perfect than that pursued for the sake of another ; and that the 
object which is never chosen on account of another thing, is more 
perfect than those which are eligible both by themselves, and for 
the sake of that other : in fine, we call that completely perfect, 
which is always eligible for its own sake, and never on account of 
anything else. 

5. Of such a kind does happiness seem in a peculiar manner to 
be ; for this we always choose on its own account, and never on ac- 
count of anything else. But honor, and pleasure, and intellect, 
and every virtue we choose partly on their own account (for were 
no further advantage to result from them, we should choose each 
of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, be- 
cause we suppose that we shall attain happiness by their means ; 
but no one chooses happiness for the sake of these, nor in short 
for the sake of anything else. 

6. But the same result seems also to arise from self-sufficiency, 
for the perfect good appears to be self-sufficient ; but we attribute 
self-sufficiency not to him who leads, for himself alone, a solitary 
life, but to him who lives also for his parents and children, and 
wife, and, in short, for his friends and fellow- citizens ; since man 
is naturally a social being.* 7. We define the "self-sufficient" as 
that which, when separated from everything else, makes life eligi- 

* [I omit the remainder o "section 6.1 



416 Kant's Ethics. § 1040' 

ble, and in want of nothing; and such we suppose the nature of 
happiness to be ; and moreover, we suppose it the most eligible of 
all things, even when not reckoned together with any other good; 
but more eligible, doubtless, even when reckoned together with the 
smallest good ; for the part added becomes an excess of good ; but 
of two goods the greater is always more eligible. Happiness, then r 
appears something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end of all 
human actions. 

8. But, perhaps, to say that happiness is the greatest good, ap- 
pears like stating something which is already granted ; and it is 
desirable that we should explain still more clearly what it is. Per- 
haps, then, this may be done, if we take the peculiar work of 
man ; for as to the musician, and statuary, and to every artist, and 
in short to all who have any work or course of action, the good 
and excellence of each appears to consist in their peculiar work - r 
so would it appear to be with man, if there is any peculiar work 
belonging to him. Are there, then, certain peculiar works and 
courses of action belonging to the carpenter and shoemaker ; 9. 
and is there no peculiar work of man, but is he by nature without 
a work? or, as there appears to be a certain work peculiarly be- 
longing to the eye, the hand, and the foot, and, in fine, to each of 
the members, in like manner would not one assume a certain work 
besides all these peculiarly belonging to man ? 

10. What, then, must this peculiar work be ? For life man ap- 
pears to share in common with plants ; but his peculiar work is the 
object of our inquiry : we must, therefore, separate the life of nu- 
trition and growth. Then a kind of sensitive life would next fol- 
low ; but this also he appears to enjoy in common with the horse,, 
the ox, and every animal. 11. There remains, therefore, a certain 
practical life of a being which possesses reason ; and of this one 
part is, as it were, obedient to reason, the other as possessing it,, 
and exercising intellect. But this life also being spoken of in two 
ways ((according to energy and according to habit)), f we must take 
that according to energy ;* for that appears to be more properly 
so called. 12. Now if the work of man is an energy of the soul 
according to reason, or not without reason ; and if we say that the 
work of man, and of a good man, is the same generically, as in 
the case of a harper, and a good harper (and so, in short, in all 
cases, superiority in each particular excellence being added to each 
particular work) ; for it is the work of a harper to play, of a good 
harper to play well : and if we assume the peculiar work of man 

* [See the note to I., i., 2 (page 411 above).] t [I have substituted double 
parentheses ((thus)) for the brackets [thus] which I find in the text.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 417 

to be a kind of life, and this life an energy of the soul, and actions 
performed with reason ; and the peculiar work of a good man to 
be the same things done well, and honorably ; and everything to 
be complete according to its proper excellence ; if, I repeat, these 
things are true, it follows, that man's chief good is " an energy of 
the soul according to virtue ; " but if the virtues are more than 
one, according to the best and most perfect virtue ; and besides. 
this, we must add, in a perfect life : * for as neither one swallow, 
nor one day, makes a spring ; so neither does one day, nor a short 
time, make a man blessed and happy. 

13. Let this then be the good in its general outlines ; for it is 
necessary, perhaps, first to sketch, then afterward to complete the 
drawing. But it would seem to be incumbent upon every one to 
improve and distinctly delineate the figures which are correctly 
sketched, and time would seem to be the discoverer of such fea- 
tures as these, or at least a good assistant; whence also proceed 
the improvements in the arts ; for it is the duty of every one to> 
supply deficiencies. 14. But it is necessary to bear in mind what 
has been mentioned already [ch. iii.], and not to demand exact- 
ness equally in all subjects, but in each according to its subject- 
matter, and just so far as is appropriate to the system to which it 
belongs : for the carpenter and geometi-ician examine a right angle 
with different views ; the one, so far as it is useful for his work,, 
whilst the other investigates its nature and properties ; for his ob- 
ject is the contemplation of the truth, for he is a contemplator of 
the truth. 15. In the same manner, then, must we act in all other 
instances, that the mere accessories may not become more nu- 
merous than the works themselves. Nor, indeed, is the cause [the 
reason] to be required in all cases alike ; but it suffices in some, as 
for instance, in first principles, that their existence be clearly 
shown ; but the existence is the first and the principle. 

16. Now of principles some are perceived by induction, others 
by sensation, others by a certain habit, and different principles in 
different ways ; but we must endeavor to trace each of them in the 
manner in which they are formed by nature ; and we must use our 
utmost endeavors that they be well defined, for that has great 
weight in the discussions which follow. For the principle seems 
to be more than the half of the whole, and many of the subjects 
of our inquiry seem to become clear by means of this. 

I., Viii., 1. But we must consider the subject of happiness not 
only as regards the conclusion which we have drawn, and the pre- 

* By a perfect life (bios teleios) Aristotle meant, first, the development of 
life to the highest degree of perfection ; and, secondly, consistency from the be- 
ginning to the end. 



418 Kanfs Ethics. § 1040 

misses from which our arguments are derived, but also as regards 
the statements of others concerning it ; for all the properties of a 
thing accord with the truth ; but the truth is at once discordant 
with falsehood. 

2. jSfow, goods being divided into three classes,* and some being 
called external, others said to belong to the soul, and others to the. 
body, we call those belonging to the soul, the superior, and good, in a 
higher sense than the others ; but we assume, that the actions and 
energies of the soul belong to the soul. 3. So that our assertion 
would be correct, according to this opinion at least, which is an- 
cient, and allowed by philosophers, that certain actions and ener- 
gies are the end ; for thus it becomes one of the goods of the soul, 
and not one of the external ones. 

4. Also, that the happy man lives well, and does well, harmon- 
izes with our definition; for we have almost defined happiness as 
a kind of well living, and well doing [St. James, i., 25]. 

5. Again, all the qualities required in happiness appear to exist 
in our definition ;f for to some it seems to be virtue, to others pru- 
dence, and to others^ a kind of wisdom: to some, again, these, or 
some one of these, with pleasure, or at least, not without pleasure ; 
others, again, include external prosperity : but of these opinions, 
many ancient writers support some ; a few celebrated philosophers 
the others ; but it is reasonable to suppose that none of these have 
totally erred, but that in some one particular, at least, they are for 
the most part right. 

6. Now with those, who say that it is every virtue, or some vir- 
tue, our definition accords ; for to this virtue belongs the energy. 
Bat perhaps it makes no slight difference whether we conceive the 
chief good to consist in possession, or in use ; in habit, or in en- 
ergy. 7, For it is possible, that the habit, though really existing, 
should cause the performance of no good thing ; as in the case of 
a man who is asleep, or in any other way is incapable of acting : 
but that the energy should do so is impossible ; for of necessity it 
will act, and will act well. 8. But as in the Olympic games, it 
is not the most beautiful and the strongest who are crowned, but 
those who engage in the conflict (for some of these are the conquerors); 

*This threefold division of goods is due to the Pythagoreans, and was adopt- 
ed by the Peripatetics. — See Cic. Acad, i., 5; Tusc. v. 85. — Brewer, t These 
primary opinions respecting happiness our author also enumerates in his Eu- 
demean Ethics. The first he refers to Socrates, Plato, and some others ; the 
second to Socrates ; the third to Thales and Anaxagoras. Amongst those who 
added external happiness, he mentions Xenocrates. — Zell, quoted by Cardivell. 
[See the note to III., viii., 5 below.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 419 

thus it is those only who act aright, who obtain what is honor- 
able and good in life. 9. Moreover, their life is of itself pleasant ; 
for to be pleased, is one of the goods of the soul ; but that is to 
every man pleasant, with reference to which he is said to be fond 
of such a thing ; as, for example, a horse to the man who is fond 
of horses, and a spectacle to the man who is fond of spectacles ; 
in like manner also, things just to the lover of justice ; and, in a 
word, virtuous things to the lover of virtue. 

10. Now the things that are pleasant to the generality of man- 
kind, are at variance with each other, because they are not natur- 
ally pleasant ; but things naturally pleasant, are pleasant to those 
who are fond of that which is honorable ; and such are always the 
actions according to virtue ; so that to these men they are pleasant, 
even of themselves. Their life therefore stands in no need of the 
addition of pleasure, as a kind of appendage or amulet, but pos- 
sesses pleasure in itself; for, besides what has been said, the man 
who does not take pleasure in honorable actions, has no title to be 
called good ; for neither would any person call that man just, who 
takes no pleasure in acting justly ; nor that man liberal, who takes 
no pleasure in liberal actions ; and in the other cases in like man- 
ner. But if this is the case, the actions of virtue must be pleasant 
of themselves ; and yet they are also good and honorable, and each 
of these in the highest degree, if, indeed, the good man judges 
rightly concerning them ; but he judges as we said. 11. Happi- 
ness ; therefore, is the best, the most honorable, and the most pleas- 
ant of all things ; and these qualities are not divided, * for all these 
qualities exist in the best energies ; and these, or the best one of 
them, we say that happiness is. f 

I., ix., 1. Hence also a question is raised, whether happiness is 
acquired by learning, by habit, or by exercise of any other kind ; 
or whether it is produced in a man by some heavenly dispensation, 
or even by chance. 2. ISTow, if there is any other thing which is 
the gift of God to men, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness 
is a divine gift, and more than anything else, inasmuch as it is the 
best of human things. | But this, perhaps, would more fitly be- 
long to another kind of investigation : but, even if it be not sent 
from heaven, but is acquired by means of virtue, and of some kind 
of teaching or exercise, it appears to be one of the most divine of 
things ; for the prize and end of virtue seems to be something 
which is best, godlike, and blessed. 3. It must also be common to 
many ; for it is possible, that by means of some teaching and care, 

*[I omit a part of section 11 at this point.] |[I omit sections 12-14.] J[Cf. 
Confucian Analects, XII., v., 3 (page 130 above).] 



420 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

it should exist in every person who is not incapacitated for virtue., 
4. But if it is better that people should be happy by these means,, 
than by chance, it is reasonable to suppose it is so, since natural 
productions are produced in the best way in which it is possible 
for them to be produced ; and likewise the productions of art, and. 
of every efficient cause, and especially op the best cause. But 
to commit the greatest and the noblest of things to chance would be 
very inconsistent. 5. Now the thing we are at present in search 
of receives additional clearness from the definition ; for happiness 
has been said to be a kind of energy of the soul according to vir- 
tue ; but of the remaining goods it is necessary that some exist in 
it, and that others should be naturally assistant and useful, instru- 
mentally. 6. But this will agree with what we stated in the be- 
ginning ; for we set down the end of the political science as the 
good ; and this devotes its principal attention to form the charac- 
ters of the citizens, to make them good, and dispose them to hon- 
orable actions. 

7. It is with reason, then, that we do not call an ox, a horse, or 
any other beast, happy ; for none of them are able to participate 
in this kind of energy. For this cause, also, a child can not be 
called happy ; for from his time of life he is not yet able to per- 
form such actions ; but those who are so called, are called happy 
from hope; for, as we said, there is need of perfect virtue, and of 
perfect life.* 

I., xiii., 1. But since happiness is a certain energy of the soul 
according to perfect virtue, we must next consider the subject of 
virtue ; for thus, perhaps, we should see more clearly respecting 
happiness. But he who in reality is skilled in political philosophy, 
appears to devote the principal part of his study to this ;f 2. for 
he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws ; but 
we have an example of this in the legislators of the Cretans and 
Lacedaemonians, and any others who may € have become like 
them. But if this is the peculiar study of political philosophy, it 
is clear that the investigation would be consistent with our origi- 
nal plan. 

3. We must therefore next examine virtue, that is to say, of 
course, human virtue ; for the good which we were in search of is 
human good, and the happiness, human happiness ; but by human 
happiness we mean, not that of the body, but that of the soul ;; 
and happiness, too, we define to be an energy of the soul [I., 
vii., 12 (page 417 above)]. 4. But if these things are true, it is 
evidently necessary for the political philosopher to have some 

* [I omit section 8, and the whole of chapters x. r xi. r and xii.] | [Virtue.] 



•§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 421 

knowledge of what relates to the soul ; just as it is necessary for 
the man who intends to cure the eyes, to study the whole body ; 
;and still more, in proportion as political philosophy is more honor- 
able and excellent than the science of medicine ; and the best ed- 
ucated physicians take a great deal of pains in acquiring a knowl- 
edge of the human body. 

5. The student of political philosophy must therefore study the soul, 
but he must study it for the sake of these things [see ch.viii., §§ 3 and 
8 (page 418)], and only so far as is sufficient for the objects which he 
has in view [i. e. for a practical behoof] ; for greater exactness re- 
quires more labor perhaps than the subject in hand demands. 6. 
-But some things are said about it sufficiently in my exoteric dis- 
courses ; and these we must make use of: as, for instance, that one 
part of it [the appetitive] is irrational, and the other possessing 
reason. But whether these things are really sepai-ate, like the 
members of the body, and everything that is capable of division ; 
■or whether, being by nature indivisible, they are only in word 
two, as in a circumference the convex and concave side, matters 
not for our present purpose. 

7. But of the irrational part, one division is like that which is 
common, and belonging to plants ; that, I mean, which is the 
cause of nourishment and growth : for a person might assert that 
such a faculty of life as this exists in all beings that are nourished, 
even in embryos, and the very same in perfect beings : for it is 
more reasonable to call it the same than any other. 8. The ex- 
cellence of this part, therefore, appears common to other beings, 
and not peculiar to man ; for this part of the soul, and its faculties, 
iseem to energize principally in sleep ; but the good and the bad 
man are in sleep least distinguishable ; whence men say, that for 
half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the 
miserable. 9. But it is reasonable that this should be the case; 
for sleep is the inaction of the soul, so far forth as it is called good 
or bad : (except if some emotions in a small degree reach it, and 
in this manner the visions of good men become better than those 
of the generality). But enough of these things ; we must there- 
fore put aside the part which consists in nourishment, since it has 
naturally no connection with human virtue. 

10. Now another natural power of the soul appears to be irra- 
tional, but to participate in reason in some sort ; for we praise the 
treason of the continent and incontinent man, and that part of the 
soul which is indued with reason ; for it exhorts us aright, and to 
the best actions. But there seems to be in man something else by 
nature contrary to reason, which contends with and resists reason 
l[St. Paul; Bomans vii., 23], 11, For, in reality, just as the par- 



422 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

alyzed limbs of the body, when we intend to move them to the 
right hand, are turned aside the opposite way to the left, so it is 
with the soul ; for the impulses of the incontinent are directed to- 
ward the contraries [contrary to virtue]. But in the case of the 
body we see the part that is turned aside, in the soul we do not see 
it ; but perhaps we must no less believe that there is in the soul 
something contrary to reason, which opposes and resists it ; but 
how it differs it matters not. 12. But this part also seems, as we 
said, to partake of reason ; at least in the continent man it obeys 
reason ; but in the temperate or brave man it is perhaps still more 
ready to listen to reason : for in them it entirely agrees with 
reason. 

13. The irrational part therefore appears to be twofold; for the 
part which is common to plants does not at all partake of reason : 
but the part which contains the desires and the appetites gener- 
ally in some sense partakes of reason, in that it is submissive and 
obedient to it.* 14. But the giving of advice, and all reproaching 
and exhorting, prove that the irrational part is in some sense per- 
suaded by reason. 15. But if it is necessary to say that this has 
reason likewise, the part which has reason will be twofold also ; 
one part properly and itself, the other as though listening to the 
suggestions of a parent. 

But virtue also is divided according to this difference ; for we 
call some of the virtues intellectual [giving law], others moral 
[obeying law] — wisdom, and intelligence, and prudence, we call 
intellectual, but liberality and temperance, moral ; for when speak- 
ing of the moral character of a man, we do not say that he is wise 
or intelligent, but that he is meek or temperate; but we praise the 
wise man also according to his habits ; but praiseworthy habits 
we call virtues. 

BOOK II. -OF VIRTUE. 

II., i., 3. j The virtues, then, are produced in us neither by 
nature nor contrary to nature, but, we being naturally adapted to 
receive them ; and this natural capacity is perfected by habit. 4. 
Further, in every case where anything is produced in us naturally,, 

*[I omit the remainder of section 13.] [In sections 6-13, Aristotle divides 
the soul into (1) rational, (2) irrational; the irrational part into (1) vegetative, 
(2) appetitive; and, finally, the appetitive part into (1) that which obeys reasonr 
(2) that which resists reason. See the translator's table (page 32) and analysis 
(p. xviii.).] [But if it is better to consider that subdivision of the appetitive part 
which obeys reason, as belonging more properly to the rational part than to the 
irrational part, Aristotle (in sections 10-14) divides the rational part of the soul 
into (1) that which gives law, (2) that which obeys law.] t[I omit sections 1 and 2.} 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 423 

we first get the capacities for doing these things, and afterward 
perform the energies ; which is evident in the case of the senses ; 
for it was not from frequently seeing or frequently hearing that 
we got the senses, but, on the contrary, we had them first, and 
then used them, and did not get them by having used them. But 
we get the virtues by having first performed the energies, as is 
the case also in all the other arts ; for those things which we must 
do after having learnt them we learn to do by doing them ; as, for 
example, by building houses men become builders, and by playing 
on the harp, harp-players ; thus, also, by doing just actions we be- 
come just, by performing temperate actions, temperate, and by 
performing brave actions we become brave. 

5. Moreover, that which happens in all states bears testimony to 
this ; for legislators, by giving their citizens good habits, make 
them good ; and this is the intention of every lawgiver, and all 
that do not do it well fail ; and this makes all the difference between 
states, whether they be good or bad. 6. Again, every virtue is 
produced and corrupted from and by means of the same causes;* 
and in like manner every art ; for from playing on the harp peo- 
ple become both good and bad harp-players ; and, analogously, 
builders and all the rest ; for from building well men will become 
good builders, and from building badly bad ones ; for if this were 
not the case, there would be no need of a person to teach, and all 
would have been by birth, some good and some bad. 7. The same 
holds good in the case of the virtues also ; for by performing those 
actions which occur in our intercourse with other men, some of us 
become just and some unjust; and by acting in circumstances of dan- 
ger, and being accustomed to be fearful or confident, some become 
brave and others cowards. 8. The same thing is true in cases of 
desire and anger ; for some become temperate and mild, and others 
intemperate and passionate — one class from having behaved them- 
selves in such cases in one way, and the other class in another. 9. 
In a word, the habits are produced out of similar energies ; there- 
fore, the energies which we perform must be of a certain charac- 
ter [that is, virtuous] ; for, with the differences of the energies the 
habits correspond. It does not therefore make a slight, but an 
important, nay, rather, the whole difference, whether we have been 
brought up in these habits or in others from childhood. 

* Actions produce contrary moral effects. Two men engaged in the same 
pursuits, exposed to the same temptations, may become, the one virtuous, the 
other vicious. In the order of nature, causes act uniformly, they can not pro- 
duce opposite effects ; therefore, virtue does not come by nature. 



424 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

II., ii., 1. Since our present treatise is not for the purpose 
of mere speculation, as all others are, for the object of our investi- 
gation Is not the knowing what virtue is, but to become good 
{since otherwise there would be no use in it), it is necessary to 
study the subject of actions, and how we must perform them ; for 
these have entire influence over our habits to cause them to be- 
come of a certain character, as we have said. 2. Now, to say that 
we must act according to right reason is a general maxim, and 
let it be assumed ; but we will speak hereafter about it, and about 
the nature of right reason, and its relation to the other virtues.* 
3. But this point must first be fully granted, that everything said 
on moral subjects ought to be said in outline, and not with exact- 
ness ; just as we said in the beginning, that arguments must be de- 
manded of such a nature only as the subject-matter admits ; 
but the subjects of moral conduct and of expediency have no 
stability [moral duties are of indeterminate extent : see § 413 
ifpage 34 above)], just as also things wholesome [we vary our food 
according to circumstances]. 4. But if the treatment of the sub- 
ject generally is of this nature, still less does it admit of exactness 
in particulars ; for it comes under no art or set of precepts, but it 
is the duty of the [moral] agents themselves to look to the circum- 
stances of the occasion, just as is the case in the arts of medicine 
and navigation. But although the subject before us is of this de- 
scription, yet we must endeavor to do the best we can to help it. 

5. This, then, we must first observe, that things of this kind are 
naturally destroyed both by defect and excess (for it is necessary 
in the case of things which can not be seen to make use of illus- 
trations which can be seen), just as we see in the case of strength 
and health ; for too much as well as too little exercise destroys 
strength. 6. In like manner drink and food, whether there be too 
little or too much of them, destroy health, but moderation in quan- 
tity causes, increases, and preserves it. The same thing, therefore, 
holds good in the case of temperance, and courage, and the other 
virtues ; for he who flies from and is afraid of everything, and 
stands up against nothing, becomes a coward ; and he who fears 
nothing at all, but goes boldly at everything, becomes rash. [Not 
that a courageous man need fear, but that rashness is not courage.] 
7. In like manner, he who indulges in the enjoyment of every 
pleasure, and refrains from none, is intemperate ; but he who 
shuns all, as clowns do, becomes a kind of insensible man. [Not 
that a man can be too temperate (which is impossible), but that 
abstinence is not temperance.] For temperance and courage are 

* Aristotle discusses the nature of risrht reason in the sixth book. 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 425 

destroyed both by the excess and the defect, but are preserved by 
the mean. [This is a maxim of education, for the establishment 
of moral habit; not a limit of education, for the restricting of vir- 
tue. Aristotle must not be understood to say that a man can be 
too virtuous, and ought only to be moderately virtuous ; but only 
that a man can not become virtuous by an intemperate repugnance 
to nature.] 

8. But not only do the generation, and increase, and destruction 
of these [moral virtues] originate in the same sources and through 
the same means, but the energies also will be employed on the 
same [resisting evil produces moral strength ; moral strength is 
employed in resisting evil] ; 9. for this is the case in other things 
which are more plain to be seen ; as in the case of strength, for it 
is produced by taking much food and sustaining many labors ; and 
the strong man is more able to do these things than any other 
person. The case with the virtues is the same ; for by abstaining 
from pleasures we become temperate, and when we have become 
so, we are best able to abstain from them. The same also is the 
case with courage ; for by being accustomed to despise objects of 
fear, and to bear them, we become brave, and when we have be- 
come so, we are best able to bear them. 

II., ill., 1. But we must make the pleasure or pain which fol- 
lows after acts a test* of the [existence of] habits [not of their 
correctness] ; for he who abstains from the bodily pleasures, and 
in this very thing takes pleasure, is temperate; but he who feels 
pain at it is intemperate ; and he who meets dangers and rejoices 
at it, or at least feels no pain, is brave ; but he who feels pain is a 
coward ; for moral virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains ; 
for by reason of pleasure we dp what is wicked, and through pain 
we abstain from honorable acts. 2. (Therefore it is necessary to 
be in some manner trained immediately from our childhood, as 
Plato says, to feel pleasure and pain at proper objects ; for this is. 
right education.) 3. Again, if the virtues are conversant with ac- 
tions and passions, and pleasure and pain are consequent upon 
every action and passion ; on this account, also, virtue must be 
conversant with pleasures and pains. 4. Punishments also, which 
are inflicted by means of pleasure and pain, indicate the same 
thing. f Again, as we said before, every habit of the soul has a 
natural relation and reference to those things by which it natur- 

* This is another instance of the practical turn of Aristotle's mind. We can 
scarcely have a more useful test. So long as any uneasiness or pain is felt at 
doing any action, we may be quite sure that the habit is imperfectly formed- 
t [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] 

28 



426 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

ally becomes better and worse. But habits become bad by means 
of pleasures and pains, by pursuing or avoiding either improper 
ones, or at improper times, in improper ways, or improperly in any 
other manner, which reason determines. 5. Hence some have 
even denned the virtues to be certain states of apathy and tran- 
quillity ; but not correctly, in that they speak absolutely, and not 
in relation to propriety of time or manner, and so on through the 
other categories. Therefore virtue is supposed to be such as we 
have said, in relation to pleasures and pains, and apt to practise 
the best things ; and vice is the contrary. 

6. These subjects may also become plain to us from the following 
considerations. Since there are three things which lead us to 
choice, and three to aversion, — -the honorable, the expedient, and 
the pleasant; and three contraries to them, — the disgraceful, the 
Inexpedient, and the painful ; on all these subjects the good man is 
.apt to be right in his actions, and the bad man is apt to be 
wrong, and especially on the subject of pleasure ; for this 
is common to all living creatures, and accompanies all things which 
are the objects of choice ; for both the honorable and the expedient 
appear pleasant.* 9. Again, it is more difficult. to resist pleasure 
than anger, as Heraelitus says,. and both art and excellence are 
always conversant with that which is more difficult ; for excellence 
In this case is superior. So that, for this reason also, the whole 
business of virtue, and political philosophy, must be with pleasures 
and pains ; for he who makes a proper use of these [as helps to 
education] will be good, and he who makes a bad use [as rules of 
life] will be bad. 10. Now on the point that virtue is conversant 
with pleasures and pains, and that it is increased and destroyed by 
means of the same things from which it originally sprung, when 
they are differently circumstanced ; and that its energies are em- 
ployed on those things out of which it originates, let enough have 
been said. 

II., iv., 1. But a person may be in difficulty as to what we 
mean when we say that it is necessary for men to become just 
by performing just actions, and temperate by performing temper- 
ate ones ; for if they do just and temperate actions, they are already 
just and temperate ; just as, if they do grammatical and musical 
actions, they are grammarians and musicians. 2. Or, is this not 
the case in the arts also ? for it is possible to do a grammatical ac- 
tion accidentally, or at another's suggestion. A man, therefore, 
will only then be a grammarian, when he not only does a grammati- 
cal action, but also [consciously and intelligently] does it gram- 

*_[! omit sections 7 and 8.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 421 

nlatically, that is, in accordance with the grammatical science, which 
he possesses in himself. 

3. Again, the case is hot similar in the arts and in the virtues, 
for the productions of art have their excellence in themselves. It 
is enough, then, that these should themselves be of a certain char- 
acter ; but acts of virtue are done justly and temperately, not if 
they have themselves a certain character, but if the agent, being him- 
self of a certain character, perform them : first, if he does them know- 
ingly ; then if with deliberate choice, and deliberate choice on 
their own account [without regard to the advantage or disad- 
vantage which may result to himself] ; and, thirdly, if he does 
them on a fixed and unchangeable principle. 4. How as to the 
possession of all other arts, these qualifications, with the exception 
of knowledge, do not enter into the calculation ; but toward the 
possession of the virtues, knowledge has little or no weight [a man 
may do wrong knowingly]; but the other qualifications are not of 
small, but rather of infinite importance, since they arise from the 
frequent practice of just and temperate actions. 

5. Acts then are called [legally] just and temperate, when they 
are such as the [morally (§§ 291, 301)] just or temperate man would 
do ; but he who [bene moratus] performs these acts is not [neces- 
sarily] a just and temperate man, but he who [morahter bonus 
(§ 680)] performs them in such a manner as just and temperate men 
do them. 6. It is well said, therefore, that from performing just 
actions, a man becomes just ; and from performing temperate ones, 
temperate ; but without performing them no person would even be 
likely to become good. [If ye know these things, happy are ye if 
ye do them (St. John xiii., 17, page 256 above ).] 7. But the gen- 
erality of men do not do these' things, but taking refuge in words, 
they think that they are philosophers, and that in this manner 
they will become good men ; and what they do is like what sick 
people do, who listen attentively to their physicians, and then do 
not attend to the things which they prescribe [§§ 821, 724, 849]. 
Just as these, then, will never be in a good state of body under 
such treatment, so those will never be in a good state of mind, if 
this is their philosophy. 

BOOK II., Chapter V., § 1. But we must next find out what 
the genus of virtue is. Since, then, the qualities which have their 
origin in the soul are three, — Passions, Capacities, and Habits, — 
Virtue must be some one of these. 2. By passions, I mean, De- 
sire, Anger, Fear, Confidence, Envy, Joy, Love, Hatred, Begret, 
Emulation, Pity; in a word, those feelings which are followed by 
pleasure or pain ; 3. by capacities, those qualities by means of 



428 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

which we are said to be able to be under the influence of these 
passions ; as those by means of which we are able to feel anger, 
pain, or pity ; 4. by habits, those by means of which we are well 
or ill disposed with relation to the passions.* 

5. Neither the virtues, therefore, nor the vices are passions ; be- 
cause we are not called good or bad according to our passions, but 
according to our virtues or vices, and because we are neither 
praised nor blamed according to our passions (for the man who 
fears or is angry, is not praised ; nor is the man who is simply 
angry, blamed ; but the man who is angry in a certain way) ; but 
according to our virtues and vices, we are praised or blamed. 6. 
Again, we feel anger and fear without deliberate preference ; but 
the virtues are acts of deliberate preference, or at any rate, not 
without deliberate preference. But besides these things, we are 
said to be "moved" by our passions, but we are not said to be 
moved, but in some way to be "disposed,"! by our virtues and 
vices. 7. For these reasons, also, they are not capacities ; for we 
are neither called good nor bad. neither praised nor blamed, for 
our being able to feel passions simply. And again, we have our 
capacities by nature ; but we do not become good or bad by nature; 
but of this we have already spoken [II., i., 4 (page 423 above)]. 
8. If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor capacities, it re- 
mains that they are habits. What, therefore, the " genus " of vir- 
tue is, has been sufficiently shown. 

II., vL, 1. But it is necessary not only to say that virtue is a, 
habit, but also what sort of a habit it is. We must say, therefore, 
that every virtuej both makes that of which it is the virtue to be 

*[I omit the remainder of section 4.] f Aristotle (Categ. c. vi., 4) thus ex- 
plains the difference between disposition (diathesis) and habit ('exis): — ''Habit 
is more lasting and more durable than disposition. The former term applies to 
the sciences, virtues, etc.; the latter to such states as are easily and quickly 
changed; as heat and cold, sickness and health." [I omit part of the note. \ 
The following is, according to Aspasius, quoted by Michelet, the relation between 
dunamis, energeia, and 'exis. " Facultas a natura insita jam est potentia 
quffidam, sed nondum vobis, ut loquimui*, potentia. cujus ex ipso vigore operatio 
profluat; hanc demum potentiam philosophus habitum vocat." J The word 
arete means not only moral virtue but the excellence and perfection of anything 
whatever. Thus Cicero says (de Leg. i., 8): " Est autem virtus nihil aliud quam 
in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura." [The reader interested will 
find the following note on page 41 (ed. Bohn).] Cicero, giving a short analysis 
of the doctrines of the Old Academy and Peripatetics (nihil enim inter Peripat- 
eticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat), thus describes their doctrine of 
moral virtue : — " Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem 
(ethos): quam partim exercitationis assiduitate, partim ratione formabant; in 
quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod inchoatum est neque absolutum pro- 
gressio qusedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, 
quasi perfectio naturae." — Acad, i., 5. — Brewer. 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 429 

in a good state, and makes its work good also ; for instance, the 
virtue of the eye makes both the eye and the work of the eye 
good ; for by the virtue of the eye we see well. 2. In like manner, 
the virtue of a horse makes a horse good, and good in speed, and 
in carrying its rider, and in standing the attack of the enemy. If, 
then, this is the case in all instances, the virtue of man also must 
be a habit, from which man becomes good, and from which he will 
perform his work well. But how this will be, we have already 
rstated. (Book II., ch. ii.) [page 424 above.] 3. And again, it will 
be made manifest in the following manner, if we investigate the 
specific nature of virtue. JSTow, in all quantity, continuous or di- 
visible, it is possible to take the greater, the less, or the equal ; and 
these either with relation to the thing itself, or to ourselves ; but 
the equal is some mean between excess and defect. 4. But by the 
mean with relation to the thing itself, I mean that which is equi- 
distant from both of the extremes, and this is one and the same in 
all cases ; but by the mean with relation to ourselves, I mean that 
which is neither too much nor too little for us. But this is not 
one and the same to all ; as, for example, if ten is too many, and 
two too few, six is taken for the absolute mean, for it exceeds two 
as much as it is exceeded by ten. 5. But this is the mean according 
to arithmetical proportion. But the relative mean is not to be taken 
in this manner ; for it does not follow, that if ten pounds are too 
much for any person to eat, and two pounds too little, the training- 
master will prescribe six pounds ; for perhaps this is too much or 
too little for the person who is to eat it.* Thus, then, every per- 
son who has knowledge shuns the excess and the defect, but seeks 
for the mean, and chooses it ; not the absolute mean, but the rela- 
tive one. 

6. If, then, every science accomplishes its work well, by keeping 
the mean in view, and directing its works to it (whence people are 
accustomed to say of excellent works, that it is impossible to take 
anything away, or add anything to them, since excess and _ defect 
destroy the excellence, but the being in the mean preserves it), 
and if good artisans, as we may say, perform their work, keeping 
this in view, then virtue, being, like nature, more accurate and 
excellent than any art, must be apt to hit the mean. 7. But I 
mean moral virtue ; for it is conversant with passions and actions; 
and in these there is defect and excess, and the mean ; as, for ex- 
ample, we may feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and, in a 
word, pleasure and pain, both too much and too little, and in both 
cases improperly. But the time when, and the cases in which, and 

* [I omit a part of section 5 at this point.] 



430 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

the persons toward whom, and the motive for which, and the man- 
ner in "which, constitute the mean and the excellence ; and this is 
the characteristic property of virtue. 

8. In like manner, in actions there are excess and defect, and 
the mean ; but virtue is conversant with passions and actions, 
and in them excess is wrong, and defect is blamed, but the mean 
is praised, and is correct ; and both these are properties of virtue. 
Virtue, then, is a kind of mean state, being at least apt to hit the 
mean. 9. Again, it is possible to go wrong in many ways ; * but 
we can go right in one way only ; and for this reason the for- 
mer is easy, and the latter difficult ; it is easy to miss a mark, but 
difficult to hit it ; and for these reasons, therefore, the excess and 
defect belong to vice, but the mean state to virtue; for, "we are 
good in one way only, but bad in all sorts of ways." 

10. Virtue, therefore, is a " habit, accompanied with deliberate 
preference, in the relative mean, defined by reason, and as the 
prudent man would define it." It is a mean state between two 
vices, one in excess, the other in defect ; and it is so, moreover y 
because of the vices one division falls short of, and the other 
exceeds what is right, both in passions and actions, whilst virtue 
discovers the mean and chooses it. 11. Therefore, with reference 
to its essence, and the definition which states its substance, virtue 
is a mean state [a virtuous man does not go to extremes in his 
daily life] ; but with reference to the standard of " the best" and 
" the excellent," it is an extreme [a virtuous man does go to 
extreme virtue]. 12. But it is not every action, nor every passion, 
which admits of the mean state ; for some have their badness at 
once implied in their name; as, for example, malevolence, shame- 
lessness, envy; and amongst actions, adultery, theft, homicide. 
For all these, and such as these, are so called from their being 
themselves bad, not because their excesses or defects are bad. 13. 
In these, then, it is impossible ever to he right, but we must always 
be wrong. ISTor does the right or wrong in such cases as these de- 
pend at all upon the person with whom, or the time when, or the 
manner, in which, adultery [for example] is committed ; but abso- 
lutely the doing of any one of these things is wrong. It would 
be equally absurd, then, to require a mean state, and an excess, 
and a defect, in injustice, and cowardice, and intemperance. 14. 
For thus there would be a mean state of excess and defect, and an 
excess of excess, and a defect of defect. But just as there is no 
excess and defect of temperance and courage (owing to the fact 
that the mean is in some sense an extreme), so neither in the case 



* [I omit part of section 9 at this point.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 431 

of these is there a mean state, excess, or defect ; but however they 
be done, sin is committed. For, in a word, there is neither a 
mean state of excess and defect, nor an excess and defect of a 
mean state* 

BOOK III.-OF MORAL CHOICE. (Chapters i.-v. inclusive.) 

III., i., 1. Since, then, virtue is conversant with passions and 
actions, and praise and blame are bestowed on voluntary acts, but 
pardon, and sometimes pity, on those which are involuntary, it is 
perhaps necessary for those who study the subject of virtue to de- 
fine what is the voluntary and what is the involuntary. It is more- 
over useful to legislators, for the regulation of rewards and 
punishments. 

2. Now, it appears that those things which are done by con- 
straint, or through ignorance, are involuntary ;f and that is done 
by compulsion, of which the principle is external, and is of such 
character that the agent or patient does not at all contribute toward 
it ; as, for example, if the wind should carry a man anywhere, or 
persons having supreme authority over him. 

3. But all those actions which are done through the fear of greater 
evils, or because of something honorable, — as if a tyrant, having 
in his power our parents and children, should order us to do some 
hase deed, and they in the case of our obedience should be saved, 
hut in the case of our refusal should be put to death, — [the student 
might perhaps without reflection think that] it admits of a ques- 
tion whether they are involuntary or voluntary. 4. Something of 
this kind happens likewise in the case of throwing things over- 
board in a storm ; for, abstractedly, no one voluntarily throws 
away his goods, but for his own and his companions' safety 
every sensible man does it. 5. Such actions as these, therefore, 
are of a mixed character; but they resemble voluntary acts most, 
for at the time of their performance they are eligible, and the end 
of the action depends upon the time of performance. 6. An act, 
therefore, is to be called voluntary and involuntary at the time when 

* [I omit chapters vii., viii., ix.] t Since those actions are voluntary of which 
the principle is in the agent, he not being ignorant of the particular circum- 
stances, an act is involuntary if one of the two conditions which constitute vol- 
untariness is wanting. If the agent knows the circumstances, but the principle 
is external, the act is done by compulsion ; if the principle is internal, but the 
agent is ignorant of the circumstances, it is done through ignorance. [I omit 
the remainder of the note.] — Michelet. [But what is done through ignorance is 
only considered involuntary, as the lawyers say, sub modo ; for if one fires a 
gun. thinking no one in range, and accidentally kills a man, the killing is invol- 
untary, but the firing is voluntary, and he ought to have first assured himself 
that there was no one in range.] 



432 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

&. man does it. But he does it voluntarily, for the principle of 
moving the limbs, which are used as instruments, rests in such ac- 
tions with the man himself; and where the principle is in himself, 
the doing or not doing the actions is in himself also. 7. Such ac- 
tions as these, therefore, are voluntary, but abstractedly they 
;are perhaps involuntary, for no person would choose anything of 
the kind for its own sake.* 9. But there are some things which 
it is wrong to do, even on compulsion, and a man ought rather to 
undergo the most dreadful sufferings, even death, than do them.f 

12. But it is not easy to lay down a rule as to what kind of 
things are eligible in preference to other things, for there are many 
differences in particulars. But if any one should say that pleasant 
and honorable things are compulsory, for, being external, they 
force a person to act, everything would in this way be compulsory; 
-for, for the sake of these things, everybody does everything ; and 
those who act from constraint, and involuntarily, do it painfully ; 
ibut those who act for the sake of pleasure and honor do it pleas- 
antly ; consequently, it is ridiculous for a man to complain of 
external circumstances, and not himself, who has been a willing 
prey to such things ;. and to call himself the cause of his honorable 
acts, and pleasure the cause of his dishonorable ones. Now, the 
compulsory appears to be that of which the principle is external, 
and to which the person compelled contributes nothing. 

13. But that which is through ignorance is in all cases non- 
voluntary ; but only that which is followed by pain and repent- 
ance, is iNvoluntary ; J for he who has done any action through 
ignorance, and who feels no annoyance at it, did not indeed do it 
voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not know it ; nor, on the other 
Jiand. did he do it involuntarily, inasmuch as he feels no pain at it. 
14. Now, of the two kinds of people who act through ignorance, 
he who feels repentance appears to be an involuntary agent ; but 
he who feels no repentance must be called, since he is not of the 
same character, by a different name — non- voluntary ; for, since 
there is a difference, it is better that he should have a name of 
his own. 

* [I omit the remainder of section 7, and the whole of section 8 ] | [I omit 
the remainder of section 9, and the whole of sections 10 and 11.] % By the ex- 
pression "acting ignorantly" is meant ignorance of the principle. This is con- 
sidered by all moralists and jurists voluntary, and therefore blamable, as it is as- 
sumed that all persons are, or ought to be, acquainted with the principles of right 
and wrong, and with the law of the land. To act "through ignorance" signi- 
fies ignorance of the fact. If an action of this kind is followed by repentance, 
Aristotle calls it involuntary, and therefore considers it excusable ; but if not 
repented of, he terms it non-voluntary, and pronounces it unpardonable. 



■§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 433 

15. But there seems to be a difference between acting through 
ignorance, and acting ignorantly ; for he who is under the influence 
of drunkenness or anger does not seem to act through ignorance, 
but for one of the motives mentioned, not knowingly but ignor- 
antly ; for every vicious man is ignorant of what he ought to do, 
and from what he ought to abstain ; and through such faulty ig- 
norance men become unjust and altogether depraved. 16. But the 
meaning of the term " involuntary " is not if a person is ignorant 
of what is expedient, for ignorance in principle is not the cause of 
involuntariness, but of viciousness ; nor is ignorance of universals 
the cause of involuntariness (for on account of such ignorance we 
are blamed), but ignorance of particulars in the circumstances of 
the action; for in these cases we are pitied and pardoned, for he 
who is ignorant of any of these things acts involuntarily. 17. 
Perhaps, then, it would be no bad thing to define what these cir- 
cumstances are, and how many there are of them, and who the 
person is who acts, and what he does, and about what and in what 
case he does it ; and sometimes with what, as the instrument ; 
and from what motive, as safety ; and in what manner, as gently 
or violently. 18. JS~o person except a madman could be ignorant 
of all these particulars ; and it is clear that he can not be ignorant 
of the agent, for how could he be ignorant of himself? But a man 
might be ignorant of what he does, as those who say that they 
had forgotten themselves, or that they did not know that they 
were forbidden to speak of it, as iEschylus said respecting the 
mysteries ; or that, wishing to exhibit an engine, he let it off by 
mistake, as the man let off the catapult.* 20. Ignorance, there- 
fore, being possible on all these circumstances connected with the 
act. he who was ignorant of any one of these, seems to have acted 
involuntarily, and particularly in the principal circumstances ; but 
the principal circumstances appear to be those of the act itself, 
and the motive. But though involuntariness is said to consist in 
such ignorance as this, still the act must be painful, and followed 
by repentance. 

21. But, since the involuntary is that which is done through 
constraint and that which is done through ignorance, it would ap- 
pear that the voluntary is that of which the principle is in the 
doer himself, having a knowledge of the particulars, namely, the 
circumstances of the act ; for perhaps it is not correct to say that 
the acts of anger or desire are involuntary. 22. For if so, in the 
first place, no other living creature except man, and no children, 
will be voluntary agents ; and in the second place, we may ask the 

*' [I omit section 19.] 



434 Kant's Ethics. § 1040' 

question, is no one of the acts of desire or anger, which we do,, 
done voluntarily ? or are the good ones done voluntarily, hut the 
bad ones involuntarily ? or is it not ridiculous to make such dis- 
tinctions, when the cause of both is one and the same ?* 24. Again,, 
what is the difference with respect to involuntariness between the 
faults that are committed on principle and in anger ? for both are 
to be avoided ; and the irrational passions appear to be no less 
naturally belonging to man ; and therefore irrational actions 
equally belong to him. It is absurd, therefore, to call these actions 
involuntary. 

III., ii., 1. The nature of the voluntary and the involuntary 
having been described, the next thing is, that we should examine 
the object of deliberate preference ; 2. for it appears to be most in- 
timately connected with virtue, and even more than actions to ba 
a test of character. Now, deliberate preference appears to be vol- 
untary, but not the same as " the voluntary," but "the voluntary'" 
is more extensive : for both children and other beings participate 
in the voluntary, but not in deliberate preference ; and we call 
sudden and unpremeditated acts voluntary, but we do not say that 
they were done from deliberate preference. But those who say 
that it is desire, or anger, or volition [wish], or any opinion, do- 
not seem to speak correctly. 3. For deliberate preference is not 
shared by irrational beings ; but desire and anger are ; and the in- 
continent man acts from desire, and not from deliberate preference ; 
and the continent man, on the other hand, acts from deliberate 
preference, and not from desire. And desire is opposed to delib- 
erate preference, but not to desire ; and desire is conversant with 
the pleasant and painful, but deliberate preference with neither.. 
4. Still less is it anger ; for acts done from anger do not at all seem, 
done from deliberate preference. 5. Nor yet is it volition [wish],, 
although it appears to approach very near it ; for there is no de- 
liberate preference of impossibilities ; and if any person should! 
say that he deliberately preferred them, he would be thought a , 
fool ; but there is volition [wishing] of impossibilities, as of immor- 
tality. And there is volition [wishing] about things which can not. 
by any possibility be performed by one's self; as, that a particular 
actor, or wrestler, should gain the victory ; but no person 
deliberately prefers such things as these, but only such things, 
as he thinks may come to pass by his own agency. 6. But,, 
further, volition [wish] is rather of the end, and deliberate 
preference of the means ; for instance, we wish to be in health,, 
but we deliberately prefer the means of becoming so ; and wft 

* [I omit section 23.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 435 

wish to be happy, and say so ; hut it is not a suitable expression to* 
say, we deliberately prefer it ; for, in a word, there appears to be 
no deliberate preference in matters which are out of our power. 

7. Nor yet can it be opinion ; for opinion seems to be about all 
objects, and on things eternal and impossible, just as much as on 
things which are in our own power ; and opinions are divided ac- 
cording to their truth and falsehood, not according to vice and 
virtue ; but the contrary is the case with deliberate preference. 
8. But, perhaps, no one says it is the same as opinion generally ; 
but it is not even the same as any particular opinion ; for we get 
our character from our deliberate preference of things good or 
bad, and not from our opinions. 9. And we deliberately prefer to 
take a thing, or not to take it, or something of this kind ; but we 
form an opinion as to what a thing is, or to whom it is advantage- 
ous, or how ; but we do not form an opinion at all about taking 
or not taking it ; and deliberate preference is rather praised for 
its being directed to a right object, or for being rightly directed, 
but opinion, for its being true. 10. And we deliberately prefer 
those things which we most certainly know to be good, but we 
form opinions about those things which we do not know for cer- 
tain. And it does not appear that the same people are the 
best both in forming opinions, and in exercising deliberate pre- 
ference ; but some are good in opinion, but through vice prefer 
not what they ought. 11. But whether opinion arises before de- 
liberate preference, or whether it follows upon it, matters not ; for 
this is not the point which we are investigating, but whether it is 
the same with any opinion. What, then, is its genus, and what 
its species, since it is not any of the things we have mentioned ? 
It seems, in fact, voluntary ; but not everything which is voluntary 
is the object of deliberate preference, but only that [action] which 
has been previously the object of deliberation; for deliberate pre- 
ference is joined with reason and intellect ; and its name seems to 
signify that it is somewhat chosen before other things. 

III., iii., 1. But do men deliberate about everything, and is 
everything an object of deliberation, or are there some things 
about which there is no: deliberation ? But perhaps we must call 
that an object of deliberation, about which, not a fool or a madman, 
but a reasonable man would deliberate. 2. About things eternal 
no man deliberates, as about the world, or the diagonal and the 
side of a square,* that they are incommensurable ; nor yet about 

*The diagonal and side of a square are incommensurable ; for let the side = a, 
then the diagonal is equal to the square root of 2 multiplied by a, and the square 
root of 2 can not be expressed by a finite number. 



436 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

things in motion, which always go on in the same manner, whether 
it be from necessity, or nature, or any other cause, as the solstices 
and the sunrise ; nor yet about things which are different at dif- 
ferent times, as droughts and showers ; nor about things accidental, 
as the finding of a treasure ; nor yet about everything human, as 
no Lacedaemonian deliberates how the Scythians might be best 
governed ; for none of these things could be done through our 
own agency. 3. But we deliberate about those subjects of action 
which are in our own power ; and these are the cases which re- 
main.* But each individual man deliberates about those subjects 
of action which are in his own power. And respecting the exact 
and self-sufficient sciences, there is no deliberation ; as respecting 
letters, for we do not doubt how we ought to write. 4. But we 
deliberate aboiit all those things which happen by our own means, 
and not always in the same manner ; as about the art of medicine, 
of finance, and the art of navigation, more than gymnastics, inas- 
much as it is less exactly described : and likewise about the rest ; 
and more about the arts than the sciences ;f for we debate more 
about them. But deliberation takes place in the case of things 
that generally happen, but respecting which it is uncertain how 
they may turn out, and in which there is indefiniteness. 5. But 
we take advice of others on great matters, because we distrust our- 
selves, as unable to decide with sufficient accuracy. 6. And we do 
not deliberate about ends, but about means; for the physician 
does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor the orator whether 
he shall persuade, nor the lawgiver whether he shall make good 
laws, nor anybody else about the end ; but having determined on 
some end, they deliberate how and by what means it may be 
effected. 

7. And if it appears that it may be done by more means than 
one, they next deliberate by which it may be done most easily and 
honorably ; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it 
can be done by this, and by what means this can be effected, until 
they arrive at the first cause, which is the last in the analysis; for 
he who deliberates appears to investigate and analyze the subject 
like a mathematical problem, in the way that we have mentioned. 
'•8. Now, not all investigation seems to be deliberation, as the in- 

* [I omit a portion of section 3 at this point.] | We debate more about the 
arts than the sciences, because the former are concerned with contingent matter, 
the latter with necessary matter. Still, however, the Greeks divided the sciences 
into akeibeis [exact] and stochastikai [approximate (aimed at ends)], and of 
these the latter alone are capable of being made the subjects of deliberation. 
See on the subject of deliberation, Khet. Book I., c. iv. 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 437 

vestigations of mathematics ; but every deliberation is an investi- 
gation ; and the last thing in the analysis is the first in the execu- 
tion. And if men come to an impossibility, they leave off delib- 
erating ; as, for example, if money is necessary, but it is impos- 
sible to get it ; but if it appears possible, they set about acting. 
For those things which can be done through our own agency are 
possible ; for those things which happen by means of our friends,, 
happen in some sense through our own agency; for the principle is- 
in ourselves. 9. But sometimes the instruments, and sometimes the 
use of them, are the subject of investigation, and in like manner 
in the other categories, sometimes we investigate by whose assist- 
ance, and sometimes how, or by what means. Therefore, as we have 
said, it seems that man is the origin of all actions ; but delibera- 
tion is [only] about those subjects of moral conduct which are in 
one's own power ; but actions are for the sake of other things., 
10. The end, therefore, cannot be a subject of deliberation, but the 
means ; nor yet are particulars the object of deliberation ; as 
whether this is a loaf or whether it is baked as it ought ; for these 
points belong to the province of sensual perception.* 11. Now, the 
object of deliberation and that of deliberate preference are the 
same, except that the object of deliberate preference has already 
[by its name] been restricted in its meaning [selected from among 
the objects of deliberation ^eaanalysis p. xxvii.) and acted upon — 
borne forward, like the standard in battle] ; for that which after 
deliberation is preferred, is an object of deliberate preference ; for 
every person ceases to deliberate how he shall act, when he refers 
the principle to himself, and his ruling part [reason] ; for it is this 
which deliberately prefers. 12. f Now, since the object of delib- 
erate preference is the object of deliberation and of desire, and for 
things in our own power, it follows that deliberate preference is 
the deliberate desire of things in our power ; for having made our de- 
cision after deliberation, we desire [§§157,163] according to our 
deliberation. Now, let deliberate preference have been sufficiently 
described in outline, and its object stated, and that it is respecting, 
the means. 

III., iv., 1. That volition is of the end, has been stated ; but to 
some it appears to be of the good, and to others of the apparent good. . 
Now the conclusion to which they come who say that the object of 
volition is the good, will be, that what he wishes who chooses in- 
correctly, is no object of volition at all (for if it is to be an object 
of volition, it must also be good ; 2. but it might be, if it so hap- 
pens, bad)'; but according to those who, on the other hand, tell us 

*[I omit the remainder of section 10.] | [I omit the first part of section 12.] 



438 Kant's Mhies. § 1040 

that the object of volition is the apparent good, there will be no 
natural object of volition^ but only that which seems to each per- 
son to be so ; and different things appear so to different persons, 
and as it might happen, contrary things. 

3. Now if these accounts are Unsatisfactory, must we then say 
that, abstractedly, and in reality, the good is the object of volition, 
and to each individual, that which to him appears to be so? That 
the good man's object of volition is the real good, but the bad 
man's anything which he may happen to think good? 4. Just as 
in the case of the body, those things are wholesome to persons in 
a good state of body, which are in reality wholesome, but different 
things to persons diseased ; and likewise things bitter and sweet, 
and warm and heavy, and everything else ; for the good man 
judges everything rightly, and in every case the truth appears so 
to him ; for there are certain things honorable and pleasant in 
every habit. 5. And perhaps the principal difference between the 
good and the bad man is that the good man sees the truth in every 
case, since he is, as it were, the rule and measure of it. [St. Paul, 
Eomans ii., 14, and I. Cor., ii., 15.] 6. But the generality of man- 
kind seem to be deceived by pleasure ; for it appears to be the 
good, though it is not so ; and therefore men choose what is pleas- 
ant, under the idea [opinion] that it is good, and avoid pain, as 
an evil. 

BOOK III., Chapter V., § 1. Now the end being an object 
of volition, and the means objects of deliberation and deliberate 
preference, the actions which regard these must be in accordance 
with deliberate preference, and voluntary ; and the energies of 
the virtues are conversant with these. And virtue also must be in 
our own power ; and in like manner vice : for wherever we have 
the power to do, we have also the power not to do ; and wherever 
we have the power not to do, we have also the power to do. 2. 
So that if it be in our power to do a thing, which is honorable, to 
leave it undone, which is disgraceful, Will be in our power likewise; 
and if it be in our power to leave a thing undone, which [omission] 
is honorable, to do it, which is disgraceful, is in our power like- 
wise. But if the doing things honorable and disgraceful be in our 
power, and the abstaining from them be likewise in our power 
(and this is the meaning of being good and bad), then the being 
good and bad will be in our power also. 

3. But as to the saying, that " No person is willingly wicked, 
nor unwillingly happy," it seems partly true, and partly false ; for 
no one is unwillingly happy ; but vice is voluntary. Or else we 
must contradict what we have just said, and deny that man is the 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 439 

origin and the parent of his actions, as of his children. 4. But if this 
appear true, and we have no other principles to which we may 
refer our actions than those which are in our own power, then 
those things, the principles of which are in our own power, are 
themselves also in our own power, and voluntary ; and testimony 
seems to be borne to this statement both by private persons indi- 
vidually, and by legislators themselves; for they chastise and 
punish those who do wicked deeds, unless they do them upon 
compulsion, or through an ignorance for which they [legislators] 
are themselves to blame [since they ought to have provided suffi- 
cient means of education] ; and they confer honor on those who 
do good actions, with a view to encouraging the one and restrain- 
ing the other. 5. And yet no person encourages us to do those 
things which are neither in our own power, nor voluntary, con- 
sidering it not worth while to persuade us not to be hot, or cold, or 
hungry, or anything of this kind ; for we shall suffer them all the 
same. 6. For they punish people even for ignorance itself, if they 
apj)ear to be the cause of their own ignorance ; just as the punish- 
ment is double for drunken people ; for the principle is in them- 
selves, since it was in their own power not to get drunk, and this 
is the cause of their ignorance. 7. And they punish those who 
are ignorant of anything in the laws, which they ought to know, 
and which is not difficult ; and likewise in all other cases in which 
they appear to be ignorant through negligence, on the ground that 
It was in their own power not to be ignorant ; for they had it in 
their own power to pay attention to it. 8. But perhaps [some one 
may object that] a person is unable to give his attention ; but [in 
such cases] they are themselves the causes of their inability, by 
living in a dissipated manner; and persons are themselves the 
cause of their being unjust, by performing bad actions, and of 
being intemperate, by passing their time in drinking-bouts and 
such like ; for energies of any description make men of such a 
■character : but this is clear from those who practice any exercise or 
course of conduct; for they continue energizing. 9. Now, to be 
ignorant that by energizing on every subject the habits are pro- 
duced, shows a man to be utterly devoid of sense. 

10. And further, it is absurd to suppose that the man who does 
unjust actions does not wish to become unjust, or that the man who 
does intemperate actions does not wish to become intemperate. 
But if any one without involuntary ignorance does those acts, 
from doing which he will become unjust, he must be unjust volun- 
tarily ; nevertheless, he will not be able to leave off being unjust, 
and to become just, when he pleases; for the sick man can not be- 



440 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

come well, even though it so happen that he is voluntarily ill, 
owing to an incontinent life, and from disobedience to physicians.. 
11. At the time, therefore, it was in his own power not to be ill, 
but when he has allowed himself to become ill, it is no longer in 
his own power; just as it is no longer in the power of a man who 
has thrown a stone, to recover it ; and yet the throwing and casting 
it was in his own power; for the origin of the action was in his 
own power ; and thus in the beginning it was in the power of the 
unjust and the intemperate man not to become such ; and there- 
fore they are so voluntarily ; but when they have become so, it is 
no longer in their own power to avoid being so. 

12. But not only are the faults of the soul voluntary, but in 
some persons those of the body are so likewise, and with these we 
find fault ; for no person finds fault with those that are ugly by 
nature, but only with those who are so through want of gymnastic 
exercises or through carelessness. 13. The case is the same with 
weakness and mutilation ; for no person would blame a man who 
is born blind, or who is blind from disease, or a blow, but would 
rather pity him; but everybody would blame the man who is 
blind from drunkenness, or any other intemperance. Now of the 
faults of the body, those which are in our own power are blamed,, 
but those which are not in our own power are not blamed. And 
if this is true, it will follow that in the case- of faults of every 
other description those which are blamed must be in our own 
power. 

14. But if any one should say that all men aim at the apparent 
good, but that they have not power over their own imagination, 
and that, according to the character of each individual, is the end 
which presents itself to him ; if, as we have said, every person is - - 
in some way the cause of his own habit, he will be in some way 
the cause of his own imagination. 

15. But if no one is to himself the cause of his doing bad ac- 
tions, but he does them through ignorance of the end, thinking 
that by these means he will have what is best ; and that the 
[faculty of] aiming-at-the-end by which [faculty] he judges well,, 
and will choose the true good, is not a matter of choice, but that 
it is necessary for a man to be born with it, as with the faculty of 
sight ; and he is well gifted by nature, who is born with this good- 
faculty ; (for he will have a most honorable and excellent thing, 
and one which he can not get or learn from any other person, but 
which he must have just as he has it by nature, and to have this 
well and excellently by nature constitutes perfect and true natural 
goodness ;) if this be true, how can virtue be more voluntary than 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 441 

vice ? for to both the good and the bad man alike the end is, by 
nature, or in some way apparent and laid down ; and referring 
everything else to this, they act accordingly. 16. Whether then 
the end does not appear by nature to every man of one kind or 
other, but the light in which it presents itself depends in some 
measure upon himself; or whether the end is by nature fixed, and 
from the good man's performing the means voluntarily, virtue is 
voluntary; in both cases vice is just as voluntary as virtue ; for 
the bad man is just as much a voluntary agent in his actions as 
the good man. 17. If, then, as is said, the virtues are voluntary, 
(for we are in some sense joint causes of our habits, and from our 
being of a certain [e. g. vicious] character, we propose to ourselves 
the same kind of end,) the vices must be voluntary also ; for they 
are just as much so as the virtues. 

18. Now about the virtues we have spoken generally ; we have 
said in outline, as it were, that they are mean states, and that they 
are habits ; we have stated from what things they derive their 
origin, and that these things they are themselves apt to practice ; 
that they are in our own power, that they are voluntary, and 
that they are under the direction of right reason. 

19. But the actions and the habits are not in the same manner 
voluntary ; for we are masters of our actions from the beginning 
to the end, since we know the particulars ; but we are masters 
only of the beginning of our habits ; but the addition of particu- 
lars we are not aware of, as we are in the case of sicknesses ; but 
because it was in our power to make this or that use of particulars 
in the first instance, on this account they [the resulting habits] are 
voluntary.* 20. Let us then take up the virtues again separately^ 

* It is plain that, according to Aristotle, virtue is the law under which we 
are born, the law of nature, that law which, if we would attain to happiness, we 
are bound to fulfil. Happiness, in its highest and purest sense, is our "being's 
end and aim ; ' : and this is an energy or activity of the soul according to the law 
of virtue: an energy of the purest of the capacities of the soul, of that capacity 
which is proper and peculiar to man alone; namely, intellect or reason. De- 
signed, then, as man is. for virtuous energies, endowed with capacities for moral 
action, with a natural taste and appreciation for that which is morally beautiful, 
with a natural disposition or instinct, as it were, to good acts; virtue, and there- 
fore happiness, becomes possible and attainable. Had this not been the case, all 
moral instruction would be useless. That for which nature had not given man 
a capacity would have been beyond his reach ; for that which exists by nature 
can never by custom be made to be otherwise. But this natural disposition or 
bias is, according to Aristotle, a mere potentiality ; it is possessed, but not active, 
not energizing. .It is necessary that it should be directed by the will, and that 
the will in its turn should be directed to a right end by deliberate preference ; 
t. e. by moral principle. From his belief in the existence of this natural capac- 

29 



442 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

and state what they are, what their subjects are, and how they are 
virtues ; and it will be at the same time clear how many there are : 
and first of courage. 

OF COURAGE AND TEMPERANCE. (Book III., chapters vi-xii. inclusive.) 

III., vi., 1. Now that courage is a mean state on the subjects of 
fear and confidence has been already made apparent : * but it is 
evident that we fear things terrible ; and these are, to speak gen- 
erally, evils ; and therefore people define fear " the expectation of 
evil." 2. Now we fear all evils, as disgrace, poverty, disease, 
friendlessness, and death. But the brave man does not appear to 
have to do with all evils ; for some it is right and good to fear, and 
not to fear them is disgraceful, as, for example, not to fear dis- 
grace ; for he who fears this is a worthy and modest man, and he 
"who does not fear it is shameless. f 

III., vii., 1. But the terrible is not to all persons the same ; 
and there is something which we say is beyond the power of man 
to bear; this, therefore, is terrible to every man, at least to every 
man of sense. 2. But those which are within the power of man 
to bear differ in magnitude, and in being some greater and some • 
less ; and circumstances which cause confidence differ likewise. 
But the brave man is fearless, as becomes a man ; therefore at such 
things he will feel fear ; but he will bear up, as far as right and 
reason dictate, for the sake of what is honorable [righteousness] ; 
for there is this same end to all the virtues. 3. But it is possible 
for these things to be feared too much and too little, and, again, 
for things not terrible to be feared as if they were so. But of 
faults, one is that the thing itself is not right ; another, that the 
manner is not right ; another, that the time is not right, and so 
on ; and the case is similar with respect to things that cause con- 

ity, and this bias or inclination toward virtue, and moreover from his believing 
that man was a free and voluntary agent, Aristotle necessarily holds the responsi- 
bility of man. Man has power over his individual actions to do or to abstain. By 
irepeated acts, habits are formed either of virtue or vice; and, therefore, for his 
whole character when formed, as well as for each act which contributes to its 
formation, man is responsible. Not that men have always power over their 
acts, when their character is formed; but what he contends for is, that they have 
power over them whilst their moral character is in process of formation ; and 
that, therefore, they must, in all reason, be held responsible for the permanent 
■effects which their conduct in particular acts has produced, and which they must 
at every step have seen gradually resulting. [Extract from Prof. Browne's 
Analytical Introduction, pages vi. and vii.] * [See II., ii., 6 (page 424 above). 
The reference is perhaps to II., vii., 2 (which I have omitted), a passage which 
is more fully elaborated at III., vii., 6-8 (page 443 below).] t [I omit the re- 
mainder of section 2, and all of sections 3-10.] 



I 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 448 

fidence. 4. Now he who bears bravely, and who fears what he 
ought, and from the right motive, and in the right manner, and 
at the right time, and feels confidence in like manner, is brave. 
For the brave man suffers and. acts just as the nature of the case 
demands, and right reason warrants. 

5. But the end of every energy is that which is according to the 
habit; and courage is that which is honorable in the case of the 
brave man ; such therefore is his end ; for everything is defined 
by its end. For the sake, therefore, of what is honorable, the 
brave man bears and performs those things which belong to cour- 
age. 6. Bat of those who are in the extreme of excess there are 
two kinds, one who is excessive in fearlessness, who is not 
named ;* but he (if, as is said of the Celts, he fears nothing, neither 
earthquake nor waves) may be called mad or insensate. 7. The 
other, who is excessive in his confidence in terrible circumstances, 
is rash ; and the rash man is thought to be arrogant, and a pre- 
tender to courage. He then wishes to seem what the courageous 
man is in terrible circumstances; wherever he can, therefore, he 
imitates him. Most of these, therefore, are at once bold and cow- 
ardly ; for though they are bold in these cases, yet they do not bear 
up under circumstances of terror. 8. But he who is excessive in 
fear is a coward ; for he has all the attendant characteristics of 
fearing what he ought not, and as he ought not, and so forth ; be- 
dsides, he is deficient in confidence ; but where he is called upon to 
bear pain, he more especially shows that he is in excess. Now the 
coward is desponding, for he fears everything ; but the brave man 
is just the reverse, for confidence belongs to the sanguine temper. 
9. With the same subjects, therefore, are conversant the characters 
of the coward, the rash, and the brave man, but they are differ- 
ently disposed with respect to them ; for the two first are in excess 
and defect; the other is in the mean, and as he ought to be ; the 
rash are precipitate, and though beforehand they are full of eager- 
ness, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof; the brave are 
in action full of spirit, but beforehand tranquil. 10. As we said, 
therefore, courage is a mean state with respect to subjects of con- 
fidence and terror ; i. e. in those which have been specified ; and it 
chooses and bears up, because it is honorable to do so, or because it 
is disgraceful not to do so. 11. But to die, and thus avoid poverty 
or love, or anything painful, is not the part of a brave man, but 
rather of a coward ; for it is - cowardice to avoid trouble ; and 
the suicide does not undergo death because it is honorable, but in 
order to avoid evil. Such, then, is the nature of courage. 

* ]I omit part of section 6 at this point.] 



444 Kant's Ethics. § 1040' 

III., viii., 5.* Again, experience on every subject appears to be 
a kind of courage ; whence even Socrates thought that courage 
was a science. f Now some people are experienced in one thing, 
and some in another ; and in warlike matters soldiers are experi- 
enced ; for there seem to be many things in war new to other men, 
with which soldiers, more than any one else, have become ac- 
quainted. They therefore appear courageous, because all other 
people are not aware of the nature of these things ; besides, 
through their experience they are better able to do, and not to 
suffer, and to protect themselves, and to wound others, because 
they are able to use dexterously their arms, and because they have 
such arms as are best adapted for offense and defense. J 7. Now 
regular troops become cowardly when the danger surpasses their 
experience, and when they are inferior in numbers or equijnnents; 
for they are the first to fly ; but a native militia stands its ground, . 
and dies, which hapjJened in the Hermseuru; || for to them flight 
is disgraceful, and death is preferable to such safety ; while the 
others only expose themselves to danger at the beginning, under 
the idea that they are superior ; but when they discover the true 
state of the case they fly, because they fear death more than dis- 
grace. But this is not the character of the courageous man.§ 

12. Now it was said to be the part of the brave man to with- 
stand everything which is or which appears to be terrible to man, 
because it is honorable to do so, and disgraceful not to do so. 13. ^ 
And therefore, also, it appears to be characteristic of a brave man 
to be fearless and imperturbable in cases of sudden danger, rather 
than in those which are previously expected ; for it arises more 
from habit, and less from preparation; for in the case of things 
previously expected, a man might prefer them from calculation 
and reason, but in things unexpected, from habit.** 

* [I omit sections 1-4.] | The moral theory of Socrates was, that as virtue 
was the only way to happiness, and no one could be willingly his own enemy r . 
so no one could do wrong willingly. Hence, whoever did wrong did it through 
ignorance of right, and therefore virtue [in so far as it could he theoretically 
taught] resolved itself into science (episteme) [and practical science would 
be a virtuous life]. Courage, therefore, being a virtue, would be, according to- 
this theory, a science likewise. % [I omit section 6.] |] The Greek scholiast in- 
forms us that the Hermteum was an open space in the city of Coronnea, in Boeotia, . 
Here the Coronaeans, assisted by some Boeotian auxiliary troops, fought an en- 
gagement with Nonarchus the Phocian, who had got possession of the citadel.. 
In this battle the native troops stood their ground, and were all killed to a man; 
the auxiliaries fled, on hearing of the death of one of their generals, g [I omit, 
sections 8-11.] ** [I omit sections 14 and 15, and the whole of chapter ix.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 445 

III., X., 1. But, after this, let us speak of temperance ; for 
these two, courage and temperance, seem to be the virtues of the 
irrational parts of the soul. Now, we have said that temperance 
is a mean state on the subject of pleasures ; for it has not the same, 
but less connection with pains ; and with the same intemperance 

. appears to be conversant likewise. But let us now distinguish the 
kinds of pleasures which are the subject of it. 

2. Let pleasures be divided into those of the soul, and those of 
the body; as, for example, the love of honor, the love of learning; 
for, in both these cases, a man takes pleasure in that which he is 
apt to love, while his body feels nothing, but rather his intellect ; 
but those who have to do with pleasures of this kind are neither 

- called temperate nor intemperate. 3. Nor are those called tem- 
perate nor intemperate who have to do with the other pleasures 
which do not belong to the body ; for, as to those who are fond of 
fables^ and telling long stories, and those who pass their days idly 
in- indifferent occupations, we call them trifiers, but not intemper- 
ate ; nor yet do we call those intemperate who are too much grieved 
at the loss of money or friends. 

4. Temperance must therefore belong to bodily pleasures ; but 
not to all even of these. For those who are delighted at the 
pleasures derived from sight, as with color, and form, and painting, 
are neither called temperate nor intemperate, and yet it would 
seem to be possible for a man to be pleased even with these as they 
ought, or too much, or too little.* 

III., xi., 6 f But there are, in fact, none who fall short on the 

. subject of pleasure, and who delight less than they ought in it ; 
for such insensibility is not natural to man ; for all other animals 
discriminate between the things which they eat, and like some, 
and dislike others. But if any one thinks nothing pleasant, and 
sees no difference between one thing and another, he would scarcely 
be a man; but this character has no name, because it is never 
found. 

7. But the temperate man is in the mean in these matters ; for 

.he is not pleased, but rather annoyed, at the principal pleasures of 
the intemperate man ; nor is he pleased with any improper objects, 

. nor excessively with anything ; nor is he pained at their absence ; 
nor does he feel desire, except in moderation, nor more than he 
ought, nor when he ought not, nor in any case improperly. 8. But 
he feels moderate and proper desire for all those pleasant things 
which conduce to health, or a sound habit of body ; and he feels 
the same desire for those other pleasures which do not hinder 

* [I omit sections 5-12.] |[I omit sections 1-5.] 



446 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

these, which are not contrary to the honorable [i. e. righteousness], 
nor beyond his means ; for he who feels otherwise sets too high a 
price upon such pleasures. But this is not the character of the 
temperate man ; but he feels them according to the suggestions of 
right reason. 

III., xii., 1. But intemperance seems more voluntary than 
cowardice ; for one arises from pleasure, and the other from pain ; 
one of which is to be chosen, and the other to be avoided. And 
pain puts a man beside himself, and disturbs his natural character ; 
whereas pleasure has no such effect. It is, therefore, more volun- 
tary, and for this reason more deserving of reproach ; for it^is 
easier to become accustomed to resist pleasures, because they fre- 
quently occur in life ; and in forming the habits there is no danger; 
but the case of things formidable is just the contrary. 

2. And it would appear that cowardice is not equally voluntary 
in the particular acts; for cowardice itself is not painful; but the 
particular circumstances through pain put a man beside himself, 
and cause him to throw away his arms, and to do other disgraceful 
things ; and therefore it appears to be compulsory. 3. In the case, . 
however, of the intemperate man, on the contrary, his particular 
acts are voluntary ; for they are committed in obedience to his 
lusts and desires : but the whole habit is less voluntary ; for no 
one desires to be intemperate. 4. We apply the term intemper- 
ance to children's faults also ; for there is some resemblance be- 
tween the two cases ; but which use of the word is derived from 
the other, matters not for our present purpose. But it is evident 
that the latter meaning was derived from the former ; and the 
metaphor seems to be by no means a bad one : for whatever de- 
sires those things which are disgraceful, and is apt to increase 
much, requires chastisement ; and this is especially the case with 
desires and children ; for children live in obedience to desire, and 
in them the desire of pleasure is excessive. 5. If, therefore, it is 
not obedient, and subject to rule, it will increase greatly ; for the 
desire of pleasure is insatiable, and attacks the foolish man on 
all sides; and the indulgence of desire increases the temper which 
is congenial to it. and if the desires are great and strong, they expel 
reason also. 6. Hence it is necessary that they should be moderate 
and few, and not at all opposed to reason : and this state is what 
we call obedient and disciplined ; for as a child ought to live in 
obedience to the orders of his master, so ought that part of the 
soul which contains the desires, to be in obedience to reason. 7. 
It is therefore necessary for that part of the soul of the temperate 
man which contains the desires, to be in harmony with reason ; for 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 447 

the honorable fi. e. righteousness] is the mark at which both aim; 
and the temperate man desires what he ought, and as he ought, 
and when he ought ; and- thus reason also enjoins. Let this suffice., 
therefore, on the subject of temperance. 

BOOK IV. -OF LIBERALITY. SOCIABILITY'. AND TRUTHFULNESS. 

IV., i., 1. Lot us next speak of liberality. Now it appears to 
be a mean on the subject of possessions ; for the liberal man is 
praised, not for matters which relate to war, nor for those in which 
the temperate character is exhibited, nor yet for his judgment, but 
in respect to the giving and receiving of property ; and more in 
giving than receiving. But by property we mean everything, of 
which the value is measured by money. 2. Now, the excess and 
defect on the subject of property are prodigality and illiberality ; 
the term illiberality we alwaj^s attach to those who are more 
anxious than they ought about money ; but that of prodigality we 
sometimes use in a complex sense, and attach it to intemperate 
people, for we call those who are incontinent, and profuse in their 
expenditure for purposes of intemperance, prodigal ; therefore they 
seem to be the most wicked, for they have many vices at once. 3. 
Now, they are not properly so called, for the meaning of the word 
prodigal is the man who has one single vice, namely, that of wast- 
ing his fortune.* 

6. But actions according to virtue are honorable [righteous], and 
are done [§ 227] for the sake of the honorable [righteousness] ; 
the liberal man, therefore, will give for the sake of the honorable, 
and will give properly, for he will give to proper objects, in proper 
quantities, at proper times ; and his giving will have all the other 
qualifications of right giving, and he will do this pleasantly and 
without pain ; for that which. is done according to virtue is pleas- 
ant, or without pain, and by no means annoying to the doer. 7. 
But he who gives to improper objects, and not for the sake of the 
honorable, is not to be called liberal, but something else ; nor yet he 
who gives with pain [ef. §338], for he would prefer the money to 
the performance of an honorable [righteous] action, and this is 
not the part of a liberal man. 8. Nor yet will the liberal man re- 
ceive from improper persons, for such receiving is not characteris- 
tic of him who estimates things at their proper value; nor would 
he be fond of asking, for it is not like a benefactor, readily to al- 
low himself to be benefited ; but he will receive from proper 
sources ; for instance, from his own possessions ; not because it is 
honorable, but because it is necessary, in order that he may have 

* [I omit the remainder of section 3, and the whole of sections 4 and 5.] 



448 Kant's Ethics. §1040 

something to give ; nor will he be careless of his own fortune, be- 
cause he hopes by means of it to be of use to others ; nor will he 
.give at random to anybody, in order that he may have something 
to give to proj>er objects and in cases where it is honorable [right] 
to do so. 

9. It is characteristic of the liberal man to be profuse and lavish 
in giving, so as to leave but little for himself, for it is characteristic 
of him not to look to his own interest. But the term liberality is 
applied in proportion to a man's fortune, for the liberal consists not 
in the quantity of the things given, but in the habit of the giver ; 
and this habit gives according to the means of the giver. And 
there is nothing to hinder the man whose gifts are smaller being 
more liberal, provided he gives from smaller means.* 

14. But we have said that prodigality and illiberality are the 
'.excess and the defect, and that they are conversant with two 
things, giving and receiving, for we include spending under giving. 
Prodigality, therefore, exceeds in giving, and not receiving, and 
falls short in receiving ; but illiberality is deficient in giving, but 
excessive in receiving, but only in cases of small expenditure- 
Both the characteristics of prodigality, therefore, are seldom found 
in the same person ; for it is not easy for a person who receives 
from nobody to give to everybody, for their means soon fail pri- 
vate persons who give, and these are the very persons who seem 
to be prodigal.f 16. But the majority of prodigals, as has been 
stated, also receive from improper sources, and are in this respect 
illiberal. Now, they become fond of receiving, because they wish 
to sj>end, and are not able to do it easily, for their means soon 
fail them ; they are, therefore, compelled to get supplies from some 
.other quarter, and at the same time, owing to their not caring for 
the honorable [righteousness], they receive without scruple from 
any person they can ; for they are anxious to give, and the how or 
the whence they get the money matters not to them. 17. There- 
fore their gifts are not liberal, for they are not honorable, nor clone 
for the sake op the honorable, nor as they ought to be done ; but 
sometimes they make men rich who deserve to be poor, and will 
give to men of virtuous characters nothing, and to flatterers, or 
those who provide them with any other pleasure, much. 18. 
Hence the generality of prodigals are intemperate also ; for, spend- 
ing money carelessly, they are expensive also in acts of intemper- 
ance, and, because they do not live with a view to the honorable 
[uprightly], they fall away toward pleasures. The prodigal, there 

* [I omit seven sections, numbered 10, 11. 12, 13, 14, 12, 13.] | [I omit 
section 15.] 



$ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 449 

fore, if he be without the guidance of a master, turns aside to these 
vices ; but if he happen to be taken care of, he ma}- possibly ar- 
rive at the mean, and at propriety. 

19. But illiberality is incurable, for old age and imbecility of 
every kind seem to make men illiberal, and it is more congenial to 
human nature than prodigality ; for the generality of mankind 
are fond of money rather than of giving, and it extends very 
widely, and has many forms, for there appear to be many modes 
of illiberality ; for as it consists in two things, the defect of giving, 
and the excess of receiving, it does not exist in all persons entire, 
but is sometimes divided ; and some exceed in receiving, and 
others fall short in giving. 20. For those who go by the names 
of parsimonious, stingy, and niggardly, all fall short in giving ; 
but do not desire what belongs to another, nor do they wish to re- 
ceive, some of them from a certain fairness of character, and cau- 
tion lest they commit a base action ; for some people seem to take 
care of their money, or at least say that they do, in order that 
they may never be compelled to commit a disgraceful action. 21. 
Of these also is the cumminsplitter, and everyone of similar char- 
acter, and he derives his name from being in the excess of unwil- 
lingness to give. Others, again, through fear abstain from other 
persons' property, considering it difficult for them to take what be- 
longs to other people, without other people taking theirs. They 
therefore are satisfied neither to receive nor give.* 

IV., vi., 1. But in the intercourse of life and society, and the 
interchange of words and actions, some people appear to be men- 
pleasers ; who praise everything with a view to give pleasure, and 
never in any case take the opposite side, but think they ought to 
give no pain or annoyance to those in whose society they happen 
to be ; others, contrary to these, who oppose everything, and are 
utterly careless of giving pain, are called cross and quarrelsome. 
2. That these habits are blamable, is evident ; and likewise that 
the mean habit [sociability] between them is praiseworthy, ac- 
cording to which a man will approve and disapprove of proper 
objects, and in a proper manner, f 4. Generally, therefore, we 
have said, that in his intercourse he will behave properly ; and re- 
ferring his conduct to the principles of honor [righteousness] and 
expediency, he will aim at not giving pain, or at giving pleasure 
[§409]. For he seems to be concerned with the pleasures and 
pains that arise in the intercourse of society ; and in all of these 
in which it is dishonorable or inexpedient to give pleasure, he 
will show disapprobation, and will deliberately prefer to give pain. 

* [I omit sections 22-25, and also chapters ii-v.] f[I omit section 3.] 



450 Kant's Ethics. • § 1040' 

And if the action bring upon the doer disgrace or harm, and that 
not small, and the opposite course of conduct only slight pain, he 
will not approve, but will disapprove of it highly. 5. But his 
manner of intercourse will be different with persons of rank, and 
with ordinary persons, and with those who are more or less known 
to him ; and in all other cases of difference he will act in like 
manner, awarding to each his due : and abstractedly preferring to 
give pleasure, and cautious about giving pain, but yet attending 
always to the results, I mean to the honorable and the expedient, 
if they be greater than the pain. And for the sake of giving 
great pleasure afterward, he will inflict small pain. Such, then, is 
he who is in the mean, but it has not a name. 6. But of those 
who give pleasure, he who aims at being pleasant, without any 
further object, is a man-pleaser ; he who does it that some benefit 
may accrue to him in money or that which money purchases; is 
a flatterer. But as for him who gives pain and always disapproves, 
we have said that he is morose and quarrelsome. But the extremes 
appear opposed to each other, because the mean has no name. 
[Let it be called sociability.] 

IV., vii., 1. The mean state on the subject of arrogance is 
concerned with almost the same object matter as the last ; this 
also has no name. But it would be no bad plan to go through and 
enumerate such habits as these ; for we should have a more accu- 
rate knowledge of what relates to moral character, when we have 
gone through them individually ; and we should believe that the 
virtues are mean states, if we saw at one comprehensive view that 
the position was true in every instance. 2. Now, in social inter- 
course, those persons who associate with others for the purpose of 
giving pleasure, and those who do it for the purpose of giving pain, 
have been treated of. But let us speak of those who are true. 
and those who are false, in their words, their actions, and their 
pretensions. 

3. Now, the arrogant man appears inclined to pretend to things 
honorable, which do not belong to him, and to things greater than 
what belong to him : the falsely modest, on the other hand, is apt 
to deny what really does belong to him, or to make it out to be less 
than it is. But he who is in the mean is, as it were, a real char- 
acter, truthful in his actions and his words, and ready to allow 
that he possesses what he really possesses, without making it 
greater or less. But it is possible to do all these things with or 
without a motive. But every one, except he acts with a motive, 
speaks, acts, and lives, according to his character. But falsehood, 
abstractedly, is bad and blamable, and truth honorable and praise- 
worthy ; and thus the truthful man being in the mean, is praise- 



§1040 The Clavis to an Index. 451 

worthy ; while the false are both blamable ; but the arrogant man 
more so than the other. 4. But let us speak about each separately: 
and first, about the truthful ; for we are not speaking of him who 
speaks truth in his agreements, nor in matters that relate to in- 
justice or justice ; for this would belong to another virtue ; but of 
him who in cases of no such consequence observes truth in his 
words and actions, from being such in character [$§ 505, 371]. 

5. Bat such a man would appear to be a worthy man; for the 
lover of truth, since he observes it in matters of no consequence,, 
will observe it still more in matters of consequence ; inasmuch as 
he who is cautious of falsehood for its own sake, will surely be 
cautious of it as being disgraceful ; and such a man is praise- 
worthy.* 7. But the character of the arrogant man does not con- 
sist in the power of being so, but in the deliberate preference to 
be so; for he is arrogant, just as the liar, from the habit, and from 
his being of this character.! 

IV., viii., 1. But since there are periods of relaxation in life,, 
and in them sportive pastime is admissible, in this case also there 
seems to be a certain method of intercourse consistent with pro- 
priety and good taste, and also of saying proper things and in a 
proper manner ; and likewise a proper manner of hearing. But 
there will be a difference in point of the persons among whom we 
speak, or whom we hear .J 

4. But tact peculiarly belongs to the mean habit ; and it is the 
part of a clever man of tact to speak and listen to such things as 
befit a worthy man and a gentleman ; for in sport there are some 
things which it is proper for such a man to say and to listen to.|| 5. 
Must we, then, define the man who jests with propriety as one 
who says such things as are not unbefitting a gentleman ? or who 
takes care not to give pain to his hearer, but rather to give pleasure ? 
or is such a thing as this incapable of definition ? for different 
things are hateful and pleasant to different people. The things 
which he will say he will also listen to ; for it is thought that a 
man would do those things which he would bear to hear of. 
jSTow, he will not do everything that he will listen to ; for a scoff 
is a sort of opprobrious expression ; and there are some opprobri- 
ous expressions which are forbidden by legislators ; and perhaps 
there are things at which they ought to have forbidden men to 
scoff. Now, the refined and gentlemanly man will so behave, 
being as it were a law to himself.§ 

* [I omit the remainder of section 5, and the whole of section 6.] t[I omit 
the remainder of section 7, and the whole of sections 8 and 9.] J [I omit sec- 
tions 2 and 3.] || [I omit the remainder of section 4.] § [I omit the remainder 
of section 5. and also the remainder of the chapter.] 



452 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

IV., ix., 1. But it is not proper to speak of the sense of shame 
as a virtue, for it is more like a passion than a habit ; it is there- 
fore defined as a kind of fear of disgrace ; but in its effects it re- 
sembles very nearly the fear that is experienced in danger; for 
those who are ashamed grow red, and those who fear death turn 
pale. Both, therefore, appear to be in some sort connected with 
the body ; and this seems characteristic of a passion rather than a 
habit. 2. But this passion befits not every age, but only that of 
youth ; for we think it right that young persons should be apt to 
feel shame, because from living in obedience to passion they com- 
mit many faults, and are restrained by a sense of shame. And we 
praise those young persons who are apt to feel shame ; but no man 
would praise an older person for being shame-faced ; for we think 
it wrong that he should do anything to be ashamed of; for shame 
is no part of the character of the good man, if, indeed, it be true 
that it follows unworthy actions ; for such things he ought not to 
vdo. But whether the things be in reality or only in opinion dis- 
graceful, it makes no difference ; for neither ought to be done ; 
so that a man ought not to feel shame. 

3. Moreover, it is a mark of a bad man to be of such character 
as to do any of these things.* 

BOOK V.— OF JUSTICE. 

V., i., 1. But we must inquire into the subject of justice and in- 
justice, and see what kind of actions they are concerned with, 
what kind of mean state justice is, and between what things " the 
just," that is, the abstract principle of justice, is a mean. But let 
our investigation be conducted after the same method as in the 
'case of the virtues already discussed. 2. We see, then, that all 
men mean by the term justice that kind of habit from which men 
are apt to perform just actions, and from which they act justly, 
and wish for just things; and similarly in the case of injustice, 
that habit from which they act unjustly, and wish for unjust 
•things. -j- 6. Now, the transgressor of law appears to be unjust) 
and the man who takes more than his share, and the unequal 
man ; so that it is clear that the just man also will mean the man 
who acts according to law, and the equal man [who acts according 
to equity]. The just will therefore be the lawful and the equal; 
and the unjust the unlawful and the unequal. But since the un- 
just man is also one who takes more than his share, he. will be of 
this character with regard to goods; not, indeed, all goods, but 
only those in which there is good and bad fortune ; and these are 

*[I omit the remainder of section 3, and the whole of section 4.] f [I omit 
•^sections 3-5.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 453- 

absolutely alwaj'S good, but relatively not always. 7. Yet 
men pray for and pursue these things ; they ought not, however ; 
but they ought to pray that absolute goods may be goods relatively 
to themselves [Xen. Mem. I., iii , 2 (page 335 above)], and they 
ought to choose those things which are good to themselves. 

8. But the unjust man does not always choose too much, but 
sometimes too little, in the case of things absolutely bad, but be- 
cause even the smaller evil appears to be in some sense a good, 
and covetousness is for what is good, for this reason he appears to 
take more than his share. He is also unequal ; for this includes 
the other, and is a common term [§305]. 9. But since the trans- 
gressor of law is, as we said, unjust, and the keeper of law just, it 
is clear that all awful things are in some sense just ; for those 
things which have been defined by the legislative science are law- 
ful : and each one of these we assert to be just. [See Xen. Mem. 
IV., iv.. 12 (page 398 above).] 10. But laws make mention of all 
subjects, with a view either to the common advantage of all, or of 
men in power, or of the best citizens ; * according to virtue, or 
some other such standard. So that in one way we call those things 
just which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its 
parts for the social community. 11. But the law directs the per- 
formance of the acts of the brave man ; for instance, not to leave 
his post, nor to fly, nor to throw away his arms; and the acts of" 
the temperate man ; for instance, not to commit adultery or out- 
rage ; and the acts of the meek man ; for instance, not to assault 
or abuse ; and in like manner, in the case of the other virtues and 
vices, it enjoins one class of actions, and forbids the other ; a well- 
made law does it well, and one framed off-hand and without con- 
sideration badly. 

12. This justice, therefore, is perfect virtue, not absolutely, but 
relatively. And for this reason justice often appears to be the 
most excellent of the virtues ; and neither the evening nor the 
morning star is so admirable. And in a proverb we say, " In jus- 
tice all virtue is comprehended." And it is more than any others 
perfect virtue, because it is the exercise of perfect virtue ; and it 
is perfect, because the possessor of it is able to exercise his virtue 
toward another person, and not only in reference to himself; for 
many men are able to exercise virtue in their own concerns, but 
not in matters which concern other people. For this reason, the 
saying of Bias seems to be a good one, " Power will show the man ; " 

* This distinction is drawn in order to make the assertion applicable to the 
circumstances both of democratical and aristocratical states, 'oi aristoi, the 
best citizens, i. e. the aristocracy. 



454 Kanfs Ethics. % § 1040 

13. for the man in power is at once associated with and stands in 
relation to others. And for this same reason justice alone, of all 
the virtues, seems to be a good to another person, because it has 
relation to another ; for it does what is advantageous to some one 
else, either to the head, or to some member of the commonwealth. 
That man, therefore, is the worst who acts viciously both as re- 
gards himself and his friends ; and that man is the best who 
acts virtuously not as regards himself, but as regards another ; 
for this is a difficult task. 14. This kind of justice, therefore, is 
not a division of virtue, but the whole of virtue [only the wholly 
virtuous man completely fulfils his duties to others ; cf. § 664] ; 
nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice, but the whole of vice. 
But the difference between virtue and this kind of justice is clear 
from the preceding statements ; for the habits are the same, but 
their essence is not the same; but so far as justice in this sense re- 
lates to another, it is justice; so far as it is such and such a habit, 
it is simply virtue.* 

V., ii., 1. But that justice which is a part of virtue is the ob- 
ject of our investigation ; for (as we say) there is such a kind of 
justice ; and, likewise, that injustice which is a part of vice :f 5.f 
particular justice is a part of universal justice ; so that we must 
speak of the particular justice and the particular injustice ; and in 
like manner of the particular just, and the particular unjust. 6. 
Let us, then, dismiss that justice and injustice which is conversant 
with universal virtue, the one being the exercise of universal virtue 
with relation to another, and the other of universal vice ; and it 
is clear that we must dismiss also the just and unjust which are 
involved in these ; for one may almost say that the greater part 
of things lawful are those the doing of which arises from universal 
virtue ; for the law enjoins that we live according to each particu- 
lar virtue, and forbids our living according to each particular 
vice ; and all those lawful things which are enjoined by law in 
the matter of social education are the causes which produce 
universal virtue.J 

8. But of the particular justice, and of the particular just which 
is according to it, one species is that which is concerned in the 
distributions of honor, or of wealth, or of any of those other 
things which can possibly be distributed among the members of 

* Virtue and universal justice are substantially the same, but in the mode of 
their existence they differ ; or, in other words, the same habit, which, when con- 
sidered absolutely, is termed virtue, is, when considered as a relative duty, termed 
universal justice, f [I omit the remainder of section 1, and the whole of sec- 
tions 2, 3, 4, and the first part of section 5.] J [I omit section 7.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 455 

a political community ; for in these cases it is possible that one 
person, as compared with another, should have an unequal or an 
equal share ; 9. the other is that which is corrective in transac- 
tions between man and man. And of this there are two divisions; 
for some transactions are voluntary, and others involuntary : the 
voluntary are such as follow ; selling, buying, lending, pledging 
transactions, borrowing, depositing of trusts, hiring; and they 
are so called because the origin of such transactions is voluntary. 
Of involuntary transactions, some are secret, as theft, adultery, 
poisoning, pandering,* assasination, false witness ; others accom- 
panied with violence, as assault, imprisonment, death, robbery, 
mutilation, evil-speaking, contumelious language. f 

*[I omit part of section 9 at this point.] t [I omit chapter iii. (of distribu- 
tive justice) and chapter iv. (of justice in transactions between man and man), 
preferring to place before the reader the introductory portion of Prof. Browne's 
analysis of the fifth book (see the analysis, pages xxxvi.-xxxix.), as follows:] 

Introductory.- — The analysis of a subject by contemplating its ideal nature 
is a course by no means suited to the practical turn of Aristotle's mind. He 
prefers, therefore, generally speaking, to consider virtues, not in the abstract, 
but in the concrete, as the quality of an act, or as the characteristic of a moral 
agent. In this way he proceeds to treat of justice and injustice. He first in- 
vestigates the nature of just and unjust actions, and of the just and unjust man, 
and thus arrives at his definition and description of justice and injustice. Of 
course, it is plain, from the nature of moral habits, that the knowledge of the 
principles of one contrary, namely, justice, conveys to us an acquaintance with 
the principles of the other contrary, injustice. 

Now a man is termed unjust, for two reasons: — Firstly, as being a transgres- 
sor of the law, whether that be the written or the unwritten ; and, Secondly, as 
being unequal or unfair, as taking more of good, and less of evil, which comes 
to the same thing, than he has a right and title to. Hence injustice, and there- 
fore justice, is of two kinds: (1) a" habit of obedience to law; (2) a habit of 
equality. 

Now, as law, in the most comprehensive acceptation of the term, implies the 
enactment of all the principles of virtue which are binding on mankind as 
members of a social community (which, be it remembered, Aristotle considers 
their proper normal condition), the only difference between universal justice (1) 
and universal.virtue is, that the habit of obedience to the fixed principles of 
moral rectitude is, when considered absolutely, termed virtue, when considered 
relatively to others, justice. 

This universal justice is not the justice which Aristotle considers in this 
book; as of course it forms the subject-matter of his whole treatise (at least the 
whole of that division of it which treats of moral virtue), if we take into con- 
sideration the additional condition of " relation." 

Particular justice, which he does investigate, is of two kinds, distributive and 
corrective. The former is a virtuous habit, which, strictly speaking, can only 
be exercised by man in his capacity as a free citizen intrusted with political 
functions, either legislative or executive, for it deals with the distribution, ac- 



456 Kant's Ethics. § 1040' 

BOOK V., chapter V., § 1. Some people think that retalia- 
tion is absolutely just, as the Pythagoreans said ; for they simply 
defined justice as retaliation to another. But retaliation does not 
fit in either with the idea of distributive or corrective justice ; and 
yet they would have that this is the meaning of the Rhadaman- 
thian rule, " If a man suffers what he has done, straightforward 
justice would take place : " for in many points it is at variance ; 
as for example, if a man in authority has struck another, it is not 
right that he should be struck in return ; and if a man has struck 
a person in authority, it is right that he should not only be struck,, 
but punished besides. 2. Again, the voluntariness and involun- 

cording to merit, of the public rewards and punishments of a state. But the ex- 
ercise of this virtue is by no means so limited as this idea of it would lead us at 
first sight to suppose. For, in the first place, in the free states of Greece, every 
citizen was, to a certain extent, intrusted with these functions, which is not the 
case under the modern system of political institutions ; and, in the second place. . 
analogically, the same principles, mutatis -mutandis, will regulate our conduct 
in the distribution of rewards and punishments, toward children, dependants,, 
and so forth. 

Besides, it is scarcely conceivable in how many instances a man is called upon 
to act as a judge, and to exercise his judicial functions as a divider and distribu- 
tor of honors and rewards, of censures and of punishments, and thus to keep in 
mind the principles which Aristotle here lays down of equality and impartiality. . 

When we contemplate justice as one of the divine attributes, it is distributive 
justice to which we allude. God will, and always has, dealt with mankind on 
principles of justice, which are in accordance with, and proportioned to, the pos- 
ition amongst created beings in which he has himself placed him. He is the 
distributor of rewards and punishments to every man according to his works, 
the punisher of the ungodly, the rewarder of them that diligently seek him.. 
He doubtless weighs well, with that strict and unerring justice of which Om- 
niscience alone is capable, the circumstances and privileges of each individual,, 
according to that analogy which is implied in the following words of inspira- 
tion : — " To whom much is given, from him much shall be required." 

The second division of particular justice may also be viewed in two lights. 
Firstly, as that habit by which the state, either by criminal or civil processes; • 
corrects the inequalities which unjust conduct produces between man and man ; 
and, Second^, as the habit, the observance of which prevents individuals from 
violating the principles of equality which we are bound to observe in our deal- 
ings or intercourse with each other. 

We may illustrate the nature of corrective justice by reference to our own- 
judicial system in the following way: — In civil actions, such as for assault, se- 
duction, etc., the amount of the injury inflicted is estimated in the form of 
damages. The defendant is presumed to have more than he ought, and the 
plaintiff less by this amount, and the equality is restored by the former paying; 
to the latter the damages assessed by the jury. In criminal cases — the state,, 
and not the person against whom the offense has actually been committed, is^ 
considered the injured party. A certain diminution has taken place in the pub- 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 457 

tariness of an action make a great difference. But in the inter- 
course of exchange, such a notion of justice as retaliation, if it he 
according to proportion and not according to equality,* holds men 
together, f 4. For commercial intercourse does not take place be- 
tween [for example] two physicians, but between a physician and 
an agriculturist, and generally between persons who are different, 
and unequal ; but it is necessary that these be made equal. There- 
fore it is necessary that all things, of which there is interchange, 
should be in some manner commensurable. 5. And for this pur- 
pose money came into use ; and it is in some sense a medium, for 
it measures everything ; so that it measures excess and defect - 

lie security of life and property, and the balance is restored by the penalty,, 
either as to person or property, which the law inflicts. 

There still remain to be considered the principles of commutative justice; 
but these Aristotle has not laid down quite so clearly as he has those of the other 
two divisions, He, evidently, as far as can be seen from the fifth chapter, con- 
siders it as a branch of corrective justice, but, at the same time, as regulated in. 
some degree by the principles of distributive justice also. Equality is maintained 
by an equivalent payment for the commodities exchanged or purchased; and 
therefore, arithmetical proportion is observed, as in corrective justice; but this 
equivalent is estimated, and the commodities and the parties compared, according 
to the law of geometrical proportion. 

There is one point which requires observation as presenting an apparent dif- 
ficulty. How is it that Aristotle considers natural justice as a division of politi- 
cal justice, whereas it might be supposed that the immutable principles of justice 
were implanted in, and formed a part of man's nature, antecedently even to any 
idea of his social condition as a member of political society? The answer to 
this question is, that the natural state of man is his social condition. Under any- 
other circumstances, it would be in vain to look for the development of any one- 
of his faculties. The history of the human race never presents man to us ex- 
cept in relation to his fellow-man. Even in savage life, the rude elements of 
civil society are discoverable. If we could conceive the existence of an indi- 
vidual isolated from the rest of his species, he would be a man only in outward 
form, he would possess no sense of right and wrong, no moral sentiments, no- 
ideas on the subject of natural justice. The principles of natural justice are- 
doubtless immutable and eternal, and would be the same had the man never ex- 
isted ; but as far as man is concerned, the development of them must be sought 
for in him as we find him ; that is, in his social condition, and no other. 

In the tenth chapter Aristotle treats of equity, the principles of which fur- 
nish the means of correcting the imperfections of law. These imperfections are 
unavoidable, because, from the nature of things, the enactments of law must be 
universal, and require adaptation to particular cases. 

* [Suppose a farmer should offer a tanner a pound of oats for a pound of har- 
ness leather; this would be according to equal ity. But if the pound of oats is 
worth one cent and the pound of harness leather twenty -five cents, the farmer 
must offer twenty-five pounds of oats for one pound of harness leather; this 
would be according to proportion.] | [I omit the remainder of section 2, and. 
the whole of section 3.] 

30 



458 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

for example, it measures how many shoes are equal to a house or to 
a certain quantity of food.* 8. There will, therefore, he retalia- 
tion, when equalization has taken place. f 13. Now we have said 
what the just and what the unjust are. But this being decided, it 
is clear that just acting is a mean between acting and suffering in- 
justice ; for one is having too much, and the other too little. But 
justice is a mean state, but not in the same manner as the before- 
mentioned virtues, but because it is of a mean, and injustice of 
the extremes.^ And justice is that habit, according to which the 
just man is said to be disposed to practice the just in accordance 
with deliberate preference, and to distribute justly, between him- 
self and another, and between two other persons ; not so as to 
take more of the good himself, and give less of it to the other, and 
inversely in the case of evil ; but to take an equal share according 
to proportion ; and in like manner between two other persons. 
14. But injustice, on the contrary, is all this with respect to the 
nnjust; and this is the excess and defect of what is useful and 
hurtful, contrary to the proportionate. Wherefore injustice is both 
excess and defect, because it is productive of excess and defect; 
that is, in a man's own case excess of what is absolutely good, and 
•defect of what is hurtful ; but in the case of others, his conduct 
generally is the same : but the violation of pro})ortion is on either 
:side as it may happen. 15. But in the case of an unjust act, the 
defect is the being injured, and the excess to injure. Now, re- 
specting justice and injustice, and the nature of each, as also re- 
specting the just and the unjust, let the manner in which we have 
treated the subject be deemed sufficient. 

V., vi., 3. || But it ought not to escape our notice, that the 
abstract and political just is the just of which we are in search ; 
but this takes place in the case of those who live as members of 
society, with a view to self-sufficiency, and who are free and equal 

* [I omit sections 6 and 7.] t [I omit the remainder of section 8, and the 
-whole of sections 9-12.] X The other virtues are mean habits between two ex- 
tremes; e. g., courage is a mean between rashness and cowar-dice; justice, on the 
other hand, is not in the mean between two extremes, but its subject-matter (to 
uikaion) is a mean between too much and too little. [The same doctrine ap- 
plied to the other virtues would perhaps have improved the whole treatise.] 
|J From the discussion of the subject of moral justice, Aristotle proceeds to that 
of political, and states that, according to its principles, he who commits an un- 
just action is not necessarily a morally unjust man : as he might have acted not 
of deliberate purpose (which is essential to a moral act), but from impulse or 
passion. In morals, regard is paid to the intention, in civil wrongs we only 
look to the action done, and the damage or wrong inflicted. — See Michelet's 
vCom. p. 177. [I omit sections 1 and 2, and the first part of section 3.] 



•'§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 459 

either proportionately or numerically. 4. So that all those who 
are not in this condition have not the political just in relation to 
one another, but only a kind of just, so called from its resemblance. 
For the term just implies the case of those who have laws to 
which they are subject : and law implies cases of injustice ; for 
the administration of law is the decision of the just and the 
unjust. Now, injustice always implies an unjust act, but an un- 
just act does not always imply [deliberate] injustice. Now, to act 
unjustly means to give to one's self too great a share of absolute 
.goods, and too small a share of absolute evils. 

5. This is the reason why we do not suffer a man to rule, but 
reason ; because a man rules for himself, and becomes a tyrant. 
But a ruler is the guardian of the just;* and if of the just, of 
equality [equity] also. But since a man [who is a ruler] seems to 
get no advantage himself if he is just (for he does not award too 
much absolute good to himself, except it be proportionately his 
due), for this reason he acts for others; and hence they say, as 
was before also observed, that justice is another man's good. 6. 
Some compensation must therefore be given ; and this is honor 
and prerogative : but all those who are not content with theirs be- 
come tyrants. f 

V., vii., 1. Of the political just, one part is natural, and the 
other legal. The natural is that which everywhere is equally 
valid, and depends not upon being or not being received. But the 
legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference, but 
which, when enacted, is so no longer.^ 2. But to some persons all 
just things appear to be matters of law, because that which is 
natural is unchangeable, and has the same power everywhere, just 
as fire burns both here and in Persia; but they see that just things 
are subject to change. This is not really [altogether] the case, 
but only in some sense [is human justice mutable] ; ** [even] 
with us [men] there is something [unchangeable] which ex- 
ists by nature ; still it may be argued, everything with us is sub- 
ject to change, yet nevertheless there is that [law] which is by 
nature and [also] that [statute law] which is not|| [by nature]. 

* For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. — Eom. xiii., 3; 
see also I. Pet., ii., 14. | [I omit sections 7 and 8.] % [I omit the remainder of 
section 1.] || The text here followed is that of Bekker: that of Cardwell is 
somewhat different; but, nevertheless, whichever reading is adopted, the mean- 
ing of the passage will still be the same. Michelet gives the following Latin 
paraphrase: "Jus apud Deos est immutabile, jus apud homines mutabile omne; 
sunt tamen nihilominus hominum jura qusedam naturalia, qusedam non." He 
adds, that he considers Bekker's reading the true one: for further discussion of 
■this passage the reader is referred to his Commentary, p. 182. **[I omit part 
•of section 2 at this point.] 



460 Kant's Ethics. § 1040' 

3. Of things contingent, what is natural, and what is not natural,, 
but legal, and settled by agreement (even granting that both are 
alike subject to change), is evident; and the same distinction will 
apply to all other cases; for, naturally, the right hand is stronger- 
than the left ; and yet it is possible for some people to use both 
equally. 4. But that justice which depends upon agreement and ex- 
pediency, resembles the case of measures ; for measures of wine and 
corn are not everywhere equal ; but where men buy they are 
larger, and where they sell again smaller.* And in like manner, 
that justice which is not natural, but of man's invention, is not 
everywhere the same ; since neither are all political constitutions, 
although there is one [if we could discover it] which would be by 
nature the best everywhere ; but there can be but one by nature 
best everywhere [because human nature is everywhere the same].. 

5. Every principle of justice and of law has the relation of a 
universal to a particular; for the things done are many; but each 
principle is singular ; for it is universal. 6. There is a difference 
between an unjust act and the abstract injust, and between a just 
act. and the abstract just ; for a thing is unjust partly by nature, 
or by ordinance. But the same thing, as soon as it is done, be 
comes an unjust act ; but before it was done, it was not yet an un- 
just act, but unjust ; and the same may be said of a just act. The 
common term for a just act is more correctly dikaiopragema [hon- 
esty], and dikaioma [justice] is [used in a more restricted sense to 
signify] the correction of an unjust act. But of each of these,, 
what and how many species there are, and with what subjects they 
are conversant, must be ascertained afterward. 

V., viii., 1. Now, since the abstract just and unjust are what 
they have been stated to be, a man acts unjustly and justly when- 
ever he does these things voluntarily ; but when he does them in- 
voluntarily, he neither acts unjustly nor justly, except accidentally ; 
for he does acts which accidentally happen to be just or unjust. 2\ 
But an unjust act and a just act are decided by the voluntariness 
and involuntariness of them ; for whenever an act [of injustice] is 
voluntary it is blamed ; and at the same time it becomes an unjust 
act : so that there will be something unjust which is not yet an un- 
just act, except the condition of voluntariness be added to it. 3.. 
I call that voluntary, as also has been said before [Bk. III., ch. i., 21 r , 

* [This sounds like sarcasm ; but Archdeacon Browne, the English transla- 
tor, thinks that Aristotle may possibly be referring to a custom] similar to that 
which exists in the London milk-trade, in which the barn gallon, as it is called, 
of the wholesale dealer, is larger than the imperial gallon, by which milk is- 
retailed. 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 461 

(page 433 above)], which (being in his own power) a man does 
knowingly, and not from ignorance of the person, the instru- 
ment, or the motive ; as of the person he strikes, the instrument, 
and the motive of striking, and each of those particulars, not acci- 
dentally, nor by compulsion ; as if another man were to take hold of 
.his hand, and strike a third person ; in this case he did it not vol- 
untarily, for the act was not in his own power.* 7. But of volun- 
tary acts, some we do from deliberate preference, and others not. 
"We do those from deliberate preference which we do after previous 
deliberation ; and we do those not from deliberate preference which 
we do without previous deliberation. 8. Now, since there are 
three kinds of hurts in the intercourse of society, those which are 
done in ignorance are mistakes.! 9. When, therefore, the hurt 
i^akes place contrary to expectation, it is an accident ; when not con- 
trary to expectation, but without wicked intent, it is a mistake 
[fault] ; for a man makes a mistake when the principle of causa- 
tion is in himself; but when it is external, he is unfortunate. 10. 
But when he does it knowingly, but without previous deliberation, 
it is an unjust act, as all those things which are done through an- 
ger, and the other passions, which are necessary or natural ; for 
by such hurts and such mistakes they act unjustly, and the actions 
are unjust; still the doers [although culpable] are not yet on this 
account unjust or wicked ; for the hurt did not arise from deprav- 
ity. 11. But when any one acts from deliberate preference, he is 
then unjust and wicked.;}; 

13. In like manner, too, the just man is he who on deliberate 
preference acts justly ; but he acts justly, only provided he acts 
voluntarily But of involuntary actions, some are pardonable, and 
^others unpardonable ; for all those acts which are done, not only 
ignorantly, but through ignorance, are pardonable; but all which 
are done not through ignorance, but ignorantly [III., i., 15 (page 
433 above)], through passion neither natural nor human, || are un- 
pardonable. 

V., ix , 15. But men suppose, that to act unjustly is in their 
•own power, and for this reason they think that to act justly is also 
easy ;** but to do this [to act justly] with a particular disposition 
[voluntarily and deliberately] is neither easy nor in one's own 

* [I omit sections 4-6.] t [I omit the remainder of section 8.] % [I omit the 
remainder of section 11, and the whole of section 12.] j] Human passions are 
grief, fear, pity; the natural appetites are hunger and thirst. "We are inclined^ 
to pardon him who acts at the instigation of these; e. g. we readily make allow- 
ance for a starving man who steals a loaf to satisfy the cravings of his hunger. 
** [I omit part of section 15 at this point, and the whole of sections 1-14.] 



462 Kant's Ethics. § 1040" 

power [because the habit required has not been established by the 
practice of virtue. Cf. Book II., ch. i. (page 423 above)]. 16. In like 
manner, men think that there is no wisdom in knowing things 
just and things unjust, because it is not difficult to comprehend the 
cases of which the laws speak; but these are not just acts except 
accidentally* — when, indeed, they are done in a certain manner, 
and distributed in a certain manner, they become just. But this 
is a more laborious thing than to know what things are wholesome, 
since even in that sort of knowledge it is easy to know honey,, 
wine, and hellebore, and burning and cutting ; but to know how 
to apply them for the purposes of health, and to whom, and at 
what time, is as difficult as to be a physician. f 18. But it is not 
merely doing these things (except accidentally), but doing them 
with a particular disposition, that constitutes the being a coward 
or an unjust man ; just as it is not performing or not performing 
an operation, nor giving or not giving medicine, that constitutes 
medical treatment or healing, but doing it in this [or that] particu- 
lar way. J 

V., X., 1. The next thing to speak of is the subject of " the 
equitable" and equity, and the relation that the equitable bears to the 
just, and equity to justice; for when we examine the subject, they 
do not seem to be absolutely the same, nor yet generally [generi- 
cally, in every respect] different. And we sometimes praise " the 
equitable," and the man of that character ; so that we even trans- 
fer the expression, for the purpose of praise, to other cases, show- 
ing by the use of the term " equitable " instead of "good," that 
equity is better. 2. Sometimes, again, if we attend to the defini- 
tion, it appears absurd that equity should be praiseworthy, when it 
is something different from justice; for either justice must be not 
good, or equity must be not just, that is, if it is different from 
justice ; or, if they are both good, they must be both the same. 

3. From these considerations, then, almost entirely arises the 
difficulty on the subject of the equitable. But all of them are in 
one sense true, and not inconsistent with each other ; for " the 
equitable" is just, being better than a certain kind of "just; " and 
it is not better than "the just," as though it were of a different 
genus. 4. Just and equitable, therefore, are identical ; and both 
being good, "the equitable" is the better. The cause of the am- 
biguity is this, that " the equitable " is just, but not that justice 
which is according to [statute] law, but the correction of the legally 

* [For example, he who refrains from theft because the statutory laws so- 
command, is not necessarily an honest man.] t [I omit section 17.] J [I omit, 
the remainder of section 18.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 463 

just. And the reason of this is, that law is in all cases universal 
[general], and on some subjects it is not possible to speak univer- 
sally with correctness. 5. In those cases where it is necessary to 
speak universally, but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes 
[and is framed to meet the circumstances of] the most general 
case, though it is well aware of the incorrectness of it. And the 
law is not, therefore, less right ; for the fault is not in the law, nor 
in the legislator, but in the nature of the thing ; for the subject- 
matter of human actions is altogether of this description [made 
up of innumerable particulars, which can not be provided for by 
general legislation]. 

6. When, therefore, the law speaks universally, and something 
happens different from the generality of cases, then it is proper, 
where the legislator falls short, and has erred, from speaking gen- 
erally, to correct the defect, as the legislator would himself direct 
if he were then present, or as he would have legislated if he had 
been aware of the case. Therefore the equitable is just, and bet- 
ter than some kind of "just; " not indeed better than the " abso- 
lute just," but better than the error which arises from universal 
enactments. 

7. And this is the nature of " the equitable," that it is a correc- 
tion of law. wherever it is defective owing to its universality. 
This is the reason why all things are not according to [statute] 
law, because on some subjects it is impossible to make a law. So 
that there is need of a special decree : for the rule of what is in- 
determinate, is itself indeterminate also ; like the leaden rule in 
Lesbian building ;* for the rule is altered to suit the shape of the 
stone, and does not remain the same ; so do decrees differ accord- 
ing to the circumstances. 8. It is clear, therefore, what " the 
equitable " is, and that it is just, and also to what "just " it is su- 
perior. And from this it is clear what is the character of the 
equitable man ; for he who is apt to do these things and to do them 
from deliberate preference, who does not push the letter of the 
law to the furthest on the worst side,f but is disposed to make 
allowances, even although he has the law in his favor, is equitable; 
and this habit is equity, being a kind of justice, and not a different 
habit from justice. 

V., XL, l.J For one class of things just is that which is enjoined 
by law, according to virtue, in the universal acceptation of the 

* Michael Ephesius says, — "The Lesbians did not build with stones arranged 
so as to form a plane surface, but alternately projecting and retiring." — Miehelet 
(See also, Ehet. I., i. |This is the meaning of the well-known proverb, — "Sum- 
mum jus summa injuria."' J [I omit the first part of section 1.] 



464 Kant's Ethics. % 1040 

term ; as, for example, it does not command a man to kill himself; 
-and whatever it does not command, it forbids.* 2. Again, when- 
- ever a man does hurt contrary to law, provided it be not in retali- 
ation, he voluntarily injures: and he acts voluntarily who knows 
the person, the instrument, and the manner. But he who kills 
himself through rage voluntarily does a thing contrary to right 
reason, which the law does not allow.f 

6. It is also plain, that both to be injured and to injure are bad ; 
ifor one implies having less, the other having more, than the mean ; 
and the case is like that of the wholesome in the science of medi- 
cine, and that which is productive of a good habit of body in 
gymnastics. 7. But yet to injure is the worse of the two ; for to 
injure involves depravity, and is culpable ; and either perfect and 
absolute depravity, or something like it ; for not every voluntary 
act is necessarily joined with injustice ; but to suffer injustice is 
Jinconnected with depravity and injustice.^ 

BOOK VI— OF PRUDENCE (i. e. MORAL WISDOM). 

YI., i., 1. But since we happen to have already said that we 
ought to choose the mean, and not the excess or defect ; and since 
the mean is as right reason determines, let us discuss this point. 
2. In all the habits already mentioned, just as in everything else, 
there is a certain mark which he who possesses reason looks at, 
sometimes slackening, at others making more intense his gaze ; 
and there is a definite boundary of the mean states, which we as- 
sert to be between the excess and the defect, and to be in obedi- 
ence to right reason. 3. But this statement, although it is true, 
is by no means clear ; for in all other studies which are the sub- 
jects of science, it is quite true to say, that we ought not to labor 
;too much or too little, nor to be idle too much or too little, but in 
'.the mean, and according to the direction of right reason ; yet he 
"who only knows this would not possess any more of the knowl- 
edge which he requires ; he would not, for instance, know what , 
applications ought to be made to the body, if a person were to tell 
him, that they are those which the science of medicine orders, and 

* The Greeks recognized the principle that it was the duty of their state to 
■support the sanctions of virtue by legislative enactments ; the moral education 
•of the people formed part of the legislative system. Hence the rule which Ar- 
istotle states, "Quselex non jubet vetat." The principles of our law, on the 
contrary, are derived from the Roman law, which confines itself in all cases to 
forbidding wrongs done to society. Hence the rule with us is exactly the con- 
trary, " Quae lex non vetat permittit." — See Michelet's Notes, p. 195. t [I omit 
the last part of section 2, and the whole of sections 3, 4, and 5.] % [I omit the 
remainder of section 7, and the whole of sections 8 and 9.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 465 

which the person acquainted with that science makes use of. 4. 
Hence, it is necessary with respect to the habits of the soul also, 
not only that this should be stated truly, but that it should also 
be determined what right reason is, and what is the definition of 
it. Now, we made a division of the virtues of the soul [I., xiii., 
15 (page 422 above)], and said that part of them belonged to the 
moral character, and part to the intellect. The moral virtues, we 
have thoroughly discussed ; but let us in the same manner discuss 
the remainder, after having first spoken about the soul. 

There were before said to be two parts of the soul, — the rational 
and the irrational; but now we must make the same kind of di- 
vision in the ease of the rational part ; and let it first be laid down, 
that there are two divisions of the rational part ; one [theoretic 
reason ; understanding], by which we contemplate those existing 
things, the principles of which are in necessary matter ; the other 
[practical reason], by which we contemplate those, the principles 
of which are contingent.* Let one of these be called the scientific, 
and the other the reasoning part ;f for deliberating and reasoning 
are equivalent. But no person deliberates upon necessary matter; 
so that the reasoning part must be one division of the rational 
part.J We must therefore ascertain which habit is the best of 
each of these two parts ; for this is the virtue of each ; but the 
virtue has reference to its peculiar work. 

VI., ii., 1. Now, there are three principles in the soul which 
have power over moral action and truth: Sensation, Intellect, || 
and Appetite; but of these, sensation is the principle of no moral 
action. § But pursuit and avoidance in appetite are precisely what 
affirmation and denial are in intellect.** 2. So that since moral 

* [I omit part of the section at this point.] f [See the note to Bk. VI., ch. 
-v., § 6, below.] X [The faculty of deliberation and the faculty of reason being 
one and the same faculty, the use of the term " reasoning part " is not inappro- 
priate, nor would the reader have been in danger of mistaking the meaning of 
practical reason (a faculty of action, and not in strict literalness a faculty 
of contemplation) if that designation had been applied to theoretic reason in 
the act of contemplating practical subjects. But in calling this "the reasoning 
part," Aristotle reminds us that the faculty of reason is likewise employed upon 
necessary matter (as in mathematics and logic), and therefore the faculty of de- 
liberation must be regarded as one division of the faculty of reason, and not as 
the whole of it.] || The word in the original, which is here translated "intel- 
lect," is nous, and is used in its most comprehensive sense ; not in the limited 
sense in which it is used in chapter vi. By sensation (aisthesis) is meant the 
perception of the external senses. §[I omit part of section 1 at this point.] 
** The Greek word is dianoia, which properly means "the movement of the 
intellect (nous) onward in the investigation of truth; " but here, as in some 
■ other places, it is used loosely as synonymous with nous. 



466 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

virtue is a habit together with deliberate preference, and deliberate 
preference is appetite, together with deliberation, it is necessary, 
for these reasons, that the reasoning process be true, and the ap- 
petite correct, if the deliberate preference is good ; and that the 
one affirm, and the other pursue, the same things. This intellect, 
therefore, and this truth are practical. 

3. Of the intellect, which is contemplative, and not practical, or 
productive ; truth and falsehood constitute the goodness and the 
badness ; for this is the work of every intellectual faculty ; but 
of that part of it which is both practical and intellectual, [that] 
truth which is in agreement with right desire. [See §§ 163, 281.] 

4. The deliberate preperence, therefore, by which we are 
moved to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is 
the principle of action ; and desire and reason, which is for the 
sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference ; hence 
deliberate preference does not exist without intellect and reason, 
nor without moral habit ; for a good course of action and its con- 
trary can not exist without intellect and moral character. 

5. Intellect of itself is not the motive principle of any action, 
but only that intellect which is for the something, and is practical; 
for this governs the [pragmatic] intellect [see § 49] which pro- 
duces also ; for every person that makes anything, makes it for 
the sake of something; and the thing made is not an end absolutely, 
but it has reference to something, and belongs to some one : but 
this is not the case with the thing practiced ; for excellence of 
action is the end, and appetite is for this. 6. Wherefore deliberate 
preference is either intellect influenced by appetite, or appetite in- 
fluenced by intellect ; and such a [compound] principle is man.* 

7. Truth, therefore, is the work of both the intellectual parts of 
the soul ; and those habits by which each part will best arrive at 
truth must be the virtues of them both. 

VI., iii., 1. Beginning, therefore, from the commencement, let 
us speak of these things again. Tjet the habits, therefore, by 
which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation, or denial, be five in 
number ; and these are Art [techne], Science [episteme], Prudence 
[phronesis], Wisdom [sophia], and Intuition [nous] ; for it is pos- 
sible to be deceived by supposition and opinion [which, therefore, 
can not be reckoned among the intellectual habits. — See the trans- 
lator's question, page 316]. Now, the nature of science is evident 
from this consideration (if it is necessary to speak accurately, and 
not to be led by resemblances), that we all suppose, that what we 
know scientifically is necessary matter.f 3. Again, all science is. 

* [I omit the remainder of section 6.] t [I omit section 2.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 46T 

thought to be taught, and the subject of science to be acquired 
by learning. But all learning is derived from things previously- 
known, as we also stated in the Analytics ; and is derived 
partly from induction and partly from syllogism. Now, in- 
duction is the origin of the universal; but a syllogism is de- 
duced from universals. There are, therefore, some principles, 
from which a syllogism is deduced, which are not themselves syl- 
logistically established, they are therefore established by induction.* 
4. Science, therefore, is a demonstrative habit, and to this defini- 
tion we must add the other parts, which we have given in the An- 
alytics;! for whenever a man is convinced of anything, and the 
principles are known to him, he knows it scientifically; for unless 
he knows the principles even better than the conclusion, he will 
only possess science accidentally. Let science, therefore, have been 
defined after this manner. 

VI., iv., 1. Of contingent matter, one species is that which is 
made, and the other that which is practiced. Now making and 
practice differ from each other ; but these points have been proved 
in our exoteric discourses : so that the practical habit, together 
with reason, differs from the productive habit together with reason: 
nor are they included one under the other : for neither is practice 
making, nor making practice [§§44, 2550, 151, 152, 392]. 2. But 
since house-building is an art, and the same thing as a habit of 
making joined with reason, and there is no art which is not a habit 
of making joined with reason, nor any such habit which is not an 
art, an art and a habit of making joined with reason must be one 
and the same thing. 

3. All art is conversant with three processes, — Production, Con- 
trivance, and Contemplation ; in order that something may be 
produced, the existence and non-existence of which are contingent, 
and the principle of which is in the doer, and not in the thing 
done ; for art is not concerned with things that exist or originate 
necessarily or naturally ; for these things have their origin in 
themselves. 4. But since making and practice are different [ch ii., 
5 (page 466 above)] things, it is necessary that art should relate to 
making, and not to practice.^ Art, therefore, as has been said, is 
a certain habit of making joined with true reason ; and absence of 
art, on the contrary, is a habit of making joined with false reason,. 
in contingent matter. 

* By the observation of a number of particular facts we arrive at a uni- 
versal principle, which can be used as one of the premisses of a syllogism. 
This process is induction. — See Arist. Rhet. Book I., c i.; also Whateley's Logic. 
[See § 1331 below.] f [The translator (analysis, page xliv.) refers to the Later- 
Analytics, L, 1, 2.] X [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] 



468 Kant's Mhics. § 1040 

BOOK VI., chapter V., § 1. We should best understand the 
subject of prudence, if we were first to consider whom we call pru- 
dent. Now it seems to be the mark of the prudent man to be able 
to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for him- 

-self ; not in particular instances, as what sort of things are good 
for his health or strength, but what is good and expedient for liv- 
ing well. And a sign of this is, that we call men prudent on any 
particular subject, when they reason well, with a view to obtain 

: some good end, in subjects where art is not concerned. So that 
generally he who is apt to deliberate, is prudent. 2. But no one 
deliberates about things that can not possibly be otherwise than 
they are, nor about things which do not admit of being done by 
himself. So that if science is with demonstration, and there is no 
demonstration in matters the premisses of which are contingent 
(for such conclusions must all be contingent likewise), and it is not 
possible to deliberate on necessary matter, then prudence can not 
be science, or art : it is not science, because the subject-matter of 
moral action is contingent; it is not art, because the nature of 
practice differs from that of making. 3. It remains, therefore, 
that it is a true habit joined with reason, which. is practical on 
the subjects of human good and evil ; for the end of making is some- 
thing different from this, but the end of practice is not ; for good- 
ness of practice is itself the end [§ 152]. 

4. For this reason we think Pericles, and those like him, pru- 
dent men, because they were able to perceive what was good for 
themselves, and for mankind ; and we think that this is the char- 
acter of those who understand oeconomics and politics. Hence 
likewise we give to temperance its appellation sophrosune, as pre- 

- serving prudence ;* for it preserves moral ideas : for the pleasant 
and the painful do not destroy or pervert all ideas ; for instance, 

* This derivation is given by Plato in the Cratylus, \ 62. There are few 
t truths more self-evident or more important than this, that temperance and vir- 
tue have a tendency to preserve, whilst intemperance and vice inevitably per- 
vert and destroy the moral sense, and the knowledge of the principles of right 
and wrong. Although, owing to the intimate and close connection between the 
mind and the body, vicious indulgence of the passions will sometimes weaken 
*the intellectual powers; yet it will not deprave and distort the power of ap- 
prehending scientific truth ; and there is no impossibility in a vicious man being 
a good mathematician. But vice will inevitably and certainly destroy the 
moral judgment, and make us think evil good, and good evil. As in the case of 
revealed truth, a blessing is promised to obedience to that law of virtue under 
which we are born: — "He that doeth my will shall know of the doctrine 
whether it be of God " [John vii., 17 (page 250 above)] ; so in the case of moral 
■ truth. [I omit the remainder of the note]. 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 469 

that a triangle has or has not its interior angles equal to two right 
angles, hut only the ideas which relate to moral conduct. 5. Now 
the motives of moral conduct are the principles of moral con- 
duct ; hut to him who has been corrupted through pleasure, or pain, 
the principle will immediately be invisible, and the knowledge that 
he ought to choose and to do everything for the sake and on ac- 
count of this ; for vice has a tendency to destroy the principle. So> 
that it necessarily follows that prudence is a true habit joined with, 
reason, practical on thejsubject of human goods. 

6. Moreover there are degrees of excellence in art, but not in 
prudence. And in art, he who voluntarily errs is the better man ; 
but in prudence he is worse, just as is the case in the virtues ; it is 
plain, therefore, that it is a virtue, and that it is not art. And 
since there are two parts of the soul which have reason, it must be 
the virtue of one; namely, the part which forms opinions:* for- 
both opinion and prudence take cognizance of contingent subjects. 
But yet it is not only a habit joined with reason [but something 
more] : and. a proof of this is, that there is a possibility of forget- 
ting a habit of this kind, but no possibility of forgetting prudence.. 

VI., vii., 1. But in the arts we attribute wisdom to those who 
are most accurately skilled in the arts : for example, we call Phidias 
a wise worker in stone, and Polyclitus a wise statuary, in this use 
of the word, meaning nothing more by wisdom than that it is the 
excellence of art. But we think that some T are universally wise ; 
and not wise only in some particular art.f 2. So that it is clear 
that wisdom must be the most accurate of all the sciences. The 
wise man must therefore not only know the facts which are de- 
duced from principles, but must also attain truth respecting the 
principles themselves. So that wisdom must be intuition]; and 
science together. 

* This is the same part of the soul which Aristotle has already called [the 
reasoning part: Book VI., ch. i.; Ueberweg (Hist. Phil. ed. Morris, vol i., page 
175) calls it "the faculty of deliberation: " see page 465 above]; for when it is 
employed upon contingent matter it arrives not at truth absolutely, but opinion. 
Stability and permanence are characteristic of virtuous energies, as contrasted, 
with those of science ; as our virtuous principles are developed and called into 
action every hour of our lives; and hence we can not forget them, as we can 
the subjects of scientific knowledge. t[I omit the remainder of section 1.] 
% [It is stated in chapter iii., § 4 (page 467 above), that, "whenever a man is con- 
vinced of anything, and the principles are known to him, he knows it scientifi- 
cally." Now the faculty by which he is convinced, which operates syllogistically, 
by ratiocination, is science (episteme), and this faculty takes cognizance of all 
propositions deduced from principles. But science does not take cognizance of ' 
its own first or fundamental principles ; because these principles are not them- 
selves deduced from other principles through that process of ratiocination by- 



470 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

3.* If, then, what is wholesome and good is different in the case 
of a man and a fish, but what is white, and straight, is always the 
same ; all will allow, that wisdom is always the same, but prudence 
different in different cases. f 6. For this reason men call Anaxa- 
goras, and Thales, and others of this description, wise, but not 
prudent, when they see that they are ignorant of what is expedi- 
ent for themselves. And they say that they are acquainted with 
subjects which are superfluous, and wonderful, and difficult, and 
divine, but yet useless, because they do not study the subject Of 
human good. But prudence is concerned with human affairs, and 
those subjects about which it is possible to deliberate. For this, 
that is, to deliberate well, we say is the work of the prudent man 
especially. 

7. But no one deliberates about things which can not be other- 
wise than they are, nor about those of which there is not some 
end, and this end a good capable of being the subject of moral ac- 
tion. But absolutely the good deliberator is he, who is skillful in 
aiming at the best of the objects of human action. Nor yet is 
prudence limited to universals only, but it is necessary to have a 
knowledge of particulars also : for prudence is practical, and prac- 
tice turns upon particulars. Therefore some who have no theo- 
retical knowledge, are more practical than others who have it ; 
those, for example, who derive their skill from experience. 8. For 
if a man should know that light meats are easy of digestion, and 
.are wholesome, without knowing what meats are light, he will 
never produce health ; but he who knows nothing more than that 
the flesh of birds is light and wholesome, will be more likely to pro- 
duce it. But prudence is practical, so that it is good to have both, 
or if not both, it is better to have this. But there must be in pru- 
dence also some master virtue. 

VI., viii., 1. Now political prudence, and prudence, are the 
same habit, yet their essence is not the same. But of prudence 
which is conversant with the state, one division, which is, as it 
were, a kind of master-prudence, is legislative [senatorial] ; a sec- 
ond, which is particular [executive], is called by the common name 
political ; but this is practical ; for a decree, as being the last thing, 
is the subject of action. Hence men say that practical statesmen 

which science operates, but are known immediately, and are apodictic, abso- 
lute, and necessary. The faculty which immediately knows these first prin- 
ciples is intuition (nous), which Aristotle defines in chapter vi. (which I 
omit) as "the habit which takes cognizance of the principles of science." (See 
also the analysis, pages xliv., xlv.)] * [I omit the remainder of section 2.] 
t [I omit the remainder of section 3, and the whole of sections 4 and 5.] 



•§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 471 

alone regulate the state; for these alone act, like artificers. 2. 
But the prudence which refers to one's self and the individual 
appears to be most properly prudence : and this bears the common 
name of prudence. But of those three divisions* one is economi- 
cal, the second legislative, and the third political; and of this last 
[executive] there are two sub-divisions, one the deliberative [ad- 
ministrative], the other the judicial. 

4.f But still, it is an obscure subject, and one which requires in- 
vestigation, how one ought to manage one's own affairs. This [the 
following] is an evidence of the truth of what we have said, that 
young men become geometricians and mathematicians, and wise 
in things of this kind ; but it is thought that a young man can not 
become prudent. 5. The reason of this is, that prudence is con- 
versant with particulars, and the knowledge of particulars is ac- 
quired by experience alone ; but a young man is not experienced ; 
for length of time causes experience.^ 

7. It is clear that prudence is not science ; for prudence, as has 
been said, is of the extreme; for this is the subject of moral action. 
Prudence is therefore opposed to intuition : for intuition is of 
those [first] principles respecting which there is no reasoning; but 
prudence is of the extreme [VI., xi., 6], of which there is no 
science, but only perception, not that perception which takes cog- 
nizance of particular objects, but such, perception as that by which 
we perceive the extreme in mathematics, a triangle for instance ; 
for it will stop there. But this is rather perception than prudence; 
but still it is of a different kind from sensual perception || [and 
may be called moral perception]. 

VI., ix., 1. Investigation and deliberation differ, for delibera- 
tion is a kind of investigation. But it is necessary to ascertain 
the genus of good § deliberation, whether it is a kind of science, 

*The divisions of prudence may be denominated personal, economical, legis- 
lative, administrative, executive, t [I omit section 3, and the first part of sec- 
tion 4.] X [I omit section 6.] || Prudence (phronesis) is not science (episteme), 
because science is conversant with universals, whereas prudence is conversant 
with particulars. These particulars are extremes (eschata), since they are the 
last results at which we arrive before we begin to act. The faculty which takes 
cognizance of them is perception (aisthesis); not the perception of the five ex- 
ternal senses, but that internal perception which is analogous to them, and which 
is popularly called common sense. Hence we can see the difference between 
prudence and intuition (nous) ; for the extremes of which intuition takes cog- 
nizance, are the first undemonstrable principles (archai, protoi 'oroi), such as 
the axioms, definitions, etc. in mathematical science. The intuition (nous), 
therefore, here spoken of, is the pure intellectual intuition, not practical or moral 
intuition. § [Euboulia is translated prudence by Ueberweg (Hist. Phil. ed. 
- Morris, vol. i., page 176, where also phronesis is translated practical wisdom).] 



472 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

opinion, happy conjecture, or what not. Now it certainly is not 
science ; for men do not investigate subjects which they know ; 
but good deliberation [ettbottlia] is a kind of deliberation ; and he 
who deliberates investigates and reasons. 2. Nor yet is it happy 
conjecture; for this is something unconnected with reason, and. 
quick; but we deliberate for a long time, and say, that it is right 
to execute quickly what we have resolved upon, but to deliberate 
slowly. Again, sagacity is a different thing from good delibera- 
tion ; and sagacity is a kind of happiness of conjecture. 3. There- 
fore no kind of good deliberation is opinion. Now since he who 
deliberates badly, errs, but he who deliberates well, deliberates 
correctly, it is plain, that good deliberation is a kind of correct- 
ness. It is not correctness either of science or of opinion ;* (for 
there is no correctness of science, because [in science] there is no 
error:) and truth is the correctness of opinion ; besides, everything 
of which there is opinion has been already defined. 4. Still, bow- 
ever, good deliberation can not be without reason. It remains, 
therefore, that it is the correctness [uprightness] of the intellect, 
moving onward in the investigation of truth, i. e. dianoia, for it is 
not yet an assertion ; but opinion is not investigation, but is at 
once an assertion. But he who deliberates, whether he does it 
well or ill, investigates something and reasons. But good deliber- 
ation is a sort of correctness of deliberation ; therefore we must 
inquire what is the nature, and what the subject-matter, of 
deliberation. 

5. Since the term correctness is used in more senses than one, it 
is plain that good deliberation is not every kind of correctness ; 
for the incontinent and depraved man will from reasoning arrive 
at that which he proposes to himself to look to ; so that he will 
[appear to] have deliberatedf rightly, and yet have arrived at great 
evil. Whereas good deliberation seems to be a good thing ; for 
good deliberation is only such a correctness of deliberation as is 
likely to arrive at good. 6. But it is possible to arrive at even 
this by a false syllogism [by false logic] ; and to be right as to. 
what one ought to do, but wrong as to the means, because the mid- 
dle term is false. So that even this kind of deliberation, by which 

* Good deliberation is (1) not a correctness of science because there is no 
such thing as incorrectness of it; (2) it is not a correctness of opinion (doxa), 
because (a) the correctness of doxa is truth ; because (b) doxa is an assertion 
(phasis), and not an investigation (zetesis) [= quaestio]. t [That is, his delib- 
eration is right, insofar as it selects the best means for attaining his predetermined 
bad end (III., Hi., 6, page 436 above); but it is not good deliberation, because he 
purposely directs it toward a bad end.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 473 

one arrives at a proper conclusion, but by improper means, is not 
quite good deliberation. 7. Again, it is possible for one man to be 
right after deliberating for a long time, and another man very 
soon. So that even this is not quite good deliberation ; but good 
deliberation is that correctness of deliberation, which is in accord- 
ance with the principle of utility, which has a proper object, em- 
ploys proper means, and is in operation during a proper length of 
time [not too hasty, nor too long delaying]. 

8. Again it is possible to deliberate well both absolutely, and 
relatively to some specific end ; and that is absolutely good de- 
liberation which is correct with reference to the absolutely good 
end, and that is a specific kind of good deliberation which is cor- 
rect with reference to some specific end. 9. If, therefore, to de- 
liberate well is characteristic of prudent men, good deliberation 
[prudence] must be a correctness of deliberation, in accordance 
with the principle of expediency having reference to the end, of 
which prudence [moral wisdom] is the true conception. 

VI., X., 1. Intelligence [sunesis], and the want of intelligence,, 
according to which we call men intelligent, and wanting in intel- 
ligence, are neither universally the same as science [episteme] or 
opinion [doxa], for then all men would be intelligent ; nor is in- 
telligence any one of the particular sciences, as medicine is the 
science of things wholesome ; or as geometry is the science of 
magnitudes. 2. Nor is intelligence conversant with things eternal 
and immutable, nor with everything indiscriminately which comes 
to pass ; but it is conversant with those things about which a man 
would doubt and deliberate. 3. Wherefore it is conversant with 
the same subjects as prudence, yet prudence and intelligence are 
not the same ; for the province of piuidence is to order (for its end 
is what it is right to do, or- not to do) ; but the province of intelli- 
gence is only to decide; for intelligence, and good intelligence, are the 
same thing ; for intelligent people, and people of good intelligence, 
are the same. 4. But intelligence is neither the possessing, nor yet 
the obtaining, of prudence ; but just as learning, when it makes 
use of scientific knowledge, is called intelligence, thus the word 
intelligence is also used when a person makes use of opinion, for 
the purpose of making a decision, and making a proper decision, 
on the subjects of prudence, when another person is speaking ; for 
the terms well and properly are identical. 5. And hence the name 
of intelligence, by which we call intelligent people, was derived,, 
namely, from that intelligence which is displayed in learning; 
since for the expression "to learn," we often use the expression 
"to understand." 

31 



474 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

VI., xi., 1. But that which is called candor, with reference to 
which we call men candid, and say that they possess candor, is 
the correct decision of the equitable man * But this is a sign of 
it ; for we say that the equitable man, above all others, is likely to 
entertain a fellow-feeling, and that in some cases it is equitable to 
entertain it. ISTow fellow-feeling is the correct discriminating can- 
dor of the equitable man; and that is correct which is the candor of 
the truthful man. 2. Bat all these habits reasonably tend to the 
same point ; for we speak of candor, intelligence, prudence, and 
j)erception, referring to the same characters the possession of can- 
dor, of [moral] perception, of prudence, and of intelligence; for 
all these faculties are of the extremes [see VI., viii., 7 (page 471 
above)], and of particulars. And it is in being apt to decide on 
points on which the prudent man decides, that intelligence, kind 
feeling, and candor, are displayed. 3. For equitable considerations 
:are common to all good men in their intercourse with others. But 
all matters of moral conduct are particulars and extremes ; for the 
prudent man ought to know them, and intelligence and candor are 
concerned with matters of moral conduct, and these are extremes. 

4. Intuition is of the extremes on both sides ;f- for intuition, and 
not reason, takes cognizance of the first principles, and of the last 
results : that intuition which belongs to demonstration takes cog- 
nizance of the immutable and first principles ; that which belongs 
to practical subjects takes cognizance of the last result of contin- 
gent matters, and of the minor premiss ; for these (i. e. minor pre- 
misses) are the origin of the motive ; for universals are made up 
of particulars. Of these, therefore, it is necessary to have per- 
ception ; and perception is intuition ,| 

* Intelligence is that faculty which forms a judgment on things; candor 
that which judges of persons, t Intuition (nous), as we have seen ahove, prop- 
erly signifies the faculty which takes cognizance of the first principles of science. 
Aristotle here, whether analogically or considering it a division of the same 
faculty, it is difficult to say, applies the term to that power which we possess of 
apprehending the principles of morals, of seeing what is right and wrong by an 
intuitive process, without the intervention of any reasoning process. It is what 
Bishop Butler calls "our sense of discernment of actions as morally good or 
•evil." In this twofold use of the term nous there is no real inconsistency, be- 
cause it is evidently, as Mr. Brewer says, p. 247, note, "the same faculty, whether 
employed upon the first principles of science or of morals." Every moral agent 
acts upon a motive (ou ; eneka [causa]), whether good or bad. This motive is> 
in other words, the principle upon which we act, and is the major premiss of the 
practical syllogism. But the minor premiss of the practical syllogism bears re- 
lation to the major, of a particular to a universal; therefore as universals are 
made up of particulars, it follows that the origin (arche) of the motive or prin- 
ciple is the minor premiss. X [I omit section 5.] 



.§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index.' 475 

6. Therefore intuition is at once the beginning and the end ; for 
demonstrations have extremes both for their origin and their sub- 
jects.* So that we ought to pay attention to the undemonstrated 
sayings and opinions of persons who are experienced, older than 
we are, and prudent, no less than to their demonstrations ; for be- 
cause they have obtained from their experience an acuteness of 
moral vision, they see correctly. What, therefore, is the nature of 
wisdom and of prudence, what the objects of both, and the fact 
that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul, has been 
stated. 

VI., xii., 1. The question might be asked, how are these habits 
useful? for wisdom does not contemplate any of the means by 
which a man will become happy ; for it relates to no production. 
Prudence, indeed, has this projjerty; yet with a view to what is 
there any need of it, if it is the knowledge of the things which 
are just, and honorable, and advantageous to man, and these are 
what the good man practices ? 2. But we are not at all the more 
apt to practice them because we know them, that is, if the virtues 
are habits ; just as we are not more apt to be healthy from the 
knowledge of wholesome things ;f for we are not at all more apt 
to put in practice the arts of medicine or gymnastics, merely be- 
cause we know them. 

3. Bat it may be said, if we must not call a man prudent on 
these grounds, but only for becoming virtuous, it would not be at 
all useful to those who are already good ; again, it would not be 
riseful to those who do not possess prudence ; for it will make no 
difference to them whether they possess it themselves, or obey 
others who possess it ; for it would be quite sufficient for us, just as 
in the case of health ; for when we wish to be well, we do not 
begin to learn the art of medicine.^ 

4. First, then, let us assert, that wisdom and prudence must be 
eligible for their own sakes, since they are the virtues, one of each 
part of the soul [YL,i.,adfin. (page 465 above)]. || Secondly, they do 
really produce an effect, although not in the same way as medicine 
produces health, but as health is the efficient cause of healthiness, 
so is wisdom the efficient cause of happiness ; for being part of 
virtue in the most comprehensive sense of the term, it causes, by 
being possessed, and by energizing, a man to be happy. 5. 

* That is, demonstrations have for their origin and foundation first prin- 
ciples, of which intuition takes cognizance, and the object of demonstration is 
■to arrive at conclusions which come under the province of intuition likewise, 
t [I omit part of section 2 at this point.] J [I omit the remainder of section 3.} 
ij| [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] 



476 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

Again, its work will be accomplished by prudence and moral vir- 
tue; for virtue makes the end and aim correct, and prudence the. 
means. * 

To answer the objection, that we are not at all more likely to- 
practice honor and justice on account of prudence, we must begin 
a little further back, making this our commencement. 6. Just as- 
we say that some who do just actions, are not yet just; those, for- 
instance, who do what is enjoined by the laws involuntarily, or ig- 
norantly, or for some other cause, and not for its own sake, though 
nevertheless they do what they ought and what a good man ought 
to do ; in the same manner, it seems, that a man must do all these 
things, being at the same time of a certain disposition, in order to 
be good; I mean, for instance, from deliberate preference, and for- 
the sake of the acts themselves. 7. Virtue, therefore, makes the 
deliberate preference correct ; but it is not the part of virtue, but 
of some other faculty, to direct aright those things which must be 
done with a view to that principle. But we must stop and speak 
on these subjects with more clearness. 

8. Now, there is a certain faculty which is called cleverness ;f 
the nature of which is to be able to do, and to attain, those things 
which conduce to the aim proposed. If, therefore, the aim be good,, 
the cleverness is praiseworthy ; but if it be bad, it becomes craft : % 
therefore we call prudent men clever, and not crafty. 9. Now 
prudence is not the same as this faculty, nor is it without this fac- 
ulty. But the habit is produced upon this eye, as it were, of the 
soul, not without virtue, as we have already stated, and as is man- 

* [I omit part of section 5 at this point.] f Cleverness (deinotes) is, ac- 
cording to Aristotle, a natural faculty, or aptness, which, in itself, is neither- 
good nor had ; it may he either used or ahused, — if abused, it is craft (panour- 
gia). It is capahle of heing cultivated and improved, and when perfected it 
hecomes phronesis. As cleverness thus perfected by the addition of moral 
virtue becomes prudence, so natural virtue, with Aristotle, who believes that, 
man is endowed, becomes perfect virtue by the addition of prudence. Not that 
Aristotle believed that man was capable of actually attaining such a height of 
perfection : he evidently believed that it was beyond human power. It is the 
theoretical standard which he proposes to the Ethical student for him to aim at,, 
and to approach as near as his natural powers will permit him. Thus, Kevela- 
tion, whilst it teaches us the corruption of human nature, bids us be perfect 
even as our Father which is in heaven is perfect. [I omit the remainder of the- 
note.] % The original word here translated craft is panotjrgia. As dei- 
notes, which signifies cleverness, generally is, when directed to a good end,. 
subject to the restrictions of sound and upright moral principles ; so when these 
are removed, it degenerates into panotjrgia, which signifies equal ability, but in 
addition, an unscrupulous readiness to do everything whatever. This is implied' 
in its etymology. 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 477 

ifest. For the syllogisms of moral conduct have as their principle, 
( (i. e. their major premiss,) since such and such a thing is the 
end and the chiep good, (i. e. anything. For let it be for the 
sake of argument, anything); but this is not visible except to the 
good man ; for depravity distorts the moral vision, and causes it 
.to be deceived on the subject of moral principles. So that it is 
clearly impossible for a person who is not good to be prudent. 

VI., xiii., 1. We must again investigate the subject of virtue. 
For virtue admits of relation of the same kind as that which pru- 
dence bears to cleverness ; that is, the two kinds of virtue are not 
identically the same, but similar ; such is the relation which exists 
between natural virtue and virtue proper. For all men think 
that each of the points of moral character exists in us in some 
manner naturally ; for we possess justice, temperance, valor, and 
the other virtues, immediately from oar birth. 2. But yet we are 
■in search of something different, namely, to be properly virtuous, 
and that these virtues should exist in us in a different manner ; for 
natural habits exist in children and brutes, but without intellect 
they are evidently hurtful. Yet so much as this is evident to the 
senses, that as a strong body which moves without sight meets 
with great falls, from the want of sight, so it is in the present 
instance : but if it gets the addition of intellect, it acts much bet- 
ter. Now the case of the habit is similar, and under similar cir- 
cumstances will be properly virtue. So that, as in the case of the 
faculty which forms opinions, there are two forms, cleverness and 
prudence; so in the moral there are likewise two, natural virtue 
and virtue proper ; and of these, virtue proper is not produced 
without prudence. 

3. Therefore it has been said .that all the virtues are prudences. 
And Socrates [Xen. Mem. III., ix., 5 (page 378 above)], in one 
part was right in his inquiry, but in the other wrong. For in 
that he thought that all the virtues are prudences, he was wrong; 
but in that he said that they are not without prudence, he was 
right. And this is a sign ; for now all men, when they define 
virtue, add also that it is a habit, according to right reason, stating 
also to what things it has reference; now that is right reason which 
is according to prudence. 4. All men, therefore, seem in some 
'way to testify that such a habit as is according to prudence, is 
virtue. But it is necessary to make a slight change ; for virtue is 
not only the habit according to, but in conjunction with, right 
reason ; and prudence is the same as right reason on these sub- 
jects. Socrates, therefore, thought that the virtues were "reasons," 
i. e. reasoning processes ; for he thought them all sciences : but we 
think them joined with reason. 



478 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

5. It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that it is im- 
possible to be properly virtuous without prudence, or prudent with- 
out moral virtue. Moreover, the argument by which it might be 
urged that the virtues are separate from each other, may in this 
way be refuted, for (they say) the same man is not in the highest 
degree naturally adapted for all : so that he will have got one 
already, arid another not yet. Now this is possible in the case of 
the natural virtues ; but in the case of those from the possession 
of which a man is called absolutely good, it is impossible ; for with 
prudence, which is one, they will all exist together.* f 

BOOK VII .—OF CONTINENCE. 

VII., i., 1. After what has been already said, we must make 
another beginning, J and state, that there are three forms of things 
to be avoided in morals — vice, incontinence, brutality. The con- 
traries of two of these are self-evident : for we call one virtue, the 
other continence: but, as an opposite to brutality, it would be 
most suitable to name the virtue which is above human nature, a 
sort of heroic and divine virtue, such as Homer has made Priam 
attribute to Hector, because of his exceeding goodness — 

" Nor did he seem 



The son of mortal man, but of a. god."]| 

4. "We must, however, treat of incontinence, and softness, and. 
luxury, and of continence and patience : for we must neither form 
our conceptions of each of them as though they were the same 
habits with virtue and vice, nor as though they were belonging to 
a different genus. But, as in other cases, we must first state the 

* If a man possesses perfect prudence, it develops itself in perfect obedience 
to the moral law ; and the perfection of the one implies the perfection of the 
other also. — [Extract from the translator's note at this point ] t[I omit section 
6.] + In a note at this point, in reference to the connection between the pre- 
ceding six books and what follows, the translator presents the following] expla- 
nation given by Muretus. In the commencement of the sixth book Aristotle 
has taught that two conditions are requisite to the perfection of moral virtue : 
first, that the moral sense ('o nous 'o praktikos) should judge correctly; next, 
that the appetites and passions should be obedient to its decisions. But though 
the moral judgment should be correct, the will is generally in opposition to it. 
If in this conflict reason is victorious, and compels the will, though reluctant, 
to obey, this moral state is continence ; if, on the contrary, the will overcomes 
the reason, the result is incontinence. It was essential to a practical treatise to 
treat of this imperfect or inchoate virtue, as well as to discuss the theory of moral 
perfection. The case is somewhat analogous to that of physical science, in 
which we first lay down theoretically the natural laws without reference to the- 
existence of any impediments, and then modify our theory by calculating and 
allowing for the effects of perturbations and resistances. || II. xxiv., 258. [I_ 
omit sections 2 and 3.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 479 

phenomena ; and, after raising difficulties, then exhibit if we can 
all the opinions that have been entertained on the subject of these 
passions ; or if not all, the greatest number, and the most impor- 
tant ; for if the difficulties are solved, and the most approved 
opinions left, the subject will have been explained sufficiently. 

5. It is a common opinion, then, first, that continence and 
patience belong to the number of things good and praiseworthy ; 
but incontinence and effeminacy to that of things bad and repre- 
hensible. That the continent man is identical with him who 
abides by his determination ; and the incontinent, with him who 
departs from his determination. That the incontinent man, know- 
ing that things are bad, does them at the instigation of passion ; 
but the continent man, knowing that the desires are bad, refuses 
to follow them in obedience to reason. That the temperate man is 
continent and patient: but some think that every one who is both 
continent and patient is temperate ; others do not. Some call 
the intemperate man incontinent, and the incontinent intemperate, 
indiscriminately ; others assert that they are different. As to the 
prudent man, sometimes it is said that it is impossible for him to 
be incontinent ; at other times, that some men both prudent and 
clever are incontinent. Lastly, men are said to be incontinent of an- 
ger, and honor, and gain. These are the statements generally made. 

"VII., ii., 1. A question might arise, how any one forming a right 
conception is incontinent. Some say, that if he has a scientific 
knowledge, it is impossible : for it is strange, as Socrates thought,* 
if science exists in the man, that anything else should have the 
mastery, and drag him about like a slave. Socrates, indeed, re- 
sisted the argument altogether, as if incontinence did not exist : 
for [he thought] that no one forming a right conception acted con- 
trary to what is best, but only through ignorance. ]STow, this ac- 
count is at variance with the phenomena; and we must inquire 
concerning this passion, if it proceeds from ignorance, what man- 
ner of ignorance it is; for that the incontinent man, before he is 
actually under the influence of passion, thinks that he ought not 
to yield, is evident. 2. There are some who concede one point, 

* Aristotle (Magna Moral.) says, that in the opinion of Socrates no one 
would choose evil, knowing that it was evil: but the incontinent man does so, 
being influenced by passion, therefore he thought there was no such thing as in- 
continence. This doctrine of Socrates doubtless originated, firstly, from his be- 
lief that man's natural bias and inclination was toward virtue, and that there- 
fore it was absurd to suppose he would pursue vice except involuntarily or ig- 
norantly. Secondly, from his doctrine that the knowledge of the principles and 
laws of morality was as capable of certainty' 'and accuracy as those of mathe- 
matical science. [Cf. Xen. Mem. IV., vi., 6; ILL, ix., 4 (pages 404, 377 above.)} 



480 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

but not the rest ; for that nothing is superior to science they allow: 
but that no one acts contrary to what they think best they do not 
allow : and for this reason they say, that the incontinent man is over- 
come by pleasures, not having science, but opinion. But still, if it 
is opinion, and not science, nor a strong conception, which op- 
poses, but a weak one, as in persons who are doubting, the not 
persisting in this in opposition to strong desires is pardonable : 
but vice is not pardonable, nor anything else which is reprehen- 
sible.^ 

9. Again, if there are incontinence and continence on every ob- 
ject-matter, who is he who is simply called incontinent? for no 
one is guilty of every species of incontinence ; but there are some 
whom we call incontinent simply. The difficulties, then, are some- 
what of this nature ; and of them we must remove some, and 
leave others ; for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of 
the truth. 

VII., iii., 1. First, then, we must consider whether men are in- 
continent, having knowledge or not, and in what way having 
knowledge. Next, with what sort of objects we must say that 
the continent and incontinent have to do ; I mean, whether it is 
every pleasure and pain, or some particular ones. Thirdly, 
whether the continent and patient are the same or different. And 
in like manner we must consider all other subjects which are akin 
to this speculation. 

2. The beginning of the discussion is, whether the continent and 
incontinent differ in the object, or in the manner : I mean, whether 
the incontinent man is incontinent merely from being employed in 
this particular thing ; or whether it is not that, but in the manner; 
or whether it is not that, but the result of both. 3. Next, whether 
incontinence and continence are on every object-matter or not : 
for he that is called simply incontinent, is not so in everything, 
but in the same things with which the intemperate is concerned : 
nor is he so from having reference to these things absolutely (for 
then it would be the same as intemperance), but from having ref- 
erence to them in a particular manner : for the intemperate is led 
on by deliberate choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue 
present pleasure : the incontinent does not think so, but neverthe- 
less pursues it. 

4. Now as to the question whether it be a true opinion, and not 
science, in opposition to which men are incontinent, makes no dif- 
ference as to the argument: for some who hold opinions, do not 
feel any doubt, but think that they know for certain. If then [it 

* [I omit sections 3-8.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 481 

is contended that] those, who hold opinions, because their convic- 
tions are weak, will act contrary to their conception, more than 
those who have knowledge, then [even in that case it may be re- 
plied that] knowledge will [so far as it relates to incontinence] in 
nowise differ from opinion: for some are convinced of what they 
think, no less than others are of what they know : Heraclitus is 
an instance of this.* 5. But since we speak of knowing in two 
ways (for he that possesses, but does not use his knowledge, as 
well as he that uses it, is said to have knowledge), there will be a 
difference between the having it, but not using it, so as to see what 
we ought not to do, and the having it and using it.f 

VII., iv., 1. We must next consider, whether any one is abso- 
lutely incontinent, or whether all are so in particular cases ; and if 
the former is the case, with reference to what sort of things he is 
so. Now that the continent and patient, the incontinent and ef- 
feminate, are so with respect to pleasures and pains, is evident. 2. 
But since some of those things which produce pleasure are neces- 
sary, and others, though chosen for their own sakes, yet admit of 
excess, those which are corporeal are necessary : I mean those 
which relate to the gratification of the appetite, and such corpo- 
real pleasures as we have stated [Book III., ch. x. (page 445 
above)] to be the object of intemperance and temperance; others 
are not necessary, but chosen for their own sakes ; 1 mean, for in- 
stance, victory, honor, wealth, and such like good and pleasant 
things. 3. Now those who are in excess in these, contrary to the 
right reason which is in them, we do not call simply incontinent, 
but we add, incontinent of money, of gain, of honor, or anger, but 
not simply incontinent, ; as if they were different, and called so only 
from analogy ; just as to the generic term man we add the differ- 
ence, " who was victor at the Olympic games ; " for in this case the 
common description differs a little from that which peculiarly be- 
longs to him. % And this is a sign : incontinence is blamed, not only 
as an error, but also as a sort of vice, either absolutely, or in some 
particular case ; but of the other characters no one is so blamed. 
4. But of those who indulge in carnal pleasures, with respect to 
which we call a man temperate and intemperate, he. who pursues 

* Heraclitus, although he said that all his conclusions rested on opinion, not 
on knowledge, still defended them as pertinaciously, and believed their truth as 
firmly as other philosophers, who asserted that theirs were founded on knowl- 
edge. — Giphanius. |[I omit sections 6-14.] % As we distinguish an Olympic 
victor from other men by the addition of this differential property to the com- 
mon term man; so we distinguish simple from particular incontinence by add- 
ing to the word " incontinent " the difference "of anger," etc. 



482 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

the excesses of things pleasant, and avoids the excesses of things 
painful, as hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and all things which 
have to do with touch and taste, not from deliberately preferring, 
but contrary to his deliberate preference and judgment, is called 
incontinent simply, without the addition, that he is so in this par- 
ticular thing ; anger, for example. 

5. A sign of it is this : men are called effeminate in these [hun- 
ger, cold, etc.] but in none of the others [anger, honor, gain, etc.]: 
and for this reason we class together the incontinent and intem- 
perate, and also the continent and temperate, but not any of the 
others, because the former are in a manner conversant with the 
same pleasures and pains. They are indeed concerned with the 
same, but not in the same manner ; for the temperate and intem- 
perate deliberately prefer them, the others [continent and incon- 
tinent] do not.* 

7. But since some desires and pleasures belong to the class of 
those which are honorable and good (for of things pleasant, some 
are eligible by nature, some the contrary, and others indifferent, 
as, for instance, according to our former division, the pleasures con- 
nected with money, and gain, and victory, and honor), in all such 
pleasures, and in those which are indifferent, we are not blamed 
for feeling, or desiring, or loving them, but for doing this somehow 
in excess [II., vi., 12 (page 430 above)]. 8. Therefore all who are 
overcome by, or pursue, what is by nature honorable and good,, 
contrary to reason, are blamed ; as for example, those who are very 
anxious, and more so than they ought to be, for honor.f 9. There 
is therefore no depravity in those cases for the reason given, that 
each belongs to the class of things which are by nature chosen for 
their own sakes; but still the excesses are bad and to be avoided. 
So also there is no incontinence ; for incontinence is not only to 
be avoided, but it belongs also to the class of things blamable. But 
from the similarity of the affection, we use the term incontinence, 
with the addition of the idea of relation : just as we call a man a bad 
physician and a bad actor, whom we would not absolutely call bad. 
As, therefore, in these instances we would not call them so abso- 
lutely, because each is not really a vice, but we call them so from 
analogy; so in the other case it is clear that we must suppose that 
only to be incontinence and continence, which has the same object- 
matter with temperance and intemperance. In the case of anger, 
we use the term analogically ; and therefore we call a man incon- 
tinent, adding "of anger," just as we add "of honor," or "of gain. "J 

* [Incontinence is aptly illustrated by St. Paul (Eomars vii., 15) "For not 
what I desire, that do I ; but what I hate, that I do."] [I omit section 6.] f [L 
omit the remainder of section 8.] % [I omit chapter 5.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 488" 

VII., vi., 1. Let us now consider the fact, that incontinence of 
anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire. For anger 
seems to listen somewhat to reason, hut to listen imperfectly ; as 
hasty servants, who before they have heard the whole message? 
run away, and then misunderstand the order ; and dogs, before 
they have considered whether it is a friend, if they only hear a 
noise, bark : thus anger, from a natural warmth and quickness, 
having listened, but not understood the order, rushes to vengeance.. 
2. For reason or imagination has declared, that the slight is an in- 
sult ; and anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to> 
quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated. 
But desire, if reason or sense should only say that the thing is 
pleasant, rushes to the enjoyment of it.* 4. Again, it is more par- 
donable to follow natural appetites, for it is more pardonable to 
follow such desires as are common to all, and so far forth as they 
are common. But anger and asperity are more natural than ex- 
cessive and unnecessary desires. f 8. Consequently, it is plain, 
that incontinence of desire is more disgraceful than that of anger, 
and that continence and incontinence are conversant with bodily 
desires and pleasures. But we must understand the different, 
forms of these ; for, as has been said at the beginning, some are 
human and natural, both in kind and in degree ; others are brutal; 
and others arise from bodily injuries and disease ; but temperance 
and intemperance are only conversant with the first of these. | 9. 
But brutality is a less evil than vice, though more formidable ; for 
the best principle has not been destroyed, as in the human being, 
but it has never existed. It is just the same, therefore, as to com- 
pare the inanimate with the animate, in order to see which is; 
worse ; for the viciousness of that which is without principle is 
always the less mischievous ; but intellect is the principle. It is 
therefore almost the same as to compare injustice with an unjust 
man ; for it is possible that either may be the worse ; for a vicious. 
man can do ten thousand times as much harm as a beast. 

VII., vii., 1. With respect to the pleasures and pains, the desires, 
and aversions which arise from touch and taste (with which in- 
temperance and temperance have already || been defined as being 
conversant), it is possible to be affected in such a manner, as to 
give way to those which the generality overcome ; and it is possi- 
ble to overcome those to which the generality give way. Whoever, 
then, is so affected as regards pleasure, is either incontinent or 
continent ; and as regards pain, either effeminate or patient. But. 

* [I omit section 3.] t [I omit sections 5-7.] j [I omit the remainder of 
section 8.] \\ [III., x., 9 (which I have omitted). See VII., iv., 2-4 above.] 



484 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

the habits of the generality are between the two, although they 
incline rather to the worse. 2. Now, since some pleasures are 
necessary, while others are not so, or only up to a certain point, 
whilst their excesses and defects are not necessary ; the same holds 
good with desires and pains ; he who pursues those pleasures which 
are in excess, or pursues them to excess, or from deliberate prefer- 
ence, and for their own sakes, and not for the sake of any further 
result, is intemperate : for this man must necessarily be disin- 
clined to repentance, so that he is incurable ; for the impenitent is 
incurable. He that is in the defect [abstaining too much from 
pleasure], is [gone to] the opposite [extreme (II.,ii.,7, and II., vi., 
11, pp. 424, 430 above)] ; he that is in the mean, is temperate. The 
case is similar with him who shuns bodily pains, not from being 
overcome, but from deliberate preference. 

3. Of those who act without deliberate preference, one [incontinent] 
is led by pleasure ; another [effeminate] by the motive of avoiding 
the pain which arises from desire; so that they differ from each other. 
But every one would think a man worse, if he did anything dis- 
graceful when he felt no desire, or only a slight one. than if he 
felt very strong desires ; and if he struck another without being 
angry, than if he had been angry ; for what would he have done, 
had he been under the influence of passion? Therefore, the in- 
temperate is worse than the incontinent. 4. Of those then that 
have been mentioned, one is rather a species of effeminacy, the 
other is incontinent. The continent is Opposed to the incontinent, 
and the patient to the effeminate ; for patience consists in resist- 
ing, continence in having the mastery ; but to resist and to have 
the mastery differ in the same way as not being defeated differs 
from gaining a victory. Therefore, also, continence is more eligi- 
ble than patience.* 

VII., viii., 1. The intemperate, as has been said, is not in- 
clined to repent; for he abides by his deliberate preference; 
but the incontinent, in every case, is inclined to repent. There- 
fore thef former is incurable, and the latter curable : % for de- 
pravity resembles dropsy and consumption amongst diseases, and 
incontinence resembles epilepsy ; for the former is a permanent, 
the latter not a permanent vice. The genus of incontinence is 
altogether different from that of vice ; for vice is nnperceived by 
the vicious ; but incontinence is not.|| 4. For as to virtue and de- 

* [I omit sections 5-9.] t[I omit part of section 1 at this point.] J [See 
note at foot of page 369 above.] || Intemperance is perfect vice, incontinence, im- 
perfect. In the intemperate, therefore, the moral principle is destroyed, the voice 
of conscience silenced, the light which is within him is become darkness. He 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 485 

pravity, one destroys, and the other preserves the principle : but 

IN MORAL ACTION THE MOTIVE IS THE PRINCIPLE, just as the hypoth- 
eses are in mathematics. Neither in mathematics does reason teach 
the [first] principles, nor in morals, but virtue, either natural or ac- 
quired by habit, teaches to think rightly respecting the principle. 
Such a character, therefore, is temperate, and the contrary charac- 
ter is intemperate. 

5. But there is a character, who from passion is precipitate con- 
trary to right reason, which passion so far masters, as to prevent 
him from acting according to right reason ; but it does not master 
him so far, as to make him one who would be persuaded that he 
ought to follow such pleasures without restraint. This is the in- 
continent man ; better than the intemperate, and not vicious ab- 
solutely ; for the best thing, i. e. the principle, is preserved. But 
there is another character opposite to this ; he that abides hy his 
opinions, and is not precipitate, at least, not through passion. It 
is evident, then, from the above considerations, that one habit [con- 
tinence] is good, the other [incontinence] bad.* 

VII., X., 1. It is impossible for the same man to be at once 
prudent and incontinent : for it has been shown that a prudent 
man is at the same time good in moral character. Again, a man 
is not prudent from merely knowing, but from being also disposed 
to act : 2. but the incontinent is not disposed to act.f 3. The 
incontinent therefore is not like one who has knowledge and uses 
it, but like one asleep or drunk ; and he acts willingly ; for he in 
a manner knows both what he does and his motive for doing it ; 
but he is not wicked ; for his deliberate preference is good ; so that 
he is half- wicked, and not unjust, for he is not insidious. For one- 
of them is not disposed to . abide by his deliberations ; and the 
choleric is not disposed to deliberate at all. Therefore, the incon- 
tinent man resembles a state which passes all the enactments which 
it ought, and has good laws, but uses none of them ; J but the 
wicked man resembles a city which uses laws, but uses bad ones..|[ 
5. What, then, continence is, and what incontinence, and patience, 

does not even feel that he is wrong; he is like a man suffering from a chronic 
disease, which is so much the more dangerous and incurable because it is pain- 
less. Pain has ceased, mortification, so to speak, has begun. The incontinent 
man, on the other hand, feels the pangs of remorse, hears the disapproving voice 
of conscience, experiences uneasiness, the "sorrow which worketh repentance;" 
his disease is acute, and may be cured. [I omit sections 2 and 3.] * [I omit 
chapter ix.] | [I omit the remainder of section 2.] % [I omit a portion of sec- 
tion 3 at this point.] || [I omit section 4.] 



486 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

.and effeminacy, and what relation these habits bear to one another, 
has been sufficiently explained. * 

BOOKS VIII., IX.-OF FRIENDSHIP. 

VIII , i., 1. It would follow next after this to treat of friend- 
ship ; f for it is a kind of virtue, or joined with virtue. Besides, 
it is most necessary for life: for without friends no one would 
choose to live, even if he had all other goods. For to the rich, 
and to those who possess office and authority, there seems to be an 
especial need of friends ; 2. for what use is there in such good for- 
tune, if the power of conferring benefits is taken away, which is ex- 
erted principally and in the most praiseworthy manner toward 
friends ? or how could it be kept safe and preserved without friends ? 
ibr the greater it is, the more insecure is it. 3. And in poverty and 
in all other misfortunes men think that friends are the only ref- 
uge. It is also necessary to the young, in order to keep them from 
error, and to the old, as a comfort to them, and to supply that 
which is deficient in their actions on account of weakness ; and to 
those in the vigor of life to further their noble deeds, as the poet 
.says, "When two come together, " etc. (Horn. II, x., 224. %) For 

*The four concluding chapters of this book, as printed irithe Greek, are con- 
sidered spurious, it being most improbable that Aristotle would have treated of 
the subject of pleasure here in an imperfect manner, and again fully in the tenth 
book. The opinion of Casaubon is that these chapters were improperly trans- 
ferred to this place from the Eudemian Ethics. They are therefore omitted* 
t Friendship, although, strictly speaking, it is not a virtue, is, nevertheless, closely 
connected with virtue. The amiable feelings and affections of our nature, which 
are the foundation of friendship, if cultivated and rightly directed, lead to the 
discharge of our moral and social duties. It is also almost indispensable to the 
highest notions which we can form of human happiness. On these accounts the 
subject is appropriately introduced in a treatise on Ethics. But friendship ac- 
quires additional importance from the place which it occupied in the Greek po- 
litical system. As, owing to the public duties (leitourgiai) which devolved 
upon the richer citizens, magnificence (megaloprepeia) was nearly allied to 
patriotism ; as, again, to make provision for the moral education of the peo- 
ple was considered one of the highest duties of a statesman, so friendships, 
under which term were included all the principles of association and bonds of 
union between individuals, involved great public interests. " The Greeks, " says 
Mr. Brewer, " had been accustomed to look upon the friendships of individuals, 
and the 'etaireiai whieh existed in different forms among them, as the organs 
not only of great political changes and revolutions in the state, but as influ- 
encing the minds and morals of the people to an almost inconceivable extent. 
The same influence which the press exerts amongst us, did these political 
and individual unions exert amongst them. " Many occasions will of course 
•occur of comparing with this book the Lrelius of Cicero. % The whole passage is 
thus translated by Pope. (Horn. II., x. 265) : — 

" By mutual confidence, and mutual aid. 
Great deeds are done, and great discoveries made ; 
The wise new prudence from the wise acquire, 
And one brave hero fans another's fire. " 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 487 

they are more able to conceive and to execute. 4. It seems also 
naturally to exist in the producer toward the produced ; and not 
•only in men, but also in birds, and in most animals, and in those 
of the same race, toward one another, and most of all in human 
beings : whence we praise the philanthropic. One may see, also, 
in traveling, how intimate and friendly every man is with his 
fellow-man. 

5. Friendship also seems to hold states together, and legislators 
appear to pay more attention to it than to justice ; for unanimity 
•of opinion seems to be something resembling friendship ; and they 
:are most desirous of this, and banish faction as being the greatest 
enemy. And when men are friends, there is no need of justice : * 
but when they are just, they still need friendship. 6. And of all 
just things that which is the most so is thought to belong to friend- 
ship. It is not only necessary, but also honorable; for we praise 
those who are fond of friends ; and the having many friends seems 
to be one kind of things honorable. 

8.f Now, let the physiological questions be passed over, for they 
do not belong to our present consideration. But as for all the ques- 
tions which have to do with man, and refer to his moral character 
and his passions, these let us consider; as, for instance, whether 
friendship exists between all, or whether it is impossible for the 
'wicked to be friends : and, whether there is only one species of 
friendship, or more ; for those who think there is only one, be- 
cause it admits of degrees, trust to an insufficient proof : for things 
differing in species admit of degrees ; but we have spoken of this 
before J. 

VIII., ii., 1. Perhaps we might arrive at clear ideas about these 
matters if it were known. what the object of love is: for it is 
thought to be not everything which is loved, but only that which 
is an object of love ; and this is the good, the pleasant, or the use- 
ful. That would be thought to be useful, by means of which some 
good or some pleasure is produced : so that the good and jjleasant 

* This is true upon the same principle which is the foundation of the Chris, 
tian maxim, " Love is the fulfilling of the law. " | [I omit section 7 and also the 
first part of section 8.] j The scholiast says that the passage in which this sub- 
ject was before spoken of must have been lost, but it probably refers to Eth o 
Book II., c. viii. [But it will be seen by reference to Book II. ch. vi. g§ S and 
7 (page 430 above), that virtue and vice are specifically different. For example 
rashness, cowardice, and courage, admit of degrees (III., vii., 10. page 443 above) 
and the first appears to be courage of too high a degree, the second, courage of 
too low a degree (II., ii., 6. page 424 above) ; while the truth is that they are not 
•courage at all (II., vi. 14, page 430 above), but vices of a different species from 
?the virtue courage, no excess or deficiency of courage being possible.] 



488 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

would be objects of love, considered as ends. Do men, then, love the 
good, or that which is good to themselves ? for these sometimes are 
at variance. The case is the same with the pleasant. Each is- 
thought to love that which is good to himself; and absolutely the 
good is an object of love, but relatively to each individual, that 
which is so to each. 

2. Now, each loves not that which is in reality good to himself 
but that which appears so ; but this will make no difference ; for 
the object of love will be that which appears to be good. But 
since there are three motives on account of which men love, the 
term friendship can riot be used to express a fondness for things in- 
animate : for there is no return of fondness, nor any wishing of 
good to them. * 3. But we say that men should wish good to a 
friend for his sake ; and those who wish good to him thus, we call 
well-disposed, unless there is also the same feeling entertained by 
the other party ; for good-will mutually felt is friendship ; or must 
we add the condition, that this mutual good-will must not be un- 
known to both parties? 4. For many feel good-will toward those 
whom they have never seen, but who they suppose are good or 
useful to them ; and this same feeling may be recijDrocated. These, 
then, do indeed appear well-disposed toward one another ; but how 
can one call them friends, when neither knows how the other is. 
disposed to him ? They ought, therefore, to have good- will toward 
each other, and wish each other what is good, not without each 
other's knowledge, and for one of the motives mentioned. 

VIII., iii., 1. But these motives differ in species from one an- 
other ; therefore the affections do so likewise, and the friendships ;. 
consequently there are three species of friendship, equal in num- 
ber to the objects of love [VIII., ii., 1., (page 487 above)], since in 
each there is a return of affection, and both parties are aware of 
it. But those who love one another wish what is good to one 
another, according to the motive on account of which they love,. 
2. Now, those who love one another for the sake of the useful, do 
not love each other disinterestedly, but only so far forth as there 
results some good to themselves from one another. The case is the 
same with those who love for the sake of pleasure, for they do not 
love the witty from their being of such a character, but because 
they are pleasant to them; and, therefore, those who love for the 
sake of the useful love for the sake of what is good to themselves^ 
and those who love for the sake of pleasure love for the sake of 
what is pleasant to themselves, and not so far forth as the person 
loved exists, but so far forth as he is useful or pleasant. 

* [I omit the remainder of section 2.] 



•§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 489 

3. These friendships, therefore, are accidental ; for the person 
loved is not loved for being who he is, but for providing something 
either good or pleasant ; consequently such friendships are easily 
dissolved, if the parties do not continue in similar circumstances ; 
for if they are no longer pleasant or useful, they cease to love. 
Now the useful is not permanent, but becomes different at different 
times ; therefore, when that is done away for the sake of which 
they became friends, the friendship also is dissolved ; which clearly 
;shows that the friendship was for those motives.* 

7. The friendship of the good and of those who are alike in vir- 
tue is perfect ; for these wish good to one another in the same way, 
so far forth as they are good ; but they are good of themselves ; 
and those who wish good to their friends for the friends' sake are 
friends in the highest degree, for the} 7 have this feeling for the 
sake of ^he friends themselves, and not accidentally ; their friend- 
ship, therefore, continues as long as they are good ; and virtue is a 
permanent thing.! And each is good absolutely and also relatively 
to his friend, for the good are both absolutely good and also rela- 
tively to one another ; for to each their own actions and those 
which are like their own are pleasant, but the actions of the good 
are either the same or similar. 

8. Such friendship as this is, as we might expect, permanent, 
for it contains in it all the requisites for friends ; for every friend 
;ship is for the sake of good or pleasure, either absolutely or to the 
person loving, and results from a certain resemblance. In this 
friendship, all that has been mentioned exists in the parties them- 
selves, for in this there is a similarity, and all the other requisites, 
and that which is absolutely good is also absolutely pleasant ; but 
these are the principal objects, of love, and therefore the feeling 
friendship, and friendship itself, exists, and is best, in these more 
than in any others. 

9. It is to be expsctad that such would be rare, for there are few 
;such characters as these [§ 606]. Moreover, it requires time and 
long acquaintance, for, according to the proverb, it is impossible 
for men to know one another before they have eaten a stated quan- 
tity of salt together, nor can they admit each other to intimacy 
nor become friends before each appears to the other worthy of his 
friendship, and his confidence. 10. Those who hastily perform 
offices of friendship to one another are willing to be friends, but 
■are not really so unless they are also worthy of friendship, and are 

'*' [I omit sections 4-6.] | Virtus, virtus inqimm, et conciliat amicitias et con- 
-servat; in ea est enim coavenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia. — 
_Cic. Liel. xxvii. 

32 



490 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

aware of this ; for a wish for friendship is formed quickly, but not , 
friendship. This species of friendship, therefore, both with re- 
spect to time and everything else, is perfect, and in all respects 
the same and like good offices are interchanged ; and this is pre- 
cisely what ought to be the case between friends. 

VIII., iv., 1. Friendship for the sake of the pleasant bears a 
resemblance to this, for the good are pleasant to one another; so 
also that which is for the sake of the useful, for the good are use- 
ful to one another.* 4. Consequently, for the sake of pleasure and 
the useful, it is possible for the bad to be friends with one another ;f 
but for the sake of one another, evidently only the good can be 
friends, for the bad feel no pleasure in the persons themselves, 
unless so far as there is some advantage. 5. The friendship of the 
good is alone safe from calumny, for it is not easy to believe any 
one respecting one who has been proved by ourselves during a long 
space of time ; and between such persons there is confidence and 
a certainty that one's friend would never have done wrong, and 
every thing else which is expected in real friendship. 6. In the 
other kinds of friendships there is nothing to hinder such things 
from occurring ; consequently, since men call those friends who 
are so for the sake of the useful, just as states do (for alliances seem 
to be formed between states for the sake of advantage), and also 
those who love one another for the sake of pleasure, as children 
do, perhaps we also ought to say that such men are friends, but 
that there are many kinds of friendship ; first and principally, 
that of the good so far forth as they are good, and the others from 
their resemblance ; for so far forth as there is something good or 
similarity of character, so far they are friends; for the pleasant is 
a kind of good to those who love the pleasant. 

7. These two latter kinds do not combine well, nor do the same 
people become friends for the sake of the useful and the pleasant ; 
for two things which are accidental do not easily combine. Friend- 
ship, therefore, being 'divided into these kinds, the bad will be 
friends for the sake of the pleasant and the useful, being similar 
in that respect ; but the good will be friends for the friends' sake, 
for they will be so, so far forth as they are good ; the latter, there- 
fore, are friends absolutely, the former accidentally, and from their 
resemblance to the latter. 

BOOK VIIL, Chapter V., § 44 The friendship of the good, 
then, is friendship in the highest degree, as has been said fre- 
quently ; for that which is absolutely good or pleasant is thought 

* [I omit sections 2 and 3.] t [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] J [I 
omit sections 1-3.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 491 

to be an object of love and eligible, and to each individual that 
which is so to him; but the good man is an object of love and 
eligible to the good, for both these reasons. Fondness is like a 
passion, and friendship like a habit ; for fondness is felt no less to- 
ward, inanimate things, but we return friendship with deliberate 
choice, and deliberate choice proceeds from habit. We also wish 
good to those whom we love for their sakes, not from passion but 
from habit ; and when we love a friend, we love that which is good 
to ourselves ; for the good man, when he becomes a friend, becomes 
a good to him whose friend he is. Each, therefore, loves that 
which is good to himself, and makes an equal return both in wish 
and in kind, for equality is said proverbially to be friendship. 
These conditions, therefore, exist mostly in the friendship of the 
good. [See §600.] 

VIII., vi., 3.* To be friends with many, is impossible in per- 
fect friendship ; just as it is to be in love with many at once ; for 
love appears to be an excess ; and such a feeling is naturally en- 
tertained toward one object. And that many at once should 
greatly please the same person is not easy, and perhaps it is not 
easy to find many persons at once who are good. They must also 
become acquainted with one another,. and be on intimate terms, 
which is very difficult. For the sake of the useful and the pleas- 
ant, it is possible to please many ; for many are of that character, 
and the services required are performed in a short time.f 

VIII., Vii., 1. There is another species of friendship, where 
one of the parties is superior ; as that of a father for his son, and 
generally an older for a younger person, and a husband for his 
wife, and a governor for the 'governed. But these differ from one 
another; for the case is not the same between parents and chil- 
dren, as between governors and the governed ; nor is the feeling 
of a father for his son the same as that of a son for his father, nor 
of a husband for his wife, as of a wife for her husband ; for the 
perfection and office of each of these is different; therefore the 
motives of their friendship are different. Consequently their af- 
fections and their friendships themselves are different; hence the 
same offices are not performed by each to the other, nor ought they 
to be required. 2. But when children pay to their parents what 
is due to those who begat them, and parents to their children what 
is due to them, the friendship in such cases is lasting and sincere. But 
in all friendships, where one party is superior, the affection also 
ought to be proportionate ; as, for example, that the better person 
should be loved in a greater degree than he loves, so also the more 

* [I omit sections 1 and 2.] t [I omit sections 4-7.] 



492 Kant's Mhics. § 1040 

useful person, and in like manner in every other ease. For when 
the affection is proportional, then there is in a manner an equality; 
which seems to be the property of friendship.* 

VIII , vi i , 5.t But since friendship consists more in loving, 
and those who love their friends are praised, to love seems to be 
the excellence of friends. So that the parties between whom this 
takes place proportionately are lasting friends, and the friendship 
of such is lasting. In this manner those who are unequal, may 
also be the greatest friends; for they may be equalized. But 
equality and similarity constitute friendship, and particularly the 
similarity of those who are alike with respect to virtue; for as 
they possess stability in themselves, they also possess the same 
toward each other, and neither ask nor render base services, but, 
so to speak, they even prevent it: for it is the characteristic of the 
good neither to commit faults themselves, nor to suffer their friends 
to commit them. 6. The wicked have no stability ; for they do 
not continue consistent even with themselves ; but they become 
friends for a short time, taking delight in each other's wickedness. 
The useful and the pleasant continue friends longer than these; 
for they continue as long as they furnish pleasure and profit to 
one another.;}; 

VIII., X., 1. There are three forms of civil government, and 
as many deflections, which are, as it were, corruptions of them. 
The former are, Monarchy, Aristocracy, and a third, on the prin- 
ciple of property, which it seems appropriate to call a Timocracy ; 
but the generality are accustomed to apply the term " polity " ex- 
clusively to this last. Of these, monarchy is the best, and timoc- 
racy the worst. 2. The deflection from monarchy is tyranny ; for 
both are monarchies : but there is the greatest difference between 
them ; for the tyrant looks to his own benefit, the king to that of 
his subjects ; for he is not a king who is not independent, and who 
does not abound in all goods ; but such an one as this wants noth- 
ing else; and consequently he would not be considering what is 
beneficial to himself, but to his. subjects; for he that does not act 
so, must be a mere king chosen by lot.|| But tyranny is the op- 
posite to this ; for a tyrant pursues his own peculiar good. 3. And 
it is more evident on this ground, that it is the worst form of all ; 
for that is worst, which is opposite to the best. But the transition 
from kingly power is to tyranny ; for tyranny is a corruption of 
monarchy, and a bad king becomes a tyrant. 

*[I omit sections 3-5.] t[I omit sections 1—4.] J [I omit sections 7-9, and 
the whole of chapter ix.] |j That is, a king who owes his dignity to his good 
fortune, and not to any merits of his own. 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 493 

4. The transition .from aristocracy is to oligarchy, through the 
wickedness of those in power, who distribute the offices of the 
state without reference to merit, give all or most good things to 
themselves, and the offices of state constantly to the same people, 
setting the highest value upon wealth : consequently a few only 
are in power, and the had instead of the best. 5. The transition 
from timocracy is to democracy ; for" they border upon one another, 
since a timocracy naturally inclines to be in the hands of the mul- 
titude,' and all who are in the same class as to property are equal. 
But democracy is the least vicious, for its constitutional principles 
are but slightly changed. Such, then, are the principal changes 
in forms of government ; for thus they change the least and in the 
most natural manner. 

6. One may find resemblances, and as it were, examples of these, 
even in private families ; for the relation of a father to his sons 
wears the form of monarchy : lor the father takes care of the chil- 
dren. Hence, also, Homer calls Jupiter father ; for the meaning 
of a kingdom is a paternal government. But in Persia the au- 
thority of a father is tyrannical, for they use their sons like slaves.* 

VIII., xiii., 2.t Accusations and complaints arise in the friend- 
ship for the sake of the useful, and in that only7 or mostly so, as 
might be expected ; for those who are friends for virtue's sake, are 
anxious to benefit each other ; for such is the property of virtue 
and friendship ; and when they are struggling for this, there are 
no complaints or quarrels; for no one dislikes one who loves and 
benefits him ; but if he is a man of refinement, he returns the 
kindness. And he who is superior to the other, since he obtains 
what he wants, can not complain of his friend ; for each is aiming 
at the good. 

3. Nor do they arise at all in friendships formed for the sake of 
pleasure ; for both parties obtain at once what they want, if they 
take pleasure in living together ; and he would appear ridiculous, 
who complained of another not giving him pleasure, when it is in 
his power to cease to live with him. 4. But the friendship for the 
sake of the useful is fruitful in complaints ; for since each makes 
use of the other for his own benefit, they are constantly wanting 
the greater share, and think that they have less than their due, 
and complain that they do not receive as much as they want, al- 
though they deserve it ; and those who confer benefits can not 
assist them as much as the receivers require."! 

*[I omit sections 7 and 8, and the whole of chapters xi. and xii.] | [I omit 
section 1.] J [I omit sections 5-7.] 



494 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

8. But it admits of a question, whether we ought to measure 
the return by the benefit done to the receiver, and make it accord- 
ing to that ; or by the kindness of him who confers it. For the re- 
ceivers say that they have received such things from those who 
conferred them as were trifling to them, and which they might 
have received from others, thus depreciating the favor : the others, 
on the contrary, say that they were the greatest favors they had 
to bestow, and favors which could not have been received from any 
others, and that they were conferred in time of danger, or such 
like exigencies. 9. Is not, therefore, the benefit of the receiver 
the measure in friendship for the sake of the useful ? for he is the 
person in want, and the other assists him, as if hereafter to re- 
ceive an equivalent: the assistance therefore is as great as the 
benefit which the other receives : and consequently he must repay 
as much as the fruit which he has reaped from it, or more; for 
that is more honorable. But in friendships for the sake of virtue 
there are no complaints; and the deliberate preference of the con- 
ferrer seems to be the measure ; for the essential part of virtue and 
moral character consists in the deliberate preference.* 

IX., i., 1. In all cases of dissimilar f friendship, proportion 
equalizes and preserves the friendship, as has been stated ; for 
example, in the political friendships, the shoemaker receives a re- 
turn for his shoes according to their value, and the weaver, and 
every one else. In these instances a common measure is provided, 
namely, money ; everything therefore is referred to this, and is 
measured by it. % 5. But who is to fix,the value? the person who 
first gives? or he who first receives ? for he who gives, seems to 
leave it to the other to fix the value: which they say is what Pro- 
tagoras did ; for when he gave any lessons, he ordered the learner 
to fix how much he thought the knowledge was worth, and so 
much he received. In such transactions, some persons approve of 
the principle, " Let a friend be content with a promised pay- 
ment." — Hes. Op. et DL, v. 368. 6. But those who receive the 
money beforehand, and then perform none of their promises, be- 
cause they w T ere so extravagant, are with justice complained of; 
for they do not fulfill their agreements. And this, perhaps, the 
Sophists are obliged to do, because no one would give a piece of 
silver for what they know. These, therefore, because they do not 
perform that for wmich they received pay, are justly complained of. 

7. Whenever there is no agreement made about the service per- 
formed, as has been stated, those who confer a favor freely for the 

* [I omit chapter xiv.] tin the Greek anomoeidesi, dissimilar in species, 
that is, when two parties become friends, each from a different motive, j [I 
omit sections 2-4.] 



•■§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 495 

sake of the persons themselves on whom they confer it, can not 
complain ; for friendship which is founded on virtue is of this kind. 
The return must be made according to the deliberate intention ; 
for it is this which characterizes a friend and virtue. It seems 
also that those who have intercourse with one another in philosophy 
must act thus ; for the value of it is not measured by money, and 
no equivalent price can be paid. But perhaps, as in the case of our 
duty to* our parents, that which is in our power is sufficient. 

8. Where the act of giving is not of this kind, but for the sake 
of something, perhaps it is best that a return should be made, which 
seems to both parties to be proportionate. If this can not be, it 
would seem not only necessary that he who first receives should 
settle it, but also just: for in proportion to the benefit which one 
received, or to the cost at which he would have purchased the 
pleasure, will bCthe equivalent which the other ought to receive in 
return ; for in things bought and sold, this seems to be clone : and in 
some places there are laws forbidding suits upon voluntary contracts; 

; as if it was right, when we have trusted any one, to settle with 
him, as we dealt with him originally: for thfey think that it is 
more just for him to fix the value who was trusted, than for him to 
do so who trusted him; for men do not in general put the same 
value upon things which they have received, as they did when 
they were wishing to receive them ; for what belongs to us, and 
what we give away, seems to each of us to be very valuable. But, 
nevertheless, the return is made with reference to such a standard 

v of value as the receiver would fix: though, perhaps, he ought not 
to value it at so much as it seems worth when he has got it, but ac- 
cording to what he valued it at before he got it. 

IX., ii., 7.f And it would seem that we ought to assist our 
parents, in preference to all other persons, in supporting them ; 
being, as it were, their debtors ; and that it is more honorable to 
assist the authors of our existence in that respect than ourselves. 
We should also give honor to our parents. J 8. We should also 
give to every old man the' honor becoming his age, by rising up in 
his presence, and giving him the place of honor, and such like 
marks of respect. To companions and brothers we should give 
liberty of speech, and a partnership in everything we have. 9. To 
our relations, and members of the same tribe, and fellow-citizens, 
and every one else, we should always endeavor to give what be- 
longs to them. 1 1 

* [I omit part of section 7 at this point.] t[I omit sections 1-6.] j [I omit 
■ the remainder of section 7.] || [I omit the remainder of section 9.] 



496 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 ; 

IX., iii., 1. There is a difficult}' in the question, whether or no 
we should dissolve friendship with those who do not continue the 
same as they originally were.* 3. But if he admits him to his 
friendship, as being a good man, and then he become wicked, or is 
thought to be so, must he still love him ? or is this impossible, since 
not everything is an object of love, but only the good? We are 
not obliged, then, to love a wicked man, nor ought we; for we 
must not be lovers of wickedness [§ 611], nor assimilate ourselves 
to the bad: and it has been stated that like is friendly to like.f 

IX., iv., 8 X The vicious, also, seek for persons with whom they 
may pass their time, and fly from themselves; for they call to mind 
many unpleasant subjects, and expect others of the same kind 
when they are by themselves ; but when they are with others, they 
forget them; and since they possess no amiable qualities, they 
have no friendly feeling toward themselves. 9. Therefore, such 
men do not sympathize with themselves in joy or sorrow ; for their 
soul is divided, as it were, by .faction, and one part from depravity 
feels pain, because it abstains from something, while the other part 
feels pleasure ; and one draws him this way. another that, just as 
if they were dragging him asunder. But though it is impossible 
to feel pain and pleasure at the same time, yet after a little time 
he feels pain at having been pleased, and wishes that these things 
had not been pleasant to him ; for bad men are full of repentance.. 
It is plain, then, that the bad man has no friendly disposition even 
to himself, because he has in him nothing amiable. If, then, such 
a condition as this is excessively wretched, he should anxiously 
flee from wickedness, and strive to be good ; for by this means a 
man may have friendly feelings toward himself, and become a 
friend of another. || 

IX., viii., 1.** The bad man also seems to do everything 
for his own sake, and the more so the more wicked he is. They 
therefore complain of him, as doing nothing without reference to 
himself: but the good man acts from honorable motives, and the 
better he is, the more he acts from honorable motives, and for his 
friend's sake; and he passes over his own interest. ff 5. Those,. 
therefore, who use it as a reproach, call those men self-lovers, who 
give to themselves the greater share of money, or honor, or bodily 
pleasures; for the generality of men are grasping after these, and 
extremely anxious about them, as if they were the best things; 
whence, also, they are objects of contention. Those, therefore, 

* [I omit the remainder of section 1, and the whole of section 2.] t [I omit, 
sections 4-6.] j, [I omit sections 1-7, and the first part of section 8.] || [I omit 
chapters v., vi., vii.] **[! omit the first part of section ].] tt[I omit sections 2-4.]j 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 497 

who are covetous of these things, gratify their desires, and, in 
short, their passions, and the irrational part of the soul. 6. But 
the generality are of this kind : whence, also, the appellation has 
arisen, from the generality, which are bad. Consequently reproach 
is justly cast upon those who are selfish in this sense. But that the 
generality are accustomed to call those self-lovers, who give such 
things as these to themselves, is quite plain. For if any one is 
constantly anxious that he himself more than any other person 
should do what is just, or temperate, or anything else in accord 
ance with virtue, and in short is always for gaining something 
honorable for himself, no one would call such a man a self-lover, 
nor blame him. 

7. And yet such a character as this would seem to be more than 
any other a self-lover ; for he gives to himself what is most honor- 
able, and the greatest goods, and gratifies the authoritative part 
of himself, and obeys it in everything. And as that part which 
has most authority seems especially to constitute the state, and 
every other system, so it constitutes a man ; and therefore he who 
loves this part and gratifies it, is especially a self-lover. 8. So also a 
man is called continent or incontinent, according as the intellect has 
authority or not, as if this constituted each individual. And men 
think that what they do with reason, they do themselves, and 
voluntarily, more than any other things. That this, therefore, 
especially constitutes the individual, is quite plain, and that the 
good man especially loves this. Therefore he must be especially a 
self-lover, after a different manner from the person who is re- 
proached for it. and differing in as great a degree, as living in 
obedience to reason differs from living in obedience to passion, 
and as desiring the honorable [righteousness] differs from desiring 
what seems to be advantageous. 

9. Now, all approve of and praise those who are particularly 
earnest* about performing honorable [right] actions: and if all 
contended for what is honorable, and strove to perform the most 
honorable acts, there would be to every one generally what is right 
and proper, and to each individually the greatest goods; at least 
if virtue is such as we have descTibed it. 10. So that the good 
man must necessarily be a self-lover ; for he will be delighted in 
performing honorable acts himself, and will benefit others. But 
the wicked man ought to be so : for he injures both himself and 
his neighbors, by following evil passions. To the wicked man, 
therefore, what he ought to do, and what he does, are at variance; 
but the good man does what he ought to do ; for all intellect chooses 

*[Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 30 (page 271 above).] 



'498 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

what is best for itself ; and the good man obeys his intellect. 11. 
It is true also of the good man, that he performs many acts for his 
friends and his country, nay, even if it is his duty to die for them: 
for he will give up money and honors, and, in short, all the good 
things which others contend for, if he can secure to himself that 
which is honorable.* 12.* With reason, then, he is thought to be a 
good man, for choosing what is honorable in preference to every- 
thing else. Lt is possible, also, that he may give up the perform- 
ance of these actions to his friend, and that it maybe more honor- 
able for him to be the cause of a friend's doing a thing, than to do 
it himself. 13. In all praiseworthy things, therefore, the good man 
seems to give himself the greater share of what is honorable. In 
this sense, therefore, one ought to love one's self, as has been 
stated ; but in the way that the generality do, one ought not. 

IX , ix., 1. But a question also arises about the happy man, 
whether he will need friends or no : for it is commonly said that 
those who are prosperous and independent, do not need friends, 
since they have all goods already, and therefore that, being inde- 
pendent, they require nothing more ; but that a friend, being 
another self, provides what a man is unable to provide of himself. 
Hence comes the saying, — 

Whew fortune gives'us good, what need of friends ? 

2. And yet it seems an absurdity to attribute all goods to the 
happy man, and yet not to give him friends, which are thought to 
be the greatest of all external goods. And if it is more the part 
of a friend to confer than to receive favors, and to do good is 
characteristic of a good man and of virtue, and it is more honor- 
able to benefit friends than strangers, the good man will want 
some persons to be benefited. 3. Hence it has also been asked, 
whether there is a greater need of friends in adversity, or pros- 
perity : as in adversity we want persons to benefit us, so in pros- 
perity we want persons Whom we may benefit. 4. And it is per- 
haps absurd to make the happy man a solitary being ; for no one 
would choose to possess all goods by himself; since man is a social 
being, and formed by nature to associate : this, therefore, is the 
case with the happy man ; for he possesses whatever is by nature 
a good. But it is evident that it is better to pass our time with 
friends and good men, than With strangers and anybody indiscrim- 
inately. The happy man, therefore, wants friends. 

5. What, then, do the first-mentioned people say, and how far 
do they speak truth? is it not that the generality consider those 
only to be friends Who are useful? The happy man will have no 

*£•! omit the remainder of section 11,- .and the first part of section 12.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 499 

need of such friends as these, since he is in possession of all goods; 
nor, consequently, of those who are friends for the sake of the 
pleasant, or only in a small degree ; for his life being pleasant, 

► does not require any adventitious pleasure. But since he does not 
require such friends as these, he has been thought not to require 
friends at all. 6. This perhaps is not true ; for it was stated at 

•the beginning [I., vii., 8-12 (page 416 above)] that happiness is a 
kind of energy : and an energy is evidently produced, not merely 
possessed, like property. And if happiness consists in living and 

■ energizing, and the energy of the good man is good and pleasant 
in itself, as was stated at the beginning; and if that which pecu- 
liarly belongs to us is of the number of pleasant things, and we 

•can contemplate others better than we can ourselves, and their 
actions better than our own, then the actions of good men, when 
they are their friends, are pleasant to the good; for both possess 
what is naturally pleasant; and consequently the happy man will 
want such friends as these, if he deliberately prefers to contem- 
plate virtuous actions, and those which are [of a kind] peculiarly 
his own. 7. And the actions of the good man are such, when he 
is his [the happy man's] friend But it is thought that tie happy 
man ought to live pleasantly. Now, to a solitary person life is 
burdensome : for it is not easy to energize constantly by one's self, 
but with and in relation to others it is easy. The energy, there- 
fore, will be more continuous when it is pleasant in itself, which 
ought to be the case with the happy man ; for the good man, so 
far forth as he is good, takes delight in actions according to virtue, 
and feels pain at those which are according to vice : just as the 
musician is pleased with beautiful melodies, but feels pain at bad 
ones. And there may be a kind of practice of virtue from living 
with good men, as Theognis says.* 

8. If we examine .the question more physiologically, it appears 
probable that the good friend is by nature an object of choice to 
the good man ; for it has been stated, that w T hat is good by nature, 
is in itself good and pleasant to the good man. But life is defined 
to consist, in animals, in the faculty of sensation, and in men, of sen- 
sation and intelligence ; and the faculty is referred to the energy, 
and properly consists in the energy. 9. Life, then, seems to be 
properly the exercise of sensation or intellect ; and life is one of 

"*The verses of Theognis are as follows: — 

" With these eat and drink, with these 
Sit, and please those whose power is great. 

For from the good thou shalt learn good ; but if with the wicked 
Thou minglest, thou wilt lose the intellect thou hast." 



500 Kant's Ethics. % 1040 

the things which are good and pleasant absolutely.* 10.* But if 
life itself is a good, it is also pleasant; and this seems likely to be 
the case from all desiring it, and particularly the good and happy : 
for to them life is most eligible, and their life is most happy. 11. 
Now, he that sees, perceives that he sees; and he that hears, that 
he hears ; and he that walks, that he walks ; and in every other 
case, in the same manner, there is some faculty which perceives 
that we are energizing; so that we perceive that we are perceiv- 
ing, and understand that we are understanding. But this is the 
same as saying that we perceive or understand that we exist; for 
existence was defined [§ 8] to be perceiving, or understanding. 12. 
Now, to perceive that one is alive, is of the number of those things 
which are pleasant in themselves : for life is a good by nature : and 
to perceive the good which is inherent in one's self is pleasant. 
But life is eligible, and particularly to the good, because existence 
is to them good and pleasant ; for by the consciousness of that 
which is absolutely a good, they are pleased. 

13. Now, the good man has the same relation to his friend as he 
has to himself; for a friend is another self; in the same manner, 
therefore, as to exist one's self is eligible to every one, so also is it 
for one's friend to exist, or nearly so. But existence was said to 
be eligible on account of the perception of that which is a good : and 
such a perception is pleasant in itself. 14. We ought, therefore, to 
be conscious of the existence of our friend ; and this would result 
from associating with him, and sharing his words and thoughts ; 
for this would seem to be the meaning of the word society, when 
applied to men, and not, as in the case of cattle, the merely feeding 
in the same place. f If, then, existence is in itself eligible to the 
happy man, being by nature something good and pleasant, and if 
the existence of a friend is nearly the same, then a friend must also 
be of the number of eligible things. But that which is eligible to 
a man, he ought to possess ; or else he is deficient in that respect ; 
he, therefore, that is to be happy, will need good friends. 

IX., X„ 1. Must we then make as many persons our friends as 
possible ? or, as it seems to have been appropriately said in the case 
of hospitality, — " Have neither many guests nOr none." — (Hesiod, 
Works and Days, 713 ) So will the rule also apply in the case of 

* [I omit the remainder of section 9 and the. first part of section 10.] f The 
philosophy of Aristotle is the exact opposite of anything approaching to ascet- 
icism. The relation subsisting between a man and his friend is the same as that 
between him and another self. He is to love his friend as himself. The en- 
joyments of friendship are derived from as clear a consciousness of our friend's 
existence as we have of our own. The nourishment and support of friendship 
are intercourse, association, communion. [I omit the remainder of the note.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 501 

friendship, that we should neither be without friends, nor yet have 
too many.* 5. Perhaps, then, it is as well not to seek to have as 
many friends as possible, but only as many as are sufficient for 
society ; for it would seetn impossible to be a very strong friend 
to many.f 6. So it seems to be in real fact: for in friendship 
between companions, many do not become friends ; and those 
friendships which are most celebrated, are between two only X [see 
§ 605]. Those who have many friends, and are familiar with 
everybody, are by no one thought to be friends, except in a politi- 
cal sense; || and these are called men-pleasers. In the above 
sense, then, a man may be a friend to many, even without being a 
man-pleaser, but really as a good man : but for the sake of virtue 
and the persons themselves, it is impossible to be a friend to many; 
one must be content indeed to find a few such. 

IX., XL, 3.** The presence of friends seems in a manner to 
cause a mixed feeling ; for the fact of seeing friends is pleasant, 
and particularly to one in misfortune, and it becomes a kind of as- 
sistance, so as to prevent pain : since the sig*ht and conversation 
of a friend is able to comfort us, if he has tact; for he knows the 
character of his friend, and what things give him pleasure and 
pain. But to perceive one's friend feeling pain at one's own mis- 
fortunes, is painful ; for every one avoids being the cause of pain 
to his friends. 4. Therefore, those who are of a manly disposition 
are cautious how they let their friends share their pain ; and unless 
a person is himself without sensibility, he can not endure that his 
friends should feel pain on his account : nor does he at all call in 
fellow-mourners, because he is not given to mourning himself. 
But women and effeminate men delight in having people to mourn 
with them, and love them as friends and partners in affliction. 
But in every case we ought of course to imitate the best. 

5. The presence of friends in prosperity makes us pass our time 
pleasantly, and makes us conscious that our friends are feeling 
pleasure at our good. Therefore, it would seem that we ought to 
invite friends to share our prosperity with alacrity ; for it is an 
honorable thing to be ready to do good to others : but to share our 
adversity, we should invite them with reluctance, for we ought to 
share our misfortunes as little as possible : whence the saying, ; ' It 
is enough that I myself am unfortunate " 6. We should call them 

*[I omit sections 2-4.] t[I omit the remainder of section 5.] j The friend- 
ships of Saul and Jonathan, Damon and Pythias, Pylades and Orestes, and so 
forth. || In a political sense, i. e. in the same sense in which a man may be said 
to have a love for his country. The feeling of patriotism is of a wider and 
more extensive kind, not so much a matter of personal attachment ; or based, 
as friendship is, in personal qualities. ** [I omit sections 1 and 2.] 



502 Kant's Ethics. § 1040* 

in especially, when they may render us great assistance, with a 
little trouble. We should perhaps, on the contrary, go to those 
who are in misfortune, without being called in, and with alacrity. 
For it becomes a friend to confer benefits, and particularly upon 
those who are in need, and did not ask it as a right : for in both 
cases it is more honorable and pleasant: but to those who are in 
prosperity, if it is to co-operate with them, we should go willingly; 
for this is the use of a friend : but if it is to enjoy their good 
fortune, we should go reluctantly ; for it is not honorable to be 
anxious to receive assistance [§ 603]. But perhaps we must guard 
against appearing ungracious in our refusal; for this sometimes 
takes place. The presence of friends, then, is necessary under all 
circumstances. 

IX., xii., 2.* But the energy of friendship consists in society; 
so that it is with reason that friends are desirous of it. And in what- 
ever each thinks that existence consists, or on whatever account 
they choose life, in this they wish to pass their time with their 
friends. f 4, Therefore, the friendship of bad men becomes de- 
praved: for they partake of what is bad, being unstable : and they 
become depraved, by growing like each other; but the friendship 
of good men is good, being mutually increased by intercourse. 5. 
Besides, men are thought to become better by energizing, and by 
correcting one another : for they receive an impress from each 
other in whatever they are pleased with: whence it is said, — 

You will learn what is good from the good. 

Of friendship, therefore, let so much be said. The next thing is to 
treat of the subject of pleasure. 

BOOK X.-OF HAPPINESS. 

X., i., 1. After this, perhaps the next subject for discussion is 
pleasure ; for it seems above everything else to be intimately con- 
nected with our nature. Hence, we educate the young, steering 
them, as it were, by pleasure and pain. 2. It seems also to be of the 
greatest consequence toward laying the foundation of the moral 
character, that men should take delight in what they ought, and 
hate what they ought ; for these feelings continue throughout life, 
carrying with them great weight and influence on the side of 
virtue and a happy life ; for men deliberately choose what is pleas- 
ant, and avoid what is painful. 

3. It would seem, then, that we ought by no means to pass over 
such subjects as these ; especially as they involve much difference 

* [I omit section 1.] f [I emit section 3.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 503 

of opinion. For some" say that pleasure* is the chief good ; others, 
on the contrary, that it is altogether bad ; some of these las4^ per- 
haps, from a persuasion that it really is so ; others, thinking that 
it is better in reference to human life, to declare pleasure to be, 
among bad things, even if it be not so ; because the mass of man- 
kind have a propensity to it, and are slaves to their pleasures ; and: 
therefore that it is right to draw them away to the opposite ; by 
which means they would arrive at the mean. But perhaps this is 
not well said ; for arguments about matters of feeling and action 
are less convincing than facts. 

4. When, therefore, arguments are at variance with what is 
evident to the senses, they are despised, and are the destruction of 
the truth also ; for if he who [in moral teaching] censures pleasure 
is ever seen to be desiring it [any particular pleasure], he appears, 
to have a leaning toward it [pleasure in general], as if all pleasure 
were of the same nature; for to draw nice distinctions [between 
lawful and unlawful pleasures] is not the character of the multi- 
tude, f True statements, therefore, seem not only to be the most 
useful for obtaining knowledge, but also for the regulation of life; 
for when they agree with facts, they are believed. Hence, men 
exhort those who understand them to live according to them. 
Enough, then, of such matters: let us now enumerate the doctrines, 
which have been held on the subject of pleasure. 

X., ii., 1. EudoxusJ thought that pleasure was the chief good, 
because he saw all, both rational and irrational, seeking it ; and in 
every case that which is an object of choice is good, and that which 
is most so is the greatest good; consequently, he considered that ; 
the fact of all having a bias toward the same object proved that 
object to be the best for all; because each finds what is good for 

:i -"The opinion that pleasure is the chief good had heen much advanced by- 
the efforts of Democritus, the Sophists, Aristippus, and others, and was enter- 
tained by many of the contemporaries of Aristotle and Plato. The dialogues, 
of the latter are full of objections to this popular theory: but in none are they 
refuted with more care and labor than in the Philebus." — Brewer. To this 
dialogue the ethical student is referred, f The slightest inconsistency of con- 
duct is fatal to the authority and influence of a moral teacher. If he warns his 
hearers against pleasure, and is then seen to devote himself to the pursuit of 
pleasure, even of an innocent kind, his arguments are ineffectual, and his warn- 
ings are unheeded, because the mass of mankind are unable to draw nice dis- 
tinctions, and to distinguish between lawful and unlawful pleasures. j Eudoxus 
was a native of Cnidus, who flourished about 01. c. iii. (B. C. 366). He was a. ■ 
disciple of the geometrician Archytas, and subseqnently of Plato, by whom he. 
was accompanied in his travels to Egypt. He was the author of a work on... 
astronomy, which was translated into verse by Aratus. See Matthias's History, 
of Greek and Roman Lit, and Clinton's Easti, p. 366, note (e).. 



-504 Kant's Ethics. § 1040 

"himself, as he does food ; he argued, therefore, that what is good to 
all, aijj# what all aim at, was the chief good. 

2. And his words were believed, more from the excellence of his 
moral character than for their own sake ; for he had the reputa- 
tion of being eminently temperate : it was therefore thought that 
he did not use this language as being a friend to pleasure, but that 
the case really was so. 3. But he considered this doctrine to be 
no less evident from considering the contrary of pleasure ; for pain 
is in itself an object shunned by all, and its contrary is, in the 
same manner, an object chosen by all; and that is especially an 
object of choice, which we choose, not on account of anything else ; 
but pleasure is confessedly of this nature ; for no one asks for the 
sake of what he is pleased, as though he knew that pleasure was 
eligible on its own account; and pleasure, if added to any good 
whatsoever, makes it more eligible ; for instance, if added to the 
act of justice or temperance ; and good can only be increased by 
the addition of itself. 

4. This argument certainly seems to prove it to be amongst 
goods, but not more so than anything else ; for everything is more 
eligible when in conjunction with another good, than when left 
alone. 5. By a similar argument, indeed, Plato overthrows the 
idea of pleasure being the chief good ; because a pleasant life is 
more eligible when joined with prudence than without; but if the 
union of the two is better, pleasure simply can not be the chief 
good ; for you can add nothing to the chief good which will make 
it more eligible : and it is plain that nothing else can be the chief 
good, which becomes more eligible when joined to any of those 
things which are eligible on their own account. 

What is there, then, of this nature in which we can participate ? 
for such is the object of our inquiry.* 

X. , iii., ll.f In answer to those who bring forward reprehensible 
pleasures, one might say, that these are not pleasant ; for we must 
not think that because they are pleasant to ill-disposed persons, they 
are also pleasant in themselves, except to these particular persons ; 
in the same way as we must not think those things wholesome, or 
sweet, or bitter, which are so to the sick : nor those white, which 
appear so to those who suffer from ophthalmia. 12. Or should 
this be said, that pleasures are eligible, but not from these sources ; 
just as wealth is eligible, but not to one who gets it by treason ; 
or health, but not to one who gets it by eating all kinds of things? 
13. Or may it be said that pleasures differ in kind ? for those which 
proceed from honorable sources differ from those which proceed 

*[I omit sections 6 and 7.] t[I omit sections 1-10.] 



§ 1040 The Olavis to an Index. 505 

from disgraceful ones ; and it is impossible to feel the pleasure of 
the just man without being just, or that of the musician, Without 
being musical : and so on in other cases. 14. But the difference 
which exists between a friend and a flatterer seems to prove either 
that pleasure is not a good, or that pleasures are different in kind ; 
for the former seems to associate with a view to the good, the latter 
with a view to pleasure ; and the latter is reproached, but the for- 
mer is praised ; as associating with a different motive. 

15. Again, no one would choose to live, having the intellect of a 
child all his life long, taking pleasure in those things which please 
children, even if that pleasure were the highest possible ; nor to 
take delight in doing anything disgraceful, even if he was never 
to feel pain for so doing. Besides, we should be diligent about 
many things, even if they brought no pleasure ; as about seeing 
remembering, knowing, possessing virtue. 16. But whether 
pleasures are consequent upon these things of necessity or no, 
makes no difference ; for we should choose them, even if pleasure 
did not result from them. 17. Consequently, that pleasure is not 
the chief good, nor every pleasure 'eligible, seems to be evident : 
and that some are eligible for their own sakes, differing either in 
kind, or in the source from whence they are derived. Let this, 
then, be sufficient as to the opinions which have been entertained 
upon the subject of pleasure and pain. 

X., iv"., 10.* But since every perception energizes with refer- 
ence to its object, and that energizes perfectly which is well-dis- 
posed with reference to the best of all the objects which fall under 
it (for this more than anything else appears to be the nature of a 
perfect energy ; and whether we say that the perception energizes, 
or that in which the perception resides, makes no difference : but 
in everything the energy is best of that which is well-disposed 
with reference to the best of all the objects which fall under it): 
this must be the most perfect and the most pleasant : for pleasure 
is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of intellect 
and contemplation ; but the most perfect is the most pleasant, and 
the most perfect is the energy of that which is well-disposed with 
reference to the best of all the objects which fall under it. Pleasure, 
therefore, perfects the energy : but pleasure does not perfect it in the 
same manner that the object and the perceptive faculty do if they 
are good ; just as health and the physician are not in the same 
manner causes of a person being healthy.f 12. But that there is 

* [I omit sections 1-9.] t The physician is what the logicians call the efficient 
cause, whilst health is the formal cause, of our being healthy. In like manner, 
the object is the efficient cause, pleasure the formal cause. 

33 



506 Kant's Ethics. §1040 

a pleasure in every act of the perceptive faculty is evident : for we 
say that sights and sounds are pleasant: and it is also evident that 
this is most so, when the perceptive faculty is the best, and ener- 
gizes upon the best object. When the object perceived, and the 
faculty which perceives it, are of this [best] nature, there will 
always be pleasure as long as there are an agent and a patient. 
13. Again, pleasure makes the energy complete, not as the inher- 
ent habit would, but as some end added to it ; it is just what the 
freshness of youth is to those in the prime of life. 

As long, therefore, as the object of perception or intellect be 
such as it ought to be, as also the faculty which judges or con- 
templates, there will be pleasure in the energy: for when the 
patient and the agent are similar, and correspond to one another, 
the same effect is naturally produced. Why, then, is no one con- 
tinually pleased? is it that he becomes fatigued? for no human 
faculties have the power of energizing continually. Pleasure, there- 
fore, can not result, for it follows the energy.* 

BOOK X., Chapter V., §9.f But since energies differ in 
goodness or badness, and some are to be chosen, some to be avoided, 
and others neither, the pleasures also are related in the same way ; 
for there is a pleasure properly belonging to every energy. That, 
therefore, which is proper to the good energy is good, and that 
which is proper to the bad energy is bad; for the desires of hon- 
orable things are praiseworthy, the desires of disgraceful ones to be 
blamed. 10. But the pleasures, which are contained in the ener- 
gies, more properly belong to them than the desires ; for the latter 
are distinct [from the energies] both as to time and nature ; but 
the former follow closely upon the energies, and are so inseparable 
from them, that it is questionable whether the energy is not the 
same as the pleasure. It appears, however, that pleasure is not an 
operation of intellect or of the senses ; for that would be absurd ; 
but because they are not separated, they appear to some to be 
identical. 

11. As, therefore, the energies are different, so are the pleasures. 
Now sight differs from touch in purity, and hearing and smelling 
differ from taste; their pleasures, therefore, differ in the same way ; 
and the pleasures of the intellect differ from these, and each 
differs from the other. 12. There seems to be a pleasure properly 
belonging to every animal, as there is to each its proper work ; 
for it is that which is according to its energy. And if we examine 
each case separately by itself, this would seem to be the case ; for 
the pleasures of a horse, of a dog, and of a man differ : as Hera- 

* [I omit sections 14-16.] t [I omit sections 1-8.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 507 

clitus says, that an ass would prefer litter to gold ; for food is 
pleasanter than gold to asses. 13. The pleasures, therefore, of 
things which differ in kind are different also ; but it is reasonable 
to expect that the pleasures of the same things should not differ. 
But they differ in no slight degree, at least in the case of men ; 
for the same things give pain to some, and pleasure to others ; and 
to some they are painful and objects of hate, to others pleasant and 
objects of love. The case is also the same in sweet things ; for the 
same things are not thought sweet by a man in a fever, and a 
man in health ; nor is the same thing thought warm by an in- 
valid and by a man in a good state of body : the same also is the 
case with everything else. But in all such instances, that is thought 
to be the truth which appears so to the good man. 

14. If this is well said, as it appears to be, and if excellence 
and the good man. so far forth as he is good, are the measure of 
everything: those must be pleasures which appear so to him, and 
those things pleasant in which he delights. But if what is dis- 
agreeable to him seems pleasant to any one, it is no wonder; for 
there are many things whicb deprave and injure men ; but such 
things are not pleasant, except to those men [who do them], and 
to others who are so disposed. 15. With respect to those pleasures 
which are confessedly disgraceful, it is evident that we must not 
call them pleasures except to the depraved.* 

X., vi., 1. Since we have spoken of the virtues, of the different 
kinds of friendships, and of pleasures, it remains that we should 
discuss the subject of happiness in outline, since we assumed this to 
be the end of human actions. Therefore, if we recapitulate what 
has been said before, the argument will be more concise. 

2. We have said that it is not a habit ; for if it were, it might 
exist in a man who slept throughout his life, living the life of a 
plant, and suffering the greatest misfortunes. 3. If, then, this does 
not please us, but if we must rather bring it under a kind of en- 
ergy, as was said before ; and if, of energies, some are necessaryf 
and eligible for the sake of something else, others are eligible for 
their own sakes ; it is plain that we must consider happiness as 
one of those which are eligible for their own sakes, and not one of 
those which are eligible for the sake of something else ; for hap- 
piness is in want of nothing, but is self-sufficient. 4. Now those 
energies are eligible for their own sakes, from which nothing 
more is sought for beyond the energy. But of this kind, 
actions done according to virtue seem to be : for the perform- 

* [I omit the remainder of section 15 and the whole of section 16.] t Neces- 
sary does not here imply necessary per se (innere Nothwendigkeit), but means 
and instruments necessary to the accomplishment of some end. — Michelet. 



508 Kant's Ethics. §1040 

ance of honorable and good acts is amongst things eligible for 
their own sakes.* 

7. It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose, that as the things 
which appear honorable to children and men differ, so also those 
which appear so to the bad and the good will differ likewise, and 
therefore, as we have very often said, those things are honorable 
and pleasant which are so to the good man. But to every man 
that energy is most eligible which is according to his proper habit ; 
and, therefore, to the good man, that is most eligible which is ac- 
cording to virtue. 

8. Consequently happiness does not consist in amusement; for 
it is absurd that the end should be amusement ; and that men 
should toil and suffer inconvenience all their life long for the sake 
of amusement ; for we choose everything, as we might say, for the 
sake of something else, except happiness ; for that is an end. 9. 
But to be serious and to labor for the sake of amusement appears 
foolish and very childish. But to amuse ourselves in order that 
we may be serious, as Anacharsis said, seems to be right : for 
amusement resembles relaxation. Relaxation, therefore, is not the 
end, for we have recourse to it for the sake of [renewing] the en- 
ergy. But the happy life seems to be according to virtue ; and 
this is serious, and does not consist in amusement.f 

X., vii., 11. 1 If, then, the intellect be divine when compared 
with man, the life also, which is in obedience to that, will be divine 
when compared with human life. 12. But a man ought not to en- 
tertain human thoughts, as some would advise, because he is human, 
nor mortal thoughts, because he is mortal : but as far as it is pos- 
sible he should make himself immortal, and do everything with a 
view to living in accordance with the best principle in him; 
although it be small in size, yet in power and value it is far more 
excellent than all.|| 

X., viii., 14.** We must not, however, imagine that the person 
who is to be happy will want many and great goods, because we 
say that without external good he can be blessed; for self-suffici- 
ency does not consist in excess, nor does action. 15. But it is 
possible to perform honorable things without being lord of earth 
and sea ; for a man may be able to act according to virtue with 
moderate means. We may see this plainly : for private individuals 
are thought to perform good acts no less than men in power, but 

* [I omit the remainder of section 4 and the whole of sections 5 and 6.] 
t[I omit sections 10 and 11.] % [I omit sections 1-10.] |[ [I omit sections 13 and 
14.] *! [I omit sections 1-13, and the first part of section 14.] 



§ 1040 The Clavis to an Index. 509 

even more so. And it is sufficient to have a competence, for the 
life of that man will be happy, who energizes according to virtue.* 

18. The opinions of wise men, therefore, seem to agree with 
what has been said ; such statements, therefore, carry with them 
some weight. But we judge of truth, in practical matters, from 
facts and from life, for on them the decisive point turns ; and we 
ought to try all that has been said by applying it to facts and to 
life; and if our arguments agree with facts, we may receive them ; 
but if they are at variance, we must consider them as mere words. f 

X., ix , 1. If, then, we have spoken at sufficient length of these 
matters, and of the virtues, and also of friendship and pleasure, 
must we think that our original plan is completed? or is the end 
in practical matters, accordiug to the common saying, not the 

CONTEMPLATING AND KNOWING ALL THINGS, BUT RATHER THE 

PRACTICING them ? If so, it is not sufficient to K^O Wthe theory 
of virtue, but we must endeavor to possess and employ it ; or pur- 
sue whatever other means there may be of becoming good. 2. 
Now, if mere treatises were sufficient of themselves, to make men 
good, justly " would they have received many and great rewards," 
as Theognis says, and it would be our duty to provide ourselves 
with them. 3. But the truth is, that they seem to have power to 
urge on and to excite young men of liberal minds, and to make a 
character that is generous and truly fond of the honorable [right- 
eousness], easily influenced by virtue ; but that they have no power 
to persuade the multitude to what is virtuous and honorable. 4. 
For it is not the nature of the masses to obey a sense of shame, 
but fear : nor to abstain from vicious things because it is disgrace- 
ful, but for fear of punishments ; for they live according to the 
dictates of passion, and pursue their own peculiar pleasures, and 
the means of gratifying them; they fly also from the contrary 
pains; but of what is honorable and truly pleasant, they have no 
idea, inasmuch as they never had a taste for them. 5. What rea- 
soning, then, can effect a change in such men as these? for it is not 
possible, or at least not easy, to alter what has been for a long 
time impressed upon the moral character ; but it is perhaps a great 
thing, if, when everything is present by which we are thought to 
become good, we can partake of virtue. 

6. But it is thought that men become good, some by nature,! 
others by practice, others by teaching. Now it is plain that what- 
ever belongs to nature is not in our own j>ower, but exists by some 

*[I omit sections 16 and 17.] | [I omit section 19.] {. [Cf. Confucian Doc- 
trine of the Mean, ch. xxi. (§871, page 116 above); and Zoroaster, Khordah- 
Avesta, xiii. (§881, page 183 above).] 



510 Kant's Ethics. 

divine causes in those who are truly fortunate. But reasoning and 
teaching, it is to be feared, will not avail in every case, but the 
mind of the hearer must be previously cultivated by habits to feel 
pleasure and aversion properly, just as the soil must, which nour- 
ishes the seed. For he who lives in obedience to passion, would 
not listen to reasoning which turns him from it ; nay, more, he 
would not understand it. And how is it possible to change the 
convictions of such a man as this ? 7. On the whole, it appears 
that passion does not submit to reasoning, but to force. There 
must, therefore, previously exist a character in some way con- 
nected with virtue, loving what is honorable, and hating what is 
disgraceful. 8. But to meet with right education in the path of 
virtue from childhood is difficult, unless one is brought up under 
such laws : for to live temperately and patiently is not pleasant 
to the majority, and especially to the young. Therefore, educa- 
tion and institutions ought to be regulated by law ; for they will 
not be painful when they have become familiar. 

9. Perhaps it is not sufficient that we should meet with good 
education and attention when young; but since when we arrive at 
manhood we ought also to study and practice what we have 
learnt, we should require laws also for this purpose : in short, we 
should want laws relating- to the whole of life ; for the masses are 
obedient to compulsion rather than to reason, and to punishments 
rather than to the principle of honor [of righteousness]. 10. 
Therefore, some think that legislators ought to exhort to virtue, 
and to urge men on by appealing to the principle of honor [the 
moral Law], since those who are good in their practice will obey 
when they are led ; but to impose chastisements and punishments 
on those who are disobedient and naturally indisposed to virtue, 
and to banish altogether the incurable; because he who is good, 
and lives with regard to the principle of honor, will obey reason ; 
but the bad man desires pleasure, and is corrected by pain, like a N 
beast of burden.* 

12. Now, then, as has been said, he that is to be a good man 
must have been educated well, and have been made to form good 
habits, and thus continue to live under good institutions, and never 
practice what is bad, either involuntarily or voluntarily ; and this 
is to be done by living in obedience to some intelligent principle, 
and some right regulation, which has the power of enforcing its 
decrees. But the paternal authority has no strength, nor compul- 
sory force ; nor, in short, the authority of any one man, unless he 
is a king, or some one of that sort ; but the law does possess a 

* [I omit section 11.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 511 

compulsory power, since it is reason proceeding from a certain 
prudence and intelligence ; and besides, men hate those individ- 
uals who oppose their appetites, even if they do it rightly; but the 
law is not odious when it prescribes what is good.* 14. It would 
therefore be best that the state should pay attention to education, 
and on right principles, and that it should have power to enforce 
it : but if neglected as a public measure, it would seem to be the 
duty of every individual to contribute to the virtue of his children 
and friends, or at least to make this his deliberate purpose. f 16. 
For in the same way that legal enactments and customs have 
authority in states, so also the words of a father, and customs, have 
authority in private families ; and still greater authority on account 
of the relationship, and the benefits conferred : for children have 
a natural affection for their parents, and are naturally disposed 
to obey.J 

§ 1041.— Epicureans and Stoics, (page 37, line 12.) Cf. §§ 2132, 
730, 623, 624, 729, 734, 3054, 3052, 3012-3014. 

§ 1042. — Academics and Skeptics, (page 38, line 3.) 

§ 1043.— Cicero and the Eoman Stoics, (p. 39, 1. 10.) Cf. § 1074, 
and the following extracts from Cicero de Offictis:|| 

BOOK I., chapter i., §1. My Son Marcus, although, as you 
have for a year been studying under Cratippus, and that, too, at 
Athens, you ought to be well furnished with the rules and prin- 
ciples of philosophy, on account of the pre-eminent reputation 
both of the master and the city, the one of which can improve you 
by his learning, the other by its examples ; yet as I, for my own 
advantage, have always combined the Latin with the Creek, not 
only in philosophy but even in the practice of speaking, I recom- 
mend to you the same method, that you may excel equally in both 
kinds of composition. 2. In this respect, indeed, if I mistake not, 
I was of great service to our countrymen ; so that not only such of 
them as are ignorant of Greek learning, but even men of letters, 
think they have profited somewhat by me both in speaking and 
reasoning. 

3. Wherefore you shall study, nay, study as long as you desire, 
under the best philosopher of this age- — and you ought to desire it, 

* [I omit section 13.] t[I omit section 15.] j [I omit sections 17-31.] 
|| "Cicero's Three Books of Offices, or Moral Duties; also his Cato Major, an 
essay on Old Age; Ladius, an essay on Friendship ; Paradoxes; Scipio's Dream; 
and Letter to Quintus on the Duties of a'Magistrate. Literally translated, with 
notes, designed to exhibit a comparative view of the opinions of Cicero, and 
those of modern moralists and ethical philosophers. By Cyrus R. Edmonds." 
(Harper & Brothers, 1871.) [I have retained a few of Mr. Edmonds' notes, 
but only two of those which contain ethical opinions of modern writers.] [I 
have inserted in the text the section numbers which I found on the margin of 
Anthon's Cicero de Officiis (Harper, 1872).] 



512 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

as long as you are not dissatisfied with the degree of your improve- 
ment ; but in reading my works, which are not very different from 
the Peripatetic — because we profess in common to be followers both 
of Socrates and Plato — as to the subject-matter itself, use your own 
judgment; but be assured you will, by reading my writings, ren- 
der your Latin style more copious. I would not have it supposed 
that this is said in ostentation ; 4. for, while I yield the superior- 
ity in philosophy to many, if I claim to myself the province 
peculiar to an orator — that of speaking with propriety, perspicuity, 
and elegance — I seem, since I have spent my life in that pursuit, 
to lay claim to it with a certain degree of right. 

5. Wherefore, my dear Cicero, I most earnestly recommend that 
you carefully peruse not only my Orations, but even my philoso- 
phical works, which have now nearly equaled them in extent ; 
for there is in the former the greater force of language, but you 
ought to cultivate, at the same time, the equable and sober style of 
the latter. 6. And, indeed, I find, that it has not happened in the 
case of any of the Greeks, that the same man has labored in both 
departments, and pursued both the former — that of forensic speak- 
ing — and the latter quiet mode of argumentation.; unless, perhaps, 
Demetrius Phalereus may be reckoned in that number — a refined 
reasoner, a not very animated speaker, yet' of so much sweetness, 
that you might recognize the pupil of Theophrastus. 7. How far 
I have succeeded in both, others must determine ; certain it is that 
I have attempted both. 8. Indeed, I am of opinion that Plato, 
had he attempted forensic oratory, would have spoken with 
copiousness and power ; and that had Demosthenes retained and 
repeated the lessons of Plato, he would have delivered them with 
gracefulness and beauty. 1 form the same judgment of Aristotle 
and Isocrates, each of whom was so pleased with his own pursuit 
that he neglected that of the other. 

I., ii., 1. Put having resolved at this time to write to you some- 
what, and a great deal in time to come, I have thought proper to 
set out with that subject which is best adapted to your years and 
to my authority. 2. Por, while many subjects in philosophy, of 
great weight and utility, have been accurately and copiously dis- 
cussed by philosophers, the most extensive seems to be what they 
have delivered and enjoined concerning the duties of mankind ; 
3. for there can be no state of life, amid public or private affairs, 
abroad or at home — whether you transact any thing with your- 
self or contract any thing with another — that is without its obli- 
gations. In the due discharge ©f that consists all the dignity, and 
in its neglect all the disgrace, of life. 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 513 

4. This is an inquiry common to all philosophers ; for where is 
the man who will presume to style himself a philosopher, and lay 
down no rules of duty? 5. But there are certain schools which 
pervert all duty by the ultimate objects of good and evil which 
they propose. 6. For if a man should lay down as the chief good 
that which has no connection with virtue, and measure it by his 
own interests, and not according to its moral merit ; if such a man 
shall act consistently with his own principles, and is not sometimes 
influenced by the goodness of his heart, he can cultivate neither 
friendship, justice, nor generosity. In truth, it is impossible for 
the man to be brave who shall pronounce pain to be the greatest 
evil, or temperate who shall propose pleasure as the highest good. 

7. Though these truths are so self-evident that they require no 
philosophical discussion, yet they have been treated by me else- 
where.* 8. I say, therefore, that if these schools are self-consist- 
ent, they can say nothing of the moral duties. Neither can any 
firm, permanent, or natural rules of duty be laid down, but by 
those who esteem virtue to be solely, or by those who deem it to 
be chiefly, desirable for its own sake. 9. The teaching of duties, 
therefore, is the peculiar study of the Stoics, of the Academics, 
and the Peripatetics ; because the sentiments of Aristo, Pyrrho, 
and Herillus, have been long exploded. Yet even those professors 
would have been entitled to have treated, upon the- duties of men, 
had they left us any distinction of things, so that there might have 
been a path open to the discovery of duty. 10. We shall, there- 
fore, upon this occasion, and in this inquiry, chiefly follow the Stoics, 
not as their expositors, but by drawing, as usual, from their sources, 
at our own option and judgment, so much and in such manner as 
we please. 

11. I therefore think proper, as my entire argument is on moral 
obligation, to define what a duty is, a definition which I am sur- 
prised has been omitted by Pansetius; 12. because every investi- 
gation which is rationally undertaken, concerning any subject, 
ought to set out with a definition, that it may be understood what 
is the subject of discussion. 

I., iii , 1. All questions concerning duty are of two sorts. The 
first [theoretical] relates to the final good; the second [practical] 
consists of those rules which are to regulate the practice of life in 
all its relations. 2. Examples of the former are as follows : — 
Whether all duties are perfect in themselves? Whether one duty 

* [Anthon (Cicero de Officiis, Harper, page 145) refers to "the treatise 
De Finibus (ii., 8, 23) and the fourth and fifth books of the Tusculan Disputa- 
tions."] 



514 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

is of more importance than another? together with other ques- 
tions of the same nature. 3. Now the rules for moral duties relate, 
indeed, to the final good ; but it is not so perceptible that they do, 
because they seem chiefly to refer to the regulation of ordinary 
life, and of them we are to treat in this book.* 

6. In the opinion, therefore, of Pansetius, there is a threefold 
consideration for determining our resolution ; for men doubt 
whether the thing which falls under their consideration be of itself 
virtuous or disgraceful, and in this deliberation minds are often 
distracted into opposite sentiments. 7. They then examine and de- 
liberate whether or not the subject of their consideration conduces 
to the convenience or enjoyment of life, to the improvement of 
their estate and wealth, to their interest and power, by which they 
may profit themselves or their relations ; all which deliberation falls 
under the category of utility. 8. The third kind of doubtful de- 
liberation is, when an apparent utility seems to clash with moral 
rectitude ; for when utility hurries us to itself, and virtue, on the 
other hand, seems to call us back, it happens that the mind is dis- 
tracted in the choice, and these occasion a double anxiety in delib- 
eration. 9. In this division (although an omission is of the worst 
consequence in divisions of this kind), two things are omitted ; 
for we are accustomed to deliberate not only whether a thing be 
virtuous or shameful in itself, but, of two things that are virtuous, 
which is the more excellent? And, in like manner, of two things 
which are profitable, which is the more profitable? 10. Thus, it 
is found that the deliberation, which he considered to be threefold, 
ought to be distributed into five divisions. We must, therefore, 
first treat of what is virtuous in itself, and that under two heads ; 
in like manner, of what is profitable ; and we shall next treat of 
them comparatively. 

I , iv., 1. In the first place, a disposition has been planted by 
nature in every species of living creatures to cherish themselves, 
their life, and body; to avoid those things that appear hurtful to 
them ; and to look out for and procure whatever is necessary for 
their living, such as food, shelter, and the like.f 3. But the great- 
est distinction between a man and a brute lies in this, that the 
latter is impelled only by instinct, and applies itself solely to that 
object which is present and before it, with very little sensibility to 
what is past or to come; but man, because endowed with reason, 
by which he discerns consequences, looks into the causes of things 
and their progress, and being acquainted, as it were, with prece- 
dents, he compares their analogies, and adapts and connects the 

* [I omit sections 4 and 5.] t[I omit section 2.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 515 

present with what is to come. It is easy for him to foresee the 
future direction of all his life, and therefore he prepares what is 
necessary for passing through it. 

4. Nature, likewise, by the same force of reason, conciliates man 
to man, in order to a community both of language and of life: 
above all, it implants in them a strong love for their offspring; it 
impels them to desire that companies and societies should be 
formed, and that they should mingle in them; and that for those 
reasons, man should take care to provide for the supply of cloth- 
ing and of food; and that not only for himself, but for his wife, 
his children, and for all whom he ought to hold dear and to pro- 
tect. This is an affection which arouses the spirit and makes 
it more strenuous for action. 

5. The distinguishing property of man is to search for and to fol- 
low after truth. Therefore, when relaxed from our necessary 
cares and concerns, we then covet to see, to hear, and to learn 
somewhat; and we esteem knowledge of things either obscure or 
wonderful to- be the indispensable means of living happily. From 
this we understand that truth, simplicity, and candor, are most 
agreeable to the nature of mankind. 6. To this passion for dis- 
covering truth, is added a desire to direct ; for a mind, well formed 
by nature, is unwilling to obey any man but him who lays down 
rules and instructions to it, or who, for the general advantage, ex- 
ercises equitable and lawful government. From this proceeds 
loftiness of mind, and contempt for worldly interests. 

7. Neither is it a mean privilege of nature and reason, that 
man is the only animal who is sensible of order, of decency, and 
of propriety, both in acting and speaking. In like manner, no 
other creature perceives the beauty, the gracefulness, and the har- 
mony of parts, in those objects which are discerned by the sight. 
8. An analogous perception to which [harmony] nature and reason 
convey from the sight to the mind; and [nature and reason] con- 
sider that beauty, regularity, and order in counsels and actions 
should be still more preserved. She [nature] is cautious not to do 
aught that is indecent or effeminate, or to act or think wantonly 
in any of our deliberations or deeds. 9. The effect and result of 
all this produces that honestum [righteousness] which we are now 
in search of; that virtue which is honorable even without being 
ennobled ; and of which we may truly say, that even were it 
praised by none it would be commendable in itself. 

BOOK I , chapter V., §1. -My Son Marcus, you here per- 
ceive at least a sketch, and, as it were, the outline of virtue j 
which, could we perceive her with our eyes, would, as Plato says, 



516 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

kindle a wonderful love of wisdom [§ 853 (page 66 above)]. 2. 
Bat whatever is virtuous arises from some one of those four* 
divisions : for it consists either in sagacity and the perception of 
truth ; or in the preservation of human society, by giving to 
every man his due, and by observing the faith of contracts ; or in 
the greatness and firmness of an elevated and unsubdued mind ; 
or in observing order and regularity in all our words and in all 
our actions, in which consists moderation and temperance. 

3. Though these four divisions are connected and interwoven 
with one another, yet certain kinds of duties arise from each of 
them. As, for instance, in that part which I first described, and 
under which I comprehended sagacity or wisdom, consists the 
search after and discovery of truth ; and this is the characteristic 
function of that virtue : 4. for the man who is most sagacious in 
discovering the real truth in any subject, and who can, with the 
greatest perspicacity and quickness, both see and explain the 
grounds of it, is justly esteemed a man of the greatest understand- 
ing and discernment. 5. From hence it follows that truth is, as it 
were, the subject-matter which this faculty handles, and on which 
it employs itself. As to the other three virtues, they necessarily 
consist in acquiring and preserving those things with which the 
conduct of life is connected, in order to preserve the community 
and relations of mankind, and to display that excellence and great- 
ness of soul which exhibits itself as well in acquiring resources 
and advantages both for ourselves and for our friends, as, still more 
conspicuously, in properly disregarding them. 6. As to order, 
resolution, moderation, and the like, they come into that rank of 
virtues which require not only an operation of the mind, but a 
certain degree of personal activity ; for it is in observing order 
and moderation in those things which constitute the objects of 
active life, that we shall preserve virtue and decency. 

I., vi., 1. Now, of the four divisions under which I have ranged 
the nature and essence of virtue, that which consists in the knowl- 
edge of truth principally affects the nature of man. 2. For all of* 
us are impelled and carried along to the love of knowledge and 
learning, in which we account it glorious to excel, but consider 
every slip, mistake, ignorance, and deception in it, to be hurtful 
and shameful. 3. In this pursuit, which is both natural and vir- 
tuous, two faults are to be avoided. The first is, the regarding things 
which we do not know as if they were understood by us, and thence 
rashly giving them our assent. And he that wishes, as every man 
ought to wish, to avoid this error, must devote both his time and 
his industry to the study of things. 

«- [i Wisdom, 2 honesty, 3 magnanimity, 4 temperance. See I., xliii., 3.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 517 

4. The other fault is, that some people bestow too much study and 
pains upon things that are obscure, difficult, and even immaterial 
in themselves. 5. When those faults are avoided, all the pains 
and care a man bestows upon studies that are virtuous in them- 
selves, and worthy of his knowledge, will be deservedly com- 
mended. Thus we have heard how Caius Sulpicius* excelled in 
astronomy, and Sextus Pompeius, to my own knowledge, in math- 
ematics ; many also in logic, and more in the civil law, 6. all 
which are arts that serve to investigate truth, in the pursuit of 
which our duty forbids us to be diverted from transacting our 
business, because the whole glory of virtue consists in activity. Yet 
this is often intermitted, and frequent are our returns to our 
studies. Then there is an incessant working of the mind, which, 
without our taking pains, is sufficient to keep us in the practice of 
thinking. f 7. Now, all our thoughts, and every motion of the mind, 
should be devoted either to the forming of plans for virtuous actions, 
and such as belong to a good and happy life, or else to the pursuits of 
science and, knowledge. I have now treated of at least the first 
source of duty. 

I., vii., 1. Now, as to the other three, the most extensive system 
is that by which the mutual society of mankind, and, as it were, 
the intercourse of life, is preserved. Of this there are two parts : 
justice, in which virtue displays itself with the most distinguished 
luster, and from which men are termed good ; and allied to this, 
beneficence, which may likewise be termed benevolence, or 

liberality.^ 

3. Now, by nature no property is private, but dependent either 
on ancient possession (as when men formerly came into unoccupied 
territories) ; or victory (as when they have taken possession of it 
in war) ; or public constitution, contract, terms, or lot. By those, 
the land of Arpinum is regarded as belonging to the Arpinates • 
the Tusculan, to the Tusculans. The like division holds with re- 
gard to matters of private property. 4. Thus, as every man holds 
his own, each should possess that portion which fell to his share of 
those things that by nature were common ; and it follows, that no 
man can covet another's property without violating the laws of 
human society. 

-:■:- u ~y? e have] in the Roman history, a remarkable story of this nobleman, by 
which we may see the excellent effects of learning in a man of consideration, 
who knows how to time it well. For we are told, that while he served against 
the Macedonians, under Julius ^Emilius, he foretold to the Roman soldiers an 
eclipse, and explained its causes, and thereby prevented the consternation they 
otherwise would have fallen into, and which seizing the enemies, they were 
easily routed by the Romans." — G-uthrie. t[Cf. Confucius, Analects, XV., xxx. 
(page 134 above) and II., xv. (page 122 above).] % [I omit section 2.] 



518 Kant s Ethics. § 1043 

5. But (as has been strikingly said by Plato) we are not born 
for ourselves alone, and our country claims her share, and our 
friends their share of us; and, as the Stoics hold, all that the earth 
produces is created for the use of man, so men are created for the 
sake of men, that they may mutually do good to one another ; in 
this we ought to take nature for our guide, to throw into the pub- 
lic stock the offices of general utility by a reciprocation of duties ; 
sometimes by receiving, sometimes by giving, and sometimes to 
cement human society by arts, by industry, and by our resources. 

6. Now the foundation of justice is faithfulness, which is a per- 
severance and truth in all our declarations and in all our promises. 
Let us therefore (though some people may think it over nice) imitate 
the Stoics, who curiously examine whence terms are derived, and 
consider that the word fides, or faithfulness, is no other than a 
performance of what we have promised (quia fiat quod dictum est, 
appellatam fidem). 7. But there are two kinds of injustice; the 
first is of those who offer an injury, the second of those who have 
it in their power to avert an injury from those to whom it is offered, 
and yet do it not. 8. For if a man, prompted either by anger or 
any sudden perturbation, unjustly assaults another man, such a 
one seems as it were to lay violent hands on one's ally; and the 
man who does not repel or withstand the injury, if he can, is as 
much to blame as if he deserted the cause of his parents, his friends, 
or his country. 

9. Those wrongs, however, which are inflicted for the very pur- 
pose of doing an injury, often proceed from fear; as for instance, 
when a man who is contriving to injure another is afraid, unless he 
executes what he is meditating, that he may himself sustain some 
disadvantage ; 10. but the great incentive to doing wrong is to 
obtain what one desires, and in this crime avarice is the most per- 
vading motive. 

I., Viii., 1. Now riches are sought after, both for the necessary 
purposes of life and for the enjoyment of pleasure. 2. But in men 
of greater minds the coveting of money is with a view to power 
and to the means of giving gratification. As M. Crassus lately 
used to declare, that no man who wanted to have a direction in 
the government had money enough, unless by the interest of it he 
could maintain an army. 3. Magnificent equipages, likewise, and 
a style of living made up of elegance and abundance give delight, 
and hence the desire for money becomes boundless. 4. Nor in- 
deed is the mere desire to improve one's private fortune, without 
injury to another, deserving of blame ; but injustice must ever be 
avoided. 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 519 

5. But the main cause why most men are led to a forgetfulness 
-of justice is their falling into a violent ambition after empire, 
honors, and glory. 6.* For where the object of ambition is of 
such a nature as that several can not obtain pre-eminence, the con- 
test for it is generally so violent that nothing can be more difficult 
than to preserve the sacred ties of society. 7. This was shown 
lately in the presumption of C. Csesar, who, in order to obtain that 
direction in the government which the wildness of his imagination 
had planned out, violated all laws, divine and human. 8. But what 
is deplorable in this matter is, that the desire after honor, empire, 
power, and glory, is generally most prevalent in the greatest soul 
and the most exalted genius ; for which reason every crime of that 
sort is the more carefully to be guarded against. 9. But in every 
species of injustice it is a very material question, whether it is 
committed through some agitation of passion, which commonly is 
short-lived and temporary, or from deliberate, prepense, malice ; 
10. for those things which proceed from a short, sudden fit, are of 
slighter moment than those which are inflicted by forethought and 
preparation. But enough has been said concerning inflicting 
injury. 

I., IX., 1. Various are the causes of men omitting the defense 
of others, or neglecting their duty toward them. They are either 
unwilling to encounter enmity, toil, or expense ; or, perhaps, they 
do it through negligence, listlessness, or laziness ; or they are so 
embarrassed in certain studies and pursuits, that they suffer those 
they ought to protect to be neglected. 2. Hence we must take 
care lest Plato's observation with respect to philosophers should be 
falsified : " That they are men of integrity, because they are solely 
engaged in the pursuit of truth, and desjfise and neglect those 
considerations which others value, and which mankind are wont 
to contend for among themselves." 3. For, while they abstain 
from hurting any by the infliction of injury, they indeed assert 
one species of honesty or justice, but they fail in another; because, 
being entangled in the pursuits of learning, they abandon those 
they ought to protect. 4. Some, therefore, think that they would 
have no concern with the government unless they were forced to 
it ; but still; it would be more just that it should be done voluntarily; 
for an action which is intrinsically right is only morally good in 
so far as it is voluntary. 5. There are others who, either from a 
desire to improve their private fortune, or from some personal re- 
sentments, pretend that they mind their own affairs only that they 
may appear not to do wrong to another. JSTow such persons are 

* [I omit the first part of section 6.] 



520 Kan? s Ethics. § 1043 

free from one kind of injustice, but fall into another ; because they 
abandon the fellowship of life by employing in it none of their 
zeal, none of their labor, none of their abilities.* 

7. For, to concern ourselves in other people's affairs is a delicate 
matter. Yet Chremes, a character in Terence, thinks, that there 
is nothing which has a relation to mankind in which he has not a 
concern."}" Meanwhile, because we have the quicker perception 
and sensation of whatever happens favorably or untowardly to 
ourselves than to others, which we see as it were at a greater dis- 
tance, the judgment we form of them is very different from what 
we form of ourselves. 8. Those therefore are wise monitors who 
teach us to do nothing of which we are doubtful whether it is 
honest or unjust ; for whatever is honest manifests itself by its 
own luster, but doubt implies the entertainment of injustice. £ 

I., xi., 1. Certain duties are also to be observed, even toward 
those who have wronged you ; for there is a mean even in revenge 
and punishments. Nay, I am not certain whether it is not suffici- 
ent for the person who has injured you to repent of the wrong 
done, so that he may never be guilty of the like in future, and that 
others may not be so forward to offend in the same manner. 2. 
Now, in government the laws of war are to be most especially ob- 
served ; for since there are two manners of disputing, one by 
debating, the other by fighting, (though the former characterizes 
men, the latter, brutes), if the former can not be adopted, recourse 
must be had to the latter. 3. Wars, therefore, are to be under- 
taken for this end, that we may live in peace without being injured; 
but when we obtain the victory, we must preserve those enemies 
who behaved without cruelty or inhumanity during the war.|| 6. 
In my opinion, we ought always to consult for peace, which should 
have in it nothing of perfidy. Had my voice been followed on 
this head, we might still have had some form of government (if 
not the best), whereas now we have none. 7. And, while we are 
bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we have con- 
quered by force, so those should be received into our protection 
who throw themselves upon the honor of our general, and lay 

* [I omit section 6.] t Heautontimorumenos, Act I., Scene 1: Homo sum: 
humani nihil a me alienum puto. Augustin, who was made hishop of Hippo, 
a. D. 395, mentions the universal applause with which this admirable sentiment 
was received in the theater. He himself has left us an expression of the same 
idea in the following words: " Omnis homo est omni homini proximus, nee ulla 
cogitanda est longinquitas generis ubi est natura communis." " Every man is - 
most closely connected with his every fellow man, nor should any distance of 
relationship enter into consideration where there is a common nature." % [I 
omit chapter x.] || [I omit sections 4 and 5.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 521 

down their arms, even though, the battering rams should have 
struck their walls. 8. In which matter justice was cultivated with 
so much care among our countrymen, that it was a custom among 
our ancestors that they who received under their protection cities, 
or nations conquered in war, became their patrons.* 

I., xiii., 1. Nay, if even private persons should, induced by 
circumstances, make a promise to the enemy, even in this fidelity 
should be observed. 2. Thus Eegulus, when he was made a pris- 
oner by the Carthaginians in the first Punic war, being sent to 
Rome to treat of an exchange of prisoners, he swore that he would 
return. The first thing he did when he came to Rome was to de- 
liver his opinion in the senate that the prisoners should not be re- 
stored ; and after that, when he was detained by his relations and 
friends, he chose to deliver himself up to a cruel death rather than 
to falsify his word to the enemy. f 

9. Enough has now been said respecting the duties connected 
with warfare; but we must bear in mind, that justice is due even 
to the lowest of mankind ; and nothing can be lower than the con- 
dition and fortune of a slave. A nd yet those prescribe wisely who 
■enjoin us to put them upon the same footing as hired laborers, oblig- 
ing them to do their work, but giving them their dues. 10. Now, 
.as injustice may be done two ways, by force or fraud; fraud being 
the property of a fox, force that of a lion ; both are utterly re- 
pugnant to society, but fraud is the more detestable. 11. But in 
the whole system of villainy, none is more capital than that of the 
men, who, when they most deceive, so manage as that they may 
seem to be virtuous men. Thus much, then, on the subject of 
justice. 

I., xiv., 1. Ret me now, as I proposed, speak of beneficence 
and liberality, virtues that are the most agreeable to the nature of 
man, but which involve many precautionary considerations. 2. 
.For, in the first place, we are to take care lest our kindness should 
burt both those whom it is meant to assist, and others. In the 
next place, it ought not to exceed our abilities ; and it ought to 
be rendered to each in proportion to his worth. This is the funda- 
mental standard of justice to which all these things should be re- 
ferred. 3. For they who do kindnesses which prove of disservice 
to the person they pretend to oblige, should not be esteemed bene- 
ficent nor generous, but injurious sycophants. And they who in- 
jure one party in order to be liberal to another, are guilty of the 
same dishonesty as if they should appropriate to themselves what 
belongs to another. 

* [I omit section 9-12, and also the whole of chapter xii.] t [I omit 
sections 3-8.] 34 



522 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

4. Now many, and they especially who are the most ambitious 
after grandeur and glory, rob one party to enrich another ; and 
account themselves generous to their friends if they enrich them 
by whatever means. This is so far from being consistent with, 
that nothing can be more contrary to, our duty. 5. We should 
therefore take care to practice that kind of generosity that is 
serviceable to our friends, but hurtful to none. 6. Upon this prin- 
ciple, when Lucius- Sylla and Caius Caesar took property from its 
just owners and transferred it to strangers,* in so doing they 
ought not to be accounted generous ; for nothing can be generous 
that is not at the same time just. 

7. Our next part of circumspection is, that our generosity never 
should exceed our abilities. For they who are more generous 
than their circumstances admit of are, first, guilty in this, that 
they wrong their relations; because they bestow upon strangers 
those means which they might, with greater justice, give or leave 
to those who are nearest to them. 8. Now a generosity of this 
kind is generally attended with a lust to ravish and to plunder, in 
order to be furnished with the means to give away. 9. For it is 
easy to observe, that most of them are not so much by nature 
generous, as they are misled by a kind of pride to do a great many 
things in order that they may seem to be generous; which things 
seem to spring not so much from good will as from ostentation. 
Now such a simulation is more nearly allied to duplicity than to 
generosity or virtue. 

10. The third head proposed was, that in our generosity we 
should have regard to merit ; and, consequently, examine both the 
morals of the party to whom we are generous, and his disposition 
toward us, together with the general good of society, and how far 
he may have already contributed to our own interest. 11. Could 
all those considerations be united, it were the more desirable ; but 
the object in whom is united the most numerous and the most im- 
portant of them, ought to have the greatest weight with us. 

I., XV., 1. But as we live not with men who are absolutely per- 
fect and completely wise, but with men who have great merit if 
they possess the outlines of worth, we are. I think, from thence to 
infer, that no man is to be neglected in w T hom there appears any 
indication of virtue ; and that each should be regarded in propor- 
tion as he is adorned with the milder virtues of modesty, temper- 
ance, and that very justice of which I have so largely treated. \ 

*[Anthon (Harper, pages 167, 168) says "the allusion is to Sulla's en- 
riching his followers by the proscription of his political opponents, and Caesar's 
reckless plundering of provinces to reward his friends and followers."] f[I 
omit section 2.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 523 

3. With regard to the kindness which a person expresses for us, 
our first duty is, to perform the most for him by whom we are 
most beloved. Now we are to judge of* kindness, not like children, 
by a sort of ardor of affection, but by its stability and constancy. 

4. But if its merits are such that we are not to court but to re- 
quite the kindness, the greater ought our care to be; for there is 
no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness. 5. 
Now if, as Hesiod enjoins, we ought, if it is in our power, to re- 
pay what we have received for mere use with interest, how ought 
we to act when called upon by kindness? Are we not to imitate 
those fertile fields which yield far more than they have received? 
6. For, if we readily oblige those who we* hope will serve us, how 
ought we to behave toward those who have served us already ? 
For as generosity is of two kinds, the one conferring a favor, the 
other repaying it, whether we confer it or not is at our own option, 
but the not repaying it is not allowable in a good man, provided 
he can do so without injury to any. 8. Now there are distinctions 
to be made as to the benefits received; and it is clear that the 
greatest return is due in each case to the greatest obligation. 
Meanwhile, we are above all things to consider the spirit, the zeal, 
and the meaning with which a favor is conferred. 9. For many 
confer numerous favors with a sort of recklessness, without any 
judgment or principle, upon all mankind promiscuously, or influ- 
enced by sudden perturbation of mind, as if by a hurricane : such 
favors are not to be esteemed so highly as those which result from 
judgment, consideration, and consistency. 10. But in conferring 
or requiting kindness, the chief rule of our duty ought to be, if all 
other circumstances are equal, to confer most upon the man who 
stands in greatest need of assistance. The reverse of this is prac- 
ticed by the generality, 11. who direct their greatest services to 
the man from whom they hope the most, though he may stand in 
no need of them. 

I., XVi., 1. Now society and alliances among men would be 
best preserved if the greatest kindness should be manifested where 
there is the nearest relation. 2. But we ought to go higher, if we 
are to investigate the natural principles of intercourse and commu- 
nity among men. 3. The first is, that which is perceived in the 
society of the whole human race, and of this the bond is sjJeech 
and reason, which by teaching, learning, communicating, debating, 
and judging, conciliate men together, and bind them into a kind 
of natural society. 4. There is nothing in which we differ more 
from the nature of brutes than in this; for we very often allow 

* [1113 change which I have made is merely verbal, not material.] 



524 Kanfs Mines. § 1043 

them to have courage, as for instance, horses and lions ; but we 
never admit that they possess justice, equity, and goodness ; 
5. because they are void of reason and speech. Now this is the 
kind of society that is most extensive with mankind among them- 
selves, and it goes through all ;* for here a community of all things 
that nature has produced for the common use of mankind is pre- 
served, sof that they may be possessed in the manner prescribed by 
laws and civil statutes : ofj which laws themselves some are to be 
observed in accordance with the Greek proverb, " that all things 
among friends are to be in common." 6. Now this community 
consists of things which are of that nature which, though placed 
by Ennius [B. C. 239-169] under one head, may be applied to 
many. "He (says that author) who kindly shows the bewildered 
traveler the right road, does as it were light his lamp by his own ; 
which affords none the less light to himself after it has lighted the 
other." 

7. By this single example he sufficiently enjoins on us to perform, 
even to a stranger, all the service we can do without detriment to 
ourselves. 8. Of which service the following are common illustra- 
tions : " That we are to debar no man from the running stream ; " 
" That we are to suffer any who desire it to kindle fire at our fire ;" 
"'That we are to give faithful counsel to a person who is in doubt: " all 
which are particulars that are serviceable to the receiver without 
being detrimental to the bestower. We are therefore to practice 
them, and be constantly contributing somewhat to the common 
good. 1 1 

I., XVii., 1. Now the degrees of human society are many. For, 
to quit the foregoing unbounded kind, there is one more confined, 
which consists of men of the same race, nation, and language, by 
which people are more intimately connected among themselves.** 
7. But among all the degrees of society, none is more excellent, 
none more stable, than when worthy men, through a similarity of 
manners, are intimately connected together ; for, as I have often 
said, even when we discern the honestum [righteousness] in 
another it touches us, and makes us friends to the man in whom 
it resides. 



®[Hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes.] |["But so as, whatever 
things have been marked out as propertj 7 by the laws and civil statutes, these 
be possessed in such a way as it has been settled (bj r those laws)." — Anthon's 
Cicero de Officiis (Harper, 1872, page 170).] J ["And in virtue of these same 
laws, let other matters be regarded in such a way as is expressed in the proverb 
of the Greeks." — Anthon (at the place cited).] |] [I omit section 9.] ** [I omit 
sections 2-6.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 525 

8. Now, though virtue of every kind attracts and charms us to 
the love of those who possess it, yet that love is strongest that is 
effected by justice and generosity. 9. For nothing is more lovely, 
nothing is more binding, than a similarity of good dispositions; 
because among those whose pursuits and pleasures are the same, 
every man is pleased as much with another as he is with himself, 
and that is effected which Pythagoras chiefly contemplates in 
friendship, " that many become one." 10. A strong community 
is likewise effected by good offices mutually conferred and received ; 
and, provided these be reciprocal and agreeable, those among 
whom they happen are bound together in close association. 

11. But when you view everything with reason and reflection, 
of all connections none is more weighty, none is more dear, than 
that between every individual and his country. 12. Our parents 
are dear to us ; our children, our kinsmen, our friends, are dear to 
us ; but our country comprehends alone all the endearments of us 
all. For her what good man would hesitate to die if he could do 
her service? 13. The more execrably unnatural, therefore, are 
they who wound their country by every species of guilt, and who 
are now, and have been, employed in her utter destruction. 14. 
But were a computation or comparison set up, of those objects to 
which our chief duty should be paid, the principal are our country 
and our parents, by whose services we are laid under the strongest 
obligations; the next are our children and entire family, who depend 
upon us alone, without having any other refuge ; the next our 
agreeable kinsmen, who generally share our fortune in common. 
15. The necessary supports of life, therefore, are due chiefly to 
those I have already mentioned; but the mutual intercourses of 
life, counsels, discourses, exhortations, consultations, and even 
sometimes reproofs, flourish chief]}' in friendships, and those friend- 
ships are the most agreeable that are cemented by a similarity of 
manners.* 

I , xix., 1. But that magnanimity which is discovered in toils 
and dangers, if it be devoid of justice, and contend not for the 
public good, but for selfish interest, is blamable ; for, so far from 
being a mark of virtue, it is rather that of a barbarity which is 
repulsive to all humanity. 2. By the Stoics, therefore, fortitude is 
rightly defined, when VaQj call it " valor fighting on the side of 
justice." 3. No man, therefore, who has acquired the reputation 
of fortitude, attained his glory by deceit and malice; for nothing 
that is devoid of justice can be a virtue. 

* [I omit chapter xviii.] 



526 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

4. It is, therefore, finely said by Plato, that not only the knowl- 
edge that is apart from justice deserves the appellation of cunning 
rather than wisdom, but also a mind that is ready to encounter 
danger, if it is animated by private interest, and not public utility, 
deserves the character of audaciousness rather than of fortitude. 
5. We therefore require that all men of courage and magnanimity 
should be at the same time men of virtue and of simplicity, lovers 
of truth, and by no means deceitful ; for these qualities are the 
main glory of justice. 

6. But there is one painful consideration, that obstinacy, and an 
undue ambition for power, naturally spring up from this elevation 
and greatness of spirit ; 7. for, as Plato tells us, the entire character 
of the Lacedaemonians was inflamed with the desire of conquest. 
Thus the man who is most distinguished by his magnanimity, is most 
desirous of being the leading, or rather the only potentate of all. 
8. Now, it is a difficult matter, when you desire to be superior to 
all others, to preserve that equability which is the characteristic of 
justice. 9. Hence it is that such men will not suffer themselves to 
be thwarted in a debate, nor by any public and lawful authority ; 
and in public matters they are commonly guilty of corruption and 
faction, in order to grasp at as great power as possible ; and they 
choose to be superior by means of force, rather than equals by jus- 
tice. 10. But the more difficult the matter [of self-restraint] is, it 
is the more glorious ; for there is no conjuncture which ought to be 
unconnected with justice. 

11. They, therefore, who oppose, not they who commit, injustice 
are to be deemed brave and magnanimous. Now, genuine and 
well-considered magnanimity judges that the honestum [righteous- 
ness], which is nature's chief aim, consists in realities and not in 
mere glory, and rather chooses to be than to seem pre-eminent: 
12. for the man who is swayed by the prejudices of an ignorant 
rabble is not to be reckoned among the great ; 13. but the man 
of a spirit the most elevated, through the desire of glory, is the 
most easily impelled into acts of injustice. This is, indeed, a slip- 
pery situation ; for scarcely can there be found a man who, after 
enduring trials and encountering dangers, does not pant for popu- 
larity as the reward of his exploits. 

I., XX, 1. A spirit altogether brave' and elevated is chiefly dis- 
cernible by two characters. The first consists in a low estimate of 
mere outward circumstances, since it is convinced that a man 
ought to admire, desire, or court nothing but what is virtuous and 
becoming ; and that he ought to succumb to no man, nor to any 
perturbation either of spirit or fortune. 2. The other thing is 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 527 

that possessed of such a spirit as I have just mentioned, you should 
perforin actions which are great and of the greatest utility, but ex- 
tremely arduous, full of difficulties and clanger both to life and the 
many things which pertain to life. 

3. In the latter of those two characters consist all the glory, the 
majesty, and, I add, the utility; but the causes and the efficient 
means that form great men is in the former, which contains the 
principles that elevate the soul, and give it a contempt for tempor- 
ary considerations. 4. Now, this very excellence consists in two 
particulars : you are to deem that only to be good that is virtuous; 
and that you be free from all mental irregularity. 5. For we are 
to look upon it as the character of a noble and an elevated soul, to 
slight all those considerations that the generality of mankind ac- 
count great and glorious, and to despise them, upon firm and dura- 
ble principles; while strength of mind, and greatness of resolution, 
are discerned in bearing those calamities which, in the course of 
man's life, are many and various, so as not to be driven from your 
natural disposition, nor from the dignity of a wise man : 6. for 
it is not consistent that he who is not subdued by fear should be 
subjugated by passion ; nor that he who has shown himself in- 
vincible by toil, should be conquered by pleasure. 7. Wherefore, 
we ought to watch and avoid the love of money : for nothing so 
truly chai'acterizes a narrow, groveling disposition as to love riches; 
and nothing is more noble and more exalted than to despise riches 
if .you have them not. and if you have them, to employ them in 
beneficence and liberality.* 

8. An inordinate passion for glory, as I have already observed, 
is likewise to be guarded against; for it deprives us of liberty, the 
only prize for which men of elevated sentiments ought to contend. 
9. Power is so far from being desirable in itself, that it sometimes 
ought to be refused, and sometimes to be resigned. 10. "We 
should likewise be free from all disorders of the mind, from all 
violent passion and fear,, as well as languor, voluptuousness, and 
anger, that we may possess that tranquillity and security which 
confer alike consistency and dignity. 11. Now, many there are, 
and have been, who, courting that tranquillity which 1 have men- 
tioned here, have withdrawn themselves from public affairs and 
taken refuge in retirement.f 

* "A reader, of very ordinary erudition," says Guthrie, "may easily perceive 
how greatly the best historians and poets among the Komans were indebted to 
this and the foregoing chapter, which have served as a commonplace for their 
finest sentiments." t[I omit the remainder of section 11 and the whole of 
section 12.] 



528 Kant's Ethics. % 1043 

I., xxi., 7.* Bat the men who inherit from nature appliances 
for government ought, laying aside all excuses, to undertake the 
discharge of all public offices and the management of state affairs; 
for neither can a state be governed, nor can magnanimity display 
itself, by any other means. 8. I am not, however, sure whether 
those who undertake the management of public affairs ought not- 
to be equally distinguished by magnanimity as philosophers, if not 
more so, and impressed with a contempt of common affairs and to 
possess that tranquillity, that calm of mind, I have so much recom- 
mended ; I mean, if they wish to live without anxiety, with dignity 
and consistency. 

9. This may be the more easily practiced by philosophers, be- 
cause in their lives there is less exposed for fortune to strike at; 
because their necessities are more contracted : and because, if any 
thing adverse should happen, they can not fall so heavily. 10. It 
is not, therefore, without reason, that in the mind of those who 
undertake the management of public affairs, more violent passions- 
are excited, and mightier matters are to be attempted, than by 
those who are retired ; they, therefore, ought to possess greater 
elevation of spirit, and freedom from disquiets. 11. But, whoever 
enters upon public life ought to take care that the question, how 
far the measure is virtuous, be not his sole consideration, but also 
how far he may have the means of carrying it into execution. 12. 
In this he is chiefly to take care that through indolence he do not 
meanly despond, nor through eagerness too much presume. Thus, 
in all affairs, before you undertake them, a diligent preparation 
should bo entered into. 

I., XXii , 1. But, since most persons are of opinion that the 
achievements of war are more glorious than civil affairs, this judg- 
ment needs to be restricted; 2. for many, as generally is the case 
with high minds and enterprising spirits, especially if they are 
adapted to military life and are fond of warlike achievements, have 
often sought opportunities of war from their fondness for glory ; 
3. but if we are willing to judge truly, many are the civil employ- 
ments of greater importance, and of more renown, than the 
military. 

4. For though Themistocles is justly praised— his name is now 
more illustrious than that of Solon, and his glorious victory at Sal- 
amis is mentioned preferably to the policy of Solon, by which he 
first confirmed the power of the Areopagus — the one should not 
be considered more illustrious than the other ; 5. for the one 
availed his country only for once — the other is lastingly advan- 

*[I omit sections 1-6.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 529 

tageous; because by it the laws of the Athenians, and the institu- 
tions of their ancestors, are preserved. 6. JSfow, Themistocles 
could, not have stated any respect in which he benefited the Areopa- 
gus, but the former* might with truth declare that Themistocles had 
been advantaged by him ; for the war was carried on by the coun- 
sels of that senate which was constituted by Solon. 

7. We may make the same observation with regard to Pausanias 
and Lysander among the Lacedaemonians ; for all the addition of 
empire which their conquests are supposed to have brought to 
their country is not to be compared to the laws and economy of 
Lycurgus ; for indeed, owing to these very causes they had armies 
more subordinate and courageous. 8. In my eyes, Marcus Scaurus 
(who flourished when I was but a boy) was not inferior to Caius 
Marius ; nor, after I came to have a concern in the government, 
Quintus Catulus to Cneius Pompey. 9. An army abroad is but of 
small service unless there be a wise administration at home.f 

10. That state described by the following line is best for a coun- 
try, for which I understand that I am abused by the wicked and 
malicious : 

Arms to the gown, and laurels yield to lore. J 

11. For, not to mention other persons, when 1 was at the helm 
of government did not "arms yield to the gown?" For never 
did our country know a time of more threatening danger or more 
profound tranquillity; 12. so quickly, through my counsel and 
my diligence, did the arms of our most profligate fellow-citizens 
drop of themselves out of their hands. 13. What so great exploit 
as this was ever performed in war, or what triumph can be com- 
pared with it ? 

The inheritance of my glory and the imitation of my actions 
are to descend to you, my son Marcus, therefore it is allowable for 
me to boast in writing to } T ou. 14. It is, however, certain that 
Pompey, who was possessed of much military glory, paid this tri- 
bute to me, in the hearing of many, that in vain would he have re- 
turned to his third triumph, had not my public services preserved 
the place in which he was to celebrate it. 15. The examples of 
civil courage are therefore no less meritorious than those of mili- 
tary ; and they require a greater share of zeal and labor than the 
latter. 

* [•■ But it might with truth have asserted." — Antlion (Cicero de Officiis, 
Harper, 1872, page 179).] |[I omit the remainder of section 9.] % Original : 
C'edaht anna togce, conceded laurea linguae. The author is here speaking of his. 
conduct in suppressing Catiline's conspiracy. [Anthon (page 180) says that 
"this line is an extract from a poem by Cicero on his own consulship."] 



530 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

I., xxiii., 1. Now all that excellence [righteousness] which 
springs from a lofty and noble nature is altogether produced by 
the mental and not by the corporeal powers. Meanwhile, the 
body ought to be kept in such action and order, as that it may be 
always ready to obey the dictates of reason and wisdom, in carry- 
ing them into execution, and in persevering under hardships* 

I., XXV , 1. All who hope to rise in a state ought strictly to 
■observe two rules of Plato. f The first is, that they so keep in 
view the advantage of their fellow-citizens as to have reference to 
it in whatever they do, regardless of their individual interest. 
The second is, that their cares be applied to the whole of the state, 
lest while they are cherishing one part they abandon the others. 
2. For the administration of government, like a guardianship, 
ought to be directed to the good of those who confer, and not of 
those who receive the trust. 3. Now, they who consult the inter- 
ests of one part of a community and neglect another, introduce 
into the state the greatest of all evils, sedition and discord. 
Prom this partiality some seem to court the people, some each 
great man, but few the whole. 4. Hence the great discords 
among the Athenians, and in our government not only seditions 
but the most destructive wars, which every worthy and brave 
citizen who deserves to rise in the state will avoid and detest ; 
he will give himself entirely up to the service of his country, 
without regard to riches or to power, and he will watch over the 
whole so as to consult the good-of all. 5. He will even be far from 
bringing any man into hatred or disgrace, by ill-grounded charges, 
and he will so closely attach himself to the rules of justice and 
virtue, that however he may give offense he will preserve them, 
and incur death itself rather than swerve from the principles I 
have laid down. 

6. Of all evils, ambition and the disputes for public posts are the 
most deplorable. Plato, likewise, on this subject, says| very ad- 
mirably, " that they who dispute for the management of a state, 
resemble mariners w T rangling about who should direct the helm." 
7. He then lays down as a rule that we ought to look upon those 
as our enemies who take arms against the public, and not those 
who want to have public affairs directed by their judgment. Por 
instance, Publius Africanus and Quintus Metellus differed in 
opinion, but without animosity. 

* [I omit sections 2-7, and also the whole of chapter xxiv.] t [Anthon (eel. 
Harper, page 185) says that "both occur in the Republic, the first in i., p. 343, 
A, and the second in i\\, p. 420, B.'"] j [Anthon (page 185) says that "the 
jiassage occurs in the Jtiepubiic, vi., p. 488, B."] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 531 

8. .Nor, indeed, are those to be listened to who consider that we 
ought to cherish a bitter resentment against our enemies, and that 
this is characteristic of a high-minded and brave man; for nothing is 
more noble, nothing more worthy of a great and a good man, than 
placability and moderation. 

9. Nay, amid free nations and equality of rights, an equability 
and loftiness of temper is necessary, to prevent our falling 
into an idle, disagreeable peevishness, when we are irritated by 
persons approaching us unseasonably, or preferring to us unrea- 
sonable requests. 10. Yet this politeness and moderation ought to 
be so tempered, that for the sake of the interests of the state 
severity should be employed, otherwise public business could not be 
carried on. 11. Meanwhile, all reprimands and punishments ought 
to be inflicted without abuse, without regard to the party so pun- 
ishing or reprimanding, but to the good of the state. 

12. We ought, likewise, to take care that the punishment be 
proportioned to the offense, and that some be not punished for 
doing things for which others are not so much as called to account. 
13. Above all things, in punishing we ought to guard against pas- 
sion ; for the man who is to pronounce a sentence of punishment 
in a passion, never can preserve that mean between what is too 
much and too little, which is so justly recommended by the Peri- 
patetics, did they not too much commend the passion of anger, by 
asserting it to be a useful property of our nature. [See Arist. 
Nic. Eth., Book II., ch. v., §5 (page 428 above).] 14. For my 
part, I think that it ought to be checked under all circumstances ; 
and it were to be wished that they who preside in government 
were like the laws, which in punishing are not directed by resent- 
ments but by equity. 

I., XX.vi., 1. Now, during our prosperity, and while things flow 
agreeably to oar desire, we ought with great care to avoid pride 
and arrogance ; 2. for, as it discovers weakness not to bear ad- 
versity with equanimity, so also with prosperity. That equanim- 
ity in every condition of life is a noble attribute, and that uniform 
expression of countenance and appearance which we find recorded 
of Socrates, and also of Caius Lselius. 3. Though Philip of 
Macedon was excelled by his son in his achievements and his re- 
nown, yet I find him superior to him in politeness and goodness 
of nature ; 4. the one, therefore, always appeared great, while 
the other often became detestable. So that they appear to teach 
rightly, who admonish us that the more advanced we are in our 
fortune the more affable ought we to be in our behavior.* 6. In 

*[I omit section 5.] 



532 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

the time of our greatest prosperity we should also have the great- 
est recourse to the advice of our friends, and greater authority 
should be conceded to them than before. 7. At such a time we 
are to take care not to lend our ears to flatterers, or to suffer our- 
selves to be imposed upon by adulation, by which it is easy to be 
misled: for we then think ourselves such as may be justly 
praised, an opinion that gives rise to a thousand errors in conduct; 
because, when men are once blown up with idle conceits, they are 
exposed to ignominious ridicule and led into the greatest mistakes. 
8. So much for this subject. 

One thing you are to understand, that they who regulate public 
affairs perform the greatest exploits, and such as require the high- 
est style of mind, because their business is most extensive and con- 
cerns the greatest number. 9. Yet there are, and have been, many 
men of great capacities, who in private life have planned out or 
attempted mighty matters, and yet have confined themselves to 
the limits of their own affairs ; or, being thrown into a middle 
state, between philosophers and those who govern the state, have 
amused themselves with the management of their private fortune, 
without swelling it by all manner of means, not debarring their 
friends from the benefit of it, but rather, when occasion calls upon 
them, sharing it both with their friends and their country. 10. 
This should be originally acquired with honesty, without any 
scandalous or oppressive practices ; it should then be made service- 
able to as many as possible, provided they be worthy ; it should 
next be augmented by prudence, by industiy, and frugality, with- 
out serving the purposes of pleasure and luxury rather than of 
generosity and humanity. 11. The man who observes those rules 
may live with magnificence, with dignity, and with spirit, yet with 
simplicity and honor, and agreeably to (the economy of) human 
life. 

I., XXVii., 1. The next thing is, to treat of that remaining part 
of virtue in which consist chastity and those (as we may term 
them) ornaments of life, temperance, moderation, and all that 
allays the perturbations of the mind. 2. Under this head is com- 
prehended what in Latin we may call decorum (or the graceful), 
for the Greeks term it the prepon. Now, its quality is such that 
it is indiscernible from the honestum [righteousness] ; for what- 
ever is graceful is virtuous, and whatever is virtuous is graceful. 

3. But it is more easy to conceive than to express the difference 
between what is virtuous and what is graceful (or between the 
honestum and the decorum) ; for whatever is graceful appears 
such, when virtue is its antecedent. 4. What is graceful, there- 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 533 

fore, appears not only in that division of virtue which is here 
treated of, but in the three foregoing ones; 5. for it is graceful 
in a man to think and to speak with propriety, to act with delib- 
eration, and in every occurrence of life to find out and persevere 
in the truth. On the other hand, to be imposed upon, to mistake, 
to falter, and to be deceived, is as ungraceful as to rave or to be 
insane. Thus, whatever is just is graceful ; whatever is unjust is 
as ungraceful as it is criminal. 6. The same principle applies to 
courage: for every manly and magnanimous action is worthy of a 
man, and graceful ; the reverse, as being unworthy, is ungraceful. 

7. This, therefore, which I call gracefulness, is a universal prop- 
erty of virtue, and a property that is self-evident, and not dis- 
cerned by any profundity of reasoning; 8. for there is a certain 
gracefulness that is implied in every virtue, und which may exist 
distinctly from virtue, rather in thought than in fact : 9. as grace 
and beauty of person, for example, can not bo separated from 
health, so the whole of that gracefulness which I here speak of is 
blended with virtue, but may exist separately in the mind and in 
idea. 

10. Now, the definition of this is twofold : for there is a general 
gracefulness that is the property of all virtue, and that includes 
another, which is fitted to the particular divisions of virtue. 11. 
The former is commonly defined to be that gracefulness that is 
conformable to that excellence of man, in which he differs from 
other sentient beings ; 12. but the special, which is comprised 
under the general, is defined to be a gracefulness so adapted to 
nature as to exhibit propriety and sweetness under a certain 
elegant appearance. 

I., XXViii., 1. We may perceive that these things are so under- 
stood from that gracefulness which is aimed at by the poets, and 
of which elsewhere more is wont to be said ; 2. for we say that 
the poets observe that gracefulness to be when a person speaks 
and acts in that manner which is most becoming his character.* 4. 
Poets, therefore, in their vast variety of characters, consider what 
is proper and what is becoming, even in the vicious: but as nature 
herself has cast to us our parts in constancy, moderation, temper- 
ance, and modesty ; as she, at the same time, instructs us not to be 
unmindful how we should behave to mankind, the effect is, that 
the extent both of that gracefulness which is the general property 
of all virtue, and of that particular gracefulness that is adapted to 
every species of it, is discovered. 5. For as personal beauty, by 
the symmetrical disposition of the limbs, attracts our attention and 

* [I omit the remainder of section 2, and the whole of section 3.] 



534 KanCs Ethics. § 1013 

pleases the eye, by the harmony and elegance with which each part 
corresponds to another, so that gracefulness which manifests itself 
in life, attracts the approbation of those among whom we live, by 
the order, consistency, and modesty of all our words and deeds. 

6. There is, therefore, a degree of respect^ due from us, suited to 
every mans character, from the best to the worst : for it is not 
only arrogant, but it is profligate, for a man to disregard the world's 
opinion of* himself; 7. but, in our estimate of human life, we are 
to make a difference between justice and moral susceptibility.^ 

* [Negligere quid de se quisque sentiat : for a man to disregard other persons' 
opinions of themselves.] 

t Justice and moral susceptibility. Orig. Justiciam et verecundiam. This is 
a very fine passage, and deserves to be explained. Verecundia is commonly 
translated bashfulness or modesty; but in the sense of our author here, neither 
of these two words will do ; nor am I sure that the word decency, or any word 
in the English tongue, comes fully up to his meaning, which is, an inborn rev- 
erence for what is right, and which supplies the place of, and sometimes con- 
trols, the law. Many actions may be agreeable to law, and yet disagreeable to 
this inborn principle. Tbe tragedian Seneca has distinguished them very 
finely. He brings in Pyrrhus, saying, 

Pyr. Lex nulla capto parcit aut pcenam impedit. 
To this Agamemnon replies, 

Ag. Quod non vetat lex, hoc vetat fieri pudor. 
Pyr. " No law exempts a captive from the sword." 
Ag. " Where the law does not, moral duties bind." 

Our author inculcates the same principles in many other parts of his works ; 
and it was afterward admitted by Justinian into his Institutes. " Fide commissa 
appellata sunt, quia nullo vinculo juris, sed tantum pudore eorum qui rogaban- 
tur, continebantur." " Deeds of trust were so called, because the party intrusted 
was not obligated by law, but by conscience or morality." Ovid has a very 
noble sentiment, which he seems to have taken from our author and from Plato. 

Nondum justiciam facinus mortale fugarat, 

Ultima de superis ilia reliquit humum ; 
Proque metu, populum, sine vi, pudor ipse regebat. 

" Nor justice yet had fled from human crimes, 
Of all their godheads she the last remained ; 
For awful conscience, in those happy times. 
Killed without tear, and without force restrained." 

Verecundia or pudor, therefore, is properly an inward abhorrence of moral 
turpitude, through which the conscience is awed, and may be said to blush. 
Plato, and from him Plutarch, makes justice and this verecundia to be insepar- 
able companions. "God (says the former), being afraid lest the human race 
should entirely perish upon earth, gave to mankind justice and moral suscepti- 
bility, those ornaments of states and the bonds of society." 

It is on the possession of this moral susceptibility, anterior to and indepen- 
dent of human laws, that Bishop Butler founds his ethical system. Thus he says 
of man, that "from his make, constitution, or nature, he is, in the strictest and 
most proper sense, a law to himself; 'i that "he hath the rule of right within," and 
that " what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it ; " and, in enforcing 
the authority of this natural monitor, " your obligation to obey this law is its 
being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 535 

8. The dictate of justice is to do no wrong ; that of moral 
susceptibility is to give no offense to mankind, and in this the 
force of the graceful is most perceptible. By these explanations I 
conceive that what we mean by the graceful and becoming may be 
understood. 

9. Now the duty resulting from this has a primary tendency to 
an agreement with and conservation of our nature ; and if we 
follow it as a guide we never shall err, but shall attain to that 
natural excellence which consists in acuteness and sagacity, to that 

to such a course of action is itself alone an obligation. Conscience doe's not 
only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its 
own authority with it, that it is our natural guide — the guide assigned us by 
the Author of our nature. It, therefore, belongs to our condition of being; it 
is our duty to walk in that path, and to follow this guide, without looking about 
to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity." It is with a. 
like reference that Lord Bacon says : " The light of nature not only shines upon 
the human mind through the medium of a rational- faculty, bat by an internal 
instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of 
man's first estate." But a parallel passage from the pen of Cicero himself, af- 
fords a still fuller and loftier enunciation of this principle : " There is, in- 
deed, one true and original law, conformable to reason and to nature, diffused 
over all, invariable, eternal, which calls to the fulfillment of duty and to ab- 
stinence from injustice, and which calls with that irresistible voice which is felt 
in all its authority wherever it is heard. This law can not be abolished or cur- 
tailed, nor affected in its sanctions by any law of man. A whole senate, a 
whole people, can not dispense from its paramount obligation. It requires no- 
commentator to render it distinctly intelligible, nor is it different at Borne, and 
at Athens, at the present, and in ages to come; but in all times and in all 
nations, it is, and has been, and will be, one and everlasting — one as that God T 
its great Author and promulgator, who is the common sovereign of ail man- 
kind, is himself one. ISTo man can disobey it without flying, as it were, from 
his own bosom and repudiating his nature, and in this very act will inflict on 
himself the severest of retributions, even though he escape what is commonly 
regarded as punishment/' 

[I can not quite agree with the translator insofar as he seems to detract 
somewhat from the conception of justice, which ought not to be understood as of 
statutory obligation merely; and for this reason the examples from Seneca and 
Justinian are not well chosen. He has also too much confounded moral suscepti- 
bility with conscience, which latter taken purely enforces merely justice, and 
only by virtue of its operation upon our sensitive nature superadds modesty. 
Pudor rather results from than " is properly an inward abhorrence of moral 
turpitude," which inward abhorrence is the work of conscience, and can not 
properly be said to awe conscience. But the pudor which awes conscience is 
more admirably illustrated by Paul (Romans xiv.): "All things indeed are pure; 
but it is evil for that man who eats with offense. It is good neither to eat flesh, 
nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbles, or is made to 
offend, or is weak." (Am. Bible Union, second revision.) The magnificent pass- 
age from Cicero cited, is therefore not an enunciation of verecundia, but of law 
(jtjs) in its most exalted sense. Cf. Xen. Mem., IV., iv., 25 (page 400 above).] 



536 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

which is best adapted to human society, and to that which is ener- 
getic and manly.* 10. But the chief force of the graceful lies in 
that suitableness of which I am now treating. For not only those 
emotions of a physical kind, but still more those of the mind are 
to be approved as they are conformable to nature. 11. For the 
nature and powers of the mind are twofold ; one consists in ap- 
petite, by the Greeks called orme (i. e. impulse), which hurries 
man hither and thither ; the other in reason, which teaches and 
explains what we are to do, and what we are to avoid. The result 
is, that reason should direct and appetite obey. 

I., XXix., 1. Now every human action ought to be free from 
precipitancy and negligence, nor indeed ought we to do any thing 
for which we can not give a justifiable reason. This indeed almost 
amounts to a definition of duty. 2. Now we must manage so as 
to keep the appetites subservient to reason, that they may neither 
outstrip it nor fall behind through sloth and cowardice. Let them 
be ever composed and free from all perturbation of spirit ; 3. and 
thus entire consistency and moderation will display themselves. 
For those appetites that are too vagrant and rampant as it were, 
either through desire or aversion, are not sufficiently under the 
command of reason ; such, I say, undoubtedly transgress bounds 
and moderation. For they abandon and disclaim that subordina- 
tion to reason, to which by the law of nature they are subjected, 
and thereby not only the mind but the body is thrown into dis- 
turbance. 4. Let any one observe the very looks of men who are 
in a rage, of those who are agitated by desire or fear, or who ex- 
ult in an excess of joy ; all whose countenances, voices, motions, 
and attitudes, are changed. 

5. But to return to my description of duty. From these par- 
ticulars we learn that all our appetites ought to be contracted and 
mitigated ; that all our attention and diligence ought to be awake, 
so that we do nothing in a rash, random, thoughtless, and incon- 
siderate manner. 6. For nature has not formed us to sport and 
merriment, but rather to seriousness, and studies that are import- 
ant and sublime. 7. Sport and merriment are not always disallow- 
able: but we are to use them as we do sleep and other kinds of 
repose, when we have dispatched our weighty and important af- 
fairs. 8. Nay, our very manner of joking should be neither wan- 
ton nor indecent, but genteel and good-humored. 9. For as we 
indulge bo} 7 s not in an unlimited license of sport, but only in that 
which is not inconsistent with virtuous conduct, so in our very 
jokes there should appear some gleam of a virtuous nature.f 

* In other words, to wisdom, justice, and fortitude. t[I omit sections 10-13.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 537 

I., XXX., 1. But in all our disquisitions concerning the nature of 
a duty, it is material that we keep in our eye the great excellence 
of man's nature above that of the brutes and all other creatures. 
2. They are insensible to every thing but pleasure, and are hurried 
to it by every impulse. Whereas the mind of man is nourished 
by study and reflection, and, being charmed by the pleasure of 
seeing and hearing, it is ever either inquiring or acting. 3. But if 
there is a man who has a small bias to pleasure, provided he is not 
of the brute kind (for there are some who are men only in name); 
but, I say, if he is more high-minded even hi a small degree, 
though he may be smitten with pleasure, he yet, through a prin- 
ciple of shame, hides and disguises his inclination for it. 

4. From this we are to conclude that mere corporeal pleasure 
is unworthy the excellence of man's nature ; and that it ought 
therefore to be despised and rejected; but that if a man shall have 
any delight in pleasure, he ought to be extremely observant of 
limits in its indulgence. 5. Therefore the nourishment and dress 
of our bodies should be with a view not to our pleasure, but to our 
health and our strength ; 6. and should we examine the excel- 
lence and dignity of our nature, we should then be made sensible 
how shameful it is to melt away in pleasure, and to live in volup- 
tuousness and effeminacy ; and- how noble it is to live with absti- 
nence, with modesty, with strictness, and sobriety. 

7. We are likewise to observe that nature has, as it were, en- 
dowed us with two characters. The first is in common to all man- 
kind, because all of us partake in that excellency of reason, which 
places us above the brutes ; from which is derived all that is vir- 
tuous, all that is graceful, and by which we trace our connections 
with our several duties. The other character is peculiar to indi- 
viduals. 8. For, as there are great dissimilarities in our persons — 
some for instance are swift in running, others strong in wrestling ; 
and in style of beauty some have a dignity, and others a sweet- 
ness of aspect — so are there still greater varieties in our minds.* 

I., XXXi., 1. Every man, however, ought carefully to follow put 
his peculiar character, provided it is only peculiar, and not vicious, 
that he may the more easily attain that gracefulness of which we 
are inquiring. 2. For we ought to manage so as never to counter- 
act the general system of nature ; but having taken care of that, 
we are to follow our natural bias; insomuch, that though other 
studies may be of greater weight and excellence, yet we are to 
regulate our pursuits by the disposition of our nature. 3. It is to 
no purpose to thwart nature, or to aim at what you can not attain. 

*[I omit sections 9-17.] 

35 



538 • Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

We therefore may have a still clearer conception of the graceful I 
am recommending, from this consideration, that nothing is grace- 
ful that goes (as the saying is) against the grain, that is, in con- 
tradiction and opposition to nature. 

4. If any thing at all is graceful, nothing surely is more so than 
a uniformity through the course of all your life, as well as through 
every particular action of it; and you never can preserve this 
uniformity, if, aping another man's nature, you forsake your own. 
5. For as we ought to converse in the language we are best ac- 
quainted with, for fear of making ourselves justly ridiculous, as 
those do who cram in Greek expressions ; so there ought to 
be no incongruity in our actions, and none in all the tenor of our 
lives.* 

10. Every man ought, therefore, to study his own genius, so as- 
to become an impartial judge of his own good and bad qualities,, 
otherwise the players will discover better sense than we; 11. for 
they do not choose for themselves those parts that are the most ex- 
cellent, but those which are best adapted to them.f 12. Shall a 
player, then, observe this upon the stage, and shall a wise man not 
observe it in the conduct of life ? Let us, therefore, most earnestly 
apply to those parts for which we are best fitted; but should neces- 
sity degrade us into characters unsuitable to our genius, let us em- 
ploy all our care, attention, and industry, in endeavoring to per- 
form them, if not with propriety, with as little impropriety as- 
possible : 13. nor should we strive so much to attain excellencies 
which have not been conferred on us, as to avoid defects. 

I., XXXii., 1. To the two characters above described is added a 
third, which either accident or occasion imposes on us; and even 
a fourth, which we accommodate to ourselves by our own judgment 
and choice. 2. Now kingdoms, governments, honors, dignities, 
riches, interest, and whatever are the qualities contrary to them,, 
happen through accident, and are directed by occasions ; 3. but 
what part we ourselves should wish to act, originates from our own 
will. Some, therefore, apply to philosophy, to the civil law, and 
some to eloquence ; and of the virtues themselves some endeavor 
to shine in one, and some in another. 

4. Men generally are ambitious of distinguishing themselves in 
that kind of excellence in which their fathers or their ancestors 
were most famous : for instance, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius, 
in the civil law ; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the art of war. 
5. Some, however, increase, by merits of their own, that glory 
which they have received from their fathers ; for the same Afri- 

*[I omit sections 6-9.] t [I omit the remainder of section 11.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 539 

canus crowned his military glory with the practice of eloquence. 
In like manner, Timotheus, the son of Conon, who equaled his 
father in the duties of the field, hut added to them the glory of 
genius and learning.* 

I., XXXiii., 1. The rarest class is composed of those who, en- 
dowed with an exalted genius, or with excellent education and 
learning, or possessing both, have had scope enough for delibera- 
ting as to what course of life they would he most willing to adojyt. 
2. Every design, in such a deliberation, ought to he referred to-the 
natural powers of the individual ; 3. for since, as I said before, 
we discover this propriety in every act which is performed, by 
reference to the qualities with which a man is born,«so, in fixing 
the plan of our future life, we ought to be still much more careful 
in that respect, that we may be consistent throughout the duration 
of life with ourselves, and not deficient in any one duty.f 

10. But if, as I said above, we are to imitate our ancestors, this 
should be first excepted, that their bad qualities must not be imi- 
tated. 11. In the next place, if nature does not qualify us to imi- 
tate them in some things, we are not to attempt it : for instance, the 
son of the elder Africanus, who adopted the younger son of Paulus, 
could not, from infirmity of health, resemble his father so much as 
his father did his grandfather. 12. If, therefore, a man is unable 
to defend causes, to entertain the people, by haranguing, or to 
wage war, yet still he ought to do what is in his power ; he ought 
to practice justice, honor, generosity, modesty, and temperance, 
that what is wanting may be the less required of him. 13. Now, 
the best inheritance a parent can leave a child — more excellent 
than any patrimony — is the glory of his virtue and his deeds; 
to bring disgrace on which ought to be regarded as wicked and 
monstrous. 

I., XXXiv., 1. And as the same moral duties are not suited to 
the different periods of life, some belonging to the young, others 
to the old, we must likewise say somewhat on this distinction. 2. 
It is the duty of a young man to reverence his elders, and among 
them to select the best and the worthiest, on whose advice and 
authority to rely. For the inexperience of youth ought to be in- 
structed and conducted by the wisdom of the aged. 3. Above all 
things, the young man ought to be restrained from lawless de- 
sires, and exercised in endurance and labor both of body and 
mind, that by persevering in them, he" may be efficient in the 
duties both of war and peace. 4. Nay, when they even unbend 
their minds and give themselves up to mirth, they ought to avoid 

* [I omit sections 6-13.] |[I omit sections 4^-9.] 



540 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

intemperance, and never lose sight of morality ; and this will be 
the more easy if even upon such occasions they desire that their 
elders should be associated with them. 

5. As to old men, their bodily labors seem to require diminution, 
but the exercises of their mind ought even to be increased. Their 
care should be to assist their friends, the youth, and above all their 
country, to the utmost of their ability by their advice and experi- 
ence. 6. Now there is nothing that old age ought more carefully 
to guard against, than giving itself up to listlessness and indolence. 
7. As to luxury, though it is shameful in every stage of life, in old 
age it is detestable ; but if to that is added intemperance in lawless 
desires, the«evil is doubled ; because old age itself thereby incurs 
disgrace, and makes the excesses of the young more shameless. 

8. Neither is it foreign to my purpose to touch upon the duties 
of magistrates, of private citizens, and of strangers. 9. It is then 
the peculiar duty of a magistrate to bear in mind that he repre- 
sents the state, and that he ought, therefore, to maintain its dignity 
and glory, to preserve its constitution, to act by its "Jaws, and to 
remember that these things are committed to his fidelity. 10. As 
to a private man and citizen, his duty is to live upon a just and 
equal footing with his fellow-citizens, neither subordinate and sub- 
servient nor domineering. In his sentiments of the [re]public to 
be always for peaceful and virtuous measures ; for such we are ac- 
customed to imagine and describe a virtuous citizen. 

11. Now the duty of a stranger and an alien is, to mind noth- 
ing but his own business, not to intermeddle with another, and 
least of all to be curious about the affairs of a foreign government. 
12. Thus we shall generally succeed in the practice of the moral 
duties, when we inquire after what is most becoming and best 
fitted to persons, occasions, and ages; 13. and nothing is more 
becoming than in all our actions and in all our deliberations to 
preserve consistency. 

I., XXXV., 1. But, because the graceful or becoming character 
we treat of appears in all our words and actions, nay, in every 
motion and disposition of our person, and consists of three particu- 
lars, beauty, regularity, and appointment suited to action (ideas 
which indeed are difficult to be expressed, but it is sufficient if they 
are understood) ; 2. and as in these three heads is comprehended 
our care to be approved by those among whom and with whom we 
live, on them also a few observations must be made.* 8. Let us, 
for our parts, follow nature, and avoid whatever is offensive to 
the eyes or ears ; let us aim at the graceful or becoming, whether 

* [I omit sections 3-7.] 



§ 1043 The Olavis to an Index. 541 

we stand, or walk, whether we sit or lie down, in every motion of 
our features, our eyes, or our hands.* 

I., XXXVi., 1. Now as beauty is of two kinds, one that consists 
in loveliness, and the other in dignity ; loveliness we should regard 
as the characteristic of women, dignity of men : 2. therefore, let 
a man remove from his person every ornament that is unbecoming, 
a man, and let him take the same care of every similar fault with 
regard to his gesture or motion. f 4. Now, comeliness in the per- 
son is preserved by the freshness of the complexion, and that 
freshness by the exercises of the body. 5. To this we are to add, 
a neatness that is neither troublesome nor too much studied, but 
which just avoids all clownish, ill-bred slovenness. 6. The same 
rules are to be observed with regard to ornaments of dress, in 
which, as in all other matters, a mean is preferable. 7. We must 
likewise avoid a drawling solemn pace in walking, so as to seem 
like bearers in a procession ; and likewise in matters that require 
dispatch, quick, hurried motions ; which, when they occur, occasion 
a shortness of breathing, an alteration in the looks, and a convul- 
sion in the features, all which strongly indicate an inconstant 
character. 8. But still greater should be our care that the move- 
ments of our mind never depart from nature ; in which we shall 
succeed if we guard against falling into any flurry and disorder of 
spirit, and keep our faculties intent on the preservation of pro- 
priety. 9. Now the motions of the mind are of two kinds, the 
one of reflection and the other of appetite. Reflection chiefly ap- 
plies itself in the search of truth. Appetite prompts us to action. 
We are therefore to take care to employ our reflection upon the 
best subjects, and to render our appetite obedient to our reason. 

I., XXXVii., 1. And since the influence of speech is very great 
and that of two kinds — one proper for disputing, the other for dis- 
coursing — the former should be employed in pleadings at trials, 
in assemblies of the people, and meetings of the senate; the latter 
in social circles, disquisitions, the meetings of our friends, and 
should likewise attend upon entertainments. 2. Rhetoricians lay 
down rules for disputing, but none for discoursing, though I am 
not sure but that likewise may be done. 3. Masters are to be 
found in all pursuits in which there are learners, and all places are 
filled wdth crowds of rhetoricians ; but there are none who study 
this, and yet all the rules that are laid down for words and senti- 
ments (in debate) are likewise applicable to conversation. 

4. But, as we have a voice as the organ of speech , we ought to 
aim at two properties in it : first that it be clear, and secondly 

* [I omit sections 9-14.] t[I omit section 3.] 



542 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

that it be agreeable ; both are unquestionably to be sought from 
nature ; and yet j>ractice may improve the one, and imitating those 
who speak nervously and distinctly, the other. 5. There was, in 
the Catuli, nothing by which you could conclude them possessed 
of any exquisite judgment in language, though learned to be sure 
they were ; and so have others been. But the Catuli were thought 
to excel in the Latin tongue ; 6. their pronunciation was harmo- 
nious, their words were neither mouthed nor minced ; so that their 
expression was distinct, without being unpleasant ; while their 
voice, without strain, was neither faint nor shrill. 7. The manner 
of Lucius Crassus was more flowing, and equally elegant ; though 
the opinion concerning the Catuli, as good speakers, was not less. 
8. But Csesar, brother to the elder Catulus, exceeded all in wit and 
humor ; insomuch that even in the forensic style of speaking, he 
with his conversational manner, surpassed the energetic eloquence of 
others. 9. Therefore, in all those matters, we must labor diligently 
if we would discover what . is the point of propriety in every 
instance. 

10. Let our common discourse therefore (and this is the great 
excellence of the followers of Socrates) be smooth and good- 
humored, without the least arrogance. Let there be pleasantry in 
it. 11. Nor let any one speaker exclude all others as if he were 
entering on a province of his own, but consider that in conversa- 
tion, as in other things, alternate participation is but fair. 12. 
But more especially let him consider on what subjects he should 
speak. If serious, let him use gravity; if merry, good humor. 
13. But a man ought to take the greatest care that his discourse be- 
tray no defect in his morals ; and this generally is the case when 
for the sake of detraction we eagerly speak of the absent in a 
malicious, ridiculous, harsh, bitter, and contemptuous manner. 

14. Now conversation generally turns upon private concerns, or 
politics, or the pursuits of art and learning. 15. We are, there- 
fore, to study, whenever our conversation begins to ramble to 
other subjects, to recall it: 16. and whatever subjects may pre- 
sent themselves (for we are not at all pleased with the same sub- 
jects and that similarly and at all times) we should observe how 
far our conversation maintains its interest ; and as there was a 
reason for beginning so there should be a limit at which to 
conclude. 

I., XXXViii., 1. But as we are very properly enjoined, in all 
the course of our life, to avoid all fits of passion, that is, excessive 
emotions of the mind uncontrolled by reason; in like manner, our 
conversation ought to be free from all such emotions ; 2. so that 



§ 1043 The Clavis io an Index. 543 

neither resentment manifest itself, nor undue desire, nor sloven- 
ness, nor indolence, nor any thing of that kind; and, above all 
things, we should endeavor to indicate both esteem and love for 
those we converse with. 3. Reproaches may sometimes be neces- 
sary, in which we may perhaps be obliged to employ a higher 
strain of voice and a harsher turn of language. Even in that case, 
we ought only [and unintentionally] to seem to do these things in 
anger;* but as, in the cases of cautery and amputations, so with 
this kind of correction we should have recourse to it seldom and 
unwillingly ; and indeed, never but when no other remedy can be 
discovered ; but still, let all passion be avoided ; for with that 
nothing can be done with rectitude, nothing with discretion. 

4. In general it is allowable to adopt a mild style of rebuke, 
•combining it with seriousness, so that severity may be indicated 
but abusive language avoided. 5. Nay, even what of bitterness 
there is in the reproach should be shown to have been adopted for 
the sake of the party reproved. 6. Now, it is advisable, even in 
those disputes which take place with our bitterest enemies, if we 
hear any thing that is insulting to ourselves to maintain our 
equanimity, and rej^ress passion; 7. for whatever is done under 
such excitement can never be either consistently performed, or ap- 
proved of by those who are present. 8. It is likewise indecent for 
a man to be loud in his own praise (and the more so if it be false), 
and so to imitate the swaggering soldier (in the play) amidst the 
■derision of the auditors. 

I., XXXix., 1. -Now, as I touch, at least wish to touch, upon 
every matter of duty, I shall likewise treat of the kind of house 
which I think suited to a man of high rank and office; the end of 
this being utility, to it the design of the building must be adapted, 
Dut still regard must be paid to magnificence and elegance. f 
4. For dignity should be adorned by a palace, but not be wholly 
sought from it : — the house ought to be ennobled by the master, 
and not the master by the house.J 8. But you are to take care, 
especially if you build for yourself, not to go beyond bounds in 
grandeur and costliness. Even the example of an excess of this 
kind does much mischief. 9. For most people, particularly in this 
Tespect, studiously imitate the example of their leaders. For in- 
stance, who imitates the virtue of the excellent Lucius Lucullus ? 
But how many there are who have imitated the magnificence of 

*[That is, we ought not to be angry, even if others, judging from our stern- 
ness, think that we are angry. Cicero must not be understood to say that we 
ought deliberately to simulate anger.] t [I omit sections 2 and 3.] % [I omit 
sections 5-7.] 



544 Kant's Ethics. § 104-5 

his villas. To which certainly a bound ought to be set, and it re- 
duced to moderation, and the same spirit of moderation ought to be 
extended to all the practice and economy of life. 

10.* Now in undertaking every action we are to regard three 
things. First, that appetite be subservient to reason, than which 
there is no condition better fitted for preserving the moral' duties. 
We are, secondly, to examine how important the object is which 
we desire to accomplish, that our attention or labor may be neither 
more nor less than the occasion requires. Thirdly, we are to take 
care that every thing that comes under the head of magnificence 
and dignity should be well regulated. 11. Now, the best regulation 
is, to observe that same graceful propriety which I have recom- 
mended, and to go no further. But of those three heads, the most 
excellent is that of making our appetites subservient to our reason. 

I., xl., 1. 1 am now to speak concerning the order and the 
timing of things. In this science is comprehended what the Greeks 
call eutaxia, not that which we Romans call moderation, an ex- 
pression that implies keeping within bounds ; whereas that is 
eutaxia in which the preservation of order is involved. 2. This 
duty, which we will denominate moderation, is defined by the Sto- 
ics as those things which are either said or done in their appropri- 
ate places of ranging. 3. Therefore, the signification of order and 
of arrangement seems to be the same. For they define order to 
be the disposing of things into fitting and convenient places. No w 
they tell us that the appropriate place of an action is the oppor- 
tunity of doing it. The proper opportunity for action being called 
by the Greeks ettkaria, and by the Latins, occasio. or occasion. 
4. Thus, as I have already observed, that modestia which we have 
thus explained is the knowledge of acting according to the fitness, 
of a conjuncture. 

5. But prudence, of which we have treated in the beginning of 
this book, may admit of the same definition. Under this head, 
however, I speak of moderation and temperance, and the like 
virtues. Therefore, the considerations which belong to pru- 
dence have been treated in their proper place. But at present I 
am to treat of those virtues I have been so long speaking of. which 
relate to morality, and the approbation of those with whom we live. 

6. Such then should be the regularity of all our actions, that in 
the economy of life, as in a connected discourse, all things may 
agree and correspond. 7. For it would be unbecoming and highly 
blamable, should we, when upon a serious subject, introduce the 
language of the jovial or the effeminate. f 

* [I omit the first part of section 10.] t [I omit sections 8 and 9.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 545 

10. But those actions that are in wide discrepancy with good- 
breeding, such, for instance, as singing in the forum, or any such 
absurdity, are so easily discernible, that they require no great de- 
gree of reprehension or advice. 11. But faults that seem to be 
inconsiderable, and such as are discernible only by a few,, are to 
be more carefully avoided. 12. As in lutes or pipes, however little 
they be out of tune, it is perceived by a practiced ear ; so in life 
we are to guard against all discrepancy, and the rather as the har- 
mony of morals is greater and much more valuable than that of 
sounds. 

I., xli., 1. Thus, as the ear is sensible to the smallest discord in 
musical instruments, so we, if we desire to be accurate and atten- 
tive observers of faults, may make great discoveries • from very 
trifling circumstances. 2. The cast of the eye, the bending or un- 
bending of the brow, an air of dejection or cheerfulne,ss, laughter, 
the tone of words, silence, the raising or falling of the voice, and 
the like circumstances, we may easily form a judgment which of 
them are in their proper state, and which of them are in discord 
with duty and nature. 3. ISTow in this case, it is advisable to judge 
from others, of the condition and properties of every one of those, 
so that we ourselves may avoid those things that are unbecoming- 
in others. 4. For it happens,! know not how, that we perceive 
what is defective more readily in others than we do in ourselves. 
5. Therefore, when masters mimic the faults of boys that they 
may amend them, those boys are most easily corrected. 

6. Neither is it improper, in order to fix our choice in matters 
which involve a doubt, if we apply to men of learning and also of 
experience, and learn what they think of the several kinds of 
duty ; 7. for the greatest part of such men are usually led to that 
conclusion to which nature herself directs; and in these cases, we 
are to examine not only what a man says, but what he thinks, and 
upon what ground he thinks it. 8. For as painters, statuaries, and 
even poets, want to have their works canvassed by the public in 
order to correct any thing that is generally condemned, and ex- 
amine both by themselves and with others where the defect lies ; 
thus we ought to make use of the judgment of others to do, and 
not to do, to alter and correct, a groat many things.* 11. But as to 
the whole system of the Cynics ; we are absolutely to reject it, be- 
cause it is inconsistent with moral susceptibility without which 
nothing can be honest, nothing can be virtuous. 

12. JSTow it is our duty to esteem and to honor, in the same man- 
ner as if they were dignified with titles or vested with command, 

* [I omit sections 9 and 10.] 



546 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

those men whose lives have been conspicuous for great and glorious 
actions, who feel rightly toward the state and deserve well or have 
deserved well of their country. We are likewise to have a great 
regard for old age ; to pa}* a deference to magistrates; to distin- 
guish between (what we owe to) a fellow-citizen and a foreigner, 
and to consider whether that foreigner comes in a public or a 
private capacity. 13. In short, not to dwell on particulars, we 
ought to regard, to cultivate, and to promote the good will and the 
social welfare of all mankind.* 

I., xliii,, 1. I have I think sufficiently explained in what man- 
ner the duties are derived from the constituent parts of virtue. 
2. Now it often may happen that an emulation and a contest may 
arise among things that are in themselves virtuous ; — of two vir- 
tuous actions which is preferable. A division that Pansetius has 
overlooked. , 3. For as all virtue is the result of four f qualities, 
})rudence, justice, magnanimity and moderation ; so in the choice 
of a duty, those qualities must necessarily come in competition 
with one another. 

4. I am therefore of opinion that the duties arising from the 
social relations are more agreeable to nature than. those that are 
merely notional. 5. This may be confirmed from the following 
argument. Supposing that this kind of life should befall a wise 
man, that in an affluence of all things he might be able with great 
leisure to contemplate and attend to every object that is worthy 
his knowledge ; yet if his condition be so solitary as to have no 
company with mankind, he would prefer death to it. J 8. For the 
knowledge and contemplation of nature is in a manner lame and 
unfinished, if it is followed by no activity ; now activity is most 
perspicuous when it is exerted in protecting the rights of mankind. 

It therefore has reference to the social interests of the human 
race, 9. and is for that reason preferable to knowledge ; and this 
every virtuous man maintains and exhibits in practice. 10. For 
who is so eager in pursuing and examining the nature of things, 
that if, while he is handling and contemplating the noblest objects 
of knowledge, the peril and crisis of his country is made known 
to him, and that it is in his power to assist and relieve her, he 
would not instantly abandon and fling from him all those studies, 
even though he thought he would be enabled to number the stars, 
or measure the dimensions of the world? And he would do the 
same were the safety of a friend or a parent concerned or en- 
dangered. 11. From this consideration I infer, that the duties of 

*'[I omit chapter xlii.] t[See chapter v., section 2 (page 516 above).] {[I 
omit sections 6 and 7.] [Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. VIII., i., 1 (page 486 above).] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 547 

justice are preferable to the studies and duties of knowledge, re- 
lating as they do to the interests of the human race, to which no 
anterior consideration ought to exist in the mind of man. 

I., xliv., 1. But some have employed their whole lives in the 
pursuits of knowledge, and yet have not declined to contribute to 
the utility and advantage of men. 2. For they have even in- 
structed many how they ought to be better citizens and more use- 
ful to their country. Thus Lysis the Pythagorean educated 
Epaminondas of Thebes, as did Plato Dion of Syracuse, and so of 
many others ; and as to whatever services I have j>erformed, if I 
have performed any to the state, I came to it after being furnished 
and adorned with knowledge by teachers and learning. 

3. Nor do those philosophers only instruct and educate those 
who are desirous of learning while alive and present among us; 
but they continue to do the same after death, by the monuments 
of their learning; 4. for they neglect no point that relates to the 
constitution, the manners and the morals of their country ; so that 
it aj>pears as if they had dedicated all their leisure to our advan- 
tage. 5. Thus while they are themselves devoted to the studies of 
learning and wisdom, they make their understanding and their 
skill chiefly available to the service of mankind. 6. It is therefore 
more serviceable to the public "for a man to discourse copiously, 
provided it is to the purpose, than for a man to think ever so ac- 
curately without the power of expression ; the reason is, because 
thought terminates in itself alone, but discourse affects those with 
whom we are connected in a community. 

7. Now as the swarms of bees do not assemble in order to form 
the honey-comb, but form the honey-comb because they are by 
nature gregarious ; so, and in a far greater degree, men, being as- 
sociated by nature, manifest their skill in thinking and acting. 
8. Therefore, unless knowledge is connected with that virtue which 
consists in doing service to mankind, that is, in improving human 
society, it would seem to be but solitary and barren. 

9. In like manner greatness of soul, when utterly disunited from 
the company and society of men, becomes a kind of uncouth fero- 
city. Hence it follows that the company and the community of 
men are preferable to mere speculative knowledge. 

10. Neither is that maxim true which is affirmed by some, that 
human communities and societies were instituted from the neces- 
sity of our condition, because we can not without the help of others 
supply what our nature requires ; and that if we could be furnished, 
as by a kind of magic wand, with every thing that relates to food 
and raiment, that then every man of excelling genius, laying aside 
all other occupations, would apply himself to knowledge and learn- 



548 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

ing. 11. The fact is not so; for he would fly from solitude and 
look out for a companion in his pursuits ; and would desire some- 
times to teach and sometimes to learn, sometimes to listen and 
sometimes to speak. 12. Every duty therefore that operates for 
the good of human community and society, is preferable to that 
duty which is limited to speculation and knowledge. 

I., xlv., 5.* Hence it follows, that in the choice of our duties 
we are to prefer that kind of duty that contributes to the good of 
society. 6. For well-directed action is always the result of knowl- 
edge and prudence. And therefore it is of more consequence to 
act properly, than to deliberate justly.f 

BOOK II , chapter i., §1. Marcus, my Son, I think 1 have in 
the former Book sufficiently explained in what manner our duties 
are derived from morality, and every kind of virtue. 2. It now 
remains that I treat of those kinds of duties that relate to the 
improvement of life, and to the acquirement of those means which 
men employ for the attainment of wealth and interest. In this 
inquiry, as I have already observed, I will treat of what is useful, 
and what is not so. Of several utilities. I shall speak of that 
which is more useful, or most so. Of all this I shall treat, after 
premising a few words concerning my own plan of life and choice 
of pursuits. 

3. Although my works have prompted a great many to the ex- 
ercise not only of reading but of writing, yet I sometimes am ap- 
prehensive that the name of philosophy is offensive to some worthy 
men, and that they are surprised at my having emploj^ed so much 
of my pains and time in that study. 4. For my part, as long as 
the state was under the management of those into whose hands 
she had committed herself, I applied to it all my attention and 
thought. 5. But when the government was engrossed by one per- 
son, when there was an end of all public deliberation and author- 
ity; when I in short had lost those excellent patriots who were 
my associates in the protection of my country, I neither abandoned, 
myself to that anguish of spirit which, had I given way to it, must ' 
have consumed me, nor did 1 indulge those pleasures that are dis- 
graceful to a man of learning. 

6. Would that the constitution had remained in its original state; 
and that it had not fallen into the hands of men whose aim was 
not to alter but to destroy it ! 7. For then I would first, as I was 
wont to do when our government existed, have employed my, 
labors in action rather than in writing; and in the next place, in. 

* [I omit sections 1-4.] t [I omit the remainder of section 6, and the whole 
of sections 7-10.] 



§ 1043 The Cleans to an Index. 549 

my writings I should havo recorded my own pleadings as I had 
frequently done, and not such subjects as the present. 8. But 
when the constitution [res publica], to which all my care, thoughts, 
and labor used to be devoted, ceased to exist, then those public 
and senatorial studies were silenced. 

9. But as my mind could not be inactive, and as my early life 
had. been employed in these studies, I thought that they might 
most honorably be laid aside by betaking myself anew to philos- 
ophy, 10. having, when young, spent a great deal of my time in 
its study, with a view to improvement. When I afterward began 
to court public offices and devoted myself entirely to the service 
of my country, I had so much room for philosophy as the time 
that remained over from the business of my friends and the public. 
But 1 spent it all in reading, having no leisure for writing. 

II., ii., 1. In the midst of the greatest calamities, therefore, I 
seem to have realized the advantage that I have reduced into 
writing, matters in which my countrymen were not sufficiently 
instructed, and which were most worthy their attention. 2. For* 
what is more desirable, what is more excellent, than wisdom? 
What is better for man? what more worthy of him? 3. They 
therefore who court her are termed philosophers ; for philosophy, 
if it is to be interpreted, implies nothing but the love of wisdom. 

4. Now the ancient philosophers defined wisdom to be the 
knowledge of things divine and human, and of the causes by 
which these things are regulated; a study that if any man despises, 
I know not what he can think deserving of esteem. 

5. For if we seek the entertainment of the mind, or a respite 
from cares, which is comparable to those pursuits that are 
always searching out somewhat that relates to and secures the 
welfare and happiness of life ? Or if we regard the principles of 
self- consistency and virtue, either this is the art, or there is abso- 
lutely no art b} T which we can attain them. 6. And to say that 
there is no art for the attainment of the highest objects, when we 
see that none of the most inconsiderable are without it, is the 
language of men who speak without consideration, and who mis- 
take in the most important matters, f 

II., iii., 1. Having laid down [I., iii , 6-10 (page 514 above)] 
the five principles upon wdrich we pursue our duty, two of which 
relate to propriety and virtue, two to the enjoyments of life, such 
as wealth, interest, and power, the fifth to the forming of a right 
judgment in any case, if there should appear to be any clashing 
between the principles I have mentioned : the part assigned to 

* [I omit a portion of section 2 at this point.] t [I omit sections 7-17.] 



550 Kanfs Ethics. § 1043 

virtue is concluded, and with that I desire you should be thor- 
oughly acquainted. 2. Now the subject I am now to treat of is 
neither more nor less than what we call expediency ; 3. in which 
matter custom has so declined and gradually deviated from the 
right path, that, separating virtue from expediency, it has deter- 
mined that some things may be virtuous that are not expedient, 
and some expedient which are not virtuous ; than which doctrine 
nothing more pernicious can be introduced into human life. 

4. It is indeed with strictness and honesty that philosophers, 
and those of the highest reputation, distinguish in idea those three 
principles which really are blended together. 5. For they give it 
as their opinion that whatever is just is expedient ; and in like 
manner whatever is virtuous is just; from whence it follows that 
whatever is virtuous is also expedient. 6. Those who do not 
perceive this distinction often admire crafty and cunning men, 
and mistake knavery for wisdom. 7. The error of such ought to 
be eradicated ; and every notion ought to be reduced to this hope, 
that men may attain the ends they propose, by virtuous designs 
and just actions, and not by dishonesty and wickedness. 

8. The things then that pertain to the preservation of human life 
are partly inanimate, such as gold, silver, the fruits of the earth, and " 
the like ; and partly animal, which have their peculiar instincts and 
affections. Now of these some are void of, and some are endowed 
with, reason.* 13. For even the very inanimate things I have men- 
tioned, are generally procured through man's labor : nor should 
we have had them but by his art and industry, nor can we apply 
them but by his management. 14. For there could neither be the 
preservation of health, navigation, nor the gathering and preserv- 
ing the corn and other fruits, without the industry of mankind. 
15. And certainly there could have been no exportation of things 
in which we abound, and importation of those which we want, 
had not mankind applied themselves to those employments. 16. 
In like manner, neither could stones be hewn for our use, nor iron, 
nor brass, nor gold, nor silver, be dug from the earth, but by the 
toil and art of man. 

II., iv., 1. As to buildings, by which either the violence of the 
cold is repelled, or the inconveniences of the heat mitigated, how 
could they have originally been given to the human race, or after- 
ward repaired when ruined by tempests, earthquakes, or time, had 
not community of life taught us to seek the aid of man against 
such influences ? 2. Moreover, from whence but from the labor of 
man could we have had aqueducts, the cutsf of rivers, the irrigation 

* [I omit sections 9-12.] t [" Derivationes fluminum. 'Canals.'" — Anihon.~\ 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 551 

of the land, damsff opposed to streams, and artificial harbors?* 6. 
Why should 1 enumerate the variety of arts without which life 
could by no means be sustained ? For did not so many arts minis- 
ter to us, what could succor the sick, or constitute the pleasure of 
the healthy, or supply food and clothing ? 

Polished by those arts, the life of man is so different from the 
mode of life and habits of brutes. 7. Cities, too, neither could 
have been built nor peopled but by the association of men : hence 
were established laws and customs, the equitable definition of 
rights, and the regulated order of life. 8. Then followed gentle- 
ness of disposition and love of morality; and the result was that 
life was more protected, and that by giving and receiving, and 
by the exchange of resources and articles of wealth, we wanted 
for nothing. 

BOOK II. , chapter V., § 5.f As this point therefore admits of 
no doubt, that man can do the greatest good and the greatest in- 
jury to man, I lay it down as the peculiar property of virtue, that 
it reconciles the affections of mankind, and employs them for its 
own purposes. 6. So that all the application and management of 
inanimate things and of brutes for the use of mankind, is effected 
by the industrial arts ; but the quick and ready zeal of mankind 
for advancing and enlarging our conditions, is excited through the 
wdsdom and virtue of the best of mankind. 

7. For virtue in general consists of three properties. First, in 
discerning in every subject what is true and genuine; what is 
consistent in every one ; what will be the consequence of such or 
such a thing ; how one thing arises from another, and what is the 
cause of each. 8. The next property of virtue is to calm those 
violent disorders of the mind which the Greek call pathe, and to 
render obedient to reason those appetites which they call 'ormai. 
The third property is to treat with moderation and prudence those 
with whom we are joined in society, that by their means we may 
have the complete and full enjoyment of all that nature stands in 
need of; and likewise by them repel every thing adverse that may 
befall us. J 

II., Vii., 1. Now, of all things there is none more adapted for 
supporting and retaining our influence than to be loved, nor more 
prejudicial than to be feared. 2. Ennius says very truly, " People 
hate the man they fear, and to each the destruction of him whom 
he hates is expedient." 3. It has been lately shown, || if it was 

* [I omit sections 3-5.] f [I omit sections 1-4.] X [I omit the remainder of 
section 8, and also the whole of chapter vi.] || Cicero here alludes to the as- 
sassination of Csesar in the senate. tt [" Breakwaters." — Anthon (page 226).] 



552 Kant's 'Ethics. § 1043 

not well known before, that no power can resist the hatred of the 
many. 4. Nor indeed is the destruction of that tyrant, who by 
arms forced his country to endure him, and whom it obeys still 
more after his death, the only proof how mighty to destroy is the 
hatred of mankind, but the similar deaths of other tj T rants ; few 
of whom have escaped a similar fate. 5. For fear is but a bad 
guardian to permanency, whereas affection is faithful even to 
perpetuity.* 

7. But of all madmen, they are the maddest who in a free state 
so conduct themselves as to be feared. 8. However under the 
power of a private man the laws may be depressed and the spirit 
of liberty intimidated, yet they occasionally emerge, either by the 
silent determinations of the people, or by their secret suffrages 
with relation to posts of honor, 9. For the inflictions of liberty, 
when it has been suspended, are more severe than if it had been 
retained. 10. We ought therefore to follow this most obvious prin- 
ciple, that dread should be removed and affection reconciled, which 
has the greatest influence not only on our security, but also on our 
interest and power ; and thus we shall most easily attain to the 
object of our wishes, both in private and jxditical affairs. f 

II., viii., 1. Upon such a subject I more willingly record for- 
eign than domestic examples ; 2. as lonff, however, as the empire 
of the Roman people was supported by beneficence, and not in- 
justice, their wars were undertaken either to defend their allies or 
to protect their empire, the issues of their wars were either merci- 
ful or unavoidable ; and the senate was the harbor and the refuge 
of kings, people, and nations. 

3. Moreover, our magistrates and generals sought to derive their 
highest glory from this single fact, that they had upon the prin- 
ciples of equity and honor defended their provinces and their allies. 
4. This therefore might more justly be designated the patronage 
than the empire of the w T orld ; 5. for some time we have been 
gradually declining from this practice and these principles; but 
after the victory of Sylla, we entirely lost them: 6. for when such 
cruelties were exercised upon our fellow-citizens, we ceased to think 
any thing unjust toward our allies. 7. In this case, therefore, a 
disgraceful conquest crowned a glorious cause ; for he had the pre- 
sumption to declare, when the goods of worthy men, of men of for- 
tune, and, to say the least, of citizens, were selling at public 
auction, that he was disposing of his own booty. 8. He was fol- 
lowed by a man who. with a impious cause and a still more detest- 
able victory, did not indeed sell the effects of private citizens, but 

* [I omit section 6.] f [I omit sections 11-17.] 



■§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 553 

involved in one state of calamity whole provinces and countries. 
9. Thus foreign nations being harassed and ruined, we saw Mar- 
seilles,* the type of our perished constitution, carried in triumph, 
without whose aid our generals who returned from Transalpine 
wars had never triumphed. 10. Were not this the most flagrant 
indignity the sun ever beheld, I might recount a great many other 
atrocities against our allies. 11. Deservedly, therefore, were we 
punished ; for had we not suffered the crimes of many to pass un- 
punished never could so much licentiousness have been concen- 
trated in one, the inheritance of whose private estate descended 
indeed to but a few, but that of his ambition devolved upon many 
profligates. 

12. Nor, indeed, will there ever be wanting a source and motive 
for civil war, while men of abandoned principles call to mind that 
bloody sale, and hope for it again. For when the spearf under 
which it Avas made was set up for his kinsman [L. Syllaff] the 
dictator, by Publius >Sylla, the same [P.ff] Sylla, thirty-six years 
after, was present at a still more detestable sale ; while another 
[C. Syllaff] who in that dictatorship [of L. Syllaff] was only a 
clerk, in the latter one [of Caesar f f] was city-qusestor. 13. From 
all which we ought to learn, that while such rewards are pre- 
sented, there never can be atl end of our civil wars. 14. Thus 
the walls of our city alone are standing, and even these awaiting 
the crimes that must destroy them; but already we have utterly 
lost our constitution ; 15. and to return to my subject, we have 
incurred all those miseries, because we chose rather to be feared 
than to endear ourselves and be beloved. 16. If this was the case 
with the people of Rome when exercising their dominion unjustly, 
what consequence must private persons expect? 17. Now, as it is 
plain that the force of kindness is so strong, and that of fear so 
Aveak, it remains for me to descant upon the means by which we 
may most readily attain to that endearment which we desire, con- 
sistently with fidelity and honor. ;j; 

II., ix., 9. 1 1 For we have confidence in those who we think un- 
derstand more than ourselves, and who we believe see further into 
the future, and, when business is actually in hand and matters 

* This was a favorite state with the Roman republicans; but having too in- 
considerately shut their gates against and provoked Csesar, he treated it as is 
here described. — Guthrie, t Cicero here alludes to the sales of the estates of 
the Roman citizens made by Sylla; and which always were, among the 
Romans, carried on under a spear stuck-into the ground. The like sales were 
afterward made by some of Cajsar's party. — Guthrie. J [I omit sections 18-21.] 
■j| [I omit sections 1-8.] tt[See Anthon's notes, page 233.] 

36 



554 Kanfs Mines. § 1043 

come to trial, know how to pursue the wisest measures and act 
in the most expedient manner, as the exigency may require ; all 
mankind agreeing that this is real and useful wisdom. 10. Such 
confidence, also, is placed in honest and honorable men, that is, in 
good men, as to exclude all suspicion of fraud or injury. We 
therefore think we act safely and properly in intrusting them with 
our persons, our fortunes, and our families. 

11. But of the two virtues, honesty and wisdom, the former is- 
the most powerful in winning the confidence of mankind. For 
honesty without wisdom has influence sufficient of itself; hut 
wisdom [prudentia] without honesty [sine justitia] is of no effect 
in inspiring confidence ; 12. because, when we have no opinion of 
a man"s probity, the greater his craft and cunning the more hated 
and' suspected he becomes ; 13. honesty, therefore, joined to un- 
derstanding, will have unbounded power in acquiring confidence; 
honesty without understanding can do a great deal ; but under- 
standing without honesty can do nothing. 

II., X., 1. But lest any one should wonder why, as all philoso- 
phers are agreed in one maxim, which I myself have often main- 
tained, that the man who possesses one of the virtues is in posses- 
sion of them all, ff I here make a distinction which implies that a 
man may be just but not at the same time prudent; 2. there is- 
one kind of accuracy which in disputation refines even upon truth,, 
and another kind, when our whole discourse is accommodated to 
the understanding of the public. 3. Therefore I here make use of 
the common terms of discourse, by calling some men brave, some 
good, others prudent. 4. For when we treat of popular opinions,, 
we should make use of popular terms, and Panaetius did the same* 

6. Now every thing that men observe to be great and above 
their comprehension they commonly admire ; and with regard to 
individuals, those in whom they can see any unexpected excel- 
lences. 7. They therefore behold with reverence and extol with 
the greatest praise, those men in whom they think they can per- 
ceive some distinguished or singular virtues; 8. whereas they 
despise those whom they think to possess no virtue, spirit, or man- 
liness.! 10. Therefore, as I have already said, those are despised 
who can neither serve themselves nor any one else, who have no- 
assiduity, no industry, and no concern about them ; but those men 
are the objects of admiration who are thought to surpass others in 
virtue, and to be free as well from every disgrace, as especially 
from those vices which others can not easily resist. 11. For 

* [I omit section 5.] t [I omit the remainder of section 8 and the whole of 
section 9.] ft [See Arist. 2lic. Eth., VI., xiii., 5, page 478 above.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 555 

pleasures* turn aside the greater number of minds from virtue, 
and most men, when the fires of affliction are applied to them, are 
immeasurably terrified. 12. Life and death, poverty and riches, 
make the deepest impressions upon all men. 13. But as to those 
who, with a great and elevated mind, look down on these indiffer- 
ently ; — men whom a lofty and noble object, when it is presented 
to them, draws and absorbs to itself; — in such cases, who does not 
admire the splendor and the beauty of virtue? 

II., xi., 1. This sublimity of soul, therefore, produces the high- 
est admiration ; and above all, justice, from which single virtue 
men are called good, appears to the multitude as something mar- 
velous. And with good reason ; 2. for no man can be just if he 
is afraid of death, pain, exile, or poverty, or prefers their contra- 
ries to justice. 3. Men especially admire him who is incorruptible 
by money, and they consider every man in whom -that quality is 
seen as ore purified by the fire.f 

7. And with those likewise who buy or sell, who hire or let out, 
or who are engaged in the transaction of business, justice is neces- 
sary to the carrying of their pursuits, 8. for its influence is so 
great, that without some grains of it, even they who live by mal- 
practices and villainy could not subsist. 9. For among those who 
thieve in company, if any one of them cheat or rob another he is 
turned out of the gang ; and the captain of the band himself, un- 
less he should distribute the spoils impartially, would either be mur- 
dered or deserted by his fellows. % 12. If, therefore, the influence 
of justice is so forcible as to strengthen and enlarge the power of 
robbers, how great must we suppose it to be amid the laws and ad- 
ministration of a well-constituted government ? 

II., xii., 1. It appears to me, that not only among the Medes, 
as we are told by Herodotus, but by our own ancestors, men of the 
best principles were constituted kings, for the benefit of their just 
government. 1 1 2. For when the helpless people were oppressed by 
those who had greater power, they betook themselves to some one 
man who was distinguished by his virtue, who not only protected 
the weakest from oppression, but by setting up an equitable sys- 
tem of government, united highest and lowest in equal rights. 3. 
The cause of the institution of laws was the same as that of kings; 
for equals of rights has ever been the object of desire ; nor other- 
wise can there be any rights at all. 

4. When mankind could enjoy it under one just and good man, 
they were satisfied with that ; but when that was not the case, 

* [I omit part of section 11 at this point.] f [I omit sections 4-6.] % [I omit 
sections 10 and 11.] j| [See Xen. Mem., pages 366, 378 sup.] 



556 Kanfs Ethics. § 1043 

laws were invented, which perpetually spoke to all men with one 
and the same voice. 5. It is therefore undeniable that the men 
whose reputation among the people was the highest for their jus- 
tice, were commonly chosen to bear rule. But when the same 
were likewise regarded as wise men, there was nothing the people 
did not think themselves capable of attaining under such authority. 
6. Justice, therefore, is by all manner of means to be reverenced 
and practiced ; both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not 
be justice), and for the enlargement of our own dignity and popu- 
larity. 7. But as there is a system not only for the acquisition of 
money but also for its investment, so that it may supply ever-re- 
curring expenses, not only the needful but the liberal ; so popular- 
it}* must be both acquired and maintained by system. 

8. It was finely said by Socrates [Xen. Mem. II., vi., 39 (page 
362 above)] that the shortest and most direct road to popularity, 
is " for a man to be the same that he wishes to be taken for. - ' 9. 
People are egregiously mistaken if they think they ever can at- 
tain to permanent popularity by hypocrisy, by mere outside ap- 
pearances, and by disguising not only their language but their 
looks. 10. True popularity takes deep root and spreads itself 
wide ; but the false falls away like blossoms ; for nothing that is 
false can be lasting.* 

II., xiii., 1. Let the man therefore who aspires after true pop- 
ularity, perform the duties of justice. What these are has been 
laid down in the former book. 2. But although we may most easily 
seem to be just what we are (though in this of itself there is very 
great importance), yet some precepts require to be given as to how 
we may be such men as we desire to be considered. 3. For if any 
one from early youth has the elements of celebrity and reputation, 
either derived from his father (which 1 fancy, my dear Cicero, 
has happened to you), or by some other cause or accident; the 
eyes of all mankind are turned toward him, and they make it 
their business to inquire what he does and how he lives; and, as 
if he were set up in the strongest point of light, no word or deed 
of his can be private. 

4. Now those whose early life, through their mean and obscure 
rank, is passed unnoticed by the public, when they come to be 
young men, ought to contemplate important purposes, and pursue 
them by the most direct means, which they will do with a firmer 
resolution, because not only is no envy felt, but favor rather is shown 
toward that period of life.f 9. As in other matters the powers of 
the mind are far more important than those of the body, so the 

*[I omit sections 11 and 12;] t [I omit sections 5-3.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis lo an Index. 557 

objects w.e pursue by intelligence and reason are more important 
than those we effect by bodily strength. 10. The most early rec- 
ommendation, therefore, is modesty, obedience to parents, and af- 
fection for relations. 11. Young men are likewise most easily and 
best known, who attach themselves to wise and illustrious men who 
benefit their country by their counsels. Their frequenting* such 
company gives mankind a notion of their one day resembling 
those whom they choose for imitation. 

12. The frequenting of the house of Publius Marcus commended 
the early life of Publius Butilius to a reputation for integrity and 
knowledge of the law. 13. Lucius Crassus indeed, when very 
young, was indebted to no extrinsic source, but by himself* ac- 
quired the highest honor from that noble and celebrated prosecu- 
tion he undertook ; at an age when even those who exercise them- 
selves are highly applauded (as we are told in the case of Demos- 
thenes), Crassus, 1 say, at that age showed that he could already 
do that most successfully in the forum, which at that time he would 
have gained praise had he attempted at home. 

II., xiv., 1. But as there are two methods of speaking; the 
one proper for conversation, the other for debate, there can be no 
doubt but the disputative style of speech is of the greatest efficacy 
with regard to fame ; for that is what we properly term eloquence. 
Yet it is difficult to describe how great power, affability and polite- 
ness in conversation have to win the affections of mankind. 2. 
There are extant letters from Philip, from Antipater, and from 
Antigonus, three of the wisest men we meet with in history, to 
their sons Alexander, Cassander, and Philip, recommending to 
them to draw the minds of the people to kindly sentiments by a gen- 
erous style of discourse, and to engage their soldiers by a winning 
address. 3. But the speech which is pronounced in debate before 
a multitude often carries away a whole assembly. 4. For great is 
their admiration of an eloquent and sensible speaker, that when 
they hear him, they are convinced he has both greater abilities 
and more wisdom than the rest of mankind. 5. But should this 
eloquence have in it dignity combined with modesty, nothing can 
be more admirable, especially should those properties meet in a 
young man. 

6. Various are the causes that require the practice of eloquence; 
and many young men in our state have attained distinction before 
the judges and in the senate ; but there is the greatest admiration 
for judicial harangues, the nature of which is twofold, 7. for it 
consists of accusation and defense. Of those, though the latter is 

- [Cf. Confucius, Analects, I., xiv. (page 121 above).] 



558 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

preferable in point of honor; yet the other has often been ap- 
proved. 8. I have spoken a little before of Crassus ; Marcus An- 
tonius when a youth did the same. An accusation also displayed 
the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius, when he brought to trial Caius 
JSTorbanus, a seditious and worthless citizen.* 

13. Moreover, this precept of duty also must be carefully ob- 
served, that you never arraign an innocent man on trial for his 
life, for this can by no means be done without heinous guilt. 11. 
For what can be so unnatural as to prostitute to the prosecution 
and the ruin of the good, that eloquence which nature has given 
us for the safety and preservation of mankind ? t 

II., XV., 1. But having explained the duties of young men, 
which avail to the attainment of glory, we have next to speak 
about beneficence and liberality, the nature of which is twofold ; 
2. for a kindness is done to those who need it, by giving either 
our labor or our money. The latter is easier, especially to a 
wealthy person ; but the former is the more noble and splendid, and 
more worthy of a brave and illustrious man. J 

II., XViii., 2. 1 1 The case is different of him who is oppressed 
with misfortune, and of him who seeks to better his fortune with- 
out being in any adversity. 3. Our benignity will require to be 
more prompt toward the distressed, unless perhaps thej^ merit 
their distress; yet from those who desire to be assisted, not that they 
may be relieved from affliction, but that they may ascend to a 
higher degree, we ought by no means to be altogether restricted, 
but to apply judgment and discretion in selecting proper persons. 
For Ennius observes well — u Benefactions ill bestowed, I deem 
malefactions." 4. But in that which is bestowed upon a worthy 
and grateful man there is profit, as well from himself as also from 
others ; 5. for liberality, when free from rashness, is most agreea- 
ble, and many applaud it the more earnestly on this aecount, be- 
cause the bounty of every very exalted man is the common refuge 
of all. 6. We should do our endeavor,, then, that we may serve as 
many as possible with those benefits, the recollection of which 
may be handed clown to their children and posterity, that it may 
not be in their power to be ungrateful ; 7. for all men detest one 
forgetful of a benefit, and they consider that an injury is done 
even to themselves by discouraging; liberality, and that he who 
does so is the common enemy of the poor. 8. And besides, that 
benignity is useful to the state by which captives are redeemed 
from slavery, and the poor arc enriched. That it was indeed the 

*[I omit sections 9-12.] t [I omit sections 15-19.] J [I omit sections 3-15, 
and also the whole of chapters xvi. and xvii.] || [I omit section 1.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 559 

common custom that this should he done by our order* we see 
copiously described' in the speech of Crassus. 9. This kind of 
bounty, therefore, I prefer far before the munificent exhibition Of 
shows. That is the part of dignified and great men- — this of flat- 
terers of the populace, tickling, as it were, with pleasures the levity 
of the multitude. 10. It will, moreover, be expedient that a man, 
as he should be munificent in giving, so that he should not be 
harsh in exacting ; and in every contract, in selling, buying, hir- 
ing, letting, to be just and good-natured to the vicinage and sur- 
rounding occupiers; conceding to many much that is his own 
right, but shunning disputes as far as be can conveniently, and 1 
know not but even a little more than he can conveniently. f 

II., XX., 11.+ But our morals are corrupted and depraved by the 
admiration of other men's wealth. Though what concern is its 
amount to any of us? 12. Perhaps it is of use to him who owns 
it; not always even • that : but admit that it is of use to himself, 
to be sure he is able to spend more, but how is he an honester man ? 
13. But if he shall be a good man besides, let his riches not pre- 
vent him from getting our assistance — only let them not help him 
1;o get it, and let the entire consideration be not how wealthy, but 
how worthy each individual is. 14. But the last precept about 
benefits and bestowing our labor is, do nothing hostile to equity — 
nothing in defense of injustice. For the foundation of lasting 
commendation and fame is justice — without which nothing can be 
laudable. 

II., XXi., 1. But since I have finished speaking about that kind 
of benefits which have regard to a single citizen, we have next to 
discourse about those which relate to all the citizens together, and 
which relate to** the public good. 2. But of those very ones, some 
are of that kind which relate to all the citizens collectively ; some 
are such that they reach to all individually, which are likewise the 
more agreeable. 3. The effort is by all means to be made, if pos- 
sible, toff consult for both, and notwithstanding, to consult also 
for them individually ; but in such a manner that this may either 
serve, or. at least should not oppose, the|| public interest. 4. The 
grant of corn proj)osed by Caius Gracchus was large, and there- 
fore would have exhausted the treasury; that of Marcus Octavius 
was moderate, both able to be borne by thej| state, and necessary for 

* The senatorial, f [I omit sections 1 1 -16, and also the whole of chapter xix.J 
1 [I omit sections 1-10.] ** [Ad rem publicam.] tt [" We ought by all means 
to lend our endeavors to practice both kinds (of benefits), if it can be done, and 
that the interests of individuals also be provided for no less (than those of the 
■community at large)." — Aathon (page 253).] %% [Rei publics.] 



560 Kant's Elides. § 1043; 

the commons ; therefore it was salutary both for the citizens and 
for the nation. 5. But it is in the first place to be considered by 
him who shall have the administration of the government, that 
each may retain his own, and that no diminution of the property 
of individuals be made by public authority.* 

14. But the principal matter in every administration of public 
business and employments is, that even the least suspicion of 
avarice be repelled. 15. " Would f ," said Caius Pontius, the 
Samnite, " that fortune had reserved me for those times, and I 
had been born then, whenever the Romans may have begun to 
accept bribes — I would not have suffered them to reign much 
longer." 16. He surely would have had to wait many generations. 
For it is of late that this evil has invaded this state ; therefore I 
am well pleased that Pontius was in existence rather at that time, 
since so much power resided in him. 17. It is not yet a hundred 
and ten years since a law about bribery was passed by Lucius 
Piso, when previously there had been no such law. But after- 
ward there were so many laws, and each successive one more 
severe, so many persons arraigned, so many condemned, such an 
Italian war excited through fear of condemnations, such a rifling 
and robbing of our allies, those laws and judgments were sus- 
pended, that we are strong through the weakness of others, not 
through our own valor. 

II , xxii., 1. Pansetius applauds Africanus because he was self- 
denying. Why not applaud him ? But in him there were other 
and greater characteristics ; the praise of self-restraint was not 
the praise of the man only, but also of those times. 2. Paullus 
having possessed himself of the whole treasure of the Macedoni- 
ans, which was most immense, brought so much wealth into the 
treasury, that the spoils of one commander put an end to taxes :, 
but to his own house he brought nothing except the eternal mem- 
ory of his name. 3. Africanus, imitating his father, was nothing 
the richer for having overthrown Carthage. 4. What ! Lucius 
JVlemmius, who was his colleague in the censorship, was he the 
wealthier for having utterly destroyed the wealthiest of cities? 
He preferred ornamenting Italy rather than his own house — 
although by the adornment of Italy, his own house itself seems to- 
me more adorned. 5. No vice, then, is more foul (that my dis- 
course may return to the point from whence it digressed) than 
avarice, especially in great men and such as administer the repub- 
lic. 6. For to make a gain of the republic is not only base, but 
wicked also, and abominable. 7. Therefore, that which the Pythian 

* [I omit sections 6-13.] f [I omit part of the translation.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 561 

Apollo delivered by his oracle, "that Sparta would perish by noth- 
ing but its avarice," he seems to have predicted not about the 
Lacedaemonians alone, but about all opulent nations. 8. More- 
over, they who preside over the state can by no way more readily 
conciliate the good-will of the multitude than by abstinence and 
self-restraint. 

9. But they who wish to be popular, and upon that account 
either attempt the agrarian affair, that the owners may be driven 
out of their possessions, or think that borrowed money should be 
released to the debtors, sap the foundations of the constitution ; 
namely, that concord, in the first place, which can not exist when 
'money is exacted from some, and forgiven to others ; and equity, 
in the next place, which is entirely subverted, if each be not per- 
mitted to possess his own.* 

If., XXiii , 1. And on account of this kind of injustice, the 
Lacedaemonians expelled their Ephorus Lysander, and put to 
death their king Agis — a thing which never before had happened 
among them. 2. And from that time such great dissensions en- 
sued, that tyrants arose, and the nobles were exiled, and a consti- 
tution admirably established fell to pieces. 3. Nor did it fall 
alone, but also overthrew the rest of Greece by the contagion of 
evil principles, which having sprung from the Lacedaemonians, 
flowed far and wide. 4. What! was it not the agrarian conten- 
tions that destroyed our own Gracchi, sons of that most illustrious 
man Tiberius Gracchus, and grandsons of Africanus? 5. But, on 
the contrary, Aratus, the Sicyonian, is justly commended, who, 
when his native city had been held for fifty years by tyrants, 
having set out from Argos to Sicj^on, by a secret entrance got pos- 
session of the city, and when on a sudden he had overthrown the 
tyrant Nicocles, he restored six hundred exiles, who had been the 
wealthiest men of that state, and restored freedom to the state by 
his coming. 6. But when he perceived a great difficulty about the 
goods and possessions, because he considered it most unjust both 
that they whom he had restored, of whose property others had 
been in possession,. should be in want, and he did not think it verj" 
fair that possessions of fifty years should be disturbed, because that 
after so long an interval many of those properties were got pos- 
session of without injustice, by inheritance, many by purchase, 
many by marriage portions; he judged neither that the properties 
ought to be taken from the latter, nor that these to whom they 
had belonged should be without satisfaction. 7. When, then, he 
had concluded that there was need of money to arrange that mat- 

* [I omit sections 10-14.] 



562 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

ter, he said that he would go to Alexandria, and ordered the matter 
to be undisturbed until his return. He quickly came to his friend 
Ptolemy, who was then reigning, the second after the building of 
Alexandria, 8. and when he had explained to him that he was 
desirous to liberate his country, and informed him of the case, this 
most eminent man readily received consent from the opulent king 
that he should be assisted with a large sum of money. 9. When 
he had brought this to Sicyon, he took to himself for his council 
fifteen noblemen, with whom he took cognizance of the cases, 
both of those Avho held other persons' possessions, and of those 
who had lost their own ; and by valuing the possessions, he so % 
managed as to persuade some to prefer receiving the money, and 
yielding up the possessions ; others to think it more convenient 
that there should be paid down to them what was the price, rather 
than they should resume possession of their own. Thus it was 
brought about that all departed without a complaint, and concord 
was established. 10. Admirable man, and worthy to have been 
born in our nation! Thus it is right to act with citizens, not (as 
we have now seen twice*) to fix up a spear in the forum, and sub- 
ject the goods of the citizsns to the voice of the auctioneer. 
11. But that Greek thought, as became a wise and superior man, 
that it was necessary to consult for all. And this is the highest 
reason and wisdom of a good citizen, not to make divisions in the 
interests of the citizens, but to govern all by the same equity. 
Should any dwell free of expense in another man's house? 12. 
Why so? Is it that when I shall have bought, built, repaired, ex- 
pended, you, without my will, should enjoy what is mine? What 
else is this but to take from some what is theirs ; to give to some 
what is another man's? But what'is the meaning of an abolition 
of debts, unless that you should buy an estate with my money — 
that you should have the estate, and I should not have my money? 
II. , xxiv., 1. Wherefore, it ought to be provided that there be 
not such an amount of debt as may injure the state — a thing 
which may be guarded against in many ways ; not that if there 
shall be such debt the rich should lose their rights, and the debtors 
gain what is another's — 2. for nothing holds the state more firmly 
together than public credit, which can not at all exist unless the 
payment of money lent shall be compulsory. 3. It never was 
more violently agitated than in my consulship, that debts should 
not be paid; the matter was tried in arms and camps, by every 
rank and description of men, whom I resisted in such a manner, 
that this mischief of such magnitude was removed from the 

* Under Svlla, and under Caesar. 



§1043 The. Clavis to an Index. 563 

state. 4. Never was debt either greater, or better and more easily 
paid. For the hope of defrauding being frustrated, the necessity 
of paying followed.* 6. From this kind of liberality, then, to give 
to some, to take from others, they will keep aloof who would pre- 
serve the commonwealth, and will take particular care that each 
may hold his own in equity of right and judgments; and neither 
that advantage be taken of the poorer class, on account of their 
humbleness, nor that envy be prejudicial to the rich, either in keep- 
ing or recovering their own.f 

8. Now, in these precepts about things profitable, Antipater the 
Tyrian, a Stoic, who lately died at Athens, considers that two 
things are passed over by Pansetius — the care of health and of 
property — which matters 1 fancy were passed over by that very 
eminent philosopher because they were obvious; they certainly 
are useful. 9. Now, health is supported by understanding one's 
own constitution, and by observing! | what things are accustomed to 
do one good or injury: and by temperance in all food and man- 
ner of living, for the sake of preserving the body ; and by forbear- 
ance in pleasures ; and lastly, by the skill of those to whose pro- 
fession these things belong. 10. Wealth ought to be acquired by 
those means in which there is no disgrace, but preserved by 
diligence and frugality, and increased, too, by the same means. 
11. These matters Xenophon. the Socratic philosopher, has dis- 
cussed very completely in that book which is entitled (Economics, 
which 1, when 1 was about that age at which you are now, trans- 
lated from the Greek into Latin. ;£ 

BOOK III., chapter i., § 1. Publius Scipio, my son Marcus, 
he who first was surnamed Africanus, was accustomed, as Cato, 
who was nearly of the same age as he, has written, to say " that 
he was never less at leisure than when at leisure, nor less alone 
than when he was alone." 2. A truly noble saying, and worthy 
of a great and wise man, which declares that both in his leisure 
he was accustomed to reflect on business, and in solitude to 
converse with himself; so that he never was idle, and sometimes 
was not in need of the conversation of another. Thus, leisure and 
solitude, two things which cause languor to others, sharpened him. 
3. I could wish it were in my power to say the same. But if I 
can not quite attain to any imitation of so great an excellence of 
disposition, I come very near it, in will at least. 4. For, being- 
debarred by impious arms and force from public affairs and forensic 
business, I remain in retirement ; and on that account having left 

* [I omit section 5.] f [I omit the remainder of section 6 and the whole of 
section 7.] J [I omit chapter xxv.] |j[Xen. Mem. IV., vii., 9 (page 409 above).] 



5 04 Kanfs Ethics. % 1043 

the city, wanderiug about the fields, I am often alone. 5. Bat 
neither is this leisure to be compared with the leisure of Africanus, 
nor this solitude with that. 6. For he, reposing from the most 
honorable employments of the state, sometimes took leisure to 
himself, and sometimes betook himself from the concourse and 
haunts of men into his solitude as into a haven : 7. but my re- 
tirement is occasioned by the want of business, not by the desire 
of repose. For, the senate being extinct, and courts of justice 
abolished, what is there that I could do worthy of myself, either 
in the senate-house or in the forum? 8. Thus, I who formerly 
lived in the greatest celebrity, and before the eyes of the citizens, 
now shunning the sight of wicked men, with whom all places 
abound, conceal myself as far as it is possible, and often am alone. 
9. But since we have been taught by learned men, that out of 
evils it is fit- not only to choose the least, but also from those very 
evils to gather whatever is good in them, I therefore am both en- 
joying rest — not such, indeed, as he ought who formerly procured 
rest for the state, — and I am not allowing that solitude which 
necessity, not inclination, brings me, to be spent in idleness.* 12. 
And thus 1 have written more in a short time, since the overthrow 
of the republic, than in the many years while it stood. 

III., ii., 1. But as all philosophy, my Cicero, is fruitful and 
profitable, and no part of it uncultivated and desert — so no part 
in it is more fruitful and profitable than that about duties, from 
which the rules of living consistently and virtuously are derived. 
2. Wherefore, although I trust you constantly hear and learn 
these matters from my friend Cratippus, the prince of the philoso- 
phers within our memory, yet I think it is beneficial that your 
ears should ring on all sides with such discourse, and that they, if 
it w r ere possible, should hear nothing else. 3. Which, as it ought 
to be done by all who design to enter upon a virtuous life, so I 
know not but it ought by no one more than you ; 4. for you 
stand under no small expectation of emulating my industry — 
under a great one of emulating my honors — under no small one, 
perhaps, of my fame. 5. Besides, you have incurred a heavy re- 
sponsibility both from Athens and Cratippus; and since you have 
gone to these as to a mart for good qualities, it would be most 
scandalous to return empty, disgracing the reputation both of the 
city and of the master. 6. Wherefore, try and accomplish as 
much as you can, labor with your mind and with your industry (if 
it be labor to learn rather than a pleasure), and do not permit 
that, when all things have been supplied by me, you should seem 

* [I omit sections 10 and 11.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 565 

to have been wanting to yourself. 7. But let this suffice ; for we 
have often written much to you for the purpose of encouraging 
you. Now let us return to the remaining part of our proposed 
division. 

8. Panastius, then, who without controversy has discoursed most 
accurately about duties, and whom I, making some correction, 
have principally followed, having proposed three heads under 
which men were accustomed to deliberate and consult about duty — 
one, when they were in doubt whether that about which they were 
considering was virtuous or base ; another, whether useful or un- 
profitable ; a third, when that which had the appearance of virtue 
was in opposition to that which seemed useful, how this ought to 
be determined ; he unfolded the two fi>st heads in three books, 
but on the third head he said that he would afterward write, but 
did not perform what he had promised'.* 

III., iii., 1. Wherefore, there can not be a doubt about the 
opinion of Panaetius; but whether it was right in him, or other- 
wise, to join this third part to the investigation of duty, about 
this, perhaps, there may be a question. 2. For whether virtue be 
the only good, as is the opinion of the Stoics, or whether that 
which is virtuous be, as it appears to your Peripatetics, so much 
the greatest good, that all things placed on the other side have 
scarcely the smallest weight ; it is not to be doubted but that 
utility never can compare with virtue. 3. Therefore we have 
learned that Socrates used to execrate those who had first separated 
in theory those things cohering in nature. 4. To whom, indeed, 
the Stoics have so far assented, that they considered that Avhatever 
is virtuous is useful, and that nothing can be useful which is not 
virtuous. 5. But if Panaetius was one who would say that virtue 
was to be cultivated only on this account, because it was a means 
of procuring profit, as they do who measure the desirableness of 
objects either by pleasure or by the absence of pain, it would be 
allowable for him to say that our interest sometimes is opposed to 
virtue. 6. But as he was one who judged that alone to be good 
which is virtuous, but that of such things as oppose this with some 
appearance of utility, neither the accession can make life better, 
nor the loss make it worse, it appears that he ought not to have 
introduced a deliberation of this kind, in which what seems profit- 
able could be compared with that which is virtuous. 7. For what 
is called the summum bonum by the Stoics, to live agreeably to 
nature, has, I conceive, this meaning — always to conform to virtue ; 
and as to all other things which may be according to nature, to 

* [I omit sections 9-14,] 



,566 Kant's Ethics. §1043 

take them if they should not be repugnant to virtue. 8. And 
since this is so, some think that this comparison is improperly in- 
troduced, and that no principle should be laid down upon this 
head. 9. And, indeed, that perfection of conductf f which is properly 
and truly called so, exists in the wise alone, and can never be sep- 
arated from virtue. But in those persons in whom there is not 
perfect wisdom, that perfection can indeed by no means exist ; but 
the likeness of it can.* 

III., iv., 2.f Nor, indeed, when the two Decii or the two Scipios 
are commemorated as brave men, or when Fabricius and Aristides 
are called just, is either an example of fortitude looked for from 
the former, or of justice from the latter, as from wise men. 3. For 
neither of these was wise in such a sense as we wish the term wise 
man to be understood. Nor were these who were esteemed and 
named wise, Marcus Cato and Caius Laelius, wise men ; nor were 
even those famous seven,;}; but from the frequent performance of 
mean duties they bore some similitude and appearance of wise 
men. 4. Wherefore, it is neither right to compare that which is 
truly virtuous with what is repugnant to utility, nor should that 
which we commonly call virtuous, which is cultivated by those 
who wish to be esteemed good men, ever be compared with profits. 
5. And that [so much of] virtue which falls within our compre- 
hension is as much to be maintained and preserved by us. as that 
which is properly called, and which truly is [the whole of] virtue, 
is by the wise. 6. For otherwise, whatever advancement is made 
toward virtue, it can not be maintained. || But these remarks are 
made regarding those who are considered good men, on account of 
their observance of duties ; 7. but those who measure all things 
by profit and advantage, and who do not consider that those things 
are outweighed by virtue, are accustomed, in deliberating, to com- 
pare virtue with that which they think profitable ; good men are 
not so accustomed. 8. Therefore, I think that Pansetius, when he 
said that men w^ere accustomed to deliberate on this comparison, 
meant this very thing which he expressed — only that it was their 
custom, not that it was also their duty. 9. For not only to think 

* [I omit sections 10-13.] t [I omit section 1.] % The seven wise men of 
Greece. || [Perfect wisdom holds that nothing can be useful which is not virtu- 
ous; therefore virtue and utility can not conflict with each other (III., iii., 2-8). 
The. imperfect wisdom of common men ought not to permit its imperfect con- 
ception of virtue to seem to stand opposed to utility (iii., 9; iv.. 2-6). But the 
actual fact is that men do make comparisons which imply that virtue and ex- 
pediency may be at variance (iv., 7-9); therefore instruction is nece'ssary (iv., 
10 and 14); and this is the object of this third book (III, ii., 8 ; II., iii., 1 ; I., 
iii., 8; III., vii., 7-8).] tt [Honestum, i. e. righteousness.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 567 

more of what seems profitable than what is virtuous, but even to 
compare them one with the other, and to hesitate between them, 
is most shameful. 

10. What is it, then, that is accustomed at times to raise a doubt, 
and seems necessary to be considered? 1 believe, whenever a 
doubt arises, it is what the character of that action may be about 
which one is considering.* 14. Therefore, that we may be able to 
decide without any mistake, if ever that which we call expediency 
(utile) shall appear to be at variance with that which we under- 
stand to be virtuous (honestum), a certain rule ought to be estab- 
lished, which if we will follow in comparing such cases, we shall 
never fail in our duty. 15. But this rule will be one conformable 
to the reasoning and discipline of the Stoics chiefly, which, indeed, 
we are following in these books, because, though both by the ancient 
Academicians and by your Peripatetics, who formerly were the 
same sect,f things which are virtuous are preferred to those which 
seem expedient ; nevertheless, those subjects are more nobly treated 
of by those X to whom whatever is virtuous seems also expedient, 
and nothing expedient which is not virtuous, than by those accord- 
ing to whom that may be virtuous which is not expedient, and 
that expedient which is not virtuous. 16. But to us, our Academic 
sect gives this' great license, that we, whatever may seem most- 
probable, by our privilege are at liberty to maintain. But I re- 
turn to my rule. 

BOOK III., Chapter V., § 1. To take away wrongfully, then, 
from another, and for one man to advance his own interests by the 
disadvantage of another man, is more contrary to nature than 
death, than poverty, than pain, than any other evils which can be- 
fall either our bodies or external circumstances. 2. For, in the 
first place, it destroys human intercourse and society ; for if we 
will be so disposed that each for his ow^i gain shall despoil or 
offer violence to another, the inevitable consequence is, that the 
society of the human race, which is most consistent with nature, 
will be broken asunder. 3. As, supposing each member of the 
body was so disposed as to think it could be well if it should draw 
to itself the health of the adjacent member, it is inevitable that 
the whole body would be debilitated and would perish ; so if each 
of us should seize for himself the interests of another, and wrest 
whatever he could from each for the sake of his own emolument, 
the necessary consequence is, that human society and community 
would be overturned. 4. It is indeed allowed, nature not opposing, 
that each should rather acquire for himself than for another, 

*[I omit sections 11-13.] t [See note X page 423 above.] j The Stoics!" 



568 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

whatever pertains to the enjoyment of life ; but nature does not 
allow this, that by the spoliation of others we should increase our 
own means, resources, and opulence. 5 Nor indeed is this forbid- 
den by nature alone — that is, by the law of nations — but it is also 
in the same manner enacted by the municipal laws of countries, 
by which government is supported in individual states, that it 
should not be lawful to injure another man for the sake of one's 
own advantage.* 6. For this the laws look to, this they require, 
that the union of the citizens should be unimpaired; those who 
are for severing it they coerce by death, by banishment, by im- 
prisonment, by fine. 7. But what declares this much more is our 
natural reason, which is a law divine and human, which he who 
is willing to obey (and all will obey it who are willing to live ac- 
cording to nature) never will suffer himself to covet what is 
another person's, and to assume to himself that which he shall 
have wrongfully taken from another. 8. For loftiness and great- 
ness of mind, and likewise community of feeling, justice and lib- 
erality, are much more in accordance with nature, than pleasure, 
than life, than riches — which things, even to contemn and count 
as nothing in comparison Avith the common good, is the part of a 
great and lofty soul. 9. Therefore, to take away wrongfully from 
another for the sake of one's own advantage, is more contrary to 
nature than death, than pain, than other considerations of the 
same kind. 10. And likewise, to undergo the greatest labors and 
inquietudes for the sake, if it were possible, of preserving or as- 
sisting all nations, f is more in accordance with nature than to live 
in solitude, not only without any inquietudes, but even amid the 
greatest pleasures, abounding in all manner of wealth, though you 
should also excel in beauty and strength. 11. Wherefore, eveiy 
man of the best and most noble disposition much prefers that life 
to this. 

12. From whence it is evinced that man, obeying nature, can 
not injure men.| 

III., vi„ 1. One thing, therefore, ought to be aimed at by all 
men ; that the interest of each individually, and of all collectively, 
should be the same ; for if each should grasp at his individual in- 
terest, all human society will be dissolved. 2. And also, if nature 

* " La plus sublime vertu est negative ; elle nous instruit de ne jamais faire 
du mal a person ne." — Rousseau. [So also Paul. (Romans, ch. xiii., verse 10: 
" Love works no ill to one's neighbor; therefore love. is the fulfillment of the 
Law." American Bible Union, second revision, New York, 1873.) Cf. Koran, 
LIY-, 4, in Rod-well's version (page 74).] t [I omit part of section 10 at this 
point.] i [I omit sections 13-15.] 



§ 10'43 The Clavis to an Index. 569 

enjoins this, that a man should desire to consult the interest of a 
man, whoever he is, for the very reason that he is man, it neces- 
sarily follows that, as the nature, so the interest, of all mankind, 
is a common one. 3. If that be so, we are all included under one 
and the same law of nature ; and if this too be true, Ave are cer- 
tainly prohibited by the law of nature from injuring another. 
But the first is true ; therefore, the last is true. -1. For that which 
some say, that they would take nothing wrongfully, for the sake 
of their own advantage, from a parent or brother, but that the 
case is different with other citizens, is indeed absurd. 5. These 
establish the principle that they have nothing in the waj- of right, 
no society with their fellow-citizens, for the sake of the common 
interest — an opinion which tears asunder the whole social compact. 
6. The} r , again, who say that a regard ought to be had to fellow- 
citizens, but deny that it ought to foreigners, break up the com- 
mon society of the human race (which being withdrawn, benefi- 
cence, liberality, goodness, justice, are utterly abolished. But 
they who tear up these things should be judged impious), 7.* the 
closest bond of which society is the consideration that it is more 
contrary to nature that man, for the sake of his own gain, should 
wrongfully take from man, than that he should endure all such 
disadvantages, either external or in the person, or even in the 
mind itself, as are not the effects of injustice. 8. For that one 
virtue, justice, is the mistress and queen of all virtues. 

Some person will perhaps say — should not the wise man, then, 
if himself famished with hunger, wrest food from another, some 
good-for-nothing fellow ? 9. By no means ; for my life is not more 
useful to me than such a disposition of mind that 1 would do vio- 
lence to no man for the sake of my own advantage.! 13. Disease, 
then, or poverty, or any thing of this sort, is not more contrary to 
nature than is the wrongful taking or coveting what is another's. 
But the desertion of the common interest is contrary to nature, 
for it is unjust. J 

III., vii., 3. 1 1 But since I am putting, as it were, the top upon 
a work incomplete, yet nearly finished, as it is the custom of 
geometers not to demonstrate every thing, but to require that 
some postulates be granted to them, that they may more readily 
explain what they intend, so I ask of you, my Cicero, that you 
grant me, if you can, that nothing except what is virtuous is 
worthy to be sought for its own sake. 4. But if this be not 

*'[I omit the remainder of section 6 and the first part of section 7. I have 
used a ( ) to enforce a close connection between the parts of the sections retained.] 
f [I omit sections 10-12.] $ [I omit sections 14-19.] j| [I omit sections 1 and 2.] 

37 



570 Kant's Ethics. § 1045 

allowed you by Cratippus,* still you will at least grant that 
what is virtuous is most worthy to be sought for its own sake. 
Whichever of the two you please is sufficient for me, and some- 
times the one, sometimes the other, seems the more probable ; nor 
does any thing else seem probable. f 

5. And in the first place, Pansetius is to be defended in this,, 
that he did not say that the really expedient could ever be opposed 
to the virtuous ffor it was not permitted to him J to say so), but 
only those things which seemed expedient. 6. But he often bears 
testimony that nothing is expedient which is not likewise virtu- 
ous — nothing virtuous which is not likewise expedient ; and he 
denies that any greater mischief has ever attacked the race of 
men than the opinion of those persons who would separate these 
things. 7. It was not, therefore, in order that we should prefer 
the expedient to the virtuous, but in order that we should decide 
between them without error, if ever they should come in collision 7 
that he introduced that opposition which seemed to have, not 
which has, existence. 8. This part, therefore, thus abandoned, I 
will complete with no help, but, as it is said, with my own forces. 
9. For there has not, since the time of Pansetius, been any thing 
delivered upon this subject, of all the works which have come to 
my hands, that meets my approbation. 

Ill viii||., 1. When, therefore, any appearance of expedi- 
ency is presented to you, you are necessarily affected by it ; but 
if, when you direct your attention to it, you see moral turpitude 
attached to that which offers the appearance of expediency, then 
you are under an obligation not to abandon expediency, but to un- 
derstand that there can not be real expediency where there is 
moral turpitude ; 2. because, since nothing is so contrary to 
nature as moral turpitude (for nature desires the upright, thesuit- 
able and the consistent, and rejects the reverse), and nothing is so 
agreeable to nature as expediency, surely expediency and turpi- 
tude can not co-exist in the same subject. 3. And again, since we 
are born for virtue, and this either is the only thing to be desired, 
as it appeared to Zeno, or is at least to be considered weightier in 
its entire importance than all other things, as is the opinion of 

* Cratippus, as a Peripatetic, held that virtue was not the only good, but 
that other things, such as health, etc., were good, and therefore to be sought for 
their own sakes, though in a less degree than virtue ; or, in other words, the 
Peripatetics admitted natural as well as moral good— the Stoics did not. | That 
is to say, he does not admit the probability of the correctness of such as Epi- 
curus, or Hieronymus, etc., who held that pleasure, the absence of pain, etc., 
were worth seeking on their own account. J Because he was a Stoic. || [See- 
note to chapter xiii., section 11, below.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 571 

Aristotle, it is the necessary consequence, that whatever is virtu- 
ous either is the only, or it is the highest good ; hut whatever is 
good is certainly useful — therefore, whatever is virtuous is useful. 

4. Wherefore, it is an error of had men, which, when it grasps 
at something which seems useful, separates it immediately from 
virtue. 5. Hence spring stilettos, hence poisons, hence forgery of 
wills, hence thefts, embezzlements, hence robberies and extortions 
from allies and fellow-citizens, hence the intolerable oppressions 
of excessive opulence — hence, in fine, even in free states, the lust 
of sway, than which nothing darker or fouler can be conceived. 
6. For men view the profits of transactions with false judgment, 
hut they do not see the punishment — I do not say of the laws, 
which they often break through, but of moral turpitude itself, 
which is more severe. 7. Wherefore, this class of skeptics should 
be put out of our consideration (as being altogether wicked and 
impious), who hesitate whether they should follow that which they 
see is virtuous, or knowingly contaminate themselves with wicked- 
ness. For the guilty deed exists in the very hesitation, even 
though they shall not have carried it out. 8. Therefore, such 
matters should not be at all deliberated about, in which the very 
deliberation is criminal ; and also from every deliberation the hope 
and idea of secrecy and concealment ought to be removed. 9. 
For we ought to be sufficiently convinced, if we have made any 
proficiency in philosophy, that even though we could conceal any 
transaction from all* [persons], yet that nothing avaricious should 
be done, nothing unjust, nothing licentious, nothing incontinent.f 

III., X., 1. Many cases frequently occur, which disturb our 
minds by the appearance of expediency. Not when this is the 
subject of deliberation, whether virtue should be deserted on ac- 
count of the magnitude of the profit (for on this, indeed, it is dis- 
honest to deliberate), but this, whether or no that which seems 
profitable can be done without baseness. J 7. Chrysippus has 
judiciously made this remark like many others : — "He, who runs 
a race, ought to make exertions, and struggle as much as he can to 
be victor ; but he ought by no means to trip up or push with his 
hand the person with whom he is contesting. Thus in life it is 
not unjust that each should seek for himself what may pertain to 
his advantage — it is not just that he should take from another." 

8. But our duties are principally confused in cases of friendship; 
for both not to bestow on them what you justly may, and to be- 
stow what is not just, are contrary to duty. 9. But the rule re- 

* [I omit a portion of section 9 at this point.] t [I omit chapter ix.] J [I 
omit sections 2-6.] 



572 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

garding this entire subject is short and easy. For those things 
which seem useful — honors, riches, pleasures, and other things of 
the same kind — should never be preferred to friendship. 10. But, 
on the other hand, for the sake of a friend a good man will neither 
act against the state, nor against his oath and good faith — not even 
if he shall be judge in the case of his friend — for he lays aside the 
character of a friend when he puts on that of a judge. 11. So 
much he will concede to friendship that he would rather the cause 
of his friend were just, and that he would accommodate him as to 
the time of pleading his cause as far as the laws permit. 12. But 
when he must pronounce sentence on his oath, he will remember 
that he has called the divinity as witness — that is, as 1 conceive, 
his own conscience, than which the deity himself has given noth- 
ing more divine to man.* [page 508 above.] 

18. When, therefore, that which seems useful in friendship is 
compared with that which is virtuous, let the appearance of ex- 
pediency be disregarded, let virtue prevail. 19. Moreover, when, 
in friendship, things which are not virtuous shall be required of 
us, religion and good faith should be preferred to friendship. Thus 
that distinction of duty which we are seeking .will be preserved. 

III., xi , 1. But it is in state affairs that men most frequently 
commit crimes under the pretext of expediency — as did our coun- 
trymen in the demolition of Corinth : the Athenians still more 
harshly, since they decreed that the thumbs of the iEginetans, 
who were skillful in naval matters, should be cut off. This seemed 
expedient ; 2. for iEgina, on account of its proximity, was too 
formidable to the Pireeus. But nothing which is cruel can be ex- 
pedient ; for cruelty is most revolting to the nature of mankind, 
which we ought to follow. 3. Those, too, do wrong who prohibit 
foreigners to inhabit their cities, and banish them, as Pennus did 
among our ancesters, and Papius did lately. 4. For it is proper 
not to permit him to be as a citizen who is not a citizen — a law 
which the wisest of consuls, Crassus and Sesevola, introduced : but 
to prohibit foreigners from dwelling in a city is certainly inhuman. 
5. Those are noble actions in which the appearance of public ex- 
pediency is treated with contempt in comparison with virtue. f 
10. Themistocles, after the victory in that war which took place 
with the Persians, said in the assembly, that he had a plan salutary 
for the state, but that it was necessary that it should not be pub- 
licly known. He demanded that the people should appoint some- 
body with whom he might communicate. 11. Aristides was ap- 
pointed. To him he disclosed that the fleet of the Lacedaemonians, 

* [I omit sections 13-17.] f [I omit sections 6-9.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 573 

which was in clock at Gytheum, could secretly be burned ; of 
which act the necessary consequence would be, that the power of 
the Lacedaemonians would be broken ; 12. which, when Aristides 
had heard, he canie into the assembly amid great expectations of 
the people, and §aidthat the plan which Themistocles proposed was 
very expedient, but by no means honorable. Therefore, the 
Athenians were of opinion that what was not upright was not 
even expedient, and on the authority of Aristides, rejected that 
entire matter which they had not even heard. 13. They acted 
better than we who have pirates free from tribute, and allies pay- 
ing taxes. 

III., xii., 1. Let it be inferred, then, that what is base never 
is expedient, not even when you obtain what you think to be use- 
ful. For this very thinking what is base to be expedient, is mis- 
chievous. 2. But, as I said before, cases often occur, when profit 
seems to be opposed to rectitude, so that it is necessary to consider 
whether it is plainly opposed, or can be reconciled with rectitude. 
3. Of that sort are these questions. If, for example, an honest man 
has brought from Alexandria to Rhodes a great quantity of grain 
during the scarcity and famine of the Rhodians, and the very high 
prices of provisions ; if this same man should know that many 
merchants had sailed from Alexandria, and should have seen their 
vessels on the way laden with corn, and bound for Rhodes, should 
he tell that to the Rhodians, or keeping silence, should he sell his 
own corn at as high a price as possible ? 4. We are supposing a 
wise and honest man ; we are inquiring about the deliberation and 
consultation of one who would not conceal the matter from the 
Rhodians if he thought it dishonorable, but is in doubt whether it 
be dishonorable.* 5. In cases of this sort, one view was habitu- 
ally taken by Diogenes, the Babylonian, a great and approved 
Stoic ; and a different view by Antipater, his pupil, a very acute 
man. -It seems right to Antipater, that every thing should be dis- 
closed, so that the buyer should not be ignorant of any thing at 
all that the seller knew. To Diogenes it appears that the seller 
ought, just as far as is established by the municipal law, to declare 
the faults, to act in other respects without fraud; but since he is 
selling, to wish to sell at as good a price as possible. f 

III., xiii , 2.X An honest man would dispose of a house on 
account of some faults which he himself knows, but others are 
ignorant of.|| 3. I ask, if the seller should not tell these things to 
the buyer, and should sell the house for a great deal more than he 

f [See the note to xiii., 11, below,] t[I omit sections 6-10.] % [I omit sec- 
tion 1.] || [I omit the remainder of section 2.] 



574 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

thought he could sell it for, whether he would have acted unjustly 
or dishonestly? He surely would, says Antipater. 4. For if suf- 
fering a purchaser to come to loss, and to incur the greatest dam- 
age by mistake, be not that which is forbidden at Athens with 
public execrations, namely, a not pointing out the road to one 
going astray, what else is ? 5. It is even more than not showing 
the way ; for it is knowingly leading another astray. 6. Diogenes 
argues on the other side. Has he forced you to purchase who did 
not even request you to do so? He advertised for sale a house 
that did not please him; you have purchased one that pleased you. 
7. But if they who advertised " a good and well-built country- 
house," are not thought to have practiced fraud, even though it be 
neither good nor well built; much less have they who have not 
praised their house. For where there is judgment in the buyer, 
what fraud can there be in the seller? 8. But if it be not neces- 
sary to make good all that is said, do you think it necessary to 
make good that which is not said ? For what is more foolish than 
that the seller should relate the defects of that which he sells ? 
Or, what so absurd as that, by the command of the owner, the 
auctioneer should thus proclaim : " I am selling an unhealthy 
house." 

9. In some doubtful cases, then, virtue is thus defended on the 
one side ; on the other side, it is said on the part of expediency, 
that it not only is virtuous to do that which seems profitable, but 
even disgraceful not to do it. This is that dissension which seems 
often to exist between the profitable and the virtuous. 10. Which 
matters we must decide. For we have not proposed them that wo 
might make a question of them, but that we might explain them. 
11. That corn merchant, then, seems to me* to be bound not to 
practice concealment on the Bhodians, nor this house-seller on the 
purchasers. For it is not practicing concealment if you should be 

* [Chancellor Kent (Comm., lect., xxxix., vol. ii., page *491, note) (12th ed., 
1873, pages [678], [679]) says that " Grotius (h. ii., eh. 12, sec. 9), and Puffen- 
clorf (Droit de la Nature, liv. 5, c. 3. sec. 4), as well as Pothier and others, dis- 
sent from the opinion of Cicero, and hold that one party is only bound not to 
suffer the other to be deceived as to circumstances relating intrinsically to the 
substance of the article sold." "It is a little singular, however," Kent remarks 
(loc. eit.), "that some of the best ethical writers, under the Christian dispensation, 
should complain of the moral lessons of Cicero as being too austere in their 
texture, and too sublime in speculation,, for actual use. There is 1 not, indeed, a 
passage in all Greek and Roman antiquity equal, in moral dignity and grandeur, 
to that in which Cicero lays it down as a fixed principle, that we ought to do 
nothing that is avaricious, nothing that is dishonest, nothing that is lascivious, 
even though we could escape the observation of" all. See Bk. III., ch. viii., 
(pa^es 570, 571 above), to which Kent explicitly refers.] 



•§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 575 

silent about any thing ; but when for the sake of your own 
emolument you wish those, whose interest it is to know that which 
you know, to remain in ignorance. 12. Now, as to this sort of 
concealment, who does not see what kind of thing it is, and what 
kind of a man will practice it? Certainly not an open, not a 
single-minded, not an ingenuous, not a just, not a good man ; but 
rather a wily, close, artful, deceitful, knayish, crafty, double-deal- 
ing, evasive fellow. Is it not inexpedient to expose ourselves to 
the imputations of so many vices, and even more ? 

III., xiv., 1. But if they are to be blamed who have kept silent, 
what ought to be thought of those who have practiced falsehood in 
word ? 2. Caius Canius, a Roman knight, not without wit, and 
tolerably learned, when he had betaken himself to Syracuse, for 
the sake, as he was himself accustomed to say, of enjoyment, not 
of business, gave out that he wished to purchase some pleasure- 
grounds, whither he could invite his friends, and where he could 
amuse himself without intruders. 3. When this had got abroad, 
one Pythius, who practiced discounting at Syracuse, told him that 
he had pleasure-grounds, not indeed for sale, but that Canius was 
at liberty to use them as his own if he desired, and at the same time 
he invited the gentleman to dinner at the pleasure-grounds on the 
following day. 4. When he had promised to go, then Pythius, 
who, as a discounter, was well liked among all ranks, called some 
fishermen to him, and requested of them that upon the following 
day they should fish in front of his grounds, and told them what 
he wished them to do. 5. In due time, Canius came to dinner — 
the entertainment was sumptuously provided by Pythius — a crowd 
of fishing-boats before their eyes. Each fisherman for himself 
brought what he had caught; the fish were laid before the feet of 
Pythius. 6. Then Canius says, " What is this, pray [quaeso], 
Pythius — so much fish — so many boats? " And he answers, "What's 
the wonder? Whatever fish there are at Syracuse are taken at 
this place ; here is their watering-place ; these men could not do 
-without this villa. " Canius, inflamed with desire, presses Pythius 
to sell. 7. He is unwilling at first; but, to be brief, he obtains 
his wish. The man, eager and wealthy, purchases the place at as 
much as Pythius demands, and purchases it furnished. 8. He 
draws the articles and completes the transaction. Canius on the 
following day invites his friends. He comes early himself; he 
sees not a boat; be asks of his next neighbor, was it any holiday 
with the fishermen, that he saw none of them. " None that I 
know," said he : " but none used to fish here, and therefore I was 
amazed at what happened yesterday." Canius got angry; 9. yet 



576 Kant's Ethics. 



8 



what could he do ? for my colleague and friend Aquillius had not 
yet brought out the forms about criminal devices; 10. in which 
very forms, when it was inquired of him, " What is a criminal de- 
vice?" he answered, "When one thing is pretended, and another 
thing done. 1 ' Very clearly, indeed, was this laid down; as by a 
man skilled in definition. 11. Therefore, both Pythius, and all 
those who do one thing, while feigning another, are perfidious, 
base, knavish. ISTo act of theirs, then, can be useful, when it is 
stained with so many vices. 

III., XV., 1. But if the Aquillian definition is true, pretense 
and dissimulation ought to be banished from the whole of life ; so 
that neither to buy better, nor to sell, will a good man feign or 
disguise any thing. 2. And this criminal device was punished 
both by the statute laws (as in the case of guardianship by the 
twelve tables, in that of the defrauding of minors, by the Plsetorian 
law), and by judicial decisions without legal enactment, in which is 
added " according to good faith (ex fide bona)."* 5. But criminal 
device, as Aquillius says, is comprised in pretense ; therefore all de- 
ceit should be excluded from contracts. 6. The seller should not 
bring a person to bid over the value, nor the buyer one to bid 
under him. Each of the two, if he should come to name a price,, 
should not name a price more than once. 7. Quintus Screvola, in- 
deed, the son of Publius, when he required that a price of a prop- 
erty of which he was about to become a purchaser should be named 
to him once for all, and the seller had done so, said that he 
valued it at more, and gave in addition a hundred sestertia. 8. 
There is no person who can deny that this was the act of an honest 
man ; they deny that it was of a prudent man ; just as it would 
be if a man should sell a thing for less than he could get. 9. This, 
then, is the mischief 1 — that persons think some men honest, others 
prudent.; through which mistake Ennius remarks, "that the wise 
man is wise in vain, who can not be of use to himself." That in- 
deed is true, if it be only agreed on between me and Ennius what 
" to be of use" means. f 13. But if pretense and dissimulation 
are criminal devices, [and since, moreover] there are few affairs 
in which that criminal device may not be employed ; or [in other 
words] if a good man is he who serves whom he can, injures no- 
body — certainly we do not easily find such a good man, 14. To 
do wrong, then„is never profitable, because it is always base; and 
to be a good man is always profitable, because it is always virtuous. 

III., xvi,, 1. And with respect to the law of landed estates, it 
is ordained among us by the civil law, that in selling them, the 

* [I omit sections 3 and 4.] t [I omit sections 10-12.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 577 

faults should be declared which were known to the seller. 2. For 
though by the twelve tables it was sufficient to be answerable for 
those defects which were expressly mentioned, which he who 
denied suffered a penalty of double the value, yet a penalty for 
silence also was established by the lawyers. 8. For they deter- 
mined that, if the seller knew whatever defect there was in an 
estate, he ought to make it good, unless it was expressly mentioned. 
4. Thus, when the augurs were about to officiate on the augurs' 
hill, and had commanded Titus Claudius Centumalus, who had a 
house on the Caeliah Mount, to take down those parts of it, the 
height of which obstructed their auspices, Claudius set up the 
house for sale, and he sold it ; Publius Calpurnius Lanarius pur- 
chased it. That same notice was given to him by the augurs; 5. 
therefore, when Calpurnius had pulled it down, and had discovered 
that Claudius had advertised the house after he had been com- 
manded by the augurs to pull it down, he brought him before an 
arbitrator, to decide " what he ought to give or do for him in good 
faith." 6. Marcus Cato pronounced the sentence; the father of 
this our Cato (for as other men are to be named from their father, 
so he who begot that luminary ought to be named from his son). 
7. This judge, then, decreed as follows : — " Since in selling he had 
known that matter, and had not mentioned it, that he ought to 
make good the loss to the purchaser." Therefore he established 
this principle, that it concerned good faith that a defect which the 
seller was aware of should be made known to the purchaser.* 

III., XVii., 1. But the laws abolish frauds in one way, philoso- 
phers in another : the laws, as far as they can lay hold of them by 
their arm ; philosophers, as far as they can check them by reason 
and wisdom. Eeason, then, requires that nothing be done insid- 
iously, nothing dissemblingly, nothing falsely. 2. Is it not then 
an ensnaring to lay a net, even though you should not beat up the 
game, nor hunt them to it? For the wild creatures often fall into 
it Of themselves, no one pursuing them. So is it fit you should set 
up your house for sale, put up a bill like a net, sell the house be- 
cause of its defects, and that somebody should rush into it un- 
wittingly? 3. Though I see that this, on account of the corrup- 
tion of manners, is neither esteemed base in morals, nor forbidden 
either by statutable enactments or by civil law ; yet it is forbidden 
by the law of nature. 4. For there is the social tie between man 
and man which is of the widest extent, which, though 1 have often 
mentioned' it, yet needs to be mentioned oftener. There is a closer 
tie between those who are of the same nation; a closer still be- 

* [I omit sections 8—1 1. ] , . 



578 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

tween those who are of the same state. 5. Our ancestors, there- 
fore, were of opinion that the law of nations [jus gentium] was 
one thing, the municipal law [jus civile] a different thing. What- 
ever is civil law, the same is not, for that reason, necessarily the 
law of nations; but whatever is the law of nations, the same 
ought to be civil iaw. 6. But we possess no solid and express 
image of true right and its sister justice : we use merely their 
shade and faint resemblances. Would that we followed even these, 
for they are taken from the best patterns of nature and truth ! 7. 
For how admirable are those words, " that I be not ensnared and 
defrauded on account of you and your bonesty." What golden 
words those — ' : that among honest men there be fair dealing, and 
without fraud." But who are honest men, and what is fair dealing, 
is the great question. 8. Quintus Scsevola, indeed, the high priest, 
used to say that there was the greatest weight in all those decisions 
in which was added the form " of good faith ; " and he thought the 
jurisdiction of good faith extended very widely, and that it was 
concerned in wardships, societies, trusts, commissions, buyings, 
sellings, hirings, lettings, in which the intercourse of life is com- 
prised ; that in these it is the part of a great judge to determine 
(especially since there were contrary decisions in most cases) what 
each ought to be accountable for to each. 9. Wherefore craftiness* 
ought to be put away, and that knavery which would fain seem, in- 
deed, to be prudence, but which is far from it, and differs most 
widely. 10. For prudence consists in the distinguishing of good 
and evilf — knavery, if all things that are vicious are evil, prefers 
evil to good. % 

13. From which it will be understood, since nature is the foun- 
tain of right, that it is according to nature that no one should act 
in such a manner, that he should prey on the ignorance of another. 
14. Nor can there be found in life any greater curse than the pre- 
tense of wisdom in knavery ; from which those innumerable cases 
proceed, where the useful seems to be opposed to the virtuous. 
For how few will be found who, when promised perfect secrecy 
and impunity, can abstain from injustice ? 

ITI., XViii., 1. Let us test the principle, if you please, in those 
examplesin which, indeed, the mass of mankind do not think per- 
baps that there is any crime. 2. For it is not necessary in this 
place to treat of assassins, poisoners, will-forgers, robbers, embez- 
zlers, who are to be kept down, not by means of words and the 
disputation of philosophers, but by chains and a dungeon. But 
let us consider these acts, which they who are esteemed honest 

* [Arist. Nic. Eth. VI., xii., 8 (page 476 above).] t[Cf. Xen. Mem. III., 
., 5 (page 378 above).] % [I omit sections 11 and J 2.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 579 

men commit. 3. Some persons brought from Greece to Rome 
a forged will of Lucius Minucius Basilus, a rich man. 4. That 
they might the more easily obtain their object, they put down as 
legatees along with themselves, Marcus Crassus and Quintus Hor- 
tensius, the most powerful men of that day ; who, though they 
suspected that it was a forgery, but were conscious of no crime in 
themselves, did not reject the paltry gift of other men's villainy. 
5. What then ? Was this enough, that they should not be thought 
to have been culpable ? To me, indeed, it seems otherwise ; though 
I loved one of them when living, and do not hate the other, now 
that he is dead. 6. But when Basilus had willed that Marcus 
Satrius, his sister's son, should bear his name, and had made him 
his heir (I am speaking of him who was patron of the Picene and 
Sabine districts ; oh ! foul stigma upon those times ! *) was it ' fair 
that those noble citizens should have the property, and that noth- 
ing but the name should come down to Satrius ? 7. For if he who 
does not keep otf an injury, nor repel it if he can from another, 
acts unjustly, as I asserted in the first book, what is to be thought 
of him who not only does not repel, but even assists in the injury? 
8. To me, indeed, even true legacies do not seem honorable, if they 
are acquired by deceitful fawning — not by the realitj', but by the 
semblance of kind offices. 9. But in such matters the profitable 
is sometimes accustomed to be thought one thing, and the honest 
another thing. Falsely; for the rule about profit is the same as 
that which obtains respecting honesty. 10. To him who will not 
thoi-oughly perceive this, no fraud, no villainy will be wanting ; 
11. for, considering thus, "that, indeed, is honest, but this is ex- 
pedient," he will dare erroneously to separate things united by 
nature — which is the fountain of all frauds, malpractices, and 
crimes. 

III., xix., 1. If a good man, then, should have this power, 
that by snapping his fingers his name could creep by stealth into 
the wills of the wealthy, he would not use this power, not even if 
he had it for certain that no one at all would ever suspect it 2. 
But should you give this power to Marcus Crassus, that by the 
snapping of his fingers he could be inscribed heir, when he really 
was not heir; believe me, he would have danced in the forum. 3. 
But the just man, and he whom we deem a good man, would take 

* Marcus Satrius, having taken his uncle's name, Lucius Minucius Basilus, 
was chosen as patron by those districts — he was a partisan of Caesar in the civil 
war. In the eyes of Cicero it was, of course, a foul stain upon the times that a 
friend of Csesar should be chosen as patron, especially since, as he insinuates in 
the 2d Philippic, it was through fear, not love, he was selected for that honor. 



580 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

nothing from any man in order to transfer it wrongfully to him- 
self. Let him who is surprised at this confess that he is ignorant 
of what constitutes a good man. 4. But if any one would be will- 
ing to develop the idea involved in his own mind, he would at 
once convince himself that a good man is he who serves whom he 
can, and injures none except when provoked by injury. 5. What 
then? Does he hurt none, who, as if by some enchantment, ac- 
complishes the exclusion of the true heirs, and the substitution of 
himself in their place? 6. Should he not do, then, somebody will 
say, what is useful, what is expedient? Yes, but he should iinder- 
stand that nothing is either expedient or useful which is unjust. 
He who has not learned this, can not be a good man. 

7. When a boy, I learned from my father that Fimbria, the con- 
sular* was judge in the case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthia, Eoman 
knight, a truly honest man, when he had given security,! (which 
he was to forfeit) u unless he was a good man ; " and that Fimbria 
thereupon told him that he never would decide that matter,- lest 
he should either deprive a worthy man of his character if he de- 
cided against him, or should be seen to have established that any 
one was a good man, when this matter was comprised in innumer- 
able duties and praiseworthy actions. 8. To this good man, then, 
whom even Fimbria, not Socrates alone had known, any thing 
which is not morally right canby no means seem to be expedient. 
9. Such a man, then, not only will not venture to do, but not even 
to think, what he would not venture openly to proclaim. 10. Is it 
not disgraceful that philosophers should hesitate about this, which 
not even rustics doubt — from whom is derived this proverb, which 
has now become trite through antiquity ; for when they commend 
the integrity and worthiness of any person, they say "he is one 
with whom you might play odd and even in the dark." 11. What 
meaning has this proverb but this, that nothing is expedient which 
is not morally right, even though you could obtain it without any 
body proving you guilty. 12. J For as, how much soever that 
which is base may be concealed, yet it can by no means become 
morally right (honestum), so it can not be made out that whatever 
is morally wrong can be expedient, since nature is adverse and 
repugnant. 

* So .called, to distinguish him from Caius Fimbria, who having by his in- 
trigues occasioned the death of Lucius Flaccus, the proconsul of Asia (eighty- 
live years B. a), was subsequently conquered by Sylla, and terminated his 
career by suicide. tThe "sponsio" was a sum deposited- in court, or promised - 
with the usual formula — hi veram causam haberet. If the party who thus gave 
securit} r was defeated, the money was forfeited to the treasury, % [I omit the 
first part of section 12.] 



§ 1043 The Clav'is to an Index. 581 

III., XX., 1. But when the prizes are very great, there is a 
temptation to do wrong. When Caius Marius was far from the 
hope of the consulship, and was now in the seventh year of his 
torpor, after obtaining the prastorship, and did not seem likely 
ever to stand for the consulship, he accused Quintus Metellus, a 
very eminent man and citizen, whose lieutenant he was, before the 
Boman people of a charge that he was protracting the war, when 
he had been sent to Borne by him — his own commander ; — stating 
that if they would make himself consul, that he would in a short 
time deliver Jugurtha, either alive or dead, into the power of the 
Boman people. 2. Upon this ho was indeed made consul, but he 
deviated from good faith and justice, since, by a false charge, he 
brought obloquy upon a most excellent and respectable citizen, 
whose lieutenant he was, and by whom he had been sent. 3. 
Even my relative Gratidianus did not discharge the duty of a good 
man at the time when he was praetor, and the tribunes of the peo- 
ple had called in the college of the prsstors, in order that the matter 
of the coinage might be settled by a joint resolution. For at that 
period the coinage was in a state of uncertainty, so that no man 
could know how much he was worth. 4. They drew up in com- 
mon an edict, with a fine and conviction annexed, and agreed that 
they should all go up together to the rostra, in the afternoon. 5. 
And while the rest of them, indeed, went off each a different way, 
Marius, from the judgment seats, went straight to the rostra, and 
singly published that which had been arranged in common. And 
this proceeding, if you inquire into the result, brought him great 
honor. In every street statues of him were erected, and at these 
incense and tapers were burned. What need of many words? 
No man ever became a greater favorite with the multitude. 6. 
These are the things which sometimes perplex our deliberations, 
when that in which equity is violated seems not a very great 
crime, but that which is procured by it appears a very great ad- 
vantage. Thus to Marius it seemed not a very base act to snatch 
away the popular favor from his colleagues and the tribunes of the 
people, but it appeared a very expedient thing by means of that 
act to become consul, which at that time he had proposed to him- 
self. 7. But there is for all, the one rule which I wish to be 
thoroughly known to you; either let not that which seems expedi- 
ent be base, or if it be base let it not seem expedient. 8. What 
then? Can we judge either the former Marius or the latter,* a 
good man? Unfold and examine your understanding, that you 
may see what in it is the idea, form, and notion of a good man. 

* Namely, Marcus Marius Gratidianus. 



582 Kant's Ethics. § 1043 

9. Does it then fall under the notion of a good man to lie for the 
sake of his own advantage, to make false charges, to overreach, 
to deceive? Nothing, indeed, less so. 10. Is there, then, any 
thing of such value, or any advantage so desirable, that for it you 
would forfeit the splendor and name of a good man? 11. What 
is there which that expediency, as it is called, can bring, so 
valuable as that which it takes away, if it deprive you of the 
name of a good man, if it rob you of your integrity and justice? * 

III., xxi., 1. What? Are not they who disregard all things 
upright and virtuous, provided they can attain power, doing the 
same as he f who was willing to have even for his father-in-law, 
that man % hy whose audacity he might himself become as power- 
ful? 2. It seemed expedient to him to become as powerful as pos- 
sible by the unpopularity of the other. He did not see how unjust 
that was toward his country, and how base and how useless. 3. 
But the father-in-law himself always had in his mouth the Greek 
verses from the Phoenissse, which I will translate as well as I can — 
inelegantly, perhaps, yet so that the meaning can be understood : — 
" For if justice ought ever to be violated, it is to be violated for 
the sake of ruling; in other cases cherish the love of country." 

4. Eteocles, or rather Euripides, deserved death for making an 
exception of that one crime, which is the most accursed of all. 
Why, then, do we repress petty villainies, or fraudulent inheritances, 
trades, and sales ? 5. Here is a man for you, who aspired to be 
king of the Roman people, and master of all nations, and accom- 
plished it — 6. if auy one says this desire is an honest one, he is a 
madman. For he approves of the murder of our laws and liberty ; 
the foul and abominable oppression of these he thinks glorious. 
7. But by what reproof, or rather by what reproach, should 1 at- 
tempt to tear away from so great an error the man who admits 
that to usurp kingly power in that state which was free, and which 
ought to be so, is not a virtuous act, but is expedient for him who 
can accomplish it?|| 

9. Expediency, then, should be guided by virtue, and indeed so 
that these two may seem to differ from each other in name, but to 
signify the same in reality. 10. In vulgar opinion I know not 
what advantage can be greater than that of sovereign sway, but, 
on the contrary, when I begin to recall my reason to the truth, I 

* [I omit section 12.] t Pompey % Caesar, whose daughter Julia' was sought 
and obtained in marriage hy Pompey, who heing, from his great power, sus- 
pected of ambitious designs hy the people, with whom Csesar was a favorite, 
wished hy the alliance to hring a share of the suspicion under which himself 
labored upon his rival, and thus to diminish his popularity. }| [I omit section 8.} 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Inchx. 583 

find nothing more disadvantageous to him who shall have attained 
it unjustly. 11. Can torments, cares, daily and nightly fears, a 
life full of snares and perils, be expedient for any man ? 12. " The 
enemies and traitors to sovereignty are many, its friends few," 
says Accius. But to what sovereignty ? That which was justly 
obtained, having been transmitted by descent from Tantalus and 
Pelops. 13. Now, how many more do you think are enemies to 
that king, who with the military force of the .Roman people crushed 
that very Eonian people, and compelled a state that was not only 
free, but also the ruler of the nations, to be slaves to him? What 
stains, what stings of conscience do you conceive that man to have 
upon his soul? 14. Moreover, could his life be a beneficial one to 
himself, when the condition of that life was this, that he who de- 
prived him of it would be held in the highest esteem and glory ? 
15. But if these things be not useful, which seem so in the highest 
degree, because they are full of disgrace and turpitude, we ought 
to be quite convinced that there is nothing expedient which is not 
virtuous. 

III., XXii., 1. But this indeed was decided, as well on other oc- 
casions frequently, as by Caius Fabricius, in his second consulship, 
and by our senate in the war with Pyrrhus. 2. For when king 
Pyrrhus had made aggressive war upon the Eoman people, and 
when the contest was maintained for empire with a generous and 
potent monarch, a deserter from him came into the camp of Fab- 
ricius, and promised him, if he would propose a reward for him, 
that as he had come secretly, so he would return secretly into the 
camp of Pyrrhus, and dispatch him with poison. Fabricius took 
care that this man should be sent back in custody to Pyrrhus, and 
this conduct of his was applauded by the senate. 3. And yet 
if we pursue the appearance and notion [opinionem] of advantage, 
one deserter would have rid us of that great war, and of that 
formidable adversary ; but it would have been a great disgrace 
and scandal, that he, with whom the contest was for glory, had 
been conquered, not by valor, but by villainy. 4. Whether was 
it then more expedient, for Fabricius, who was such a person in 
our state as Aristides was at Athens, or for our senate, which never 
separated expediency from dignity, to fight against an enemy with 
arms or with poison ? 5. If empire is to be sought for the sake of 
glory, away with guilt in which there can not be glory ; but if 
power itself* is to be sought by any means whatever, it can not 
be expedient when allied to infamy. 6. That proposition, therefore, 

* [For itself, for its own sake, not for the sake of glory, but for the sake of 
power.] 



584 Karifs Ethics. § 1043 

of Lucius Philippus, the son of Quintus, was not expedient that 
those states, which, by a decree of the senate, Lucius Sylla, on 
receiving a sum of money, had made free, should again be subject 
to tribute, and that we should not return the money which they 
had given for their freedom. 7. To this the senate agreed. Dis- 
grace to the empire ! For the faith of pirates is better than was 
the senate's. But our revenues have been increased by it — there- 
fore it was expedient ! 8. How long will people venture to say 
that any thing is expedient which is not virtuous ? Now, can 
odium and infamy be useful to any empire which ought to be sup- 
ported by glory and the good-will of its allies? 9 1 often dis- 
agreed in opinion even with my friend Cato. For he seemed to 
me too rigidly to defend the treasury and tributes ; to deny all 
concessions to the farmers of the revenue ; and many to our 
allies, when we ought to have been munificent toward the latter, 
and to have treated the former as we were accustomed to do our 
colonists, and so much the more, because such a harmony between 
the orders* conduced to the safety of the republic. f 

III., xxiii, 1. The sixth book of Hecaton '-De Officiis ■" is 
full of such questions — whether it be the part of a good man, in 
an exceedingly great scarcity of provisions, not to feed his slaves. J 
9. He also asks, if a wise man should receive base money unawares 
for good, shall he, when he shall have come to know it, pay it in- 
stead of good, if he owes money to any person? 10. Diogenes 
affirms this ; Antipater denies it — and with him £ rather agree. || 

12. It is plain now, both what is my view, and what is the con- 
troversy between those philosophers whom I have mentioned.** 

III., XXV., 9.ft Now, indeed, of those things which seem to 
be profitable, contrary to justice, but with the semblance of pru- 
dence, I think enough has been said. 10. But since in the first 
book [ch. v., §2 (page 516 above)] we derived duties from the 
four sources of virtue, we shall be engaged with those same, while 
we show that those things which seem to be useful are not so as 
long as they are hostile to virtue. 11. And indeed of prudence, 
which craft is apt to imitate, and likewise of justice, which is 
always expedient, we have already treated. 12. Two parts of 

*The equestrian order, who were the farmers of the revenue, and the sena- 
tors, who exacted too rigidly the full amount of the contracts, notwithstanding 
any event that might render the taxes less valuable to the farmers. This dis- 
gusted the knights with the senate, and threw them into the arms of Caesar, 
who procured for them a remission of part of their liabilities, t [I omit sections 
10 and 11.] % [I omit the remainder of section 1, and the whole of sections 
2-8]. || [I omit the remainder of section 10, the whole of section 11, and the 
first part of section 12.] ** [See ch. xii.. xiii. (pages 573, 574 above).] ft [I 
omit sections 1-8, and also the whole of chapter xxiv.] 



•§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 585 

virtue remain, of which the one is discerned in the greatness and 
pre-eminence of an elevated mind ; the other in the habit and 
regulation of continence and temperance. 

III., XXVi., 7.* Marcus Atilius Eegulus, when in his second 
consulship taken in Africa by stratagem by Xanthippus, the Lace- 
daemonian general — but when Hamilear, the father of Hannibal, 
was the commander-in-chief — was sent to the senate, bound by an 
oath, that unless some noble captives were restored to the Cartha- 
ginians, he should himself return to Carthage. 8. When he 
arrived at Rome, he saw the semblance of advantage, but, as the 
event declares, judged it a fallacious appearance, which was this 
— to remain in his country, to stay at home with his wife and his 
children; and, regarding the calamity which he had experienced 
as incident to the fortune of war, to retain the rank of consular 
dignity. Who can deny these things to be profitable? Who do 
you think ? Greatness of mind and fortitude deny it. 

III., XXVli., 4.t When his authority had prevailed, the 
captives were retained, and he returned to Carthage ; nor did the 
love of his country or of his family withhold him. 5. Nor was he 
then ignorant that he was returning to a most cruel enemy, and to 
exquisite tortures. But he considered that his oath ought to be 
observed. 6. Therefore, at the very time when he was undergoing 
death by want of sleep, he was in a better condition than if 
he had remained at home an aged captive, and a perjured'! 
consular. 1 1 

III., XXViii., . Men pervert those things which are the 
foundations of nature, when they separate expediency from vir- 
tue. For we all desire our own interest — we are carried along to 
it ; nor can we by any means dp otherwise. 2. For who is there 
that shuns his own advantage? or rather, who is there that does 
not most eagerly pursue it ? 3. But because we never can find 
real advantage except in good report, honor, virtue; therefore we 
esteem these things first and chief; we consider the name of utility 
not so much noble as necessary. 4. What is there, then, some- 
body will say, in an oath ? ** 

III., XXix., 3.ft But in an oath it ought to be considered, not 
what is the fear, but what is the force. 4. For an oath is a re- 
ligious affirmation ; but what you solemnly promise, as if the deity 
were witness, to that you ought to adhere. XX 



:; [I omit sections 1-6.] t [I omit sections 1-3.] J [See I., xiii., 2 (page 521 
above).] || [I omit sections 7 and 8.] ** [I omit the remainder of section 4. and 
the whole of sections 5-10.] tt [1 omit sections 1 and 2.] .|+ [I omit the re- 
mainder of section 4, and the whole of sections 5-9.] 

38 



586 Kant's Ethics. § 1045 

10. But as to what they say, choose the least of evils — that is- 
[choose] baseness rather than calamity — can there be any evil 
greater than baseness ? And if this implies something of disgust 
in the deformity of person [corporis], how much worse should 
appear the depravity and foulness of a debased mind ?* 

III., XXX- , 6.f But, say they, that which was extorted by 
force ought not to be ratified ; as if, indeed, force could be used 
to a man of fortitude. 7. Why, then, you say, did Eegulus go to 
the senate, if he was about to dissuade them concerning the cap- 
tives ? You are reprehending that which was the noblest thing in 
that transaction ; 8. for he did not rely, upon his own judgment, 
but he undertook the cause that there might be a decision of the 
senate; by whom, had not he himself been the adviser of the 
measure, the prisoners, indeed, would have been restored to the 
Carthaginians. Thus Begulus would have remained in safety in 
his country ; 9. which, because he thought inexpedient for his 
country, therefore he believed it virtuous in himself both to think 
and to suffer these things. 10. Now, as to what they say, that 
whatever is very useful becomes virtuous, I say, Nay, it is so really, 
and does not merely become so ; for nothing is expedient which is 
not likewise virtuous ; and it is not because it is expedient that it 
is virtuous, but because it is virtuous it is expedient.]; 

III., XXXiii., 1. The fourth part remains, which is compre- 
hended in propriety, moderation, modesty, continence, temper- 
ance. 2. Can any thing, then, be expedient, which is contrary to 
this train of such virtues? 3. However, the Cyrenseans, followers- 
of Aristippus, and the Annicerians, misnamed philosophers, have 
made all good consist in pleasure, and have thought virtue to be 
commended on this account, because it is productive of pleasure ; 
but, as they are antiquated, Ejficurus flourishes, the advocate and 
author of nearly the same opinion. 4. Against these we must 
fight with man and horse, as it is said, if it is our intention to de- 
fend and retain virtue. 5. For if not only expedienc}^, but all the 
happiness of life, be contained in a strong bodily constitution, and 
in the certain hope of that constitution, as it is written by 
Methrodorus ; certainly this expediency, and that the greatest (as 
they think), will stand in opposition to virtue. 6. For, in the first 
place, where will room be given for prudence ? Is it that it may 
seek on all sides after sweets ? 7. How miserable the servitude of 
virtue, when the slave of pleasure ? Moreover, what would be the 
office of Prudence ? Is it to select pleasures ingeniously ? Admit 

" :;: '[I omit sections 11-22.] t [I omit sections 1-5.] ± [I omit section 11, and 
also the whole of chapters xxxi. and xxxii.] 



§ 1043 The Clavis to an Index. 587 

that nothing could be more delightful than this ; what can be inv 
agined more base? 8. Now, what room can Fortitude, which is 
the contemning of pain and labor, have in his system, who calls 
pain the greatest of evils ? 9. For though Epicurus may speak, 
as he does in many places, with sufficient fortitude regarding pain ; 
nevertheless, we are not to regard what he may say, but what it is 
consistent in him to say, as he would confine good to pleasure, evil 
to pain ; so if I would listen to him on the subject of continence 
and temperance, he says, indeed, many things in many places ; but 
there is an impediment in the stream,* as they say. 10. For how 
can he commend temperance who places the chief good in pleasure ? 
For temperance is hostile to irregular passions ; but irregular pas- 
sions are the companions of pleasure. 11. And yet, in these three 
classes of virtue, they make a shift, in what ever manner they 
can, not without cleverness. 12. They introduce prudence as the 
science which supplies pleasures and repels pain. Fortitude, too, 
they explain in some manner, when they teach that it is the 
means of disregarding death, and enduring pain. 13. Even tem- 
perance they introduce — not very easily, indeed — but yet in 
whatever way they can. For they say that the height of pleas- 
ure is limited to the absence of pain.f Justice staggers, or 
rather falls to the ground, and all those virtues which are discerned 
in society, and the association of mankind. 14. For neither kind- 
ness, nor liberality, nor courtesy can exist, any more than friend- 
ship, if they are not sought for their own sakes, but are referred 
to pleasure and interest. 15. Let us, therefore, sum up the subject 
in a few words. For as we have taught that there is no expedi- 
ency which can be contrary to virtue : so we say that a]l bodily 
pleasure is opposed to virtue. 16. On which account I think Cal- 
lipho and Dinomachus the more deserving of censure, for they 
thought they would put an end to the controversy if they should 
couple pleasure with virtue. J 17. Virtue does not admit that com- 
bination — it spurns, it repels it [§242]. ISTor can, indeed, the 
ultimate principle of good and evil, which ought to be simple, be 
compounded of, and tempered with these most dissimilar ingre- 
dients 18. But about this (for it is an important subject), I have 
said more in another place. Now to my original proposition. 19. 
How, then, if ever that which seems expedient is opposed to vir- 
tue, the matter is to be decided, has been sufficiently treated of 
above. 20. But if pleasure be said to have even the semblance of 

* Meaning that the system of Epicurus presents impediments to the flowing 
of the virtues, like obstructions in a water-course, t That is, that the greatest 
pleasure consists in the absence of pain. +[I omit the remainder of section 16.] 



588 Kant's Ethics. 

expedience, there can be no union of it with virtue. 21. For 
though we may concede something to pleasure, perhaps it has 
something of a relish, but certainly it has in it nothing of utility. 
III., xxxiv., 1. You have a present from your father, my son 
Marcus; in my opinion, indeed, an important one — but it will be 
just as you will receive it. However, these three books will de- 
serve to be received by you as guests among the commentaries of 
Cratippus. 2. But as, if I myself had gone to Athens (which 
would indeed have been the case had not my country, with loud 
voice, called me back from the middle of my journey), you would 
sometimes have listened to me also : so, since my voice has reached 
you in these volumes, you will bestow upon them as much time as 
you can ; and you can bestow as much as you wish. 3. But when 
I shall understand that you take delight in this department of 
science, then will I converse with you both when present, which 
will be in a short time, as I expect — and while you will be far away. 
I will talk with you, though absent. Farewell, then, my Cicero, 
and be assured that you. are indeed very dear to me, but that you 
will be much more dear if you shall take delight in such memorials 
and precepts. 

§ 1044. — Arabians, Scholastics, and Eclectics, (page 39, line 19.) 

§ 1045. — Bacon and Descartes, (page 40, line 5.) 

§ 1046. — Leibnitz and Locke, (page 40, line 23.) 

§ 1047. — Faulty method of Leibnitz and Wolf, (page 41, line 4.) 

§ 1048.— Newton, (page 41, line 14.) 

§ 1049. — Our age is that of criticism, (page 41. line 22.) 

Chapter V.— Cognition in general — Intuitive and discursive cognition ; intui- 
tion and conception, and their distinction in particular— Logical and sestheti- 
cal perfection of cognition. ('■>/-, 1050-1063 inclusive. ) 

§ 1050. — All our cognition refers (1) to the object, and (2) to the 
subject. (1) -Representation ; (2) consciousness, (page 42, line 17.) 

§ 1051. — Every cognition has (1) a matter, and (2) a form, (page 
43, line 1.) 

§ 1052. — Consciousness is the essential condition of all logical 
form of cognitions, (page 43, line 12.) 

§1053. — Bepresentation is not cognition ; but cognition always 
presupposes representation, (page 43, line 19.) 

§ 1054.— All clear representations (to which alone the logical 
rules can be applied) may be distinguished with regard to distinct- 
ness and to indistinctness, (page 44, line 7.) 

§ 1055. — Indistinct representations improperly termed confused 
(by the disciples of Wolf), (page 45, line 5.) 

§1056.- — Distinctness may be two-fold: (1) sensual; (2) intel- 
lectual, (page 46, line 1.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 589 

§ 1057. — All our cognitions are either (1) intuitions (of the sensi- 
tivity), or (2) conceptions (of the understanding), (page 46, 
line 26.) 

§ 1058. — Perfection of cognition is either (1) sesthetical (relating 
to the sensitivity), or (2) logical (relating to the understanding), 
(page 47, line 20.) 

§ 1059. — Essential sesthetical perfection (the beautiful) specifi- 
cally distinguished from the unessential (the agreeable), (page 
48, line 7.) 

§ 1060. — Study to furnish logically perfect cognitions with an 
sesthetical perfection, (page 48, line 27.) 

§ 1061. — Rules for the conjunction of sesthetical and logical per- 
fection in our cognitions, (page 49, line 28.) 

§ 1062. — Logical and sesthetical perfections of cognition com- 
pared in regard to (1) quantity, (2) quality, (3) relation, and (4) 
modality, (page 50, line 15.) 

§ 1063. — Unity is essential to all perfection of cognition, (page 
51, line 26.) 

PARTICULAR LOGICAL PERFECTIONS OF COGNITION. (A) 
QUANTITY; (B) RELATION; (C) QUALITY; (D) MODALITY. 
(22 1061-1149 inclusive.) 

Chapter VI.— Greatness— Extensive and intensive greatness— Copiousness 
and profoundness or importance and fertility of cognition— Determinatio a of 
the horizon of our cognition. (?| 1064-1076 inclusive.) 

TITLE A. -LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION AS TO QUANTITY. 

§ 1064. — Greatness of cognition may be taken in a two-fold 
sense: (1) extensive; (2) intensive (§ 1076). (page 52, line 24.) 

§ 1065. — Horizon of our cognitions may be determined (1) logi- 
cally. (2) aesthetically, and (3) practically, (page 53, line 7.) 

§ 1066. — Objectively, the horizon of cognition is either historical 
or rational, (page 54, line 11.) 

§ 1067. — Subjectively, the horizon of cognition is either universal 
or particular, (page 55, line 1.) 

§ 1068. — HI very logically perfect cognition is always of some pos- 
sible use. (page 55, line 17.) 

§ 1069. — Eules for our clemarkation of our cognition, (page 57, 
line 1.) 

§ 1070. — Ignorance, objectively, is either material or formal, 
(page 58, line 27.) 

§ 1071. — Ignorance, subjectively, is either learned or common, 
(page 59, line 10.) 

§ 1072. — Learning which is cyclopic (or wants an eye — the eye 
of philosophy), (page 60, line 26.) 



590 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1073. — Pedantry and gallantry in science, (page 62, line 12.) 
. § 1074.— Learn true popularity, (p. 63, 1. 24.) Of §§ 1146, 1060. 
See page 556 above. \_Cicero' s philosophical writings, § 1043.] 
§ 1075. — Architectonic of the sciences, (page 65, line 17.) 
§ 1076. — Intensive greatness of cognition, (page 66, line 9.) 
See § 1064. 

Chapter VII.— Truth— Material and formal or logical truth.— Criteria of logical 
truth— Falsity and error— Appearance, as the source of error— Means to avoid 

errors. ('% 1077-1092 inclusive.) 

TITLE B. -LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION AS TO RELATION. 

§ 1077.— Truth is the essential and indispensable condition of all 
perfection of cognition, (page 67, line 12.) Of. §§ 1062, 1063. 

§1078. — Is there a universal criterion of truth? (page 68, line 
9.) OP. §1539. 

§ 1079.; — Universal material criterion oP truth is not possible. 
(page 68, line 24.) Of § 1540. 

§ 1080 — Conditio sine qua -non of objective truth, (page 69, line 
11.) Of. §1541. 

§1081. — Formal criteria of truth in logic: (1) contradiction; 
(2) sufficient reason, (page 69, line 29.) 

§ 1082. — Inferences from the logical coherence oP a cognition 
with grounds and consequences: (1) negative (modus tollens) ; (2) 
positive (modus ponens). (page 70, line 13.) Of §§ 2538, 2539. 

§ 1083. — Universal formal criteria oP truth : (1) contradiction 
and identity ; (2) sufficient reason ; (3) excluded middle, (page 
72, line 1.) ' 

§ 1084. — Error takes the appearance oP truth for truth itself, 
(page 72, line 16.) 

§ 1085. — Ground oP the origin oP all error, (page 72, line 21.) 
OP. § 1928. 

§ 1086. — Nature does not occasion error: the fault of error we 
have to attribute to ourselves, (page 73, line 24.) 

§ 1087. — All error of the human understanding is but partial, 
(page 74, line 11.) 

§ 1088. — Exactness as an objective perfection oP cognition, 
(page 74, line 16.) See § 1089. - 

§ 1089. — Subtilty as a subjective perfection oP cognition, (page 
75, line 10.) 

§ 1090. — Must endeavor to discover and explain the source of 
errors (page 75, line 30.) 

§ 1091 — Must avoid the reproach oP absurdity or insipidity, 
(page 76, line 30.) Of. § 589. 

§ 1092. — JRules for avoiding error, (page 77, line 24.) 



The Clavis to an, index. 591 

Chapter VIII.— Clearness— Conception of a mark in general— Various sorts of 
marks— Determination of the logical essence of a thing— Its distinction from 
the real essence— Distinctness, a higher degree of clearness— .ZEsthetical and 
logical distinctness— Discrepance between analytic and synthetic distinctness. 
(2? 1093-1113 inclusive.) 

TITLE C -LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION AS TO QUALITY. (?? 1093-1113,) 

§ 1093. — All thinking is nothing but a representing by means of 
marks (i. e. discursive), (page 79, line 12.) 

§ 1094. — Every mark may be considered as (1) a representation; 
(2) a ground of cognition, (page 79, line 25.) 

§ 1095. — Analytic or synthetic marks, (page 80, line 13.) 

§ 1098. — Co-ordinate or subordinate marks, (page 80, line 24.) 

§ 1097. — Series of subordinate marks is grounded upon insoluble 
•conceptions, and with respect to the consequences is infinite, 
(page 81, line 11.) 

§ 1098. — Profundity of cognition. Intensive distinctness in- 
creases with the further analysis of the conceptions in the series 
of subordinate marks, (page 81, line 18.) 

§ 1099. — Affirmative or negative marks, (page 81, line 28.) 

§ 1100. — Important and fertile or empty and unimportant marks. 
Logical fertility distinct from the practical, (page 82, line 13.) 

§ 1101. — Sufficient and necessary or insufficient and contingent 
marks, (page 82, line 26.) 

§ 1102. — Necessary marks are either primitive and constitutive 
(grounds of other marks), or consequential (attributes), (p, 83, 1. 10.) 

§ 1103. — Unessential marks regard either internal determinations 
(modi), or external relations, (page 83, line 23.) 

§ 1104. — Logical essence is nothing but the first fundamental 
conception of all the necessary marks, (page 83, line 29.) 

§ 1105. — Distinctness of cognition consists in the clearness of 
the marks, (page 84, line 25.) Cf: §§ 1052, 1054, 1055, 1056. 

§ 1108. — Logical distinctness (objective) must be distinguished 
from the aesthetical. Perspicuity consists in the conjunction of 
both, (page 84, line 30.) Cf. §§1060, 1061. 

§ 1107. — Logical distinctness may be extensively complete (am- 
plitude of the conception), or intensively complete (solidity), (page 
86, line 1.) Cf. § 1098. 

§ 1108. — Amplitude and precision together make up the adequate- 
ness of cognition, (page 88, line 20.) 

§ 1109. — All distinctness does not depend upon the analysis of a 
given conception, (page 86, line 30.) 

§ 1110. — Synthetic distinctness, as to the matter, enlarges the con- 
ception by that which is superadded to it as a mark in the (pure 
or empirical) intuition, (page 87, line 12.) Cf. §2461. 



592 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1111. — Analytic distinctness by no means increases the concep- 
tion (as to the matter), (page 88, line 3.) 

§ 1112. — Synthetic procedure is sometimes used in rendering the 
conceptions distinct; hut the analytic procedure is the chief 
requisite, (page 88, line 14.) 

§1113. — Objective value of cognition: (1) representing; (2} 
perceiving; (3) kenning*; (4) cognizing; (5) understanding ; (6) 
perspecting; (7) comprehending. (2) percipere ; (3)noscere; (4) 
cognoscere ; (5) intelligere ; (6) perspicere. [*So denominated by 
Mr. Eichardson to prevent confusion with knowing (scire) §1126]. 
(page 89, line 4.) Cf. §§1963 and 1729. [ (1) repraesentare ; (7) 
comprehender e.~] \_Perspect, comprehend, understand : Our duties as- 
obligatory in respect of ourselves and our fellow men, we compre- 
hend ; our duties merely subjectively considered quasi divine 
commandments, we perspect ; our duties qualibet commandments 
of God, considered objectively, we can not so much as understand. 
Cf.§2577.] V^Vl^ 

Chapter IX.— Certainty— Conception of holding true in general— Modes of hold- 
ing true : opining, believing, and knowing— Conviction and persuasion— Re- 
serving and suspending a judgment— Previous judgments-Prejudices, their 
sources and their chief sorts. (<< 1114-1143 inclusive.) 

TITLE D. -LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION AS TO MODALITY. C;U114- 

1149 inclusive.) 

§ 1114. — Holding true is the subjective judgment by which some- 
thing is represented as true, (page 91, line 11.) Cf. §§ 2579, 2583. 

§ 1115. — Holding true is either certain (objectively sufficient) or 
uncertain (objectively insufficient), (page 91, line 16.) 

§ 1116. — Three modes of holding true : (1) problematical (opin- 
ing); (2) assertive (believing); (3) apodictic (knowing), (page 91,, 
line 26.) 

§ 1117. — Opining may be considered as a previous judging, and 
has place in empirical cognitions only, (page 92, line 22.) Cf. §§ 
2584, 2585, 1135. 

§ 1118. — Believing is a holding true of that which we assume on 
moral grounds, in such a manner as to be certain that the contrary 
never can be proved, (page 94, line 8.) Cf. §§ 2593, 2594, 1133. 

§ 1119. — Believing (when considered as limited to matters of 
belief only) is distinguished from opining, not by the degree, but 
by the relation which it as a cognition bears to acting, (page 94, 
line 20.) Cf. § 2592. [Must not merely opine : but must have some- 
thing akin to belief, which analogon (§ 2590) may be considered 
as a superior degree of opining or prejudging, and upon which 
his action is grounded. But moral action is never to be grounded 
on the moral belief, which latter rises out of the necessity which 



The Clavis to an Index. 593 

enforces moral action. (See § 140, cf. § 144).] [JYot a necessary ref- 
erence of our arbitrament: that is, objectively it is not necessary 
that the final object or end of the human will should ever exist, it 
being quite sufficient to satisfy reason that the summum bonum is a 
cogitable possibility which may be regarded as an ideal toward 
which moral actions tend. Indeed, it is rather probable that the 
realization of this ideal end would militate against the moral in- 
terests of mankind, which are centered in the education of virtue, 
an education belonging to battle, not to victory. (Cf. §§ 232, 384, 
454.)] 

§ 1120. — Subjective necessity of believing in God, freedom, and 
immortality, rests upon the necessary determination of the will, 
(page 95, line 23.) Cf. §§ 643-645, and § 877, and see § 2595. 

§ 1121. — Belief of reason is merely a presupposition of reason 
with a subjective, but absolutely necessary practical, view, (page 
96, line 21.) Cf. §2361 and see §2556 et seqq. 

§ 1122. — Matters of belief are (1) not objects of empirical cog- 
nition, (page 95, line 1.) 

§ 1123. — Matters of belief are (2) not objects of the cognition of 
reason, theoretical or practical, (page 97, line 5.) 

§ 1124. — Belief only supplies the place of a cognition, without 
being itself a cognition, and affords no conviction which may be 
communicated, (page 98, line 3.) [Practical belief: belief of such 
a sort that I act in view of it, although my action is not deter- 
mined by it. (Cf. § 1119.)] Cf. § 1133. 

§ 1125. — Moral unbelief does not assume that which it is impos- 
sible to know, but morally necessary to presuppose, (page 98' 
line 17.) 

§ 1126. — Knowing (scire) is holding true on a ground of cog- 
nition which is both objectively and subjectively sufficient, and is 
either empirical or rational, (page 98, line 26 ) Cf. § 2583. 

§1127. — Certainty of reason is either intuitive (evidence; 
mathematical) or discursive (philosophical), (page 99, line 4.) 
Cf. § 2475. 

§1128. — Empirical certainty is either original or derived (his- 
torical), (page 99, line 13.) 

§ 1129. — Certainty of reason is distinguished from the empirical 
by the consciousness of necessity, (page 99, line 18.) 

§1130. — All certainty is either a mediate or an immediate one. 
(page 100, line 1.) 

§ 1131. — Proofs, upon which all the madiate certainty of a cog- 
nition depends, (page 100, line 9.) 



594 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1132. — Science the complex of cognition as a system, (page 
100, line 24.") 

§ 1133. — Conviction is either logical (produced by objective cer- 
tainty) or practical (the belief of reason), (page 101, line 9.) [Cf. § 
2594 as to practical conviction, and §§ 2580-2583 as to logical 
conviction.] 

§ 1134. — Persuasion, a holding true on insufficient grounds, 
which we do not know whether they are merely subjective or also 
at the same time objective, (page 102, line 1.) Cf §§ 2580-2582. 

$5 1135. — Persuasion may be true as to the matter, even though 
formally false, (page 102, line 23.) 

§ 1136. — Will can not contest convincing proofs, and has no im- 
mediate influence on holding true, (page 103, line 13.) 

§ 1137. — Will, by exciting the understanding to the investiga- 
tion of truth or withholding it from it, has a mediate influence on 
conviction, (page 104, line 1.) 

§ 11.38. — Suspension of judgment consists in the intention not to 
allow a merely previous judgment to become a determining one. 
(page 104, line 7.) 

§1139. — Previous judgments serve to guide the understanding 
in meditation and in investigation, (page 105, line 17.) 

§1140. — Prejudices are sometimes true previous judgments; 
-only their serving us for principles or for determining judgments 
is wrong, (page 108, line 5.) 

§1141. — Principal fountains of prejudice: (1) imitation; (2) 
habit; (3) inclination, (page 107, line 8.) 

§ 1142.— Things which contribute to accustom us to the maxim of 
imitation, and thereby to make reason a soil fertile in prejudices: 
(1) formules ; (2) sayings ; (3) sentences ; (4) canons ; (5) prov- 
erbs, (page 107, line 26.) 

§1143 — Prejudices (1) of authority: (1) arising from the 
authority of a person, (page 109, line 9.) 

§ 1144. — Prejudice arising from the authority (2) of a multitude, 
(page 110. line 20.) [See § 1145.] 

§ 1145. — Common sense in moral philosophy, (page 110, line 30.) 
Cf. §§ 2638, 2850. 

§1146. — Prejudice of the authority (3) of the age. (page 112, 
line 1.) Cf. §§ 569, 1074, 219. [Doctrine of the Mean, xxviii., 1.] 

§ 1147. — Prejudice of novity. (page 113, line 15.) 

§ 1148. — Prejudices (II) from self love, or logical egotism, (page 
114, line 1.) 

§ 1149. — Extirpation of prejudices will be productive of great 
good, (page 114, line 9.) [But whether in reference to one's self.] 



The Olavis to an Index. 5',) 5 

Chap'xr X.— Probability— Explication of the probabilities— Distinction of prob- 
ability from verisimilitude— Mathematica' and philosophical probability- 
Doubt both subjective and objective — Skeptical, dogmatical, and critical way 
of thinking or method of philosophizing.— Hypothesis. (ij§ 1150-1163 inclusive.) 

§ 1150. — Probability is a holding true on insufficient grounds, 
but which have a greater relation to sufficient ones than the grounds 
of the contrary, (page 115, line 10.) 

§ 1151. — Probability is an approximation to certainty ; but in 
verisimilitude we compare the insufficient grounds, not with the 
sufficient ones, but with those of the contrary, (page 116, line 1.) 

§ 1152. — Mathematician alone can determine the relation of in- 
sufficient grounds to the sufficient holding true, (page 116, line 12.) 

§ 1153. — Logic of probability is not possible, (page 116, line 29.) 

§ 1154. — Doubt is a contrary reason for holding true, or a 
mere impediment to it. Objectively, as the knowledge of the in- 
sufficiency of the reasons for holding true, it is named an objec- 
tion, (page 117, line 9.) 

§ 1155. — Scruple is a merely subjectively valid contrary reason 
for holding true, (page 117, line 18.) 

§ 1156. — Scruples must be removed by exposing their grounds 
and origin. It is not enough merely to answer every doubt, 
(page 118, line 4.) 

§ 1157. — Skeptical and dogmatic methods, when they become 
universal, are both faulty, (page 118, line 17.) 

§ 1158. — Skeptical method is very useful to the critical pro- 
cedure, (page 119, line 3.) 

§ 1159. — Absolute skepticism contradicts itself, (p. 119, 1. 16 ) 

§ 1160. — Hypothesis is the holding of a presupposition true as a 
ground (being sufficient to explain other cognitions as consequen- 
ces), (page 119, line 25.) Cf. 251.8. 

§ 1161. — Probability of a hypothesis may increase to an analogon 
of certainty. (Induction.) (page 120, line 17.) 

§ 1162. — Must be apodictically certain in every hypothesis : (1) 
the possibility of the presupposition itself ; (2) the consequence; 
(3) the unity (needing no subsidiary hypotheses), (p. 120, 1. 27.) 

§ 1163. — Sciences which do not allow of hypotheses, (page 
121, line 30.) 

Appendix.— Of the distinction of theoretical and practical cognition. (35 1164-1168. ) 

§ 1164.- — Practical cognitions either are imperatives or comprise 
the grounds to possible imperatives, (page 122, line 7.) Cf § 1242. 

§1165. — Imperative is a proposition expressing a possible free 
action, by which a certain end is to be realized, (page 122, line 15.) 

§ 1166. — Theoretical cognitions are such as express (not what 
must be and ought to be, but) what is. (p. 123, 1. 1.) Cf. §2360. 



596 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1167. — Speculative cognitions are those from which no rules 
of conduct can be derived. Every theoretical cognition is not 
speculative, (page 123, line 6.) Cf § 2363. 

§ 1168. — Morality the absolute practical (to which every practi- 
cal use of our cognition must finally be referred), (page 123, line 
21.) [The relative practical (relative to arbitrary ends) should be 
termed pragmatical. (See § 2550.)] Cf. §§ 3036, 2607. 

LOGIC. -PART I. 

GENERAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. ($11,69-1344 inclusive.) 
Chapter I.— Conceptions. (§ni69-1208 inclusive.) 

Article I. — Conception in general, and its distinction from intuition. 
(§§ 1169-1171 inclusive.) 

§ 1169. — All cognitions are either intuitions or conceptions. Cog- 
nition by conceptions is termed thinking (cognitio discursiva). 
(page 125, line 9.) 

§ 1170. — Conception is a representation of that which is com- 
mon to several objects, (p. 125, 1. 17.) [§§ 1170 , 1171 are scholia.] 

§ 1171. — Tautology to speak of universal or of common concep- 
tions, (page 126, line 4.) 

Article II. — Matter and form of conceptions. (§ 1172.) 

§ 1172. — Matter (the object) and form (the universality) are to 
be distinguished in every conception, (page 126, line 11.) 

Article III. — Empirical and pure conceptions. (§§ 1173-1180.) 

§ 1173. — Pure conception is not taken from experience, but 
arises, as to both form and matter, from the understanding, (page 
126, line 16.) 

§ 1174 — Idea is a conception of reason, whose object can not be 
met with in experience, (page 126, line 20.) Cf. § 1963. 

§ 1175. — Eeality of pure conceptions must be investigated by 
metaphysic. (page 127, line 1.) [§ 1175 is a scholion.] 

§1176. — Ideas serve to guide the understanding by means of 
reason with regard to experience and to the use of the rules of the 
understanding, (page 127, line 11.) [§§ 1176-1180 are a scholion.] 

§ 1177. — Ideas are regulative principles of the subordinate in- 
tellectual operations of the understanding, (page 128, line 6.) 

§ 1178. — Can not prove the objective reality of any theoretical 
idea but the idea of liberty, (page 128, line 26.) Cf § 897. 

§ 1179. — Idea of the whole is architectonic, (page 129, line 4.) 
Cf. § 2598. 

§ 1180. — Wanting to most men. (page 129, line 11.) 

Article IV. — Conceptions given (apriori or aposteriori), and facti- 
tious conceptions. (§§ 1181, 1182.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 597 

§ 1181. — All conceptions are, as to the matter, either given or 
factitious, (page 129, line 20.) 

§ 1182. — Form of conceptions is always factitious, (page 129. 
line 26.) (§ 1182 is a scholion.] 

Article V. — Logical origin of conceptions. (§§ 1183-1185 inclusive.) 

§ 1183. — Origin of conceptions as to the mere form depends 
upon reflection and upon abstraction, (page 130, line 3 ) 

§ 1184. — Universal logic has to investigate, not the source of 
conceptions, but the distinction of reflection, (page 130, line 11.) 
[§§ 1184, 1185 are scholia ] 

§ 1185. — Origin of conceptions with regard to their matter, must 
be investigated by metaphysic. (page 131, line 3.) 

Article VI — Logical acts of comparison, of reflection, and of ab- 
straction, (§§ 1186-1189 inclusive.) 

§ 1186. — Logical acts of the understanding, by which conceptions 
as to their form are engendered : (1) comparison ; (2) reflection ; 
(3) abstraction, (page 131, line 10.) 

§ 1187. — Essential and universal conditions of the engendering 
of every conception in general, (page 131, line 21.) [§§ 1187-1189 
are scholia.] 

§ 1188 — Abstraction (the word) is not always used right in logic, 
(page 132, line 5.) 

§ 1189. — Abstraction is but the negative condition on which uni- 
versally valid representation can be generated, (page 133, line 1. ) 

Article VII — Matter and sphere of conceptions. (§§1190, 1191.) 

§ 1190. — Every conception, as a partial one, is contained in the 
representation of things; but, as the ground of cognition, these 
things are contained under it. (page 133, line 9.) 

§ 1191. — Universal validity of a conception depends upon the 
conception's being a ground of cognition, (page 133, line 18.) [§ 1191 
is a scholion.] 

Article VIII — Greatness of the sphere of conceptions. (§§ 1192. 
1193.) 

§ 1192. — Sphere of a conception is the greater, the greater the 
number of things that rank under it. (page 133, line 23.) 

§ 1193. — Conception, as a ground of cognition, contains under it 
all those things from which it has been obtained by means of ab- 
straction, (page 133, line 26.) [§ 1193 is a scholion.] 

Article IX. — Superior and inferior conceptions. (§§ 1194, 1195.) 

§ 1194. — Conceptions, if they have under them other concep- 
tions (which in relation to them are named inferior ones), are de- 
nominated superior ones, (page 134, line 18.) 

§ 1195. — Very same conception, taken in various references, may 



59,8 Kant's Ethics. 

be at once a superior and an inferior one. (page 134, line 24 ) 
[§ 1195 is a seholion.] 

Article X. — Kind (genus) and sort (species). (§ 1198.) 

§ 1196. — Generic and special conceptions are distinguished, not 
as to their nature, but with regard to their relation to one another 
in the logical subordination, (page 135, line 5.) 

Article XI — Highest genus and lowest species. (§§ 1197, 1198 ) 

§ 1197. — Highest genus is not a species, (page 135, line 15.) 

§ 1198 — No such thing as a lowest conception or a lowest 
species, under which no other conception or species is contained 
(page 135, line 22.) Of. § 2391. [§ 1198 is a seholion.] Cf. § 1735. 

Article XII. — Larger and stricter conceptions. Alternate concep- 
tions. (§ 1199.) 

§ 1199. — Superior conception is also named a larger ; an inferior, 
a stricter or narrower. Conceptions which have the same sphere 
are named alternate, (page 136, line 29.) 

Article XIII — Relation of the inferior to the superior, of the larger 
to the stricter, conceptions. (§ 1200.) 

§ 1200. — Inferior conception is not contained in the superior, but 
under it. (page 137, line 6.) Cf. § 1190. 

Article XIV. — Universal rules relative to the subordination of con- 
ceptions. (§§ 1201, 1202.) 

§ 1201. — What agrees with or is repugnant to a superior concep- 
tion, likewise agrees with or is repugnant to all the inferior ones 
contained under it. (page 137, line 18.) 

§1202. — Can not conclude that what agrees with oris repugnant 
to an inferior conception, likewise agrees with or is repugnant to 
other inferior conceptions which belong with it to a superior one. 
(page 138, line 1.) [§1202 is a seholion.] 

Article XV. — Conditions of the origin of superior and of inferior 
conceptions: logical abstraction and determination. (§§1203,1204.) 

§ 1203. — Logical abstraction continued yields higher and higher 
conceptions ; logical determination continued, lower and lower 
ones, (page 138, line 14.) 

§ 1204. — Cognitions as intuitions only, but not as conceptions, can 
be thoroughly determined. (See § 1198 [and cf. §§ 1170 and 1093. 
That a conception can not be a completely determined cognition, 
is evident from the mere definition of conception].) (page 138, 
line 25.) [§ 1204 is a seholion.] 

Article XVI. — Use of conceptions in the abstract and in the con- 
crete. (§§ 1205-1208 inclusive.) 

§ 1205. — Every conception may be used both universally and 
particularly, (page 139, line 6.) 



The Glavis to an Index. 599 1 

§ 1206 — Abstract and concrete refer not so much to conceptions 
themselves, as to their use. (page 139, line 11.) [§§ 1206-1208 are 
scholia.] 

§ 1207. — -Cognize by very abstract conceptions, in many things 
little ; by very concrete ones, in few things much. (p. 139, 1. 22 ) 

§ 1208. — Whereby the maximum of cognition, with regard as 
well to the sphere as to the matter, is attained, (p. 140, 1. 5.) 

Chapter II.— Judgments. (§g 1209-1259 inclusive.) 

Article XVII. — Explication of a, judgment in general. (§ 1209.) 

§ 1209. — Judgment is the representation of the unity of the 
consciousness of various representations, (page 141, line 6.) 

Article XVIII — Matter and form of judgments (§ 1210 ) 

§ 1210.- — Matter of a judgment consists in the cognitions which 
are given and conjoined in the unity of consciousness in the judg- 
ment ; the form of the judgment, in the determination of the 
way in which the various representations, as such, belong to one 
consciousness, (page 141, line 12.) 

Article XIX. — Object of logical reflection — the mere form of judg- 
ments. (§1211.) 

§1211.- — Logic has to consider merely the distinction of judg- 
ments with regard to their bare form, (page 141, line 22.) 

Article XX. — Logical forms of judgments : quantity, quality, rela- 
tion and modality. (§ 1212.) 

§ 1212. — Distinctions of judgments with respect to their form 
may be reduced to the four main points of quantity, quality, rela- 
tion and modality, (page 142, line 6.) 

Article XXI — Quantity of judgments : universal, particular, singu- 
lar. (§§ 1213-1218.) [Plurative § 2716 (.Richardson's reference).] 

§ 1213. — Subject in the judgment is either quite included in the 
notion of the predicate, or excluded from it, or but in part included 
in it, in part excluded from it. (page 142, line 14.) 

§ 1214. — Single judgments as to the form, are to be esteemed in 
the use equal to universal, (page 143, line 9.) [§§ 1214-1218 are 
scholia.] 

§1215. — Real distinction between general and universal propo- 
sitions, (page 143, line 16.) 

§ 1216. — Universal rules are either analytically or synthetically 
universal, (page 143, line 26.) 

§ 1217. — Can not hold heuristically * in the aj>plication, but are 
only problems, (page 144, line 1.) [* i. e. can not be used as secure 
principles for the further extension of knowledge; can not be 
made premises for the further discovery of truth. (Cf. § 2401.)] 

§ 1218. — Subject of particular judgments, if they are to have a 



600 Kant's Ethics. 

rational (not merely an intellectual) form, must be a larger con 
ception than the predicate, (page 144, line 17.) [See § 1199.] 

Article XXII. — Quality of judgments : affirmative, negative, indefin- 
ite. (§§1219-1222 inclusive.) 

§ 1219 — Subject of the judgment is thought of under the sphere 
of the predicate, or is placed without that sphere, or is put within 
the sphere of a conception which lies without the sphere of another 
conception, (page 145, line 7.) 

§ 1220. — Indefinite judgment represents the sphere of the predi- 
cate as limited, (page 145, line 14.) Bounds are positive concep- 
tions of limited objects. [§§1220-1222 are scholia] 

§1221. — Distinction of the indefinite from the net ative judg- 
ments does not appertain to logic, (page 146, line 4 ) Cf. §§ 1214, 
1556, 1557. 

§ 1222. — Negation always affects the copula in negative judg- 
ments, but the predicate in indefinite, (page 146, line 11 ) 

Article XXIII — Relation of judgments: categorical, hypothetical, 
disjunctive. (§ 1223.) 

§1223. — Given representations in a judgment are subordinated 
to one another in the unity of consciousness either as the predicate 
to the subject, or as the consequent to the antecedent, or as a mem- 
ber of the division to the divided conception, (page 146, line 18.) 
Cf. §§1290, 1558, 1559. 

Article XXIV. — Categorical judgments. (§§ 1224, 1225.) 

§ 1224. — Subject and predicate make up the matter of categori- 
cal judgments ; the form is termed the copula, (page 147, line 3.) 

§ 1225. — Categorical judgments make up the matter of other 
judgments; but all the three judgments depend upon essentially 
distinct logical functions of the understanding, (page 147, line 8.) 
[§ 1225 is a scholion.]. 

Article XXV. — Hypothetical judgments. (§§ 1226-1228 inclusive.) 

§ 1226. — Matter of hypothetical judgments consists of two judg- 
ments which are connected together as antecedent and consequent, 
(page 147, line 19.) 

§ 1227. — What the copula is to categorical judgments, the conse- 
quence is to hypothetical ones, (their form), (page 148, line 3.) 
[§§ 1227 and 1228 are scholia.] 

§ 1228. — Essential distinction between categorical and hypotheti- 
cal propositions, (page 148, line 6.) 

Article XXVI. — Modes of connection in hypothetical judgments : 
modus ponens and modus tollens. (§ 1229.) 

§ 1229. — When the antecedent or ground is true, the consequent 
determined by it is likewise true. When the consequent is false. 



The Clavis to an Index. 601 

the antecedent or ground is likewise false, (page 148, line 26.) 
Cf. §§ 1082, 1131. 

Article XXVIL— Disjunctive judgments. (§ 1230.) 

§ 1230. — When the parts of the sphere of a given conception 
determine one another in the whole or to a whole as complements, 
(page 149, line 8.) 

Article XXVIII. — Matter and form of disjunctive judgments. 
(§§ 1231, 1232.) 

§ 1231. — Form of disjunctive judgments consists in the deter- 
mination of the relation of the various judgments as members of 
the whole sphere of the divided cognition excluding one another, 
(page 149, line 15.) 

§ 1232. — Not one member in this judgment determines another 
but with a proviso, that all the members are in commerce as parts 
of a whole sphere of cognition, (page 149, line 23.) [Cf. § 1822 in 
reference to commercium.~\ [§ 1232 is a scholion.] 

Article XXIX. — Peculiar character of disjunctive judgments. 
(§§ 1233, 1234.) 

§ 1233. — All the members of disjunction are problematical judg- 
ments, of which nothing else is thought than that they, as parts of 
the sphere of a cognition, each the complement of the other to the 
whole, taken together, are equal to that sphere, (page 150, line 11.) 

§ 1234. — Comparison between categorical and disjunctive judg- 
ments. In disjunctive judgments we go from the whole to all the 
jiarts taken together, (page 151, line 1.) [§ 1234 is a scholion.] 

Article XXX. — Modality of judgments : problematical, assertive, 
apodictical. (§§ 1235-1238 inclusive.) 

§ 1235. — Eelation of the whole judgment to the cognitive fac- 
ulty, (page 152, line 15.) 

§ 1236. — Concerns the judgment itself only, by no means the 
thing which is judged of. (page 152, line 23.) [§§ 1236-1238 are 
scholia,] 

§ 1237. — Subject in problematical judgments must always have a 
smaller sphere than the predicate, (page 153, line 10.) 

§ 1038. — Distinction between judgments and propositions, (page 
153, line 15.) 

Article XXXI. — Expoundable propositions. (§§ 1239, 1240.) 

§ 1239. — Propositions in which both an affirmation and a nega- 
tion are comprised, (page 154, line 5.) 

§ 1240. — Nature of expoundable propositions depends entirely 
upon conditions of language, (p. 154, 1. 9.) [§ 1240 is a scholion.] 

Article XXXII. — Theoretical and practical propositions. (§§1241, 
1242.) 

39 



602 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1241. — Practical propositions express the action which is the 
necessary condition whereby an object is possible, (p. 154, 1. 21.) 

§ 1242. — Practical propositions belong to logic as to the form 
only ; as to the matter, to moral philosophy, (page 154, line 26.) 
[§ 1242 is a scholion.] Cf. § 1164. 

Article XXXIII. — Indemonstrable and demonstrable propositions. 

(§ 1243 

§ 1243. — Demonstrable propositions are those capable of proof, 
(page 155, line 8.) 

Article XXXIV.— Principles. (§ 1244.) 

§ 1244. — Principles are immediately certain judgments apriori, 
by which other judgments can be evinced, (page 155, line 16.) 

Article XXXV. — Intuitive and discursive principles: Axioms and 
acroams. (§ 1245.) 

§ 1245. — Principles are either intuitive or discursive. The lat- 
ter can not be expressed but by conceptions, (page 155, line 25.) 

Article XXXVI — Analytic and synthetic propositions. (§§ 1246- 
1248 inclusive.) 

§ 1246. — Propositions whose certainty depends upon the iden- 
tity of the conceptions are analytical, (page 156, line 8.) 

§ 1247. — Synthetic propositions increase the cognition materiali- 
ter. (page 156, line 13.) [§§ 1247 and 1248 are scholia.] 

§ 1248. — Analytic principles are not axioms, (p. 156, 1. 23.) 

Article XXX VII— Tautological propositions. (§§ 1249-1251.) 

§ 1249. — Identity of the conceptions in analytic judgments may 
be either explicit or implicit, (page 156, line 28.) 

§ 1250. — Tautological propositions are void of consequence, 
whereas implicitly identical propositions are not. (page 157, line 
3.) [§§ 1250, 1251 are scholia.] 

§ 1251. — Propositions void of sense, (page 157, line 14.) 

Article XXX VI II— Postulate and problem. (§§ 1252-1255.) 

§ 1252. — Postulate is a practical immediately certain proposition, 
(page 157, line 20.) 

§ 1253. — Problems express an action whose way of being per- 
formed is not immediately certain, (page 158, line 1.) 

§ 1254. — Theoretical postiilates too for the behoof of practical 
reason, (p. 158, 1. 5.) Cf. §2361. [§§ 1254 and 1255 are scholia.] 

§ 1255. — Problems contain (1) the question, (2) the resolution, 
and (3) the demonstration, (page 158, line 10.) 

Article XXXIX. — Theorems, corollaries, lemmas, and scholia. 
(§§ 1256, 1257.) 

§ 1256. — Thorems are theoretical propositions capable and stand- 
ing in need of a proof; corollaries are immediate consequences; 
scholia are mere illustrative propositions, (page 158, line 20.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 603 

§ 1257. — Distinction between theorems and corollaries, (page 158, 
line 28:) [§ 1257 is a scholion.] 

Article XL. — Judgments of -perception and experience. (§§ 1258, 
1259.) 

§ 1258. — Judgment of perception is merely subjective ; an ob- 
jective judgment from perceptions is a judgment of experience, 
(page 159, line 8.) [Lemma: a judgment must be examined in 
reference to its objective validity, before we can presume to call 
it a judgment of experience.] 

§ 1259. — -What is merely in the subject, must not be considered 
.as belonging to the object, (p. 159, 1. 11.) [§ 1259 is a scholion.] 

Chapter III.— Syllogisms. (§§ 1260-1344 inclusive.) 

Article XLI. — Syllogism in general. (§ 1260.) 

§ 1260. — Syllogism in general is the deduction of one judgment 
from another, (page 160, line 6.) 

Article XL1I. — Immediate and mediate syllogisms. (§ 1261.) 

§ 1261. — Immediate syllogism is the deduction of one judgment 
from another without an intermedial judgment, (page 160, line 13.) 

Article XL III. — Syllogisms of the understanding ', of reason, and 
of judgment. (§ 1262.) 

§ 1262. — Immediate syllogisms are styled syllogisms of the un- 
derstanding, (page 161, line 4.) 

TITLE I.-SYLLOGISMS OF THE UNDERSTANDING. (?§ 1263-1281 inclusive.) 

Article XL1V. — Peculiar nature of the syllogisms of the under- 
standing. (§§ 1263-1265.) 

§ 1263. — Consist entirely in an alteration of the mere form of 
the judgments, (page 161, line 12.) 

§ 1264. — Distinguished from all mediate ones, (page 161, line 
17.) [§§ 1264 and 1265 are scholia.] 

§ 1265. — Intermedial judgment, it is true, may be thrown in. 
(page 162, line 4.) In that case the middle term is a tautological 
proposition. 

Article XL V. — Moods of syllogisms of the understanding. (§ 1266.) 
' § 1266. — Syllogisms of the understanding go through all the 
•classes of the logical functions of judging : (1) quantity ; (2) qual- 
ity ; (3) relation ; (4) modality, (page 162, line 13.) Cf. § 1212. 

Article XL VI. — Class I. — Syllogisms of the understanding (with 
regard to the quantity of judgments) per judicia subalternata. 
(§§ 1267, 1268.) 

§ 1267. — Both the judgments are distinct as to quantity, and the 
particular judgment is deduced from the universal, (p. 162, 1. 23.) 

§ 1268. — Judgment, when it is contained under another, is 
termed subaltern, (page 163, line 3.) [§ 1268 is a scholion.] 



604 Kant's Ethics. 

Article XL VII. — Class II. — Syllogisms of the understanding (with 
regard to the quality of judgments) per judicia opposita. (§§ 1269, 
1270.) 

§ 1269. — Immediate syllogizing (a) by contradictorily opposed 
judgments, (b) by contrary, and (c) by subcontrary ones, (page 
163, line 12.) 

§ 1270. — Syllogisms of tbe understanding by equipollent judg- 
ments, (page 163, line 19.) [§ 1270 is a scholion.] 

Article XL VIII — (a) Syllogisms of the understanding per judicia 
contradictor ie opposita. (§ 1271.) 

§ 1271. — Truth of the one of the contradictory judgments is in- 
ferred from the falsity of the other, and conversely. (Principle of 
the exclusive third, cf §§ 1081, 1083.) (page 164, line 4.) 

Article XLIX. — (b) Syllogisms of the understanding per judicia 
contrarie opposita. (§1272.) 

§ 1272. — Inference of the falsity of the one of the contrary 
judgments from the truth of the other, holds ; but not conversely. 
(page 164, line 21.) 

Article L. — (c) Syllogisms of the understanding per judicia sub- 
contrarie opposita. (§§ 1273, 1274.) 

§ 1273. — When the one of the subcontrarily opposed judgments 
is false, the other is true ; but not conversely, (page 165, line 10.) 

§ 1274. — No pure strict opposition obtains in the subcontrary 
judgments, (page 165, line 17.) [§ 1274 is a scholion.] 

Article LI. — Class III — Syllogisms of the understanding (with re- 
gard to the relation of judgments) per judicia conversa, sive per con- 
versionem. (§ 1275.) 

§ 1275. — Consist in the transposition of the subject and of the 
predicate in both judgments, (page 166, line 6.) 

Article LII. — Pure and, altered conversion. (§ 1276.) 

§ 1276. — Either the quantity of the judgment is altered, or it 
remains unaltered, (page 166. line 14.) 

Article LIII — Universal rules of conversion. (§ 1277-1279.) 

§ 1277. — Universally affirmative judgments can not be converted 
lout per accidens; but all universally negative judgments, and all 
particularly affirmative, may be simpliciter converted, (p. 166, 1. 27.) 

§ 1278. — Reason why universally negative judgments are sim- 
pliciter convertible, (p. 167, 1. 15.) [§§ 1278, 1279 are scholia.] 

§ 1279. — Several universally assertive judgments may be simply 
converted, (page 167, line 25.) 

Article LIV. — Class IV. — Syllogisms of the understanding (with 
regard to the modality of judgments) per judicia contraposita. (§ 1280.) 

§ 1280. — Consists in that metathesis of the judgments by which 



The Clavis to an Index. 605 

the quantity remains the same, but the quality is altered, (page 

168, line 5.) 

Article LV. — Universal rule of contraposition. (§ 1281.) 

§ 1281. — All universally affirmative judgments may be simply 

contraposed. (page 168, line 13.) 

TITLE II— SYLLOGISMS OF REASON. (§§ 1282-1324 inclusive.) 

Article LVI. — Syllogisms of reason in general. (§ 1282.) 

§ 1282. — Syllogism of reason is the knowledge of the necessity 
of a proposition by the subsumption of its condition under a given 
universal rule, (page 169, line 6.) [See § 1284.] 

Article L VII — Universal principle of all syllogisms of reason. 
.(§§ 1283, 1284.) 

§ 1283. — What ranks under a condition of a rule, ranks under 
the rule itself, (page 169, line 12.) 

§ 1284. — Cognize the conclusion apriori not in the single, but as 
comprehended in the universal and as necessary on a certain con- 
dition, (page 170, line 3.) [§ 1284 is a scholion.] 

Article L VIII — Constituents of a syllogism of reason. (§§ 1285, 
1286.) 

§ 1285. — Three essential parts belong to every syllogism of rea- 
son : (1) universal rule; (2) assumption ; (3) conclusion, (page 
170, line 13.) 

§ 1286. — Subsumption means the knowledge that the condition 
has place, (page 171, line 1.) [§ 1286 is a scholion.] 

Article LIX. — Matter and form of syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1287- 
128!) inclusive.) 

§ 1287. — Form of syllogisms of reason consists in the conclusion, 
provided that it comprises the consequence, (page 171, line 12.) 
[As to the consequence, see § 1286.] 

§ 1288. — Truth of the premises must be first proved, and then 
the rightness of the consequence, (page 171, line 15.) [§§ 1288, 
1289 are scholia.] 

§ 1289. — Conclusion is given the moment the premises and the 
consequence are. (page 171, line 21.) 

Article LX. — Division of the syllogisms of reason (as to relation) 
into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. (§§ 1290-1292.) 

§ 1290. — Conditions of the objective unity of the conscious- 
ness of the multifarious of cognition. (Either as the subject of the 
inherence of the marks, or as the ground of the dependence of one 
cognition upon another, or as the conjunction of the parts in a 
whole.) (page 172, line 5.) Cf. § 1223. 

§ 1291. — Only possible ground of the division of the syllogisms 
of reason (relation), (page 172, line 19.) [§§ 1291, 1292 are scholia.] 
[Equipollent: equivalent. Polleo: potvaleo.~] 



606 Kant's Ethics. 

$ 1292. — All these three species are productions of equally right 
functions of reason, (page 173, line 1.) Cf. i*§ 1228, 123-4. 1225. 

Article LXI. — Proper distinction between categorical, hypothetical, 
and disjunct ice syllogisms of reason. (§ 1293.) 

£ 1293. — Lies in the major proposition, (page 173. line 11.) 

Article LXII. — Categorical syllogisms of reason. f§£ 1294. 1295.) 

£ 1294. — Three principal conceptions in every categorical syllo- 
gism, (major, minor, and middle terms.) (page 173, line 18.) 

§ 1295. — Distinction of the terms has not place except in categori- 
cal syllogisms, (page 174. line 7.) [§ 1295 is a scholion.] 

Article LXIII. — Principle of categorical syllogisms of reason. 
(§§ 1296. 1297.) 

§ 1296. — TThat agrees with the mark of a thing agrees with the 
thing itself, (page 174. line 19.) 

S 1297. — Dictum de omni et nullo may be easily deduced, (page 
174, line 27.) [§ 1297 is a scholion.] 

Article LXIY. — Pules for the categorical syllogisms of reason. 
(§§ 1298,. 1299.) 

^ 1298. — Eight rules "which flow from the nature and the prin- 
ciple of categorical syllogisms of reason, (page 175. line 14.) 

^ 1299. — Conclusion must always follow the negative and the 
particular proposition in the premises, (page 176. line 16.) [£ 1299 
is a scholion.] 

Article LA~V. — Pure and impure categorical syllogisms of reason. 
(§1300.) 

^ 1300. — Categorical syllogism is pure or simple when in it 
neither an immediate consequence is intermixed nor the legitimate 
order of the premises altered, (page 177, line 4.) 

Article LXYI. — Impure syllogisms of reason by the metathesis of 
the propositions. — Figures. (§ 1301.) 

5 1301. — Arise from the transposition of the propositions (in the 
last three figures), (page 177. line 15.) 

Article LXYI1. — Four figures of syllogisms. (§ 1302.) 

§ 1302. — Four modes of syllogizing, whose distinction is deter- 
mined by the particular disposition of the premises and of their 
conceptions, (page 177, line 23.) 

. Article LXYIII. — Determinative of their distinction by the various 
disposition of the middle term. (§ 1303.) 

^ 1303. — Middle term may occupy either the place of the sub- 
ject or that of the predicate, (page 178, line 4.) 

Article LXIX. — Pule of the first, as the only legitimate, figure. 
(§§ 1304, 1305.) 

§ 1304 — Eule of the first figure is that the major be a universal, 
the minor an affirmative proposition, (page 178. line 22.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 607 

§ 1305. — First figure may have a conclusion of every quantity 
and of every quality, (page 179, line 7.) [§ 1305 is a scholion.] 

Article LXX. — Condition of the reduction of the last three figures 
to the first one. (§ 1306.) 

§ 1306. — Middle term must obtain in the propositions a place 
whence their order may arise by means of immediate consequences 
according to the rules of the first figure, (page 179, line 24.) 

Article LXXI.—Rule of the second figure. (§§ 1307, 1308.) 

§ 1307. — Major must therefore be converted so that it may re- 
main universal, (page 180, line 7.) 

§ 1308. — Eule of the second figure is, that to which the mark 
of a thing is repugnant, is repugnant to the thing itself, (page 
180, line 14.) [§ 1308 is an explanatory scholion.] 

Article LXXIL—Rule of the third figure. (§§ 1309, 1310.) 

§ 1309. — Minor must be converted, yet so that an afiirmative 
proposition may result from it. (page 181, line 6.) 

§ 1310. — Eule of the third figure is, what agrees or is repugnant 
to a mark, agrees or is repugnant to some things under which this 
mai*k is contained, (page 181, line 12.) [§ 1310 is a scholion] 

Article LXXIIL—Eule of the fourth figure. (§§ 1311, 1312.) 

§ 1311. — When in this figure the major is universally negative, 
it may be simply converted, (page 181, line 24.) , 

§ 1312. — Predicate adheres to the middle term ; this to the sub- 
ject (of the conclusion) ; consequently the subject to the predicate, 
(page 182, line 6.) [§ 1312 is an explanatory scholion.] 

Article LXXIV. — Universal result of the last three figures. 

(§ 1313-) 
§ 1313. — AH these three modes of syllogizing must be named 

impure sjdlogisms. (page 183, line 3.) 

Article LXXV. — Hypothetical syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1314- 
1316 inclusive.) 

§ 1314. — Hypothetical proposition for its major, (page 184, line 
6.) Cf. §§ 1290-1293. 

§ 1315. — Nothing is shown in them but the consequence of one 
proposition of another, (p. 184. 1. 12.) [§§ 1315, 1316 are scholia.] 

§ 1316. — Immediate consequence evincible from an antecedent 
and a consequent, (page 185, line 10.) 

Article LXXVI. — The principle of hypothetical syllogisms. (§ 1317.) 

§ 1317. — Principle of the ground is the principle of hypothetical 
syllogisms, (page 185, line 25.) Cf. §§ 1081, 1082. 

Article LXXVII. — Disjunctive syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1318- 
1320 inclusive.) 

§ 1318. — Argue either from the truth of one member of dis- 



608 Kant's Ethics. 

junction to the falsity of all the others, or from the falsity of all 
the members except one to the truth of this one. (p. 186, 1. 3.) 

§ 1319. — All the members of disjunction, one excepted, taken 
together, make up the contradictory opposite of this one. (page 
186, line 12.) [§§ 1319, 1320 are scholia.] 

§ 1320. — All disjunctive ratrocinations of more than two mem- 
bers of disjunction, are, properly speaking, polysyllogistic. (page 
186, line 20.) 

Article LXXVIII. — Principle of the disjunctive syllogisms. 
(§1321.) 

§ 1321. — Principle of the exclusive third, (page 187, line 3.) 
Cf. § 1083. 

Article LXXIX.— Dilemma. (§§ 1322, 1323.) 

§ 1322. — Dilemma is a hypothetical argument whose consequent 
is a disjunctive judgment, (page 187, line 9.) 

§ 1323. — Sophistical artifice not to refute propositions directly, 
but to point out difficulties, (p. 187, 1. 19. [§ 1323 is a scholion.] 

Article LXXX. — Formal and cryptical syllogisms of reason. 
(§ 1324.) 

§ 1324. — Cryptical syllogisms, in which either the premises are 
displaced, or one of them is omitted, or the middle term only con- 
joined with the conclusion, (page 188, line 18.) 

TITLE III.— SYLLOGISMS OF JUDGMENT. (§21325 1332 inclusive.) 

Article LXXXI. — Determining and reflecting judgment. (§ 1325.) 

§ 1325. — .Reflecting judgment goes from, the particular to the 
universal, and is but of subjective validity, (page 189, line 13.) 

Article LXXXI1. — Syllogisms of (the reflecting) judgment. (1326.) 

§ 1326. — Determine not the object, but the way of thinking of 
it, in order to obtain the knowledge of it. (page 189, line 22.) 

Article LX XXIII. — The principle of these syllogisms. (§§ 1327, 
1328.) 

§ 1327. — Many do not agree in one without a common ground, 
(page 190, line 3.) 

§ 1328. — Syllogisms of judgment can not be held immediate, 
(page 190, line 8.) [§ 1328 is a scholion.] 

Article LXXXIV. — Induction and analogy the two species of syllo- 
gism of judgment. (§§ 1329-1332 inclusive.) 

§ 1329. — Judgment infers either from many all things of a sort, 
or from many determinations and properties in which things of 
the same sort agree, the others, (page 190. line 13.) [See §2826.] 

§ 1330. — Induction extends the empirically given from the par- 
ticular to the universal with regard to many objects; analogy, on 
the other hand, the given properties of a thing to several of the 
very same thing, (page 190. line 22.) [§§1330-1332 are scholia.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 609 

§ 1331. — Induction and analogy not syllogisms of reason, but 
logical presumptions, or empirical syllogisms, (page 191, line 21.) 

§ 1332. — Enlarging our cognition of experience, (p. 191, 1. 26.) 

Article LXXXY. — Simple and compound syllogisms of reason. 
(§1333.) 

§ 1333. — Eatiocination, when it consists of but one syllogism, is 
simple, (page 192, line 4.) 

Article LXXXVI. — Polysyllogistic ratiocination. (§ 1334.) 

§ 1334. — Concatenation of syllogisms (conjoined by subordina- 
tion), (page 192, line 9.) 

Article LXXXVII. — Prosyllogisms and episyllogisms. (§ 1335.) 

§ 1335. — Argue either from the grounds down to the conse- 
quences, or from these up to those, (page 192, line 16.) 

Article LXXXVIIL— Sorites. (§ 1336.) 

§ 1336. — Syllogism consisting of several abridged syllogisms 
producing one conclusion, (page 193, line 3.) 

Article LXXXIX. — Categorical and hypothetical sorites (§ 1337.) 

§ 1337. — That consists of categorical propositions as a series of 
predicates ; this, of hypothetical ones as a series of consequences, 
(page 193, line 12.) 

Article XC— Fallacy.— Paralogism.— Sophism. (§§ 1338, 1339.) 

§ 1338. — Fallacy, when one deceives himself with it, is a para- 
logism ; and when he endeavors to deceive others with it, a 
sophism, (page 193, line 19.) 

§ 1339. — Art of framing sophisms ancient, (page 194, line 1.) 
[§ 1339 is a scholion.] 

Article XGI. — Leap in syllogizing. (§ 1340.) 

§ 1340. — Saltus is the conjunction of the one premiss with the 
conclusion, so that the other is .left out. (page 195, line 3.) 

Article XC II. — Petitio principii. Cir cuius in probanda . (§§ 1341, 
1342.) 

§ 1341. — Assuming, for the purpose of an argument, a proposi- 
tion as an immediately certain one, though it requires a proof, 
(page 195, line 13.) 

§ 1342. — Circle in proving is often difficult to be detected ; and 
this fault is usually committed the oftenest just when the proofs 
are difficult, (page 195, line 20.) [§ 1342 is a scholion.] Eichard- 
son asks, " Would it not, for example, were the scriptures to be 
proved to be the word of God by the authority of the church, and 
the authority of the church to be proved by the scriptures as the 
word of God, be a glaring circle?" 

Article XCTII. — Probatio plus et minus probans. (§§ 1343, 1344.) 

§ 1343. — Proof may prove too much, as well as too little, (page 
196, line 3.) 



610 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1344. — Proof that proves too little may be true, (page 196, 
line 7.) [§ 1344 is a seholion.] [In saying that a proof which 
proves too much is false, Kant instances the proof against suicide, 
That whoever lias not given life can not take it away. " For on this 
ground," he adds, " we could not kill any animal," whence it is 
probable that the need of proof of the assumed right to kill 
animals never even occurred to him. Cf. § 540.] 

LOGIC. -PART II. 

GENERAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. (§§1345-1398 inclusive.) 

Article XCIV. — Manner and method. (§ 1345) 

§ 1345. — All cognition must be conformable to a rule, (page 
197, line 6.) [Note Richardson's seholion.] 

Article XCV. — Form of science. — Method. (§ 1346.) 

§ 1346. — Cognition, as science, must be arranged after a method, 
(page 197, line 16.) Cf. § 471. 

Article XCVI. — Doctrine of method — its object and its end. (§ 1347.) 

§ 1347. — Doctrine of method has to treat of the form of a 
science in general, (page 198, line 4.) Cf. §§1007, 1008, 1013. 

Article XGVII. — Means of promoting the logical 'perfection of cog- 
nition. (§ 1348.) 

§ 1348. — Doctrine of method must show the way in which we 
attain the perfection of cognition, (page 198, line 14.) 

Article XGVIII. — Conditions of the distinctness of cognition. 
(§ 1349.) 

§ 1349 — Means of promoting the distinctness of conceptions 
with respect to their (1) matter and (2) sphere, (page 198, line 25.) 
Cf. § 1190.) 

TITLE I. -PROMOTION OF THE LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION BY 
THE DEFINITION, THE EXPOSITION, AND THE DESCRIPTION OF CON- 
CEPTIONS, (gg 1350-1376 inclusive.) 

Article XCIX.— Definition. (§§1350, 1351.) 

§ 1350. — Definition is a sufficiently distinct and adequate con- 
ception, (page 199, line 14.) 

§ 1351. — Definition alone is to be considered as a logically per- 
fect conception, (page 199, line 17.) [§ 1351 is a seholion.] [Cf. 
Abelard (Ueberweg, Hist, Phil., ed. Morris, § 94, vol. i., page 393) : 
" Nihil est definitum, nisi declaratum secundum significationem 
vocabulum." (Cf. § 1366.)] 

Article G — Analytic and synthetic definition. (§ 1352.) 

§ 1352. — All definitions are either analytical or synthetical, 
(page 199, line 24.) 

Article CI. — Given and factitious conceptions apriori and aposteriori. 
(§ 1353.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 611 

§ 1353. — Conceptions of an analytic definition are given, either 
apriori or aposteriori. (page 200, line 4.) 

Article GIL — Synthetic definitions by exposition or by construction. 
(§§ 1354, 1355.) 

§ 1354. — -Synthesis of the factitious conceptions, from which the 
synthetic definitions arise, is either that of exposition (of phenom- 
ena) or that of construction, (page 200, line 11.) 

§ 1355. — All definitions of the mathematical conceptions must be 
synthetically framed, (page 200, line 20.) [§ 1355 is a scholion.] 

Article GUI. — Impossibility of empirically synthetic definitions, 
(§§ 1356, 1357.) 

§ 1356. — Empirical conceptions can not be defined, (p. .201, 1. 7.) 

§ 1357 — None but the arbitrable conceptions are capable of 
being defined, (page 201, line 12.) [§ 1357 is a scholion.] 

Article GIV. — Analytical definitions by the dissection of concep- 
tions given apriori or aposteriori. (§§ 1358, 1359.) 

§ 1358. — JS"o given conceptions, whether given apriori or apos- 
teriori, can be defined but by analysis, (page 201, line 24.) 

§ 1359. — All analytical definitions are to be held uncertain, 
(page 202, line 7.) [§ 1359 is a scholion.] 

Article GV. — Expositions and descriptions. (§§ 1360-1365.) 

§ 1360. — Expounding of a conception consists in the coherent 
(successive) representation of its marks, provided that they are 
found by analysis, (page 202, line 13.) [Now read §§ 1361-1365.] 

§ 1361. — Description of a conception is its exposition, provided 
that it is not precise, (page 202, line 21.) 

§ 1362. — Experience is expounded by synthesis, (page 202, line 
23.) See § 1354. [§ 1362 is a scholion.] 

§ 1363. — Exposition distinguished from declaration, (page 202,. 
line 26.) See § 1357. [§§ 1363, 1364 are a scholion.] 

§ 1364. — Incomplete exposition, as part of a definition, (page 
203, line 3.) 

§ 1365. — Description can not take place but with respect to con- 
ceptions empirically given, (p. 203, 1. 10.) [§ 1365 is a scholion.] 

Article GVI— Nominal and real definitions. (§§ 1366-1370.) 

§ 1366. — Seal definitions suffice to the cognition of the object ; 
nominal definitions serve merely to distinguish it from other ob- 
jects, (page 203, line 16.) [See § 1351.] 

§ 1367. — lllimited external sufficiency is not possible without 
the internal, (page 203, line 26.) [§ 1367 is a scholion.] 

§ 1368. — Eeal definitions are taken from the essence of the thing, 
from the first ground of possibility, (page 204, line 5.) [§§ 1368- 
1369 are a scholion.] 



612 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1369. — Real definitions must, in moral philosophy, always be 
sought for. (page 204, line 17.] 

§ 1370. — Mathematical definitions are genetical. (page 204, line 
22.) [§ 1370 is a scholion.] 

Article CV1L— Chief requisites of definition. (§§ 1371, 1372.) 

§ 1371. — Essential and universal requisites of* the jDerfection of a 
definition in general, considered under the four main points of 
quantity, quality, relation, and modality, (page 204, line 28.) 

§ 1372.- — Condition of nominal definitions. (That the generic 
conception and the conception of the specific distinction must 
make up the definition.) (page 205, line 16.) [§ 1372 is a scholion.] 

Article CVIII. — Rules for the proving of definitions. (§ 1373.) 

§ 1373. — Must be investigated as to whether a definition is (1) 
true, (2) distinct, (3) ample, (4) determinate, (page 205, line 24.) 
Cf. §1371. 

Article CIX. — Rules for the framing of definitions. (§§1374-1376.) 

§ 1374. — Very same operations which are requisite to the prov- 
ing of definitions, are to be performed in the framing of them, 
(page 206, line 10.) 

§ 1375. — Must set forth an analytical definition as an essay only, 
(page 206, line 20.) Cf. §§ 1359, 1364. [§§ 1375, 1376 are scholia.] 

§ 1376. — Defining by a circle, (page 207, line 3.) 

TITLE II. -PROMOTION OF THE PERFECTION OF COGNITION BY THE LOG- 
ICAL DIVISION OF CONCEPTIONS. (§§1377-1397 inclusive.) 

Article CX. — Conception of the logical division. (§§ 1377-1379.) 

§ 1377. — Determination of a conception with regard to all the 
possible distinct representations contained under it. (p. 207, 1. 7.) 

§ 1378. — Dissection and division of a conception are very dis- 
tinct operations, (page 207, line 25.) [§§ 1378, 1379 are scholia.] 

§ 1379- — Descend from superior to inferior conceptions, (page 
208, line 7.) 

Article CXI. — Universal rules of the logical division. (§§1380, 
1381.) 

§ 1380. — Members of division (1) exclude one another, and (2) 
rank under a superior conception, to which they (3) collectively 
taken are equal, (page 208, line 12.) 

§ 1381. — Members of division must be separated from one 
another by a contradictory opposition, (page 208, line 20.) [§ 1381 
is a scholion.] See §§ 1271, 1272. 

Article CXII. — Codivision and subdivision. (§§ 1382-1384.) 

§ 1382. — Codivisions are the various divisions of a conception, 
which are made with various views, (page 208, line 25.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 613 

§ 1383. — Division niay be continued indefinitely, (page 209, 
line 3.) [§§ 1383 and 1384 are scholia.] 

§ 1384. — Division according to the variety of the conceptions of 
the same object, (page 209, line 8.) 

Article CXIIL— Dichotomy and poly tomy. (§§1385-1387.) 

§ 1385. — Dichotomy is a division into two members, (page 
209, line 14.) 

§ 1386 — Dichotomy is the sole division according to principles 
apriori. (page 209, line 17.) [§§ 1386 and 1387 are scholia.] 

§ 1387. — Division according to the principle of the synthesis 
apriori has trichotomy, (page 209, line 23.) 

Article OXIV. — Various divisions of method. (§ 1388.) 

§ 1388. — Elaboration and treatment of scientific cognition, 
(page 210, line 10.) 
. Article CXV. — (1) Scientific or popular method. (§§ 1389, 1390.) 

§ 1389. — Scholastic method sets out from fundamental and ele- 
mental propositions, (page 210, line 16.) 

§ 1390. — Popular and scientific methods are distinguished as to 
the species, (page 210, line 22.) Cf. § 1013. [§ 1390 is a scholion.] 

Article GXVI. — -(2) Systematical or fragmentary method. (§§1391, 
1392.) 

§ 1391. — Transition from one proposition to another distinctly 
made, (page 211, line 3.) 

§ 1392. — Propounding externally fragmentary, but metbodical 
in itself, is aphoristical. (page 211, line 12.) [§ 1392 is a scholion.] 

Article CXVII.—(3) Analytic or synthetic method. (§§ 1393, 1394.) 

§ 1393. — Analytic method begins with the conditionate and the 
founded, and proceeds to the principles (regressive method), (page 

211, line 20.) 

§ 1394. — Analytic method is usually named the heuristical. 
(page 212, line 1.) [§ 1394 is a scholion.] 

Article CXVIII.—(±) Syllogistic or tabellary method. (§ 1395.) 

§ 1395. — Syllogistic method, according to which a science is 
propounded in a series or concatenation of syllogisms, (p. 212, 1. 9.) 

Article CXIX. — (5) Acroamatic or erotematic method. (§§ 1396, 
1397.) 

§ 1396. — Method when one teaches only, is acroamatical. (page 

212, line 16.) Cf. §§ 473, 474. 

§ 1397. — Can not teach erotematically but by the Socratic dia- 
logue, (page 212, line 22.) [§ 1397 is a scholion.] Cf. § 614. 

Article C 'IT. —Meditation. (§1398.) 

§ 1398. — Meditation must accompany all reading as well as all 
learning, (page 213, line 11.) 



614 Kant's Ethics. 

VOLUME IV.— CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. 

Translated from the German of Immanuel Kant. By J. M. D. Meiklejohst. 
(gg 1399-2628 inclusive.) Paging of the edition included in Bonn's Philc- 
sophical Library (London, Bell & Daldy, 1866). [The student will please 
remember that the following pages contain, not an exposition or explanation 
of the Critique, but, as is sufficiently described at page 9 above, some refer- 
ences from one section to another, set forth on a series of section heads nearly 
all selected from the text.] 

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, (a. d. 1781.) (§§1399-1409 inclusive.) 

§ 1399. — Eeason is called ujton to consider questions which it 
can not decline, but which it can not answer, as they transcend 
every faculty of the mind, (page xvii., line 2.) 

§ 1400. — Arena of these endless contests is called metaphysic. 
(page xvii., line 20.) 

§ 1401. — Vain to profess indifference in regard to inquiries, the 
object of which can not be indifferent to humanity, (p. xviii., 1. 22.) 

§ 1402. — Call to reason again to undertake the most laborious of 
all tasks — that of self-examination, (page xix., line 2.) 

§ 1403. — Critical investigation of pure reason entered upon by 
Kant, (page xix., line 9.) 

§ 1404. — Chief aim in this work has been thoroughness, (page 
xx., line 7.) Pure reason is a perfect unity : cf. §1424. 

§ 1405. — Two indispensable conditions of a critique of pure 
reason : (1) certitude ; (2) clearness, (page xx., line 38.) 

§ 1406. — Opinion is perfectly inadmissible ; and hypothesis must 
be excluded, as of no value in such discussions, (page xxi, line 3.) 

§ 1407. — Deduction of the pure conceptions of the understand- 
ing. (§§ 1578-1652.) (page xxi., line 25.) Cf. § 2869, and Prof. 
Mahaffy's note. 

§ 1408. — Examples and explanations are necessary only from a 
popular point of view; but logical clearness is essential, (page 
xxii., line 14.) 

§ 1409. — Metaphysic of Nature — What reason produces from 
itself can not be concealed, (p. xxiii., 1. 14.) Cf. §§ 2611, 2613, 2614, 
2729, 2841, 1424. 

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION", (a. d. 1787.) (§§1410-1435.) 

§ 1410. — Metaphysics far from having attained to the certainty 
of scientific progress, (page xxi v., line 15.) 

§ 1411. — Logic has advanced in this sure course, (p. xxiv., 1. 32.) 

§ 1412. — Logic is properly only a propaedeutic — forms as it 
were the vestibule of the sciences, (page xxv., line 16.) 

§ 1413. — Sciences must contain elements of apriori cognition, 
theoretical or practical, (page xxv., line 30.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 615 

§ 1414. — Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical 
sciences, (page xxv., line 40.) 

§ 1415. — Mathematics had already entered on the sure course of 
science, among that wonderful nation, the Greeks, (p. xxvi., 1.1.) 

§ 1416. — Physics exhibits a rapid intellectual revolution, (page 
xxvi., line 35.) 

§ 1417. — Reason must approach nature, not in the character of 
a pupil, but in that of a judge, (page xxvii., line 1.) 

§ 1418. — Metaphysics, a purely speculative science, deals with 
mere conceptions. We find that reason perpetually comes to a 
stand, (page xxvii., line 28.) 

§ 1419. — Assume that the objects must conform to our cognition, 
(page xxviii., line 25.) Cf. in Fischer (p. 37, Mahafly's translation, 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1866), where Mahaffy says that Kant re- 
fers to the rotation of the earth, and " not to the heliocentric 
hypothesis, as Cousin and Professor Webb suppose." [Cf. the 
views of the Chinese scholar Ch'ing, according to Choo He, at the 
foot of page 104 above.] 

§ 1420. — Objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but 
which can not be given in experience, (page xxix., line 29.) 

§ 1421. — Conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to 
transcend the limits of possible experience.) (page xxx , line 1.) 

§ 1422.— Unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in 
things as they are in themselves, (page xxx., line 20.) 

§ 1423. — Practical data to determine the transcendent conception 
of the unconditioned, (page xxxi. , line 6.) 

§ 1424. — Aim of the critique of pure speculative reason. No 
principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it 
is at the same time viewed in relation to the total use of pure rea- 
son, (page xxxi., line 18.) 

§ 1425. — Removes an obstacle which impedes and even threatens 
to destroy the use of practical reason, (page xxxii., line 28.) 

§ 1426. — Must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surren- 
der the power of cognizing, we reserve the power of thinking 
objects as things in themselves, (page xxxiii., line 29.) Cf. §§ 2911 
2983, Mahaffy's notes. 

§ 1427. — While I can not cognize, I can quite well think freedom 
(that is to say, my representation of it involves at least no con- 
tradiction), (page xxxiv., line 2.) 

§ 1428. — Morality does not require the speculative cognition of 
liberty; it is enough that I can think it. (page xxxiv., line 39.) 
-Cf. § 897. 

§ 1429. — Abolish knowledge, to make room for belief. I can not 



616 Kant's Ethics. 

even make the assumption (as the practical interests of morality 
require) of God, freedom, and immortality, if I do not deprive 
speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight, 
(page xxxv., line 21.) Cf. § 2596. 

§ 1430. — All the objections urged against morality and religion, 
may he silenced for ever hy the Socratic method, (p. xxxv., 1. 38.). 

§ 1431. — Genesis of the practical convictions of mankind so far 
as they depend on rational grounds. (1) the hope of a future life ; 
(2) the consciousness of freedom ; (3) the belief in a wise and 
great Author of the universe, (page xxxvi., line 18.) Cf. § 877. 

§ 1432. — Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materi- 
alism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, 
which are universally injurious, as well as of idealism and skepti- 
cism, (page xxxvii., line 16.) 

§ 1433. — Criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly 
scientific system of metaphysics, which must perform its task en- 
tirely apriori. (page xxxviii., line 10.) 

§ 1434. — Second edition. — Greater clearness of the exposition as 
it now stands, (page xxxix, line 10.) 

§ 1846. — Proves the existence of external objects in space, 
(page xl., line 14.) See §1434, and cf. §1846 below, and also 
§§ 2033, 1634, 1635, 2970, and Mahaffy ' note to § 2919. 

§ 1435. — Task of removing any obscurity which may still ad- 
here to the statement, (page xli., line 16.) 

INTRODUCTION. (§§ 1436-1472 inclusive.) 

Article I. — Of the difference between pure and empirical knowledge. 
(§§ 1436-1439 inclusive.) 

§ 1436. — All our knowledge begins with experience, (p. 1, 1. 4.) 

§ 1437. — Question which requires close investigation (whether 
there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience.) 
(page 1, line 14.) 

§ 1438. — Knowledge apriori must be taken to mean such as is 
absolutely independent of all experience, (page 1, line 29.) 

§ 1439. — Knowledge apriori is either pure or impure, (p 2, 1. 17.) 

Article II. — The human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state, 
is in possession of certain cognitions apriori. (§§ 1440-1442.) 

§ 1440. — Necessity and strict universality are infallible tests for 
distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, (page 2, line 26.) 

§ 1441. — Fact that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure 
apriori cognition. We have judgments which are necessary, 
(page 3, line 19.) [Cf. Fischer, page 13 of Mahaffy's translation, 
and also (same page 13, note f) where Mahaffy translates from 
Kant's first edition.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 617 

§ 1442. — Apriori origin manifest even in conceptions, (p. 4, 1. 6.) 

Article ILL — Philosophy stands in need of a science which shall 
■determine the possibility, principles, and extent of human knowledge 
apriori. (§§ 1443-1447 inclusive.) 

§ 1443. — Unavoidable problems of mere pure reason — (God, 
freedom, and immortality), (page 4, line 25.) 

§ 1444. — Solution of these problems is undertaken by the 
science of metaphysics, (page 5, line 1.) 

§ 1445. — Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, 
(page 5, line 16.) [Mathematics, radically meaning science, or that 
which is to be learned, is (strictly speaking) the science based on 
(or consisting of and in) definitions, axioms, and demonstrations. 
See §§2466 et seqq., and cf. §§ 2603.] 

§ 1446. — Deceived by such a proof of the power of reason, 
(page 5, line 41.) 

§ 1447. — What frees us from all apprehension or suspicion, and 
flatters us into an unstable belief, (page 6, line 19.) 

Article IV. — Of the difference between analytical and synthetical 
judgments. (§§ 1448-1451 inclusive.) 

§ 1448. — Synthetical judgments add to our conceptions of the 
subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no 
analysis could ever have discovered therein, (page 7, line 3.) 

§ 1449. — Judgments of experience, as such, are always syntheti- 
cal, (page 7, line 34.) [See Fischer (page 12, note) where Mahatfy 
translates from Kant's first edition, and MahafFy's note to § 2653. 
(Proleg., page 19.)] 

§ 1450. — Synthetical judgments apriori can not be founded on 
experience, (page 8, line 30.) [Cf. § 1441.] 

§ 1451. — Depends the whole aim of our speculative knowledge 
apriori. Synthesis alone is a real acquisition, (page 9, line 14.) 

Article V. — Ln all theoretical sciences of reason, synthetical judg- 
ments apriori are contained as principles. (§§ 1452-1458 inclusive.) 

§ 1452. — Mathematical judgments are always synthetical, (page 
9, line 23.) Of. § 2654. 

§ 1453. — Mathematical propositions (pure) are always judgments 
apriori, and not empirical, (page 9, line 37.) 

§ 1454. — Arithmetical propositions are always synthetical, 
(page 10, line 5.) [See Mahaffy's note to § 2654. (Proleg., page 22.)] 

§ 1455. — Just as little is any principle of pure geometry 
analytical, (page 10, line 35.) [The last half of this section (page 
11, lines 3 to 11) is parenthetical. See Monck's observation men- 
tioned by Mahaffy (Fischer, page 16, note*), and Mahaffy's note 
to § 2654. (Proleg., page 23.)] 

40 



618 Kant's Ethics, 

§ 1456. — Predicate pertains to these conceptions but by virtue 
of an intuition, (page 11, line 11.) Cf. § 2654. 

§ 1457. — Science of natural philosophy contains in itself syn- 
thetical judgments apriori as principles, (page 11, line 24.) 

§ 1458. — Metaphysics, according to the proper aim of the science,, 
consists merely of synthetical propositions apriori. (p. 11, 1. 40.) 

Article VI. — The universal problem of pure reason. (§§ 1459-1466.) 

§ 1459. — How are synthetical judgments apriori possible ? (page 
12^ line 15.) [Cf. § 2667.] 

§ 1460. — Hume came the nearest of all to this problem, (page 
12, line 30.) [Cf. §§ 2634-2640, and § 2670.] 

§ 1461. — Possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation 
and construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowl- 
edge apriori of objects', (page 13, line 9.) Cf. Fischer, page 17, 
and see § 1511 (to which MahatYy refers) in regard to motion. 

§ 1462. — How is metaphysics as a natural disposition possible? 
(page 13, line 19.) 

§ 1463. — How is metaphysics possible as a science? (p. 14, 1. 8.) 

§ 1464. — Critique of reason leads at last naturally and neces- 
sarily to science, (page 14, line 25.) 

§ 1465. — [Metaphysical ?] science can not be of great and formid- 
able prolixity, (page 14, line 30.) [1 am not sure that Kant is 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

"An Analysis of Kant's Critick of Pure Eeason, by the translator of that 
work." London, William Pickering, 1844. [On the title page of my copy,, 
underneath the line " translator of that work," some person has written with a 
pencil, "P. Haywood."] [The preface (after the first four sentences) is con- 
cluded as follows:] The present analysis is founded upon and couched in the 
words of the original work: for though different great commentators have 
"been more or less closely followed, yet, as they themselves have in most cases- 
borrowed their phraseology from Kant himself, they are not so entirely copied 
in this analysis as, in looking merely at the expressions used, might seem to he- 
the case. In several instances, however, not only their mode of reasoning, hut 
their form of language, has been implicitly adopted, and from Wirgm'an in 
particular, as well as from Schoen, and Beck, and from Joufl'roy's translation of 
a German Analysis, much that is in the following work will be found to have 
been taken. The object of the author or compiler was less originality, than 
to render his subject comprehensible ; and, if this be attained, the end he had 
in view will be fully accomplished and for this he is willing to forego any 
higher claim of authorship. 

[In the following first part of the Analysis I have inserted [in brackets] a. 
few words (nearly all from Meiklejohn's translation of the Critique), and also 
some references to the Critique, (sections according to the numbering of the 
Clavis). An asterisk * indicates that at that point I have omitted a word or 
words out of Haywood's text. I have omitted the letter k from the words. 



The Clavis to an Index. 619 

speaking of metaphysical science in its entirety : it may be that 
he refers to science concerning the possibility of metaphysics. 
Cf. §§ 2841, 1467.] 

§ 1466. — Attempts hitherto made to establish metaphysical 
science dogmatically, may be regarded as non-existent, (p. 14, 1. 41.) 

Article VII. — Idea and division of a particular science, under the 
name of a critique of pure reason. (§§ 1467-1472 inclusive.) 

§ 1467.- — Critique of pure reason, to purify our reason, and to 
shield it against error, (page 15, line 25.) 

§ 1468. — Transcendental critique aims not at the enlargement, but 
at the correction and guidance of our knowledge. Transcendental 
knowledge is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode 
of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition 
is possible apriori. (page 16, line 3.) 

§ 1469. — Transcendental philosophy is the system of all the 
principles of pure reason : the whole plan of this science is sketched 
architectonically by the critique of pure reason, (page 17, line 5.) 

§ 1470. — No conceptions must enter into it which contain aught 
empirical. (Hence the science of morals is not jnire transcendental 
philosophy. For all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, 
relates to feelings, and these belong to empirical sources of cog- 
nition, (page 17, line 39.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
analytick and dialectick, changed the spelling Critick to Critique, omitted 
parenthetical marks ( ) in one sentence, sometimes used a semicolon instead of 
a comma which I found printed, made perhaps some other minor changes in 
punctuation, and in a few cases made minor changes or transposition in the 
text : which small matters, not often occurring, I have not thought it necessary 
to hring to the notice of the reader except in this general way, so that if I have 
done anything wrong, I may receive the blame.] 

In 1781, Kant published his first edition of this celebrated work, the preface 
to which is short, and hardly does more than introduce the subject generally ; 
but in 1790, together with a second edition a second preface appeared, wherein 
the leading principles of the system are set forth. The exposition commences 
by showing that Logic, unlike the cognition of Reason, is a science which from 
the earliest times has proceeded in a right path, and that even so soon as the 
days of Aristotle this was discovered; and that though the subject, may not 
have made great advances since that period, it has not retrograded. 

If psychological, metaphysical, or anthropological elements have been in- 
correctly pushed into Logic, this, it is contended, though it may have disfigured 
the science, — inasmuch as it added considerations which do not properly apper- 
tain to it, — was a mistake, rather than a fault. Logic in Kant's view of the 
matter has, in fact, nothing to do but with the formal rules of all thinking, 
whether such be apriori, or empirical [§ 1411]. 

Logic then being limited in this way, the Understanding therein is only 



620 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1471. — Division of this science : (I.) doctrine of the elements, 
and (II.) doctrine of the method of pure reason, (page 18, line 
16.) [Cf. § 1008.] 

§ 1472. — Two sources of human knowledge : sense and under- 
standing, (page 18, line 21.) Cf. §1524. [Probably Mahaffy (Fischer, 
page 4) translates perh aps.~] 

TOME I.— TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF 
ELEMENTS. (§§ 1473-2444 inclusive.) 

PART I.— TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC. (§§1473-1523.) 

Article I. — Introductory. (§§1473-1477 inclusive.) 

§ 1473. — Sensibility is the capacity for receiving representations 
(receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by ob- 
jects, (page 21, line 5.) [Cf. § 1787.] 

§ 1474. — Sensation is the effect of an object upon the faculty of 
representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, (page 
21, line 21.) 

§ 1475. — Pure intuition, which exists apriori in the mind, as a 
mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses 
or any sensation, (page 22, line 1.) 

§ 1476. — Transcendental aesthetic is the science of all the prin- 
ciples of sensibility apriori. (page 22, line 16.) 

HAY WOODS ANALYSIS. 

concerned with itself and its form. Reason, the particular subject-matter of 
Kant's investigation, is twofold, theoretical or practical, and its cognitions may 
be so referred to its object [i. e., the apriori cognition of reason, in reference to 
its object, is either theoretical or practical. # 1413]. But, in the present in- 
stance, the pure part of both is only to be treated, that is to say, that part 
wherein reason determines its object wholly apriori; and that which proceeds 
from other sources must not be mixed up with it. 

Mathematics and Physics are adduced as the two theoretical cognitions of 
Reason which have to determine their objects apriori [§ 1414], the first of which 
is stated to have always proceeded in a right track from the earliest period of 
Greece [§ 1415]; it had, however, more difficulty in getting into this proper 
way than Logic, where, as it was before said, the understanding or reason has 
only to do with itself. With Physics, again, this was more difficult, and it was 
not until the time of Galileo that a light is supposed to have dawned upon 
natural philosophers. It was then discovered that reason only perceives that 
which it itself produces, and that its judgments coincide with certain laws ex- 
isting in the understanding. Reason, in this way, though it refers to nature, in 
order to be instructed by it, experimentally, yet in fact itself gives laws to 
nature, compelling the answers to be rendered in certain forms [§ 1417]. 

This is the essence of the system of Kant, and upon which every thing 
depends ; and though it seems something like the exploded doctrine of innate 
ideas, yet it will be ascertained in the sequel to be very different. 



The Clavis to an Index. 621 

§ 1477. — Two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of 
knowledge apriori : (1) space ; (2) time, (page 22, line 22.) 

TITLE I. -OF SPACE, (§g 1478-1494 inclusive.) 

Article II. — Metaphysical exposition of this conception. (1478-1483.) 

§ 1478. — Represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these 
all in space, (page 23, line 9.) 

§ 1479. — Exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which 
represents the conception as given apriori. (page 23, line 27.) 

§ 1480. — External experience is itself only possible through the 
antecedent representation of space, (page 23, line 33.) 

§ 1481. — Space is a necessary representation apriori, and must 
be considered the condition of the possibility of phenomena, (page 
24, line 6.) 

§ 1482. — Space is no discursive or general conception of the re- 
lations of things, but a pure intuition, (page 24, line 15.) A dis- 
cursive conception is one which has received from the faculty of 
judgment (ratio) some addition to the content with which (as an 
intuition) it enters the mind. Of. §§ 1550, 1551. 

§ 1483. — Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. No 
conception, as such, can be so conceived as if it contained within 
itself an infinite multitude of representations, (page 24, line 31.) 
Cf. Fischer, page 41, where Mahaffy translates, " For all the parts 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

Metaphj-sics not having, like' Mathematics, the advantage of Intuition, 
has been longer in falling into the sure path of a science ; for reason comes 
to a stand-still, when it wishes to discover, apriori, laws which, it insists, the 
most common experience confirms [$ 1418]. The error in metaphysical specu- 
lations seems to have been, that it has hitherto been laid down, that our cogni- 
tion was to regulate itself according to the objects, whilst, under such a sup- 
position, all attempts to make out any thing, apriori, respecting these objects, 
by means of conceptions, whereby our cognition would be extended, have 
failed. The next thing then to be tried is whether it would not be better to 
admit that the objects are regulated according to our cognition [£ 1419]. This 
accords more with the possibility that is desired of their cognition apriori, which 
is to determine something respecting them before they are given. 

Copernicus, it is known, made little progress in his knowledge of the motions 
of the heavenly bodies so long as he supposed that the stars revolved round the 
spectator, but when he reversed the idea, and made the spectator to turn and 
the sun itself to be at rest, he arrived at the true result. All objects according 
to this improved mode of thinking regulate themselves as objects of experience, 
in which character alone they are known, according to cognitions apriori, exist- 
ing in the understanding. The contradictions that arise in our investigations 
of reason, flow from confounding the objects that .are presented to us in one 
case as Objects of experience, and in another as Things in themselves. 

This is the great distinction of the Kantian system. Reason, for instance, 



622 Kan? 8 Ethics. 

of space, ad infinitum, exist simultaneously." See § 1639, cf. § 2684, 
and Mahafty's note in reference to unendlich (Proleg., page 47), 
and see especially § 2427. Cf. §§ 2178, 2181. 

Article III. — -Transcendental exposition of the conception of space. 
(§§ 1484-1488 inclusive.) 

§ 1484 — transcendental exposition is the explanation of a con- 
ception as a principle whence can be discerned the possibility of 
other synthetical apriori cognitions, (page 25, line 2.) 

§ 1485,. — Eepresentation of space must be originally intuition, 
(page 25, line 9.) Cf. §§ 1455 and 1440. 

§ 1486. — Must be found in the mind apriori. (page 25, line 15.) 

§ 1487.- — How can an external intuition anterior to objects 
themselves, and in which our conception of objects can be de- 
termined apriori, exist in the human mind? (page 25, line 21.) 

§ 1488. — Possibility of geometry, as a synthetical science apriori, 
becomes comprehensible, (page 25, line 29.) 

Article IV. — Conclusions from the foregoing conceptions. (§§ 1489- 
1494 inclusive.) 

§ 1489. — Space does not represent any property of objects as 
things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations 
to each other, (page 25, line 36.) 

§ 1490. — Space is the subjective condition of the sensibility, 
under which alone external intuition is possible, (page 26, line 9.) 

§ 1491. — Can not make the special conditions of sensibility into , 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

aspires to the Unconditioned. But if we admit our cognition of experience 
regulates itself according to objects, as Things in themselves, the unconditioned 
can not he thought without contradiction [stated hypothetically in §1422]; 
whilst if we suppose that our representation of things as they are given to us, 
does not regulate itself according to these, as things in themselves, but that 
these objects, as phenomena, rather regulate themselves according to our mode 
of representation, the contradiction disappears. The analysis of pure cogni- 
tion apriori by the metaphysician is or ought to be divided into the two classes 
mentioned, namely, that of Things in themselves, and Things as phenomena. 
Carrying the experience-view of things out to its strict consequences, it would 
seem to exalt Sensibility or Sensation high above all other principles, but this 
Kant is peculiarly anxious to avoid ; and by endeavoring to show that the prac- 
tical or moral use of Reason is no less true and demonstrable than the specula- 
tive, and in having cleared the way of all that was obstructive, he thinks he 
affords freer passage to the dictates of the moral principle [g 1423]. The 
Critique of Pure Reason limits the use of reason, in this way, that it admits 
Space and Time to be merely Forms of sensible intuition, consequently only 
the conditions of things as phenomena; and it further shows, that we can have 
no elements at all for the cognition of things, excepting so far as a correspond- 
ing intuition can be given to these conceptions — consequently, that we can have 



The Clavis to an Index. 623 

conditions of the possibility of things, but only of the possibility 
of their existence as far as they are phenomena, (page 26, line 19.) 

§ 1492. — Eeality (i. e. the objective validity) of space in re- 
gard of all which can be presented to ns externally as object, and 
at the same time also the ideality of space in regard to objects 
when they are considered (by means of reason) as things in them- 
selves (that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensi- 
bility), (page 26, line 40.) Cf. § 1614. 

§ 1493. — Space excepted, there is no representation subjective 
and referring to something external to us, which could be called 
objective apriori. (page 27, line 19.) See Fischer, (page 57) where 
Mahaffy translates from the first edition, and refers to § 1515. 

§ 1494. — Outward objects are nothing else but mere representa- 
tions of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real cor- 
relate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these repre- 
sentations, nor ever can be. (page 27, line 41.) 

TITLE II.— OF TIME. (§31495-1508 inclusive.) 

Article V. — Metaphysical exposition of this conception. (§§ 1495- 
1499 inclusive.) 

§ 1495. — Time is not an empirical conception, (page 28, line 14.) 

§ 1496. — Time is a necessary representation, lying at the founda- 
tion of all our intuitions, (page 28, line 20.) 

§ 1497. — Apodictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms 
•of time in general, (page 28, line 29.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but merely so far as it is an object 
■of sensible intuition, that is, so far as it is Phenomenon [$ 1425]. 

The analytical part of the Critique of Pure Eeason is devoted to the proof 
of these assertions, and restrains thereby the speculative cognition of Reason, 
as has been remarked, to mere objects of experience. But then there arises the 
greatest difference between cognizing or knowing objects, and. thinking them 
fj 1426]; and the antagonist views which Kant afterward develops in what he 
terms Antinomies, are only to be explained by admitting two modes of contem- 
plating the objects, namely, in the one case, to look upon things, as things in them- 
selves, and in the other, as they are phenomenal, or as they appear [§ 1427]. 
Kant intimates, that through his view of the case, and the great distinction 
which he establishes, the doctrines of materialism and atheism are totally up- 
xooted, and he insists that the outcry raised against his system arises not from 
the public, who are never injured by any speculative opinion, but from school- 
men, who" alone are interested in maintaining their selfish and prejudiced posi- 
tions [§ 1432]. 

[Here we leave] * the preface to the Critique of Pure Eeason.* The reasoning 
by which these principles are to be supported forms the subject of a work which, 
however disfigured by a harsh and singular terminology, must always be re- 
garded as one of the most important productions connected with the history 
•of the human mind. 



624 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1498. — Time is not a discursive or general conception but a 
pure form of the sensuous intuition, (page 29, line 1.) Cf. § 1482. 

§ 1499. — Infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every 
determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations 
of one time lying at the foundation, (page 29, line 11.) Cf. § 1639. 

Article VI. — Transcendental exposition of the conception of time.. 

(§ 1500 

§ 1500. — Explains the possibility of so much synthetical knowl- 
edge apriori as is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, 
(page 29, line 22.) Cf. § 1632. 

Article VII. — Conclusions from the above conceptions. (§§ 1501- 
1505 inclusive.) 

§ 1501- — Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which 
inheres in things as an objective determination, (page 30, line 4.) 

§ 1502. — Time is nothing else than the form of our internal 
sense, that is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state, 
(page 30, line 17.) 

§ 1503. — Time is the formal condition apriori of all jmenomena 
whatsoever, (page 30, line 33.) Cf. §§ 291, 1490. 

§ 1504. — Time is merely a subjective condition of our (human) 
intuition, and in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is. 
nothing, (page 31, line 9.) Cf. § 1492. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

The Introduction to the work itself of the Critique of Pure Reason begins 
by exposing the difference between pure and empirical cognition or knowledge ; 
and whilst it admits that this said cognition begins with experience [§ 1436], it 
denies that it springs up out of experience [# 1437] — empirical cognition being 
a compound of that which we have received through our impressions ; and 
that which our own inherent, as it may be termed, cognition-faculty, (called 
however only into action by impressions made upon the senses), has supplied 
from or out of itself. Hence, according to this view, although all knowledge 
commences its operations from experience, which is designated variously as sen- 
sible, sensual, or sensitive, the one does not flow from the other; the very facts 
of experience being conceived and arranged according to innate forms of the 
understanding, and which are subsequently shown to be so many Categories of 
Pure Reason. Cognitions apriori are such as are entirely independent of ex- 
perience, though by this experience alone are they called into operation ; and 
cognitions aposteriori are, on the other hand, those which have their' source in 
experience. Pure knowledge, apriori, is that with which nothing at all empiri- 
cal is mixed, so that the proposition that " every change has its cause," notwith- 
standing that it is a proposition apriori, is not pure ; because change is a con- 
ception which can only be derived from experience [§ 1439]. In the same way 
it is erroneous, in speaking of one who undermines the foundation of his house, 
to say that he might, apriori, have known the house would fall ; because this 
entirely, apriori, he could not be acquainted with, for heaviness is in this case 



The Clavis to an Index. 625 

• § 1505. — Transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if 
we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition, it is 
nothing, (page 31, line 33.) Cf. § 1493. 

Article VIII. — Elucidation. (§§ 1506-1511 inclusive.) 

§ 1506. — Objection urged against this theory : Changes are 
only possible in time, and therefore time must be something real, 
(page 32, line 17.) 

§ 1507. — Reason why this objection is so unanimously brought, 
(page 33, line 6.) 

§ 1508. — Genus phenomenon, which has always two aspects, 
(page 33, line 18.) 

§ 1509. — Time and space, being merely conditions of our sensi- 
bility, do therefore, and as such, strictly determine their own 
range and purpose. The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere 
of their validity, (page 33, line 28.) 

§ 1510. — Validity of our empirical knowledge unshaken, (page 
34, line 5.) 

§ 1511. — Transcendal aesthetic can not contain any more than 
these two elements, space and time, (page 35, line 12.) 

Article IX. — General remarks on transcendental aesthetic. (§§ 1512- 
1522 inclusive.) 

Scholium I. — (§§ 1512-1516 inclusive.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
added; and that bodies* are heavy, and that they fall when their supports 
are taken away, is a species of knowledge only derivable from experience [§1438]. 

[In order to show]* that the human mind is always in possession of certain 
cognitions apriori, the only question then is, what is the criterion by which 
such are distinguished from those that are aposteriori \j> 1440] ? This criterion is 
Necessity and strict Universality, and wherever either of these belongs to a 
judgment, they are such characteristics as indicate a peculiar source of cogni- 
tion, or the one which is apriori. Experience can only give contingent judg- 
ments; and Hume's idea of the necessary connection of Cause and Effect being 
simply in our minds the result of Habit [# 1441], is precisely the doctrine which 
Kant opposes, and to which the world is indebted for the publication of the 
Critique of Pure Reason. 

Now if what has been stated as to cognitions apriori be true, the necessity of 
a science which should establish positively the principles and extent of the same 
is obvious, and the most important of all [the problems of pure reason] * to 
man are the questions of God, Liberty, and Immortality [# 1443], and the 
Critique of Pure Reason is the essential preliminary to that of Practical Reason, 
wherein these three points are to be fully proved and determined. To prepare 
the way for this investigation, it will be first necessary to show the difference 
[$ 1447] that exists between the different kinds of judgments, or those which 
are analytical and those which are synthetical. 

A judgment is called analytical, when the predicate adds nothing to the con- 



626 • Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1512. — Fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in gen- 
eral. (Recapitulation.) (page 35, line 29.) See § 1822. 

§ 1513. — Difference between a confused and a clear representa- 
tion is merely logical, and has nothing to do with content, (page 
36, line 27.) Cf. §§ 1052-1055, and 1109-1112. 

§ 1514. — Distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual is 
plainly transcendental, and concerns not merely the clearness or 
obscurity, but the content and origin of both. (Leibnitz-Wolfian 
philosophy erroneous.) (page 37, line 13.) See §1513. 

§ 1515. — Question of the relation of the representation to the 
object is transcendental, (page 37, line 28.) See § 1493. 

§ 1516. — Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves 
objective, and conditions of the possibility of objects as things in 
themselves. Whence do 3'ou obtain the propositions of geometry, 
cognized synthetically apriori, and with apodictic certainty? (page 
38, line 22.) See § 2277. 

Scholium 17.— (§§ 1517-1520 inclusive.) 

§ 1517. — All in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains 
nothing more than mere relations, (page 40, line 12.) 

§ 1518. — External sense in its representation can contain only 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
ception of the subject, but only by analysis separates it into its constituent 
parts [g 1448]. This is merely an explicative judgment, but a synthetical one 
is an extending or amplifying judgment; inasmuch as it adds a predicate to the 
conception of the subject, which was not at all thought in it, and could not by 
any analysis of the same have been added to it. Thus mathematical judgments 
are all synthetical, and mathematical propositions are judgments apriori, and 
not empirical, because the}' carry along with them the test of necessity, which 
it is evident is not derivable from experience [§ 1453]. 

The questions then arise, how these synthetical judgments apriori, are pos- 
sible, as well as how pure Mathematics and pure Physics are possible [§ 1461]. 
* These sciences* [mustbe possible, because they really exist. [Regarding] Meta- 
physics,* the question is then asked also as to possibility in this case, and 
this again leads to the idea and division of a particular science, to be denomi- 
nated by the title of the Critique of Pure Keason [g 1467]. 

Here the objects and limits of the work itself are determined. It is not to 
be designated Transcendental Philosophy [g 1468], because, to be a complete 
system in this sense, it ought to contain a full analysis of the whole of human 
cognition apriori; but whilst "the Critique" as a work lays before us a complete 
enumeration of all the fundamental conceptions of the human mind, or of the 
categories which form the aforesaid pure cognition, it refrains from a full an- 
alysis of these conceptions themselves, as well as* such as are thence derived. 
Limiting itself thus to the consideration of synthetical cognition apriori, the 
science is separated into the two great divisions of the Elemental Doctrine, or 
the doctrine of the elements of the subject, and the Methodical Doctrine, or that 
which is to determine the method that is to be applied to these elements [§ 1471]. 



The Clavis to an Index. 627 

the relation of the object to the subject, but not the essential 
nature of the object as a thing in itself, (page 40, line 23.) 

§ 1519. — Nothing else than the mode in which the mind is af- 
fected by its own activity, (page 40, line 30.) See Mahaffy's In- 
troduction to Fischer, page liv., and Kant's note to § 1633, to which 
JVIahaffy refers. 

§ 1520. — Subject intuites itself according to the manner in which 
the mind is internally affected, consequently as it appears and not 
as it is. (page 41, line 7.) Cf. § 1629. 

Scholium IIL—(§ 1521.) [Cf. §§1856, 1896.] 

§ 1521. — Illusory appearance never can be attributed as a predi- 
cate to an object. When we say that the intuition of external ob- 
jects, and also the self-intuition of the subject, represent both, ob- 
jects and subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses (that 
is, as they appear), this is by no means equivalent to asserting 
that these objects are mere illusory appearances, (p. 41, 1. 35.) 

Scholium IF.— (1522.) 

§ 1522. — Intuition in space and time is dependent on the exist- 
ence of the object, (page 43, line 5.) See §§ 2282, 2700. 

Article X. — Conclusion of the transcendental aesthetic. (§ 1523.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

The interpretation is here to be afforded of what is termed by Kant, Trans- 
cendental ^Esthetic, or the theory or rules of sensibility in general ; and intui- 
tion is declared to be the only means by which reference is made to objects, and 
whereby immediate (as distinct from other) cognition is afforded [$ 1473] To 
realize this the object must be given to us, and the effect of the object upon the 
representation-faculty of man is Sensation [§ 1474]; that which corresponds, in 
the phenomenon, to the sensation is Matter, and that which causes that the 
diversity of the phenomenon is adduced in certain relationship is Form. 

By means of the external sense we represent to ourselves every thing as in 
Space; and by the internal sense all is represented in the relationship of Time 
[$ 1478]. But the question arises what are these two things, space and time ? Are 
they determinations or relations of things, but yet such as would belong to 
things in themselves, though they should not be intuited or envisaged; or are 
they such things that they belong only to the form of the intuition, and con- 
sequently to a subjective property ["to the subjective constitution of the 
mind," Meiklejohn translates (1478)] of mind, without which these at ributes 
could not be attached to any thing. 

After discussing * what space is, Kant arrives at the conclusion that space 
is an intuition apriori, and not a [discursive] conception [§1482]. Space* is 
held to be nothing but the form of all phenomena of the external sense, or the 
subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone external intuition is pos- 
sible to us [# 1490]; and it will be seen from considering the doctrine, that the 
Reality or objective validity of space is positive, in reference to all that, ex- 
ternally, as object, can be presented to us; but at the same time that it is an 
Ideality in reference to things if they are considered in themselves, by mean 



628 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1523.- — Valid only for objects of possible experience, (page 
44, line 2.) 

PART II.— TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. (§21524-2444.) 

Introduction.— Idea of a Transcendental Logic. (g§ 1524-1545.) 

Article I. — Of logic in general. (§§ 1524-1534 inclusive.) 

§ 1524. — Knowledge springs from two main sources in the 
mind : (1) the power of receiving representations ; (2) the power 
of cognizing by means of these representations, (page 45, line 8.) 
See §§ 1544, 1551, 1473, and Mahaffy's note in Fischer, page 5, with 
which compare Kant's note to § 1639. 

§ 1525. — Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the ele- 
ments of our knowledge; so that neither conceptions without an 
intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition with- 
out conceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure 
or empirical, (page 45, line 15.) [§ 1526 (page 45, line 28).] 

§ 1526. — Sensibility is the faculty of receiving representations. 

§ 1527. — Understanding is the faculty of thinking the object of 
sensuous intuition, (page 46, line 1.) 

§ 1528. — Understanding can not intuite, and the sensuous faculty 
can not think. In no other way than from the united operation 
of both, can knowledge arise, (page 46, line 11.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
of reason or without regard to the nature of our sensibility [§ 1492]. Here the 
distinction shows itself, between things in themselves, and things as they ap- 
pear.- Space is not a form which is proper to things in themselves [§ 1494], nor 
are such things at all known to us. What we term external objects are noth- 
ing but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is in space, but 
whose true correlative, that is to say, the thing in itself, is not thereby, nor can 
it be, known. 

Neither is Time any empirical conception which can be adduced from ex- 
perience [g 1495]. It is a necessary representation which lies at the foundation 
of all intuition [§ 1496.] Time is given, apriori : — it is the form of the internal 
sense, and the formal condition, apriori, of phenomena in general [§1503]. 
Hence it will be seen that all intuition is nothing but the representation 
of phenomena ; that the things we see or envisage are not in themselves 
what they are taken for ; that if we did away with ourselves, that is to say, the 
subject or the subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality that 
we discover in time and space, and even time and space themselves, would dis- 
appear [§ 1512] What objects may be in themselves, separated from the re- 
ceptivity of our sensibility, is quite unknown to us. We only are .acquainted 
with our own mode of perceiving these objects. The pure intuitions are space 
and time; the empirical is sensation. Here the error of the Leibnitzian-Wolnan 
philosophy becomes palpable, for in the view there taken of our cognitions, the 
difference between that which was intellectual and that which appertains to the 



The Clavis to an Index. 629 

§ 1529. — Logic distinguished from sesthetic. (page 46, line 17.) 

§ 1530. — Logic is either logic of the- general or of the particular 
use of the understanding, (page 46, line 20.) Cf. § 993. [It does 
not seem, to have occurred to Mr. Meiklejohn that a particular 
designation is desirable for so much of logic as is found necessary 
as a propaedeutic to a particular science. This may be called the 
organon of the science, or logic of the particular use, to distinguish 
it from the completeness of universal logic] 

§ 1531. — General lo.aric is either pure or applied, (page 47, line 
18.) Cf §994. 

§ 1532. — Pure general logic is a canon of understanding and 
reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use. (page 
48, line 2.) Cf. § 1001. 

§ 1533. — Pure general logic is a demonstrated doctrine, and 
everything in it must be certain completely apriori. (page 48, line 
15.) Cf § 996. 

§ 1534. — Applied logic is a representation of the understanding, 
and of the rules of its necessaiy employment in concrete (page 
48, line 31.) Cf. §§1531, 1532, 1009. 

Article II. — Of transcendental logic. (§§ 1535-1538 inclusive.) 

§ 1535. — Distinction between pure and empirical thought (of 
objects), (page 49, line 10.) Cf. § 1000. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
sensibility was considered merely as logical ; whereas it is transcendental, con- 
cerning not merely the form as to clearness or obscurity, but the origin and 
content of our cognitions themselves [g 1514.] 

The science which treats of the laws of the understanding in general is 
termed Logic, as that which treated of the science of sensibility or sensitivity 
was ./Esthetic [# 1529]. But logic is divided into two branches accordingly as 
it signifies [relates to] the universal or the particular use of the understanding 
[§ 1530]. The one contains the absolutely necessary rules of Thinking in gen- 
eral ; the other contains rules as to thinking correctly, in regard to particular 
kind of objects. The one is Elemental Logic, or general logic, the other is the 
Organon or understanding-instrument of this or that particular science .* 

Now this elemental or general logic may be divided again into two branches 
pure and applied [g 1531]. In the one, abstraction is made of all the empirical 
conditions under which the understanding is exercised, as for instance, the in- 
fluence of the senses, the power of custom, of inclination, desire, passion, the 
sources of prejudices, etc.; as well as all causes of experience-cognitions, inas- 
much as these merely concern the application of the understanding to sensible 
impressions. Pure elemental, or universal, or general logic, only regards pure 
principles, apriori ; and is therefore a canon of the understanding and reason 
[§ 1532], (or a complex of rules for the faculty of forming conceptions, and 
judging and concluding), [and]* it [only] considers the formal part and what, 
as thinking, is necessarily required for thinking, the content of the same being 



630 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1536. — Examine the origin of our cognitions of objects, so far 
as that origin can not be ascribed to the objects themselves, (page 
49, line 21.) 

§ 1537. — Must bear well in mind that not every cognition apriori 
is transcendental. Distinction of the transcendental and empiri- 
cal, (page 49, line 33 ) [The apriori determinations of space are 
empirical, because they do not transcend the sensible world; but 
they are not of empirical origin, because determined apriori by the 

intuition.] S^j^^^A V\oW; A f U<W V W^^L 

§ 1538. — Idea of a science of pure understanding! ana rational 
cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely 
apriori. (page 50, line 10.) Cf. §1535. 

Article III. — Of the division of general logic into analytic and 
dialectic. (§§1539-1543 inclusive.) 

§ 1539. — '•' What is truth?" To know what questions we may 
reasonably propose, is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and 
intelligence, (page 50, line 26.) Cf'. §§1114, 1133. 

§ 1540. — JSTo universal test of the truth of our cognitions in re- 
spect of their matter can be demanded, because such a demand is 
self- contradictory, (page 51, line 6.) [This demonstration is re- 
markable for its terseness.] Cf. § 1079. 

§ 1541. — Accordance of a cognition with the universal and 



HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

[what it may,] either empirical, that is, derived from experience, or transcen- 
dental, that is to say, concerning cognitions apriori. This elemental or univer- 
sal logic is termed applied elemental logic when it is directed to the rules of the 
use of the understanding under alleged subjective empirical-psychological con- 
ditions, as for example, when it is directed to the play of the imagination, etc. Still 
it is universal logic, though it has empirical principles, for this reason, that it 
refers to the .use of the understanding without distinction of objects, and in this 
way it becomes neither exactly an Organon (or an understanding-instrument) 
of particular sciences, (which contains the rules of thinking as to a particular 
kind of objects,) nor a Canon of the understanding in general, because it con- 
tains the application of the use of the understanding to a determinate thinking- 
subject, that is to say, man ; but it is only a Cathartikon, (means of purification) 
of the common understanding from error. 

In elemental logic the part which is pure, or which regards pure reason, 
must be separated from that which constitutes what is applied, though still ele- 
mental or universal logic [§ 1533]. As a science it appears dry. It is, however, 
a systematic cognition, though a short one. It derives all its positions from the 
understanding, and is nothing else but an analysis or development of the func- 
tions of the understanding in thinking or in thought generally. Logicians 
must therefore at all times have the two [following] rules before them in treat- 
ing of elemental logic; for [first rule] when it is considered under the sense of 
universal, it makes abstraction of the content of all understanding-cognition ; 



The Clavis to an Index. 631 

formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing more than 
the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all truth, (page 
51, line 23.) Cf § 1080. 

§ 1542. — No one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predi- 
cate anything of, or decide concerning, objects, (page 52, line 1.) 

§ 1543. — Any attempt to employ logic as an instrument (organon) 
in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge, must 
end in mere prating, (page 52, line 18.) Cf. §§ 1003, 1004, 1545. 

Article IV. — Of the division of transcendental logic into transcen- 
dental analytic and dialectic. ((§§ 1544, 1545 ) 

§ 1544. — Transcendental analytic treats of the elements of pure 
cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without 
which no object at all can be thought, (page 53, line 18.) Cf. §§ 
1522, 1524, 1542, 1546. 

§ 1545. — Transcendental dialectic is a critique of dialectical il- 
lusion, (page 53, line 32.) See § 1543, and cf. §§ 1925, 1926. 

Division I. — Transcendental Analytic. {$ 1546-1924 inclusive.) 

Article I.— (§ 1546.) 

§ 1546. — Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole 
of our apriori knowledge into the elements of the' pure cognition 
of the understanding, (page 54, line 26.) Books (1) the concep- 
tions, and (2) the principles of pure understanding. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

or of all reference of the same to the object; consequently [it makes abstrac- 
tion] in respect to the same, whether the cognition be pure or empirical; 
whether the object springs from the cognition-faculty itself, or is given bv 
means of sensible impressions. For if it were admitted that it has reference to 
the difference of objects of thought, then by reason of this difference, and be- 
cause the same is frequently given, by experience, it could not assume strict 
universality, [or possibly the meaning here is that by reason of this difference 
of objects, logic could not assume strict universality, nor could the frequent 
repetition of experience ever warrant the assumption of strict universality] as 
to its rules, because these rules might change according to the difference of ob- 
jects. Elemental logic in this way considers simply the l'ogical form in respect 
of cognitions one to another [the logical form of cognitions in respect to one 
another], that is, it has only to do with the pure form of thought. But [second 
rule] as pure logic it has no empirical principles, and consequently it derives 
nothing from psychology, which has no influence upon the canon of the under- 
standing [§ 1533]. Pure elemental logic is a demonstrated doctrine. All is 
entirely in it apriori, that is, must carry along with it necessity and universality. 

Applied Logic is a representation of the necessary understanding-use under 
the contingent conditions of the subject [§1534]. It treats of attention, its 
obstacles and consequences, the origin of error, etc. Universal and pure logic 
has the same reference to this that pure morality has to [practical] Ethics. 

Logic must again be further divided into different parts, and the divisions 



632 Kant's Ethics. 

BOOK I.- ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTIONS. (§§1547-1652 inclusive.) 

Article II.— (§1547.) 

§ 1547. — Dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in 
order to investigate the possibility of conceptions apriori, by look- 
ing for them in the understanding alone, (page 55, line 22.) 

Chapter I.— Of the transcendental clue to the discovery of all pure concep- 
tions of the understanding. (§§1518-1577 inclusive.) 

Article III— Introductory. (§§ 1548, 1549.) 

§ 1548. — Present themselves by no means in order and system- 
atic unity, (page 56, line 7.) 

§ 1549. — Conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the un- 
derstanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected 
with each other according to one conception or idea, (page 56, line 
22.) Cf. § 1569. 

TITLE I.— OF THE LOGICAL USE OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN GENERAL. 

(§§ 1550-1554 inclusive.) 

Article IV,— (§§ 1550-1554 inclusive.) 

§ 1550. — Cognition of every human understanding is a cognition 
through conceptions, not intuitive, but discursive, (page 56, line 
37.) [A discursive conception is a conception formed after the 
manner of a judgment, a rational or argumentative process. 
See §§1169, 1963, 1057.] 

§ 1551. — Conceptions are based on the spontaneity of thought, 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
"before given of universal and particular and of pure and applied will not suf- 
fice. There is besides a transcendental logic [§1535]. Universal logic, as we 
have observed, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, that is, reference 
to its object, or of all relationship to the object, considering only logical form in 
the relations of cognitions to each other, or the form of thought in general. 
But as we are aware that there are pure as well as empirical intuitions, — there 
is also a difference between pure and empirical thinking, and there is likewise a 
logic in which we should not make abstraction of all content of® [cognition], 
as universal or elemental logic does, which has nothing to do with difference as 
to pure or empirical thinking in particular, but with thinking in general. This 
other science, or . that of conceptions, apriori, is called transcendental Logic 
[§ 1538], and it forms a part of transcendental philosophy [cf. # 1469]. It shows 
not only that there are pure conceptions apriori, but it distinguishes also how 
many there are of them, — how they spring up, whether the understanding cog- 
nizes through them alone, how far they may be applied, and if and how, con- 
sequently, they limit the understanding. This science stands in the same light, 
in regard to pure conceptions apriori, that Transcendental ^Esthetic does to 
pure intuitions apriori [cf. § 1544]. It has only to do with the laws of the un- 
derstanding and of reason, so far simply as it has reference to objects apriori ; 
and it differs in this way from Logic Universal which refers indifferently to 
cognitions empirical as well as to those appertaining to pure reason. 



The Clavis to an Index. 633 

•as sensuous intuitions are on the receptivity of impressions, (page 
57, line 5.) [Functions — faculties of judgment — from fungor, to per- 
form.] [Affections — capacities of being acted upon.] Spontaneity : 
see §§ 1524 and 1544 (exercise depends). 

§ 1552. — All judgments are functions of unity in our represen- 
tations, inasmuch, as, instead of an immediate, a higher represen- 
tation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our 
cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions are 
collected into one. (page 57, line 11.) 

§ 1553. — Understanding may be represented as the faculty of 
judging, (page 57, line 32.) 

§ 1554. — All the functions of the understanding can be discovered 
when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judg- 
ments, (page 58, line 2.) 

TITLE II.— OF THE LOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN JUDG- 
MENTS. (§§1555-1562 inclusive.) 

Article F.— (§§ 1555-1562 inclusive.) 

§ 1555. — Function of thought in a judgment can be brought 
under four heads, of which each contains three momenta. (Table 
of judgments), (page 58 line 9.) Cf. §§ 1573, 1186. [As to infinite, 
cf. §§ 1219-1221 and § 2717 (where Eichardson translates in- 
definite, page 76.)] 

§ 1556. — Singular judgment relates to the general one as unity 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

Universal logic again is divided into* Analytic and * Dialectic [g§ 1542, 1543]. 
Analytic, by dissecting, discovers all the operation of reason which we perform 
in thinking in general. It is therefore an analytic of the understanding and 
of reason, and is justly named the Logic of Truth, because it contains the neces- 
sary rules of all (formal) truth, and Without which our cognition is, with regard 
to the objects, untrue in itself [$ 1544]. Should this merely theoretical and uni- 
versal doctrine be used as a practical art, that is, as an Organon, it would be- 
come a Dialectic or Logic of Appearance, which arises from a mere abuse of 
the Analytic [§§ 1543, 1545], when, according to the bare logical form, the ap- 
pearance of a true cognition, whose marks must however be taken from the 
agreement with the objects, and consequently from the matter [cf. \\ 1540, 1541], 
is fabricated. 

In Transcendental Logic we isolate the understanding, as in Transcendental 
^Esthetic we isolate sensibility, and we extract merely that part of thought from 
our cognition, which has its origin solely in the understanding; and the use of 
this pure cognition r^sts upon this as its condition, that objects can be given to 
us in intuition to which the pure cognition can be applied [§ 1544]. Care must 
be taken in making use of these pure understanding-cognitions and principles, 
that a material use is not made of what is merely formal [g 1545]. "When tran- 
scendental Analytic is considered as an Organon of universal and unlimited 
use, instead of a Canon of judgment in an empirical sense, it falls into mistakes 

41 



634 Kant's Ethics. 

to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different, (page 58,, 
line 33.) ' Cf. § 1214. 

§ 1557. — Infinite must be distinguished from affirmative judg- 
ments (in transcendental logic), (p. 59, 1. 13). See §§ 1219-1222.) 

§ 1558 — All relations of thought in judgments are those (a) of 
the predicate to the subject ; (b) of the principle to its consequence ;. 
(c) of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to 
each other, (page 60, line 3.) See § 1225. 

§ 1559. — Disjunctive judgment a relation not only of logical op- 
position, but also at the same time of community, in so far as all 
the propositions taken. together fill up the sphere of the cognition, 
(page 60, line 15). Cf. §§1230-1234. 

§ 1560. — Modality of judgments contributes nothing to the con- 
tent of a judgment, but concerns itself only with the value of the 
copula in relation to thought in general, (p. 60, 1. 40.) Cf. § 1236. 

§ 1581. — Problematical judgment expresses only logical possi- 
bility ; the assertorical speaks of logical reality, or truth ; the 
apodictical expresses logical necessity, (page 61, line 7.) See § 1238. 

§ 1562. — Eeckon these three functions of modality as so many 
momenta of thought, (page 61, line 33.) 

TITLE III — OP THE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR. 
CATEGORIES. (§§ 1563-1577 inclusive.) Cf. in Fischer (page 72) Mahaffy's note. 

Article VI— (§§ 1563-1572 inclusive.) 

§ 1563. — Matter to the pure conceptions of the understanding, 
(page 62, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1522, 1544. 

§1564. — Examined after a certain manner, received into the 
mind, and connected, in order afterward to form a cognition out of 
it. (page 62, line 12.) 

§ 1565. — Synthesis — the process of joining different representa- 
tions to each other, and of comprehending their diversity in one 
cognition, (page 62, line 21.) 

§ 1566. — Blind but indispensable function of the soul, without 
which we should have no cognition whatever, (page 62, line 36.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

and error and the use becomes dialectical. The second part of Transcendental 
Logic will be a criticism of this dialectical Appearance to expose its fallacy and 
correct its errors [cf. \\ 1925-1933}. 

Transcendental Analytic, then, is the dissection of our whole cognition,, 
apriori, into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding, and the 
following are the conditions: — That the conceptions must be pure and not 
empirical;* that they do not belong to intuition or sensibility, but to 
thought and understanding ; and that they are elemental, and not derived or 
composed ; that they fill up the whole field of the pure understanding, which is. 



The Clavis to an Index. 635 

See §§ 543, 544, 2938. [1 do not know, however, that the " func- 
tion of the soul" spoken of in §1566, is one of those "jmwers of 
soul"' to which § 544 refers.] 

§ 1567. — Pure synthesis — that which rests upon a basis of apriori 
synthetical unity, (page 63, line 6.) [The decade is a bad ex- 
ample, insomuch as it (at least as represented in the Arabic nota- 
tion) is altogether conventional (notwithstanding it may stand on 
digital ground). But the unit is not conventional, but essential.] 

§ 1568. — Duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, 
not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations, 
(page 63, line 15.) [A critical intimation that we may apprehend 
the synthesis without attending to the voice of judgment concern- 
ing it.] See Mahaffy's Introduction to Fischer, page xlvii. 

§ 1569. — Unity to the mere synthesis of different representa- 
tions, (page 63, line 28 ) Cf. §§ 1563, 1549. 

§ 1570. — Function of unity in understanding divided systemati- 
cally from a common principle, namely, the faculty of judgment. 
(Table of the categories.) (page 64, line 1.) See § 1555, cf. §§ 1553, 
1554,1549. [Category: that which may be predicated; predica- 
ment.] 

§ 1571. — Deduced and subsidiary conceptions can easily be 
added, and the genealogical tree of the understanding completely 
delineated, (page 65, line 17.) 

§ 1572. — Definitions of the categories omitted, (page 66, line 
21,) See §§ 1595, 2722, 2912. [Cf. §§ 1643, 1674, 1835, 1858, and 
2914, all referred to by Mahafty (Introduction to Fischer, page 
xxxv.)] See also §§ 1687 and 2009. 

Article VII — Observations on the table of categories. (§§1573- 
1576 inclusive.) 

§ 1573. — Table of categories is useful in the theoretical part of 
philosophy, (page 67 line 5.) 

§ 1574. — Categories divided into two classes : (1) mathematical; 
(2) dynamical, (page 67, line 18). Cf. § 2203. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

a unity, self- subsisting and self-sufficient. This part of Transcendental Logic 
consists of two divisions, one of which concerns the conceptions, the other the 
principles of the pure understanding [§ 1546]. Transcendental Analytic is 
termed the dissection of the understanding itself, in order to investigate the 
possibility of conceptions apriori, and to look at them as they lie prepared, as it 
were, in the human intellect, until developed by experience, whence we again 
liberate them from such empirical conditions as attach to them when seen in 
action [g 1547]. The different kind of judgments afford us the means of ascer- 
tainino- which are the functions of the understandine-. 



636 Kant's Ethics, 

§ 1575. — Number of the categories in each class is always the 
same, namely, three, (page 67, line 29.) [It is perhaps only in the 
categories of quantity and quality that the third rises out of the 
first and second. As to the rest, all causality is the causality of 
substance ; and possibility must be predicated of all existence. 
The disjunctive is the categorical plus something not hypothetical, 
and the apodictical is the assertorical plus something not proble- 
matical. Totality may be regarded as a plural view of the unity 
of plurality (that is, a view in which that which is considered is 
rather the plurality in unity than the unity in plurality), and limi- 
tation may be regarded as a negative view or phase of the negation 
of reality (two minus signs equal plus). Plurality and negation are 
the correlates (see § 1574) of unity and reality.] [Thus, the concep- 
tion of a number.: The remark is true but irrelevant. For if it 
were otherwise than true, the conception of totality is no clearer. 
There is totality of the infinite and totality of the finite : insofar 
as the conception of totality is concerned, there is absolutely no 
difference.] [The conception of influence: By Ci the conception of a 
cause " I understand the conception of causality, and by " the 
concejvtion of influence," the conception of reciprocity of influence. 
The conception of community is at least as independent of sub- 
stance as is that of causality. Although it is evident that a par- 
ticular act of the understanding is necessary, Kant's illusti-ations 
unfortunately confuse me in endeavoring to seize the evidence.] 

§ 1576. — Accordance of the category of community with the 
form of the disjunctive judgment, (page 68, line 18.) Cf. § 1559. 

Article VIlX.—(§ 1577.) ' 

§ 1577. — Unum, verum, bonum. (page 69, line 16.) See Mahaffy's 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
If we can expose with certainty the functions of unity in judgments, which 
judgments are the mediate cognitions of objects [§ 1552], we can then find the 
functions of the understanding [§1554], which we before explained as a non- 
sensible cognition faculty [§§ 155Q, 1526, 1528]. Now all functions of thought 
in judgments are found reducible to four heads, each of which is again divided 
into three classes [§ 1555]. These are — 

I. II. III. IV. 

Quantity of Judgments. Quality. Relation. Modality. 

Universal. Affirmative. Categorical, Problematical. 

Particular. Negative. Hypothetical. Assertorical. 

Individual. Infinite. Disjunctive. Apodictical. 

Thus it is in making abstraction of the object as to which a judgment is 
given, that we arrive at form ; and when we are acquainted with all the forms 
and modes of judgment, we are then acquainted with all the forms of the under- 
standing. 



The Clavis to an Index. 637 

note in Fischer (page 75). [(1) These are deduced conceptions ; 
therefore they do not determine the possibility of thought. (2) 
They are apriori ; therefore they possess logical truth, and non- 
conformable conceptions may properly be condemned. (3) They 
are altogether formal, their matter being merely the form of sensu- 
ous intuition ; therefore they have no material force or validity, 
and ought to be regarded merely as affections of the ego. The 
first remark removes them from the table of the categories ; 
the third shows that no ontological use can be make of them ; the 
second explains their history and renown. Now, since the human 
mind can not obviate the categories of quantity, upon which these 
deduced concepts are based, it must not be said that the logical 
use of the deductions is unauthorized, but only the ontological.] 

Chapter II.— Of the deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. 

(§j! 1578-1652 inclusive.) 

TITLE I.— OF THE THE PRINCIPLES OF A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION 
IN GENERAL. {& 1578-1595 inclusive.) Cf. Fischer (and Mahaffy), pages 9 and 67. 

Article IX.— (§§ 1578-1587 inclusive ) 

§ 1578. — Distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) 
from the question of fact (quid facti). (page 71, line 10.) 

§ 1579. — Transcendental deduction of conceptions (explanation 
of the manner in which conceptions can apply apriori to objects), 
distinguished from the empirical deduction, (page 72, line 1.) 

§ 1580. — Deduction of pure apriori conceptions must always be 
transcendental, (page 72, line 15.) [No empirical deduction can 
account for the elements of necessity and universality which are 
found in these conceptions, and which we must clearly show before 
we have the right to ground and argument therein.] 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

Now just as many pure understanding-conceptions arise which refer, apriori, 
to objects of intuition in general, as there are logical functions of all the possible 
judgments just detailed, and these * [twelve] understanding-conceptions ara 
what are termed the Categories [§ 1570], and they are the following t — 

TABLE OF CATEGORIES. 
I. II. IV. 

Of Quantity. ■ Of Quality. Of Modality. 

Unity. Reality. Possibility. Impossibility. 

Plurality. ^Negation. Existence.. Non-existence. 

Totality. Limitation. Necessity. Contingence. 

in. 
Of Relation. 
Inherence and Subsistence (Substantia et Accidens). 
Causality and Dependence (Cause and Effect). 
Community (Reciprocity between the Agent and the Patient). 



638 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1581.- — Discover in experience the occasioning causes of their 
production, (page 72, line 28.) 

§ 1582. — All attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to 
pure apriori conceptions, are vain, (page 73, line 5.) 

§ 1583. — Not for that reason perfectly manifest that a deduction 
is absolutely necessary, (page 73, line 19.) 

§ 1584. — Must be quite convinced of the absolute necessity of a 
transcendental deduction, before taking a single step. (p. 73, 1. 35.) 

§ 1585. — Can not discover how the subjective conditions of 
thought can have objective validity, (page 75, line 8.) Cf. § 1620. 

§ 1586. — Phenomena might be so constituted as not to corres- 
pond to the conditions of the unity of thought. (For example, 
the conception of cause.) (page 75, line 31.) 

§ 1587. — Must either have an apriori basis in the understanding, 
or be rejected as a mere chimera. (For example, the conception 
of cause), (page 76, line 17.) 

Article X. — Transition to the transcendental deduction of the cate- 
gories. (§§ 1588-1595.) 

§ 1588. — Either the object alone makes the representation pos- 
sible, or the representation alone makes the object. possible, (page 
77, line 7.) 

§ 1589. — -Intuition, under which alone objects can be intuited, 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

Such is the enumeration of all the originally pure conceptions of that syn- 
thesis which the understanding contains within itself apriori, and by reason of 
which it simply is pure understanding, inasmuch as by means of the said pure 
conceptions only can it comprehend anything in the diversity of the intuition 
[§ 1570]. Aristotle had an idea of this faculty of the understanding, but it was 
an incorrect one, as he added some conceptions and omitted others which dis- 
figured the catalogue. To this table of the categories Kant added another list, 
which he called Predicables, but which he merely indicated without devel- 
oping [§ 1571]. 

The existence of the categories and their number being deduced and proved, 
the next question naturally is as to their application, for without this they are 
nothing more than inert capacities remaining in total inaction. To us they are 
absolutely non-existing, so long as they have not been called into operation by 
external objects [§ 1581]. Now, in order to know an object, two things are 
necessary, the intuition by which the object is given, and the idea [conception, 
£2 1589, 1963] by which this same object, corresponding to the intuition, is con- 
verted into thought. This is the operation of the understanding. Kant, in 
imitation of certain jurists, calls the right by which we establish the connexion, 
the Deduction, which in & general sense means the proof of claim, or a claim of 
right [g 1578]. In a particular sense it signifies the legitimating, if it may be 
so expressed, of a representation, or proof of the right to use the same, or that 
the representation possesses sense, meaning, and objective validity; and more 



The Clavis to an Index. 639 

must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, apriori in the mind, 
(page 77, line 20.) 

§ 1590. — Conditions under which alone something, if not intuited, 
is yet thought as object, (page 77, line 31.) 

§ 1591. — Conceptions of objects in general must lie as apriori 
conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition; and con- 
sequently the objective validity of the categories, as apriori con- 
ceptions, will rest upon the fact that experience (as far as re- 
gards the form of thought) is possible only by their means, (page 

77, line 38.) 

§ 1592. — Conceptions which afford us the objective foundation 
of the possibility of experience, are for that very reason necessary 
(i. e. apriori conditions of the possibility of all experience), (page 

78, line 10.) 

§ 1593. — Empirical derivation, which both Locke and Hume at- 
tributed to these conceptions, can not possibly be reconciled with 
the fact that we do possess scientific apriori cognitions, (page 78, 
line 22.) Cf. Fischer, page 76, where Mahaffy translates from the 
first edition. 

§ 1594. — Extravagance and skepticism. Safely to conduct rea- 
son between these two rocks, (page 79, line 7.) 

§ 1595. — Categories are conceptions of an object in general, by 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
especially that it is not void, but refers to objects in reality. Then again there 
is another distinction between empirical and transcendental deduction [§ 1579]. 
It is the former which explains the validity of an empirical representation 
through the proof of its origin from experience itself, showing that the repre- 
sentation necessarily refers to the object, since the one makes the other possible. 
Transcendental deduction, on the other hand, shows that a representation can 
~be referred apriori to an object, and, without having its origin from experience, 
-can still be valid as to the objects themselves.** It was because Locke did not 
see the necessity of something in the understanding previous to experience, 
namely, conditions apriori, that he was led into error. Meeting with pure con- 
ceptions of the understanding in experience, this great philosopher derives the 
.same from experience, and he ventured in this way upon attempts at cogni- 
tions which extend far beyond the limits of experience [g 159.3]. Hume saw 
that in order to do this, it was necessary (which Kant also contends is the case) 
that these conceptions should have their origin apriori. But not being able to 
explain how it was possible that the understanding should be compelled to 
think conceptions, which are not in themselves conjoined in the understanding, 
yet as necessarily conjoined in the object, he deduced the same from experience, 
-or subjective necessity, or habit. It did not enter into his imagination that pos- 
sibly the understanding itself, by means of these coiiceptions, was the author of 
the experience. But he acted more consistently than Locke in this respect in 
■declaring that with the conceptions in question and the principles they gave 



640 Kant's Ethics. 

means of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in re- 
lation to one of the logical functions of judgment, (page 79, line 
18.) Cf. § 1572. On Kant's connection of the terms substance and 
subject, see §§ 1621, 1687, 1858, 1870, 1881, 1895, 1969, 2010, 2016, 
2049, and especially § 2022. 

TITLE II.— TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF Tf IE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF" 
THE UNDERSTANDING, (gg 1596-1652 inclusive.) Cf. gg 2S66-2912, Mahaffy's trans- 
lation from the first edition. 

Article XI. — Of the possibility of a conjunction of the manifold 
representations given by sense. (§§ 1596-1598 inclusive.) 

§ 1596. — All conjunction (whether conscious or unconscious, be 
it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous, or of 
several conceptions) is an act of the understanding (synthesis)., 
(page 80, line 9.) . 

§ 1597. — Possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very 
nature of the spontaneous activity of the subject. Analysis, which 
appears to be its contrary, must always presuppose it. (page 80,. 
line 25.) [Without the function or faculty, no conjunction would 
be possible for the subject ; and if we suppose such conjunction 
possible to any other than human understanding, we thereby pre- 
suppose in that unknown understanding the same function of 
synthesis which we recognize as subsisting in the human under- 
standing.] Cf. Mahaffy's Introduction to Fischer, page xlvii. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
rise to, it was impossible to go out beyond the limits of experience. The fact,, 
however, of both pure mathematics and general physics proving cognitions 
apriori to exist, overthrows the system of both of these great philosophers. 

Synthesis or conjunction is the operation of the understanding alone, and 
we can represent to ourselves nothing as conjoined in the object, unless we our- 
selves have previously conjoined it [# 1596]. This is an act of self-activity 
[§ 1597]. Analysis is posterior to synthesis, for only as Conjoined by the under- 
standing can anything be presented to us, and admit of being decomposed. 
Conjunction is the synthetic unity of the multiplex or diverse [§ 1598]. The^ 
representation of this unity does not arise out of the composition ; it precedes, 
every thing, and therefore is to be distinguished especially from the Category 
of Unity. 

As in Transcendental ^Esthetic, or the first division of the work, it is de- 
clared that all diversity of what appertains to sensibility, or what appertains to 
the domain of sense in general, must stand as to intuitions, under the formal 
conditions of space and time; so the highest principle [of the possibility or 
intuition] with reference to the understanding [is, that all diversity of intuition] 
must stand under an original Unity of Apperception [g 1607]. And this is the-. 
U I think" which must be able to accompany all my representations [§ 1599]. It 
is pure or original apperception. It accompanies every other. Self-conscious- 
ness is at the bottom of all my representations, for otherwise they would not be-. 



The Clavis to an Index. 641 

§ 1598. — Unity which apriori precedes all conceptions of con- 
junction (i. e. qualitative unity), (page 80, line 37.) Cf. § 1577. 

Article XII. — Of the originally synthetical unity of apperception. 
(§§ 1599-1606 inclusive.) Cf. § 1729. 

§ 1599. — I 'think must accompany all my representations. All the 
diversity or manifold content of intuition, has therefore a necessary 
relation to the I think, in the subject in which this diversity is 
found, (page 81, line 19.) 

§1600. — I think is an act of spontaneity (pure apperception). 
It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same ; and unaccom- 
panied by it, no representation can exist for me. (page 81, line 27.) 

§ 1601. — Transcendental unity of self-consciousness. The mani- 
fold representations which are given in an intuition would not all 
of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one 
self-consciousness, (page 82, line 6.) 

§ 1602. — Analytical unity of apperception is possible only under 
the presupposition of a synthetical unity, (page 82, line 16.) 

§ 1603. — Synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point 
with which we must connect every operation of the understanding, 
even the whole of logic, (page 82, note.) See § 1482 as to general 
conceptions, and see also Kant's note to § 1607. 

§ 1604. — Synthetical unity of the manifold in intuitions, as given 
apriori, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception 



HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

mine [# 1601]. Analytical unity of apperception is opposed to [or ought to be- 
distinguished from] the synthetical unity [§ 1602]. The distinction as laid down 
is a little difficult to be understood when expressed simply in the language of 
Kant; but when divested of technicality, the difference is obvious. Analytical 
unity is that by means of which conceptions are thought as conjoined. If the 
Understanding thinks two conceptions as conjoined in one judgment, the rep- 
resentation by which they are thought as conjoined is analytical unity. The 
conception of a black dish, for instance, is an analytical unit}', inasmuch as the 
representation of the conjunction of the two conceptions, black and dish, in one 
Judgment, is that the "dish is black." The idea of man in general is an ana- 
lytical unity, as the term applies to men of every color. It is called the. 
analytical unity of apperception or consciousness, by reason of many concep- 
tions being conjoined through it in one consciousness. For instance, if I think 
of the color red, I represent to myself a quality which is common to different 
representations ; all of which are thought as red. It is the analytical unity of 
consciousness which makes a representation into a common conception [§ 1603]. 
It is opposed to [or presupposes] the synthetical unity of consciousness, by 
which I represent to myself the part-representations as conjoined [or, by which 
I conjoin the manifold] in one object, which always presupposes intuition, and 
not in a judgment, which is an analytical proceeding. It is also a similar act 
when I attach the color, as for instance, redness in general to several objects;. 



642 Kant's Ethics. 

itself, which antecedes apriori all determinate thought, (page 
82, line 32.) 

§ 1605. — Operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing 
more than the faculty of conjoining apriori, and. of bringing the 
variety of given representations under the unity of apperception, 
(page 83, .line 13.) 

§ 1606. — Explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold 
given in an intuition, without which the identity of self conscious- 
ness would be incogitable. (page 83, line 22.) [My intuition be- 
longs to me no less than my imderstanding, and I am conscious of 
both. See §§ 1472, 1632.] 

Article XIII. — The principle of the synthetical unity of appercep- 
tion is the highest principle of all exercise of the understanding. 
(§§ 1607-1611 inclusive.) 

§ 1607. — Supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in 
relation to the understanding is that all the manifold in intuition 
be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical unity of ap- 
perception, (page 84, line 9.) See Mahaffy's note in Fischer (page 
59), and Kant's note to § 1639, to which Mahaffy refers. 

§ 1608. — Unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possi- 
bility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of 
their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and con- 
sequently the possibility of the existence of the understanding 
itself, (page 84, line 23.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

but it is a synthetical one, to think the color itself, when diversity of intuitions 
is thought or envisaged as conjoined. The pure conception of the understand- 
ing, or the category, is synthetic unity, because through it different representa- 
tions in an intuition are conjoined in one conception, whether of quantity, 
quality, reality or substance. The principle of the synthetical unity of the 
apperception is the highest principle of all use of the understanding [§ 1611], 
and leads to the logical form of all judgments, which consist in the objective 
unity of the conceptions therein contained [§ 1614]; and we perceive that the 
diversity contained in the intuition, which I call mine, is represented by the 
synthesis of the understanding as belonging to the necessary unity of self-con- 
sciousness. This occurs through the category which shows that the empirical 
consciousness of a given diversity of an intuition is subject, just in the same way, 
to a pure self-consciousness apriori, as empirical intuition is to a pure sensible intu- 
ition, which also takes place apriori [§ 1616]. But at the same time that the cate- 
gory is spoken of as being that by which alone unity is given to the diversity of 
.a given intuition generally, it must not be overlooked that the category is of no 
other use for the cognition of things than so far as it has application to objects 
of experience [j$ 1620, 1622]. Two parts belong to cognitions, first, the concep- 
tion in which the object is thought, or the category; and secondly, the intuition 
whereby it is given; for if a corresponding intuition to conception could not be 



The Clavis to an Index. 643 

§ 1609. — Objective condition of all cognition, which I do not 
merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every 
intuition must necessarily be subject, in order to become an object 
for me. (page 85, line 3.) Of. Mahafty's note in Fischer, page 41. 

§ 1610. — Synthetical unity the condition of all thought, (page 
85, line 22.) 

§ 1611. — First principle of all the operations of our understand- 
ing, (page 85, line 30.) 

Article XIV. — What objective unity of self consciousness is. 
(§ 1612.) 

§ 1612 — Transcendental unity of apperception is alone object- 
ively valid, (page 86, line 8 ) [Empirical intuition may attach 
various qualities (as colors or scents) to the same object (as a rose). 
These intuitions would possess only subjective validity (§ 1493).] 

Article XV — The logical form of all judgments consists in the ob- 
jective unity of apperception of the conceptions contained therein. 
(§§ 1613-1614 ) 

§ 1613. — Definition which logicians give of a judgment, the 
representation of a relation between two conceptions, does not 
determine in what the said relation consists, (page 86, line 37.) 

§ 1614. — Judgment is nothing but the mode of bringing given 
cognitions under the objective unity of apperception, (page 87, 
line 9.) Reproductive imagination, see § 1628. {Belong to each other : 
It is possible to think an intuition which does not at all contain 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

given, it might, as to its form, be thought, hut being without an object, no cog- 
nition of it would be at all possible [§ 1623]. The thought or the thinking of 
an object in general by means of the category or pure understanding-concep- 
tion can only become cognition in us so far as the same has reference to objects 
of the senses [§§ 1626, 1620]. 

It must at the same time be observed that Synthesis is divided into two 
kinds, Speciosa and Intellectualis [§ 1627]. By the former, or speciosa or figura- 
tive, is meant that which is possible and necessary apriori, in contradistinction 
io that which, in respect of the diversity oi" an intuition in general, would be 
thought in the mere category, and is termed on its part synthesis intellectualis, 
or conjunction of the understanding. Both are transcendental, not merely be- 
cause they themselves are api"iori, but because they form the basis of the j)ossi- 
bility of other cognition apriori. The figurative synthesis is the Synthesis of 
the Imagination,! which is the faculty of representing an object without its pres- 
ence in the intuition. [At the bottom of the pages, below the above paragraph, 
Haywood prints the following note:] tin the first edition of the Critique, when 
speaking of the faculty of the Imagination, Kant shows that in order to present 
.a whole, it was necessary to see each of the several parts, and to collect them 
successively and finally to unite them in one image. This was in fact Imagina- 
tion. The conjunction or union of these was the "Synthesis of the Apprehen- 



644 Kant's Ethics. 

the sensation of weight. But if the sensation be given, the unity 
of apperception unites it with " body " necessarily.] 

Article XVI — All sensuous intuitions are subject to the categories, as 
conditions under which alone the manifold content of them can be 
united in -one consciousness. (§ 1615.) 

§ 1615. — Categories are nothing else than the logical functions 
of judgment, so far as the manifold in a given intuition is deter- 
mined in relation to them, (page 88, line 14). Cf. §$1595, 1588- 
1592, 1607-1611, 1613, 1614, and 1578-1587 (§ 1615 being a brief 
statement of the results previously attained). 

Article XVII.— Observation. (§§ 1616-1619 inclusive.) 

§ 1616. — Beginning of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the 
understanding, (page 88, line 31.) 

§ 1617. — Make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold 
of an empirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention ex- 
clusively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into 
the intuition by means of the category, (page 89, line 7.) Cf. §§ 
1615, 1641. 

§ 1618. — One thing of which 1 could not make abstraction, 
namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously 
to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it. 
(page 89, line 20.) Cf. § 1544. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

sion of the Intuition;" and as this act of apprehension was successive, and it 
was necessary to reproduce one part before passing to another, the Imagination 
became necessarily a reproduction-faculty, and the Synthesis of the Eeproduc- 
tion in the Imagination occurs. This reproduction would he of no avail 
unless we were conscious that each part was the same before and after the repro- 
duction, and from this resulted the synthesis of the cognition of the idea, so that, 
objective cognition in experience is only possible by means of a triple synthesis,, 
that of the Apprehension in the Intuition, that of the Eeproduction in the Imag- 
ination, and that of Cognition in the idea by means of consciousness. The- 
analysis, in this form at least, is omitted or changed in all the editions of the 
Critique that succeeded to the first. [End of Haywood's note] [See g§ 1407 and. 
2870]. [Cf. immediately the head of §2870 below.] 

It is at this point [§ 1629] that, after having exposed the different kinds of" 
syntheses, Kant digresses into an explanation of a position which he had laid 
down in an earlier part of his work, in some degree, dogmatically, in order at 
this stage of his system to justify the assertion that the I may be both active 
and passive. 

But to understand this it will be necessary to consider rather more in detail 
the characteristics or qualities of the 7, which, being the foundation of all 
other acquisitions, requires to be investigated in its innermost nature and ca- 
pacity. It is the 7, then, which connects in man all his intuitions and thoughts. 
There is nothing beyond this 7 that is either diverse or multiplex, but it is that 



The Clavis to an Index. 645 

§ 1619. — Categories are merely rules for an understanding whose 
whole power consists in thought, that is, in the act of submitting 
the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it in intuition 
from a very different quarter, to the unity of apperception, (page 
89, line 24.) 

Article XVIII. — In cognition, its application to objects of experience 
is the only legitimate use of the category. (§§ 1620-1622 inclusive ) 

§ 1620. — Thought as regards its form, but without any object, 
(page 90, line 4.) [(1) A cognition is something which may be 
known, not necessarily is known. It is the objective phase of that 
act of the understanding which consists in bringing the manifold 
in intuition under the unity of apperception. Now, if we do not 
critically examine the united manifold with reference to the cate- 
gories, we have nevertheless a cognition, but are not entitled to 
pronounce a judgment upon it. (2) If we do not examine the 
manifold with reference to its empirical reality, we can predicate 
of the cognition nothing but possibility; that is to say, it is cogni- 
tion, but no knowledge is given by it. (3) If the manifold which 
we unite be not intuitive (possible to be perceived by the faculty 
of sensibility), we have no cognition, but only a thought. This 
thought can not possibly become knowledge for us, so long as we 
are intellectually so constituted as now. (4) A mathematical con- 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

wherewith all that is diverse in the intuition and the conception as therein con- 
joined, is represented. This /, however, does not envisage its own self, for it is 
neither an intuition-faculty, which would he, as it were, something super- 
sensible or intellectual; nor is it an object given to the intuition, hut it is 
merely the ground of the conjunction of the diverse in an object. I call all 
representations mine, because I am one and the same person who conjoins 
them [cf. §^ 1604, 1606]. In this manner the I is termed the original synthetic 
unity of the apperception, or consciousness: original, because this representa- 
tion of the / can be derived from nothing else ; synthetic, since it lies at the 
foundation or root of all conjunction or synthesis, and makes this same syn- 
thesis possible. The representation /, or / think, is the manifestation of a spon- 
taneity (not the being-affected state of the sensibilit} r ),and it is termed the tran- 
scendental unity of self-consciousness, in order thereby to show that without 
the same, no conjunction is possible apriori, and that it precedes all experience, 
and yet is not derived from experience. 

As space and time are forms of all intuitions, so, according to the sense 
Kant attaches to the 7, does this I appear to be the form of the pure original 
conceptions of the understanding, and to lie at the bottom of them, so that the 
difference of the two 7's is rendered comprehensible by referring the one to 
reason and the other to sense [cf. \ 1607]. 

The J that thinks is rational, the /that is thought is empirical. Thus unity 
is the original characteristic of the understanding or mind, or by whatever name 



646 Kant's Ethics. 

ception is a cognition of the conception itself, regarding that con- 
ception as void of real content. Such a cognition is not a cogni- 
tion of tilings, because no possible combination of an empty formal 
intuition with a purely formal understanding can constitute any 
content. 0+0=0; 0x0=0: 0+0=0, etc. See § 1621.] Cf § 1701. 

§ 1621. — Mathematical conceptions are not per se cognition, 
except in so far as we presuppose that there exist things which 
can only be represented conformably to the form of our pure sensu- 
ous intuition, (page 90, line 17.) 

§ 1622. — Categories do not (even by means of pure intuition) 
afford us any cognition of things ; they can only do so in so far as 
they can be applied to empirical intuition, (page 90, line 27.) 

Article XIX.— (§§ 1623, 1624.) 

§ 1623. — Empty conceptions of objects, as to the possibility or 
impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no 
means of discovery, (page 91, line 4.) 

§ 1624. — Ignorant whether there can really be any thing to cor- 
respond to such a determination of thought, if empirical intui- 
tion did not afford me the occasion for its application, (page 5)1, 
line 27.) Cf § 1595. See § 1618. 

Article XX. — Of the application of the categories to objects of the 
senses in general. (§§ 1625-1633 inclusive.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

the intellectual principle in man is denominated, and everything is presented 
to it as a unity ; consequently, conjunction, or synthesis or unity, is the first 
condition of thought; but theu again it must not be forgotten that this Unity, 
I think,. lying at the foundation of the human mind as elemental principle, is 
not to be confounded with that category of Unity which exists in the table of, 
the categories and is the first division of the category of quantity. The unity 
now in question is a higher unity than the categorical one, and is to be found at 
the root of the possibility of the understanding itself in its logical use [§ 1598]. 
It is independent of all conditions of sensible intuition, and is the principle of 
the original synthetic unity of apperception [cf. \ 16091; whilst categories, it 
may be repeated, are of no value to procure Knowledge, excepting so far as. 
they apply to objects presented to us by experience [§ 1619]. They are all 
forms of Thought. 

To think an object and to know an object are two distinct things [# 1620]. 
We have the conception whereby a thing is thought, and that is the category ; 
and we have the intuition whereby the thing is given — for could an intuition 
corresponding to the conception not be given, the latter would be a thought, as. 
to its form, but without any object, and by means of it no cognition at all of an 
object would be possible, since, so far as I know, there was neither any thing, 
nor could be any thing, to which my thought could be applied. Sensible intui- 
tion is either pure,, that is, it is space or time ; or it is empirical, that is, that, 
which is immediatel}' represented in space and time as real by means of sensa- 



The Clavis to an Index. 647 

§ 1625. — Synthesis of apperception is not merely transcendental, 
but also purely intellectual, (page 92, line 11.) Cf. §1605. 

§ 1626. — Unity of apperception, in relation to the manifold of 
sensuous intuition apriori. (page 92, line 22.) Cf. §§ 1569, 2899. 
[Space and time determine all sensuous intuition. But the mani- 
fold represented in these intuitions of space and time, is subject to 
the unity of apperception. All that is determined by these intui- 
tions, is therefore with them subject to the unity of apperception. 
But all sensuous intuition is of phenomena (see § 1512) .] 

§ 1627. — Transcendental synthesis of imagination, (page 92,. 
line 35.) Cf. §1609. 

§ 1628. — Imagination a faculty of determining sensibility apriori. 
(page 93, line 8.) Cf. §§ 1626, 2902, 2904, 2906. [I am inclined to 
retract my censure of Kant's definition of imagination, on the 
ground that to rigidly define it as a purely intellectual faculty is 
not essential to the purposes of philosophy, while Kant's use keeps 
close to the popular understanding. See in Webster Stewart's 
homely definition : "A power of modifying our conceptions by 
combining the parts of different ones so as to form new wholes 
of our own creation." (See Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. Y., page 113, 
§ 42. The last sentence of the section arose out of a miscon- 
ception of § 1639 below, and must also be retracted.)] § 1632. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
tion [§1621]. Through the determination of the first we ohtain cognition 
apriori of objects, as in mathematics, bat yet only according to their form as 
phenomena, and thus every thing is reduced ultimately to experience, so far as 
knowledge is concerned, the categories themselves affording us no cognition of 
objects, except through their possible application to empirical intuition [# 1622], 
which [resulting cognition] is *" experience [g 2707]. To think is to unite several 
ideas in the unity of consciousness, and thought and judgment are valid when they 
are conformable to the axiom of Identity, whether they have or have not an ob- 
ject corresponding to them in the reality. Thought can teach us nothing, but. 
to know an object is to have an intuition corresponding to the idea [conception,, 
cf. 1649]; and a pure idea can not be known except inasmuch as it refers to an 
intuition which is sensible. 

The difference of the internal sense and of consciousness, according to our 
author, has been overlooked by psychologists [g 1629], and led to confusion and. 
embarrassment. The internal sense is time, and this internal sense is determined 
by the understanding [§ 1630], or, it may be said, by ourselves, and this deter- 
mination takes place according to the. synthesis which the understanding thinks. 
for the internal intuition. Pure apperception, or consciousness, is the source or 
principle of all synthesis ; and whether an object is given to it or not, it refers.- 
apriori to the variety of intuitions in general [J 1631]. The internal sense, on 
the other hand, is the simple form of the intuitions, and it contains no synthesis, 
and consequently no determinate intuition, for this is only possible by a tran- 



•648 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1629. — How the internal sense represents us to our own con- 
sciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in our- 
selves, (page 93, line 34.) Of. § 1520. 

§ 1630. — Synthesis of understanding is (considered per se) noth- 
ing hut the unity of action of which as such it is self-conscious 
even apart from sensibility, (page 94, line 7.) Cf. §1642. 

§ 1631. — Internal sense (on the contrary) contains merely the 
form of intuition, but without any s}'nthetical conjunction of the 
manifold therein, (page 94, line 22.) [See § 1639.] 

§ 1632. — Understanding, therefore, does by no means find in the 
internal sense any such, synthesis, but produces it, in that it affects 
this sense, (page 94, line 35.) Cf. §1500. [Bat the understanding 
does find in the sensibility the manifold, and operates (not on the 
sensibility which gives the manifold, but) on the manifold which 
the sensibility gives. Sensibility can not give synthesis. (See 
§§ 1596-1598.) .Notwithstanding that the understanding can not 
(so far as I know) operate on any manifold not given by sensibility, 
I do not think it necessary, therefore, to say that understanding 
operates upon sensibility, a mode of expression which, while it 
perhaps prevents the misconception that the synthetic power can 
lay hold of any manifold not given by sensibility, also (and as it 
seems to me needlessly) obscures the cogitable absolute unity of the 
rational faculty. (See §§ 1472, 246, and cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., Yol. V, 
page 113, §§43,44.) ] 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

scendental synthesis, or by the influence of the understanding upon the inter- 
nal sense. It is thus that we can not represent to ourselves a line, nor a circle, 
nor a triangle, without tracing it visibly, and the three dimensions of space, 
length, breadth and thickness, are designated by drawing one line which is 
perpendicular to another [$ 1632]. 

In general logic all content of cognition being abstracted, its business is to 
expose analytically the form of cognition in conceptions, judgments, and con- 
clusions \J 1653], and thereby to establish formal rules of the use of the under- 
standing [§ 1654], but with all this it can not give any precepts for the faculty 
of judgment [§ 1659]. Transcendental logic is differently circumstanced; and 
it would seem as if it had for its peculiar province to correct and secure, by 
means of determinate rules, the faculty of judgment, in the use of the pure 
understanding [$ 1662]. Transcendental philosophy goes even further than 
this, for besides the rule (or rather the general condition for rules) which is 
given in the pure use of the understanding, it can at once indicate apriori the 
■case wherein the rule is to be applied [g 1663]. It has a preference over all 
other branches of science, excepting mathematics, inasmuch as it treats of con- 
ceptions which are to refer to their objects apriori ; and the objective validity of 
these, which are the categories, can not be demonstrated aposteriori. But at the 
same time that transcendental science does this, it must likewise expose, as gen- 



The Clavis to an Index. 649 

§ 1633. — Cognize our own subject only as phenomenon, and not 
as it is in itself, (page 95, line 12.) [Necessitated to take— A weighty 
consideration, as such necessity could not exist if we could cognize 
ourselves directly without the intervention of phenomena of our- 
selves. (Cf. §1846.)] 

Article XXI — Consciousness of self is very far from a knowledge 
of self. (§§1634, 1635) 

§ 1634. — Conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I 
am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, 
not an intuition, (page 96, line 9.) Cf. §§ 1635, 1846, 1849. [A man 
who stands before a mirror knows that he intuites a reflection of 
his body. But to suppose that the reflection intuites the body, is 
to presuppose that the reflection embodies the intuiting conscious- 
ness ; which, if possible, is no advantage, since the difficulty is not 
thereby obviated. Suppose I possess an intuition which gives the 
determining in me prior to my own act of self-determination. 
JSTow, that intuition, as to its content, must necessarily be either 
determined or practically nothing. I must therefore assume that 
it is determined. But if it is determined, it must be determined as 
to its form by me, else it can be no intuition. Therefore, I must 
again preposit a determining ego, and am thereby reduced either 
to an infinite series of appearances, or to admit that the determin- 
ing ego (of which I am conscious) can not be intuited prior to self- 
determination, nor otherwise than as self-determined.] § 2009. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

eral or sufficient characteristics, the conditions under which such objects can be 
given, in accordance with such conceptions. If it were not so, these concep- 
tions or categories would be without content, and mere logical forms, and not 
pure conceptions of the understanding. 

The first point then to be considered (and this is the work of Transcen- 
dental Analytic) is, how this pure conception of the understanding can be used, 
or what is the sensible condition, under which alone it can be of avail. The 
next inquiry then to be made is into those synthetic judgments which flow from 
the pure conceptions of the understanding under conditions apriori, and which 
lie at the foundation of all other cognitions apriori. The one may be called the 
schematism, the other the principles of the pure understanding [§ 1664]. This 
forms another of the great divisions of the work before us. 

In all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the representation of 
the one must be homogeneous with the other, or the conception itself must con- 
tain that which is represented in the object to be subsumed under it [§ 1665]. 
The empirical conception of a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical 
one of a circle — the roundness which is thought in the plate is envisaged in the 
conception of a circle. But pure conceptions of the understanding are quite 
heterogeneous with those that are empirical, and they can never be met with 
in any intuition [§ 1666] ; and to render the application of the categories to phe- 

42 



650 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1635. — Require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only 
the consciousness of myself, or the thought that I think myself, 
but in addition, an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which 
to determine this thought, (page 97, line 5.) Cf. § 1634. [If its in- 
tuition were intellectual : If a dog were an eagle, it could fly ; but 
if it had wings, it would scarcely be a dog.] [Thought of an object 
in general, which thought may be called the consciousness of not- 
self, and is inseparable from self-consciousness.] 

Article XXII. — Transcendental deduction of the universally pos- 
sible employment in experience of the pure conceptions of the under- 
standing. (§§ 1636-1648 inclusive.) 

§ 1636. — Possibility of cognizing apriori, by means of the cate- 
gories, all objects which can possibly be presented to our senses, 
not, indeed, according to the form of their intuition, but according 
to the laws of their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, 
of prescribing laws to nature, (page 97, line 32.) Cf. §§ 1615-1619. 

§ 1637. — Synthesis of apprehension, (page 98, line 7.) Cf. §§, 
1729, 1731, 1642, 2873. 

§ 1638. — Synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phenom- 
enon must be always conformable to the apriori forms of the exter- 
nal and internal sensuous intuition, (page 98, line 11.) 

§ 1639.- — Space and time contain apriori the determination of the 
unity of the manifold which they contain. (The unity of this intui- 
tion apriori belongs to [i. e., qualifies — see § 1598] space and time,, 
and not to the conception of the understanding [i. e., is not the cat- 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
nomena possible, we must adopt a medium which shall be itself pure, and yet. 
be on the one hand (in reference to the understanding) intellectual, and on the 
other hand, sensible [§ 1668]. The transcendental doctrine of judgment is to 
show how this is to be effected, and the representation itself is termed a Tran- 
scendental Schema. 

The conception of the understanding or the category contains pure synthet- 
ical union of the diverse generally ; and Time, as the formal condition of the- 
diversity of the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all represen- 
tations, contains a diverse, apriori in the pure intuition [§1669]. Now a tran- 
scendental determination of time,* the unity of [which is constituted by] the 
category [but see \ 1639], is so far homogeneous with it as it is general [or uni- 
versal], and rests upon a rule apriori; and this transcendental determination, on 
the other hand, is so far homogeneous with the phenomenon, as time is con- 
tained in every empirical representation of the diverse ; and in this way an 
application of the category to phenomena is possible by means of this transcen- 
tal determination of time, which, as the schema of the conceptions of the under- 
standing, operates as a medium of the subsumption of the phenomena under the- 
category. The term Schema, however, is not to be confounded with the Greek 



The Clavis to an Index. 651 

egory of unity]. Cf. §§ 1483, 1499, and Fischer, p. 41.) (p. 98, 1. 15.) 
[See § 1628.] Cf. §§ 1607, 1701, and Mahafiy s note to § 2873. 

§ 1640. — Unity of the synthesis of the manifold without or 
within us, consequently also a conjunction to which all that is to 
be represented as determined in space or time must correspond, is 
given apriori along with (not in) these intuitions, as the condition 
of the synthesis of all apprehension of them, (page 98, line 19.) 
[See the definition of transcendental deduction in § 1579.] Cf. §§ 
2873, 2874. [The understanding acts, as the condition of the 
action of the understanding.] 

§ 1641. — All synthesis, whereby alone is even perception pos- 
sible, is subject to the categories, (page 98, line 28.) Cf. § 1617. 
[In the transcendental unity of the imagination, we make abstrac- 
tion of the empirical manifold, and view the unity as an original 
act of consciousness. (See Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V.,page 113, §41.)] 

§ 1642. — Synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must 
necessarily be conformable to the synthesis of apperception, which 
is intellectual, (page 99, note.) See §§ 1641, 1637. 

§ 1643. — Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws apriori 
to phenomena, consequently to nature as the complex of all phe- 
nomena, (page 99, line 33.) [To say that the human understand- 
ing necessarily imposes upon nature certain laws, is cogitably 
equivalent to saying that certain laws have been imposed upon 
nature by whatsoever power has subjected the human understand- 
ing to the necessity of enouncing those laws. Hence, if nature is 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

word, Image, from which it is derived, which is something particular or specific 
or individual, and therefore empirical ; whereas the word schema in the present 
philosophical sense is generic, and includes in its meaning what is universal in 
its character [gg 1672, 1674]; as for instance, the conception of man, which is 
subsumed under that of mortal, and the conception of ball under that of a sphere 
A polyhedron drawn is an image of the figure which I have in view when I en- 
tertain its idea [conception, g 1963]. A polyhedron in general is not an image, 
hut only a rule, in order to represent this figure by an image, which never can 
attain to the idea [can never be adequate to the conception (1673) ] that exists 
within us. The medium which renders categories homogeneous with intuitions 
is Time. This is the connection between the pure conceptions of the understand- 
ing and objects; categories rendered sensible by time are schemata, and these 
are products of the imagination. All our ideas ["pure sensuous conceptions," 
(g 1673) ] possess a schema as their foundation, but they have not images of the 
object, for no image of an object can entirely coincide with the pure idea [con- 
ception (see g 1963). ] [Take] * the figure before mentioned, the polyhedron, for 
example, this in its generality can never have an adequate or complete image, 
because the image can not attain to the generality of my idea, and would be 



652 Kant's Ethics. 

objectively valid in se, it does not follow that the rational doctrine 
of nature is false or illusory.] Cf. § 1827 and see § 1651. 

§ 1644. — Laws do not exist except by relation to the subject in 
which the phenomena inhere, insofar as it possesses understanding, 
just as phenomena have no existence except by relation to the 
same existing subject insofar as it has senses, (page 100, line 11.) 

§ 1645. — Things in themselves must necessarily conform to law, 
independently of an understanding to cognize them, (page 100, 
line 22.] Cf. §§ 1826, 1856. 

§ 1646. — Phenomena, as mere representations, stand under no 
law of conjunction except that which the conjoining faculty pre- 
scribes, (page 100, line 24.) 

§ 1647. — All possible perceptions, and therefore every thing that 
can attain to empirical consciousness, that is, all phenomena of 
nature, must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to the cate- 
gories, (page 100, line 28.) 

§ 1648. — Understanding is not competent to enounce other or 
more laws than those on which a nature in general depends. Ex- 
perience must be superadded in order to know particular laws, 
(page 100, line 41.) Of. §§ 1743, 1624. 

Article XXIII. — Result of this deduction of the conceptions of the 
understanding. (§§ 1649-1652 inclusive.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
limited to a part only of the idea [conception]. The image could only repre- 
sent a tetrahedron, a hexahedron, or an octahedron, whilst the idea of a polyhe- 
dron in general comprehends in itself all these figures. The schema of a poly- 
hedron can only exist in the idea, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis of the 
imagination with relation to figures in space. 

As there are as many classes of schemata as there are categories, we shall 
under the schema of Quantity necessarily find Unity, Plurality, and Univer- 
sality. This schema is Number [§ 1675] in general, or the synthesis of time, 
as One, Several and the Whole. [Number is nothing else than the unity of the 
synthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition, etc. (§ 1675). ] The 
schema of quality [§ 1676] is a degree in general, or the synthesis of sensations 
in time. Eeajity is that to which sensation corresponds in every intuition ; 
and as there is an infinite number of degrees between sensation and the absence 
of sensation, we have in the one case Limitation, and in the other Negation, or 
the state of the transition of the degree of intensity of a sensation until its final 
extinction. The schema of Relation is the relationship of sensations between 
themselves in the order of time. [The schema of] Substance [§ 1677] is the per- 
durability [permanence] of a reality in time, or that which remains whilst all 
its accidents change. [The schema of] Causality [g 1678] is the determinate 
succession of realities in time, so that when one event occurs, another neces- 
sarily follows. [The schema of] Community or concurrence is the co-existence 
of realities in space, so that one determines the place of the other [see the 



The Clavis to an Index. 653 

§ 1649. — No apriori cognition is possible for us, except of objects 
of possible experience, (page 101, line 14.) Cf. § 269. 

§ 1650. — Categories do contain the grounds of the possibility of 
all experience, (page 101, line 21.) Cf. § 1588. 

§ 1651. — Conclusive objection to the hypothesis that the catego- 
ries are merely subjective aptitudes for thought, (page 102, line 
15.) Cf. § 1643. [Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V., page 27, § 1.] 

Short view of the above deduction. (§ 1652.) 

§ 1652. — Exposition of the pure conceptions of the understand- 
ing (and with them of all theoretical apriori cognition), as princi- 
ples of the possibility of experience, but of experience as the 
determination of all phenomena in space and time in general — of 
experience, finally, from the principle of the original synthetical 
unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in rela- 
tion to time and space as original forms of sensibility, (p. 103, 1. 3.) 

BOOK II.— ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. (§21653-1924 inclusive.) 

§ 1653. — General logic is constructed upon a plan which coin- 
cides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition, 
(page 103, line 20.) 

§ 1654. — Must contain, in its analytic, a canon for reason. For 
the form of reason has its law, which, without taking into consid- 
eration the particular nature of the cognition about which it is 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

Clavis, §1679]. The schema of Modality is the mode of existence of sensations 
in time, or the complex of time. [The schema of] Possibility is the idea [con- 
ception, see £ 1963] of an object being able to exist only in time [perhaps Hay- 
wood designed "only" to qualify "being able," and indicate that the conception 
does not go so far as real existence. See § 1680]. [The schema of] Existence is 
the being of a reality in a given time [g 1681]. [The schema of] Necessity is the 
idea [conception] of an object, always existing in time [§ 1682]. Hence it will 
be seen how the connection of a variety, and therefore the representation of an 
object, is possible. The categories, as pure intellectual conceptions, could not 
effect this ; but the schemata being employed as media, the necessary unity of 
the given variety is represented. The categories rendered sensible by time are 
the schemata, and all objects are given by their means. We may think a thing 
through the categories, but we can not say any thing of it, or attribute any pre- 
dicate to it, and the pure origin of the category does not assist in saying what 
an object is, because we must have an intuition before we can make any thing 
of it. We can not know any thing of Noumena, or Things in themselves, but 
only of Phenomena, or Things as they appear. Time being the form of the 
internal sense, schemata produce the synthesis of the intuition of the internal 
sense, and they are the only mode by which reality can be given to the catego- 
ries in establishing their relationship to objects [§ 1684]. But although the 
schemata of sensibility give reality to the categories, yet they at the same time 
limit them [g 1686], and the schema being the sensible conception of an object 



654 Kant's Ethics. 

employed, can be discovered apriori, by the simple analysis of the 
action of reason into its momenta, (page 103, line 27.) 

§ 1655. — Transcendental logic can not imitate general logic in 
this division. (Transcendental employment of .Reason is not ob- 
jectively valid.) (page 103, line 35.) §§ 1934, 1942. 

§ 1656. — Understanding and Judgment possess in transcendental 
logic a canon of objectively valid and therefore true exercise, 
(page 104, line 6.) 

§ 1657. — -Analytic of principles will be merely a canon for the 
faculty of judgment, (page 104, line 15.) 

Introduction.— Of the transcendental faculty of judgment in general. C3§ 1658- 

1634 inclusive.) 

§ 1658. — Judgment may be termed the faculty of subsumption 
under the rules of understanding, (page 104, line 27.) 

§ 1659. — General logic contains no directions or precepts for the 
faculty of judgment, nor can it contain any such. (p. 104. 1. 31.) 

§ 1660. — Judgment is a peculiar talent, which does not and can 
not require tuition, but only exercise, (page 105, line 4.) 

§ 1661. — Examples are commonly injurious rather than other- 
wise, because, as casus in terminis, they seldom adequately fulfill the 
conditions of the rule. (The grand and only use of examples is to 
sharpen the judgment.) (page 105, line 26.) 

§ 1662. — Duty of transcendental logic is to secure and direct, by 
means of determinate rules, the faculty of judgment in the em- 
ployment of the pure understanding, (p. 106, 1. 4.) Cf. § 1656. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

in unison with the category, it is evident that schemata only represent things 
as they appear, and not as they are, which the categories, in their pure signifi- 
cation, would do, were it possible that there could be an application of them in 
this sense. "Without schemata, the categories are simply functions of the under- 
standing for conceptions, but they represent no object [§ 1687]. Meaning comes 
to them from sensibility, and this, whilst it realizes, at the same time necessarily 
restricts the understanding. 

Having thus disposed of the schemata, it will be necessary to investigate the 
second portion of the division of the faculties of the understanding, and to 
explain what is meant by principles of the pure understanding [#1688], and 
with this one main branch of the subject will be completed. Analytical judg- 
ments have been shown to be those which are tested by the principle of non- 
contradiction [§ 1693]. The principle of their legitimacy consists in this, that 
the idea [conception] of the predicate is contained in the subject, as for in- 
stance, "bodies are extended," where the predicate extended is contained in the 
idea, "body." The two ideas [conceptions, see § 1963] also are identical, the 
predicate in fact doing nothing but developing and extending the subject. But 
with synthetical judgments the case is quite different [§ 1698]. In these the 
subject does not contain the predicate, and this may or may not agree with tire 



The Clavis to an Index. 655 

§ 1663. — Indicate apriori the case to which the rule must be ap- 
plied, (page 106, line 18.) [If objects can not be given in har- 
mony with the pure conceptions of the understanding, the concep- 
tions may be said nevertheless to exist as logical forms ; but since 
they could receive no content, they would be mere thoughts, could 
not enter into cognition, and therefore would not belong to under- 
standing, which is the faculty of cognition.] 

§ 1664. — Transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment 
will treat (1) of the schematism and (2) of the principles of the 
pure understanding, (page 106, line 32.) [(1) Outward form or 
shape ; habit. (2) Although subsidiary to the conceptions, they 
are properly termed principles, or fundamenta, because the con- 
ceptions themselves have effect only by force of the copula in a 
judgment. See Fischer, pages 97, 301, 302, and § 2479, to which 
Mahany (Fischer, page 97) refers.] 

Chapter I.— Of the schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding. 

(§§ 1665-1687 inclusive.) 

§ 1665. — Eepresentation of the object must be homogeneous 
with the conception, (page 107, line 6.) 

§ 1666. — Pure conceptions of the understanding, when com- 
pared with empirical intuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions 
in general, are quite heterogeneous, and never can be discovered 
in any intuition, (page 107, line 15.) 

§ 1667.- — Eeal cause of the necessity of a transcendental doc- 
trine of the faculty of judgment, (page 107, line 22.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

subject without there being any contradiction, and without the affirmation or 
negation being contrary to the axiom of contradiction spoken of; hence it is 

■evident that this is not the principle of synthetic, as it was of analytical judg- 
ments. 

In the analytical judgment, I stop at the given conception, in order to make 

• out something with respect to it. If it is to be affirmative, I merely attribute 

"to this conception that which was already thought in it. If it is to be negative, 
I exclude only the contrary thereof from it. But in synthetical judgments I 
must go beyond the given conception, in order to consider, in reference to the 
same, something quite different from that which was thought in it [§ 1448], — 
which, therefore, is never either a relationship of identity or of contradiction, — 

•and whereby in the judgment in itself, neither the truth nor the error can be 
seen. 

Experience arises when together with the necessary unity of consciousness, 
variety [or manifold] of the empirical intuition is thought, and such experience 
reposes upon the synthetical unity of phenomena, without which it would never 
be cognition, but merely a rhapsody or unconnected body of perceptions which 
would not arrange themselves together in any context according to the rules of 

=an absolutely connected consciousness. Experience, therefore, has lying, even 



656 Kant's Ethics. 

§1668. — Must be some third thing, which on the one side is 
homogeneous with the category, and with the phenomenon on the 
other, and so makes the application of the former to the latter pos- 
sible. (Transcendental schema.) (page 107, line 32.) 

§ 1669. — Application of the category to phenomena becomes 
possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, 
which (as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding) 
mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former, (page 
108, line 4.) [The unity of apperception, from which the categories 
are deduced, is objectively valid in sensuous intuition (§1607). 
The subsumption of phenomena under the categories ultimately 
rests upon this objective validity, which has been already demon- 
strated. The present argument is merely an explication, develop- 
ing and applying the logical results of the deduction of the pure 
conceptions of the understanding.] 

§ 1670. — Conceptions can not possibly apply to objects as things 
in themselves without regard to the question whether and how 
these may be given to us. (page 108, line 18.) 

§ 1671. — General condition under which alone the category can 
be applied to smy object, (page 108, line 32.) 

§ 1672. — Schema of the conception of the understanding : — rep- 
resentation of a general procedure of the imagination to present 
its image to a conception, (page 108, line 38.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

at its foundation, the principles of its form apriori, or general rules of unity in. 
the synthesis of phenomena [§ 1702], and the highest principle of all synthetical 
judgments is that every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the syn- 
thetical unity of the diversity of the intuitions in a possible experience [# 1705]., 
The conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same time con- 
ditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and they have for this . 
reason objective validity in a synthetical judgment apriori [§1706]. 

That there are synthetical principles of the pure understanding, is clear from 
the fact that experience being general or valid for every body, and this experi- 
ence, consisting in the representation of a necessary connexion of the variety 
of empirical intuitions, having only been rendered possible by the application 
of the categories to intuition, the understanding must therefore contain 
within itself these rules which are necessary to determine the cases of appli- 
cation [cf. % 1663, 1707]. 

The principles of the pure understanding are divided like the categories and 
schemata, into four classes [§ 1713], and they comprehend first, as relating to 
the principle of Quantity, the Axioms of Intuition. Secondly, in reference tc- 
that of Quality, the Anticipations of Perception. Thirdly, with respect to 
Relation, the Analogies of Experience. Fourthly, in regard to Modality, the 
Postulates of Empirical Thought in general. These principles are not all of" 
the same nature, the two former being those which are termed constitutive- 



The Clavis to an Index. 657 

§ 1673. — Schema of sensuous conceptions is a product and as it 
were a monogram of the pure imagination apriori, whereby and 
according to which images first become possible, which however 
can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of 
the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully 
adequate to it. (p. 109, 1. 17.) Cf. Fischer, page 94, where Mahaffy 
retranslates. Cf. § 2452 (referred to by Mahaffy, Fischer, page 97). 

§ 1674. — Schema of a pure conception of the understanding is 
something that can not be reduced into any image — it is nothing 
else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category, conform- 
ably to a rule of unity according to conceptions, (page 110, line 8.)' 

§ 1675. — Schema of quantity as a conception of the understand- 
ing, is number, (page 110, line 24.) 

§ 1676. — Schema of a reality as the quantity of something inso- 
far as it fills tims, is the continuous and uniform generation of the 
reality in time, as we descend in time from the sensation which has 
a certain degree, down to the vanishing thereof, or gradually 
ascend from negation to the quantity thereof, (page 110, line 33.) 

§ 1677. — Schema of substance is the permanence of the real in 
time, (page 111, line 16.) 

§ 1678.- — Schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the 
real which, when posited, is always followed by something else. 
(page 111, line 25.) It consists therefore in jhe succession of the 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
[cf. \ 1752] or absolutely necessary [$ 1712], inasmuch as they concern intuitions 
without which the object would not be given, determining really what the phe- 
nomenon contains with reference to the form of the intuition. The two latter 
on the other hand are merely discursive or produced by the ideas, and are only 
necessary under the condition of a possible experience, which is always contin- 
gent. These are also termed Dynamical, in opposition to the former, which 
are designated Mathematical, but without its being intended to limit the mean- 
ing to the principles of the mathematics on the one hand, or to those of physi- 
cal dynamics on the other; but only to those of the pure understanding in rela- 
tion to the internal sense, without any distinction of the representations therein 
given. The title is. allotted rather in consideration of their application than 
their content f [g 1714]. [At the bottom of the page, Haywood prints the fol- 
lowing note:] t'A subtle distinction is made by Kant in the connexion of the- 
variety of empirical intuition according to the categories. This is stated to 
be of two kinds, one a connexion of the homogeneous, or Compositio, the other 
of the heterogeneous, or Nexus; all conjunctio belonging to either of these 
classes. The one is mathematical, the other dynamical, and this last is subdi- 
vided into the physical and metaphysical. Compositio is a square divided into 
two triangles by a diagonal. Nexus is when one thing necessarily belongs to- 
another, as accident to substance, or effect to cause. [End of Haywood's note.]; 
[§ 1715.] 



658 Kant's Ethics, 

manifold, insofar as that succession is subjected to a rule. [It is 
not intended to define the conception, but only to indicate the con- 
nection of the conception with the rule. What or why causality 
is, is not cognized. See §§ 1793, 1803.] 

§ 1679. — Schema of community (reciprocity of action and re- 
action), or the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their 
accidents, is the coexistence of the determinations of the one with 
those of the other, according to a general rule, (page 111, line 29.) 

§ 1680. — Schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis 
of different representations with the conditions of time in general, 
(page 111, line 33.) Cf: Fischer, page 96. 

§ 1681. — Schema of reality is existence in a determined time, 
(p. Ill, 1. 39.) Cf. Haywood, p. 653 above. [I would confine the use 
of the word reality to the category of quality (existence in sensa- 
tion) ; the category of modality indicates something more (reality 
in a determined time). Meiklejohn notes that in the table of cate- 
gories (§ 1570), the term used is existence (Daseyn).] 

§ 1682. — Schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all 
time, (page 112, line 1.) Cf. § 1851. [Be careful not to confuse the 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

It is to be here borne in mind, that the point under consideration is the pos- 
sibilit}- of experience itself, and the mode in which it is practicable. But it 
must not be supposed that the. synthetical principles apriori in question have 
meaning irrespective of sensible application [cf. \ 1703]. They afford no rules 
as to what objects are absolutely, without reference to given intuition, and to 
the form of the internal sense, as condition of the synthetical unity of the intu- 
ition. The laws of the understanding are in ourselves, that is to say, in our un- 
derstanding, and they are not derived from elsewhere: and the possibility of 
experience itself reposes upon the synthetic unity of phenomena or Ideas ajjriori 
or categories. 

In the division of the principles of the pure understanding, it has just been 
•observed, that "the Axioms of Intuition" are at the head of the list, and the 
principle of these is that "all intuitions are extensive quantities" [§1716], that is, 
that they possess extensive quantities, or as it may be otherwise expressed, it is 
impossible to represent to ourselves any thing if it be not in space and time. 
The proof adduced is this, that all phenomena contain, according to form, an 
intuition in space and time, lying at the foundation of the whole of them apriori 
[§1717]. They can therefore only be apprehended or received into empirical 
•consciousness through the synthesis of the diverse, whereby the representations 
of a determined space or time are generated. This synthesis is the conjunction 
of a diverse-homogeneous [the conjunction of a homogeneous manifold], and its 
representation is the conception of Quantity. All phenomena are, in fact, 
quantities, and they are extensive quantities, the character of this kind of quan- 
tity being that the representation of the parts renders possible the representa- 
tion of the whole, and so far, consequently, the one precedes the other [§ 1718]. 
I can represent to myself no line, however small it may be, without drawing it 



The Clavis to an Index. 659 

schema of necessity with the conception of permanence. See §§ 
1760-1763.] 

§ 1683. — Schemata are nothing but apriori determinations of 
time according to rules, (page 112, line 3.) See in Fischer, page 
96, Mahaffy's note. 

§ 1684. — Schematism of the understanding, by means of the 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing- 
else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal 
sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as a func- 
tion corresponding to the internal sense, (page 112, line 18.) 
Cf. § 1642. [I refer the word " function " to " schematism." Cf. §§ 
1551 and 1632.] 

§ 1685.- — Categories are only capable of empirical use, inasmuch 
as they serve merely to subject phenomena to the universal rules 
of synthesis, by means of an apriori necessary unity, (page 112, 
line 26.) 

§ 1686. — Schema is properly only the phenomenon, or the sen- 
suous conception of an object in harmony with the category, 
(page 112, line 36.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

■at least in idea — thereby deducing from one point all the parts in succession, 
-and so dissecting as it were the intuition. And in respect of time, the same 
process takes place, for with regard to the smallest portion of it, I therein think 
to myself only the successive progression from one moment to another, and in 
this way by means of all the portions of time, and their addition, a determinate 
quantity of time is ultimately produced. The simple intuition in all phenom- 
ena must be either space or time, and each phenomenon is, as intuition, an 
•extensive quantity, because only through successive quantities from part to part 
•[by successive synthesis] can it be recognized in apprehension [§ 1719]. 

The second principle of the understanding, the principle of Quality, is 
termed "Anticipations of Percejotion ;" and here it is shown that "in all phe- 
nomena, the Real which is an object of sensation or a sensible object, possesses 
intensive quantity, that is, it has a degree" [§ 1724] : or in other words it may be 
said, that all our sensations have a certain degree of intensity. The proof of 
this rests upon the fact, that each sensation filling up only one moment, the 
reality of phenomenon is only perceived at once, and not successively [§ 1729]. 
But between each sensation or reality in the phenomenon and negation, there 
is a continual connection of many possible intermediate sensations, the'differ- 
ence of which from one to the other is always smaller than the difference be- 
tween the given one and zero, or total negation [§1730]. Every sensation, 
however small it may be, has in fact a degree or intensive quantity, which may 
always be further diminished; and between reality and negation there is a con- 
tinual connexion of possible realities, and of possible smaller perceptions [§ 1734]. 
Every color, for instance, as red or blue, has a degree, which, however delicate 
it may be, is never the most delicate; and it is the same with the qualities of 
-b.eat, weight, etc., generally. This property of quantities is termed their con- 



660 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1687. — Categories, without schemata, are merely functions of 
the understanding for the production of conceptions, but do not 
represent any object, (page 113, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1649, 1595. 

Chapter II.— System of all principles of the pure understanding, (gg 1688-1862. > 

§ 1688. — Exhibit in systematic connection those judgments which 
the understanding really produces apriori. (Table of categories 
will certainly afford us the natural and safe guidance. For it is 
precisely the categories whose application to possible experience 
must constitute all pure apriori cognition of the understanding ; 
and the relation of which to sensibility will on that very account 
present us with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the 
transcendental principles of the use of the understanding.) (page 
113, line 33.) 

§ 1689. — Principles apriori are so called, not merely because they 
contain in themselves the grounds of other judgments, but also 
because they themselves are not grounded in higher and more 
general cognitions. This peculiarity, however, does not raise them 
altogether above the need of a proof, (page 114, line 10.) 

§ 1690. — Limit our investigations to those principles which re- 
late to the categories, (page 114, line 23.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

tinuity, and space and time are quanta continua, because no parts thereof can be 
given without the same being included within points or instants as limits [§ 1735]. 
Space, therefore, consists of spaces, and Time of times. Phenomena are all con- 
tinuous quantities, extensive with reference to their intuition, and intensive as 
regards their mere perception [§ 1736]. Between the reality in the phenomenon 
and the negation there may be any number of degrees, the total vanishing of 
the reality at any determinate point not being provable either as to space or 
time \_l 1739]. With respect to what constitutes the empirical in a phenomenon, 
this can not be known except aposteriori [cf. §§1743, 1737]; but that a phe- 
nomenon must have a reality, we know apriori, and from looking at the nature 
of experience we anticipate what is to arise, and by this principle of anticipa- 
tion, the determination of the particular realities belonging to objects of experi- 
ence becomes possible. 

The third principle of the understanding or Relation is designated the- 
"Analogies of experience," and here it has to be shown that experience is only 
possible by means of the representation of a necessary connexion of perceptions 
[§ 1744] : and these analogies are divided into three classes, termed the Principle 
of the Perdurabilitj r [permanence] of substance [§1757]; Succession of time 
according to the laws of causality [§ 1771]; Coexistence according to the laws 
of reciprocity or community [§ 1813]. 

With regard to the proof of one [the general] principle of this division, or that 
experience is only possible by means of a necessary connexion of apprehensions, 
it must be evident that experience is only empirical cognition [§ 1745], or a syn- 
thesis of perceptions, which itself is not contained in the perception, and the 
cognition of phenomena is only possible by means of synthetic unity ; so that,. 



The Clavis to an Index. 661 

§ 1691. — Principle of analytical judgments, in opposition to syn- 
thetical judgments, (page 114, line 39.) 

TITLE L-OF THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF ALL ANALYTICAL JUDGMENTS. 
(821692-1696 inclusive.) 

§ 1692. — Universal although only negative condition of all our 
judgments is that they do. not contradict themselves. (Without 
being self-contradictory, a judgment may nevertheless be either 
false or groundless.) (page 115, line 7.) 

§ 1693. — Principle of contradiction. (Universal but purely nega- 
tive criterion of all truth.) " JS r o subject can have a predicate that 
contradicts it.'' (page 115, line 19.) 

§ 1694. — Positive use of this principle. (If the judgment is an- 
alytical, be it affirmative or negative, its truth must always be 
recognizable by means of the principle of contradiction.) (page 
115, line 25.) § 2652. 

§ 1695. — Principle of contradiction the sine qua non, but not the 
determining ground of the truth of our cognition, (p. 115, 1. 36.) 

§ 1696. — Reason why Kant altered the formula of this principle. 
(Must not by any means limit its application merely to relations 
of time.) (page 116, line 10.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
in order to determine the existence of objects in any given time, it is necessary 
that the synthesis thereof must be possible in time [$ 1747]. Now as the syn- 
thesis of apprehension can only occur in time, the variety in experience must 

• occur in general according to the three modes of time, and which are those of 
perdurability, succession, and coexistence, and these three laws, which are those 
of all the relationships of time in phenomena, will precede and render possible 
all experience, whereby to each phenomenon, its existence, in respect of the 
unity of time, can be determined Jj} 1748]. 

The first analogy asserting the principle of the perdurability of substance, 
necessarily maintains that in all change of phenomena the substance is perma- 
nent, and that its quantum in nature is neither diminished nor increased [§ 1757]. 

"® Succession and determinations of time can only be represented by means of a 
substratum, which represents time in general, and in which all change or co- 
existence can be perceived by means of the relationship of phenomena to this 

.substratum in the apprehension, [§ 1759]. Now substance is the substratum of 
all that is real, or of all that belongs to the existence of things, in the which 
substance all that appertains to existence can be thought only as determina- 
tion [g 1760]. There must be an invariable and durable principle in time, 
whereof succession and simultaneousness are only modifications, and conse- 
quently all phenomena must have this principle, which is the object itself ["the 
object in itself" (§ 1763) ]. No relationships can be given by time itself, which 
is in itself nothing, and can not be perceived [§1762]; and they can not be 
given by our perceptions, for the synthesis of these is always successive. "It can 
not therefore teach us whether tlie diverse in phenomena, as object of experi- 

• ence, is co-existent or successive, provided something does not lie [or unless 



662 Kant's Ethics. 

TITLE II.— OF THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF ALL SYNTHETICAL JUDG- 
MENTS. (§§1697-1706 inclusive.) 

§ 1697. — Explanation of the possibility of synthetical judg- 
ments is the most important matter in transcendental logic, (page 
117, line 9.) 

§ 1698. — Eelation which is consequently never one either of 
identity or of contradiction, (page 117, line 18.) 

§ 1699. — Third thing is necessary, in which alone the synthesis 
of two conceptions can originate. {Time.) (page 117, line 29.) 

§ 1700. — Synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagin- 
ation; their synthetical unity (which is requsite to a judgment), 
upon the unity of apperception, (page 117, line 36.) 

§ 1701. — Necessary that the object be given in some way or 
another. Without this, our conceptions are empty, and we may 
indeed have thought by means of them, but by such thinking we 
have not in fact cognized any thing, (page 118, line 7.) [Pure logic 
and pure mathematics give no cognition of any thing.] Cf. §§ 1620,, 
2461, 1626, 1544. 

§ 1702. — Possibility of experience is, then, that which gives ob- 
jective validity to all our apriori cognitions, (page 118, line 27.) 

§ 1703. — Pure synthetical judgments do relate- (though but 
mediately) to the possibility of experience, (page 119, line 4.) 

§ 1704. — Synthesis, as cognition apriori, possesses truth, that is, 
accordance with its object, only insofar as it contains nothing more 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
something does lie] at the foundation which is or exists always, that is to say,, 
which is- something fixed and permanent, and as to which all change and co- 
existence are nothing else hut so many modi of time wherein the permanent, 
exists, hecause only in the permanent are the relationships of time possible 
[§1761]. The determinations of a subject which are nothing else but its par- 
ticular modes of existing, are termed Accidents, and these are always real be- 
cause they concern the existence of the substance [§ 1766]. Upon permanence 
alone can we ground the conception of change. Change is one mode of exist- 
ence, which follows upon another of the same object, and therefore all that. 
changes is permanent, its state alone varies [§ 1768]. Neither absolute rise or 
origin nor extinction can be a possible perception ; for if it be assumed that 
something begins to be, there must be a point of time wherein it was not, but 
only a void time. [But a void time is] no object of perception, [nor can it be- 
assumed that a thing has become absolutely extinct in] * time, for this would be 
to suppose an empirical representation of time when there was no phenomenon 
[§17691. Permanence is thus a necessary condition under which alone phe- 
nomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible experience [§ 1770].. 
What the empirical criterium of this necessary permanence may be, and of the 
substantiality of the phenomena, will be remarked hereafter. 

The second analogy is the principle of production or of succession, accord- 



The Clavis to an Index. 663 

than what is necessary to the synthetical unity of experience, 
(page 119, line 15.) 

§ 1705. — Supreme principle of all synthetical judgments is: 
Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical 
unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience, (page 
119, line 22.) [Observe the radical importance of §§ 1705, 1706.] 

§ 1708.— Conditions of the possibility of experience in general 
are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of 
experience, and have for that reason objective validity in an apriori 
synthetical judgment, (page 119, line 26.) Cf. § 2479. 

TITLE III.-SYSTEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF ALL SYNTHETICAL PRIN- 
CIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING. (;g 1707-18G2 inclusive.) 

§ 1707. — Source of principles according to which every thing 
that can be presented to us as an object is necessarily subject to 
rules, (page 120, line 5.) 

§ 1708. — All laws of nature, without distinction, are subject to 
higher principles of the understanding, (page 120, line 10 ) 

§ 1709. — No danger of our mistaking merely empirical prin- 
ciples for principles of the pure understanding, (page 120, line 23.) 

§ 1710. — Pure principles apriori, which nevertheless I should 
not ascribe to the pure understanding, (page 120, line 28.) 

§ 1711. — Possibility and objective validity apriori of principles 
of the mathematical science, (page 120, line 38 ) 

§ 1712. — Principles of the mathematical use of the categories 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

ing to the laws of causality, and this corresponds to the second of the three 
modes of time, and the import of it is, that "all changes occur according to the 
law of connexion of cause and effect" [§1771]. This answers to the principle 
of nihil est sine ratione svfficiente, as the preceding law did to the dictum gigni 
de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti [§ 1765]. As the first analogy showed 
that all the phenomena of the succession of time are only changes, the present 
indicates that all changes occur according to the law of the synthesis of cause 
and effect, or in other words every phenomenon which appears supposes 
another to which it succeeds, by virtue of a necessary law [§ 1784]. Now what 
is necessary must arise from a category, and we see in the table of the catego- 
ries, that under the head of Relation, the second in that division is the one of 
causality and dependence [§ 1570].* In looking at a house or a statue, the ap- 
prehension of it may begin with one man at the roof or the head, or with another 
at the foundation or foot ; but if the conception carries with it a necessity of 
synthetic unity, this being a pure conception of the understanding, or a cate- 
gory, the same does not lie in the perception. Such a conception is that of the 
relationship of Cause and Effect [§ 1774]. I perceive that phenomena succeed 
one another, or I connect two opposite states of substance in time. All this 
takes place in my own mind, and the connexion is either voluntary, that is, it 
remains with me which state shall be first, and which last; or it is necessary,.. 



-664 Kant's Ethics. 

will possess a character of absolute necessity (that is, will be 
apodictic) ; those on the other hand, of the dynamical use, the 
character of an apriori necessity indeed, but only under the 
condition of empirical thought in an experience, therefore only 
mediately and indirectly, (page 121, line 6.) 

§ 1713. — All principles of the pure understanding are : (1) ax- 
ioms of intuition ; (2) anticipations of perception ; (3) analo- 
gies of experience ; (4) postulates of empirical thought in general, 
(page 121, line 24.) 

§ 1714. — Mathematical principles are possessed of an intuitive, 
but the dynamical of a merely discursive, though in both instances 
a complete certitude. (These principles are named rather with 
reference to their application than their content.*) (p. 122, 1. 1.) 
* Exempli gratia, the first principle is not an axiom, but is merely 
the formulation of a rule whereby axioms are possible. An axiom 
is an apriori synthetical rule possessing immediate and apodictic 
certainty; but the rule "all intuitions are extensive quantities," 
requires proof. See §§ 2474, 2475. 

§ 1715. — All combination (cowjunctio) is either composition or 
connection (nexiis). (page 122,' line 27.) 

Article I. — Axioms of intuition: (§§ 1716-1723.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
that is, I am conscious that the one state must ever be the first, and the other 
the last. In the first case, the connexion is subjective, or it is in my imagina- 
tion, and not in the objects [§ 1773]; but in the second case, the subjective con- 
nexion is changed into an objective one, or it is represented not merely as to be 
found in my mind, but is at the same time in the phenomena, or the objects of 
experience. If, consequently, the objective succession of things is to be distin- 
guished from the subjective, and the first not held to be the last, this must arise 
from the principle of Necessity [§ 1774], and this again brings us back to 
the same point, that necessity is only possible apriori; and the connexion dis- 
covered must be a work of the understanding. * It is the conception of cause in 
general, or that there is a cause for every change, which enters into our consid- 
eration here ; and as this is a necessary law of thought, this is, as it was before 
stated to be, itself a Category. We are certainly ignorant apriori of the definite 
cause of any particular change [$ 1803], but we are thoroughly convinced that 
every change has a cause. Neither can this conception of cause be obtained 
empirically, because then *["the rule which it furnishes us with — 'everything 
that happens must have a cause' — would be just as contingent as experience 
itself. The universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly 
spurious attributes of it. Indeed, it could not possess universal validity, inas- 
much as it would not in this case be apriori, but founded on de[in]duction." 
§ 1785].* This law of causality can not be borrowed from experience, because, 
as just mentioned, it is a necessary law; for unless it were so, it would be im- 
possible to conceive the necessary succession of perceptions, and to distinguish 



The Clavis to an Index. 665 

§ 1716. — All intuitions are extensive quantities, (p. 122, 1. 24.) 

froof.—(§§ 1717-1719 inclusive.) 

§ 1717. — All phenomena are quantities, and extensive quanti- 
ties, because, as intuitions in space and time, they must be repre- 
sented by means of the same synthesis through which space and 
time themselves are determined, (page 123, line 2.) 

§ 1718. — Extensive quantity I call that wherein the representa- 
tion of the parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily ante- 
cedes) the representation of the whole, (page 123, line 22.) 

§ 1719. — Every phenomenon in its character of intuition is an 
extensive quantity, inasmuch as it can only be cognized in our ap- 
prehension by successive synthesis (from part to part), (page 
123, line 32.) 

§ 1720. — Founded the mathematics of extension, or geometry, 
with its axioms, (page 124, line 1.) Quanta. 

§ 1721. — Regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas). (ISTo 
axioms.) (page 124, line 10.) 

§ 1722. — Can not be called axioms, but numerical formulae. 
(As to the relation of numbers.) (page 124, line 21.) Cf § 1454. 

§ 1723. — Greatly enlarges our apriori cognition. For it is by this 
principle alone that pure mathematics is rendered applicable in all 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

that necessary, succession which is objective, from the subjective succession of 
perceptions [§ 1783]. Hence the principle, Inmitndo non datur fatum [cf. \ 1855]- 
When two apprehensions follow one another, it is evident that this is noth- 
ing but the succession of two representations, and this is subjective, and yet to 
this subjective act we attribute continually reference to an object [$§ 1784. 1782], 
and this arises, it may be again repeated, from the category, for without it, the 
objective relationship would be merely a subjective play of the imagination, 
and we should merely say that one apprehension followed upon another, but 
not that it was necessarily so [g£ 1783, 1775, 1797]. In thinking of cause and 
effect, or the law of causality, continual reference is made to what is termed 
Power, Action, Force, and Substance ; and it is thereby meant that where there 
is action, consequently activity and force, there also is substance, and in this 
substance alone must the seat of that fruitful source of phenomena, action, 
be found. Action signifies the relationship of the subject of causality to the 
effect ; and since the effect consists in that which happens, consequently in the 
Mutable which time indicates according to succession, the last subject of this is 
the Permanent as the substratum of the changeable, that is, the substance. For 
according to the principles of causality, actions are always the first foundation 
of all change of phenomena, and can not therefore lie in a subject which itself 
changes, because otherwise other actions and another subject determining such 
change would be required. In consequence of this, action, as a sufficient empir- 
ical criterium, shows substantiality, without its being necessary first of all to 
seek the permanence of this substance by means of compared perceptions^ 180]]. 

43 



666 Kant's Ethics. 

its precision to objects of experience, (page 125, line 5.) Cf. §§ 
1810, 1811. 

Article II — Anticipations of perception. (§§ 1724—1743 inclusive.) 

§ 1724. — Real, that which is an object of sensation, has intensive 
quantity, that is, has a degree, (page 125, line 38.) 

Proof.— ■(§§ 1725-1732 inclusive.) 

§ 1725. — Gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure 
consciousness is possible, inasmuch as the real in this consciousness 
entirely evanishes, and there remains a merely formal conscious- 
ness (apriori) of the manifold in time and space, (page 126, line 2.) 

§ 1726. — Must ascribe intensive quantity (that is, a degree of 
influence on sense) to all objects of perception, insofar as this per- 
ception contains sensation, (page 126, line 19.) 

§ 1727. — Sensation is just that element in cognition which can 
not be at all anticipated, (page 126, line 29.) Anticipation — pro- 
lepsis — foretaking. 

§ 1728. — Deserve to be called anticipation in a special sense, 
(page 127, line 5.) 

§ 1721). — Apprehension, by means of sensation alone, fills only 
one moment, (page 127, line 13.) Cf. §1642. [Meiklejohn re- 
marks that " apprehension is the Kantian word for perception, in 
the largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus 
which includes under it as species, perception proper and sensa- 
tion proper." I should rather say, in the most limited sense, 
excluding merely possible perception. See §§ 1796, 1824, 1839, 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
The first subject of the causality of all origin and extinction can not itself, in 
the field of phenomena, arise or perish. This runs into [or leads to the concep- 
tion of] empirical necessity and permanency of existence, and consequently 
into the conception of substance as phenomenon. When an origin arises from 
an extraneous cause, it is termed creation, which can not be admitted amongst 
phenomena as an event, for its possibility would annihilate the unity of experi- 
ence; although, when things are considered not as phenomena, but as things in 
themselves and objects of the mere understanding, then, notwithstanding they 
are substances, they may be regarded as dependent upon an extraneous cause, 
in respect of their existence [§ 1802]. But this would not be phenomena, as pos- 
sible objects of experience. In conclusion, it should not be overlooked, that 
concomitance, as well as succession, belongs to cause and effect ; for though one 
position of causal connexion amongst phenomena is limited in our formula to 
the succession of their sei'ies, we still find, in the use of the same position, that 
it suits with their concomitancy, and can at the same time be cause and effect. 
There is, for instance, warmth in a room which can not be met with in the 
open air. I look for the cause, and find it in a heated stove. Now this stove, 
as cause, and warmth as its effect, are co-existent, and consequently there is 
here no succession of series, according to time, between cause and effect, but 



The Clavis to an Index. 667 

1963, 2873. For the same reason that Kant uses appercep- 
tion (§ 1600) to indicate the pure act of consciousness, he uses ap- 
prehension to indicate the empirical act of consciousness — namely, 
to bring prominently forward the idea of activity of the subject. 
(See § 1776 and cf. §§ 1749, 1754.)] Of. §§ 1731, 1736. 

§ 1730. — Every sensation is capable of a diminution, so that it 
can decrease, and thus gradually disappear, (page 127, line 19.) 

§ 1731. — Real in a phenomenon has always a quantity, which 
however is not discoverable in apprehension, (page 127, line 28.) 

§ 1732. — Quantity which is apprehended only as unity, (page 
127, line 35.) 

§ 1733. — Call the degree of reality, in its character of cause, 
a momentum, (p. 128, 1. 1.) § 1807 See Meiklejohn's note to § 1742. 

§ 1734. — Every sensation, consequently every reality in phe- 
nomena, however small it may be, has a degree, (page 128, line 9.) 

§ 1735. — Property of quantities, according to which no part of 
them is the smallest possible, is called their continuity, (page 128, 
line 17.) 

§ 1736. — All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in re- 
spect both to intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with 
it reality). In the former case, they are extensive quantities ; in 
the latter, intensive, (page 128, line 33.) 

§ 1737. — Dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, an- 
ticipate general physical science, which is built upon certain funda- 
mental experiences, (page 129, line 15.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

they are contemporaneous ; and yet the law in question holds good. The greater 
part of the effective causes in nature are together in time with their effects ; and 
the succession of time in the latter only arises through this, that, the cause can 
not produce the whole effect in a moment. But in the moment when this first 
begins, it is always co-existent with the causality of its cause, because if that 
(the cause) had ceased to be a moment previously, this (the effect) would not at 
all have taken place. We must also here particularly observe, that we are here 
to look at the order of time, and not the flow of time — the relationship remain- 
ing, although no time have elapsed. The time between the causality of the 
cause and its immediate effect may be vanishing away (therefore it be co-exist- 
ently the effect) but still the relationship of one to the other always remains de- 
terminable according to time. If I consider a ball which lies upon a stuffed 
cushion, and makes an impression thereon, as a cause, it is contemporaneous 
with the effect. But I still distinguish both, through the relationships of time 
of the dynamic connection of the two. For if I place the ball upon the cushion, 
the dent succeeds to its previous smooth shape ; but if the cushion have (I know 
not whence) a dent, a leaden ball does not succeed to that [§ 1798]. 

Succession is, therefore, absolutely the single empirical criterium of effect, in 
reference to the causality of the'cause which precedes [g 1799]. The glass is the 



668 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1738. — Shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise 
we might rashly draw, (page 129, line 36.) 

§ 1739. — No perception, and consequently no experience, is pos- 
sible, which can prove, either immediately or mediately, an entire 
absence of all reality in a phenomenon ; in other words, it is im- 
possible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of 
empty space or of empty time, (page 129, line 41.) 

§ 1740. — Erroneous to regard the real in a phenomenon as equal 
quoad its degree, and different only quoad its aggregation and ex- 
tensive quantity. (Hypothesis of empty spaces.) (p. 130, 1. 22.) 

§ 1741. — Must somewhat startle an inquirer, (page 131, line 29.) 

§ 1742. — Eeal (that which corresponds to sensation, in opposi- 
tion to negation = 0) only represents something the conception of 
which in itself contains a being, and signifies nothing but the 
synthesis in an empirical consciousness, (page 132, line 1 .) 

§ 1743. — All sensations, therefore, as such, are given only apos- 
teriori ; but this property thereof, namely, that they have a de- 
gree, can be known apriori. (page 132, line 16.) Cf. § 1648. 

Article III — Analogies of experience. (§§ 1744-1829 inclusive.) 

§ 1744. — Experience is possible only through the representation 
of a necessary connection of perceptions, (page 132, line 27.) Cf. 
Fischer, page 107. [Dr. Fischer, alter quoting Kant's expression 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
cause of the rise of water above its horizontal surface, although both phenom- 
ena are co-existent. For as soon -as I have drawn this water with the glass out 
of a larger vessel, something ensues, that is to say, change of the horizontal state 
which it had. (in the vessel), into a concave one, which it assumes in the glass. 

Hence we see that it is the Intellect which connects [§§1774-1797; espe- 
cially §§ 1793-1795]. One species of this connection is, that it makes some of 
the realities of time to follow upon some other realities agreeably to the laws of 
its constitution. This species of connection considered separately comprehends 
the categories of cause and effect, but applied to time it is the schema of this 
category [§1678], and it presents such connexion as inhering to the realities of 
time [see § 1812]. 

The law of continuity, or the proposition that in the transition from one 
state to the other, no change can be the smallest, comes under this analogy. It 
is found apriori, because all changes occur in time, and each perception only 
renders perceptible the succession of time. To find the law, we anticipate our 
perceptions in time, in order to conceive how the succession of time occurs in 
general. All the determinations of time therefore being apriori, the law itself 
must be so necessarily [§§ 1804-1812]. 

The third analogy is the principle of co-existence according to the law of 
reciprocity or community, and the law is that "all substances, so far as they can 
be perceived in space in the same time, are in thorough reciprocalness of action " 
[§ 1813], and so far as they are co-existent, that they stand in absolute commu- 



The Clavis to an Index. 669 

in the first edition of the Critique, "All phenomena stand (as to 
their existence) apriori under rules of the determinations of their 
mutual relations in time," says, " The expression in the second 
edition is not so accurate, and leaves out the time-relation, which 
is here essential. " But if the time-relation is essential only he- 
cause time is the sole form of the internal sense, in which all that 
happens passes, and if the point to be here considered is the neces- 
sary relation of perceptions, I do not know why the logical state- 
ment of the principle should be confused by introducing into it 
the fact that this is a time relation. See § 1749.] Cf. § 2727. 

Proof.— (§§ 1745-1747 inclusive.) 

§ 1745. — Unity constitutes the essential of our cognition of 
objects of the senses, that is, of experience, (page 132, line 31.) 

§ 1746. — Apprehension is only a placing together of the mani- 
fold of empirical intuition; and no representation of a necessity in 
the connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension 
brings together, is to be discovered therein, (page 133, line 3.) 
Cf. § 1729. 

§ 1747. — Determination of the existence of objects in time can 
only take place by means of their connection in time in general, 
consequently only by means of apriori connecting conceptions, 
(page 133, line 10.) [The objective validity of apriori conceptions 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

nity or reeiprocalness with one another [g 1321], or that they are in thorough 
action or reaction [§ 1817]. It has "been observed in speaking of and explain- 
ing the second principle or analogy, that in the succession of phenomena the 
perception of one thing can not follow upon the perception of another recipro- 
cally [$51780, 1782], but is determined in the mind [$1793]. In the analogy, 
however, now to be explained, the contrary occurs, as for instance, in looking 
at the earth or moon, it is immaterial which is the first perception in order. It 
is of no consequence whether I begin my perception first with the moon, and 
afterward the earth, or conversely, first with the earth, and then with the 
moon; and because the perceptions of these objects follow one another recipro- 
cally, they are said to exist contemporaneously [$ 1814] — contemporaneousness 
being the existence of what is diverse in the same time [j5 1815]. "We know that 
things are in one and the same time when the order in the synthesis of the 
apprehension of the diversity is of no consequence, or when it can proceed reg- 
ularly from A, through B, C, D, E, or, on the other hand, retrograde from E to 
A. If this order in time were successive, or in the order which begins from A 
and terminates in E, it would be then impossible to begin the apprehension in 
the perception from E, and proceed backward to A, because A belongs to past 
time, and could no longer be an object of apprehension [§1818]. If it were 
assumed that in a diversity of substances as phenomena, * no one operated 
upon the other, nor partook of reciprocal influence, then contemporaneousness 
£or co-existence] of the same could not be an object of possible perception, and the 



670 Kant's Ethics. 

is not here in question (see § 1669). But it is shown that except 
Toy such conceptions, the existence of objects in time can not be 
connected into experience.] [Whatever color objects determined in 
time may take from the apprehending subject, it is certain that 
they do not take from the subject their existence. (Cf. § 1751.)] 

§ 1748. — Three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, ac- 
cording to which the existence of every phenomenon is deter- 
mined in respect of the unity of all time; and these antecede all 
experience, and render it possible, (page 133, line 21.) 

§ 1749. — General principle of all three analogies rests on the 
necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empiri- 
cal consciousness (perception) at every time, (page 133, line 27.) 

§ 1750. — All empirical determinations of time must be subject to 
rules of the general determination of time, (page 133, line 36.) 

§ 1751. — Existence of phenomena can not be known apriori. 
(page 134, line 6.) Cf. §§ 1522, 1544, 1619, 1624, 2282, 2700. 

§ 1752. — Constitutive (mathematical) principles relate to phe- 
nomena only in regard to their possibility, (page 134, line 20.) 
Mathematic — Science of relation and measurement of quantity. 

§ 1753. — Eegulative principles only concern the relations of ex- 
istence (qualitative relations, not quantitative), (page 134, line 33.) 
Analogy in philosophy. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
existence of the one, by no way of empirical synthesis, could lead to the exist- 
ence of the other [§ 1819]. For if it were fancied that these substances were 
separated by means of a completely void space, the perception which proceeds 
from one to the other in time, would then determine, by means of a subsequent 
perception to this other, its existence, but it could not decide whether the phe- 
nomenon followed objectively upon the first * ["or is co-existent with it. Besides 
the mere fact of existence, then, there must be something by means of which A 
determines the position of B in time, and conversely, B the position of A." 
§1819]. Through * reciprocity, therefore, alone can the objective contempo- 
raneousness of objects be distinguished from the subjective succession of the 
same in the mind. The apprehension of the diverse of representations occurs 
at all times successively, first comes A, then B, then C, etc., and then it must be 
determined whether this is merely a contingent succession in me. * This occurs 
only through the understanding-conception [§1816] apriori of concurrence, 
which makes it general and necessary, that it is indifferent whether the series 
is A, B, C, D, or D, C, B, A, since * B not only follows upon A, and* C upon B, 
but equally the same occurs if the series be reversed. ["Now that alone deter- 
mines the position of another thing in time, which is the cause of it or of its 
determinations. Consequently every substance (inasmuch as it can have suc- 
cession predicated of it only in respect of its determinations) must contain the 
causality of certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time 
the effects of the causality of the other in itself." § 1820.] This necessity in the 



The Clavis io an Index. 671 

§ 1754. — Analogy of experience is therefore a rule according 
to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in re- 
spect to objects (phenomena) not as a constitutive hut merely as a 
regulative principle, (page 135, line 21.) [But see § 2102.] As to 
perception, cf. §§ 1749, 1729, and 2949. 

§ 1755. — Analogies possess significance and validity, not as prin- 
ciples of the transcendental, but only as principles of the empiri- 
cal use of the understanding, and their truth can therefore be 
proved only as such; and consequently the phenomena must not 
be subjoined directly under the categories, but only under their 
schemata, (page 136, line 3.) Cf. §§ 1858, 1870, 2914, 1687. 

§ 1756. — Authorize us to connect phenomena according to an 
analogy, with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, (page 
136, line 19.) Restricting conditions, under the title of formulae of the 
categories: cf. §1687. 

A. — First Analogy. — Principle of the permanence of substance. 
(§§ 1757-1770 inclusive.) 

§ 1757. — Substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in 
nature is neither increased nor diminished, (page 136, line 33.) 

Proof— (§§ 1758-1760 inclusive.) 

§ 1758. — -Time, in which all changes of phenomena must be 
cogitated, remains and changes not. (page 136, line 37.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

succession when I reverse the series, causes that I must think the things as side 
by side and contemporaneous, because it does not depend upon my will to let 
them follow upon one another according to an order necessarily, but I am tied 
and bound to this necessity in the order when I reverse the series, and I cog- 
nize only through the relationship of my successive representations to an object, 
in which this double succession "of representations is cognized as necessary. 
Hence it will be seen that the co-existence of substances in space is the applica- 
tion of the category of community or concurrence or reciprocity* to empirical 
intuition. In looking at certain objects one apprehension follows after another 
empirically ; and I am conscious of the same successively, but still no succes- 
sion is attributed to the objects because the apprehensions are reciprocally 
related to one another. The light which plays between our eyes and the heav- 
enly bodies, for instance, produces a mediate community between us and them, 
and thereby manifests contemporaneousness [or co-existence]; but if the objects 
were separated by void space, so that one object could not act upon the other, 
it would then be impossible to say that the objects coexist; [the illustration (see 
2 1822) is perhaps somewhat defective, in so far as it disregards the time occu- 
pied by the light in transmission ; but the defect may be remedied by abstrac- 
tion]. The apprehending intellect is the connecting link by which we remark 
that objects coexist, and whereby the arbitrary order of apprehensions is repre- 
sented as objectively and universally valid. 

In reflecting upon the three analogies just considered, or those into which 



672 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1759. — Must be found a substratum which represents time m 
general, (page 137, line 4.) 

§ 1760. — Permanent, in relation to wbicb alone can all relations 
of time in phenomena be determined, is substance in the world of" 
phenomena, (page 137, line 9.) 

§ 1761. — Permanent is the substratum of our empirical repre- 
sentation of time itself, in which alone all determination of time 
is possible, (page 137, line 19.) 

§ 1762. — Permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the sub- 
stratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the 
condition of the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions, 
i. e. of experience, (page 137, line 30.) 

§1763. — All that changes "or can change belongs only to the 
mode of the existence of this substance or substances, consequently 
to its determinations, (page 138, line 12.) 

§ 1764. — -Valid only in relation to possible experience, and 
therefore can not be proved except by means of a deduction of the 
possibility of experience, (page 138, line 17.) [Dogmatical: see 
also § 2478.] See especially Fischer, pages 108-110. 

§ 1765. — Dependence (even in respect of its substance also) of 
the world upon a Supreme Cause, (page 139, line 3.) This per- 
manence: see § 1687. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

the third [principle ($ 1744) or rule for the objective employment (§ 1713) of the 
categories]* of Kelation is subdivided, we see that they are nothing else than 
the principles of the determination of existence of phenomena in time, accord- 
ing to all three modes of the same, namely, the relationship to time itself as a 
Quantity (or duration), the relationship in time as of a Series (in succession), 
and the relationship in time as a Complex of all existences (contemporaneously) 
[# 1825]. In this way we come to the consideration of nature generally; these 
analogies, in fact, being its laws [§ 1826]. The question of how is nature possi- 
ble |j$ 2747-2749, 2702] arises naturally from these considerations; and we- 
arrive at the conclusion by an easy process, that it is the understanding which 
does not derive its laws, apriori, from nature, but presents the same to it [£§ 1643— 
1648]. 

Under the term Nature is meant, in the empirical sense, the coherence of 
phenomena in respect of their existence according to necessary rules or laws ; 
and, consequently, there must be, in this view of the matter, certain laws apriori 
which make nature possible [g 1826]. Only by experience and by reason of" 
those original laws, by virtue of which experience itself is possible, can empirical 
laws be discovered [$ 1648]; and the three analogies which are three dynamic 
relationships of Inherence, Consequence, and Composition [§1825], represent 
the unity of nature in the connexion of all phenomena under certain exponents,. 
which express nothing else but the relationship of time — so far as this compre- 
hends all unity [all existence \ 1826] in itself- to the unity of the apperception,. 



The Clavis to an Index. 673 

§ 1766. — Accident is the mode in which the existence of a sub- 
stance is positively determined, (page 139, line 39.) 

§ 1767. — Category of substance stands under the title of rela- 
tion, rather because it is the condition thereof, than because it 
contains in itself any relation, (page 140, line 10.) 

§ 1768. — Change is but a mode of existence which follows on 
another mode of existence of the same object; hence, all that 
changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes, 
(page 140, line 18.) 

§ 1769. — Origin or extinction in an absolute sense (that does not 
concern merely a determination of the permanent) can not be a 
possible perception, (page 140, line 30.) 

§ 1770. — Permanence is a necessary condition under which alone 
phenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible 
experience, (page 141, line 8.) 

B. — Second Analogy —Principle of the succession of time accord- 
ing to the law of causality. (§§ 1771-1812 inclusive.) 

§ 1771. — All changes take place according to the law of the con- 
nection of cause and effect, (page 141, line 26.) 

Proof. — (§§ 1773-1775 inclusive.) § 1772 is premonitory. 

§ 1772. — All alteration (succession) of phenomena is merely 
change, (page 141, line 29.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
which can only take place in synthesis according to rules. Unity of apper- 
ception [g$ 1601, 1605] is that which unites all the given diversity in an intui- 
tion, into one conception of object, and consequently is the objective. This ob- 
ject must be determined in respect of time, and this time comprehends all exist- 
ence in itself. This [determination] happens only through conjunction or syn- 
thesis according to the three analogies, or laws of the understanding just now 
under consideration, whereby the object is determined as necessarily changing- 
(accident), or as the necessary consequence of another (effect), or as necessarily 
contemporaneous with another object (reciprocity) ; so that these three analo- 
gies of Change, Succession and Contemporaneousness are the three possible rela- 
tionships of time to the unity of apperception. 

The fourth leading division of the categories has been already stated to be^ 
that of " Modality " [§ 1570]; and under this are to be found the " Postulates of 
empirical thinking in general" [§ 1713], and these are subdivided into three 
principles, and are thus stated [$ 1830] : 

Firstly, that which accords with the formal condition of experience (accord- 
ing to intuitions and conceptions') is possible. 

Secondly, that which coheres with the material conditions of experience- 
sensation) is real. 

Thirdly, that whose coherence with the real is determined according to the- 
general [i. e., universal] conditions of experience, is, or exists, necessarily. 

These three postulates develop the meaning of the three divisions [or con- 



674 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1773. — Objective relation of the successive phenomena remains 
quite undetermined by means of mere perception, (p. 142, 1. 5.) 

§ 1774. — Conception which carries with it a necessity of syn- 
thetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the 
understanding, which does not lie in mere perception, (p. 142, 1. 20.) 

§ 1775. — Only because we subject the sequence of phenomena, 
and consequently all change, to the law of causality, that ex- 
perience itself (that is, empirical cognition of phenomena) becomes 
possible, (page 142, line 32.) 

§ 1776 — Manifold of phenomena is always produced successively 
in the mind, (page 142, line 38.) As to apprehension, see § 1729. 

§1777. — Utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition. (How 
things may be in themselves.) (page 143, line 11.) 

§ 1778. — Phenomenon, in opposition to the representations of 
apprehension, can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of 
them, if it is subject to a rule, which distinguishes it from every 
other apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of con- 
nection of the manifold. That in the phenomenon which contains 
the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension, is the object, 
(page 143, line 17.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

ceptions] of possibility, reality, and necessity, which were before stated to be 
those of * modality [see pages 637 and 653 above], and they are so named pos- 
tulates, in imitation of geometry. * [" This expression," says Kant (in \ 1857), 
" I do not here use in the sense which some more recent philosophers (contrary 
to its meaning with mathematicians, to whom the word properly belongs) attach 
to it — that of a proposition, namely, immediately certain, requiring neither de- 
duction nor proof." " Now a postulate in mathematics is a practical pro- 
position which contains nothing but the synthesis by which we present an ob- 
ject to ourselves, and produce the conception of it, for example, — ' With a given 
line, to describe a circle upon a plane, from a given point ; ' and such a proposi- 
tion does not admit of proof, because the procedure, which it requires, is exactly 
that by which alone it is possible to generate the conception of such a figure. 
With the same right, accordingly, can we postulate the principles of modality, 
because they do not augment the conception of a thing, but merely indicate the 
manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition."]* Modality, 
itself, has its seat necessarily in the understanding, and thereby an empirical 
object is so conjoined with the faculty of cognition, that not only is it thought 
with reference to the same, but also as a product of it, and the conception of 
modality is the conception of the way in which the representation of the object 
inheres in the subject of it, as thought, sensation, or [effect (§ 1852) in con- 
formity with] law. By the term * [possible], we require not that a thing 
should be only logically possible, for every thing that does not imply con- 
tradiction is logically possible, but it also requires that the object should [be 
such as can] be given in an intuition [§ 1834].* The principle of possibility 
precedes our having the idea [conception] of what is, or what is not possible ; 



The Clavis to an Index. 675 

§ 1779. — Every apprehension of an event is a perception which, 
follows upon another perception, (page 144, line 8.) 

§ 1780. — Kule is always to be met with in the perception of that 
which happens, and it makes the order of the successive percep- 
tions in the apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary, (page 
144, line 16.) 

§ 1781.- — Deduce the subjective sequence of apprehension from 
the objective sequence of phenomena, (page 145, line 1.) 

§ 1782. — Because there certainly is something that follows, 
(page 145, line 16.) 

§ 1783. — Suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which 
this event must follow iu conformity with a rule. (p. 145, 1. 31.) 

§ 1784. — Only therefore, in reference to a rule, according to 
which phenomena are determined in their sequence (that is, as 
they happen) by the preceding state, can I make my subjective 
synthesis (of apprehension) objective; and it is only under this 
presupposition that even the experience of an event is possible, 
(page 146, line 9.) [It must be remembered, that the conception 
of causality has been already deduced from the unity of apper- 
ception, and its objective validity established. In this place, Kant 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

and we examine whether this * [conception of a possible object] maybe con- 
formable to the conditions of experience [$ 1832]. Now the difference between 
the principle of Possibility and Keality, which is the second postulate, is that 
the former only requires the formal conditions of experience [g 1837], whilst the 
latter requires conditions which are material; as for instance, the simple idea 
[mere conception (g 1840)] of an object can not cause us to know the objective 
existence, or the reality of the object; for in order to do this sensation is 
required [g 1839], and real existence is only possible to us by means of such proof. 

In the third principle, or the postulate of Necessity, we declare that what- 
soever has a connexion with reality, according to the laws of experience, exists 
necessarily. This postulate does not imply necessity in thought merely, but 
also in existence [§ 1851]. Yet effects are the only thing whose existence can 
positively be known [to be necessary (§ 1852)]. One existence is known to be 
necessary, as far as it refers to others, but still not of itself alone, and in this 
way there is no individual substance whose existence is absolutely, or rather, 
.abstractedly necessary. It is only in relation to the effects it produces as con- 
nected with causes that this necessity can be attributed. This necessity, there- 
fore, only regards accidents, and not substances. It is not the existence of 
things (substances), but of their state whereof the necessity is cognizable by us, 
and this only from other states given in the perception, according to the em- 
pirical laws of causality ; and thus it follows, that the criterion of necessity 
alone lies in the law of possible experience. 

The question of Idealism naturally arises out of this discussion, because, as 
the second postulate is a description of Reality, the antagonist principle of 
Idealism has necessarily to be refuted [§ f 842]. Now this, as it is known, may 



676 Kant's Ethics. 

designs merely to show that except by means of the conception 
objectively applied, we can not find in phenomena any synthesis 
of existence in its relations. (See § 1747.)] 

§ 1785. — Ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded 
it apriori. (page 146, line 21.) 

§ 1786. — First renders possible the representation of a succession 
in the object, (page 147, line 7.) 

§ 1787. — Objective significancy can not consist in a relation to 
another representation, (page 147, line 16.) 

§ 1788. — Relation to an object has no other effect than that of' 
rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a 
certain manner, and of subjecting them to a rule. (p. 147, 1. 30.) 

§ 1789. — Must assign a certain determinate position in time, 
which can not be altered, (page 147, line 39.) 

§ 1790. — Something antecedes, because it is only in relation to 
this that the phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time, 
(page 148, line 8.) 

§ 1791. — "Whereby the present gives a sure indication of some 
previously existing state, as a correlate, (page 148, line 17.) 

§ 1792. — Indispensable law of empirical representation of the 
series of time, (page 148, line 29.) 

§ 1793. — First step which understanding takes in the sphere of 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

be considered under two points of view [g 1843] ; one of which was adduced by 
Des Cartes, and the other by Berkeley. The first system may be designated 
problematical Idealism, the other dogmatical. The French philosopher de- 
clared only one empirical assertion to be undoubted, namely, the l, I am" — the 
English philosopher, on the other hand, has declared that space, with all the 
things to which it adheres as inseparable condition, is impossible in itself; 
and consequently, also, that the things in space are mere imaginations. The 
latter view is inevitable, if we regard space as a property which is to belong to 
things in themselves, for then, together with all to which it serves as a condi- 
tion, it is a non-entity [§ 1844]. But the foundation of this idealism is destroyed 
if the views adopted ir/the transcendental ^Esthetic are admitted ; and the prob- 
lematical idealism of Des Cartes only remains to be answered. This seems 
easily effected by proving that it is not imagination of external things which 
we only possess, but that we attain to this knowledge by experience ; and. the 
point, therefore, is to show that even our internal, and what was to Des Cartes,, 
indubitable experience, is only possible by means of the external [§• 1845]. 

The lemma here [§1846] laid, down is, that ''the simple but empirically 
determined consciousness of my own existence, proves the existence of the ob- 
jects out of me;" and the proof is thus adduced: Man is conscious of his ex- 
istence as determined in time. Every determination of time presupposes some- 
thing permanent in the perception. But this permanent can not be an intui- 
tion in me, for all the grounds of determination of my existence that can be 



The Clavis to an Index. 677 

experience, is, not to render the representation of objects clear, 
but to render the representation of an object in general possible, 
(page 148, line 41.) 

§ 1794. — Phenomena must reciprocally determine the places in 
time of one another, and render these necessary in the order of 
time, (page 149, line 9.) Cf. § 1784. 

§ 1795. — Principle of cause and effect is the principle of possible 
experience, that is, of objective cognition of phenomena, in regard 
to their relations in the succession of time, (page 149, line 22.) 

§ 1796. — Perception, if it is to contain the cognition of an event, 
must be an empirical judgment, wherein we think that the succes- 
sion is determined, (page 149, line 34.) Cf. §§ 1729, 1963, 1754. 

§ 1797. — Condition of the objective validity of our empirical 
judgments in regard to the sequence of perceptions, consequently 
of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience, (p. 150, 1. 13.) 

§ 1798. — Cause and effect may be simultaneous. (We must con- 
sider the order of time; and not the lapse thereof.) (page 150, line 
28.) [Both fire and heat are continuous quantities. But if I rep- 
resent to myself the smallest possible quantity of each, I am com- 
pelled to represent the fire as antecedent to the heat. Neither do 
I find any simultaneity as to cause and effect when I represent 
simultaneous quantities. I necessarily regard each moment of 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

met with in me are representations, and require as such, themselves, a perma- 
nent which is different from them, and whereupon can be determined in rela- 
tion the change thereof, — consequently my existence in the time in which they 
•change. [The following is Meiklejohn's version (though I do not prefer it be- 
fore Haywood's), page xl, preface : " For all the determining grounds of my 
existence which can be found in me, are representations, and, as such, do them- 
selves require a permanent, distinct from them, which may determine my ex- 
istence in relation to their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they 
change."] Against this observation an objection may possibly be taken, that I 
.am not conscious of external things as things in themselves, but as representa- 
tions to which things in themselves may [or may not] lie at the foundation, 
which they represent. The rejoinder to this, then, is, I am conscious of my 
internal state in a determinate time, and this through internal experience. 
This has reference not merely to the representations which I have, but [proves] 
that I may have them, and, consequently, how in a certain determinate time, I 
am existing. This [determination of my internal state] would not be possible 
without something out of me, — consequently the external is not imagination ; 
it is experience of an external, and I come to the consciousness of the same 
through the being-affected of my senses, and not through fancy of my imagi- 
nation-faculty, by which [i. e., by experience] the external is inseparably con- 
nected with my internal sense. Provided through the mere idea [representa- 
.tion], 'I am' (wherein intellectual consciousness manifests itself), I could alone 



678 Kanfs Ethics. 

heat as the effect of a preceding moment of fire. For I repre- 
sent cause and effect as two states, of which the one must cease to 
he before the other can entirely he.] 

§ 1799. — Law of succsssion of time is in all instances the only 
empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the an- 
tecedent cause, (page 151, line 20.) See § 1795. 

§ 1800. — Remarks on the empirical criterion of a substance, 
(page 151, line 29.) 

§ 1801. — Action alone, as an empirical criterion, is a sufficient 
proof of the presence of substantiality, (page 152, line 3.) Cf. 
Fischer, page 121, where Mahaffy refers to §2049 to show that 
Kant does not mean that we go back to substance in a regressive 
series, and to §§ 1849, 2337, and 1895, as to what effects suggest 
action. 

§ 1802. — Conception of a substance as phenomenon. (Creation 
can not be admitted as an event among phenomena.) (page 152, 
line 30.) See §§ 1763, 1768, 1769. \A very different meaning in the 
words : For example, it would require us to regard phenomenal 
substance no longer as substance, but only as a mode of substance.], 

§ 1803. — How a thing can be changed — of this we have not the 
smallest conception apriori. (page 153, line 15.) 

§ 1804. — When a substance passes from one state (a) into another 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
be conscious of [or determine] my state (through intellectual intuition), it would 
[in that case] not require for internal experience necessarily the consciousness 
of a relationship to something out of me for in the external sense). But as I 
am become conscious of my state, only through the being-affected of my inter- 
nal sense, and this must be * in time, whilst to this something permanent must 
necessarily belong — which is not to be found in the internal sense, and conse- 
quently must be found in the external — I am equally as conscious that there are 
things out of me, or which refer to my external sense, as I am conscious that I 
myself exist in time, with certain determinations.* In this proof it will be 
seen that the game idealism plays of referring every thing to internal sense, is 
played upon it back again [§1847] by attributing all to the external one ; as 
only by means of it is the consciousness of [the determination of] our own 
existence possible, as determined in time, — which is, in fact, that very deter- 
mined experience, or consciousness of existence, whereupon Des Cartes would 
make all to depend, instead of itself being dependent upon that which is ex- 
ternal. 

The categories being so far examined in detail, it becomes now. advisable to 
make some general observations upon the system of principles as laid down, 
and to draw attention still more strongly to the fact, that the possibility of a 
thing is not to be perceived by the mere category, but that an intuition is always 
necessary to show the objective reality of the pure conception of the under- 
standing [§ 1858]. In the categories of relation, for instance, it would be im- 



The Clavis to an Index. 679 

state (b), tbe point of time in whicb the latter exists is different 
from and subsequent to that in which the former existed, (page 
153, line 29.) 

§ 1805. — Every transition from one state into another is always 
effected in a time, (page 154, line 1.) 

§ 1806. — Cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at 
once, or in one moment, but in a time, (page 154, line 13.) 

§ 1807. — All change is therefore possible only through a con- 
tinuous action of the causality, which, insofar as it is uniform, we 
call a momentum, (page 154, line 20.) See § 1733. 

§ 1808. — No smallest degree of reality in a phenomenon, just as 
there is no smallest degree in the quantity of time. (p. 154, 1. 25.) 
(Law of the continuity of all change.) 

§ 1809. — Appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of nature, 
(page 154, line 36.) 

§ 1810. — Nothing more than an extension of the determination 
of the internal sense, (page 155, line 7.) 

§ 1811. — Merely anticipate our own apprehension, the formal 
condition of which, inasmuch as it is itself to be found in the 
mind antecedently to all given phenomena, must certainly be ca- 
pable of being cognized apriori. (page 155, line 22.) 

§ 1812. — Understanding, by virtue of the unity of apperception, 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

possible to see * from mere conceptions * how something can exist,- 5 only as 
subject, and not as mere determination of other things; that is, can be sub- 
stance — or how because something is, something else must be, — and conse- 
quently how something* can be cause — or how, if several things exist, because 
one of these exists, something follows in the others and reciprocally ; and in 
such manner a community of substances takes place. These, however, are all 
pure conceptions of the understanding, and if we proceed to the other cate- 
gories, we shall find they are equally* without application so long as intuition 
is wanting to manifest their * [objective reality]. "Without intuition it is quite 
impossible to know whether we think an object by means of the categories, or 
whether, in fact, any object can belong to them ; and it is then[ce] shown that 
they are no cognitions, but merely forms of thought whereby cognitions arise, 
called into action by intuition. No synthetical proposition can be made from 
the mere categories, as for example, that in every existence there is " substance," 
that is, that something [which] can exist as subject only, and not as mere pre- 
dicate, or that everything is a quantum, for in these cases there is nothing . 
[without intuition] to aid us to go out beyond a given conception and to con- 
nect another with it ; and in this way it will [furthermore] be obvious that 
from mere pure conceptions of the understanding, no synthetical proposition 
can be proved [§ 1859]. Besides this — and which is still more remarkable — it. 
must not be overlooked, that in order to understand the possibility of things, 
and therefore to represent the objective reality of the same [categories], not. 



680 Kant's Ethics. 

contains the condition apriori of the possibility of a continuous 
determination of the position in time of all phenomena, (page 
155, line 29.) Of. § 1723. 

C. — Third Analogy. — Principle of co-existence, according to the law 
of reciprocity or community. (§§ 1813-1824 inclusive.) 

§ 1813. — All substances, insofar as the}' can be perceived in 
space at the same time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of 
action, (page 156, line 5.) 

Proof.— ■(§§ 1814-1821 inclusive.) 

§ 1814. — Things are co-existent, when in empirical intuition the 
perception of the one can follow upon the perception of the other, 
and vice versa, (page 156, line 8.) 

§ 1815. — Can not conclude from the fact that things are placed 
in the same time, the other fact, that the perceptions of these 
things can follow each other reciprocally, (page 156, line 16.) 

§ 1816. — Requisite to justify us in saying that the reciprocal 
succession of the perceptions has its foundation in the object. 
(A conception of the understanding.) (page 156, line 27.) 

§ 1817. — Co-existence of substances in space can not be cognized 
in experience, otherwise than under the precondition of their re- 
ciprocal action, (page 156, line 33.) [The pure conceptions of the 
understanding having been previously deduced from the unity of 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

only intuitions are required, but intuitions that are external [§1861]. For 
instance, if we take the pure conceptions of relation, we first find that in order 
to give, corresponding to the conception of substance, something permanent in 
the intuition (thereby to prove the objective * [reality] of this conception), an 
intuition in space (of matter) is required, since space alone determines perma- 
nently — whilst time, consequently all that is in the internal sense, flows con- 
stantly. Secondly, that in order to represent change as the corresponding 
intuition to the conception of causality, we must, for example, take motion as 
change in space, and that in fact, thereby alone can we render perceptible to 
ourselves changes, the possibility of which no pure understanding can compre- 
hend. Change is the conjunction of contradictory opposing determinations 
[contradictorily opposed] one to the other, in the existence of one and the 
same thing. Now, how it is possible that from a given state an opposite one to 
it should follow of [in] the same thing, pure reason can not, not only [can not 
only not] without an example, render conceivable, but without an intuition, 
not even intelligible ; and this intuition is that of the motion of a point in 
space, the existence of which point in different places (as a consequence of op- 
posite determinations) first alone makes change capable of intuition, or visible 
to us; for in order afterward to render imaginable even internal changes, we 
[first] make time comprehensible to ourselves, figuratively, by means of a line, 
as the form of the internal sense, and the internal change by means of the 
drawing of this line (motion) — consequently [we make comprehensible to our- 



The Clavis to an Index. 681 

apperception, and their objective validity established, Kant intends 
here merely to show that we have no other basis for the cognition 
•of co-existence than the conception of community. See §§1784, 
1747. Cf. §1689.] [The relation of influence : See Mahaffy (Fischer, 
page 123) on Fischer and Schopenhauer, and cf § 1575.] 

§ 1818. — Observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehen- 
sion of the manifold is arbitrary, (page 157, line 4.) 

§ 1819. — Besides the mere fact of existence, there must be some- 
thing by means of which A determines the position of B in time, 
and conversely, B the position of A. (page 157, line 15.) 

§ 1820. — Substances must stand (mediately or immediately) in 
dynamical community with each other, if co-existence is to be 
cognized in any possible experience, (page 157, line 31.) 

§ 1821. — Absolutely necessary = without which the experience 
of these objects would itself be impossible, (page 157, line 40.) 

§ 1822. — Community contains the two notions conveyed in the 
Latin communio and commercium. (Kant employs it here in the lat- 
ter sense, that of a dynamical community.) (page 158, line 6.) 

§ 1823. — Community of phenomena in apperception (communio). 
(page 158, line 35.) See § 1601. Cf. § 1729. 

§ 1824. — Community of substances in perception (commercium). 
(page 159, line 1.) See §§ 1715. 1729. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

selves] the successive existence of ourselves in different states, by means of ex- 
ternal intuition ; the particular ground of which is this, that all change [al- 
though, I suppose, only in order itself to be perceived as change] necessarily 
presupposes something permanent in the intuition, in order itself only to be 
perceived as change, though in the internal sense no permanent intuition at all 
is to be met with. [Meiklejohn translates : " The proper ground of this fact is, 
that all change to be perceived as change presupposes something perma- 
nent in intuition, while in the internal sense no permanent intuition is to be 
found."] Lastly, the category of community is, in respect of its possibility, not 
possible to be comprehended by means of mere reason ; and therefore the ob- 
jective reality of this conception without intuition, and this again external in 
space, is not possible to be seen. For how can we conceive the possibility that 
if several substances exist, something as effect can follow, from the existence of 
the one to the existence of the other, reciprocally, and therefore, because there 
was something in the former, something must also be in the latter, which from 
the existence of that latter alone can not be understood. For this is required 
:for community, but is not at all comprehensible amongst those things where 
each thing is entirely isolated by means of its subsistence. Hence the final con- 
sequence is, that all principles of the pure understanding are nothing more 
than principles apriori of the possibility of experience, and all synthetical prin- 
ciples apriori relate to this last alone, nay, their possibility itself rests entirely 
upon such relationship [§ 1862]. 

44 



682 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1825. — Unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly 
dynamical. (The rule of the understanding, through which alone 
the existence of phenomena can receive synthetical unity as re- 
gards relations of time, determines for every phenomenon its pos- 
ition in time, and consequently apriori, and with validity for all 
and every time.) (page 159, line 15.) 

§ 1826. — Purpose of the analogies is therefore to represent the 
unity of nature in the connection of all phenomena, (page 159, 
line 37.) Cf. §§1644, 2055, 2056. 

§ 1827. — All phenomena exist in one nature, and must so exist, 
inasmuch as without this apriori unity, no unity of experience, 
and consequently no determination of ohjects in experience, is 
possible, (page 160, line 9.) 

§ 1828. — Mode of proof employed in treating of these transcen- 
dental laws of nature. (To demonstrate the possibility of experi- 
ence as a cognition in which at last all objects must be capable of 
being presented to us, if the representation of them is to possess 
any objective reality.) (page 160, line 14.) Cf. §§ 1764, 1744, 2732. 

§ 1829. — Always been silently employed by the mind, (page 
161, line 1.) [The other two analogies: causality and community. 
Cf. §§ 1764, 1765.] 

Article IV. — The postulates of empirical thought. (§§ 1830-1857.) 

§ 1830. — Principles of modality. — Postulates (1) of possibility, 
(2) of reality, (3) of necessity, (page 161, line 14.) Cf. § 1706. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
In the observations which have hitherto been made, the difference between 
things in themselves, or Noumena [but see § 2920], and things as they appear, 
or Phenomena, has been especially alluded to [pages 653, 628, 621, above], and 
it is the great object of the present investigation to distinguish continually 
these particular and opposite views. In the pure understanding, the divisions 
or categories have been distinctly marked out and their connexion with human 
intuitions exemplified, and in some degree explained. But if the inquiry were 
to rest here, it would appear incomplete. It seems necessary to show how from 
the very nature of man those errors have arisen which have thus far injured 
the advance of truth, and converted the science of mind into a play of logical 
and metaphysical subtlety and error. Now in the present instance, in his jour- 
ney through the country of the pure understanding, Kant says, he has endeav- 
ored to take into his view each portion of the land, carefully, measuring it out, 
and determining therein to each thing its place specifically [§ 1863]. But then 
this region, to continue the metaphor, is said to be an island surrounded by a 
wide and stormy ocean, and the very especial seat of false or deceptive appear- 
ance, where clouds which assume the form of banks, and masses of ice which 
speedily melt away, constantly delude and deceive the philosophic sailor seek- 
ing to discover new lands, and whereby he is continually led on to entertain 
hopes never to be realized, — hopes no sooner generated than proved to be fal- 



The Clavis to an Index. 688 

§ 1831. — Categories of modality do not in the least determine 
the object, or enlarge the conception to which they are annexed 
as predicates, but only express its relation to the faculty of cogni- 
tion, (page 161, line 22.) Of. § 2728. 

§ 1832. — Restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone, 
(page 162, line 6.) Cf. §§1622, 1670, 1751, 1755, 1872. 

Postulate I. — Of the possibility of things. (§§ 1833-1838 inclusive.) 

§ 1833. — Conception which contains a synthesis must be re- 
garded as empty and without reference to an object, if its synthe- 
sis does not belong to experience, (page 162, line 17.) 

§ 1834. — Apply to possible things, because they contain apriori 
the form of experience in general, (p. 162, 1. 29.) Meality : validity. 

§ 1835. — Express apriori the relations of perceptions in every 
experience, and consequently possess objective reality, that is, tran- 
scendental truth ; and that independent of experience, though not 
independent of all relation to the form of an experience in general 
and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects can be empirically 
cognized, (page 163, line 5.) 

§ 1836. — Conceptions the possibility of which has no ground to 
rest upon. For they are not based upon experience and its known 
laws, (page 163, line 27.) 

§ 1837. — Possibility of things is not derived from apriori con- 
ceptions per se, but only when considered as formal and objective 
conditions of an experience in general, (page 164, line 18.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

lacious. But if we take warning by the errors of those who have preceded us,. 
after well examining the chart of the country clearly held in our possession, we- 
shall find we do well to be satisfied with what we have already acquired, with- 
out grasping at more ; and we shall rather endeavor to understand and explain 
the principles we feel to be true, than to seek after others which surpass the' 
bounds of human cognition. 

We have seen that everything which the understanding derives from itself, 
without borrowing it from experience, it still only possesses for the use of expe- 
rience alone [§ 1864]. The principles of the pure understanding, whether 
apriori constitutive, as the mathematical, or merely regulative, as the dynami- 
cal, contain nothing, as it were, but the pure schema only for possible experi- 
ence; for such experience has its unity simply from the synthetical unity 
which the understanding imparts of itself and originally, to the synthesis of 
the imagination, in reference to the apperception, and to which the phenomena, 
as data of a possible cognition, must already stand in relation and accordance 
[{$ 1640, 1626]. But the understanding, it must never be forgotten, can not 
make of all its principles apriori, or of its conceptions, any other than an em- 
pirical, but never a transcendental use [§§ 1866, 1649, 1702, 1862]. The tran- 
scendental use of a conception in any principle is this, that it is referred to 
things as things in general, and *[as things in themselves]; but the empirical 



684 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1838. — Possible only in relation to experience and within its 
limits, (page 165, line 4.) 

Postulate II. — Concerning the cognition of the reality of things. 
(§§ 1839-1850 inclusive.) 

§ 1839. — Eequires that the object have some connection with a 
real perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience 
(§ 1744) which exhibit all kinds of real connection in experience, 
(page 165, line 13.) Of. § 1729. 

§ 1840. — Perception, which presents matter to the conception — 
that is the sole criterion of reality, (page 165, line 20.) 

§ 1841. — Eeason in the series of possible perceptions from a 
thing which we do really perceive to the thing we do not perceive, 
(page 165, line 29.) 

§ 1842. — Knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as 
our perceptions, and what may be inferred from them according 
to empirical laws, extend, (page 166, line 7.) 

Appendix to Postulate II. — Refutation of Idealism. (§§ 1843-1849.) 

§ 1843. — Idealism declares the existence of objects in space 
without us to be either (1) doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) 
false and impossible, (page 166, line 18.) 

§ 1844. — Idealism of Berkeley. (The foundation for this kind 
of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental 
aesthetic.) (page 166, line 23.) See § 1510, and § 2700. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

use is when it is merely referred to phenomena, that is to objects of a possible 
experience. And that * only [the empirical vise can be permitted] * is seen from 
this. To each conception is required, first, the logical form of a conception (of 
thinking) in general, and then, secondly, also the possibility of offering an ob- 
ject to the conception, to which [object]it refers. "Without the object, the con- 
ception has no sense, and is quite void of content, although it may still always 
contain the logical function for forming a conception from certain data. Now 
the object can not be given to a conception otherwise than in the intuition, and 
if a pure intuition is even possible apriori before the object, such intuition still 
can receive its object, consequently objective validity, only by means of the em- 
pirical intuition, of which it is the mere- form [§ 1866]. Therefore all concep- 
tions and with them all principles, however much they may be possible apriori, 
still refer to empirical intuitions, that is, to data of possible experience [§ 1867]. 
Without this, they have no objective validity at all, but are a mere play either 
of the imagination or the understanding respectively, with their representations. 
Let us take, for example, only the conceptions of mathematics, and first of all 
in their [its] pure intuitions, " Space has three dimensions." " Between two 
points there can be only a [one] straight line," etc. Although all these princi- 
ples, and the representation of the object with which this Mathematic occupies 
itself, are entirely generated in the mind apriori, yet they would mean nothing 
at all, could we not always expose their meaning in phenomena (empirical ob- 



The Clavis to an Index. 685 

§ 1845. — Idealism of DesCartes alleges our incapacity to prove 
the existence of any thing besides ourselves by means of immediate 
experience, (page 166, line 32.) Cf. § 2699. 

§ 1846. — Proves the existence of external objects in space, 
(page 167, line 7.) See §§ 1634, 1635. Cf. §§ 1434, 1507, 2156, 2158, 
2953, 2785, 2958. [Mahany refers to §§ 1870, 2956, 2265, to prove 
that Kant uses thing in the sense of object. See Mahany's Intro- 
duction to Fischer, page 1L, and §2956, and cf. §§ 1770, 1837.] Cf. 
also Fischer, page 178. Cf. §2691. 

§ 1847. — External experience is properly immediate. Internal 
experience is itself possible only mediately and through external 
experience, (page 167, line 30.) [Eead the third and fourth sen- 
tences as one — for although it is quite possible that the cause of 
our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it 
falsely to external things, our proof shows, etc.] 

§ 1848. — Idea of permanence is not itself derived from external 
experience, but is an apriori necessary condition of all determina- 
tion of time, consequently also of the internal sense in reference 
to our own existence, and that through the existence of external 
things, (page 168, line 16.) [All that is given by the relation of 
the representation in me to the permanent in me is the fact of 
time. I can. however, no more get cognition out of the fact of the 
existence of the relation of time than out of the fact of the exist- 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

jects). Consequent]}' it is requisite also to make sensible a [any] separate con- 
ception, that is to expose the object corresponding to it in the intuition, since 
without this object, the conception (so to speak) would remain without sense, 
that is, without meaning [g 1868]. Mathematics fulfill this condition by means 
of the construction of figure, which is a phenomenon present to the senses 
(although produced apriori). The conception of quantity seeks even in science 
its support and sense, in number [§ 1675] — and this on the fingers, — or counters 
of a calculating table — or in the lines and points which are exposed to our view. 
The conception always remains generated apriori, together with the synthetical 
principles or formulas from such conceptions ; but the use of these, and refer- 
ence to supposed objects, can, finally, never be sought [found] any where but in 
experience, the possibility of which (according to the form) they contain apriori. 

This is the case with the categories and the principles thence deduced, for 
we can not make the possibility of the object of one of those to be understood, 
without submitting ourselves to the conditions of sensibility immediately, and 
consequently to the form of phenomena, in respect of which as to their sole ob- 
jects, the categories must be limited. If we remove this condition, all meaning 
or reference to the object disappears [g 1869]. 

!N"o one can explain the conception of quantity in general, except in this 
way, that it is the determination of a thing, whereby it can be thought, how 
many times the number One can be placed in it [§ 1870]. But this how many 



636 Kant's Ethics. 

ence of the permanent in me, which is immediately given in con- 
sciousness. (See § 1635.) For the purposes of cognition, I require 
something more, namely, a definite determination of that relation. 
This is given only by reference to the permanent without me. 
Whence I find that by assigning my objective representations to 
the permanent within me as their substance or cause, I uproot my 
whole internal experience, and am lost in maya.~] 

§ 1849. — I has not any predicate of intuition which, in its 
character of permanence, could serve as correlate to the determin- 
ation of time in the internal sense (in the same way as inpenetra- 
bility is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition.) (page 
168, line 29.) 

§ 1850. — Mere products of the imagination, (page 169, line 8.) 
Postulate III. — Of material necessity in existence. (§§ 1851-1855.) 
§ 1851. — Necessity of existence can never be cognized from con- 
ceptions, (page 169, line 23.) 

§ 1852. — Criterion of necessity is to be found only in the law of 
a possible experience, (page 169, line 34.) \_Not the necessity of the 
existence of things (as substances) : which would be merely duplicat- 
ing the conception of substance, a category of relation.] 

§ 1853. — Possesses no application beyond the field of possible 
experience, (page 170, line 6.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

times, is founded upon successive repetition, consequently upon time, and the 
synthesis (of the homogeneous) therein. Reality we can only then explain in 
opposition to negation, provided we think a time (as the complex of all being) 
which either is filled therewith, or is void. If I omit permanence (which is an 
existence in all time), there remains to me of the conception of substance, nothing 
more than the logical representation of the subject, which I believe [Meiklejohn 
translates "endeavor," #1870] to realize from this, that I represent to myself 
something which can take place merely as subject (without being a predicate*). 
But, not only, do I not know any conditions at all under which then this logical 
prerogative is proper to a thing, but there is likewise nothing further thence to 
be made, and not the least consequence to be drawn, inasmuch as thereby no 
object at all of the use of this conception is determined, and consequently w r e do 
not know whether it means any thing at all. With respect to the conception 
of cause (if I omit time, in which something follows upon something else accord- 
ing to a rule), I should find nothing further in the pure category than that 
there is something whence it may be concluded as to the existence of something 
else ; and- thereby cause and effect would not only not at all be able to be sep- 
arated [distinguished] from one another, bat since this capability of conclusion 
still immediately requires conditions of which I know nothing, the conception 
would then have no determination as to the way it agrees with an object The 
pretended principle, "All that is contingent has a cause," presents itself cer- 
tainly with tolerable gravity, as if it had its own value in itself. But if I ask, 



The Clavis to mi Index. 687 

§ 1854. — Subjects the changes which take place in the world to 
a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence, without which nature 
herself could not possible exist, (page 170, line 11.) 

§ 1855. — Admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which 
might cause a break in or be foreign to the understanding and the 
continuous connection of all phenomena. Necessity in nature 
is not blind, (page 170, line 18.) 

§ 1856. — Whether the sphere of possibility is wider than that of 
experience. (Whether some other sphere of matter exists, the 
understanding has no power to decide, its proper occupation being 
with the synthesis of that which is given.) (page 171, line 22.) 
[Whether that may be possible which can not be real, or that real 
which can not be necessary. If I think to myself other forms of 
intuition and understanding, through which other experience be- 
comes possible, I nevertheless, in so thinking, think that other ex- 
perience as subject to law; and whatever that law be, I think it 
includes under it no less reality than possibility, no less necessity 
than reality. (See §§ 2309-2311 .)] 

§ 1857. — Postulate the principles of modality, because they do 
not augment the conception of a thing, but merely indicate the 
manner in which it -is connected with the faculty of cognition, 
(page 173, line 1.) [See page 674 above.] 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

what do you understand by contingent? and you answer, that whose non-being 
is possible, I should like to know by what you would cognize this possibility of 
non-being, if you do not represent to yourself a succession in the series of phe- 
nomena, and in this succession an existence, which follows upon a non-existence 
(or conversely) — consequently a change. For that the non-being of a thing 
does not contradict itself, is a poof appeal to a logical condition, which is cer- 
tainly necessary for the conception, but which is far from being sufficient for 
the real possibility, as I* may annihilate every existing substance in thought 
without contradicting myself, but can not at all thence conclude as to the ob- 
jective contingency of the same in its existence, that is, the possibility of its 
non-being in itself. As to what regards the conception of community, it is 
easy to appreciate that as the pure categories of substance as well as causality 
[abstract from their sensuous schemata] admit of no explanation determining 
the object, reciprocal causality in the relationship of substances to one another 
(commercium) is just as little capable of it. Possibility, Existence, Necessity, 
no one Avould be able to explain otherwise than by a manifest tautology, if we 
would deduce their definition singly from the pure understanding.- For the 
illusion of exchanging the logical possibility of the conception (where it does 
not contradict itself) for the transcendental possibility of things (where an object 
corresponds to the conception) can only deceive and satisfy the inexperienced. 
In a word, all these couceptions are not to be supported by means of any 
thing, and thereby their real possibility demonstrated, if all sensible intuition 



688 Kant 8 Ethics. 

General remark on the system of principles. (§§ 1858-1862.) 

§ 1858. — Can not perceive the possibility of a thing from the 
category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to- 
make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the 
understanding. (Categories are not in themselves cognitions, but 
mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from' 
given intuitions.) (page 174, line 9.) 

§ 1859. — JSTo synthetical proposition can be made from categories 
alone, (page 174, line 30.) [Cf. §§ 1685. 1832.] 

§ 1860. — Contingent existence. — " Every thing that is contingent 
must have a cause," is an analytical proposition, (p. 175, 1. 16.) 

§ 1861. — Objective validity of the categories can be grounded 
only in external intuition. (To understand the possibility of 
things according to the categories, and thus to demonstrate the 
objective reality of the latter, we require not merely intuitions, 
but external intuitions.) (page 176, line 4.) Cf. § 1834. [Cf. §§ 1454, 
1868, referred to by Mahaffy (Fischer, page 15, qv).] 

§ 1862. — All principles of the pure understanding are nothing 

more than apriori principles of the possibility of experience, and 

to experience alone do all apriori synthetical propositions apply 

and relate, (page 177, line 32.) Cf. § 1938. 

Chapter III.— Of the ground of the division of all objects into phenomena and 
noumena. (§§1863-1887 inclusive.) 

§ 1863. — Inclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits, 
(page 178, line 7.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

(the only one which Ave have) is taken away ; and there then only remains be- 
sides, the logical possibility — that is, that the conception (thought) is possible, 
but as to which it is not the question, but [the question is] whether the con- 
ception refers to an object, and therefore signifies something [§ 1871]. 

Now it hence follows incontestably, that the conceptions of the pure under- 
standing can never be of transcendental, but at all times only of empirical use, 
and that the principles of the pure understanding [see § 1872] in relation to the 
general conditions of a possible experience, can be referred only to objects of" 
the senses, but never to things in general (without paying regard to the manner 
in which we may envisage [intuite] them). 

Transcendental Analytic has therefore this important result, that the under- 
standing can never apriori do more than anticipate the form of a possible expe- 
rience in general; and that, as that which is not phenomenon can be no object 
of experience, the understanding can never overstep the limits of sensibility, 
within which alone objects are given to us [§ 1873]. 

The pure categories, without formal conditions of sensibility, have mere' 
transcendental meaning, but are of no transcendental use, since this is impos- 
sible in itself, because all conditions of any use (in judgments) leave them r 
that is, the formal conditions of the subsumption of a supposed object under- 



The Clavis to an Index. 689* 

§ 1864. — Every thing which the understanding draws from 
itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses 
only for the behoof and use of experience, (page 178, line 32.) 
Constitutive: see §§ 1752, 1753. 

§ 1865. — One advantage in such transcendental inquiries, which 
can be made comprehensible to the dullest, (page 179, line 11.) 

§ 1866. — Understanding can not make of its apriori principles, 
or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use. (page 
180, line 1.) Cf. §§ 1832, 1859. 

§ 1867. — All conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles 
however high the degree of their apriori possibility, relate to em- 
pirical intuitions — that is, to data toward a possible experience, 
(page 180, line 20.) 

§ 1868. — Requisite that an abstract conception be made sensuous 
— that is, that an object corresponding to it in intuition be forth- 
coming ; otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without 
sense, that is, without meaning, (page 180, line 25.) [Evident to the 
senses : Mahaffy translates " present to the senses (although pro- 
duced apriori). In the same science the concept of quantity finds 
support and significance in number ; this in turn finds it in the 
fingers, or in counters, or in lines and points placed before our 
eyes." (See Fischer, page 16.)] [The same science : cf. Haywood's 
translation, page 685 above.] 

§ 1869. — Can not render intelligible the possibility of an object 
corresponding to the categories, without having recourse to the 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

these conceptions [leave them, or are wanting]. As, therefore [in the supposed 
case which we are now considering] (as mere pure categories [i. e., without 
formal conditions of sensibility]) they are not to be of empirical use, and [for 
precisely the same reason, it has just been stated in the preceding sentence] can 
not be of transcendental, they are of no use at all, if we separate them from all 
sensibility, that is, they can not be applied to any supposed object. They are 
merely the pure form ot the use of the understanding in respect of objects in 
general and of thinking, without, however, our being able by means of these 
alone to determine or think an object [$ 1875]. 

The question then now arises, since we see that things are divided into nou- 
mena and phenomena, whether, though the pure conceptions of the under- 
standing, or the categories, are of no avail themselves, and signify nothing 
unless they are connected with objects or phenomena, they might not have 
some meaning in reference to noumena, and [whether we do not therefore] pos- 
sess some means of cognizing such [noumena] [§1876]. Yet this is easily 
answered if we pay attention to the distinction of the word noumena, when 
taken in a positive, and when used in a negative sense. If we understand by 
noumenon, a thing so far as it is an object of our sensible intuition [at the same 
time] making abstraction of our mode of intuition of the same, this would be the 



690 Kant's Ethics. 

conditions of sensibility, consequently to the form of phenomena, 
to which, as their only proper objects, their use must be confined, 
inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all significance (that is, 
all relation to an object) disappears, and no example can be found 
to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think 
under such conceptions, (page 181, line 6.) Cf. § 2913 and § 1687. 

§ 1870. — -Categories, without the condition of sensuous intuition, 
have no definite relation to any object, (page 181, line 16.) See §§ 
1869, 1871, 2914. [Cf. § 1595 as to substance and subject. After 
reflection, I have become reconciled to Kant's use of the latter 
term to assist in explaining the former, and am inclined to think 
that I was hasty in assuming that such use of the words might 
lead to confusion. (Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V., page 112, § 40.)] 

§ 1871. — Keal possibility of the categories can not be demon- 
strated, if we take away sensuous intuition, (page 182, note.) 
See § 1870, and cf. § 2914, where Mahaffy translates from the first 
edition. 

§ 1872. — Principles of the pure understanding relate only to the 
general conditions of a possible experience, to objects of the senses, 
and never to things in general, apart from the mode in which we 
intuite them, (page 183, line 1.) Cf. §1832. 

§ 1873. — Understanding is competent to effect nothing apriori, 
except the anticipation of the form of a possible experience in 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
negative sense [§ 1878; cf. 1877, and see immediately \ 2920 below]. But if we 
understand by it an object of nonsensible intuition, we thus assume a particular 
mode of intuition, namely, an intellectual one; and this would be a noumenon 
in a positive sense, although this intellectual mode of intuition is not our mode, 
nor is it one the possibility of which we as at present constituted can under- 
stand. If we apply categories to objects which are not considered as phe- 
nomena, we* must lay at the foundation an intuition, other than a sensible one 
;[§ 1880]. This [supposed object] is, as before stated, noumenon in the positive 
sense; but such an intuition, namely the intellectual one, lying quite out of our 
faculty of cognition, the use of the categories can by no means extend beyond 
the limits of objects of experience ; and [nevertheless] if beings of the under- 
standing correspond to beings of the senses, there may be likewise beings of the 
understanding to which our sensible intuition-faculty has no relation whatever. 
Our understanding-conceptions as mere forms of thought, do not extend in the 
least to these ; and that therefore which is called by us noumenon, must, as 
such, only be understood in the negative meaning. But if we continue the 
investigation a little further, we shall arrive at another point, which is of im- 
portance to our present inquiry; for if I take away all thinking (or what occurs 
through the categories) from an empirical cognition, it is then found that there 
remains no cognition at all of an object, for by means of mere intuition it has 
been before declared and explained that nothing at all is thought [see §§1527, 



The Clavis to an Index. 691 

general. (Ontology must give place to the modest title of analytic 
of the pure understanding.) (page 183, line 7 ) 

§ 1874. — Beyond the sphere of possible experience, no syntheti- 
cal apriori principles are possible, (page 183, line 18.) 

§ 1875. — Categories are of no use at all when separated from 
sensibility. (They are not of transcendental use.) (p 183, 1. 41.) 
[Cf. Haywood's translation, page 689 above.] 

§ 1876. — Lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion. 
(Categories seem to be capable of an application beyond the sphere 
of sensuous objects.) (page 184, line 14.) Cf. §§ 2915-2920, where 
Mahaffy translates from the first edition. [Through them an ob- 
ject: purely formal. But this formal object has no meaning apart 
from its possible matter.] Cf. § 1687. 

§ 1877. — Led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of 
an intelligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our 
sensibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which we 
■can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding, 
(page 184, line 40.) 

§ 1878. — Noumena (1) in the negative sense of the word, and 
(2) in the positive sense, (page 185, line 14.) 

§ 1879. — Doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena 
in the negative sense, (page 185, line 23.) Cf. § 1858. 

§ 1880. — ISToumenon must be understood by us as such in a nega- 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
1528, 1473, and cf. pages 642, 646, 655, 664, 679, above], and because such repre- 
sentation of the sensibility is in me, this does not constitute any relationship of 
such a representation to any object. But if, on the contrary, I take away all 
intuition, the form of thought still remains, that is, the manner of determining 
an object to the diversity of a possible intuition. Hence the categories extend 
themselves in this mode much further than the sensible intuition, that is, they 
think objects in general, but still without looking to the particular mode (the sen- 
sibility) whereby they may be given. Yet they do not in this way determine a 
larger sphere of objects, because we can not admit, that sucb could be given, 
without presupposing as possible a kind of intuition other than a sensible one, 
and yet in respect of which [presupposition] we are not in the least justified 
[§ 1881]. The conception of a Noumenon, however, or the conception of a 
thing, whicb is to be thought, not at all as an object of the senses, but as a thing 
in itself, by means only of a pure understanding, is not in any degree contra- 
dictory, for we can not assert of sensibility that such is the only possible mode 
of intuition [# 1882]. Besides tbis, the conception also is necessary [in order to 
remind us] not to extend sensible intuition up to things in themselves, and 
therefore [the conception serves] to limit the objective validity of sensible [sen- 
suous (see the note to §1885)] cognition [g 1882]. The conception of a noume- 
non is, therefore, strictly a limiting conception, circumscribing the pretensions 
•of sensibility, and it is, consequently, only of negative use, in order thereby to 



692 Kant's Ethics. 

tive sense, (page 185, line 40.) [A noumenon in the positive 
sense I do not think at all as a noumenon, but only as a chimera. 
(See Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V., page 111, §36.) Cf. §§ 1915, 2944.] 

§ 1881. — Think objects in general, without regard to the mode 
(of sensibility) in which these objects are given, (page 186, line 16.) 
[There is no conflict between this section and § 1872. A thing in 
general is perfectly indeterminate, but an object in general con- 
tains the synthetical unity of the understanding.] Cf. § 2920. 

§ 1882. — Conception of a noumenon is merely a limitative con- 
ception, and therefore only of negative use. (page 186, line 33. 
[Connected with the limitation : for we can not conceive a limit and 
wholly exclude the conception of the possibility of something be- 
yond. Not even the conception of a possible intuition : but only the 
conception of the possibility of an intuition, or (more rigidly ex- 
pressed) the knowledge of our complete ignorance of any possible 
intuition by means of which, etc.] 

§ 1883. — Division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and 
of the world into mundus sensibilis and inteUigibilis, is therefore 
quite inadmissible in a positive sense. . (page 187, line 20.) [I can 
not conceive a mundus inteUigibilis (that is, capable of entering as 
content into the pure forms of my intellect) except as a mundus 
sensibilis (that is, capable of sensuous representation provided my 
sensibility were so modified as to receive it). Cf. § 2086.] 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

show that cognition through the senses is not to pretend to he the only possible 
cognition. Still this conception is not arbitrarily imagined, but is connected 
with the limitation of sensibility, yet without being able to place any thing 
positive beyond its sphere. Now, though the division of objects, phenomena 
and noumena, into a sense-world and an understanding-world, can not be 
granted in a positive signification, it is possible to imagine an intellectual and 
sensible division of conceptions. It is obvious, if we abandon the senses, there 
is no mode by which we can cause the categories to signify any thing at all, 
since in order to refer to an object, something beyond the unity of thought 
must be given, that is to say, an intuition, whereupon the unity or category 
could be applied [§ 1883]. Notwithstanding this, the conception of a noumenon,. 
however, still remains as fixing the sensibility Avithin certain limits, though it 
is not an intelligible object to the understanding, and we know nothing of such 
understanding as that to which it could belong, or an understanding of that 
kind which cognizes its objects, not discursively or by means of the application 
of the categories to sensible intuition, but intuitively, in a non-sensible intuition 
— in respect to the possibility of which we have no idea [or conception g 1884]. 
Our understanding receives in this way a negative extension, inasmuch as, 
though limited to a certain degree by the sensibility, it on the other hand also' 
itself limits the same so far as it makes a distinction between noumena and 
phenomena, and terms things in themselves by the former title, as contra-dis- 



The Clavis to an Index. 693 

§ 1884. — Noumenon is not a particular intelligible object for our 
understanding (page 187, line 31) [but merely a hypothetical ob- 
ject for a problematical understanding, of the possibility of which 
understanding we have no conception whatever]. Cf. § 1918. 

§ 1885. — Quite departs from the meaning of the ancients, (page 

188, line 6.) Cf. § 2080. 

§ 1886. — Understanding and sensibility (with us) can determine 
objects only in conjunction, (page 188, line 30.) Cf. § 1528. 

§ 1887. — Abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories, 
completely renouncing pure and nonsensuous judgment, (page 

189, line 8.) 

APPENDIX TO DIVISION" I.-OF THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OR 
AMPHIBOLY OP THE CONCEPTIONS OP REFLECTION PROM 
THE CONFUSION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WITH THE EM- 
PIRICAL USE OF THE UNDERSTANDING-. (§§1888-1921 inclusive.) 
[Amphi-ballo: Strike both ways.] See Meiklejohn's erratum, page 518. 

§ 1888. — Reflection is that state of mind in which we set our- 
selves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain 
conceptions, (page 190, line 6.) 

§ 1889. — All judgments require reflection, that is, a distinction 
of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, 
(page 190, line 10.) 

§ 1890. — Transcendental reflection is the act whereby I compare 
my representations with the faculty of cognition which originates 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
languished from the latter. The expressions in modern writers of mundus sen- 
■sibilis, and mundus inteMigibilis, present a meaning so different from that in 
which they are used by the ancient philosophers, that some explanation becomes 
necessary.* Mundus sensibilis, or the world of sense, has been used to mean 
the complex of phenomena so far as this is envisaged [intuited] or perceived ; 
but so far as the connection according to the general laws of the understanding 
is thought, it is termed mundus inteUigibilis, or the world of the understanding.* 
Visible astronomy, which proposes the mere visual observation of the heavens, 
would represent the first ; and contemplative or scientific astromomy, such as 
that explained by Copernicus or Newton, would represent the second. But 
this still would only be a perversion of words in order to avoid troublesome 
points, wherein each party modifies his meaning so as to meet his own views. 
The question at last is resolved into this, whether understanding and reason can 
"be used, if the object submitted to them is any thing but phenomenon; for in 
the sense of noumenon only must it be taken if thought in itself as intelligible, 
or as given to the understanding alone, and not to the senses [g 1885]. Hence, if 
we say that the senses represent to us the objects as they appear, but the 
understanding as they are, the last expression is not to be taken in a transcen- 
dental but in a mere empirical signification, namely, how they, as objects of 
experience, must be represented in the universal connection of phenomena, 
and not according to what they may be, independent of the relation to possible 



694 Kant's Ethics. 

them, and whereby I distinguish whether they are compared with 
each other as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensuous 
intuition, (page 190, line 26.) 

§ 1891. — Conceptions of comparison. (Identity and difference, 
etc. §§1893-1896.) (page 191, line 1.) 

§ 1892. — Transcendental reflection contains the ground of the 
possibility of objective comparison of representations with each 
other, (page 191, line 9.) 

§ 1893. — Identity and difference. (Difference of place at the 
same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical differ- 
ence of objects (of sense).) (page 191, line 38.) Cf. § 1901. 

§ 1894. — Agreement and opposition. (Beal in a phenomenon 
may very well be in mutual opj:>osition.) (page 192, line 28.) [The 
only realitas noumenon (that which corresponds to the matter of 
the phenomenon given in sensation) which the pure understanding 
represents, is substance. For in thinking to the substance an in- 
finity of possible manifestations, I think nothing more than an in- 
finity of phenomenal changes, and acid nothing whatever to the 
reality of substance. But realitas phenomenon is the given man- 
ifestation ; and being thought as accidental and in process of 
change, it may well be thought in opposition.] 

§ 1895. — Internal and external. (Internal determinations of a 
substantia phe?iomenon in space are nothing but relations, and it is 
itself nothing more than a complex of mere relations.) (page 192, 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

experience and to the senses in general — consequently as objects of the pure 
understanding [§ 1886]. The conception of mere pure intelligible objects is 
wholly void of all principle of application, because we can not imagine any 
thing as to the mode in which these are to be afforded, and the problematical 
idea [thought, or conception of a noumenon] which we have been referring to, 
and which as noumenon yet leaves a place open to them, serves simply as a 
void space for circumscribing empirical principles, without however containing 
in itself or showing any other object of cognition out of the sphere of such 
principles [§ 1887]. 

The Amphiboly of the conceptions of Reflection which [amphiboly originates 
in such deceptive misapprehension and want of care as permit or] occasion the 
exchange of the empirical use of the understanding for the transcendental, 
comes now to be considered, and this is added by Kant in the way of an ap- 
pendix, to the preceding explanation of phenomena and noumena. In order 
however, to make this clear, a definition and an explanation of what reflection 
is, necessarily precedes, and this is given in the following manner. Reflection, 
without which no judgment is possible, is that state of mind in which we set 
ourselves, in order to discover the subjective conditions under which we may 
attain to conceptions [§ 1888]. It has nothing to do with the objects themselves 
for the purpose of obtaining conceptions of them. It is the consciousness of" 



The Clavis to an Index. 695 

line 41.) On phenomenal substance, see § 2199. On substance and 
subject, see §1595 and references. On monads, see § 1903. [I pre- 
sume that I understand by matter that complex of mere relations 
which Kant terras substantia phenomenon. But I do not use the 
words matter and substance as convertible. By the former, I do 
not indicate any thing more than the determinable in sensation. 
By the latter, I cogitate that in the matter which is permanent 
and I suppose it the same in the phenomenon and in the noumenon. 
(Jour. Sp. Phil., Yol. V , page 111.) But whether substance has 
internal determinations in any intellectual sense, is a question with 
which I do not find it necessary to concern myself at all. That it 
is, and that it manifests forces and modes of existence, is all that 
I think. Cf. §§ 1886, 1767, 1880.] Cf. §1915. 

§ 1896. — Matter and form. (Form of intuition (as a subjective 
property of sensibility) must antecede all matter (sensations).) 
(p. 193, 1. 22.) § 1224. [J. Sp. Ph., Yol. VIII., p. 341, § 87, note.] 

Remark on the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection. (§§ 1897- 
1921 inclusive.) 

§ 1897. — Transcendental topic : the appointment of the position 
which must be taken by each conception according to the differ- 
ence in its use, and the directions for determining this place to all 
conceptions according to rules, (page 194, line 31.) 

§ 1898. — Contains nothing more than the above mentioned four 
titles (§§ 1893-1896) of all comparison and distinction, (p. 195, 1. 1.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

the relationship of given representations to our different sources of cognition, 
by which consciousness alone their relationship with one another can he cor- 
rectly detenninecl. The first question hefore any further treating of our rep- 
resentations is this, to what faculty of cognition do they together belong ? Is 
it the understanding or the senses by [in] which they are connected or com- 
pared ? All judgments, that is, all comparisons, require the reflection we are 
now speaking of, which is a distinguishing of that cognition-faculty — that is,. 
the understanding or the senses — to which the given conceptions belong [§ 1889]; 
and it is the action whereby I connect the comparison of representations in 
general with the faculty of cognition, wherein it is effected, and whereby I 
distinguish whether those representations are compared with one another as be- 
longing to the pure understanding or to the sensible intuition [§1890]. It is 
termed transcendental reflection, the ideas [conceptions] being reflective. Be- 
sides this, there is another kind of reflection, which is the logical reflection, but 
[if we wish to establish an apriori judgment upon things (§ 1892; cf. g 1899)] 
this is only possible by means of that which is transcendental. Through the 
logical we only seek to know whether certain objects [representations] are 
identical or different, to collect those which may produce a general idea [judg- 
ment (§ 1891)] ; and as objects may be in respect of the understanding identical, 
and not so with regard to the sensibility [§§ 1892, 1893], it is necessary [if we: 



696 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1899. — Previous transcendental reflection is necessary if we 
wish to enrploy conceptions in respect of objects, (p. 195, 1. 20.) 

§ 1900. — Leibnitz, deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions 
of reflection, constructed an intellectual system of the world, 
(page 195, line 31.) [Noogony : genesis of understanding.] 

§ 1901. — Leibnitz's application of the principle of indiscernibles 
(which is valid solely of conceptions of things in general) to ob- 
jects of sense (mundus ■phenomenon), (page 196, line 29.) Cf § 1893. 

§ 1902. — Leibnitz employed the principle " .Realities (as simple 
affirmations) never logically contradict each other," for the estab- 
lishment of new propositions, (page 197, line 16.) Cf. §§1080- 
1083 and 1894. 

§ 1903. — Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation 
than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the differ- 
ence of the internal and external solely in relation to the under- 
standing, (page 198, line 8.) § 1895. 

§ 1904. — Leibnitz's view of the possible community of substances 
could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony, and by no 
means as a physical influence, (page 198, line 25.) 

§ 1905 — Leibnitz's celebrated doctrine of space and time as the 
intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and their 
states) in themselves, (page 198, line 40.) Cf. § 1514. 

§ 1906. — Could not apply to phenomena, (page 199, line 22.) 

§ 1907. — Matter is not an object for the pure understanding, 
(page 199, line 32.) Cf. § 1896. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

wish to employ conceptions in respect of objects (§ 1899)] "before all logical re--, 
flection, to be certain whether the two ideas [conceptions] to be compared be- 
long to the same faculty, or whether one of them does not belong to the under- 
standing, and the other the sensibility, and in this way it is clear that it is 
the transcendental reflection which establishes the seat of the idea [conception]. 
If attention is not paid to this distinction, noumena and phenomena are con- 
founded together, and hence arises the amphiboly of reflection, or the subject 
now under consideration. In this way the reflexive ideas [conceptions] have 
been placed [I do not know by whom (cf. §1911)] erroneously amongst the 
categories, the first only serving to indicate the relationship of the given ideas 
.[representations (§ 1898)], whose origin is known, whilst the last are, as has 
already been shown, used for the synthesis of objects [see §§ 1636 — 1641, and 
§1647]. 

The relationships in which conceptions to be compared can stand to one 
another, are [indicated by] the reflexive ideas [conceptions] of Identit} r and 
Difference, Accordance and Opposition, Internal and External, and the Deter- 
minable and the Determination (Matter and Form) [J 1890]. The right deter- , 
mination of this relationship rests upon this, as to [quoad] what cognition- 
faculty these conceptions subjectively belong to each other — whether to [in] 



The Clavis to an Index. 697 

§ 1908. — Penetrate into the interior of nature by observation 
and analysis of phenomena, (page 200, line 7.) 

§ 1909. — Nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are 
compared with each other in the understanding alone, (page 

200, line 34.) 

§ 1910. — Must therefore make abstraction of all objects, as in 
logic, or, admitting them, must think them under conditions of 
sensuous intuition, (page 201, line 3.) Cf. §1882. 

§1911. — Origin of these * false principles of Leibnitz, (page 

201, line 34.) *§§ 1900-1905. 

§ 1912. — Dictum de omni et nullo. (Absurd so to alter this.) 
(page 202, line 4.) 

§ 1913. — Abstraction has been made of many necessary con- 
ditions of intuition, (page 202, line 17.) Cf. §§ 1901, 1902. 

§ 1914. — Can not say : Because a thing can not be represented 
by mere conceptions without something absolutely internal, there is 
also in the things themselves (which are contained under these 
conceptions) and in their intuition nothing external to which some- 
thing absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation, (page 
203, line 6.) 

§ 1915. — What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations, 
(page 204, line 13.) [Does away with the possibility : a noumenon 
can not possibly be or become object for me, excejDt through its 
external relations, in its phase of phenomenon.] 

§ 1916. — Conception of a noumenon is problematical, that is to 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

the sensibility or the understanding. The difference between these two last 
makes the difference as to the manner in which the conceptions are to he 
thought. "With respect to identity and difference, accordance and opposition, 
internal and external, matter and form, Kant says, first as to 

Identity and Difference [§1893] — "If an object is presented to us several 
times, but every time with the self-same internal determinations, (qualitas et 
quantitas) it is the same thing if it is valid as an object of the pure under- 
standing, it is ever the very same — and not several — but only one thing, (nu- 
merica identitas) ; but if it is phenomenon, the point is not at all then as to the 
comparison of conceptions, and however identical all may be in respect to the 
same, still the difference of the places of this phenomenon at the like time is a 
sufficient ground for the numerical difference of the object itself (of the senses). 
Thus in two drops of water we can entirely make abstraction of all internal 
difference (of quality and quantity), and it is enough that they can be perceived 
in different places contemporaneously, in order to hold them as numerically 
different. Leibnitz took phenomena for things in themselves, consequently for 
intelligibilia, that is, objects of the pure understanding (although on account of 
the confusion of their representations he gave them the name of phenomena), 
and then his principle of the indistinguishable (principium identitatis indis- 

45 



698 Kant's Ethics. 

say, it is the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it 
is possible nor that it is impossible, (page 205, line 3.) 

§ 1917. — Categories are not of themselves sufficient for the cog- 
nition of things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility 
are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding, 
(page 205, line 28.) 

§ 1918. — Conception of a noumenon is therefore not the concep- 
tion of an object, (page 206, line 4.) Cf. § 1884. 

§ 1919. — Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without 
at the same time enlarging its own field, (page 206, line 17.) [The 
word noumenon means object of the understanding.] 

§ 1920. — Critique of the pure understanding does not permit us 
to stray into intelligible worlds, (page 206, line 38.) 

§ 1921. — Transcendental employment of the understanding is 
contrary to its proper purpose and destination, (page 207, line 1.) 

SUPPLEMENT TO DIVISION" I.-THE CONCEPTION" OP NOTHING. 

(§§1922-1924 inclusive.) 

§ 1922. — Conception of an object in general, problematically 
understood, and without its being decided whether it is something 
or nothing, (page 207, line 20.) 

§ 1923 — Distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or 
nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the 
categories, (page 207, line 28.) 

§ 1924. — Division of the conception of nothing, (p. 208, 1. 15.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

cernibilium) certainly could not be contested: but as they are objects of sensi- 
bility, and the understanding in respect thereof is not of pure but of simply 
empirical use, plurality and numerical difference is thus already given through 
space itself, as the condition of the external phenomena. For a part of space, 
although indeed it may be entirely similar and equal to another, is still out of 
it, and precisely, thereby, a part different from the first, which is added to it, in 
order to make up a greater space — and thence this must hold true of all which 
is at the same time in the various places of space, however else such thing be 
similar and equal to itself. 

2. Accordance and Opposition [§ 1894] — "If reality is only represented to us 
by means of the pure understanding (realitas noumenon), no contradiction can 
be thought between the realities, that is, such a relationship as that these eon- 
joined in a subject destroy mutually one another, and 3 — 3 is=0. On the other 
hand, the real in the phenomenon (realitas phenomenon) may certainly be in 
opposition with one another ; and [in that case, if such opposed realities are] 
united in the same subject, one annihilates the consequence of the other wholly, 
or in part, as two moving forces in the same straight line, so far as they draw 
or force a line [or point] in an opposite direction — or also [exemp. grat.] pleas- 
ure which holds the balance with pain. 

3. The Internal and External [g 1895] — "In an object of the pure under- 



The Clavis to an Index. 699 

Division II. — Transcendental Dialectic. (§g 1925-2444 inclusive.) 

INTRODUCTION. (£g 1925-1951 inclusive.) 
■ TITLE I. -OF TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSORY APPEARANCE, (gg 1925-1933.) 

§ 1925. — Dialectic does not signify a doctrine of probability, 
(page 209, line 7.) Cf. §§1545, 1003 and see § 1150. 

§ 1926. — Illusory appearance does not reside in the object, inso- 
far as it is intuited, but in the judgment upon the object, insofar 
as it is thought, (page 209, line 12.) 

§ 1927. — Neither the understanding per se (without the influence 
of another cause), nor the senses per se, would fall into error, (page 
209, line 21.) Cf. §1085. 

§ 1928. — Error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of 
the sensibility upon the understanding, (page 209, line 32.) 

§ 1929. — -Leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, 
completely beyond the empirical employment of the categories. 
(page 210, line 16.) 

§ 1930. — Transcendent principles are those which transgress the 
limits of possible' experience, (page 210, line 27.) 

§ 1931. — Principles of the pure understanding (which are lim- 
ited in their employment to the sphere of experience) may be 
called immanent [i. e. remaining in], (page 211, line 2.) Tran- 
scendental and transcendent are not identical terms. 

§ 1932. — -Transcendental illusion does not cease to exist, even 
after it has been exposed, (page 211, line 13.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

standing, that only is internal, which has no relation at all (according to exist- 
ence) to any thing different from it[self]. On the other hand the internal de- 
terminations of a substantia phenomenon in space are only relationships, and 
it itself [substantia phenomenon) wholly a complex of pure relations. Substance 
in space we only know by means of forces, which are real in this space, either to 
urge others on therein (attraction), or to restrain from forcing into it, (re- 
pulsion and impenetrability). Other properties we do not know, which con- 
stitute the conception of substance that appears in space, and which we name 
matter. Every substance, on the other hand, as object of the pure understand- 
ing must have internal determinations and forces, which refer to internal 
reality. But what kind of internal accidents can I think to myself, except 
those which my internal sense offers to me ? namely, that which either itself is 
a thinking, or is analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, from all substances, as he 
represented them to himself as noumena, even from the component parts of 
matter, after he had taken away in idea [in conception] all that might signify 
external relation, consequently composition also, produced simple subjects in- 
vested with powers of representation — in a word, Monads. 

4. Mattel' - and Form [§ 1896] — "These are two conceptions which are laid 
at the foundation of all other reflection, so very inseparably are they joined 
with every use of the understanding. The first signifies the determinable in 



700 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1933. — Bests upon subjective principles, and imposes these 
upon us as objective, (page 211, line 35.) 

TITLE II. -OF PURE REASON AS THE SEAT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IL- 
LUSORY APPEARANCE. (§§1934-1951 inclusive.) 

Article A. — Of reason in general. (§§ 1934-1942 inclusive.) 

§ 1934. — Reason divided into a logical and a transcendental fac- 
ulty, (page 212, line 17.) 

§ 1935. — Eeason may be distinguished from understanding as 
the faculty of principles, (page 213, line 1.) 

§ 1936. — Principle is an ambiguous term. Every general propo- 
sition is not a principle, (page 213, line 4.) Cf §§ 1244, 1284, 147. 

§ 1937. — Cognition from principles is that cognition in which 
I cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions, 
(page 213, line 17.) 

§ 1938. — Apriori principles of the pure understanding are not 
cognitions from conceptions, (page 213, line 27.) Cf. §§ 1702, 
1711, 1858, 1862. 

§ 1939. — Principles are synthetical cognitions from conceptions, 
and can not be supplied by the understanding, (page 213, line 37.) 
1940. — Secret of simplifying legislation, (page 213, line 41.) 
Cf. §§1959, 2065, 342. 

§ 1941. — Cognition from principles is something very different 
from cognition by means of the understanding, (page 214, line 9.) 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

general; the second, the determination of it: (both in a transcendental sense, as 
Ave make abstraction of the difference of that which is given, and of the 
manner in which it is determined). Logicians formerly called the universal, 
matter, but the specific difference, form. In each judgment we may name the 
given conceptions, logical matter (for judgment) ; their relationship, (by means 
of the copula), the form of the judgment. In every being, the constituent 
parts (essentialia) of it are matter ; the mode in which they are connected in a 
thing, the essential form. In respect of things in general, unlimited reality 
was also regarded as the matter of all possibility, but the limitation thereof 
(negation) as that form, whereby a thing distinguished itself, from another, ac- 
cording to transcendental conceptions. The understanding requires, first, 
namely, that something is given (at least in the conception) in order to be able 
to determine it in a certain manner. Consequently matter precedes form in 
the conception of the pure understanding ; and Leibnitz first assumes on this 
account things (monads), and internally a representation-force [an internal 
power of representation] belonging to them, in order afterward to found there- 
upon their external relationship, and the community of their states, (that is, 
of the representations). Hence, space and time were possible, as causes and 
consequences, the first [space] only by means of the relationship of substances, 
the latter [time] through the connection of their determinations with one 
another. And so in fact would it likewise necessarily be, if the pure under- 



The Clavis to an Index. 701 

§ 1942. — Eeason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules 
(of the understanding) under principles, (page 214, line 20.) 

Article B. — Of the logical use of reason. (§§ 1943-1945 inclusive.) 

§ 1943. — Conclusion of reason can be deduced only by means of 
a mediating judgment. (Conclusion of the understanding is im- 
mediate.) (page 214, line 35.) See §§ 1262, 1282. 

§ 1944. — Eelations which the major proposition, as the rule, rep- 
resents between a cognition and its condition, constitute the dif- 
ferent kinds of syllogisms: (1) categorical ; (2) hypothetical ; (3) 
disjunctive, (page 215, line 24.) Cf. §§ 1290, 1293. 

§1945. — Reason endeavors to subject the great variety of the 
cognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number 
of principles (general conditions), and thus to produce in it the 
highest unity, (page 216, line 1.) 

Article C. — Of the pure use of 'reason. (§§ 1946-1951 inclusive.) 

§ 1946. — Does pure reason contain apriori synthetical principles 
and rules? (page 216, line 15.) 

§ 1947. — Unity of reason is not the unity of a possible experi- 
ence, (page 217, line 3.) 

§ 1948. — Eeason, in its logical use, endeavors to find for the con- 
ditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned where- 
by the unity of the former is completed, (page 217, line 23.) Cf. § 
1959 sub fin. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
standing could be referred immediately to objects, and if space and time were 
determinations of things in themselves. But if they are only sensible intuitions 
in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, then the form of the 
intuition (as a subjective quality of the sensibility) precedes all matter, the sen- 
sations, consequently space and time precede all phenomena and all data of 
experience — or rather make experience first of all possible. The intellectual 
philosopher could not permit that the form would precede the things themselves, 
and determine their possibility ; a censure entirely correct, if he admitted that 
we see things as they are (although in confused representation). But as the 
sensible intuition is wholly a particular subjective condition, which lies at the 
foundation, apriori, of all perception, and the form of which is original, the 
form thus of itself alone is given; and so far from its being the case, that mat- 
ter (or the things themselves which appear) is to lie at the foundation (as one 
must judge according to mere conceptions), its own possibility presupposes 
rather a formal intuition (time and space) as given." 

Here it will be seen that besides explaining these ideas [conceptions], the 
author has also another object in view, which was to refute the theory of Leib- 
nitz, on the same questions, and in furtherance of this he adds, what he terms 
a scholium [g 1897 et seqq.] to the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, 
wherein he further exposes his own view of the subject. In this scholium, the 
place or situation which is assigned to a conception whether in the sensibility or 



702 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 1949. — Principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical, (page 
217, line 34.) 

§ 1950. — Principles resulting from this highest principle of pure 
reason will, however, he transcendent in relation to phenomena, 
(page 217, line 41.) Cognition: Mahaffy says condition. Cf. in 
Fischer, page lxi. 

§ 1951. — Duty in the transcendental dialectic. To discover 
whether the principle, that the series of conditions (in the synthe- 
sis of phenomena, or. of thought in general) extends to the uncon- 
ditioned, is objectively true, or not ; what consequences result there- 
from affecting the empirical use of the understanding, or rather 
whether there exists any such objectively valid proposition of rea- 
son, and whether it is not, on the contrary, a merely logical pre- 
cept, which directs us to ascend perpetually to still higher con- 
ditions, to approach completeness in the series of them, and thus 
to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of rea- 
son, (page 218, line 15.) [§740.] 

BOOK I.-Or THE CONCEPTIONS OP PURE REASON". (?§ 1952-1992.) 

§ 1952. — Conceptions of pure reason are not obtained by reflec- 
tion, but by inference or conclusion, (page 219, line 4.) 

§ 1953. — Aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension, as 
that of the conceptions of understanding is the understanding of 
perceptions, (page 219, line 19.) 

§ 1954.— Conceptions of pure reason are called transcendental 
ideas, (page 220, line 3.) See §1975. 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS, 
understanding, is characterized as the transcendental place, and the indication, 
for determining this place, for all conceptions, according to rules, would be 
termed transcendental topic, or a system which would guarantee us completely 
from the subreptions of the pure understanding, and the delusions thence arising, 
inasmuch as it at all times distinguishes to what faculty of cognition the con- 
ceptions strictly belong. 

To close finally the system of Transcendental Analytic, the table of the 
division of the conception of Nothing is introduced as opposed to Something 
[§§ 1922-1924], and as the categories are the only conceptions which refer to 
objects in general, the distinction of an object whether it is something or nothing 
proceeds according to the order and directions of the categories.! 

[Haywood prints, at the foot of the page, the following note:] tKant 
proved himself the umpire between Sensuality and Intellect. Until his time, 
ever since that of Des Cartes, it had been a subject of bitter dispute, whether 
philosophical knowledge or conceptions were, as according to the Sensualists, 
derived from experience, or, as according to the Intellectualists, from pure rea- 
son. Kant demonstrated tbat all phenomenal knowledge must arise from the 
co-operation of the outward and the inward. An intellect that loses sight of 
experience, has no object on which to act. The objects which experience pre- 



The Clavis to an Index. 703 

Chapter I.— Of Ideas in general, (g? 1955-1963 inclusive.) 

§ 1955. — Better to adhere to and confirm its proper meaning, 
(page 220, line 10.) 

§ 1956. — Ought not to employ the expression improvidently. 
(page 220, line 26.) 

§ 1957. — Plato employed the expression idea in a way that 
plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived 
from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of 
the understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself), (page 
220, line 39.) 

§ 1958. — Plato found his ideas especially in all that is practical 
(that is, which rests upon freedom), (page 221, line 21.) 

§ 1959. — Platonic Eepublic. Neglect of true ideas in legisla- 
tion. Although a perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on 
that account the less just which holds up this maximum as the 
archetype or standard of a constitution, in order to bring legisla- 
tive government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible 
perfection, (page 222, line 22.) 

§ 1960. — Plato's mental power exhibited in the ascent from the 
ectypal * mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonicf 
connection thereof according to ends, that is, ideas, (page 223, 
line 22.) [* Taken from the original. — Webster.'] [f " That has 
power or skill to build," Webster says, and refers to Smellie.— De- 
signed by an architect (the Author of reason). Of. § 2616.] 

§ 1961. — Plato has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

sent's to us, can not truly be said to exist until intellect, with its arranging and 
combining power, commences its operation upon them. — See Foreign Quarterly 
Review, 98. [End of Haywood s note.] 

NOTHING as 

1. Void conception without object: — Ens rationis. 

2. Void object of a conception : — Nihil privativum. 

3. Void intuition without object: — Ens imaginarium. 

4. Void object without conception : — Nihil negativum. 

Here terminates one of the most important divisions of the critical philoso- 
phy. The first part of the work, as we have seen, is termed transcendental 
elemental doctrine, and is composed of the two great divisions of transcen- 
dental ^Esthetic and transcendental Logic. The first of these, or transcendental 
^Esthetic, is only concerned with the explanation of space and time; the 
second, or transcendental Logic, enters into the subject generally, [first defining 
logic], whether general or transcendental; and [sub-dividing]* each of these 
divisions, [general logic into]*' analytic and dialectic [and transcendental logic 
into] * transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic, [and then, under 
the first of these latter divisions, Transcendental Analytic], the whole faculty 
of the"*understahding becomes dissected and explained with reference to the 



704 Kant's Mines. 

merit as regards the principles of ethics, of legislation, and of re- 
ligion, (page 224, line 2.) 

§ 1962. — Confine ourselves for the present to the more humble 
but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation for those 
majestic edifices of moral science, (page 224, line 13.) 

§ 1963. — Idea (or conception of reason) is a conception formed 
from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, 
(p. 224, 1. 24.) [As to perception, cf. §§ 2949, 2957, 1754, 1729.] 
Cf. § 1113. [Intuition, I. — objective phase : the manifold con- 
tent of an objective perception. It has an immediate relation 
to the object, and is singular and individual. II. — subjective 
phase : the act of intuiting or immediately beholding (receiving 
into the sensibility) the sensuous content of objective perception. 
III. — faculty: reason in the act of intuition.] [Contemplation 
II. — subjective phase : prolonged intuition. Intuition refers more 
immediately to the matter acted upon, while contemplation relates 
rather to the state of mind. Ex. gr., " You can not learn by intro- 
spection ; you must contemplate external nature." Cf. §§ 1639, 1473.] 

Chapter II.— Of Transcendental Ideas. (§§1964-1984 inclusive.) 

§ 1964. — Form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity 
of intuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

categories, their schematism, and to judgments. The synthetical principles 
also of the pure understanding, when more fully explained, are shown to be 
axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, and analogies of experience, 
whether regarded as principles of the permanence of substance, of succession, 
or of co-existence, and postulates of empirical thinking in general. 

To this development of the qualities of the intelligence, another division, 
[chapter] has been added, showing the grounds of the distinction of all objects 
in general into phenomena and noumena — and lastly, an explanation is sub- 
joined of the amphiboly that arises from exchanging the empirical use of the 
understanding for the transcendental [or better, according to Meiklejohn's 
erratum, from the confusion of the transcendental with the empirical use]. 
This leads naturally to the second great division of [transcendental] logic, or 
that which is to be treated of in a succeeding part, under the title of Transcen- 
dental Dialectic. 

Before entering however upon this new subject, it may not be useless to re- 
capitulate succinctly those principles which we have had under consideration 
and the connection existing between them ; and if any thing further should be 
required for the more complete understanding of the doctrines of the critical 
philosophy than is to be found in the " Critique," reference must be made to the 
" Prolegomena," where the writer's views are still more [analytically] developed, 
and to the " Logic " where questions appertaining to this subject [logic] partic- 
ularly are explained at length, and where they are perhaps more systematically 
handled than in the work now under analysis. In the particular work before 



The Clavis to an Index. 705 

the origin of particular ajDriori conceptions, which we may call 
pure conceptions of reason, or transcendental ideas, and which 
will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of ex- 
perience according to principles, (page 225, line 16.) 

§ 1965. — Function of reason in arguments consists in the uni- 
versality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism 
itself is a judgment which is determined apriori in the whole ex- 
tent of its condition, (page 225, line 31.) 

§ 1966. — Transcendental conception of reason is nothing else 
than the conception of the totality of the conditions of a given 
conditioned, (page 226, line 10.) 

§ 1967. — Pure rational conception in general can be defined and 
explained by means of the conception of the unconditioned, insofar 
as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned, (page 
226, line 14.) 

§ 1968. — Number of pure rational conceptions corresponds to the 
number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by 
means of the categories, (page 226, line 20.) Cf. § 2999. 

§ 1969. — Exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each 
of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned : 
(1) to the subject * which can not be employed as a predicate ; 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

us, however, most of the questions as to the logical use of the understanding in 
general are discussed at considerable length; and the application of those laws 
which regulate that operation of mind which is denominated thinking, is most 
especially considered. 

This operation is shown to be an act wherein we represent objects to our- 
selves, by adding certain designations to them. The representation is termed a 
conception, whilst the designations are predicates of the object itself. Logic as 
a science is found to be universal and particular, and the first is divided into pure 
and applied. In pure we abstract [from] all the empirical conditions under which 
the understanding is exercised. The science is called applied when it is directed 
toward the rules of the understanding-use, under those subjective empirical con- 
ditions which Psychology teaches. Universal logic contains the absolutely neces- 
ary rules of thinking; whilst particular logic contains the rules of thinking 
correctly on a certain sort of objects. Applied logic * treats of attention, of 
whatever hinders or promotes it, of the origin of error, illusion, prejudices, etc. 
Pure logic is divided into the doctrines of the understanding, of judgment and 
of reason, or the doctrines of conceptions, judgments and syllogisms. The un- 
derstanding possesses conceptions as so many rules for the thinking of objects; 
but it is not the design of the science under consideration, to inquire after the 
origin of these. Judgment is the placing of objects under these rules. A syl- 
logism is the deduction of one judgment from another. If we separate the 
designations, fby the addition of which we represent an object to ourselves,) in 
the object, that which we retain in thought, divested of its designations, is the 



706 Kant's Ethics. 

(2) to the presupposition which supposes nothing higher than 
itself; (3) to an aggregate of the members of the complete di- 
vision of a conception, (page 226, line 27.) *§§ 1595, 1870. 

§ 1970. — Pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of 
conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human 
reason, (page 226, line 32.) 

§ 1971. — Absolute necessity does not by any means depend on 
internal necessity. Absolutely possible signifies that which is pos- 
sible in all relations and in every respect, (page 227, line 1.) 

§ 1972. — Eeason restricts itself to the absolute totality in the 
employment of the conceptions of the understanding, and aims at 
carrying out the synthetical unity which is cogitated in the cate- 
gory, even to the unconditioned, (page 228, line 12.) 

§ 1973. — Objective employment of the pure conceptions of rea- 
son is always transcendent, (page 228, line 25.) 

§ 1974. — Idea is a necessary conception of reason, to which no 
corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense, 
(page 228, line 38.) 

§ 1975. — Pure conceptions of reason are transcendental ideas, 
(page 228, line 40.) 

§ 1976.- — Practical idea is always in the highest degree fruitful, 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 

analytical unity of consciousness, and it forms the basis of ail conceptions or of 
all thinking. [See pages 596, 590, 603, and 322, above.] 

In all judgments, conjunction and agnition are to be distinguished from one 
another; the first consists in the transition of consciousness from one concep- 
tion to the other, so that both come to one consciousness, but agnition consists 
in the placing of an object under a precise conception. The original use of the 
understanding, (it can not be too often repeated,) consists of the categories, and 
their exhibition as postulates is that same original use, and this is seen to con- 
sist every where in original composition or synthesis, and in original agnition 
or schematism. Transcendental philosophy is the science of the original use 
of the understanding in the categories. Critical idealism consists in the position 
that the understanding conjoins originally in the categories; and that the use of 
the categories as predicates of objects, (that is to say, the conjunction we place 
in things), entirely rests on the original intellectual conjunction. Synthetic 
unity and analytical unity seem in the first instance embarrassing, because they 
appear to run into one another, but duty considered, a marked distinction is 
shown to exist between them, though from the corresponding nature of their 
functions to separate faculties of the mind, they are frequently confounded. 
In an analytical judgment those designations are added to a thing, which are 
already thought in the conception of this thing, and whereby' the analytical 
unity of this conception is first fixed. Now it has been shown that this analyti- 
cal unity is the basis of all conceptions, or of all thinking, and the analytical 
unity of consciousness is the simple point we retain in thought in reference to 
an object, when we have separated the designations by whose addition we rep- 



The Clavis to an Index. 707 

and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary, (page 
229, line 9.) [Subject: § 1595.] 

§ 1977. — Pure reason possesses even causality, and the power of 
producing that which its conception contains. Hence we can not 
say of wisdom, in a disparaging way, "it is only an idea." (page 

229, line 33.) 

§ 1978. — Canon for the extended and self-consistent exercise of 
the understanding. Transition from our conceptions of nature 
and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, (page 229, line 41.) 

§ 1979. — Source of conceptions which enable us to regard ob- 
jects in themselves as determined synthetically apriori in relation 
to one or other of the functions of reason, (page 230, line 15.) 
See § 1881. Of. §§ 1993, 1995. 

§ 1980. — Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical 
form of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate 
judgment — by means of the subsumption of the condition of a 
possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment, (page 

230, line 26.) Cf. §§ 1943, 1284. 

§ 1981. — Reason attains to a cognition by means of acts of the 

understanding which constitute a series of conditions, (p. 230, 1. 39.) 

§ 1982. — Conducts us to the ratiocinatio yolysyllogistica, which is 

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS. 
resent any object to ourselves. Synthetic unity conjoins the different represen- 
tations in every intuition ; and as it refers to the understanding, it may, so far only 
as it merely renders possible the various ways of uniting the given diverse or 
multiplex through intuition, be termed the pure conception of the understanding. 
The supreme unity thereof is that whereby every compounded cognition is 
thought as something, or as an object; and we have seen that the number of 
these pure synthetic unities or categories is twelve. The synthetic unity is op- 
posed to the analytic. With the further development of these principles, but 
preceded by a full explanation of the doctrines of time and space which form 
the basis of the Kantian philosophy, and wherein it is assumed that these qual- 
ities are only forms of thought and not any thing in themselves, the first great 
division of the subject is concluded, and the attention is afterward directed to 
the application and proof of the positions, rather than to any further elucidation 
of the nature and quality of the human mind. 

[As Mr. Haywood's Analysis stands in no relation to my index, and is en- 
tirely outside of my purpose, I shall print no more of it here. I hope that 
I have presented indubitable evidence of the fidelity and excellency of Hay- 
wood's work. I do not mean to say that it is as good as Meikejohn's transla- 
tion, which the student ought by all means to keep open before him and con- 
sult at every point. I do not suppose that the Kantic philosophy can be learned 
from any analysis^, synopsis, epitome, introduction, or brief exposition or com- 
mentary, or by any other process whatever than that intimated by Kant 
himself (in £2641, Prof. Mahaffy's translation), namely, thinking, thinking 
through, thinking through the Critique.] 



708 Kant's Ethics. 

a series of syllogisms that can be continued either on the side of 
the conditions (per prosyllogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyl- 
logismos) to an indefinite extent, (page 231, line 10.) 

§ 1983. — Reason can attain to this cognition only under the pre- 
supposition that all the members of the series on the side of the 
conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), (page 
231, line 17.) 

§ 1984. — Series of premisses may have a first or highest con- 
dition, or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited; 
but it must nevertheless contain totality of conditions, and the 
whole series must be unconditionally true, (page 232, line 2.) 

Chapter III.— System of Transcendental Ideas. (?§ 1985-1992 inclusive.) 

§ 1985. — Form of the transcendental ideas, (page 232, line 17.) 
Cf. §§ 1944, 1969, 1948, and Fischer, page 157. [The student must 
be on his guard in reading Fischer, or he may get the thing per se 
confused with the idea of the unconditioned. Mahaffy's caution 
(for example, see in Fischer, pages 159, 189, 196, 34) should be 
noted and imitated. See § 1991.] 

§ 1986. — Content of the transcendental ideas : (1) the relation of 
the representation to the subject ; (2) the relation to the manifold 
of the object as a phenomenon ; (3) the relation to all things in 
general, (page 232, line 34.) Cf. § 2989. 

§ 1987. — All transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three 
classes, the first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) 
unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the 
series of the conditions of a phenomenon, the third the absolute 
unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general, (page 233, 
line 4.) 

§ 1988. — Pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcen- 
dental doctrine of the soul (psychologia rationalist, of a transcen- 
dental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and finally of a 
transcendental doctrine of Cod (theologia transcendentalis) . (page 
233, line 13.) 

§ 1989. — Reason's logical procedure necessarily produces the 
transcendental ideas. They follow the guiding thread of the cate- 
gories, (page 233, line 28.) 

§ 1990. — Objective deduction of the transcendental ideas is im- 
possible, (page 234, line 1.) See § 1614. Cf. § 1579. 

§ 1991. — Transcendental ideas are available only for ascending 
in the series of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that is y 
principles, (page 234, line 8.) 

§ 1992. — Reason, by means of the transcendental ideas, collects 
all its cognitions into one system. From the cognition of self to 



The Clavis to an Index. 709 

the cognition of the world, and through these to the Supreme 
Being, the progression is so natural that it seems to resemble the 
logical march of reason from the premisses to the conclusion. 
(The science of metaphysics has for the proper object of its in- 
quiries only three grand ideas : Cod, freedom, and immortality.) 
(page 234, line 33.) 

BOOK II.— OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REA- 
SON. (§§1993-2371 inclusive.) 

§ 1993. — Conception of an object that is adequate to the idea 
given by reason, is impossible, (page 235, line 18.) 

§ 1994. — Subjective reality of the transcendental ideas, (page 
236, line 3.) 

§ 1995. — Conclude from something that we do know to some- 
thing of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we 
nevertheless, by an unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality, 
(page 236, line 5.) 

§ 1996. — Dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corre- 
sponding to the number of the ideas which their conclusions pre- 
sent: (1) transcendental paralogism; (2) antinomy of pure reason; 
(3) ideal of pure reason, (page 236, line 20.) See §§ 1968-1970. 

Chapter I. --Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. (J§ 1997-2035 inclusive.) 

§ 1997. — Transcendental paralogism concludes falsely, while the 
ibrm is correct and unexceptionable, (page 237, line 7.) Cf. § 2991. 

§ 1998. — " I think" is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in 
general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also. 
Cf. §§ 1599-1601 and § 1634. (page 237. line 14.) [Cf. Fischer, 
page 178. Mahaffy says that Meiklejohn mistranslates, but I do 
not see that any particular harm is done.] 

§ 1999. — " 7," as a thinking being, designates the object-matter 
of psychology, (page 237, line 25.) 

§ 2000. — Smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure 
or pain) that should be included in the general representation of 
self-consciousness, would immediately change the rational into an 
empirical psychology, (page 237, line 36.) Cf. carefully § 1537, 
and Fischer, page 32 (where Mahaffy refers to §§ 2000, 1537). 

§ 2001. — " I think " is therefore the only text of rational psycho- 
logy, from which it must develop its whole system, (p. 238, 1. 27.) 

§ 2002. — Topic of the rational doctrine of the soul: (1) The soul 
is substance ; (2) as regards its quality, it is simple ; (3) as re- 
gards the different times in which it exists, it is numerically identi- 
cal, that is unity, not plurality ; (4) it is in relation to possible ob- 
jects in space, (page 238, line 33.) Cf. §2021. 



710 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2003. — Originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by 
combination alone, (page 239, line 11.) 

§ 2004. — Foundation of this science nothing but the simple and 
in itself perfectly contentless representation 7, which can not even 
be called a conception, (page 239, line 23.) Cf. § 1998. 

§ 2005. — Necessarily attribute to things apriori all the properties 
which constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate 
them, (page 240, line 10.) 

§ 2006. — Never be available for discovering those properties 
which do not belong to possible experience, (page 240, line 32.) 
Cf. § 2967. 

§ 2007. — Conclusions are drawn from the proposition " I think," 
only by a transcendental employment of the understanding, (page 
241, line 3.) Cf. §§ 2921-3000, where Mahaffy translates from the 
first edition. 

§ 2008. — Cognize myself, not through my being conscious of 
myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition 
of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought, 
(page 241, line 14.) Cf. § 2032. § 2934. 

§ 2009. — All the modi of self-consciousness in thought are hence 
not conceptions of objects (conceptions of the understanding — cate- 
gories) ; they are mere logical functions, which do not present to 
thought an object to be cognized, (page 241, line 22.) Cf. § 2025. 

§ 2010. — Not signify that I, as an object, am for myself a self- 
subsistent being, or substance, (page 241, line 32.) Cf. § 1635. 

§ 2011. — Not tantamount to declaring that the thinking ego is a 
simple substance, (page 242, line 1.) [That the ego of appercep- 
tion is singular and can not be otherwise cogitated, is true ; but 
when I think to the ego simplicity, I construct a synthesis just 
as much as when I think to it substance. I can construct just as 
many such syntheses as I please, but I find no knowledge in the 
thought. My own determination of my ego in my internal sense 
gives reality, but by no means simplicity. I believe that the latter 
thought belongs solely to the sphere of reason, growing out of the 
tendency of that faculty to complete the series of the conditioned. 
Whether the thought contains transcendental truth, is a question 
which I do not propose to myself at all, since no solution is possible. 
Cf. §§ 2083, 2022.] Kant's use of the singular to assist in explain- 
ing the simple is a logical explication parallel to the explication of 
substance by subject. See § 1870. [Cf. § 2532.] 

§ 2012. — Can not therefore enounce the identity of the person. 
(page 242, line 19.) 

§ 2013. — Whether this consciousness of myself is possible with- 



The Clavis to an Index. 711 

out things external to me, can not be known or inferred from this 
proposition, (page 242, line 31.) Cf. § 1846. 

§ 2014. — Logical exposition of thought in general, is mistaken 
for a metaphysical determination of the object, (p. 242, 1. 40.) 

§ 2015. — Critique would he an investigation utterly superfluous, 
if there existed a possibility of proving apriori that all thinking- 
beings are in themselves simple substances, (page 243, line 4.) 

§ 2016. — Lurks in the procedure of rational psychology a par- 
alogism. The conclusion is arrived at by a sophisma figurae dic- 
tionis. (page 243, line 31.) Cf. § 2991. 

§ 2017. — Conception of the simple nature of substance, which 
is connected with the objective reality of this conception, is shown 
to be also invalid, and to be in fact nothing; more than the log-ical 
qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought ; whilst we re- 
main perfectly ignorant whether the subject is composite or not. 
(page 244, line 5.) Cf. § 1598. 

§ 2018. — Eefutation of the argument of Mendelssohn for the 
substantiality or absolute* permanence of the soul, (page 245, line 
3.) [Can not refuse to it a degree of reality : We must therefore 
deny to it simplicity. Cf. § 2011.] *See Meiklejohn's note. 

§ 2019. — Unable to explain the possibility of a thinking nature. 
We can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul — even that 
of consciousness — as diminished by one half, the substance still 
remaining, (page 246, line 12.) Cf. Fischer, page 197, and Ma- 
haffy's note. See § 2037 (to which Mahafly refers), and cf. §865. 

§ 2020. — Idealism — at least, problematical idealism — is perfectly 
unavoidable in this rationalistic system, (page 247, line 1.) See §§ 
2001-2003. 

§ 2021. — " I think" as a proposition containing in itself an ex- 
istence as given (consequently modality being the principle) : (1) 
I think, (2) as subject, (3) as simple subject, (4) as identical sub- 
ject, in every state of my thought, (page 247, line 17.) Cf. §§ 
2020, 2002. 

§ 2022. — Impossibility of a definition on the basis of materialism 
of the constitution of my ego as a merely thinking subject, (page 
248, line 1.) [Simplicity of its nature : I confess that I must give 
this up. It is no more possible for me to predicate simplicity of 
apperception than to predicate of it color, or any other absurd 
rule. See §§ 2011, 2532. Cf. Fischer, page 198, where Mahafly 
translates ' ; and its unity is given in the very fact of its possibility." 

§ 2023. — Mode of my existence, whether as substance or as acci- 
dent, can not be determined by means of this simple self-conscious- 
ness. Thus, if materialism is inadequate to explain the mode in 



712 Kant's Ethics. 

which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient; and the 
conclusion is, that we are utterly unable to attain to any knowl- 
edge of the constitution of the soul, insofar as relates to the 
possibility of its existence apart from external objects. [Cf. § 
.2970.] (page 248, line 18.) 

§ 2024. — Eational psychology is nothing more than a discipline, 
which sets impassable limits to speculative reason, to prevent it on 
the one hand from throwing itself into the arms of a soulless ma- 
terialism, and on the other from losing itself in the mazes of a 
baseless spiritualism, (page 248, line 33.) 

§ 2025. — Subject of the categories can not, for the very reason 
that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object 
of the categories ; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the founda- 
tion its own pure self-consciousness, the very thing that it wishes 
to explain and describe, (page 249, line 13.) Cf. §§ 2914, 2934, 
2997, 2009, 2909, 2032. 

§ 2026. — Can not say, "Every thing which thinks, exists." My 
existence can not be considered as an inference from the proposi- 
tion " I think" as Des Cartes maintained, (page 249, line 32.) 
Identical : On this point see § 2782 (Kant's note, which note 
carefully) and cf § 2932, and Mahaffy's note in Fischer, page 
199. See also a remarkable passage in § 952. 

§ 2027. — Severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not un- 
important service by the demonstration of the impossibility of 
making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experi- 
ence beyond the boundaries of experience, (page 250, line 1.) 

§ 2028. — Necessity to admit a future life, upon princijDles of the 
practical conjoined with the speculative use of reason, has lost 
nothing by this renunciation, (page 250, line 18.) Cf. § 2593. 
[ Who alone is the final end and aim of this order : gratuitous as- 
sumption.] 

Conclusion of the solution of the psychological paralogism. (§§ 2029, 
2030.) 

§ 2029. — Dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from 
our confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with 
the conception (in every respect undetermined) of a thinking be- 
ing in general, (page 251, line 36.) 

§ 2030. — Task of explaining the community of the soul with 
the body, (page 252, line 9.) Cf. § 2937 referred to by Mahaffy 
in Fischer, page 183. Mahaffy also refers to Schwegler on Spinoza, 
page 188 of Seelye's translation (1864, Appleton). §§2938, 2939. 

General remark on the transition from rational psychology to cos- 
mology. (§§ 2031-2035 inclusive.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 713 

§ 2031. — Theory appears to maintain that the soul, even in 
thought, is only a phenomenon, (page 252, line 35.) 

§ 2032. — Consciousness of myself in mere thought does not pre- 
sent to me any property of my being as material for thought, 
(page 253, line 1.) Cf. §§ 2009, 2025, 2934. 

§ 2033. — Internal empirical intuition is sensuous, and presents 
us with nothing but phenomenal data, which do not assist the ob- 
ject of pure consciousness in its attempt to cognize itself as a sep- 
arate existence, (page 253, line 22.) Cf. §§ 2231, 1846, 1434. 

§ 2034. — Find ourselves possessed of a spontaneity by which our 
actual existence would be determinable without the aid of the con- 
ditions of empirical intuition, (page 254, line 1.) 

§ 2035. — Still in need of sensuous intuitions. For this wonderful 
faculty which the consciousness of the moral law in me reveals, 
would present me with a principle of the determination of my own 
existence which is purely intellectual — but by what predicates ? 
(page 254, line 14.) Cf. Mahaffy, in Fischer, pages 200, 201. 

Chapter II.— The Antinomy of Pure Reason. (§§ 2036-2257 inclusive.) 

§ 2036. — Second kind of dialectical argument (following the 
analogy with hypothetical syllogisms) is concerned with the un- 
conditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon, 
(page 255, line 4.) Cf. § 1996. 

§ 2037. — Transcendental paralogism produced in the mind only 
a one-sided illusion, in regard to the idea of the subject of our 
thought; and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to main- 
tain the contrary proposition- (page 255, line 21.) \_Pneumatism : 
doctrine of spiritual substances (Latin anima). See Webster, sub 
voce pnewmatics.~\ 

§ 2038. — Very different is the case when we apply reason to the 
objective synthesis of phenomena, (page 255, line 28.) 

§ 2039. — Natural antithetic, which does not require to be sought 
for by subtile sophistry, but into which reason of itself unavoid- 
ably falls, (page 255, line 33.) 

§ 2040. — All transcendental ideas, insofar as they relate to the 
absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, are called cosmical 
conceptions, (page 256, line 7.) Cf. §§ 2057, 2058. 

§ 2041. — Antinomy of pure reason will present us with the 
transcendental principles of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology 
— not, however, to declare it valid, (page 256, line 21.) 

TITLE I.-SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. (§2.2042-2058 inclusive.) 

§ 2042. — Eeason does not properly give birth to any conception, 
:but only frees the conception of the understanding from the un- 

46 



714 Kant's Ethics. 

avoidable limitation of a possible experience, and thus endeavors 
to raise it above the empirical, (page 256, line 32.) 

§ 2043. — Transcendental ideas are properly nothing but cate- 
gories elevated to the unconditioned. All the categories are not 
available for this purpose, (page 257, line 12.) See § 1984. Cf. § 
2999. [Cf. Mahaffy in Fischer, p. lxiii., whereupon I remark that 
what we aim at, in all critical inquiry, is cognition ; and it is there- 
fore essential that our conclusions be well grounded. The entire 
series of premises must consequently be unconditionally true 
(§ 1984), and we are rationally concerned with the totality of the 
regressive series of conditions (§ 1983). Kant's remark must 
therefore be restricted, not to the cosmological ideas (as Mahaffy 
says Monck suggested; cf. Monck's Introduction to the Critical Phil- 
osophy, pages 90, 100) but to the interest of reason, an interest too 
often overlooked in speculative inquiries, but which ought always 
to be peremptorily decisive. To the question, Why call .Reason a 
special faculty, it may be replied that the distinct terminology 
gives to the argument a precision which would be otherwise un- 
attainable without much circumlocution. To say that Understand- 
ing can not transcend, is equivalent to saying .that Reason, if it 
transcends, can not understand. (Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. Y., pp. 113, 
114, 115, §§43, 44, 46.)] 

§ 2044. — Absolute totality is required of reason only insofar as 
concerns the ascending series of the conditions of a conditioned, 
(page 257, line 18.) Cf. § 1983. 

§ 2045. — Cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the to- 
tality of the regressive synthesis, and proceed in antecedentia, not 
in consequentia. (page 258, line 7.) See § 2051. 

§ 2046. — Transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the 
series of the conditions of a given conditioned, relates merely to 
all past time, (page 258, line 20.) 

§ 2047. — Transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the 
synthesis in a series of conditions applies to space also, (page 258, 
line 30.) 

§ 2048. — Regressive synthesis of the real in space, the absolute 
totality of which is a demand of reason, (page 259, line 21.) 

§ 2049. — Series of causes to a given effect, and in which we as- 
cend from the latter as the conditioned to the former as the con- 
ditions. (Accidents, insofar as they inhere in a substance, are co- 
ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series.) (page 
259, line 30.) [Subject: see § 1595.] 

§ 2050. — Contingent in existence must always be regarded as 
conditioned, and as indicating, according to a law of the under- 



The Clavis to an Index. 715 

standing, a condition, under which it is necessary to rise to a higher, 
till, in the totality of the series, reason arrives at unconditioned 
necessity, (page 260, line 15.) 

§ 2051. — Only four cosmological ideas (§§ 2046-2050) correspond- 
ing with the four titles of the categories. The absolute complete- 
ness (1) of the composition of the given totality of all phenomena, 
(2) of the division of a given totality in a phenomenon, (3) of the 
origination of a phenomenon, and (4) of the dependence of the 
existence of what is changeable in a phenomenon, (p. 260, 1. 22.) 

§ 2052. — Idea of absolute totality relates to nothing but the ex- 
position of phenomena, and therefore not to the pure conception 
of a totality of things, (page 260, line 41.) 

§ 2053. — Eeason sets out from the idea of totality, although its 
proper and final aim is the unconditioned (of the whole series, or 
of a part thereof), (page 261, line 9.) 

§ 2054. — Unconditioned may be cogitated either as existing only 
in the entire series, or as only a part of the series. In the second 
case, there exists a first in the series, (page 261, line 39.) 

§ 2055. — World is termed nature when it is regarded as a 
dynamical whole — when our attention is not directed to the aggre- 
gation in space and time, for the purpose of cogitating it as a 
quantity, but to the unity in the existence of phenomena, (page 

262, line 15.) 

§ 2056. — Nature substa?itive (materialiter), the sum total of phe- 
nomena insofar as they, by virtue of an internal principle of caus- 
ality, are connected with each other throughout, (page 262, line 
35.) Of. §§ 1643, 1826. 

§ 2057. — Cosmical conceptions. [In a more limited signification, 
only the two mathematical ideas are so called, according to § 2058.] 
(page 263, line 3.) Of. § 2040. 

§ 2058. — Transcendent physical conceptions (the two dynamical 
ideas), (page 263, line 17.) See § 2203. 

TITLE II.— ANTITHETIC OF PURE REASON. (g§ 2059-2118 inclusive.) 

§ 2059. — Antithetic is engaged in considering the contradictory 
nature of the general cognitions of reason, and its causes, (page 

263, line 28.) 

§ 2060. — Transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the 
antinomy of pure reason, its causes and result, (page 263, line 35.) 

§ 2061. — Questions which naturally arise in the consideration of 
this dialectic of pure reason, (page 264, line 9.) 

§ 2062. — Distinguishable from all sophistical propositions. A 
natural and unavoidale illusion, (page 264, line 15.) 

§ 2063. — Eelates to the unity of reason in pure ideas. If it is 



716 Kant's Ethics. 

adequate to the unity of reason, it is too great for the understand- 
ing, (page 264, line 27.) 

§ 2064.— Allow the combat to be first decided, (p. 264. I. 37.) 

§ 2065. — Skeptical method aims at certainty, by endeavoring to 
discover in a conflict of this kind, conducted honestly and intelli- 
gently on both sides, the point of misunderstanding. It is thor- 
oughly distinct from skepticism, (page 265, line 16.) 

§ 2066. — Skeptical method is essentially peculiar to transcenden- 
tal philosophy. Transcendental reason presents us with no other 
criterion than that of an attempt to reconcile such assertions, and 
for this purpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict between 
them, (page 265, line 36.) 

Article I. — First conflict of the transcendental ideas. (§§2067- 
2080 inclusive.) 

Text of the first thesis. (§ 2067.) 

§ 2067. — Thesis of the first antinomy. The world has a begin- 
ning in time, and is also limited in regard to space, (page 266, line 
20.) [Cf. article Buddhism (vol. iii., page 396) American Cyclo- 
paedia : "A Buddha alone can conceive the worlds. It is heresy 
to believe the worlds limited or illimited, or neither limited nor il- 
limited." " ' The worlds are, from the not-beginning, in a continual 
revolution of arising and of perishing.' "] 

Proof of the first thesis. (§§ 2068, 2069.) 

§ 2068. — Infinite series already elapsed is impossible, (page 266, 
line 25.) 

§ 2069. — Infinite aggregate of actual things can not be con- 
sidered as a given whole, (page 267, line 10.) 

Text of the first antithesis. (§2070.) 

§ 2070. — Antithesis of the first antinomy. The world has no 
beginning, and no limits in sj>ace, but is, in relation both to time 
and space, infinite, (page 266, line 20.) 

Proof of the first antithesis. (§§ 2071, 2072.) 

§ 2071.- — Origination of a thing in a void time is impossible, (page 
266, line 26.) 

§ 2072. — Relation of the world to a void space is merely a rela- 
tion to no object. Empirical intuition is not a composition of phe- 
nomena and space, (page 267, line 14.) 

Observations on the first antinomy. (§§ 2073-2080 inclusive.) 

On the first thesis. (§§ 2073-2077 inclusive.) 

§ 2073. — Advantage presented by the mistakes of the dogmatists 
has been completely set aside, (page 268, line 22.) 

§ 2074. — Thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated by 
the introduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a 
given quantity, (page 269, line 7.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 717 

§ 2075 — True conception of an infinite whole, (p. 269, 1. 26 ) 

§ 2076. — True (transcendental) conception of infinity is that 
the successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given 
quantum can never be completed, (page 270, line 10.) 

§ 2077. — Conception of the totality of the manifold of a world 
infinite in extension, is the representation of a completed synthe- 
sis of its parts ; and this completion, and consequently its concep- 
tion, is impossible, (page 270, line 23.) 

On the first antithesis. (§.§ 2078-2080 inclusive.) 

§ 2078. — Some ways of escaping this conclusion, (p. 268, 1. 32.) 

§ 2079. — Space (filled or void) may be limited by phenomena, 
but phenomena can not be limited by an empty space without 
them, (page 269, line 10.) 

§ 2080. — Question relates to the mundus phenomenon and its 
quantity ; and in this case we can not make abstraction of the 
conditions of sensibility, without doing away with the essential 
reality of this world itself, (page 270, line 6.) See § 1885. 

Article II — Second conflict of the transcendental ideas. (§§ 2081- 
2093 inclusive.) 

Text of the second thesis. (§ 2081.) 

§ 2081. — Thesis of the second antinomy. Every composite sub- 
stance in the world consists of simple parts ; and there exists 
nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed of simple 
parts, (page 271, line 21.) 

Proof of the second thesis. (§§2082, 2083.) 

§ 2082. — Impossible to annihilate composition in thought ; or else 
after such annihilation, there must remain something that subsists 
without composition, (page 271, line 28.) 

§ 2083. — Although we never can separate and isolate the ele- 
mentary substances from the state of composition, reason must 
cogitate these as the primary subjects of all composition, and con- 
sequently as prior thereto — and as simple substances, (page 272, 
line 30.) [The thesis amounts simply to showing that the concep- 
tion of substance is not the conception of the composite. But the 
category authorizes/us merely to predicate substance (of accidents, 
or appearances) as an existent substratum or foundation. Whatever 
predicates (e. g. simplicity) we choose to think to substance, we 
can not conjoin them with it in cognition unless we have them 
given in (at least possible) intuition. But simplicity is not given 
in intuition. (See §§ 2022, 2011.)] 

Text of the second antithesis. (§ 2084.) 

§ 2084. — Antithesis of the second antinomy. No composite 
thing in the world consists of simple parts ; and there does not 
exist in the world any simple substance, (page 271, line 29.) 



718 Kant's Ethics. 

Proof of the second antithesis. (§§ 2085-2087 inclusive.) 

§ 2085. — Every thing' real that occupies a space, contains a mani- 
fold the parts of which are external to each other. Every part of 
the composite must occupy a space, (page 271, line 35.) 

§ 2086. — Simplicity can not be inferred from any perception 
whatever. The absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective 
reality of which can not be demonstrated in any possible experi- 
ence, (page 272, line 30.) [§1883.] 

§ 2087. — Drives it entirely oat of nature, (page 273, line 33.) 

Observations on the second antinomy. (§§ 2088-2093 inclusive.) 

On the second thesis. (§§ 2088-2091 inclusive.) 

§ 2088. — Substantial whole, as the true composite, (p. 274, 1. 5.) 

§ 2089. — Space ought not to be called a composition, but a totum. 
(page 274, line 16.) 

§ 2090. — Inference of the simple from the composite is valid only 
of self- subsisting things, (page 275, line 3.) 

§ 2091. — Proper signification of the word monas. (p. 275, 1, 34.) 

On the second antithesis. (§§ 2092, 2093.) 

§ 2092. — Against the assertion of the infinite sub-divisibility of 
matter, whose ground of proof is purely mathematical, objections 
have been urged by the monadists. (page 274, line 11 ) 

§ 2093 — Dogmatical proposition which (among all such sophis- 
tical statements) is the only one that undertakes to prove in the 
case of an object of experience, that which is properly a trans- 
cendental idea (the absolute simplicity of substance), (page 276, 
line 34.) Cf. § 2011. 

Article III. — Third conflict of the transcendental ideas. (§§ 2094- 
2104 inclusive.) 

Text of the third thesis. (§ 2094.) 

§ 2094. — Thesis of the third antinomy. Causality according to 
the laws of nature is not the only causality operating to originate 
the phenomena of the world. A causality of freedom is also neces- 
sary to account fully for these phenomena, (page 278, line 3.) 

Proof of the third thesis. (2095, 2096.) 

§ 2095. — Nothing can happen without a sufficient apriori deter- 
mined cause. [Self-contradictory law of nature.] (p. 278, 1. 12.) 

§ 2096. — Eollows that a causality must be admitted by means of 
which something happens without its cause being determined ac- 
cording to necessary laws by some other cause preceding, (page 
279, line 33.) 

Text of the third antithesis. (§ 2097.) 

§ 2097. — -Antithesis of the third antinomy. There is no such 



The Clavis to an Index. 719 

thing as freedom, but every thing in the world happens solely 
according to the laws of nature, (page 278, line 14.) 

Proof of the third antithesis. (§§ 2098, 2099.) 

§ 2098. — Transcendental freedom is opposed to the natural law 
of cause and effect, and such a conjunction of successive states in 
effective causes is destructive of the possibility of unity in experi- 
ence, and for that reason not to be found in experience, and is 
consequently a mere fiction of thought, (page 278, line 20.) 

§ 2099. — Nature and transcendental freedom are distinguish- 
able as conformity to law and lawlessness, (page 279, line 21.) 
[Guarantee of a unity complete : a poor guarantee, since it abso- 
lutely requires the unconditioned to complete the unity.] [This 
section is a well written and striking demonstration of the transcen- 
dental helplessness of the understanding.] 

Observations on the thud antinomy. (§§ 2100-2104 inclusive.) 

On the third thesis. (§§ 2100-2102 inclusive.) 

§ 2100. — Transcendental idea of freedom merely presents us 
with the conception of spontaneity of action, as the proper ground 
for imputing freedom to the cause of a certain class of objects, 
(page 280, line 14.) Cf. Mahaffy, in Fischer, page 216. Mahaffy 
refers also to § 2553 (or possibly to § 2552). [Look entirely to ex- 
perience : and experience gives us merely a method, never a ration- 
ale. Cf. § 784.] 

§ 2101. — Action of a free aa-ent must be termed, in regard to 
causality, if not in relation to time, an absolutely primal beginning 
of a series of phenomena, (page 281, line 29.) Cf. § 2214 et seqq. 

§ 2102. — Need of reason to rest upon a free act as the first be- 
ginning of the series of natural causes, (page 283, line 16.) 

On the third antithesis. (§§ 2103, 2104.) 

§ 2103. — Assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to 
causality (transcendental physiocracy), in opposition to the doc- 
trine of freedom, (page 280, line 27.) 

§ 2104. — Faculty must at least exist out of and apart from the 
world. (If the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is 
granted.) (page 282, line 8.) [Subject to the intrusive influences : 
as indeed they are. Witness Kant getting out of his chair op- 
posite. But since the materialist must cogitate a material sub- 
stance or none, he must think freedom as lawlessness — i. e. antag- 
onistic to law.] 

Article IV. — Fourth conflict of the transcendental ideas. (§§2105- 
2118 inclusive.) 

Text of the fourth thesis. (§2105.) 



720 Kant's Mhics. 

§ 2105. — Thesis of the fourth antinomy. There exists either m 
or in connection with the world, either as a part of it or as the 
cause of it, an absolutely necessary being, (page 284, line 3.) 

Proof of the fourth thesis. (§§ 2106, 2107.) Cf. § 2163. 

§ 2106. — Existence of a given condition presupposes a complete 
series of conditions up to the absolutely unconditioned, which alone 
is absolutely necessary, (page 284, line 10.) 

§ 2107. — Supreme condition of the beginning of a series of 
changes must exist in the time in which this series itself did not 
exist (consequent^' must belong to time), (page 284, line 31.) 

Text of the fourth antithesis. (§ 2108.) 

§ 2108. — Antithesis of the fourth antinomy. An absolutely 
necessary being does not exist, either in the world or out of it — as 
its cause, (page 284, line 3.) 

Proof of the fourth antithesis. (§§2109, 2110.) 

§ 2109. — Two cases are possible : (1) at variance with the dynam- 
ical law of the determination of all phenomena in time ; (2) self- 
contradictory, (page 284, line 8.) 

§ 2110. — Must also begin to act, and its causality would there- 
fore belong to time, (page 284, line 31.) 

Observations on the fourth antimony. (§§ 2111-2118 inclusive.) 

On the fourth thesis. (§§ 2111-2115 inclusive.) 

§ 2111. — Can not be permitted in this place to employ any other 
than the cosmological argument, (p. 286, 1. 4.) Cf. §§ 2162, 2318. 

§ 2112. — Leaves it quite unsettled whether this being is the 
world itself, or quite distinct from it. (page 286, line 20.) 

§ 2113. — Not at liberty to break off from this mode of demon- 
stration, and to pass over to something which is not itself a mem- 
ber of the series, (page 287, line 6.) 

§ 2114. — Certain philosophers have nevertheless allowed them- 
selves the liberty of making such a saltus. (page 287, line 37.) 

§ 2115. — Can not reason from empirical contingency to intellec- 
tual, (page 288. line 31.) 

On the fourth antithesis. (§§ 2116-2118 inclusive.) 

§ 2116 — Objections must not be ontological, but must be 
directed against the causal connection with a series of phenomena 
of a condition which is itself unconditioned, (page 286, line 4.) 

§ 2117. — -Observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast. 
The very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis 
the existence of a supreme being, demonstrated in the antithesis — 
and with equal strictness — the non-existence of such a being, 
(page 286, line 35.) [§2147.] 

§ 2118. — Cause of this seeming incongruity, (page 287, line 18.), 



The Clavis to an Index. 721 

TITLE III.— OF THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THESE SELF-CONTRADIC- 
TIONS. (§? 2119-2135 inclusive.) [The whole of this is admirably written, and should, 
receive especial attention, See also \ 2484 et seqq.] 

§ 2119. — Cosmological ideas not arbitrary fictions of thought. 
Attempts to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason, 
(page 290, line 15.) 

§ 2120. — Philosophy discovers a value and a dignity which, if 
it could but make good its assertions, would raise it far above all 
other departments of human knowledge — professing, as it does, to- 
present a sure foundation for our highest hopes and the ultimate 
aims of all the exertions of reason. Questions for the solution of 
which the mathematician would willingly exchange his whole 
science ; for in it there is no satisfaction for the highest aspira- 
tions and most ardent desires of humanity, (page 290, line 30.) 

§ 2121.— Eeason, in the midst of her highest anticipations, finds 
herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and contradictory con- 
clusions, (page 291, line 32.) 

§ 2122. — Consider for a little — what side in the controversy we 
should most willingly take, (page 292, line 5.) 

§2123. — Dogmatism* of pure reason. Principles of the thesis 
not simple, (page 292, line 21.) * Cf. §§2477, 2478. 

§ 2124. — Practical interest, which must be dear to every right- 
thinking man. (page 292, line 37.) 

§ 2125. — Speculative interest of reason manifests itself also on 
the side of dogmatism, (page 293, line 8.) 

§ 2126 — Advantage Of popularity. The Common understanding 
does not find the least difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned 
beginning of all synthesis — accustomed, as it is, rather to follow 
out consequences, than to seek for a proper basis for cognition, 
(page 293, line 24.) 

§ 2127. — Can not discover, on the side of the antithesis, any such 
practical interest arising from pure principles of reason, as moral- 
ity and religion present, (page 293, line 36.) 

§ 2128.— Empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in its 
speculative interests, certain important advantages, (p. 294, 1. 7.) 

§ 2129. — -Receive an objective basis for all our conceptions, and 
instruction in the unvarying laws of things, (page 294, line 31.) 

§ 2130. — Direct us to the right mode of extending the province 
of the understanding, by the help of the only true teacher, experi- 
ence, (page 295, line 6.) 

§ 2131.— Empiricism, if it becomes dogmatic, falls itself into the 
error of intemperance, (page 295, line 31.) 

§ 2132. — Epicurus and Plato assert more in *their systems than 
they know, (page 295, line 37,) ' 



722 Kant' 's Ethics. 

§ 2133. — Seems very extraordinary that empiricism should be 
utterly unpopular, (page 296, line 9.) 

§ 2134. — Architectonic interest of reason, which requires a unity 
not empirical but apriori and rational, forms a natural recom- 
mendation for the assertions of the thesis, (page 297, line 22.) 

§ 2135. — Called to action — the play of the merely speculative 
reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream, (page 298, 
line 1.) I. Cor., xiv., 8. 

TITLE IV.— OF THE NECESSITY IMPOSED UPON PURE REASON OF PRESENT- 
ING A SOLUTION OF ITS TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS. (?§ 2136-2145 in- 
clusive.) [Maliaffy (Fischer, page Ixv.) gives a different version of this head.] 

§ 2136. — Every question arising within certain spheres must ne- 
cessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge 
already possessed, (page 298, line 27.) 

§ 2137. — No question relating to an object presented to pure 
reason, which is insoluble by that reason, (page 299, line 17.) 

§ 2138. — Only the cosmological questions, to which we can de- 
mand a satisfactory answer in relation to the constitution of their 
object, (page 299, line 28.) 

§ 2139. — Case where no answer is the only proper answer, (page 
300, note.) 

§ 2140. — Answer to the transcendental cosmological question 
need not be sought out of the idea, (page 300, line 3.) 

§ 2141. — Nothing uncertain in the pure sciences of reason (1, 
Mathematics; 2, Ethics; 3, Philosophy), (page 300, line 21.) 

§ 2142. — Can not escape the resjjonsibility of at least a critical 
solution of the questions of reason, (page 301, line 25.) 

§ 2143. — Idea of the absolute whole is by no means necessary 
for the explanation of any phenomenon, and the idea can not have 
been in any sense given by the object itself, (page 302, line 13.) 

§ 2144. — Can not seek for explanations of this whole beyond 
itself, in other perceptions, (page 303, line 5.) 

§ 2145. — Must not permit ourselves to say that it is uncertain 
how the object of our inquiries is constituted, (page 303, line 13.) 

TITLE V.— SKEPTICAL EXPOSITION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS PRE- 
SENTED IN THE FOUR TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. (§?2146 2149 inclusive.) [Cf. 
Abelard (Ueberw'eg, Hist. Phil., tr. Morris, 1873, vol. i., page 395) : ''dubitando enim ad 
inquisitionem venimus," ete.] 

§ 2146. — Irresistible summons to institute a critical investiga- 
tion of the question, for the purpose of discovering whether it is 
based on a groundless presupposition, (page 303, line 31.) 

§ 2147. — Cosmological idea either too great or too small for every 
conception of the understanding, consequently completely void in 
relation to an object of exj>erience (i. e. theoretically invalid, and 



The Clavis to an Index. 723 

of merely practical significance), (page 304, line 17.) [Cf. -Fischer, 
page 227, and Mahaffy's note referring to the fourth antinomy. 
It seems ridiculous to remark that system is not the object of the 
thesis ; hut I can not think of any other way to obviate Mahaffy's 
difficulty. In § 2170, to which Mahaffy refers, Kant is concerned 
with the series; while in the antinomy (§2109) he regards the 
unconditioned, and therefore (§ 2147 fourthly) it is the conditioned 
which is too small for the series. To say that the series is too 
large would merely repeat the third antithesis (§2147 thirdly), 
and mistake the fourth cosmological idea, which is the object of 
the fourth antinomy. Furthermore, since by hypothesis (§ 2109) 
the unconditioned may reside in the whole series. I can not see 
that the time required to complete the synthesis is " quite beside 
-the question," as Mahaffy thinks.] [§ 2177.] 

§ 2148. — Possible experience alone can give reality to our con- 
ceptions. Hence a possible empirical conception must be the 
standard by which we are to judge whether an idea is possessed of 
truth or relation to an object, (page 306, line 4.) 

§ 2149. — How to expose the illusion (by a critical examination 
of our conception of the mode in which the object of the cosmolo- 
gical ideas is presented to us. (page 308, line 30 ) 

TITLE VI. -TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION 
OF PURE COSMOLOGICAL DIALECTIC. (§3 2150-2159 inclusive.) 

§ 2150. — All objects of a possible experience are nothing but 
^phenomena. The realist in the transcendental sense regards these 
modifications of our sensibility — these mere representations — as 
things subsisting in themselves, (page 307, line 5.) Cf. § 2952. 

§ 2151. — Unjust to accuse us of holding the long decried theory 
of empirical idealism, (page 307, line 14.) [§ 2699.] 

§ 2152. — Empirical truth of phenomena in space and time is 
guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt, (page 307, line 23.) 

§ 2153. — Objects of experience are not things in themselves, but 
are given only in experience, (page 308, line 11.) 

§ 2154. — Phenomena, as mere representations, are real only in 
perception. To call a phenomenon a real thing prior to percep- 
tion means either that we must meet with this phenomenon in the 
progress of experience, or it means nothing at all. (page 308, line 
.24.) Cf. § 1729 and references, as to perception. 

§ 2155. — Transcendental object — the non-sensuous cause of phe- 
nomena, but merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered 
as a receptivity, (page 308, line 40.) [§ 2920.] 

§ 2156. — Phenomena corresponding to it are not given as things 
in themselves, but in experience alone, (page 309, line 14.) 



724 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2157.— Series in past time is represented as real, not in itself,. 
but only in connection with a possible experience, (p. 309, 1. 23.) 

§ 2158. — Represent to myself all objects existing in all space 
and time : nothing more than the notion of a possible experience, 
in its absolute completeness, (page 309, line 37.) 

§ 2159. — Without any relation to possible experience, they are 
for me non-existent, (page 310, line 5.) 

TITLE VII.— CRITICAL SOLUTION OF THE C0SM0L0GICAL PROBLEM. (2160- 

2174 inclusive.) 

§ 2160. — Antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following 
dialectical argument : If that which is conditioned is given, the 
whole series of its conditions is also given ; but sensuous objects 
are given as conditioned; consequently... (page 310, line 30.) 

§ 2161. — Evident and indubitably certain : If the conditioned 
is given, a regress in the series of all its conditions is thereby im- 
peratively required, (page 311, line 4) 

§ 2162. — Synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, if 
both are things in themselves, is a synthesis of the understanding 
merely, which represents things as they are, without regarding 
whether and how we can cognize them, (page 311, line 14.) [If 
therefore we grant that the conditioned as a thing in itself is given 
to us merely as to its existence, the unconditioned is likewise so 
given. My consciousness of self (§§ 1634, 2782) gives conditioned 
existence or else (since existence must be either conditioned or un- 
conditioned) unconditioned existence, and if the former (which 
I have no doubt is the true alternative), then the latter along with 
it, necessarily, and therefore consciousness of God. But this my 
consciousness of God is not knowledge of God, and to it the cat- 
egories can not be applied. (For the statement of this cosmologi- 
cal argument in precise terms, see §2318 )] 

§ 2163. — Synthesis which constitutes the empirical condition of 
a given conditioned, if I have to do with phenomena, can be es- 
tablished only by an actual regress in the series of conditions, 
(page 311, line 25.) 

§ 2164. — Dialectical fallacy in the cosmological syllogism (§ 2160). 
The major takes the conditioned in the transcendental significa- 
tion which it has in the pure category ; while the : minor speaks of 
it in the empirical signification which it has in the category as 
applied to phenomena. (This is a sophisma figure dictionis. § 
1339.) (page, 312, line 3.) Cf. Fischer, page lxv., where Ma- 
hafly excellently makes the following brief statement : "In all 
four antinomies the theses and antitheses are not contradictories; 
but contraries. Hence we can not argue from the falsity of one 



The Clavis to an Index. 725 

to the truth of the other. All the arguments, therefore, offered, 
are invalid ; but in the case of the latter two, a, modification in 
their statement makes them sub-contraries, in which case we can 
not argue from the truth of one to the falsity of the other." (Cf. 
Abp. Thomson's Laws of Thought, § 84.) See § 2169. 

§ 2165. — Synthesis of the conditioned with the condition, and the 
complete series of the latter (in the major) are not limited by time, 
and do not contain the conception of succession * (page 312, line 
22) [*but only that of causality. The fact that the complete series 
is not limited by time, is further proved by the fact that when we 
•do so limit it, we fall instantly into the conflict of the antinomy, 
from which there is no escape. (See § 2172 )] [ — can not presuppose : 
nor is it at all necessary to presuppose this absolute totality, which 
is not necessary to the understanding. (See § 2143.)] 

§ 2166. — Disputing about nothing, (page 312, line 38.) 

§ 2167. — Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely repri- 
manded by Plato, (page 313, line 18). 

§ 2168. — Contingent condition of the conception. If two oppo- 
site judgments presuppose a contingent impossible or arbitrary 
condition, both (in spite of their opposition — which is, however, 
not properly or really a contradiction) fall away; because the 
condition, which insured the validity of both, has itself disap- 
peared, (page 314, line 1.) See §2164. 

§ 2169. — Dialectical opposition of judgments distinguished from 
analytical. Of two dialectically opposed judgments, both may be 
false, from the fact that the one is not a mere contradictory of the 
other, but actually enounces more than is requisite for a full and 
complete contradiction. Ex. gr. The world is either infinite or 
finite, (page 314, line 19.) [The word noninfinite obscures the 
conception, and should be omitted.] 

§ 2170. — Deny that it is a thing in itself, — the contradictory op- 
position is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one. (page 
314, line 40.) 

§ 2171.- — Series of conditions is discoverable only in the regres- 
sive synthesis itself, and not in the phenomenon considered as a 
thing in itself — given prior to all regress, (page 315, line 17*) 

§ 2172. — Antinomy of pure reason furnishes us with an indirect 
proof of the transcendental ideality of phenomena, (p. 315, 1. 34.) 

§ 2174. — Proofs of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophis- 
tries — are not fallacious, but grounded on the nature of reason, 
and valid — under the supposition that phenomena are things in 
themselves, (page 316, line 14.) 

§ 2174. — Transcendental dialectic does not favor skepticism, 
(page 316, line 21.) 



726 Kanfs Ethics. 

TITLE VIII. -REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF PURE REASON IN RELATION TO 
THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. (§§2175-2183.) 

§ 2175. — Yalid, not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality 
in the object as actual, but as a problem for the understanding, 
requiring it to institute and to continue, in conformity with 
the idea of totality in the mind, the regress in the series of the 
conditions of a given conditioned, (page 316, line 35.) 

§ 2176. — Principle for the enlargement and extension of experi- 
ence as far as is possible for human faculties. Prohibiting any pause 
or rest on an absolutely unconditioned, (page 317, line 13.) See §§ 
1752, 1753. [Subreptio : stealing, purloining ; the amplication of a 
conception or principle beyond or out of its legitimate sphere.] 

§ 2177. — Idea of absolute totality can not be regarded as valid — 
except as a rule for the regressive synthesis in the series of con- 
ditions, according to which we must proceed from the conditioned, 
through all intermediate and subordinate conditions, up to the un- 
conditioned ; although this goal is unattained and unattainable. 
. (page 317, line 38.) [§§ 2413, 2147.] 

§ 2178. — Determine clearly our notion of a synthesis which can 
never be complete. (Progressus in indefinitum.) (page 318, line 18.) 
Cf. §§ 1483, 1555, 2427, 2684, and Mahaffy's note on unendlich. 

§ 2179. — Progressus in infinitum in all cases when we speak of a 
progressus, i. e. an advancement from the condition to the condi- 
tioned, (page 318, line 31.) [But even in case of progressus, it is 
better to say in indefinitum, because, how far soever we produce or 
proceed, our series is finite. I can not agree that the expression in 
infinitum is correct in reference to the power or possibility, because 
I deny these. Although reason supposes possible totality in the 
series of the conditioned, it can no more represent to itself this 
possible totality in a possible experience than it can the totality 
in the regressus. It must posit this totality (as conditioned) in 
its entirety, in order to predicate of it infinity. However, we 
may excuse any science from observing any greater accuracy than 
is required to make its representation clear. (§§ 1983, 2044.)] 

§ 2180. — Problem — how far the regress, which ascends from the 
given conditioned to the conditions, must extend, (p. 319, 1. 9.) 

§ 2181. — Answer to this question is : If the series is given in 
empirical intuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its inter- 
nal conditions proceeds in infinitum; but if only one member of 
the series is given, from which the regress is to proceed to abso- 
lute totality, the regress is possible only in indefinitum. (page 319, 
line 20 ) [I predicate infinite divisibility of body because body 
fills space, and not with any reference to the content or matter 



. The Clavis to an Index. 727 

(see § 2182), except insofar as that matter is itself nothing more 
than the schematism of the understanding. The proof is, that if 
an empirical regress terminates in an atom (proceeds infinitum) 
reason has no ground of complaint. Until the regress has em- 
pirically proceeded in infinitum, we have no ground in experience 
for asserting that the series has been empirically given as a whole. 
I therefore prefer the expression in indefinitum in the case of the 
division of a portion of matter given within certain limits.} 
See §§ 2195, 2196. Cf. §§ 2179, 2427. 

§ 2182. — Series of conditions is not in either case (the regressus 
in infinitum or the regressus in indefinitum) to be considered as ac- 
tually infinite in the object itself, (page 320, line 5.) See Mahaify's- 
note in Fischer, pages 237, 238. 

§ 2183. — Question no longer is, " What is the quantity of this 
series of conditions in itself — is it finite or infinite? " for it is noth- 
ing in itself; but " How is the empirical regress to be commenced, 
and how far ought we to proceed with it? " (page 320, line 10.) 

TITLE IX.— OF THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF 
REASON WITH REGARD TO THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. (§? 2184-2255.) 

§ 2184. — Demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions 
in the world of sense arises from a transcendental employment of 
reason, (page 321, line 5.) 

§ 2185.— Doctrinal principle of reason. A rule for the extension 
of a possible experience. Its influence and value are just as 
great as if it were an axiom for the apriori determination of ob- 
jects, (page 321. line 18.) 

Article I.— Solution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the 
composition of phenomena in the universe. (§§ 2186-2194 inclusive.) 

§ 2186. — Ground of the regulative principle of reason is the prop- 
osition that in our empirical regress no experience of an absolute 
limit, and consequently no experience of a condition which is itself 
absolutely unconditioned, is discoverable, (page 322, line 4.) 

§ 2187. — Rule in terminis, which requires me, to whatever extent 
I may have proceeded in the ascending series, always to look for 
some higher member in the series, whether this member is to be- 
come known to me through experience or not. (page 322, line 14.) 

§ 2188. — Regress to the unconditioned quantity of the universe 
(as regards space and time) ought to be called a regressus in indefi- 
nitum. (page 322, line 21.) 

§ 2189. — Follows that I am not entitled to make any assertion 
at all respecting the whole object of experience (the world of sense) ; 
I must limit my declarations to the rule according to which expe- 
rience or empirical knowledge is to attained, (page 323, line 29.) 



728 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2190. — Negative answer respecting the cosmical quantity. 
The world has no beginning in time and no absolute limit in space, 
(page 324, line 1.) 

§ 2191. — Affirmative answer. The regress in the series of phe- 
nomena, as a determination of the cosmical quantity, proceeds in 
indefinitum. (page 324. line 13.) 

§ 2192. — Eule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one 
kind of phenomena, (page 324, line 26.) 

§ 2193. — Phenomena in the world are conditionally limited ; but 
the world itself is not limited either conditionally or uncondition- 
ally, (page 325, line 5.) 

§ 2194. — Conception of the cosmical quantity is given only in 
and through the regress, and not prior to it. (page 325, line 10.) 

Article II. — Solution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the 
division of a whole given in intuition. (§§ 2195-2201 inclusive.) 

§ 2195.- — Division of the parts of a given whole proceeds in infin- 
itum, (page 325, line 25.) [§2181.] 

§ 2196. — Can not affirm of a whole which is divisible in infinitum, 
that it consists of an infinite number of parts, (page 326, line 3.) 

'§ 2197. — Every limited space is divisible to infinity, (page 326, 
line 16.) 

§ 2198. — Body is consequently divisible to infinity, though it 
does not for that reason consist of an infinite number of parts, 
(page 326, line 20.) 

§ 2199. — Substance in the phenomenal world is merely a perma- 
nent sensuous image, and nothing more than an intuition, in 
which the unconditioned is not to be found, (page 326, line 26.) 
See §§ 1595, 1895. 

§ 2200. — Organized body. Eule of progress to infinity is not 
applicable to a whole consisting of a number of distinct parts and 
constituting a quantum discretum.j (page 327, line 4) [f disjoined, 
distinct, separate (see Webster) ; opposed to continuous.] 

§ 2201. — How far the transcendental division of a phenomenon 
must extend, we can not know from experience ; it is a question 
which experience can not answer ; it is answered only by the prin- 
ciple of reason which forbids us to consider the empirical regress, 
in the analysis of extended body, as ever absolutely complete, 
(page 327, line 29.) See §2182, and Mahafly, loc. cit. 

Concluding remark on the solutioti of the transcendental mathemati- 
cal ideas, and introductory to the solution of the dynamical ideas. 
(§§ 2202-2206 inclusive.) 

§ 2202. — Homogeneity of the whole series was assured. We did 
not consider the object (that is, the conditioned), but the series of 



The Clavis to an Index. 729 

conditions belonging to the object, and the magnitude of that 
series, (page 328, line 6.) 

§ 2203. — Dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Opens up to us 
an entirely new view of the conflict in which reason is involved, 
(page 328, line 30.) Cf. §§ 270, 2058. 

§ 2204. — Conception of the understanding which lies at the 
basis of these ideas, contains a synthesis either of the homogene- 
ous or of the heterogeneous, (page 329, line 15.) 

§ 2205. — Dynamical series of sensuous conditions admits a 
heterogeneous condition, which is not a member of the series, but, 
as purely intelligible, lies out of and beyond it. (page 329, line 24.) 

§ 2206. — Eesult which we should not have expected from an 
antinomy. Both propositions of reason may be shown to be true 
in their proper signification, (page 329, line 33.) 

Article III — Solution of the cosmologieal idea of the totality of the 
deduction of cosmical events from their causes. (§§ 2207-2245.) 

§ 2207. — Only two modes of causality cogitable. The causality 
of nature, or of freedom, (page 330, line 12.) 

§2208 — Freedom in the cosmologieal sense: a faculty of the 
spontaneous origination of a state, (page 330, line 22.) 

§ 2209. — Practical conception of freedon is based upon the trans- 
cendental idea. The question of the possibility of the former is 
difficult only as it involves the consideration of the truth of the 
latter, (page 331, line 9.) 

§ 2210. — Question of the possibility of freedom is properly 
transcendental, (page 331, line 35.) 

§ 2211. — Dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. 
The dynamical ideas relate to an object considered (not as a quan- 
tity, but) as an existence, (page 332, line 6 ) 

§ 2212. — Question is : Whether an effect, determined according 
to the laws of nature, can at the same time be produced by a free 
agent, (page 332, line 18.) 

§ 2213. — Freedom is impossible if phenomena are things in 
themselves, (page 332, line 31.) [A careful reading of § 2213 leads 
me to think that Mahaffy is wrong (Fischer, page Ixxiv.) in saying 
"phenomenally speaking from nothing " — phenomenal ground being 
always to be found in the preceding time.] 

Possibility of freedom in harmony with the universal law of natural 
necessity. (§§ 2214-2221 inclusive.) 

§ 2214. — Causality may be considered to be intelligible as re- 
gards its action (the action of a thing which is a thing in itself), 
and sensible as regards its effects (the effects of a jmenomenon be- 
longing to ""he sensible world), (page 333, line 21). Cf. Mahaffy 

47 



730 Kant's Ethics. 

(Fischer, page lxxix). See Mahaffy 's appendix to the Pro- 
legomena (page 273), and his appendix to Fischer (page 369), and 
his preface to Fischer (page lxxii). [I do not think Prof. Ma- 
haffy's retranslation (of §§ 2214-2231) necessary. I have noted 
the principal variations (§§2218,2219,2226 and 2228). I have 
not discovered any difficulty of importance in Meiklejohn.] [/Sen- 
suous : see Kant's note to § 1885.] 

§ 2215. — Twofold manner of cogitating a power residing in a _ 
sensible object does not run counter to any of the conceptions 
which we ought to form of the world of phenomena, or of possible 
experience, (page 333, line 31.) 

§ 2216. — Every effective cause must possess a character,* that is 
to say a law of its causality, without which it would cease to be a 
cause, (page 334, line 5). [*"The peculiar qualities or properties 
by which one thing is distinguished from another." — Webster.'] 

§ 2217. — Causality of the subject, in so far as it is intelligible, 
would not form part of the series of empirical conditions which 
determine and necessitate an event in the world of sense. No 
action would begin or cease to be in this subject, (page 334, 
line 21.) 

§ 2218. — Intelligible character of a thing can not be immediately 
cognized, but it must be capable of being cogitated in harmony 
with the empirical character, (page 334, line 31.) For: so wie : 
Prof. Mahaffy renders this just as, making it an illustration. Dr. 
Harris says just as is more literal, and more stiff also, than for. [I 
am indebted to Dr. Harris for the G-erman words. I do not pos- 
sess the German text, and could not understand it if I did.] 

§ 2219. — All requisites for a complete and necessary determina- 
tion of these actions must be presented to us by experience, (page 
334, line 38.) How : Mahaffy translates, " when influenced by ex- 
ternal phenomena — when cognized through experience in its em- 
pirical character, i. e. in the law of its causality — all its actions 
must be explicable according to natural laws, and all the requisites 
for their complete and necessary determination must occur in pos- 
sible experience." (M. Proleg, page 275.) 

§ 2220. — Must in its actions be free from and independent of 
natural necessity, for this necessity exists only in the world of 
phenomena, (page 335, line 8.] 

§ 2221. — Determined by prior empirical conditions, by virtue of 
the empirical character, which is the phenomenon of the intel- 
ligible character, (page 335, line 18.) 

Exposition of the cosmological idea of freedom in harmony with the 
universal law of natural necessity. (§§ 2222-2245 inclusive.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 731 

§ 2222. — Now proceed to exhibit the several momenta of thig 
solution, (page 335, line 32.) 

§ 2223. — Law of the understanding from which no departure, 
and to which no exception, can be admitted, (page 335, line 38.) 

§ 2224. — Obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of 
causes, in which, however, absolute totality can not be found, 
(page 336, line 13.) 

§ 2225. — Action which forms an absolute beginning is beyond 
the causal power of phenomena, (page 336, line 26.) 

§ 2226. — Empirical causality may be itself the effect of a non- 
empirical and intelligible causality, its connection with natural 
causes remaining nevertheless intact, (page 336, line 36.) A 
phenomenon : Professor Mahaffy translates, " The causality of their 
cause, which (cause) is also a phenomenon, must be merely em- 
pirical ? " See in Fischer, page lxxii., and see different transla- 
tions by Professor Mahaffy in Fischer, page 372, and in the Pro- 
legomena (appendix) page 278. 

§ 2227. — Physical explanations of physical phenomena may 
proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without 
opposition, (page 337, line 9.) 

§ 2228. — -Phenomenon * of the subject (with all its phenomenalf 
causality) would nevertheless contain certain conditions which, if 
we ascend from the empirical to the transcendental object, must 
necessarily be regarded as intelligible, (page 237, line 16.) [*Prof. 
Mahaffy translates noumenon; but I do not see how a noumenon 
can contain conditions, while I can easily think that conditions 
may refer to (i. e. indicate) a noumenon. Dr. Harris says that 
Kant's second edition reads phenomenon, but Hartenstein has 
changed it to noumenon as a conjectural emendation. It' seems to 
me that the source of the confusion is to be found in the conjunc- 
tions. Meiklejohn renders it, " and the phenomenon only of the 
subject," which will not do at all. Dr. Harris says that it should 
read, " and only the phenomenon of the subject." This points us 
at once to the real meaning, which would then be conveyed by 
merely omitting and as superfluous — i. e. " only the phenomenon," 
that is to say, " observe furthermore that the phenomenon of the 
subject," or, " and notwithstanding this natural nexus the phenom- 
enon of the subject," in which latter case w T e may preserve the 
comma which Harris says precedes and in the German (Meikle- 
john has a semicolon), and which I take it indicates the closeness 
of Kant's thought, and accounts for the double conjunction. (It 
is the closeness of the thought which occasions Kant's long sen- 
tences, and makes Mahaffy's attempts to break them up disastrous. 



732 Kant's Ethics. 

He might better have imitated Richardson, who in § 2834 omitted 
to supply a verb which Kant forgot, but who conscientiously gave 
the reader all the aid to excogitation afforded by the original. 
" The German has a comma here," Harris writes, " and goes right 
on to say 'and only the phenomenon.' ' : That is Kant, exactly. 
He always " goes right on to say ; " and if you do not go right on 
with him, you are apt to lose the thought.)] [f Mit alter desselben 
Causalitaet in der Erscheinung : " With all its causality in the 
phenomenal world." So Dr. Harris writes.] When the cause is 
phenomenized : Mahaffy translates, " but so that the action in the 
phenomenon of this cause must be in accordance," etc. (page 279). 

§ 2229. — Intelligible ground of phenomena in the subject, does 
not concern empirical questions, (page 337, line 30.) It has to do 
only with pure thought: Mahaffy renders, " Perhaps it." 

§ 2230. — Man must have an empirical character, (p. 338, I. 4.) 

§ 2231. — Man, in respect of certain faculties, is a purely intel- 
ligible object — intelligible, because its action can not be assigned 
to sensuous receptivity, (page 338, line 14.) See the definition of 
cognition in §1983, and cf. §§2025, 202G, 2032. 2033, 1634, 1635. 
[Self cognition through consciousness of self determination in ac- 
cordance with the moral law is empirical, not apriori. Man's 
knowledge of the law is apriori, and the apperception is pure ; 
but while his knowledge that he ought to act is apriori * his 
knowledge that he does so act is aposteriori. He finds in con- 
sciousness the motives of actions which as perceptions are also at 
the same time sensuously determined. Upon practical ground, 
therefore, we attain a result which we could not anticipate apriori, 
to -wit, that we possess an empirical and aposteriori cognition, 
through pure apperception, of an intelligible man, or that at least 
we are compelled so to represent it, provided we certainly have 
the needed certain knowledge that one of our actions has been de- 
termined by the pure law.] 

§ 2232. — Keason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at 
least we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the im- 
peratives, which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many 
of our executive powers, (page 338, line 28.) See § 37. 

§ 2233. — Ought indicates a possible action, the ground of which 
is a pure conception ; while the ground of a merely natural action 
is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon, (page 339, line 3.) 

§ 2234. — Empirical character of reason. (Conception of a cause, 
as a faculty or power.) (page 339, line 29.) 

• See 8 2552 and cf. 88 2260 and 2360 and 1470. 



The Olavis to an Index. 733 

§ 2235. — Volition of every man has an empirical character, 
which is nothing* more than the causality of his reason, insofar as 
its effects in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule, 
(page 339, line 41.) 

§ 2236. — Actions, in relation to practical reason, as the produc- 
ing cause of these actions, determined, not by empirical causes, but 
by the act of the will, upon grounds of reason, (page 340, line 22.) 

§ 2237. — Empirical character is itself determined by the intelligi- 
ble character, (page 340, line 35.) Cf. Fischer (page 245): " by re- 
garding the empirical character itself to be a consequence of the 
intelligible, a sequence which excludes all succession in time." Cf. § 
2221 : " by virtue of the empirical character, which is the phenom- 
enon of the intelligible character." Cf. § 2243 : " a different in- 
telligible character would have exhibited a different empirical 
character." See Mahaffy Int. Fischer, page lxxvii. Cf. § 2165. 

§ 2238. — Causality of reason in its intelligible character does 
not begin to be. Not the conditions of pure reason, but only their 
effects in the internal sense, precede the act. (page 341, line 1.) 
[The causality of a cause in nature makes its appearance in a de- 
termined time. But the causality of reason makes its appearance 
in a perfectly indeterminate time, which time it alone determines 
for itself by and in its spontaneous action. So appearing, it is 
empirical. (See §2226.)] 

§ 2239. — Condition of a successive series of events, itself em- 
pirically unconditioned. If reason stands in a causal relation to 
phenomena, it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition 
of an empirical series of effects, (page 341, line 14.) 

§ 2240. — ISTo given action can have an absolute and spontaneous 
origin, all actions being phenomena, and belonging to the world 
of experience, (page 341, line 26.) 

§ 2241. — Reason, as the unconditioned condition of all action of 
the will, admits of no time-conditions, although its effect does 
really begin in a series of phenomena — -a beginning which is not, 
however, absolutely primal, (page 342, line 1.) 

§ 2242. — Illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an ex- 
ample from its employment in the world of experience — (offense is 
estimated according to its intelligible character), (p. 342, 1. 29.) 

§ 2243. — Different intelligible character would have exhibited a 
different empirical character ; and when we say that in spite of the 
course which his whole former life has taken, the offender could 
have refrained from uttering the falsehood, this means merely that 
the act was subject to the power and authority — permissive or 
prohibitive — of reason, (page 343, line 29.) Cf. § 2237. \_JYot sub- 



734 Kant's Ethics. 

ject in its causality : although, so far as we know, it can not mani- 
fest its causality otherwise than upon phenomena conditioned in 
time, and is therefore not absolutely free. (Cf. § 1544.)] 

§ 2244. — Beyond the power of our reason to decide, (page 344, 
line 17.) 

§ 2245. — Intention in the above remarks has not been to prove 
the actual existence of freedom, (page 345, line 1.) 

Article IV. — Solution of the cosmological idea of the totality of 
the dependence of phenomenal existences. (§§2246-2255 inclusive.) 

§ 2246. — Guide to an existence which may be the highest con- 
dition of all changeable phenomena, that is, to a necessary being, 
(page 345, line 26.) 

§ 2247. — Existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the 
existence of sensible phenomena, would be perfectly impossible, 
if phenomena were things in themselves, (page 345, line 37.) 

§ 2248. — Important distinction between the dynamical and the 
mathematical regress, (page 346, line 9.) See §270. 

§ 2249. — Way of escape from the difficulty ; for it is not im- 
possible that both of the contradictory statements (§§ 2105 and 
2108) may be true in different relations, (page 346, line 24.) 

§ 2250. — Ground of distinction between the modes of solution 
employed for the third and fourth antinomies, (p. 346, 1. 35.) 

§ 2251. — Regulative principle of reason in relation to the fourth 
antimony, (page 347, line 5.) 

§ 2252. — Set bounds to the law of the purely empirical undei'- 
standing (against any attempts on its part at deciding on the pos- 
sibility of things). It has been shown that the contingency of all 
the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite 
consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary although 
purely intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists be- 
tween them, and that consequently both may be true, (page 347, 
line 18) 

§ 2253. — Cogitate an intelligible ground of phenomena ; as free, 
moreovei', from the contingency of the latter, (page 348, line 4.) 

§ 2254. — -Empirical employment of reason is not affected by the 
assumption of a purely intelligible being, (page 348, line 33.) 

§ 2^55. — Intelligible cause signifies merely the transcendental 
and to us unknown ground of the possibibUy of sensuous phenom- 
ena, (page 348, line 37.) 

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE ANTINOMY OP PURE REASON. (§g 225R, 2257.) 

§ 2256. — Transcendent ideas detach themselves completely from 
experience, and construct for themselves objects the material of 
which has not been presented by experience, and the objective 



The Clavis to an Index. 785 

reality of which is not based upon the completion of the empirical 
series, but upon pure apriori conceptions, (page 349, line 7.) 

§ 2257. — First step which we take out of the world of seuse 
obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with the investi- 
gation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions 
of it all our conceptions of intelligible things, (page 349, line 27.) 

Chapter III— The Ideal of Pure Reason. (§§2258-2371 inclusive.) 
TITLE I. -OF THE IDEAL IN GENERAL, (gg 2258-2263 inclusive.) 

§ 2258. — Ideas are still further removed from objective reality 
than categories ; for no phenomenon can ever present them to the 
human mind in concreto. (page 350, line 17.) \_Cresco — grow.] 

§ 2259. — Ideal (the idea, not in concreto, but in individuo) still 
further removed than the idea from objective reality, (page 350, 
line 32.) 

§ 2260.— Human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which 
possess (not, like those of Plato, creative, but) certainly practical 
power (as regulative principles), and form the basis of the per- 
fectibility of certain actions, (page 351, line 10.) 

§ 2261. — Ideals are not to be considered as chimeras;* on the 
contrary, they provide reason with a standard which enables it to 
estimate by comparison the degree of incompleteness in the ob- 
jects presented to it. (page 351, line 30.) [* Monstrous creations 
of the brain.] 

§ 2262. — Ideals of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to 
present an intelligible conception. They are a kind of monogram, 
drawn according to no determinate rule, (page 352, line 3.) 

§ 2263. — Reason, in its ideals, aims at complete and perfect de- 
termination according to apriori rules, (page 352, line 18.) 

TITLE II. -OP THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL (Prototypon transcendentale). 

• (§§2254-2287 inclusive ) 

§ 2264. — Every conception is, in relation to that which is not 
contained in it, undetermined and subject to the principle of deter ■ 
minability. (page 352, line 28.) 

§ 2265. — Everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject to 
the principle of complete determination, (page 352, line 36.) 

§ 2266. — Principle of complete determination relates to the con- 
tent, and not to the logical form, (page 353, line 8.) 

§ 2267. — Conception of complete determination can not be pre- 
sented in its totality in concreto, and is therefore based upon an 
idea, (page 353, line 18.) 

§ 2268. — Idea of the sum-total of all possibility becomes the 
conception of an individual object, which is completely determined 



736 Kant's Ethics. 

by and through the mere idea, and must consequently be termed 
an ideal of pure reason, (page 353, line 33.) 

§ 2269. — Negation indicates a mere want, or privation, or ab- 
sence. (The logical negation expressed in the word not, does not 
properly belong to a conception, but only to the relation of one 
conception to another in a judgment.) (page 354, line 12.) 

§ 2270. — All conceptions of negatives are accordingly derived 
or deduced conceptions, and realities contain the data and (so to 
speak) the material or transcendental content of the possibility 
and complete determination of all things, (page 354, line 32.) 

§ 2271. — Idea of a sum-total of reality. (In this view, nega- 
tions are nothing but limitations.) (page 355, line 6.) 

§ 2272. — Transcendental ideal which, forms the basis of the com- 
plete determination of every thing that exists, and is the highest 
material condition of its possibility, (page 344, line 15.) 

§ 2273. — Reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the foun- 
dation of its determination of all possible things, takes a course in 
exact analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms, 
(page 355, line 29.) See $§ 1968-1970, and 1996. Perhaps the first 
reference is intended to be or begin with § 1964: [See Mahaffy's 
note in Fischer, pages 254, 255.] 

§ 2274. — Reason, in cogitating the necessary complete determin- 
ation of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being cor- 
responding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal, (page 
356, lino 17.) 

§ 2275. — Possibility of things must be regarded as derived, ex- 
cept that of the thing which contains in itself all reality, (page 

356, line 27.) 

§ 2276. — Object of the ideal of reason — an object existing only 
in reason itself, (page 356, line 38.) 

§ 2277. — Ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple, 
(page 357, line 9.) Cf. § 1516. 

§ 2278. — Highest reality must be regarded rather as the ground 
than as the sum total of the possibility of all things, and the mani- 
fold nature of things be based, not upon the limitation of the 
primal being itself, but upon the complete series of effects which 
flow from it. (page 357, line 14.) 

§ 2279. — Ideal of pure reason is the object-matter of a transcen- 
dental theology, (page 357, line 27.) 

§ 2280. — Hypostatising of the content of the idea into an ideal, 
as an individual being, is a step perfectly unauthorized, (page 

357, line 36.) 

§ 2281. — Endeavor to discover the sources of this dialectic, that 



The Clavis to an Index. 737 

we may have it in our power to give a rational explanation of this 
illusion, (page 358, line 8.). See §§ 2282-2285. 

§ 2282. — Keality of the phenomenon (that element which cor- 
responds to sensation) must be given prom without, as otherwise 
it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be pre- 
sentable to the mind, (page 358, line 20.) Cf. §§ 1522, 1544, 1551. 

§ 2283. — Material of the possibility of all sensuous objects must be 
presupposed as given in a whole ; and it is upon the limitation of 
this whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their dis- 
tinction from each other and their complete determination, are 
based, (page 358, line 27.) 

§ 2284. — Thing is not an object to us unless it presupposes the 
whole or sum total of empirical reality as the condition of its pos- 
sibility, (page 358, line 37.) 

§ 2285. — Natural illusion leads us to consider this principle, 
which is valid only of sensuous objects, as valid with regard to 
things in general, (page 359, line 1.) 

§ 2286. — Proceed afterward to hypostatise this idea of the sum 
total of all reality, by changing the distributive unity of the em- 
pirical exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of 
an empirical w T hole (a dialectical illusion), and by cogitating this 
whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, containing in 
itself all empirical reality, (page 359, line 8.) 

§ 2287. — Ideal of the ens realissimum (although merely a mental 
representation) is (1) objectivised, (2) hypostatised, (3) personified, 
(page 359, note.) 

TITLE III— OP THE ARGUMENTS EMPLOYED BY SPECULATIVE REASON IN 
PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING, (gg 2238-2299.) 

§ 2288. — Foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under 
and above it empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room 
for a why or a wherefore, (p. 359, 1. 22.) [Factitious: artificial. Jr 7 .] 

§ 2289.- — -Argument by which reason justifies its advances toward 
a primal being, (page 360, line 13.) 

§ 2290. — Purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of 
possible things, that conception which possesses no element incon- 
sistent with the idea of absolute necessity, (page 360, line 21.) 
[Remove : prove ?] 

§ 2291. — Can not infer that what does contain in itself the con- 
ditions of all that is possible, must possess unconditioned exist- 
ence : for, precisely because by hypothesis it is unconditioned, it 
possesses no condition which can enable reason to cognize apriori 
its necessary existence* (page 360, line 37.) [* i. e. it is impossible 
to conclude that it might not just as well not exist. (But if the 



738 Kant's Ethics. 

reader prefers, he may put upon this section another meaning, to- 
wit, that we can not infer that what does not contain in itself the 
supreme and complete condition, must therefore not possess un- 
conditioned existence. See §2295.) Cf. § 2326.] See § 2330. 

§ 2292. — Conception of an ens realissimum is that which best 
agrees with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary 
being, (page 361, line 14.) 

§ 2293. — Natural course of human reason. Concludes that the 
Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an ex- 
istence which is absolutely necessary, (page 361, line 23.) 

§ 2294. — Conclusion seems defective in the grounds upon which 
it is supported, (page 361, line 34 ) 

§ 2295. — Can not infer that the conception of a limited being, in 
which the supreme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible 
with the idea of absolute necessity, (page 362, line 8.) This ar- 
gument: §2289. 

§ 2296. — Equilibrium of doubt (as to the validity of the conclu- 
sion of § 2293) destroyed by a practical addition, (page 362, line 
33.) Cf. § 541. [The reader ought to notice in this section (as 
also in § 2236 and elsewhere) the extreme care with which Kant 
avoids the direct and unqualified assertion of positions based on the 
practical law, which are nevertheless practically sufficient. See §§ 
2231, 2232.] 

§ 2297. — Highest cause we regard as absolutely necessary, be- 
cause we find it absolutely necessary to rise to it, and do not dis- 
cover any reason for proceeding beyond it. It is natural that we 
should place the highest causality just where we place supreme* 
causality, in that being which contains the conditions of all possi- 
ble effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that of an 
all-embracing reality, (page 363, line 11.) [* Highest in authority. 
That is, we place the highest possible where we find the highest 
necessary for the practical purposes of our reason.] 

§ 2298. — Only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, 
on the grounds of speculative reason: (1) physico-theological ; 
(2) eosmological ; (3) ontological. (page 363, line 29.) 

§ 229:). — Begin with an examination of the transcendental ar- 
gument, It is the transcendental idea of reason which guides it 
in its pilgrimage and is the goal of all its struggles, (p. 363, 1. 41.) 

TITLE IV. -OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OP AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF GOD. (?g 2300-2315 inclusive.) 

§ 2300. — Conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in 
forming any conception of such a being, (page 364, line 19.) 
§ 2301. — Trouble of conceiving whether and how a being of this 



The Clavis to an Index. 739 

nature is even cogitable, (page 364, line 31.) [Demonstrable: in- 
demonstrable ?] 

§ 2302. — Logical necessity has been the source of the greatest 
delusions. All the examples adduced have been drawn from judg- 
ments and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of 
a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing, (page 

365, line 9.) 

§ 2303. — No contradiction arises if I suppress both subject and 
predicate in thought, (page 365, line 35.) 

§ 2304. — Contradiction is the only criterion of impossibility, in 
the sphere of pure apriori conceptions, (page 366, line 17.) [and in 
further maintaining your position you find yourselves compelled to 
declare, etc.]. 

§ 2305. — Affirmed that there is one and only one conception in 
which the non-being or annihilation of the object is self-contra- 
dictory, and this is the conception of an ens realissimum. (page 

366, line 30.) 

§ 2306. — -Warning against concluding from the possibility of a 
conception (which is logical) the possibility of a thing (which is 
real), (page 367, note.) Nihil negativum §1924. 

§ 2307. — Absurd to introduce (under whatever term disguised) 
into the conception of a thing (which is to be cogitated solely in 
reference to its possibility) the conception of its existence, (page 

367, line 6.) 

§ 2308. — Illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a 
real predicate (a predicate which aids in the determination of a 
thing) resists almost all the endeavors of explanation and illustra- 
tion, (page 367, line 30.) 

§ 2309. — Being is evidently not a real predicate — that is, a con- 
ception of something which is added to the conception of some 
other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain 
determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the cojjula of a judg- 
ment, (page 368, line 9.) 

§ 2310. — Heal contains no more than the possible, (page 368, 
line 25.) See § 1856. 

§ 2311. — Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more 
than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I 
could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real 
existence, (page 368, line 40.) 

§ 2312. — Cause of the present difficulty (§ 2301) becomes ap- 
parent, (page 369, line 12.) 

§ 2313. — All our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by 
perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a percep- 



740 Kant's Ethics. 

tiort) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience, (p. 369, 1. 32.) 
§ 2314. — Synthesis of the possibility of which an apriori judg- 
ment can not be formed, because these realities are not presented to 
us specifically ; and even if this were to happen, a judgment would 
still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of syn- 
thetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of experience, 
to which the object of an idea can not belong, (page 370, line 5.) 
§ 2315. — Ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of 
a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient, (page 370, line 22.) 

TITLE V.-OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF GOD. (gg 2316-2338 inclusive.) 

§ 2316. — Ontological argument an invention entirely due to the 
subtlety of the schools, (page 370, line 31.) 

§ 2317. — Cosmological proof concludes from the given uncon- 
ditioned necessity of some being, its unlimited reality. (Termed by 
Leibnitz the argumentum a coniingentia mundi.) (p. 371, 1. 18.) 

§ 2318 — Cosmological argument really begins at experience, and 
is not completely apriori. (page 371, line 36.) Cf. § 1860 (referred 
to by Meiklejohn) and § 2162. 

§ 2319. — Proof of the cosmological argument. ■ (page 272, line 
10.) Cf. §2324. 

§ 2320. — Imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress, (page 

372, line 20.) Cf. §§ 2324, 2327. 

§ 2321. — Pursues its inquiries in the field of pure conceptions, 
(page 372, line 31.) 

§ 2322. — Presupposed that the conception of an ens realissimum 
is perfectly adequate to the conception of a being of absolute 
necessity, that is, that we may infer the existence of the latter 
from that of the former — a proposition which formed the basis of 
the ontological argument, (page 373, line 12.) 

§ 2323. — Experience has been of no further use than to conduct 
us to the conception of absolute necessity (being utterly in- 
sufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute in any de- 
terminate existence or thing), (page 373, line 25.) 

§ 2324 —Nervus probandi of the cosmological argument, (page 

373, line 41.) § 2319. 

§ 2325. — Possesses the additional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi* 
(page 374, line 19.) [* Irrelevant conclusion. (Elenchos — argu- 
ment, proof, question.)] 

§ 2326. — Cosmological argument contains a perfect nest of dia- 
lectical assumptions, (page 374, line 25.) Above: §2320. 

§ 2327. — Aim of the cosmological argument defeated. (Its aim 
is to avoid the necessity of proving the existence of a necessary 
being apriori from mere conceptions.) (page 375, line 16.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 741 

§ 2328. — No longer the modest enunciation of an admissible 
hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodictic* certainty, 
(page 376, line 14.) [*Apodict — the logical correlate of the math- 
ematical axiom. A logical proposition which does not require 
demonstration. The apodict, like the axiom, must be pointed out 
(apo-deiknumi). Cf. logic 33, 34, 35, §§ 1243-1245.] 

§ 2329. — Aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is 
either to discover a conception which shall harmonize with the 
idea of absolute necessity, or a conception which shall contain that 
idea, (page 376, line 22.) 

§ 2330. — Unconditioned necessity,* which, as the ultimate sup- 
port and stay of all existing things, is an indispensable require- 
ment of the mind, is an abyss on the verge of which human reason 
trembles with dismay, (page 376, line 31.) [* That which is ab- 
solutely unconditioned can not possibly be necessary. I can not 
cogitate internal necessity ; for if I say (for instance) that I am 
under an internal necessity to exist no othewise than in space, I 
immediately ascribe that necessity to some external cause. But 
then, it is external (foreign) necessit}^. If I say that God is, 
I do not condition Him; for I may say that He might just as 
well not be. But the moment I say that He must he, I have 
conditioned Him. In other words, although being is not a predicate, 
necessity is. It follows that the only necessity is external, or rela- 
tive ; and that only is unconditionally necessary without which 
nature could not exist or I possess any experience. But when I 
transcend the bounds of nature and experience, the conception of 
unconditioned necessity becomes self-contradictory ; and instead 
of an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles with 
dismay, I find nothing at all.- That which is an indispensable re- 
quirement of my mind, is an existence unconditionally necessary. 
But this is asserting nothing more than existence. If I say that 
God is unconditionally necessary, I am merely using the strongest 
language to posit His existence ; but if I say that He possesses 
unconditioned necessity, I have so far vitiated my conception that 
it is no longer absolute or unconditioned, and I must now proceed 
to inquire (as Kant suggests) whence God is — that is, I must carry 
the regress further back. See § 2309, and § 2333 sqq.] 

§ 2331. — Ideal of pure reason can not be termed mysterious or 
inscrutable. It must, as a mere idea, be based on the constitution 
of reason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation 
and solution, (page 377, line 7). See §2136. 

Detection and explanation of the dialectical illusion in all transcen- 
dental arguments for the existence of a necessary being. (§§ 2332- 
2338 inclusive.) 



742 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2332. — What is the cause, in these transcendental arguments, 
of the dialectical but natural illusion which connects the concep- 
tions of necessity and supreme reality, and hypostatizes that which 
can not be anything but an idea? (page 377, line 29.) 

§ 2333. — Can not cogitate any single or individual thing as 
necessary, even though 1 may be obliged to admit that all existing 
things have a necessary basis, (page 378, line 9.) 

§ 2334. — Inevitable inference is that necessity and contingency 
are not properties of things themselves, but merely subjective 
principles of reason, (page 378, line 24.) 

§ 2335. — Both principles, in their purely heuristic* and regula- 
tive character, and as concerning merely the formal interest of 
reason, are quite consistent with each other, (page 378, line 36.) 
* Promotive of discovery. See §2401. 

§ 2336. — Must accept the absolutely necessary as out of and be- 
yond the world, (page 379, line 11.) 

§ 2337. — Matter, and in general all that forms part of the world 
of sense, can not be a necessary primal being, nor even a principle 
of empirical unity, (page 379, line 17.) Cf. §§2175, 2176. Cf. 
Fischer, page 269, and § 2380. 

§ 2338. — Absolute necessity exists merely in my own mind, as the 
formal condition of thought, but not as a material and hypostatic 
condition of existence, (page 380, line 15.) 

TITLE VL-OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PHY/SICO-THEOLOGICAL £PROOF. 

(i§ 2339-2354 inclusive.) 

§ 2339. — Grounding our argument upon a determinate experi- 
ence of the phenomena of the present world, their constitution 
and disposition, (page 381, line 7.) 

§ 2340. — Essence of an idea consists in the fact that no experience 
can ever be discovered congruent or adequate with it. (page 381, 
line 19.) 

§ 2341. — All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, 
all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible 
experience and the objects of the sensible world, (p. 381, 1. 32.) 

§ 2342. — -Universe must sink into the abyss of nothingness, un- 
less we admit that, besides this infinite chain of contingencies, 
there exists something that is primal and self-subsistent. (page 
382, line 4.) 

§ 2343. — Supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, 
what is to prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of per- 
fection as to place it above the sphere of all that is possible ? (page 
382, line 26.) 

§ 2344. — Belief in a Divine Author of the universe rises to 
the power of an irresistible conviction, (page 383, line 4.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 743 

§ 2345. — Hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the au- 
thority it has always enjoyed, (page 383, line 15.) 

§ 2346. — Physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to 
prove the existence of a Supreme Being. It must intrust this to 
the ontological argument, to which it serves merely as an intro- 
duction, (page 383, line 26.) 

§ 2347. — Momenta in the physico-theological argument, (page 
384, line 1.) 

§ 2348. — Inferred from the analogy of certain products of nature 
with those of human art. (page 384, line 21.) 

§ 2349. — Demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world, 
whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with 
which he works, but not of a Creator of the world, to whom all 
things are subject, (page 384, line 41.) 

§ 2350. — Conception of this cause must contain certain determinate 
qualities, (page 385, line 18.) 

§ 2351. — Physico-theology incapable of presenting a determinate 
conception of a Supreme Cause of the world, (page 385, line 39.) 

§ 2352. — Recurs, in its embarrassment, to the cosmological argu- 
ment, (page 386, line 8.) 

§ 2353. — Physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard 
with contempt the transcendental mode of argument, (p. 386, 1. 29.) 

§ 2354. — Ontological proof the only possible one, if any proof 
of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the 
understanding is possible at all to pure reason, (page 387, line 12.) 

TITLE VII.-CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY BASED UPON SPECULATIVE 
PRINCIPLES OP REASON. (?g 2355-2371 inclusive.) 

§ 2355. — Theology is based either upon reason, or upon revela- 
tion. The former is cither transcendental or natural theology, 
(page 387, line 23.) 

§ 2356. — Deist believes in a transcendental theology alone; the 
theist acknowledges the possibility of a natural theology also, 
(page 387, line 31.) 

§ 2357. — Transcendental theology divided into cosmotheology 
and ontotheology.. (page 388, line 8.) 

§ 2358. — Natural theology is either physico-theology or moral- 
theology, (page 388, line 15.) 

§ 2359. — Deist believes in a God ; the theist in a Living Cod 
(summa intelligentid). (page 388, line 23.) 

§ 2360. — Practical employment of reason is that by which 1 
cognize apriori what ought to happen, (p. 389, 1. 3.) Cf. § 2231. 

§ 2361. — Moral laws postulate the existence of a Supreme Being, 
(page 389, line 9.) See § 2567. [Postulate: see § 1857.] 



744 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2362. — Theoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a 
thing can not be attained otherwise than apriori by means of con- 
ceptions, (page 389, line 27.) 

§ 2363. — Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to 
an object or certain conceptions of an object which is not given 
and can not be discovered by means of experience, (page 389, 
line 39.) Cf. logic § 1167. 

§ 2364. — -Principle that everything which happens (the empiri- 
cally contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition 
of nature, but not of speculative cognition, (page 390, line 4.) 

§ 2365. — Assertion of a reason employing its principles in a 
speculative manner. Assertion that the existence of substance 
itself is contingent, is not justified by experience, (p. 390, 1. 17.) 

§ 2366. — Bational theology can have no existence unless it is 
founded upon the laws of morality, (page 390, line 35.) 

§ 2367. — All transcendental procedure in reference to specula- 
tive theology is without result, (page 391, line 23.) 

§ 2368. — Cognition of the existence of the object depends upon 
the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the concep- 
tion. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our conception 
without the aid of experience, (page 391, line 38.) Cf. § 2282. 

§ 2369. — Pure speculative reason is of the highest utility in cor- 
recting our conception of the Supreme Being, (page 392, line 30.) 

§ 2370. — Transcendental theology of importance in a negative 
respect. To overthrow all contradictory assertions, be they 
atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic, (page 392, line 39.) 

§ 2371. — Conception which perfects and crowns the system of 
human cognition, but the objective reality of which can neither be 
proved nor disproved by pure reason, (page 393, line 22.) 

APPENDIX TO TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC, (gg 2372-2444 inclu- 
sive.) See I 2836. 

Schorion I. -Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason. 

(gg 2372-2407 inclusive.) 

§ 2372. — Transcendental ideas are as much the natural property 
of the reason as categories are of the understanding, (p. 394, 1. 4.) 

§ 2373. — Errors of subreptio (of misapplication) are to be as- 
cribed to defects of judgment, and not to understanding or reason, 
(page 394, line 18.) C£ §§ 1926-1928. 

§ 2374. — Beason never has an immediate relation to an object; 
it relates immediately to the understanding alone, (p. 394, 1. 35.) 

§ 2375. — Transcendental ideas can never be employed as consti- 
tutive ideas; but they are capable of an admirable and indispens- 
ably necessary application to objects — as regulative ideas, directing 
the understanding to a certain aim. (page 395, line 15.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 745 

§ 2376. — Demands complete unity in the cognition of the un- 
derstanding (not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of 
a system connected according to necessary laws), (p. 395, 1. 39.) 

§ 2377. — Conceptions of reason are not derived from nature ; on 
the contrary we employ them for the interrogation and investiga- 
tion of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long as it 
is not adequate to them, (page 396, line 12.) § 2387. 

§ 2378. — Hypothetical employment of reason, and the demon- 
strative or apodictic* employment of reason, (page 396, line 31.) 
[* See §2328.] 

§ 2379. — Hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas 
employed as problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive, 
but merely regulative, (page 397, line 8.) 

§ 2380. — Object of the hypothetical employment of reason is the 
systematic unity of cognitions, (page 397, line 19.) 

§ 2381. — Systematic unity of cognitions is a logical principle, 
whose aim is to assist the understanding. This regulative prin- 
ciple, transformed by a natural and unavoidable dialectic (§ 1933) 
into an illusory transcendental principle of reason, would render 
this systematic unity objectively necessary, (p. 397, 1. 29.) § 2337. 

§ 2382. — Illustrate this by an example. (Tbe idea of a funda- 
mental power.) (page 398, line 5.) 

§ 2383. — Try to discover and introduce it, so far as is practicable, 
into the sphere of our cognitions, (page 398, line 30.) [In this 
and the preceding section appears, developed as a heuristic prin- 
ciple for the investigation of nature, insofar as it could be properly 
stated as an appendage to a system of pure reason, the doctrine of 
the correlation of forces, anticipating the natural philosophers by 
two generations. This would be a good place for the positivists 
and cosmic philosophers to remark that the pursuit of meta- 
physics is an idle and profitless employment.*] 

* Kant's authority as a natural philosopher is not altogether derived from the 
Critique of Pure Reason, although it might securely rest thereon. Ernst Haeckel, 
Professor in the University of Jena, in his History of Creation (Appleton, New 
York, 1876, vol. i., p. 101), says: " Even in the year 1755, in his 'General History of 
Nature and Theory of the Heavens,' he made the bold attempt to discuss the 
constitution and the mechanical origin of the whole universe, according to 
Newton's principles, and to explain them mechanically by the natural course 
of development, to the exclusion of all miracles. This cosmogeny of Kant's, or 
cosmological gas theory, which we shall briefly discuss in a future chapter," 
[page 321, sqq.], "was at a later day fully established by the French mathema- 
tician Laplace, and the English astronomer Herschel, and enjoys at the present 
day almost universal recognition. On account of this important work alone, in 
which exact knowledge is coupled with most profound speculation, Kant deserves 
the honorable name of a natural philosopher, in the best and purest sense of the 
word." — See Appendix XL below. 

48 



746 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2384. — Transcendental employment of the understanding 
would lead us to believe that this idea of a fundamental power is 
not problematical, but that it possesses objective validity, (page 
398, line 39.) 

§ 2385. — Can not understand how a logical principle of iinity 
can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle 
by which such a systematic unity (as a property of objects them- 
selves) is regarded as necessary apriori. (page 399, line 16.) § 2875. 

§ 2386 — Find this transcendental presupposition lurking in dif- 
ferent forms in the principles of philosophers, (page 399, line 39.) 

§ 2387. — Presupposed by philosophers in the well-known scho- 
lastic maxim which forbids us unnecessarily to augment the num- 
ber of entities or principles, (page 400, line 12.) §§ 2377, 2343. 

§ 2388. — Logical principle of genera, if it is to be applied to. 
nature, presupposes a transcendental principle (of homogeneity), 
(page 401, line 3.) 

§ 2389. — Balanced by another principle, that of species, which 
requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their ac- 
cordance in the same genus, and directs the understanding to attend 
to the one no less than to the other, (page 401,- line 20.) 

§ 2390. — No species or sub-species is to be considered as the low- 
est possible, (page 402, line 3.) See § 1198. 

§ 2391. — Based upon a transcendental law of specification. The 
cognition of phenomena in their complete determination (which is 
possible only by means of the understanding) requires an unceas- 
ingly continued specification of conceptions, and a progression to 
ever smaller differences, of which abstraction had been made in 
the conception of the species, and still more in that of the genus, 
(page 402, line 25.) 

§ 2392. — Law of specification can not be deduced from experi- 
ence, (page 403, line 4.) 

§ 2393. — Understanding belongs to us just as much under the 
presupposition of differences in the objects of nature, as under the 
condition that. these objects are homogeneous, (page 403, line 16.) 

| 2394. — B,eason prepares the sphere of the understanding for 
the operations of this faculty by the principles of (1) the homo- 
geneity, (2) the specification, and (3) the continuity of forms, (page 
403, line 23.) See §§ 2396 and 2397. 

§ 2395. — Illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three 
logical principles. Till we arrive at the highest genus, or univer- 
sal and true horizon, which is determined by the highest concep- 
tion, and which contains under itself all differences and varieties, 
as genera, species, and sub-species, (page 403, line 39.) See § 1065. 



The Olavis to an Index. 747 

§ 2396. — Principle datur continuum formarum indicates that all 
differences of species limit each other and do not admit of transi- 
tion from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller de- 
grees of the difference between the one species and the other, 
(page 404, line 17.) Cf. § 2394. 

§ 2397 — Enouncing the fact of homogeneity as existing even 
in the most varied diversity, by means of the gradual transition 
from one species to another, (page 404, line 39.) 

§ 2398. — Presupposes a transcendental principle, without which 
"the understanding might be led into error. Principles of parci- 
mony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and affinity in 
phenomena, are in accordance both with reason and with nature, 
(page 405, line 9.) § 2892. 

§ 2399. — Continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no ade- 
quate object can be discovered in experience, (page 405, line 29.) 
Meiklejohn refers to § 1735 et. seqq. 

§ 2400. — Arrange these principles of systematic unity in the 
order conformable to their employment in experience : (1) variety; 
(2) affinity; (3) unity, (page 406, line 3.) 

§ 2401. — Available as rules for possible experience. They may 
also be employed with great advantage as heuristic principles 
[i. e. promotive of discovery or invention], (page 406, line 38.) 
[Cf. §§ 1990, 1579, 1592, in reference to deduction.] Asymptotic- 
like a tangent to an infinitely distant curve. See Webster, sub 
nom. Asymptote. [See §2411.] 

§2402. — Principles of pure reason can not be constitutive* 
even in regard to empirical conceptions, because no sensuous 
schema corresponding to them can be discovered, and they can 
not therefore have an object in concreto. (page 407, line 11.) [*§§ 
1714, 1715, 1752, 1753.] Schema : see § 1668. 

§ 2403. — Analogon of a schema for the complete systematic 
unity of all the conceptions of the understanding, (p. 407, 1. 25.) 

§ 2404. — Objective validity of the principles of pure reason as 
regulative principles, (page 408, line 10.) 

§ 2405. — Maxims of reason are subjective principles derived from 
the interest which reason has in producing a certain completeness 
in her cognition, (page 408, line 23.) 

§ 2406. — Eegarded as objective principles, they must not only 
occasion contradictions and polemic, but place hindrances in the 
way of the advancement of truth, (page 404, line 30.) 

§ 2407. — Method of investigating the order of nature which 
guides us to the goal of systematic unity, (page 409, line 31.) 



748 Kant's Ethics. 

Seholion II.— Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Rea- 
son. (§§2408-2443 inclusive.) See §§2837, 748, 2816. 

§ 2408. — Ideas of pure reason can not be of themselves and in 
their own nature dialectical; it is from their miseraployment alone 
that fallacies and illusions arise, (page 410, line 17.) See § 2833 
and Fischer (page lxiv.) where Mahafty quotes from this section, 
in correcting Hamilton. [§ 2435.] 

§ 2409. — Deduction of the ideas of pure reason must be possible, 
if they are to possess the least objective validity, (p. 410, 1. 31.) 

§ 2410. — Object (1) in an absolute sense, or (2) merely an ideal 
object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to determine 
the object ; in the latter case, nothing is present to the mind but a 
mere schema, (page 410, line 40.) 

§ 2411. — Idea is properly a heuristic and not an ostensive* con- 
ception. It does not give us any information respecting the con- 
stitution of an object, (page 411, line 8.) \* Showing. That is, 
promotive of discovery by urging toward the goal, but not itself 
discovering.] §§ 2335, 2401. 

§ 2412. — Transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas (not 
as constitutive principles, but as regulative principles.) (page 411, 
line 24.) See §§ 1753, 2402. 

§ 2413. — Guided by the principles involved in these ideas, (page 
411, line 40.) §§2808,2818. 

§ 2414. — Eegarded not as actual things, but as in some measure 
analogous to them, (page 412, line 29.) See § 2828. 

§ 2415. — Admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend 
our cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience. We ex- 
tend merely the empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of 
systematic unity, (page 413, line 14.) 

§ 2416. — Transcendental and only determinate conception of 
God which is presented to us by speculative reason is in the strictest 
sense deistic. (page 413, line 28.) §§ 2827, 2296, 2573. 

§ 2417. — Admitting a divine being, I can have no conception of 
the internal possibility of its perfection or of the necessity of its 
existence, (page 414, line 3.) 

§ 2418. — Distinction in regard to the way in which we may cog- 
itate a presupposition. I may have sufficient grounds to admit 
something, or the existence of something, in a relative point of 
view (suppositio relativa~), without being justified in admitting it in 
an absolute sense {suppositio absolutd). (page 414, line 16.) 

§ 2419. — Admit the existence of an incomprehensible being of 
this nature (the object of a mere idea) relatively to the world of 
sense., although I have no ground to admit its existence absolutely 



The Clavis to an Index. 749 

and in itself, (page 414, line 28.) [See §2258 and cf. §1673 in 
reference to concrete representation.] See § 2818. 

§ 2420. — Eegarding all connections and relations in the world of 
sense as if they were the dispositions of a Supreme Eeason. (page 
415, line 18.) Cf. § 529. See. § 2825. 

§ 2421. — Cogitate merely the relation of a perfectly unknown 
being to the greatest possible systematic unity of experience, 
(page 415, line 31.) 

§ 2422. — Supposition of a Supreme Being or Cause is purely 
relative, (page 416, line 10.) 

§ 2423. — Unity of reason is the unity of system; and this sys- 
tematic unity is not an objective principle, extending its dominion 
over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending its authority over 
the empirical cognition of objects, (p. 416, 1. 22.) See §§ 328, 2569. 

§ 2424. — Object of the idea forms merely the problematical foun- 
dation of the connection which the mind introduces among the 
phenomena of the sensuous world, (p. 417, 1. 5.) [§ 2441 sab finem.'] 

§ 2425. — Left completely undetermined what the nature or 
properties of this so-called ground may be. (page 417, line 20.) 

§ 2426. — Psychological idea is meaningless and inapplicable, ex- 
cept as the schema of a regulative conception, (page 417, line 33.) 
[Palingenesis : regeneration. See Webster, under Palingenesia.] 

§ 2427. — Cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles, 
and not constitutive, (p. 419, 1. 9.) In indefinitum : see. § 1483. 

§ 2428. — Theological idea does not contain any constitutive 
principle, (page 420, line 1.) 

§ 2429. — Hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as a principle 
which is purely regulative. (Reason aims at the highest degree 
of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a causality accord- 
ing to design in a supreme cause — a cause which it regards as the 
highest intelligence.) (page 420, line 25.) \_Teleological: pertain- 
ing to the science of the final causes of things. See Webster.] 

§ 2430. — Neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely regula- 
tive influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors, (page 
421, line 31.) 

§ 2431. — Inactive reason (ignava ratio) the first error which 
arises from our employing the idea of a Supreme Being as a con- 
stitutive principle, and not as a regulative principle. Prejudicial 
consequences. (Directing us to refer such and such phenom- 
ena immediately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the 
Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to investigate their causes in 
the general laws of the mechanism of matter.) (page 422, line 5.) 
[For which no particular arrangement, etc.: from.'] 



750 Kanfs Ethics. 

§ 2432.- — Perverted reason {perversa ratio) the second error which 
arises from the misconception of the principle of systematic unity. 
(Hinders reason from attaining its proper aim, that is, the proof, 
upon natural grounds, of the existence of a Supreme Intelligent 
Cause.) (page 423, line 32.) [This argument on perverse reason 
is very clear and conclusive.] 

§ 2433. — Eeason ever follows the light of the idea of an Author 
of the Universe, (page 424, line 27.) [Thus, then,] to take, etc.; 
[but, if not misdirected], the investigation, etc. 

§ 2434. — Idea of unity is essentially and indissolubly connected 
with the nature of our reason, (page 425, line 3.) 

§ 2435. — Always possible to answer all the questions \M\\\ C v\}^v f e' 
reason may raise, (page 425, line 19.) Cf. §§ 2137, 2142, 2408. 

§ 2436. — -Whether there is anything distinct from the world, 
which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection ac- 
cording to general laws ? (page 425, line 31.) 

§ 2437. — Whether this being is substance? whether it is of the 
greatest reality ? whether it is necessary ? etc. (page 426, line 3.) 

2438. — Whether we may not cogitate this being, which is dis- 
tinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience? 
(page 426, line 14.) 

§ 2439. — Must assume the existence of a wise and omnipotent 
Author of the world, (page 426, line 33.) 

§ 2440. — Use of this conception and hypothesis in the investi- 
gation of nature, (page 427. line 13.) 

§ 2441. — Justified in introducing into the idea of the Supreme 
Cause other anthropomorphic elements, (p. 428, 1. 12.) Cf. § 2438. 

§ 2442. — Directs reason to its proper field of action, nature and 
her phenomena, (page 428, line 36.) 

§ 2443. — Pure reason is found to contain nothing but regulative 
principles, (page 429, line 5.) 

§ 2444. — Speculative reason can never pass the bounds of pos- 
sible experience, (page 429, line 19.) 

TOME II.— TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF 
METHOD. (§§ 2445-2628 inclusive.) 

§ 2445. — Eelates not to the materials, but to the plan of an 
edifice (if we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative 
reason as an edifice), (page 431, line 3.) [See § 977.] 

§ 2446. — Transcendental doctrine of method, the determination 
of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason, 
(page 431, line 26.) Cf. Fischer, page 277. 



The Clavis to an Index. 751 

Chapter I.— The Discipline of Pure Reason. (g§ 2-447-2541 inclusive.) 

§ 2447. — .Negative judgments. In relation to the content of our 
cognition, their peculiar province is solely to prevent error, (page 
432, line 12.) 

§ 2448. — Discipline takes a negative, culture and doctrine a pos- 
itive part. (The restraint which is employed to repress and 
finally to extirpate the constant inclination to depart from certain 
rules, is termed discipline.) (page 432, line 28.) 

§ 2449. — Reason stands in great need of discipline, to restrain 
its propensity to overstep the limits of possible experience, and to 
keep it from wandering into error, (page 433, line 8.) 

§ 2450. — Discipline of pure reason in the methodology is not 
directed to the content, but to the method of the cognition of pure 
reason, (page 434, line 9.) 

TITLE I. -THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON" IN THE SPHERE OF DOGMA- 
TISM. (;§2451-2480 inclusive.) 

§ 2451. — Mathematics presents the most brilliant example of the 
extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experi- 
ence, (page 434, line 25.) Dogmatical: see § 2478. 

§ 2452. — Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by 
means of conceptions; mathematical cognition is cognition by 
means of the construction of conceptions, (p. 435, 1. 1.) §1021. 

§ 2453. — Philosophical cognition regards the particular only in 
the general ; mathematical, the general in the particular, (page 

435, line 23.) 

§ 2454. — Essential difference of these two modes of cognition 
consists, therefore, in this formal quality (§ 2453) ; it does not re- 
gard the difference of the matter or objects, (page 435, line 31.) 

§ 2455. — Mathematics arrives at results which discursive cog- 
nition can not hope to reach by the aid of mere conceptions, (page 

436, line 24.) [Mahaffy (Fischer, page 279, note) sajs that the 
passage relating to the symbolical representation of the construc- 
tion of conceptions in algebra by means of signs is " confused in 
the translation."] 

§ 2456. — Cause of this difference in the fortune of the philoso- 
pher and the mathematician, (page 437, line 25.) 

§ 2457. — -What is the cause which necessitates this two-fold ex- 
ercise of reason? [§2452.] (page 438, line 25.) 

§ 2458. — -All our knowledge relates finally to possible intuitions, 
for it is these alone that present objects to the mind, (page 438, 
line 33.) Cf. § 2282. 

§ 2459. — Matter of phenomena, by which things are given in 
space and time, can be represented only in perception, aposteriori. 
(page 439, line 1.) 



752 Kant' 8 Ethics. 

§ 2460. — Transcendental propositions can not be framed by 
means of the construction of conceptions. They contain merely 
the rule by which we are to seek in the world of perception or ex- 
perience the synthetical unity of that which can not be intuited 
apriori. (page 439, line 16.) 

§ 2461. — Synthetical judgment regarding a conception must go 
beyond it, to the intuition in which it is given, (page 439, line 28.) 
Cf. §§ 1110, 1701, 1448. 

§ 2462. — Transcendental proposition is a synthetical cognition 
of reason by means of pure conceptions and the discursive method, 
(page 440, line 10.) 

§ 2463. — Discursive and intuitive modes of cognition have the 
properties of universality and an apriori origin in common, but 
are, in their procedure, of widely different character, (page 
440, line 26.) 

§ 2464. — Masters in the science of mathematics are confident of 
the success of this method in other regions of mental endeavor 
besides that of quantities, (page 441, line 34.) 

§ 2465. — Mathematical method is unattended in the sphere of 
philosophy by the least advantage, (page 442, line 27.) 

§ 2466. — Evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, ax- 
ioms and demonstrations. None of these forms can be employed 
or imitated in philosophy, in the sense in which they are under- 
stood by mathematicians, (page 443, line 1.) 

§ 2467. — Definition is the representation, upon primary grounds, 
of the complete conception of a thing within its own limits, (page 
443, line 14.) 

§ 2468. — Empirical conception can not be defined ; it can only 
be explained, (page 443, line 16.) 

§ 2469. — Apriori conceptions, such as those of substance, cause, 
right, fitness, can not be defined, (page 444, line 3.) 

§ 2470. — Arbitrary conceptions can always be defined. Conse- 
quently, the science of mathematics alone possesses definitions, 
(page 444, line 19.) 

§ 2471. — Philosophical definitions are therefore merely exposi- 
tions of given conceptions, while mathematical definitions are con- 
structions of conceptions originally formed by the mind itself, 
(page 445, line 1.) 

§ 2472. — Must not imitate in philosophy, the mathematical usage 
of commencing with definitions — -except by way of hypothesis or 
experiment, (page 445, line 9.) 

§ 2473. — Mathematical definitions can not be erroneous, (page 
445, line 25.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 753 

§ 2474. — Axioms, insofar as they are immediately certain, are 
apriori synthetical principles, (page 446, line 16.) 

§ 2475. — Philosophy possesses no axioms, and has no right to 
impose its apriori principles upon thought until it has established 
their authority and validity by a thorough-going deduction, (page 
446, line 28.) List of principles: §§ 1713, 1714. 

§ 2476. — Demonstration : an apodictic proof, based upon intui- 
tion. Discursive proofs ought to be termed acroamatic * proofs, 
rather than demonstrations, (page 447, line 14.) [* Cf. Logic, § 
1245. Designed for hearing only, while a demonstration is 
something pointed out, to be seen.] 

§ 2477. — Not consonant with the nature of philosophy, especi- 
ally in the sphere of pure reason, to employ the dogmatical method, 
and to adorn itself with the titles and insignia of mathematical 
science, (page 448, line 1.) 

§ 2478. — Dogma is a direct synthetical proposition, based on 
conceptions ; a proposition of the same kind, based on the con- 
struction of conceptions, is a mathema. (page 448, line 21.) 
[Dogma (from dokeo) means that which appears to be, or seems 
to be. It does not mean that which is seen to be, for dokeo is 
strictly opposed to einai. (See Liddell and Scott's Greek-English 
Lexicon, Article Dokeo.) It follows that a dogma is a rule con- 
structed to simulate an axiom or demonstration. A dogma is not 
necessarily false ; but it can not be shown to be true. Hence dog- 
mata constitute the rational dialectic, and are not able to contend 
successfully with discursive principles based upon experience, 
although these latter may be equally dogmatic] 

§ 2479. — Pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not 
contain a single direct synthetical judgment based upon conceptions. 
When experience is presupposed, the principles of the pure under- 
standing [§ 1713] are apodictically certain ; but in themselves and 
directly, they can not even be cognized apriori. (page 448, line 39.) 
See §1706. [Theorem: a demonstrable mathema; a rule based 
upon contemplation (§ 1963).] 

§ 2480. — Dogmatical methods only serve to conceal errors and 
fallacies, and to deceive philosophy, (page 449, line 20.) 

TITLE II— THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN POLEMICS. (?? 2481-2516.) 

§ 2481. — Eeason must be subject, in all its operations, to criti- 
cism, (page 449, line 39.) 

§ 2482. — Justification of reason, when it has to defend itself, 
not before a judge, but against an equal, (page 450, line 12.) 

§ 2483. — Polemic of pure reason is the defense of its propositions 
made by reason in opposition to the dogmatical counter-proposi- 
tions advanced by other parties ! (page 450, line 26.) 



754 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2484. — Keason in its highest exercise falls into an antithetic — 
but we found that it was based upon a misconception [§ 2164]. 
(page 450, line 36.) 

§ 2485. — Cases in which a similar misunderstanding can not be 
provided against, (page 451, line 13.) 

§ 2486. — Sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal proposi- 
tions of pure reason (the existence of a Supreme Being and the 
immortality of the soul) can not be hoped for. (But we can always 
meet our opponent with a non liquet [" My firm foundation does 
not melt away" (§1962)]. See §2534.) (page 451, line 33.) 

§ 2487. — Appear no combatant whom we need to fear, (page 
452, line 22.) Cf. § 2498. 

§ 2488. — Everything in nature is good for some purpose, (page 
452, line 32.) Cf. § 2833. 

§ 2489. — Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, 
and combat him only with the weapons of reason, (p. 453, 1. 13.) 

§ 2490. — Unfair to decry Priestley and Hume, blameless in 
moral character, (page 453, line 26.) 

§ 2491. — Absurd to expect to be enlightened by reason, and at 
the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she 
must adopt, (page 454, line 20.) 

§ 2492. — Strife of dialectic requires perfect freedom, (p. 455, 1. 9.) 

§ 2493. — Unworthy propensity to conceal our real sentiments, 
and to give expression only to certain received opinions, corrupts 
the heart, (page 455, line 16.) 

§ 2494. — Tendency to misrepresentation and hypocrisy in the 
sphere of speculative discussion, (page 455, line 40.) 

§ 2495. — Consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, 
there can be really no polemic of pure reason, (page 456, line 36.) 

§ 2496. — Critique of pure reason. Why it may be regarded as 
the highest tribunal for all speculative disputes, (p. 457, 1. 16.) 

§ 2497. — Freedom of critical investigation will, among other 
things, permit of our openly stating the difficulties and doubts 
which we are ourselves unable to solve, (page 457, line 39.) 

§ 2498. — Dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to 
criticism, and enables us to test and correct its principles, w T hile 
there is no occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and re- 
sults of his reasoning, (page 458, line 5.) 

§ 2499. — Critical system ought to be pursued in academical in- 
struction, (page 458, line 40.) 

§ 2500. — Skepticism is merely a means of awakening reason 
from its dogmatic dreams, and exciting it to a more careful inves- 
tigation into its own powers and pretensions, (page 460, line 11.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 755 

Skepticism not a permanent state for human reason. (§§ 2501- 
2516 inclusive.) 

§ 2501. — Consciousness of ignorance (unless this ignorance is 
recognized to be absolutely necessary) ought, instead of forming 
the conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest motive ' to the 
pursuit of them, (page 461, line 8.) 

§ 2502. — Cognition of absolutely necessary ignorance is an 
apriori science, (page 461, line 22.) [TSTote the use of word apriori 
in this section, sub finem.'] §1071. 

§ 2503. — Sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems 
to us to be a level surface, with an apjDarent horizon. All the 
questions raised by pure reason relate to that which lies beyond 
this horizon, or at least in its boundary line. (p. 462, 1. 5.) § 2832. 

§ 2504. — Hume was unable to determine the horizon of our 
knowledge. He inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason 
to pass the region of the empirical, (page 462, line 14.) § 1065. 

§ 2505. — Skepticism must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding 
all transcendent employment of principles, (page 462, line 31.) 

§ 2506. — Criticism demonstrates from indubitable principles, not 
merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in re- 
gard to all possible questions-of a certain class, (page 462, line 40.) 

§ 2507. — Eeason is not to be considered as an indefinitely ex- 
tended plane, of the bounds of which we have only a general 
knowledge; it ought rather to be compared to a sphere, the radius 
of which may be found from the curvature of its surface (that is, 
the nature of apriori synthetical propositions), and consequently 
its circumference and extent, (page 463, line 17.) Cf. § 2642. 

§ 2508. — Eeason is the sole creator of all her ideas, and is there- 
fore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their il- 
lusory nature, (page 463. line 28.) See §2435. 

§ 2509. — Skepticism does not in itself give us any certain infor- 
mation in regard to the bounds of our knowledge, (p. 464, 1. 13.) 

§ 2510. — Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all 
skeptical philosophers, and his writings have undoubtedly exerted 
the most powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough 
investigation into its own powers, (page 464, line 26.) Cf. § 2639. 

§ 2511. — Hume did not distinguish the synthetical judgments of 
the pure understanding from those of the pure reason. The so- 
called apriori principles of these faculties he regarded as nothing 
but subjective habits of thought originating in experience, (page 
464, line 34.) 

§ 2512. — Hume was wrong in inferring, from the contingency of 
the determination according to law, the contingency of the law 



756 Kant's Ethics. 

[of causality] itself; and the passing beyond the conception of a 
thing to possible experience (which is an apriori proceeding, con- 
stituting the objective reality of the conception) he confounded 
with our synthesis of objects in actual experience, which is always 
empirical, (page 465, line 18.) 

§ 2513. — Hume denies, with truth, certain powers to the under- 
standing ; but he goes further, and declares it to be utterly inade- 
quate to the apriori extension of knowledge, although he has not 
fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty, (page 
466, line 13.) 

§ 2514. — Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded 
claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of 
reason; against which [latter], however, his attacks are mainly 
directed, (page 466, line 39.) 

§ 2515. — Attacks of skepticism are not only dangerous but 
destructive to the uncritical dogmatist, (page 467, line 12.) 

§ 2516. — Skeptical procedure in philosophy does not present 
any solution of the problems of reason ; but it forms an excellent 
exercise for its powers, awakening its circumspection, and indicat- 
ing the means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to its 
legitimate possessions, (page 467, line 22.) 

TITLE III.— THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN HYPOTHESIS, (gg 2517- 

2530 inclusive.) 

§ 2517. — Where we can not know with certainty, we are at lib- 
erty to form suppositions, (page 467, line 36.) §§1163, 1117. 

§ 2518. — Suppositions must be based on something that is per- 
fectly certain, and that is the possibility of the object. Further- 
more, a supposition must be connected, as its ground of explana- 
tion, with that which is really given and absolutely certain, (page 
468, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1162, 2584, 1856. 

§ 2519. — Can not, in accordance with the categories, imagine or 
invent any object or any jjroperty of an object not given, or that 
may not be given in experience, and employ it in a hypothesis ; 
otherwise we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon mere 
chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of things, (page 
468, line 13.) See § 2261. 

§ 2520. — Ideas do not relate to any object in any kind of experi- 
ence. Consequently they can not be employed as hypotheses in 
the explanation of real phenomena, (page 468, line 37.) 

§ 2521. — Transcendental hypotheses would not assist the under- 
standing in its application to objects, (page 469, line 24.) 

§ 2522. — Transcendental hypotheses do not advance reason, but 
rather stop it in its progress, (page 470, line 9.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 757 

§ 2523. — Sufficiency is requisite for the admissibility of a hypoth- 
esis. It must be sufficient alone to determine the given conse- 
quences, and must not be supported by auxiliary hypotheses, 
(page 470, line 24.) [Cf. Hadrian. Impel*. — 

Aniniula, vagula, blandula, 
Hospes comesque corporis, 
Qua? nunc abibis in loca? 

See the text in Byron's Hours of Idleness ; or in Dr. Thomas' 
Biographical Diet., Art. Hadrian, page 1108. Cf. § 2967.] 

§ 2524. — Opinion must be restricted to the world of experience 
and nature. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can 
either cognize a proposition entirely apriori, and as necessary, or 
it can cognize nothing at all ; and hence the judgments it enounces 
are never mere opinions (they are either apodictic certainties, or 
declarations that nothing can be known on the subject), (page 
471, line 5.) 

§ 2525. — Hypotheses are admissible in polemic, but not in the 
sphere of dogmatism. In relation to its practical exercise, reason 
has the right of admitting what in the field of pure speculation 
she would not be justified in supposing except upon perfectly suf- 
ficient grounds, (page 471, line 26.) 

§ 2526. — Opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves. 
The difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves, 
(page 472, line 24.) 

§ 2527. — Thinker, to be fully equipped, requires the hypotheses 
of pure reason — (e. g. in relation to the immateriality of the soul 
[which, however, is a wholly unwarrantable assumption]), (page 
473, line 3.) Cf. §§ 2523, 2529, 2023. 

§ 2528. — Adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life is 
properly intelligible, and not • subject to changes of time, and that 
it neither began in birth nor will end in death, (page 473, line 27.) 

§ 2529. — Such hypothetical defenses (§§ 2525-2528) against the 
pretensions of an opponent, must not be regarded as declarations 
of opinion, (page 474, line 9.) 

§ 2530. — Guard against any assumption of absolute validity, 
(page 474, line 31.) 

TITLE IV.— THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN RELATION TO PROOFS. 
(§§2531-2541 inclusive.) 

§ 2531. — Peculiarity which distinguishes the proofs of transcen- 
dental synthetical propositions. First obliged to prove apriori 
the objective validity of the conceptions and the possibility of 
their syntheses, (page 475, line 11.) 

§ 2532. — Require, before attempting any proof of a proposition of 
pure reason, to consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of 



758 Kant's Mines, 

cognition by the operations of pure reason, (page 476, line 15.) 
[Consequently simple: I do not see the "consequently." To my 
mind, the simple is a representation which does take account of 
the content in space, and declares that content to be not quantum 
continuum. (See §2011.)] 

§ 2533. — First rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt 
a transcendental proof, before we have considered from what 
source we are to derive the principles upon which the proof is to 
be based, and what right we have to expect that our conclusions 
from these principles will be veracious, (page 477, line 23.) 

§ 2534. — Unable to expose the particular sophism upon which 
the proof is based, we have a right to demand a deduction of the 
principles employed in it. (page 477, line 35.) Cf. § 2486. 

§ 2535. — Transcendental proposition can not rest upon more 
than a single proof. (Second peculiarity.) (Because it is the con- 
ception alone which determines the object). The proof can not 
contain anything more than the determination of the object ac- 
cording to the conception, (page 478, line 6.) 

§ 2536. — Serves to simplify very much the criticism of all prop- 
ositions of reason, (page 479, line 5.) 

§ 2537. — Transcendental proofs must never be apagogic,* or in- 
direct, but always ostensive, or direct, (page 479, line 19.) [*Drawn 
aside. — See Webster. Like the proofs in the antimonies (§ 2067 
et seqq) except the fourth thesis (§ 2105).] 

§ 2538. — Reason why indirect proofs are employed in different 
sciences, (page 479, line 34.) 

§ 2539. — Apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those 
sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective representa- 
tion for an objective cognition, (page 480, line 22.) 

§ 2540. — Apagogic method of arriving at the truth, in the tran- 
scendental sphere of pure reason and in the case of synthetical 
propositions, is impossible, (page 481, line 2.) 

§ 2541. — Apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those il- 
lusions which have always had so strong an attraction for the ad- 
mirers of dogmatical philosophy, (page 481, line 30.) 

Chapter II.— Tne Canon of Pure Reason. (§§ 2542-2596 inclusive.) 

§ 2542. — Use of all philosophy of pure reason is of a purely 
negative character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a 
discipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise, (page 
482, line 24.) 

§ 2543. — Must be some source of positive cognitions which be- 
long to the domain of pure reason, and which become the causes 
of error only from our mistaking their true character, while 



The Clavis to an Index. 759 

they form the goal toward which reason continually strives, (page 
483, line 5.) 

§ 2544. — Canon : a list of the apriori principles of the proper 
employment of certain faculties of cognition, (page 483, line 17.) 
Cf. §1656. 

§ 2545. — Canon of pure reason will relate, not to the speculative, 
hut to the practical use of reason, (page 483, line 25.) 

TITLE I.— OF THE ULTIMATE END OF THE PURE USE OF REASON. (§3 2546- 

2555 inclusive.) 

§ 2546. — Natural desire to venture beyond the field of experi- 
ence, (page 483, line 38.) 

§ 2547. — Highest aims must, from the nature of reason, possess 
complete unity, (page 484, line 6.) 

§ 2548. — Transcendental speculation of reason relates to three 
things : (1) the freedom of the will ; (2) the immortality of the 
soul ; (3) the existence of God. The speculative interest which 
reason has in those questions is very small, (page 484, line 14.) 

§ 2549. — Real value and importance of these three cardinal 
propositions relate to our practical and not to our speculative in- 
terest, (page 485, line 10.) 

§ 2550. — Moral laws alone- belong to the sphere of the practical 
exercise of reason, and admit of a canon, (page 485, line 15.) 
[Pragmatical : exhibiting the connection of cause and consequence. 
A practical law ordains the end — or, more strictly, commands ac- 
tion irrespective of the end ; while a pragmatic law directs upon a 
given end, irrespective of the character of the end. An end con- 
travening the practical command is disallowed ; but it is impossi- 
ble for the end to contravene the pragmatical law, because the 
latter must be constructed expressly in view of the former. See § 
49.] Cf. § 46 et seqq. 

§ 2551. — Eeason's ultimate end — the practical answer to the 
question What we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a God, 
and a future world, (page 485, line 35.) See § 1027. 

§ 2552. — Excluding all psychological (that is, empirical) ele- 
ments, (page 486, line 3.) 

§ 2553. — Practical laws. Freedom in the practical sense. Rea- 
son enounces laws which are imperative or objective laws of free- 
dom, and which tell us what ought to take place, (p. 486, 1. 10.) 

§ 2554. — All we have to do, in the practical sphere, is to inquire 
into the rule of conduct which reason has to present, (p. 487, 1. 1.) 

§ 2555. — Canon of pure reason has to do with two questions of 
practical interest: (1) Is there a God? (2) Is there a future life? 
(page 487, line 17.) 



760 Kant's Ethics. 

TITLE II.-OF THE IDEAL OF THE SUMMUM BONUM AS A DETERMINING 
GROUND OF THE ULTIMATE END OF PURE REASON. (522556-2578 inclusive.) 

§ 2556. — Now remains for us to consider whether reason can be 
employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will here conduct 
us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason 
(page 487, line 30.) 

§ 2557. — Knowledge in regard to those two problems lies be- 
yond our reach, (page 488, line 5.) Cf. § 1027. 

§ 2558. — Hoping stands in precisely the same relation to the 
practical and the law of morality, as knowing to the theoretical 
cognition of things and the law of nature, (page 488, line 25.) 

§ 2559. — Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires. The 
moral law dictates how we ought to act in order to deserve hap- 
piness, (page 448, line 36.) 

§ 2560. — Assume that there are pure moral laws, absolutely im- 
perative, (page 489, line 14.) 

§ 2561. — Principles of pure reason in its practical, but especially 
in its moral use, possess objective validity, (page 489, line 24.) 

§ 2562. — Idea of a moral world has objective reality — not as re- 
ferring to an object of intellectual intuition (for of such an object 
we can form no conception whatever), but to the world of sense 
(conceived, however, as an object* of pure reason in its practical 
use), (page 489, line 40.) [* That is to say, the power of practical 
reason is here presupposed. See §§178,2560.] [Pravity : crook- 
edness — deviation from right. — See Webster.] 

§ 2563. — Answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason 
which relate to its practical interest: Do that which will render 
thee worthy of happiness, (page 490, line 18.) 

§ 2564. — System of morality is inseparably (though only in the 
idea of pure reason) connected with that of happiness, (page 
490, line 20.) 

§ 2565. — Necessary connection of the hope of happiness with 
the unceasing endeavor to become worthy of happiness, can not be 
cognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide, (page 
490, line 34.) 

§ 2566. — God and a future life are two hypotheses which, ac- 
cording to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the 
obligation which this reason imposes upon us. (page 491, line 18.) 
[Kant's doctrine of a future life — how connected with the principles 
of pure reason.] Cf. §§ 3037, 3046. Cf. Athenagoras (Ueberweg, 
Hist. Phil. §79, tr. Morris, vol. i., page 297, line 44). 

§ 2567. — Moral laws could not be universally regarded as com- 
mands, did they not connect apriori adequate consequences with 



The Clavis to an Index. 761 

their dictates, and thus carry with them promises and threats, 
(page 491, line 35.) [Koran.] 

§ 2568. — Leibnitz distinguished the kingdom of grace from 
the kingdom of nature, (page 492, line 9.) 

§ 2569. — Observance of moral laws proceeds according to maxims, 
(page 492, line 21.) Cf. §§ 328, 147. 

- § 2570. — Without a God and without a world invisible to us now 
but hoped for, the ideas of morality can not be the springs of pur- 
pose and action, (page 492, line 26.) 

§ 2571. — Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from 
being the complete good, (page 492, line 38.) § 3029. 

§ 2572. — Happiness in exact proportion with the morality of 
rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness) con- 
stitutes alone the supreme good, (page 493, line 17.) § 3061. 

§ 2573. — Moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast 
with speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception 
of a sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, (page 493, line 30.) 

§ 2574. — Teleological unity of all things according to universal 
natural laws. (Transcendental theology.) (page 494, line 12.) 

§ 2575. — Effect of the practical teleology which pure reason im- 
poses upon us. (Transcendental enlargement of our rational cog- 
nition.) (page 494, line 37.) [This will: see §2573.] 

§ 2576. — Christianity's effect (of its pure moral conceptions) in 
correcting our conception of the Divine Being, (page 495, line 13.) 

§ 2577. — Moral actions must not be looked upon as binding on 
us because they are the commands of God, but we must regard 
them as divine commands because we are internally bound by 
them, (page 495, line 39.) 

§ 2578. — Moral theology is therefore only of immanent use. 
(page 496, line 21.) 

TITLE III.-OF OPINION, KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, (gg 2579-2596 inclusive.) 

Cf. 1 1114 et seqq. 

§ 2579. — Conviction is a judgment which rests on objective 
grounds and is valid for every rational being, (page 496, line 35.) 
[i. e. conviction is the subjective phase of knowledge. See § 2583]. 

§ 2580. — Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judg- 
ment, which lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective, 
(page 497, line 3.) See especially § 1134. 

§ 2581. — Persuasion can not be subjectively distinguished from 
conviction. Means of detecting the merely private validity 
of a judgment. How to expose the illusion, (page 497, line 20.) 

§ 2582. — Conviction alone can be maintained. Persuasion I may 
keep for myself, (page 497, line 38.) 

49 



762 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2583. — Holding for true has the three following degrees : (1) 
opinion; (2) belief; (3) knowledge, (page 498, line 1.) Knowl- 
edge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective 
sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency 
is termed certainty (for all). Belief is subjectively sufficient, but 
is recognized as being objectively insufficient. [See §§ 1133, 1124. 
2594, 2579.] Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment sub- 
jectively as well as objectively. 

§ 2584. — Must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing 
something, (page 498, line 12.) §§ 2564, 2524. 

§ 2585. — Opinion has no place in the judgments of pure reason, 
(page 498, line 19.) 

§ 2586. — Belief can not be admitted in speculative inquiries, 
(page 498, line 31.) 

§ 2587. — Theoretically insufficient judgment can be termed be- 
lief only from the practical point of view, (page 498, line 39.) 

§ 2588.- — Pragmatical belief is a contingent judgment resting 
upon arbitrary practical grounds, (page 499, line '3.) See §§49, 
2550. [I suppose that pragmatical belief belongs to the field of 
opinion, and can not properly be termed belief. In practical or 
moral belief, the subjective sufficiency is impregnable and secure; 
in pragmatical belief the subjective sufficiency is not impregnable, 
although it is practically sufficient. Furthermore, in the case of 
practical belief, objective sufficiency is known to be unattainable; 
but I do not know this to be the case with pragmatical belief. 
See Kant's note ad § 1133, and cf. § 1119.] 

§ 2589. — Pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion 
to the interests at stake, (page 499, line 22.) 

§ 2590. — Doctrinal belief — an analogon of practical judgments, 
which is found in theoretical judgments, (page 499, line 39.) 

§ 2591. — Doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal 
belief, (page 500, line 14.) [But see § 2593.] 

§ 2592. — Belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives 
me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, 
(page 501, line 4.) §§ 1118, 1121. 

§ 2593. — Moral belief in the existence of God and in a future 
life is (unlike mere doctrinal belief) not wanting in stability, 
(page 501, line 19.) See §§ 1118, 2486, 1133. 

§ 2594. — Belief in God and in another world is so interwoven 
with my moral nature that I am under as little apprehension of 
having the former torn from me as of losing the latter. This con- 
viction is not logical, but moral certainty, (page 501, line 39.) 
[Beligious conviction, moral certainty, like doctrinal belief (§ 2590) 
are mere analogues.] See §§1133, 1124. 



The Clavis to an Index. 763 

§ 2595. — Only point in this argument that may appear open to 
suspicion, is that this rational belief presupposes the existence of 
moral sentiments. (But in these questions, no man is free from 
all interest.) (page 502, line 15.) [Cf. Arist. Me. Eth. X., ix., 6, 
and II., i., 4, 9, (pages 509, 423, above), with Kant's note here.] 
See §§ 441, 248, 125. 

§ 2596. — Can not advance further with the help of the highest 
philosophy than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed 
to the meanest understanding, (page 502, line 36.) § 942. 

Chapter III.— The Architectonic of Pure Reason. (§§2597-2621 inclusive.) 

§ 2597. — Architectonic: The art of constructing a system ; the 
doctrine of the scientific in cognition, (page 503, line 24.) 

§ 2598. — System — the unity of various cognitions under one 
idea (the idea of the form of a whole, insofar , as the conception 
determines apriori not only the limits of its content, but the place 
which each of its parts is to occupy. The whole is thus an organ- 
ism, and not an aggregate), (p. 503, 1. 29.) [Acervus: a heap.] 

§ 2599. — Schema which is originated from an idea (in which 
case reason presents us with aims apriori, and does not look for 
them to experience) forms the basis of architectonical unity. (Em- 
piricism can give us nothing more than technical unity ) (page 
504, line 14.) 

§ 2600. — Sciences ought to be explained and defined (not ac- 
cording to the description which the originator gives of them, but) 
according to the idea which we find based in reason itself, and 
which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of the science 
already accumulated, (page 504, line 39.) 

§ 2601. — Possible to frame an architectonic of all human cogni- 
tion. Our purpose is at present merely to sketch the plan of the 
architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason, (p. 505, 1. 14.) 

§ 2602. — All cognition is, from a subjective point of view, either 
historical or rational, (page 505, line 39.) §§ 1018, 1072. 

§ 2603. — All rational cognition is either philosophical or mathe- 
matical. A cognition may be objectively philosophical and sub- 
jectively historical, (page 506, line 27.) §§ 2452, 1020, 1127. 

§ 2604. — Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. 
(Scholastic conception.) (page 507, line 7.) § 1025. 

§ 2605. — Philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition 
to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason (teleologia ra- 
tionis humance). (page 507, line 24.) Cf. §§ 1023-1027. and § 469. 

§ 2606. — Philosopher the ideal teacher who employs conceptions 
as instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human 
reason, (page 508, line 1.) §§ 1030, 3104. 

§ 2607. — Moral philosophy relates to the one and only ultimate 



764 Kant's Ethics. 

end of all the operations of the mind. Why the ancients always 
included the idea (and in an especial manner) of moralist in that 
of philosopher, (page 508, line 13.) See §§1027, 3005. 

§ 2608— Philosophy is either natural or ethical, (p. 508, 1. 26.) 

§ 2609. — Philosophy is either pure or empirical, (p. 508, 1. 32.) 

§ 2610. — Philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic (the 
critical philosophy) or metaphysic (the system of pure reason), 
(page 508, line 36.) §§ 1469, 1424. 

§ 2611. — Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and 
that of the practical use of pure reason, and is accordingly either 
the metaphysic of nature or the metaphysic of ethics, (page 509, 
line 12.) §§ 1409, 3135. 

§ 2612. — Duty of the philosopher, that the value of each differ- 
ent kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations of 
the mind, may be clearly defined, (page 509, line 29.) 

§ 2613. — Metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which 
attempts to represent all pure apriori cognition in the peculiar 
and distinct systematic unity which that cognition forms, (page 
511, line 10.) Cf. §§ 1469, and 2610. 

§ 2614. — Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the 
term [i. e. metaphysic of nature ; see § 1409, and Meiklejohn's 
note there], consists of two parts: (1) transcendental philosophy, 
and (2) the physiology of pure reason, (page 511, line 19.) 

§ 2615. — Physiology of pure reason is either (I) immanent [(1) 
physica rationalis; (2) psychologia rationalist or (II) transcendent 
[(3) rational cosmology ; (4) rational theology], (page 511, line 
28.) Ontology : see § 2614. 

§ 2616. — Fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of 
necessity dictates this division [§§2614, 2615]; it is therefore ar- 
chitectonical. (page 512, line 20.) Cf. § 2599. 

§ 2617. — How is it possible to cognize the nature of things ac- 
cording to apriori principles, and to attain to a rational physiology ? 
(page 512, line 29.) 

§ 2618. — Empirical psychology must be banished from the sphere 
of metaphysics and placed by the side of empirical physics, as a 
part of applied philosophy (the apriori principles of which are 
contained in pure philosophy), (page 513, line 13.) § 3137. 

§ 2619. — Metaphysics can never be completely abandoned. Al- 
though it can not form the foundation of religion, it must always 
be one of its most important bulwarks, (page 513, line 36.) 

§ 2620. — Metaphysic therefore forms properly that department 
of knowledge which may be termed, in the truest sense of the 
word, philosophy, (page 514, line 17.) \_Propa j deutic : preliminary 
instruction. — See Webster.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 765 

§ 2621. — Metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the cul- 
ture of human reason, (page 514, line 31.) 

Chapter IV.— The History of Pure Reason. (g§ 2622-2628 inclusive.) 

§ 2622. — Cursory glance, from a purely transcendental point of 
view, (page 515, line 7.) 

§ 2623. — Remarkable that, in the infancy of philosophy, the 
study of the nature of God and the constitution of a future world, 
formed the commencement, rather than the conclusion (as we 
should have it),' of the speculative efforts of the human mind. 
Theology and morals formed the two chief motives, or rather the 
points of attraction in all abstract inquiries, (page 515, line 15.) 

§ 2624.- — Three different ends, in relation to which the most im- 
portant revolutions in this sphere of thought have taken place, 
(page 515, line 33.) 

§ 2625. — Philosophers may be divided, in relation to the object 
of the cognition of reason, into sensualists and intellectualists. 
Epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former ; Plato, of the 
latter, (page 516, line 1.) 

§ 2626. — Origin of the pure cognitions of reason. Aristotle may 
be regarded as the head of the empiricists ; Plato, of the noolo- 
gists. (page 516. line 19.) 

§ 2627. — Methods at present employed may be divided into the 
naturalistic and the scientific, (page 516, line 37.) [Misology : 
hatred of logic] Cf. § 1006. 

§ 2628. — Scientific method is either dogmatical (e. g. Wolf), or 
skeptical (e. g. Hume), or critical (§§ 1403, 1432). (p. 517, 1. 20.) 

VOLUME V.— PROLEGOMENA 

To every Future Metaphysig which can Appear as a Science. 

Translated from the German of Immanuel Kant, by John Richardson. (§§ 
2629-2865 inclusive.) Paging (in parentheses) of the edition of Simpkin and 
Marshall (London, 1819). [I subjoin (in [brackets,] and explicitly marked M.) 
the paging of Mahaffy (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1872), and (also 
in [brackets] and also in every case marked M) so many of Mahaffy's altera- 
tions as I think may perhaps be of use to the reader. The words selected 
from Professor Mahaffy are also in every case on the following pages preceded 
by one or more words (printed in italics) from Richardson's translation, not 
with the purpose of placing before the student the whole of that part of Rich- 
ardson's text which corresponds with the words from Professor Mahaffy, but 
merely for the purpose of reference. Else I prefer Richardson ; not without 
regret, however, because I do not know German, and because my own frequent 
failure to comprehend Kant's meaning does not add weight to my judgment, 
and because I am greatly indebted to Prof. Mahaffy for his notes, and still 
more for his translation of Fischer and for his accompanying expositions, and 
most of all for his translation of important passages of the first (1781) edition 
of the Critique, which he appended to Fischer and also to the Prolegomena. 
(See below, §2866.)] 



766 Kant's Ethics. 

Preface. (§8 2620-2645 inclusive.) 

§2629. — Prolegomena intended for future teachers, (page iii., 
line 2.) [page 1, line 5. M.] 

§ 2630. — First to put the question whether such a science- as 
metaphysic is but possible, (page iii., line 7.) [page 1, line 10. M.] 

§ 2631. — Amuses the human understanding with never ceasing 
but never fulfilled hopes, (page iv., line 7.) [page 2, line 10. M.] 

§ 2632. — Human reason builds so willingly that it has often 
reared up an edifice and as often pulled it down again in order to 
examine the state of its foundation, (page v., line 3.) [page 3, 
line 3. M.] 

§ 2633.— Metaphysics do not yet exist as a science, (page v., 
line 14.) [page 3, line 13. M.] 

§ 2634. — Since the origin of the metaphysics, as far as their his- 
tory reaches, no event more decisive of their fate than the attack 
which David Hume made on them has happened, (page vi., line 
19.) [page 4, line 13. M.] § 2670. 

■'§ 2635. — Hume proves incontrovertibly that it is totally impos- 
sibly for reason to conceive of such a conjunction (as that of cause 
and effect) apriori and from conceptions, (page vii., line 3.) [page 
4, line 22. M.] 

<§ 2636. — Hume's conclusion, though precipitate and wrong, is at 
least founded in investigation, (page viii., line 4.) [page 5, line 
24. M.] See § 1460. 

§ 2637. — Painful to see how his opponents — Eeid, Oswald? 
Beattie, and at last even Priestly — so entirely miss the point of 
his problem, (page viii., line 13.) [page 6, line 8. M.] 

§ 2638. — Hume could lay just as good a claim to common sense 
as Beattie, and over and above to that which Beattie certainly did 
not possess, a critical reason, which sets limits to common sense, 
that it may not lose itself in speculations, (page ix., line 24.) Cf. § 
1145. [page 7, line 12. M.] 

§ 2639. — Hume's hint first roused Kant from a dogmatic slum- 
ber of many years, and gave quite a new direction to his researches 
in the field of speculative philosophy, (page xi., line 8.) See Eich- 
ardson's note, and cf. §2363. Cf. §2510. [page 8, line 25. M.] 

§ 2640. — Tried first whether Hume's scruple could not be uni- 
versally represented. Deduction of the apriori conceptions of the 
understanding from a single principle, (page xi., line 22.) [Intel- 
lect : understanding. M.) [(page 9, line 9. M.] §1570. 

§ 2641. — Execution of Hume's problem in its greatest possible 
extension (the Criticism of Pure Reason*). It will not be un- 
derstood, because the public in general will be inclined to turn 



The Clavis to an Index. 767 

over the leaves of the book, but not to study it thoroughly, (page 
xiii., line 1.) [Prolix : opposed to all ordinary notions, and more- 
over voluminous. M.] [* Eichardson says, in a note here, of the 
Critique of Pure Eeason: "It were well worth a philosopher's 
while to learn German for the sole purpose of studying thisincom. 
parable work in its native language. It would be of more use to 
him than all his Greek and Latin."] [page 10, line 9. M.] 

§ 2642. — Nothing of any former data but the hint Hume's doubt 
gave could be used, which doubt however afforded no presension 
[anticipation] of a possible formal science of this nature, (page 
xiv., line 12.) Cf. Fischer* (page 33). Cf. §2507. Cf. §279. 
[Pilot : whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot. M.] [page 
11, line 9. M.] [* The references to Fischer are to the edition of 
1866, Mahaffy's translation, Longmans, Green & Co., London.] 

§ 2643.— Much perseverance and not a little self denial were 
requisite to postpone the temptation of an earlier favorable recep- 
tion to the prospect of a late but lasting approbation, (page xv., 
line 4.) [Opiniative : "very stiff in adherence to preconceived 
notions." — Webster.] [Prolixity: voluminous character. M.] [page 
11, line 27. M.] 

§ 2644. — Criticism of Pure Eeason must be completed entirely. 
Either everything or nothing of the sphere of this faculty must be 
determined. The end of each member can not be derived but 
from the complete conception of the whole, (page xvi., line 7.) 
[Proposing : by proposing what it knows not where to find. M.] 
[Presumed (i. e. than mere presumption) : than mere conjectures. 
M.] [page 13, line 3. 31.] 

§ 2645. — Prolegomena a mere plan after the analytic method, 
and for review, to be considered subsequently to the Criticism op 
Pure Eeason. (page xvii., line 6.) Cf. § 2664. [ Very particular : 
peculiar. M.] [Genuine: yet it does contrast with sound critical 
principles. M.] [page 13, line 27. M.] See §§ 2668, 2664. 
Chapter I.— On what is Peculiar to all Metaphysical Cognition. (§§2546-2676.) 

Article I. — Of the sources of the metaphysics. (§§ 2646-2648.) 

§ 2646. — Must previously be able exactly to ascertain that which 
is distinctive in it. (page 17, line 9.) [As to their nature : according 
to its nature. M.] [page 16, line 5. M.] 

§ 2647. — Principles of metaphysical cognition must never be 
taken from experience, (page 17, line 22.) [page 16, line 16. M.] 

§ 2648. — Metaphysical cognition is cognition apriori, and (to 
distinguish it from the pure mathematics) is named pure philo- 
sophical cognition, (page 18, line 9.) See §§ 2452-2454. [Intel- 
lect: understanding. M.] [Represented: is sufficiently explained. 
M.] [page 17, line 4. M.] 



768 Kanfs Ethics. 

Article II — On the only sort of cognition which can be named meta- 
physical. (§§ 2649-2654 inclusive.) 

A. — On the distinction of synthetic and, of analytic judgments in 
general (§§ 2649, 2650.) 

§ 2649. — Distinction between judgments as to the matter : (1) 
merely explanatory, add nothing to the cognition ; (2) enlarging, 
increase the given cognition, (page 18, line 25.) [Peculiar: the 
peculiarity of its sources. M.] [page 17, line 17. M.] 

§ 2650. — Analytic judgments express nothing in the predicate 
but what is really cogitated in the conception of the subject, (page 

19, line 10.) Resolved: analyzed. M.] [page 17, line 27. M.] 

B. — The common principle of all analytic judgments is the proposi- 
tion of contradiction. (§2651.) 

§ 2651. — Analytical judgments rest entirely upon the proposition 
of contradiction, and are as to their nature cognitions apriori, 
whether the conceptions which serve for matter to them are em- 
pirical or not. (page 19, line 29.) Cf. §1695. [Though: even 
when. M.] [page 18, line 14. M.] §§ 1081, 1083. 

C. — Synthetic judgments require another principle than the proposi- 
tion of contradiction. (§ 2652-2654 inclusive.) 

§ 2652.— Synthetic judgments never can arise from the proposi- 
tion of contradiction only (though they must always be derived 
conformably to that principle), (page 20, line 26.) [Conformably : 
they must be subject to the law of contradiction. M.] [page 19 ? 
line 12. M.] Cf. §§ 1697, 1692. 

§ 2653. — Judgments of experience are always synthetical, (page 
21, line 11.) [Mahaffy refers to Fischer (page 12) where he (M.) 
translates from the first edition of the Critique.] [This section 
2653 is wholly included in §1449, q. v.] [page 19, line 25. M.] 

§ 2654. — Mathematical judgments are synthetical, (page 21, line 
25.) See § 1722. [§2654 is almost the same as §§ 1452-1456, which 
see.] [Add the units contained in the five given in the intuition to 
the conception of seven (§ 1454) : Whereupon Mahaffy here re- 
marks : •" The reader will observe that to the concept of 7 the in- 
tuition of 5 is gradually added; it is not an addition of two intui- 
tions. In the case of 2+2=4 this latter may be the case, but 
most probably more than five can not be grasped in a single visi- 
ble intuition. Accordingly 7 is first made up of 5 + 2, and then 
the resulting concept used for further processes. The system 
adopted in Roman figures (which is indeed almost universal) il- 
lustrates the point exactly. Instead of writing six points or 
strokes, we write VI, substituting the symbol V, perhaps a rude 
representation of an open hand, for the intuition IIIII."] [page 

20, line 13. M.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 769 

Article III. — ScJwlion to the general division of judgments into ana- 
lytical and synthetical. (§§ 2655, 2656.) 

§2655. — Division of judgments into analytical and synthetical 
is with regard to the criticism of the human understanding indis- 
pensable. (p. 24, 1. 24.) [Ground: reason. M.] '[p. 24, 1. 5. M.] 

§ 2656. — Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding — a hint 
of this division, (page 25, line 9.) [Fourth Book: eh. iii., §9, seq. 
M.] [Allows: §10. M] [When: then. M.J [Prof. Mahaffy re- 
fers to Locke's Essay, book IV., chapter i., § 7, as the " really de- 
cisive passage in Locke on the point.''] [page 24, line 17. M.] 

Article IV. — Is metaphysic possible ? (§§2657-2665 inclusive.) 

§ 2657. — Can not open a single book, as we can a Euclid, and say, 
" Here is metaphysic, here you will find the chief end of this 
science, the knowledge of a Supreme Being and of a future world, 
evinced on principles of pure reason." (page 26, line 8.) [Were 
metaphysic— actual : a metaphysic — really in existence. M.] [Make 
the beginning : comes to attain it. M.] [Our real design: Mahaffy 
here refers to Article II., above.] [page 26, line 3. M.] 

§ 2658. — Endeavors to bring this science to pass were no doubt 
the first cause of so early a skepticism, (page 27, line 10.) [To 
pass: to set up such a science. M.] [His own: they questioned 
isolated reason. M.] [That when: that when what had been 
gathered was dissolved. M.] [Of those : of their neighbors. M.] 
[page 27, line 4. M.] 

§ 2659. — Hume inadvertently cut off from the field of pure cog- 
nition apriori its chief province, the pure mathematics, (page 28, 
line 1.) [Construction of conceptions : §2452.] [To his whole con- 
ception: [system] adds Mahaffy.] [Too great penetration : Mahaffy 
thinks "Kant's confidence on this point is hardly justified," and 
refers to Hume's essays (vol. ii., note P, etc.) for hints that mathe- 
matics might be based on experience.] [His opinion : Hume's in- 
tention. M.] [page 27, line 23. M.] 

§ 2660.— All metaphysical judgments are synthetical. (Meta- 
physical judgments, however, must be distinguished from those be- 
longing to the metaphysics.) (p. 29, 1. 21.) [p. 29, 1. 11. M.] 

§ 2661. — Thilosophia definitiva, which contains merely analytic 
propositions belonging to metaphysic. (page 30, line 21.) [page 
30, line 14. M.] 

§ 2662. — -Metaphysic has in strict propriety to do with synthetic 
■propositions apriori, and these only constitute its end. (page 31, 
line 5.) [page 30, line 26. M.] [Only : alone. M.] 

§ 2663. — Question " Is metaphysic possible ? " must be answered 
not by skeptical objections to certain assertions of an actual meta- 



770 Kant's Ethics. 

physic (for we do not admit of it yet), but from the (as yet only 
problematical) conception of a science of this sort, (page 31, line 
18.) [page 31, line 9. M.] 

§ 2664. — Criticism of Pure Reason treats this question synthet- 
ically, (page 32, line 3.) Cf. §2645. [page 31, line 25. M.] 

§ 2665. — Need not ask whether cognitions apriori be possible (for 
they are real), but how they are possible. (In order to be able, 
from the principle of the possibility of the given ones, to deduce the 
possibility of all the others.) (p. 32, 1. 25.) [p. 32, 1. 18. M.] 

Article V. — How is cognition from pure reason possible? (§§ 2666- 
2676 inclusive.) 

§ 2666. — Possibility of synthetic propositions aposteriori does 
not require a particular explanation, (p. 33, 1. 12.) [p. 33, 1. 5. M.] 

§ 2667. — Problem, expressed with scholastic precision, conse- 
quently is, HOW ARE SYNTHETIC PROPOSITIONS APRIORI POSSIBLE? 

(page 33, line 25.) [page 33, line 18. M.] 

§ 2668. — Analytic method, provided that it is opposed to the 
synthetic (§ 2664), is very distinct from a complex of analytic 
propositions : it signifies only that we set out from what is sought 
as if it were given, and mount to the only conditions on which it 
is possible, (page 34, line 22.) [Inadequate: and there can not 
but be some danger of confusing a newer and more appropriate 
use with the older. M. (matter not in Eichardson).] [p. 34, note. M.] 

§ 2669. — Solution of that problem the standing or the falling of 
metaphysic. (page 35, line 1.) [ With regard to it : let him pile con- 
clusions upon conclusions till they almost smother us. M. (Not in 
Richardson).] [page 35, line 1. M.] 

§ 2670. — Reflects on what this problem requires, must at first be 
struck with its difficulty, (page 35, line 20.) '[As difficult : equally 
difficult. M.] [Their : its. M.] Cf. § 2635. [page, 35, line 21. M.] 

§ 2671. — Cost a labor of many years in order to be able to solve 
this problem in its whole universality, (page 36, line 28.) Cf. § 
2641. [page 36, line 27. M.] 

§ 2672. — Assertion must be science, or it never is anything at 
all. Let metaphysicians speak the discreet language of a rational 
belief, (page 37, line 13.) [page 37, line 11. M.] 

§ 2673. — Transcendental philosophy is nothing but the complete 
solution of the problem here propounded, (page 38, line 17.) 
Cf. §§2664, 2641, 2613, 1469. [That a whole science: that when a 
whole science. M. (A transposition of when from below.)] [page 38, 
line 15. M.] 

§ 2674. — Now proceed to this solution according to the analytic 
method (§ 2645), in which we presuppose that cognition from pure 



The Clavis to an Index. 771 

reason is possible ; we can only appeal [in support of this presup- 
position] to two sciences of theoretical cognition, the pure mathe- 
matics and the pure physics, (page 39, line 5.) [page 39, line 1. M.] 
§ 2675. — -Xecessary for us to comprehend the predisposition of 
nature to such a science as metaphysic. Consequently we divide 
the transcendental main question (§ 2667) into four other questions: 
(1) How are pure mathematics possible ? (§§ 2677-2700) ; (2) How 
are pure physics possible ? (§§ 2701-2766) ; (3) How is metaphysic 
in general possible ? (§§ 2767-2838) ; (4) How is metaphysic as a 
science possible? (§§2839-2865). \_To comprehend that (i. e. the 
dialectic) which occasions it (i. e. metaphysic) and as a merely natur- 
ally given (i. e. as the natural predisposition of human reason to 
dialectic, it lies at the foundation of the so-called science of meta- 
physic ; but being uncritically taken, it proves illusory) though on 
account of its truth not an unsuspected : i. e. the practical power of 
the regulative ideas of pure reason (which constitutes its legislative 
truth) is the energetic reason (i. e. cause) why it has been sus- 
pected that metaphysical cognition possesses an apriori character, 
or (which is the same thing) that there is such a thing as meta- 
physical cognition.] (page 39, line 22.) [ In our chief question : 
under our chief inquiry. M.] [page 39, line 18. M.] 

§ 2676. — Solution of those problems, though it is chiefly designed 
to exhibit the essential matter of tbe Criticism, has something 
particular, which deserves attention by itself, and which is to seek 
the sources op given sciences in reason itselp, in order thereby 
to know something apriori of this their faculty, to investigate and 
to measure it by means of the fact itself; by which these sciences 
themselves gain, if not with regard to their matter, as to their right 
use, and wdiile they procure light to a higher question relative to 
their common origin, at the sanie time give occasion to illustrate 
their own nature better, (page 40, line 9.) [page 40, line 7. M.] 
Chapter II.— How are Pure Mathematics Possible? (§§2677-2700 inclusive.) 

Article VI. — Mathematic cognition carries with it thoroughly apo- 
dictical certainty. (§ 2677.) 

§ 2677. — Ground of cognition apriori, which lies deeply hidden, 
but which might manifest itself by these its effects, if their first 
beginnings were but diligently investigated, (page 40, line 24.) 
[page 41, line 4. M.] 

Article VII. — Mathematical cognition must previously exhibit its 
conception by intuition apriori. (§ 2678.) 

§ 2678. — Clue to the first and chief condition of the possibility 
of mathematics, (page 41, line 15.) [Philosophy can : must. M.] 
[page 41, line 19. M.] 



772 Kant's Ethics. 

Article VIII. — Difficulty of the question increasing. (§2679.) 

§ 2679. — -How can the intuition of the object precede the object 
itself? How is it possible to represent anything immediately 
apriori? (p. 42, 1. 21.) [As : qualibet, non quia.] [p. 42, 1. 28. M.] 

Article IX. — It is only possible in one way for my intuition to pre- 
cede the reality of the object, and to have place as cognition apriori. 
(§ 2680.) Of. .§ 1487. 

§ 2680. — Intuition contains nothing but the form of the sensi- 
bility* (sensualitas), which precedes in me all the real impressions 
by which I am affected by objects, (page 43, line 14.) [* /Sensitiv- 
ity (sensualitas): sensibility. M. (Richardson explains, in a note to § 
986, that he substitutes the word sensitivity, because the word sensu- 
ality has degenerated from its original meaning in our language. 
Meiklejohn uses the word sensibility (§ 1473), and with it Mahafly 
replaces sensitivity throughout the Prolegomena — an emendation, 
to which I need not again refer.)] [page 43, line 18. M.] 

Article X. — Intuitions which the pure mathematics lay as the foun- 
dation to all their cognitions and judgments. (§§ 2681, 2682.) 

§ 2681. — Presupposition absolutely necessary, if synthetic prop- 
sitions apriori shall be granted as possible, or (in case they, are 
really met with) their possibility comprehended and previously 
determined, (page 44, line 16.) [page 44, line 17. M.] 

§ 2682. — Space and time, being pure intuitions apriori, are mere 
forms of our sensibility, which must precede ail empirical in- 
tuition (that is, perception of real objects), (page 44, line 25.) 
[Just : at the same time. M.] [page 44, line 26. M.] 

Article XI— The first problem (§ 2675) solved. (§ 2683.) 

§ 2683. — Mathematics, as synthetical cognition apriori, are only 
possible by their referring to no other objects than those of the 
senses, to whose empirical intuition a pure one (of space and time) 
lies as a foundation apriori. (page 45, line 29.) [page 46, line 6. M.] 

Article XII. — Something by way of illustration. (§ 2684.) 

§ 2684. — Transcendental deduction of the conceptions of space 
and time (§§ 1484-1488) explains at the same time the possibility 
of the pure mathematics, (page 46, line 29.) [Wot more than two : 
three, M.] [To indefinite: Mahaffy renders it " to infinity (in in- 
definitum)," and notes it as "this identification of unendlich with 
indefinitumy See §1483.] [page 47, line 4. M.] 

Article XIII. — Exercise your acumen on the following. (§§2685- 
2687 inclusive.) 

§ 2685. — Two spherical triangles, whereof the one can not be 
put in the place of the other, (p. 48, 1. 11.) [Of both hemispheres: 
on opposite hemispheres. M.] [Of both triangles: between the two 
triangles. M.] [page 48, line 18. M.] Gf. Fischer (page 42). 



The Clavis to an Index. 773 

§ 2686. — Left hand can not be inclosed in the same bounds as 
the right, (page 49, line 18.) [page 49, line 22. M.] 

§ 2687. — Solution of that paradox. Objects are not representa- 
tions of things as they are in themselves and as the pure under- 
standing would cognize them, but sensual intuitions (that is, phe- 
nomena) whose possibility rests upon the relation of certain things un- 
known in themselves to something else (to our sensitive faculty), 
(page 50, line 3.) [Snails: spirals winding opposite ways. M.] 
[page 50, line 8. M.] 

Scholion I. — The pure mathematics, and particularly pure geometry ', 
can not have objective reality but on condition of their referring to ob- 
jects of sense only. (§§ 2688-2690 inclusive.) 

§ 2688. — Propositions of geometry are not the determinations 
of a mere creature of our feigning fancy, nor for that reason in- 
valid in reference to real objects, (p. 50, 1. 24.) [p. 51, 1. 2. M.] 

§ 2689. — All the external objects of our sensible world must 
necessarily accord with the propositions of geometr} r with the 
greatest punctuality; because the sensibility, by means of its form 
of external intuition (or of its original mode of representation, 
space), about which the geometrician is occupied, first of all makes 
those objects possible as mere phenomena, (page 51, line 16.) 
[Only : alone. M.] [page 5.1, line 19. M.] 

§ 2690. — Geometrician can be secured in no other way from all 
the cavil or chicane of superficial metaphysicians, on account of 
the undoubted objective reality of his propositions, (page 52, line 
10.) [page 52, line 15. M.] 

Scholion II. — The understanding represents nothing immediately 
(§§ 2691, 2692.) 

§ 2691. — Idealism of Kant grants that there are bodies without 
us, that is, things, which, though it is quite unknown to us what 
they are in themselves, we know by the representations which 
their influence on our sensibility procures us, and to which we af- 
fix the denomination of a body, which word therefore signifies 
merely the phenomenon of that object which is unknown to us, but 
not the less real. Can this be termed, idealism? It is the very con- 
trary, (page 53, line 19.) [Without these: external to them. M.] 
[page 53, line 20. M.] 

§ 2692. — Idealism of Kant can not be named idealistical merely; 
for the existence of the thing that apjDears is thereby not destroyed 
(as in the real idealism), but it is shown that we can not cognize 
at all by the senses how it is in itself. [Kant's system must there- 
fore be named the critical idealism, as in the next scholion.] 
(page 54, line 22.) [page 55, line 1. M.] See § 1846. 



774 Kant's Ethics. 

Scholion III.— The critical idealism. (§§ 2693-2700 inclusive.) 

§ 2693. — Objection to Kant's critical idealism is started, as if 
it turned all the things of the sensible world to mere apparition, 
(page 55, line 28.) [Appearance : illusion. M.] An objection 
which the philosophers of the Leibnitzian school can easily make, 
after having first spoiled, etc. See Mr. Richardson's note on this 
point. Cf. § 1905. [page 56, line 12. M.] 

§ 2694. — Phenomenon depends upon the senses, but the judg- 
ment (which we make from it) in reference to the thing depends 
upon the understanding, whose province alone it is to give an ob- 
jective judgment of the phenomenon, (page 56, line 23.) [page 
57, line 6. M.] §1927. 

§ 2695. — Deceitful appearance or truth can arise accordingly as 
we are negligent or careful to reflect on the origin of our repre- 
sentations and to connect our intuitions (of the senses, whatever 
they may contain, in space and in time) according to the rules of 
the coherence of all cognition in an experience, (page 57, line 25.) 
[Rules of truth : of reality. M.] [page 58, line 7. M.] § 1928. 

§ 2696. — Error, which rests upon an illusion,* may arise, if I 
venture to go beyond all possible experience with niy conceptions 
of space and time (which I can not avoid doing when I give them 
out for qualities which adhere to things in themselves), (page 58, 
line 24.) [^Appearance : illusion. M.] [page 59, line 7. M.] § 1862. 

§ 2697. — Critical idealism is the only means of securing the ap- 
plication of one of the most important cognitions (that which the 
mathematics propound apriori) to real objects, and of preventing 
its being held mere illusion.* (page 59, line 8.) [^Appearance : , 
illusion. M.] [page 59, line 21. M.] 

§ 2698. — Critical idealism is the only means of preventing the 
transcendental illusion by which the metaphysics have hitherto 
been deceived, which error gave occasion to the remarkable an- 
tinomy of reason, (p. 59, 1. 26.) [p 60, 1. 9, M.] §2036, sqq. 

§ 2699. — Critical idealism need not be confounded with the em- 
pirical idealism of Descartes or with the mystical and extravagant 
idealism of Berkle}\ (page 60, line 12.) [Denominations : nomen- 
clature. M.] [Appearance : illusion. M.] [p. 60, 1. 25. JVL] §1843. 

§ 2700. — Critical idealism concerns not the existence of things 
(the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the re- 
ceived* sense), for it never entered into my mind to doubt of them. 
(page 61, line 10.) Cf. § 2785. [* Received : ordinary. M.] [Re- 
pudiable: objectionable. JVL] See what Kant says of transcenden- 
tal in §2700. [page 61, line 22. M.] Cf. §§ 1751, 1787, 2692. 



The Clavis to an Index. 775 

Chapter III.— How are Pure Physics Possible? (gg 2701-2766 inclusive.) 

Article XIV. — Of the legality of the determinations of the exist- 
ence of things in general. [See § 2703.] (§ 2701.) 

§ 2701. — Nature is the existence of things, provided that it is 
determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify 
the existence of things in themselves, we could never cognize 
them* either apriori or aposteriori. (page 62, line 7.) [*Them; 
nature. M.] [By which: by what. M.] [Without our conception: 
outside the. M.] [page 63, line 4. M.] 

Article XV. — Of the pure science of nature. (§ 2702.) 

§ 2702. — Actually universal laws of nature, which subsist totally 
apriori. By consequence, there is in fact a pure natural philoso- 
phy ; and the question now is, How is it possible ? (page 63, line 
12.) See § 2675. [Manges : to which nature is subject. M.] [In- 
ertness : inertia. M.] [page 64, line 11. M.] 

Article XVI. — Of things as objects of possible experience. (§ 2703.) 

§ 2703. — Nature, considered materialiter, is the complex of all 
the objects of experience, (p. 64, 1. 20.) [p. 65, 1. 14. M.] §2056. 

Article XVII. — Of the necessary legality of all the objects of possi- 
ble experience. (§§ 2704-2706 inclusive.) 

§ 2704. — Nature (formaliter), in this narrower sense, is therefore 
the legality of all the objects of experience, and, provided that it 
is cognized apriori. their necessary legality, (page 65, line 14.) 
[Legality : subjection to law. If.] [page 66, line 7. M.] § 1647. 

§ 2705. — Better to arrange the problem thus: How is it possible 
to cognize apriori the necessary legality * of experience itself, 
relatively to all its objects in general? (page 66, line 2.) [* Legal- 
ity : legitimacy. M,] [Only such: alone such. M.] For things: 
laws for things. M.] [page 66. line 18. M.] § 1706. 

§ 2706. — Only objects of our research here are experience and 
the universal conditions given apriori of its possibility, and thence 
we have to determine nature as the whole object of all possible ex- 
perience, (page 67, line 16.) [page 68, line 3. M.] 

Article XVIII. — Judgments of experience distinguished from judg- 
ments of perception. (§§ 2707-2709 inclusive.) 

§ 2707. — All judgments of experience are empirical; but all em- 
pirical judgments are not judgments of experience, (page 68, line 
2.) [page 68, line 17. M.] 

§ 2708. — Empirical judgments, provided that they have objective 
validity, are judgments of experience ; but those which are only 
subjectively valid, are mere judgments of perception, (page 68, 
line 14.] [I take the emphasis from Mahaffy, and may have done 
so elsewhere; at least I know that 1 often approved his use of 
italics.] [Give occasion to: produce. 31.] [page 69, line 1. M.] 



776 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2709. — Objective validity of the judgment of experience signi- 
fies nothing else than its necessary universal validity, (page 
69, line 1.) [Give: we do not till afterward give them a new. M.] 
[ Willing : that is, nobody is unwilling to agree.] [M ay express : 
expresses. M.] [page 69, line 12. M.] 

Article XIX. — Universal validity of the empirical judgment rests 
never on empirical conditions, nor even on sensual conditions in gen- 
eral. (§§ 2710, 2711.) 

§ 2710. — Judgments of experience take their objective val- 
idity not from the immediate cognition of the object (for this 
is impossible § 2701), but from the (condition of the) universal 
validity of the empirical judgment, which rests upon a pure con- 
ception of the understanding, (page 69, line 24.) [Commonly 
valid: universal. M.] [Already said : in §2709.] [p. 70, 1. 5. M.] 

§ 2711. — Judgment of perception is one in which I do noth- 
ing but refer two of my sensations to one another. But if I 
would have it named a judgmeut of experience, I require this con- 
nection to stand under a condition which makes it universally 
valid, (page 70, line 18.) [My will: not arbitrary. (See §2709) 
Mahaffy has " I desire.'"] [page 70, line 27. M.] 

Article XX. — How the judgment of experience is possible. (§§ 
2712—2716 inclusive.) 

§ 2712. — Foundation of experience is the intuition (of which 
we are conscious to ourselves, that is perception), which pertains 
merely to the senses. And in the next place, judging also (which 
belongs merely to the understanding) pertains thereto, (page 71, 
line 23.) [page 72, line 4. M.] 

• § 2713. — Judgment of perception is merely a connection of the 
perceptions in the state of my mind, without reference to the ob- 
ject, (page 72, line 7.) [page 72, line 12. M.] 

§ 2714. — Before perception can become experience, the given in- 
tuition must be subsumed under a conception which determines the 
form of judgment in general relatively to intuition, connects its em- 
pirical consciousness in a consciousness in general, and thereby 
procures universal validity to empirical judgments, (page 72, line 
22.) [Such : suppose the concept of cause to be such. M.] 
[Hypothetical : the causality of the air, from which causality the 
elasticity results, is not intuited. If the intuition is not sub- 
sumed under the category of cause, no universal judgment can 
be pronounced, no matter how often the intuition is repeated ; 
but the moment the intuition is brought under the category, the 
air (which possesses the causality) stands to the elasticity (which 
results from the causality) in the logical relation of the principle 



The Olavis to an Index. 777 

to the consequence, which relation constitutes the hypothetical 
judgment. (See §§ 1558, 1228). The conception of expansion 
could be here taken " in a statical sense " only by a dolt.] [page 
72, line 26. M.] 

§ 2715. — Subsuinption under the apriori conception of the pure 
understanding determines the perceptions not merely respectively 
to one another in me, but relatively to the form of judging in general, 
and in this way renders the empirical judgment universally valid, 
(page 73, line 15.) [page 73, line 20. M.] 

§ 2716. — Dissection of objectively valid synthetic judgments 
will show that they never consist of bare intuitions merely con- 
nected by comparison in a judgment, and that they would be 
impossible were not a pure conception of the understanding super- 
added to the conception drawn from the intuition, (page 74, line 
15.) [Logical poiiits : logical distinctions (Momente).* M.] [Two 
points: two points. M. (Cf. in §§2717, 2721, 2731.)] Much: a 
plurality of homogeneous parts. M.] [page 74, line 15. M.] [*I 
have substituted parentheses () for the brackets [] within which 
Professor Mahaffy prints the word Momente.] 

Article XXI. — Systematic division of the function of judgment in 
general. (§ 2717.) 

§ 2717. — Principles apriori of the possibility of all experience, 
as of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely de- 
termined, (page 75, line 12.) [The momenta of this determina- 
tion are as follows : (1) We represent what belongs to judging in 
general, and the various states * of the understanding in it, in a 
complete table (the logical table of judgments: cf. §1555). (2) 
"We find, exactly parallel to these logical positions, pure conceptions 
of the understanding, which may be regarded as conceptions of 
intuition-in-general determined by the logical functions of judgment. 
(These pure conceptions constitute a table of categories: cf. § 
1570). (3) We are now in a position to formulate the propositions 
by which all perceptions are subsumed under the pure conceptions 
of the understanding (and so to frame a pure physiological table 
of the universal principles of the physics : cf. § 1713). The 
following is Eichardson's version of this important section, which 
might almost be called " The transcendental analytic compressed 
into three sentences : "] In order therefore to show the possibility 
of experience provided that it rests upon pure conceptions of the 
understanding apriori, we must first represent what belongs to 
judging in general, and the various points* of the understanding 
in it, in a complete table ; for the pure conceptions of the under- 
standing, which are nothing more than conceptions of intuition in 

50 



778 Kant's Ethics. 

general if these are in f regard to the one or the other of these 
points determined for judgments in themselves, f by consequence 
necessarily and in a universally valid manner, will % fall out ex- 
actly parallel to them. J And by that means the principles apriori 
of the possibility ft of all experience, as of an objectively .valid em- 
pirical cognition, will be precisely determined. For they are noth- 
ing but propositions by which all perceptions are (on certain uni- 
versal conditions of intuition) subsumed under those pure concep- 
tions of the understanding. [Here follow the three tables.] [Par- 
ticular : see Kant's note to §2716.] [Indefinite: infinite. M. (But 
see §§1219-1221, 2178, 2684.)] [* Points : states. X.] [fin re- 
gard to : determined by one or other of these ways of judging, in 
themselves. M.] Of. §§ 2912, 2914. [J Will fall out : must run 
parallel to these states. M.] [Commerce: community. M. (But 
see § 1822.)] [page 75, line 19. M.] [ff § 1652.]' 

Article XXII — What the judgment of experience adds to the judg- 
ment of perception : something that determines the synthetic judgment 
as necessary. (§§ 2718, 2719.) 

§ 2718.- — Question here is not the origin of experience, but that 
which lies in experience. (The former pertains to the empirical 
psychology.) (page 78, line 2.) [page 77, line 21. M.] 

§ 2719. — Category represents the intuition ioith regard to one 
form of judgment rather than another as determined in itself ; i.e. 
it is the conception of that synthetic unity of intuitions which can 
only be represented by a given logical function of judgments, 
(page 78, line 11.) [page 78, line 4. M.] 

Article XXIII.— The sum of the foregoing subject. (§§ 2720-2723.) 

§ 2720. — Judgments are objective, when representations are 
united in a consciousness in general, that is, necessarily, (page 
79, line 6.) [Represent immediately: intuite. M.] [Casual: con- 
tingent. M.] [Is a consciousness in the judgment : in one conscious- 
ness is judgment. M.] [page 78, line 26. M.] 

§2721. — Categories are conceptions of the necessary union of 
representations in a consciousness, and consequently principles of 
objectively valid judgments, (page 79, line 20.) [Points : phases 
(Momente).* M.] [page 79, line 14. M.] [*I have substituted 
parentheses ( ) for brackets [ ] within which Professor Mahaffy 
prints the word Momente.] 

§ 2722. — Perceptions, ere they can serve for judgments of 
experience, must previously be subsumed under the categories, 
(page 80, line 1.) [page 79, line 19. M.] 

§ 2723. — Experience is first of all generated by this addition 
of the conception of the understanding to perception, (page 80, 



The Clavis to an Index. 779 

note). [Casual: contingent. M.] Cf. §§1699 and 1703. [page 
80, note. M.] 

Article XXIY. — The second problem (§2675) solved. A system of 
nature which precedes all empirical cognition of nature. (§§ 2724, 
2725.) [Compare § 2725 with § 2717.] 

§ 2724. — No conditions of the judgments of experience are 
above those [determined in § 2717] which bring the phenomena, 
according to the various form of their intuition, under pure con- 
ceptions of the understanding which render the empirical judg- 
ment objectively valid, (page 80, line 15.) [page 80, line 3. 31.] 

§ 2725. — Principles of possible experience are at the same time 
universal laws of nature, which can be cognized apriori. (page 81, 
line 15.) [Perfectly: in perfection. M.] [p. 81, 1. 3. M.J § 1652. 

Article XXV — The mathematical principles. (§ 2726.) 

§ 2726. — Principles of the application of the mathematics to ex- 
perience. (The first and second physiological principles, concern- 
ing the quantity and quality of the empirical representations. 
See §§1714, 1716, 1724.) (page 82, line 8.) [Showing: in giving a 
general view. M.] [Counterbalanced: outbalanced. 31.] [Thus: 
this occurs. M.] [page 81, line 23. M.] 

Article XXVI. — The dynamical principles. (§§ 2727, 2728.) 

§ 2727. —Principles apriori of the possibility of experience if it 
shall connect objects, as to existence, in nature. (The third physi- 
ological principle, with regard to the relation of phenomena.) 
Dynamical laws of nature, (page 83, line 20.) Cf. §§ 1751, 1744, 
1825-1827. [The laws: the proper laws. 31.] [p. 83, 1. 3. M.] 

§ 2728. — Principles of the relation of phenomena to the condi- 
tions of experience in general. (The fourth physiological prin- 
ciple, concerning the modality of the empirical representations, 
which constitutes the physiological doctrine of method.) (page 84, 
line 14.) Cf. §§1830, 1857. See §§ 1831, 1832. [Unites: i. e. com- 
prehends. (31ahaffy has concerns in brackets here and combines 
both below )] [page 83, line 24. M.] 

Article XXVII— Of the essential limitation of the employment of 
the categories in the physiological principles.. (§§ 2729-2732.) 

§ 2729. — Executing all synthetical principles apriori completely 
and on a principle (the faculty of judging in general) which consti- 
tutes the essence of experience in regard to the understanding, 
(page 84, line 28.) [page 84, line 9. M.] 

§2730. — Limits all similar* principles to a condition : that they 
contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience-in-gen- 
eral provided that it is subjected to laws apriori. (page 85, line 14.) 
[* Similar : such. M.] That all things stand of necessity apriori 



780 Kant's Ethics. 

as objects of experience only under the afore-mentioned condi- 
tions. [I take the emphasis from Mahaffy.] [page 84, line 24. JVL] 

§ 2731. — Hence follows a specifically peculiar mode of proof of 
these principles. That they are not referred directly to phenom- 
ena and their relation, hut to the possibility of experience, (page 
86, line 7.) [That they are proved neither inductively (empiri- 
cally) nor dogmatically (from conceptions), but by showing that 
experience is possibly only by virtue of these principles.] [By 
this, that: because. M.] [Points: gradations. M.] [p. 85, 1. 16. M.] 

§ 2732. — Analogies of experience comprise the necessity of the 
determination of the existence in time in general, consequently 
according to a rule of the understanding apriori. (page 87, line 
12.) Cf. §§ 1828, 1755, 1756. [It (this existence): this determina- 
tion. (Mahaffy has it the connection, and also inserts connection in 
brackets after this in the second line preceding.)] [Prolegomenous : 
in Prolegomena. M. [page 86, line 15. M.] 

Article XXVIII. — The proper place to remove Hume's doubt. 
(§2733.) 

§ 2733. — Laws of nature, however incomprehensible absolutely 
in themselves, are nevertheless firmly established.apriori relatively 
to experience, and in experience (but not elsewhere) possess un- 
doubted objective validity, (page 88, line 24.) Cf. § 784. [Per- 
spect: Mahaffy has see in the third line and comprehend in the 
seventh line.] [Commerce : community. M.] [page 88, line 1. M.] 

Article XXIX. — Connection of the representations in our under- 
standing. (§ 2734.) 

§ 2734. — Question is not how the thing in itself, but how the 
cognition of experience of things in respect to the various modes 
of judgment in general, is determined, (page 89, line 26.) [Refer- 
ence: relation. M.] [Perspect : comprehend. M.] [p. 88, 1. 28. M.] 

Article XXX. — Hume's crux metaphysicorum (causality) . (§ 2735.) 

§ 2735. — Perspect* [§ 1113] the conception of cause as a concep- 
tion necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience and of 
its possibility as a synthetic union of perceptions in a conscious- 
ness; but I do not at all perspect* the possibility of a thing as a 
cause, (p. 91, 1. 6.) [In order to bring — to the test : let us make an 
experiment with Hume's. M.] [To use: qu. — to-wit? (Mahafly 
has that is.)~] [Which experience cannot be but: it is nothing in 
fact but. M.] [page 90, line 4. M.] [*I do not know the meaning of 
the word perspect, and I do not know whether the illustration 
which I made at § 1113 (page 592 above) is correct. Mahaffy in § 
2735 has comprehend, possibly qualified in one instance.] 

Article XXXI. — Categories serve, so to say, only to spell phenom- 
ena, that we may be able to read them as experience. (§§ 2736-2738.) 



The Clavis to an Index. 781 

§ 2736. — Pare conceptions of the understanding, if we quit ob- 
jects of experience and would refer these conceptions to things in 
themselves (noumena), have no signification whatever, (page 92, 
line 15.) [Further: beyond this. M. (i. e. beyond experience).] 
[Arbitrable: arbitrary. M.] [page 91, line 11. M.] 

§ 2737. — Preserves to the pure conceptions of the understand- 
ing their origin apriori, and to the universal laws of nature their 
validity as laws of the understanding, yet in such a manner that 
their use is limited to experience, because their possibility has its 
ground only in the reference of the understanding to experience ; 
but not in such a manner that they are derived from experience 
(but that it is derived from them), (page 93, line 4.) [This com- 
plete : (though to its originator unexpected.) M. (words not in 
Eichardson.)] [page 91, line 27. M.] 

§ 2738. — All synthetic principles apriori are nothing more than 
principles of possible experience, and can never be referred to 
things in themselves (but to phenomena, as objects of experience). 
(page 93, line 15.) [Always : be capable of being represented. M.] 
[page 92, line 9. M.] § 1862. 

Article XXXII. — Who make use of these conceptions and principles 
beyond all possible experience. ~ (§§ 2739, 2740.) 

§ 2739. — Always blindly gone beyond everything without dis- 
tinction, (page 93, line 27.) [Sane: supposed sound common 
sense. M.] [And even on: or even on. M.] [page 92, line 21. M.] 

§ 2740. — Adept of sound reason is not so sure, for all the easily 
acquired wisdom which he arrogates to himself, not to fall insensi- 
bly beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras, (page 
94, line 14.) [Vaticinating: prophetic spirit of his sound sense, 
not only suspected, but knew and comprehended, what is here pro- 
pounded with so much ado. M.] [Dogmatist : both himself and 
the dogmatist, who makes use. M.] [page 93, line 8. M.] 

Article XXXIII — -Of particular beings of the understanding, or 
noumena. (§§ 2741-2743 inclusive.) 

§ 2741. —Granted creatures of the understanding alone reality, 
(page 95, line 12.) [Phenomenon and mere appearance : appear- 
ance and illusion. M.] [Scrutators of : inquirers into. M.] [page 
94, line 5. M.] 

§ 2742. — Representation of such beings as form the substrata of 
phenomena, consequently of mere beings of the understanding, is 
not only admissible, but unavoidable, (page 95, line 21.) [page 
94, line 14. M.] 

§ 2743. — Rule which admits of no exception, and which is 
that we know nothing at all determinate of these pure creatures 



782 Kant's Ethics. 

of intellect, nor is it possible for us to know anything of them, 
(p. 96, 1. 7.) [Quit these : leave this sphere. M.] [p. 94, 1. 27. M.] 

Article XXXIV. — Temptation to a transcendental use of the pure 
conceptions of the understanding. (§ 2744.) 

§ 2744. — Conceptions of the understanding seem to have too * 
much sense and matter for the mere use of experience to exhaust 
all their determinations, (page 96, line 25.) Cf. § 1687. [Something: 
something seductive in our pure concepts of the understanding, 
which tempts us to a transcendent f use. M.] [Our conceptions of 
substance : Not only are our. M.] [Still corroborates : strengthens. 
M.] [Comprise: they contain. 31.] [* Too : deeper meaning and 
import than can be exhausted by their empirical use. M.] [^Tran- 
scendental : cf. §§1537, 1887, 2373 and especially §§1930,1931, 
2853.] [page 95, line 16. M.] 

Article XXXV. — Two indispensable investigations have therefore 
been necessary [i.e. §§1665 sqq., 1863 sqq.*]. (§2745.) [*I pre- 
sume that I am indebted to Professor Mahaffy for these references, 
and possibly elsewhere, because he refers to the pages of Meikle- 
john, whereas .Richardson I suppose refers to the paging of a Ger- 
man edition.] 

§ 2745. — Notwithstanding the independence of our pure con- 
ceptions of the understanding and of our principles upon experi- 
ence (and findeed upon the seemingly greater sphere of their use), 
nothing whatever can be thought of by them without the field 
of exj>erience. (page 97, line 26.) [Intellectual world: see § 1885.] 
[ Yes : and f despite of. ~M .] [ The objects of its reference : to which 
it should be applied. M.] [Without it: beyond it. M.] [page 
96, line 11. M.] 

Article XXXVI.— Understanding never can be forgiven for roam- 
ing instead of thinking. (§ 2746.) 

§ 2746. — Fruitless endeavors of pure reason will never be fully 
set* aside, if the self- cognition of reason does not become true 
science, in which the field of its right use is (so to say) distin- 
guished with geometrical certainty from that of its wrong and 
vain use. (page 99, line 11.) [For upon it: for we depend upon 
it alone for assistance. M.] [ With that : its vagaries. M.] [Puri- 
ties : separates. M.] [ Of degradation : by degrading our assertions. 
M.] [* Set aside : abandoned. M.] [page 97, line 12. M.] 

TITLE II.— HOW IS NATURE ITSELF POSSIBLE. (§§2717-2756 inclusive.) 

Article XXXVII. — Nature is derived from the laws of the possibil- 
ity of experience in general § 2752. (§§ 2747-2753 inclusive.) 

§ 2747. — Nature in the material sense is possible by means of 
the quality * of our sensibility, according to which our sensibility 



The Clavis to an Index. 783 

is affected (in the way peculiar to it) by objects which are in them- 
selves unknown to it. (page 100, line 26.) [* Quality : constitution. 
M.] [page 99, line 2. M] [I have substituted Professor Mahaffy's 
sensibility for Richardson's sensitivity throughout the Prolegomena 
section heads. See § 2680, page 772 above.] 

§ 2748. — Nature in the formal sense is possible by means of the 
quality * of our understanding, according to which all those repre- 
sentations of the sensibility are necessarily referred to a conscious- 
ness, and by which the peculiar way of our thinking, that is by 
rules, fand by their means experience (which is to be quite distin- 
guished from the insight into the objects in themselves), is possible, 
(page 101, line 15.] [* Quality : constitution. M.] [page 99, line 
18. M.] [|See§§ 986, 1658.] 

§ 2749. — Can not be further resolved or answered, (page 102, 
line 1.) Cf. §2914. [Basis : and of the apperception which is 
necessarily its basis and that of all thinking. M.] [p. 100, 1. 5. M.] 

§ 2750. — Nature in general we can not learn to know by any 
experience, because experience itself requires laws upon which its 
possibility bottoms apriori. (p. 102, 1. 8.) [p. 100, 1. 12. M.] 

§ 2751. — Possibility of experience in general is therefore at 
the same time the universal law of nature, (page 102, line 14.) 
[page 100, line 18. M.] 

§ 2752. — Must not seek the universal laws of nature in nature 
by means of experience, but (conversely) nature, as to its universal 
legality, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, which 
lie in our sensibility and in our understanding, (page 102, line 25.) 
[page 100, line 28. M] §§1826,1706,2479,1862. [Crusius : cf. 
Tennemann, Hist. Phil., ed. Morell, §§ 368, 369, pages 360-362.] 

§ 2753. — Understanding does not draw its laws (apriori) from 
nature, but prescribes them to it. (p. 104, 1. 1.) [p. 102, 1. 1. M.] 

Article XXXVIII. — Illustrate this apparently* hazardous proposi- 
tion. (§§2754-2756 inclusive.) 

§ 2754. — Unity of various properties of geometrical figures 
under common laws, (page 104, line 18.) [* In appearance: ap- 
parently. M.] [When they: when these laws. M.] [Arbitrable: 
arbitrary determinations of space in itself, and therefore in a uni- 
versal rule. M.] [Lines which cut : which intersect one another 
and the circle, however they may be drawn, are always divided 
-so that the rectangle. M.] [Diameters: radii. M.] [Radii's: chords. 
M.] [Radii which cut : chords which intersect. M.] [Right angles: 
rectangles. M.] [Equal relations: a constant ratio. M.] [page 
102, line 17. M.J 

§ 2755. — Law of the reciprocal attraction diffused over all ma- 



784 Kant's Ethics. 

terial nature, (page 105, line 30.) [Conversely: that it decreases 
inversely as the square of the distance from each. M.] [As the 
spheres : that is, as the spherical surfaces over which this. M.] [ In 
sections of cones : (are described)* in conic sections. M.] [Inverse : 
inverse square of the distance. M.] [page 104, line 2. M.] [*I 
have substituted parenthesis () for the brackets [] within which 
Professor Mahaffy prints the words are described.^ 

§ 2756. — Understanding (as it comprehends all phenomena 
under its own laws, and thereby brings first of all to pass apriori 
experience ((as to its form)) by means of which all that which 
can only be cognized by experience is subjected to its laws of ne- 
cessity) is the origin of the universal order of nature, (page 106, 
line 20.) [To which : in which its concepts are all centred. M.] 
[page 104, line 23. M.] 

APPENDIX TO THE PURE PHYSICS. (§§ 2757-2766 inclusive.) 

Article XXXIX.— Of the system of the categories. (§§ 2757-2766.) 

§ 2757. — Nothing can be more wished for by a philosopher than 
to be able to derive the multifarious of conceptions (and principles) 
from a principle apriori, and to unite everything in this way in 
one cognition, (page 108, line 4.) [Multifarious : the scattered 
multiplicity of the concepts or the principles, which had occurred 
to him in concrete use. M.] [page 106, line 8. M.] 

§ 2758. — Aristotle collected ten pure elementary conceptions 
under the name of categories, (page 108, line 21.) Cf. § 1570. 
[Quality : constitution. M.] [Lie in those: are contained in the 
former. M.] [page 106, line 23. M.] 

§ 2759. — Because there was not a principle on which the under- 
standing could be fully investigated, and all its functions, whence 
its pure conceptions arise, determined fully as to number and with 
precision, (page 109, line 20.) [page 107, line 23. M.] 

§ 2760. — Looked round me for an act of the understanding 
which comprises all the other acts. (Judging : cf. §2717.) (page 
110, line 6.) Cf. §1570. [Wants: defects. M.] [To determine: 
of determining judgments as objectively valid, and so there arose 
the pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which I could 
make certain that these, and this exact number only, constitute 
our whole cognition of things from pure understanding. I was 
justified in calling them by their old name, Categories ; while I 
reserved for myself the liberty of adding, under the title of Pre- 
dicables, a complete list of all the concepts deducible from them, 
by combinations whether among themselves, or. M.] [page 108, 
line 11. M.] Predicabilia : cf. § 1571. 

§ 2761. — True signification of the pure conceptions of the un 



The Clavis to an Index. 785 

derstanding and the meaning of their use can be precisely deter- 
mined, (page 111, line 6.) [ Why it only : for which alone it. M.] 
[Obvious: for here it became obvious that they are themselves 
nothing but. M.] [As limits .- which limits. M.] [p. 109, 1. 13. M.] 

§ 2762. — System of categories makes all treatment of every ob- 
ject of pure reason itself systematical, and affords a clue how and 
by what points of inquiry every metaphysical contemplation must 
(if it shall be complete) be made, (page 112, line 16.) Cf. §§1923 
and 2043. [page 110, line 17. M.] 

§ 2763.- — -Many curious observations may be made on the table 
of the categories, (page 113, note.) Cf. §§ 1575, 1560. [For this 
purpose the categories: of quality. M. inserts.] [page 111, note. M.] 

§ 2764. — Making use of this guidance with regard to one of the 
most abstract ontological divisions, the various distinction of the 
conceptions of something and of nothing, (page 113, line 6.) 
See § 1924, pages 698, 703 above, [page 111, line 9. M.] 

§ 2765. — System of the categories excludes all foreign concep- 
tions which might otherwise slip in between those pure conceptions 
of the understanding, and determines the place of every cognition, 
(page 114, line 15.) Cf. §§1888-1897. [page 112, line 1. M.] 

§ 2766. — Use of that separated table of the categories, if we 
separate the table of the transcendental conceptions of reason, 
(page 115, line 3.) Cf. §§ 1966-1968. [Metaphysic : (fwhere on the 
contrary)* these rational Ideas live with the categories without 
separation, like the children of one familyf — a confusion not to be 
avoided for want of a definite system of categories. M.] [page 
112, line 17. M.] [* I have substituted parenthesis () for the 
brackets [ ] within which Professor Mahaffy pi'ints the words 
where on the contrary^] [f . . • . fnot in Richardson.] 

Chapter IV.— How is Metaphysic in General Possible? (§§2767-2838 inclusive.) 

Article XL. — Why metaphysic requires the Solution of this question. 
(§§ 2767-2771 inclusive.) 

§ 2767. — Neither the pure mathematics nor the pure physics 
had any occasion for such a deduction as we have made [in the 
two preceding chapters], (page 115, line 15.) [page 114, line 4. M.] 

§ 2768. — Metaphysic has to do with pure conceptions of reason 
and the acquaintance with objects which is supposed to arise im- 
mediately from these conceptions without standing in need of the 
mediation of experience ; and therefore this science requires a de- 
duction, (page 115, line 28.) [And whilst : and the supposed knowl- 
edge of objects arising immediately from this incubation of its 
own concepts, without requiring or indeed being able to reach that 
knowledge through experience. M.] [page 114, line 16. M.] 



786 Kanfs Ethics. 

§ 2769. — Absolute whole of all possible experience is itself not 
experience, and yet a necessary problem for reason, (page 116, line 
22.) [page 115, line 13. M.] 

§ 2770. — Eeason contains in itself the ground of ideas, by which 
I mean necessary conceptions whose object can not be given in any 
experience, (page 117, line 15.) [Appearance : illusion. M.] [.page 
116, line 6. Mi] 

§ 2771. — Self-cognition of pure reason is the sole preservative 
from the aberrations into which reason falls when it misappre- 
hends its destination, and refers that f which only regards itself and 
its guidance in all immanent use, transcendently to the object in 
itself, (page 117, line 25.) [(False) appearance : illusion. M.] [page 
116, line 15. M.] 

Article XL1. — Value of the Criticism of Pure Reason. (§ 2772.) 

§ 2772. — Distinguishing of ideas from categories, as cognitions 
of a quite distinct species, origin, and use, is so important a part 
for the groundwork of a science which contains the system of all 
these cognitions apriori, that, without this separation, metaphysic 
is absolutely impossible, or at most an irregular bungling attempt 
to erect an edifice without a knowledge of the materials or of 
their fitness for any purpose, (page 118, line 4.) [To the illustra- 
tion of : to clear up. M.] [page 116, line 23. M.] 

Article XLII. — Reason naturally becomes dialectical by means of 
its ideas. (§ 2773.) 

§ 2773. — Transcendent cognitions of reason neither can (as to 
their ideas) be referred to experience, nor can their propositions 
ever be confirmed or refuted by it; hence can the error, which 
slips in perhaps by that means, be discovered by nothing but pure 
reason itself, (page 118, line 27.) [But which discovery : a discov- 
ery of much difficulty. M.] [Appearance: illusion. M.] [Researches: 
into things, but by a subjective investigation of. M.] [page 117, 
line 14. M.] 

Article XL III. — Division of the dialectic. (§§ 2774-2776.) 

§ 2774. — Derive conceptions belonging to each sort of cognition 
alone from their common source, in order that I not only could, 
by my being informed whence they descend, determine their use 
with safety, but have the incalculable advantage of cognizing the 
completeness in the enumeration, the classing, and the specifica- 
tion of the conceptions apriori, consequently according to prin- 
ciples, (page 119, line 15.) [page 117, line 28. M.] 

§ 2775. — Seek the origin of the ideas in the three functions of 
the syllogisms of reason, (page 120, line 8.) [page 118, line 15. M.] 

§ 2776. — Division of the whole dialectic of pure reason into its 



The Clavis to an Index. 787 

paralogism, its antinomy, and its ideal, is founded therein, (page 

120, line 22.) [page 118, line 29. M.] See §§ 1292, 1970, 1944. 
Article XLIV. — Purpose of the ideas of pure reason. ( To bring 

the cognition of the understanding as near the completeness which an 
idea denotes, as possible.) (§§ 2777-2779 inclusive.) 

§ 2777. — Idea of reason is not, as the categories are, of service 
to us for the use of the understanding in regard to experience; but 
with respect to that use it is quite dispensable, nay even contrary, 
and an impediment to the maxims of the rational* cognition of 
nature, (page 121, line 15.) [ >:< Cognition of reason : rational cog- 
nition. M.] [page 119, line 18. M.] See Richardson's note. 

§ 2778. — Must be harmony between that which belongs to the 
nature of reason and what belongs to that of the understanding, 
and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter, and 
can not possible confuse it. (page 123, line 1.) [Use of experience: 
empirical use. M.] [page 120, line 28. M.] 

§ 2779. — Pure reason has not in its ideas particular objects which 
lie beyond the field of experience in view, but requires only com- 
pleteness of the use of the understanding in the coherence of ex- 
perience. But this completeness can be a completeness of prin- 
ciples only (not of intuitions and of objects), (page 123, line 18.) 
\_Gonceives of such a one : i. e. regards its own procedure.] [page 

121, line 16. M.] 

Article XLY. — Observation previous to the dialectic of pure reason. 

(§ 2780 

§ 2780. — Transcendental ideas (which rightly aim only at illim- 

ited extension of the use of experience*) entice the understanding 

by an unavoidable illusionf to a transcendent use. (page 124, 

line 6.) Cf. §§ 2741-2744. [On which only: on which alone. M.] 

[*Use of experience : empirical use. M\] [Determination of nature: 

natural determination. 1L] \j Appearance : illusion. M\] [page 122, 

line 3. M.] 

TITLE I. -PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS. (i§ 2781-2785.) Cf. §31997-2035,2921-3000. 

Article XL VI. — The denotation of the object of the internal sense, 
and the illusory inference of the nature of our thinking being. (§§ 
2781, 2782.) 

§ 2781. — Pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of 
a thing its subject that belongs to it, and for this subject, which is 
of necessity nothing but a predicate again, its subject, and so on. 
(page 125, line 26.) [page 123, line 22. M.] 

§ 2782. — Jean not be conceived of as the predicate of any other 
subject. But it is nothing more than the feeling of an existence, 
without the least conception, and is only the representation of 



788 Kant's Ethics. 

that to which all thinking stands in relation (relatione accidentis) 
[Das Denken ist nicht das Ich.~\ Cf. §§ 2026, 952, 1729, 1599. (page 
126, line 30.) [I can not be conceived of: I can' not conceive my- 
self. M.] [We do not cognize more* of it: we cognize it by no 
further predicate. M.] [* i. e. than the bare fact of existence.] 
[Should be thought : could be thought. M.] [page 124, line 26. M.] 

Article XL VII. — From the conception of a subject which does not 
exist itself as the predicate of another thing, to prove that its existence 
is thoroughly permanent. (§ 2783.) 

§ 2783. — Conception of the thinking self as substance, if its 
durability can not be proved, remains quite empty and of no con- 
sequence, (page 128, line 5.) Cf. § 1764. [ Whether : whether he 
can succeed in proving. M.] [Beginning : originate or be annihi- 
lated. M.] [page 126, line 1. M.] 

Article XLVIII. — -Permanence of the soul can be evinced during 
the life of man only. (§ 2784.) 

§ 2784. — Conception of substance, if it shall be considered as 
necessarily conjoined with the conception of permanency, can be 
so according to a principle of possible experience only, and conse- 
quently for the behoof of experience only, (page 128, line, 28.) 
[End of all experience : of all experience which concerns the soul 
as an object of experience, except the contrary be proved, which 
is the very question in hand. M.] But I am not sure that Rich- 
ardson is not right, [page 126, line 23. M.] 

Article XLIX. — Kant's formal (or transcendental) idealism actu- 
ally annuls the material (or Cartesian) idealism, (Cf. §§ 2854, 2855.) 
(§2785.) 

§ 2785. — Bodies exist without us (in space) is just as sure an 
experience as that I myself exist according to the representation 
of the internal sense (in time), (page 130, line 2.) Cf. §§ 1846, 
2700 and 2953. (Cf. Mahaffy's notes on this §2785.) [If the ob- 
jects : whether the objects. M.] [If experience : whether experience. 
M.] [As of external phenomena : Mahaffy omits of] [May like- 
wise : may accordingly. M.] [Out of my thoughts : apart from my 
thoughts. M.] [Out of my power: apart from my faculty. M.] 
[In both : in both (space and time). M. (I have substituted paren- 
enthesis ( ) for brackets [ ] within which Professor Mahaffy prints 
the words space and time.)'] [page 128, line 1. M.] 

TITLE 1I.-COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. (^ 2786-2804 inclusive.) Cf..?2042 et seqq. 

Article L. — In what respect the cosmological idea becomes transcen- 
dent. (§ 2786.) 

§ 2786. — Cosmological idea takes its object from the sensible 
world, but enlarges the connection of that which is conditionate 



The Clavis to an Index. 789 

■with its condition so much that experience never can equal it. 
(page 133, line 8.) [page 131, line 9. M.] 

Article LI. — Transcendental ideas refer to nothing but the absolute 
completeness of the series of conditions of a given conditionate. 
(§ 2787.) 

§ 2787. — Antinomy, which is not arbitrarily * excogitated, but 
founded in the nature of human reason, by consequence unavoid- 
able and never ceasing, (page 134, line 4.) (Here follow the four 
theses, together with their antitheses. See §§ 2067, 2081, 2094, 
2105.) Cf. §§2051, 2062. [*Arbitrariously : arbitrarily. M.] [Cas- 
ual: contingent. M.] [Is simple : consists of simple (parts), f M.] 
[page 132, line 9. M.] [f I have substituted parentheses () for the 
brackets [ ] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word parts.] 
Article LII (a). — The thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be 
evinced by equally clear, evident, and irresistible proofs. (§2788.) 

§ 2788. — Mast bring the philosopher to reflection and give him 
uneasiness, (page 135, line 23.) [page 134, line 1. M.] 

Article LII (b). — The only possible case in which reason reveals its 
secret dialectic. (§ 2789, 2790.) 

§ 2789. — Never can be refuted by experience, (page 136, line 14.) 
[If the world : whether the world. M.] [If matter : whether mat- 
ter. M.] [page 134, line 20. M.] 

§ 2790. — Must necessarily discover an error for us which lies hid- 
den in the presuppositions of reason.* Two propositions contradict- 
ing one another can not both be false, except when the conceirtion 
upon which both bottom is itself contradictory, (page 137, line 1.) 
Cf. § 2149. [Against its will : unintentionally. M.] (* I therefore 
wish [says Kant in a note here] that the critical reader may make 
this antinomy his chief study, because nature itself seems to have 
established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring preten- 
sions, and to force it to self trial. Every proof which I have 
given, as well of the thesis as of the antithesis, I oblige myself to 
be answerable for, and thereby to show the certainty of the inevit- 
able antinomy of reason. If the reader is once brought by this 
rare phenomenon to recur to the proof of the presupposition upon 
which it bottoms, he will feel himself constrained to investigate the 
first foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me.) 
Cf. §2860. [Appearance : illusion. M.] [page 135, line 5. M.] 
Article LII (c). — The mathematical antinomies. (§§2791-2794.) 
§ 2791. — Thesis as well as the antithesis of both is false, (page 
138, line 14.) [page 136, line 14. M.] 

§ 2792. — Objects of the senses exist in experience only. To 
give them an existence subsisting by itself* without experience or 



790 Kant's Ethics. 

before it, is as much as to represent to ourselves that experience 
is actual without experience or before it. (p. 138, 1. 20.) [But I: 
accordingly I. M.] [p. 136, 1. 21. M.] [* Absolutely. E's n.] 

§ 2793. — Solution of the problem concerning the quantum of the 
world (as to space and time) is (whether attempted positively or 
negatively) always false, because the conception of an absolutelv 
existing sensible world is contradictory in itself, (page 139, 
line 10.) [Impossible to all: impossible, as regards all. M.] [Ac- 
cording to : or, again, of the limitation of the world by a void space 
or an antecedent void time, is impossible. M.] Cf. §§ 2170, 2189, 
2193. [page 137, line 16. M.] 

§ 2794. — Every solution of the misunderstood problem relating 
to the division of phenomena, whether it is maintained in it that 
bodies consist in themselves either of infinitely many parts, or of 
a finite number of simple parts, is contradictory or absurd. To 
assume that a phenomenon (exempli gratia, that of a body) con- 
tains in itself before any experience all the parts which nothing f 
but possible experience can ever reach, is as much as to give a 
mere phenomenon, which can exist only in experience, at the same 
time an existence previous to experience, or to say that mere rep- 
resentations exist before they are met with in the power * of rep- 
resentation, (page 140, line 5.) Cf. §§ 2171, 2196. [* Power : fac- 
ulty. M.] [f Nothing but: any. M.] [page 138, line 8. M.] 

Article LIII. — In the dynamical antinomies, both the thesis and 
the antithesis (which are opposed to one another by mere misunder- 
standing) can be true. (§§ 2795-2803 inclusive.) 

§"2795. — Falseness of the representation in the dynamical an- 
tinomies consists in representing what can be united as contradic- 
tory, (page 140, line 26.) [page, 138, line 26. M.] 

§ 2796. — Presupposition of homogeneity is by no means requisite 
to the dynamical connection, (page 141, line 9.) Cf. § 2205. [Ma- 
haffy begins this § 2796 with the word For.~\ [Laid down by : 
posited through. JVL] [page 139, line 9. JVL] 

§ 2797. — Necessity of nature is referred merely to phenomena 
and liberty merely to things in themselves, and — though both 
species of causality (how difficult soever or impossible it may be 
to render that of the latter sort comprehensible) are assumed or 
granted — no contradiction arises. [This position is the master- 
key to all the speculative difficulties inherent in moral philosophy. 
The solution is not essential to ethics (whose supreme position is 
the Law's imperative), but is required for the satisfaction of rea- 
son. (Cf. §2862.)] (page 141, line 22.) [Same: same predicate 
is at once affirmed and denied of the same kind of object in the 
same sense. M.] [page 139, line 21. M.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 791 

§ 2798. — Nature therefore and liberty can without a contradic- 
tion be attributed at the very same time to the very same thing, 
but in a distinct reference : (1) as a phenomenon ; (2) as a thing in 
itself (in.se). (page 142, line 6.) See §2212. Of. § 2214 et seqq. 
[Every effect (as a ■phenomenon'): In the phenomenon, every ef- 
fect. M.] [To effectuate: to act must also have originated among 
phenomena. M.] [Of its own accord: from itself. M.] [But the 
effects : and its effects only, as. M.] [Though grounded : though the 
basis of one. M.] [At one time : on one side as a phenomenon, on 
the other as. M.] [page 140, line 6. M.] 

§ 2799. — Idea of liberty has place only in the relation of the 
intellectual, as cause, to the phenomenon, as the effect, (page 
143, note.) Cf. § 718. [Pure beings of the understanding : pure 
rational beings. M.] [Begin itself : itself begin. M.] [Beginning 
itself: itself beginning. M.] [Produce: originate. M,] [page 141, 
note. M.] 

§ 2800. — Causality of reason is liberty with regard to the effects 
in the sensible world, provided that objective grounds, which are 
themselves idea, are considered as determining relatively to liberty.* 
(This connection is expressed by the word ought. Cf. § 2233.) 
[*That is, provided that liberty means (not lawlessness, but) con- 
formity to the Law. (Cf. James, i., 25.) Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. 
v., page 109, §30.] (page 144, line 1.) Cf. §2231. [Causes of 
nature : natural causes. M.] [* Relatively to liberty : in regard to 
it. M.] [To determine it: Mahaffysays "to determine them,'' (i. e. 
I suppose, conditions).] [page 142, line 3| M.] 

§ 2801. — Law of nature remains,! whether the rational being- 
is the cause of the effects of* the sensible world from reason, con- 
sequently through liberty, or whether he does not determine these 
on grounds of reason. [That is to say, he who tramples on the 
Law is not more a natural man than he who " abides % thereby, 
being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of work," but has merely 
cast away his liberty — lost his soul birthright (§ 369) without gain- 
ing therefor the whole world, in which his Law-abiding brother 
has quite as large ground as he.] (page 145, line 8.) Cf. § 2212. 
[* Of the effects of: of the effects in. M.] [Contradiction : JSTow I 
may say without contradiction. M.] [Mere laws of nature of the 
sensitivity : mere natural laws of sensibility. M.] [Hindrance : no 
hindrance to natural law in phenomena. M.] [page 143, line 6. M.] 
[f I take the emphasis from Mahaffy.] [% Am. Bib. Un., I think.] 

§ 2802. — Eelation of the action to objective grounds of reason is 
not a relation of time ; in this case that which determines the 
causality does not as to time precede the action, because such de- 



792 Kant's Ethics. 

termining grounds represent not a reference of objects to sense, 
"by consequence not to causes as phenomena, but determining 
causes as things in themselves, which do not rank under conditions 
of time, (page 146, line 15.) [Necessity of nature's: natural neces- 
sity. M.] [Respective to the: regarded as. M.] [Of its own accord: 
from itself. M.] [Of objects to sense: to objects of sense. M.] Cf. § 
2238. [page 144, line 12. M.] [Semple Int. K. Eth., page c] 

§ 2803. — Solution of the fourth antinomy. Both propositions 
can perfectly subsist together, (page 147, line 23.) Cf. § 2249. 
[As a phenomenon: in the phenomenon. M.] [In another way : of 
another kind. M.] [page 145, line 19. M.] 

Article LIV. — Result of the whole antinomy. (§ 2804.) 
§ 2804. — Eeacler is thereby forced once more to undertake the 
deduction of all our cognition apriori, and to prove that deduction 
which Kant has already given (in the transcendental analytic), 
(page 148, line 10.) [Erection : arrangement. M.] [Represented : 
exposed. M.] [Necessitated: compelled. M.] [Circumstance: pre- 
paration. M.] [page 146, line 6. M.] 

TITLE III.-THE THEOLOGICAL IDEA. (§2805.) 

Article LV. — Dialectical illusion % of the third transcendental idea 
(which is occasioned by our holding the subjective conditions of think- 
ing objective ones f of the things themselves and a necessary hypothesis 
for the satisfaction of our reason a dogma') can be easily exhibited. 

(§ 2805 

§ 2805. — Ideal op pure reason affords matter for the most im- 
portant (but, if it is made * only speculatively, transcendent and 
just thereby dialectic) use of reason, (page 149, line 10.) Cf. §§ 
2258-2371. [* If it is made: if pursued. M.] [Misled: and err 
by exaggerating its grounds, in striving to attain if possible the 
absolute completeness of their series. It rather breaks totally 
with experience. M.] [f Ones : conditions. M.] [^.Appearance : il- 
lusion. M.] [page 147, line 4. M.] 

GENERAL SCHOLION. (§§2806-2808 inclusive.) 

Article LVI — On the transcendental ideas. (§§2806-2808.) 
§ 2806. — Eeason by all means can give and must give a full ac- 
count of its own procedure. All the problems that must needs 
arise from the conceptions of reason can be solved, (page 150, line 
17.) Cf. §2408. [Plainer: a. d., 1744-1818. See Tennemann 
(Morell) §381, page 387.] Aphorisms: (§728-9). M. inserts.] 
[To a certain height: beyond a certain point. M.] [p. 148, 1. 8. M,] 
§ 2807. — Questions which reason asks us relatively to the trans- 
cendental ideas are put to us not by the objects but by mere 
maxims of our reason for the sake of its own satisfaction, and 



The Clavis to an Index. 793 

must collectively be capable of being* sufficiently answered, (page 
151, line 8.) [^Answered: of complete answers. M.] [Of it on the 
whole: of experience as a wbole. M.] [The only idea: yet tbe 
Idea of a whole of cognition according to principles must above 
all things afford. M.] [Mean : mean only the practical, but also 
the highest end of the speculative use. M.] [page 148, line 26. M.] 
§ 2808. — Transcendental ideas therefore express the peculiar 
destination of reason as a principle of the systematic unity of the 
use of the understanding. But if this unity of the mode of cog- 
nition is considered as if it adhered to the object of cognition, if 
it (a unity merely regulative) is held constitutive, and if we should 
persuade ourselves that we can by means of these ideas enlarge our 
cognition far beyond all possible experience, then the dialectic 
arises, confusing the empirical use of reason, and urging reason into 
conflict with itself, (page 152, line 13.) [Partly — partly: both — 
also. M.] Cf. § 2375. [page 150, line 3. M.] 

■CONCLUSION".— ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE BOUNDARY OF PURE 
REASON. (H 2809-2837 inclusive.) 

Article L VII. — On the outer verge of all lawful f use of reason. 
(See § 134.) (§§ 2809-2825 inclusive.) [f See in § 2823.] 

§ 2809. — Absurd for us to hope to cognize more of any one ob- 
ject than belongs to the possible experience of it, or to lay the 
least* claim to the cognition of any one thing which we do not 
assume to be an object of possible experience, (page 153, line 7.) 
[* least : lay claim to the least atom of knowledge. M.] [Clear- 
est : very cogent. M.] [Quality: the constitution it has in itself. 
M.] [page 150, line 22. M.] 

§ 2810. — Absurdity yet greater i/* we should not allow of any 
things in themselves, or had a mind to give out our experience for 
the only possible mode of cognition of things, by consequence our 
intuition in space and in time for the only possible intuition, and our 
discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible un- 
derstanding, (page 153, line 24.) [* If we : if we conceded no 
things per se. M.] [page 151, line 11. M.] 

§ 2811. — Confusion of the science of metaphysics can be cleared 
up only * by a formal determination, drawn from principles, of 
the boundary of our use of reason, (page 154, line 7.) [Could in 
consequence of that : might in this way. M.] [Serve : may illus- 
trate. JVL] [Same understanding : sane f understanding ?] [Give 
out — for: announce — as. M.] [And thus: then men began to 
doubt even the. M.] [* But this confusion: and this confusion 
can only be cleared up and all future relapses obviated by a formal 
determination, on principles, of the boundary of the use of our 
reason. M.] [page 151, line 20. M.] [f Sound sense. M.] 51 



794 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2812. — Insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to 
the satisfaction of reason, (page 155, line 4.) [Clear: "as re- 
gards the nature of our soul, a clear consciousness of the subject" — 
(so many words I select from Mahaffy, almost consecutively).] 
[From losing himself in mere ideas : against losing himself in tran- 
scendent Ideas. M.] [page 152, line 16. M.] 

§ 2813. — Eeason sees, as it were, a space round it for the cog- 
nition of things in themselves (though it can never have deter- 
minate conceptions of them). (page 156, line 15.) [Always: 
always presuppose. M.] [page 153, line 27. M.] 

§ 2814. — Eeason, in the mathematics and in natural philosophy, 
admits (of limits, but) not of bounds; that is, (that something at 
which it can never arrive lies without it, but) not that it will be any- 
where completed itself in its internal progress, (page 156, line 24.) 
[By constant : by continued experience and its rational combina- 
tion. M.] [page 154, line 7. M.j 

§2815 — Limits must * not be mistaken here; for the mathe- 
matics refer to phenomena || only ; and what (such as the concep- 
tions of the metaphysics and of moral philosophy) can not be an 
object of sensual intuition, lies entirely without their || sphere, and 
they can never lead to it. (.Natural philosophy will never dis- 
cover to us the internal of things.) (page 157, line 6.) [*Must 
not: can not. M.] [So to say : and there is not, as it were, any 
point. M.] [They should : must. M.] [Chief: ultimate. M.] [page 
154, line 18. M.] 

§ 2816.- — Metaphysic leads us (in the dialectic essays of pure 
reason) to bounds; and the transcendental ideas serve to point out. 
to us actually not only the bounds of the use of pure reason, but 
the way to determine them, (page 157, line 28.) [Of being rendered 
current : "of evasion."' (I have interlined it, and I presume that 
it is Professor Mahany's word.)] [page 155, line 11. M.] 

| 2817. — Sensible world is nothing but a chain of phenomena 
connected according to universal laws ; it therefore has not any 
subsistence by itself, it is not the thing in itself, and by conse- 
quence refers of necessity to that, which contains the ground of 
this phenomenon,* to beings which can not be cognized merely as 
phenomena, (page 158, line 18.) [* Phenomenon : experience. M.] 
[Of them — only : of them alone. M.] [page 156, line 1. M.] 

§ 2818. — Question now is, What is the office of our reason in 
this connection of that which we know with that which we do not 
know and never shall know ? This is a real connection of a 
known thing with one quite unknown (and which will always re- 
main unknown), and, though* what is not known should not be- 



The Clavis to an Index. 795 

come known in the least (which knowledge we in fact can not hope 
for), the conception of this connection must be capable of being 
determined and rendered distinct, (page 159, line 12.) \^If: 
though. M.] [At present: Now only — since the transcendental Ideas 
compel ns to approach them, and so have led us, as it were, only 
to the contact. M.] Cf. §§2741-2745 (Mahaffy refers to xxxiv. 
and xxxv., i. e. §§2744, 2745). [page 156, line 23. M.] 

§ 2819. — Conceive of an immaterial being, of an intelligible 
world, and of a Supreme of all beings (merely noumena), because 
in them only, as things in themselves, reason meets with that 
completeness and satisfaction which it never can hope for in the 
derivation of phenomena from their homogeneous grounds, (page 
160, line 9.) [Always : always presuppose a thing per se, and there- 
fore indicate it, whether we can know more of it or not. M.] [page 

157, line 20. M.] Cf §2566. 

§ 2820. — Assume them relatively to the sensible icorld, and con- 
nect them with it by reason ; we are able to think at least of this 
connection by means of such conceptions as express their rela- 
tion to this world, (page 160, line 21.) [For: yet. M.] [page 

158, line 3. M.] Cf §2418. 

§ 2821. — Deistical conception, a pure conception of reason, which 
represents only a thing that contains all reality, is nevertheless 
not able to determine any one reality ; because for that purpose 
the example would need to be taken from the sensible world, in 
which case we should have to do always with an object of sense 
only, not with something quite heterogeneous, which can not be 
an object of sense, (p. 161, 1. 8 ) [In reducing : in bringing them 
under rules of the unity of consciousness. M.] [Universal : gen- 
eral. M.] [Happens: very same difficulties arise if M.] [But in 
this: and therefore from our dependence for satisfaction upon ob- 
jects whose existence we require, and so the notion rests upon 
sensibility. M.] [page 158, line 20. M.] 

§ 2822. — Hume's objections to deism are weak, and reach noth- 
ing but the proofs ; but with regard to the theism which will be 
brought about by a stricter determination of the deist's * merely 
transcendent conception of the Supreme Being, they are very 
strong. All his dangerous arguments refer to anthropomorphism, 
which he holds inseparable from theism, and to make f it absurd 
in itself, and that if the former were omitted J the latter would 
fall with it, and nothing remain but a deism, of which nothing 
can be made, which is of no use to us, and which can not serve 
for any foundation of religion or of morals, (page 162, line 16.) 
[* Our there : the deist's. M.] [f Makes: to make. M.] [I Omit- 



796 Kant's Ethics. 

ted: abandoned. M.] [Ubiquity: omnipresence. M.] [Always: 
Hume always insists that. M.] [But properties : and that proper- 
ties. M.] [Unavoidableness : If this anthropomorphism were really 
unavoidable. M.] [Not enough: that it is not enough to say, it is 
Cause, but we must explain the nature of its causality. M.] [page 
159, line 29. M.] 

§ 2823, — Both can subsist together, but exactly at the bound- 
ary or verge of all allowed | use of reason only, (page 163, line 
22.) Of. §134. [f Allowed : lawful. M.] [For this : For this bound- 
ary. M ] [So that : as if nothing but mere world remained for us 
to cognize. M. (Of. § 2810).] [page 161, line 3.] 

§ 2824. — Limit our judgment to the relation merely, which the 
world may have to the Supreme Being, and thereby avoid the dog- 
matic anthropomorphism (and allow ourselves a symbolical an- 
thropomorphism), (page 164, line 10.) Of. § 748. [Appropriate : 
attribute. ¥.] [page 161, line 20. M.] 

§ 2825. — Necessitated so to consider the world as if it were 
the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, (page 164, line 
22 ) [To me: for me. M.] [page 162, line 3. M.] Cf. § 2420. 

Article L VIII. — Anthropomorphism is entirely avoided in rational 
theology. (§§2826-2829 inclusive.) 

§ 2826.— Analogy (§§ 2824, 2825) yields a conception of the Su- 
preme Being sufficiently determined for us,* though we have left 
out everything that could determine him absolutely* or in him- 
self ; for we determine him respectively to the world, and by con- 
sequence to us, and more is not necessary to us. (page 165, line 4.) 
See § 1330. [* I take this emphasis from Mahaffy.] [That accord- 
ing to analogy : analogical. M.] [Act as much : react equally. M.] 
[Right and motive power: Here right and motive power. M.] 
[Give: obtain. M.] [If we should: if we give up the. M.] [page 
162, line 13- M.] 

§ 2827.— DEISTICAL CONCEPTION of the First Being, as a 
necessary hypothesis, in which conception this Being is thought 
of by the merely ontological predicates of substance, of cause, etc., 
as those predicates are mere categories, which, as* they do NOT 
give a DETERMINA TE conception of him,f consequently give 
a conception which is NOT LIMITED to any sensuous conditions, 
PERMITS O UR predicating of this Being a causality by % rea- 
son with regard to the world, and thus PASSING TO THEISM. 
(page 166, line 10.) Cf. §§2356 and 2359. [*As they: though 
they. M.] [f Thereby give : yet give. M.] [X By reason : through 
reason. M.] [As to the former : in the first place.] [If we are 
but granted at first : let us assume at the outset. M.] [And which: 



The Clavis to an Index. 797 

and it therefore. M.] [To him himself : to him in himself. M.] [If 
we even assume again : to assume. M.] [To it : to our reason. M.] 
[Use of nature: natural use. M.] [page 163, line 14. M.] 

§ 2828.- — Eeason is attributed to the Supreme Being, provided 
that he contains the ground of the rational form of the world, 
but according to analogy only, that is provided that this expres- 
sion shows the relation only which the Supreme Cause that is 
unknown to us has to the world. We are thereby using the prop- 
erty of reason for the purpose of conceiving by means of it not of 
God, but of the world in such a manner as is necessary in order to 
have the greatest possible use of reason with regard to it accord- 
ing to a principle, (page 167, line 10.) [Form of reason : rational 
form. M.] [Of this form: of this rational form. M.] [Of conceiv- 
ing : kept from using this (human)* attribute, Eeason, for the pur- 
pose of conceiving Go I by means of it, instead of conceiving the 
world. M.] [Quality: constitution. M.] [That reason : the former 
reason. M.] [page 164, line 19. M] [*I have substituted paren- 
thesis () for the brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy 
prints the word human.'] 

§ 2829. — Difficulties which seem to oppose theism disappear. 
The Criticism of Pure Eeason shows here the true middle way 
between the dogmatism which Hume combats and the skepticism 
which he would introduce, (page 169, line 1.) [As that which: 
as one which. M.] [To determine : to determine for. M] [Some- 
thing : by adopting something from one side and something. M.] 
[page 166, line 7. M.] 

■ Article LIX.— The general conclusion of the CRITIQUE OF 
PURE REASON. (§§ 2830-2832 inclusive.) 

§ 2830. — Bounding of the field of the understanding by some- 
thing which is otherwise unknown to it, is however a cognition, by 
which reason is neither shut up within the sensible world nor 
roams without it, but limits itself to the relation of that which 
lies without it to that which is within it. (page 169, line 18.) 
[Type: metaphor. M.] [At this station : even at this standpoint. 
M] [As belongs to : as befits. M.] [page 167, line 3. M.] 

^ 2831. — Natural theology is a conception of that sort at the 
boundary of human reason, because reason is obliged to look 
beyond this boundary for the idea of a Supreme Being, not 
in order to determine anything relatively to this mere being of the 
understanding, consequently out of the sensible world, but in order 
to guide its own use within it according to principles of the 
greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical) unity, (page 
170, line 28.) [Feign : invent. M.] [page 168, line 9. M] 



798 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2832. — Eesult of the whole Criticism of Pure Eeason ■ that 
reason by all its principles apriori never teaches us anything more 
than objects of possible experience, and even of these nothing 
more than what can be cognized in experience ; but this limitation 
does not 'prevent reason leading us to the objective boundary of ex- 
perience, to the reference to something not an object of experience, 
but the chief ground of all experience, without however teaching us 
anything of it in itself, (page 171, line 15.) [1 am partly indebted 
to Professor Mahaffy for emphasis.] [page 168, line 28. M.] 

Article LX. — WHATEVER is grounded in the nature of our 
powers, will be found to be in harmony with the final purpose and 
proper employment of these powers, when once we have discovered their 
true direction and aim [§ 2373]. (§§ 2833-2837 inclusive.) 

§2833. — Problem worthy of inquiry : to find out the ends* of 
nature at which this predisposition to transcendent conceptions in 
our reason may be aimed,* because everything that lies in nature 
must be originally placed in it for some useful purpose, (page 172, 
line 4) [* The ends of nature — aimed: the natural ends intended 
by this. IVL] \_Predisposition of nature: natural predisposition. 
M.] [Partly — partly: either apparently or really conflicting dia- 
lectical. M] [page 169, line 15-. M.] 

§ 2834. — Aim of this natural predisposition * is to free our con- 
ception from the fetters of experience and the limits of the mere 
contemplation of nature, so far as at least to open to its view a 
field which contains merely objects for the pure understanding, 
not for the purpose of speculation, but for f the behoof of practical 
principles, (page 173, line 5.) [f In order that : for the behoof of] 
[* Predisposition of nature: natural tendency. M.] [ Whether : 
be it knowledge or nonsense. M.] \_Spread : expand. JVL] [page 
170, line 12. M.] 

§ 2835. — Transcendental ideas serve to annul * the rash asser- 
tions of materialism, of naturalism, and of fatalism, and thereby 
to afford scope for the moral ideas without the field of speculation, 
(page 173, line 26.) \_Over and above: besides. M.] [Sufficiently: 
which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself. M.] [* To annul: 
at least to destroy. M.] [page 171, line 5. M.] 

§ 2836. — Practical utility of the transcendental ideas. (First 
scholion to the transcendental dialectic, §§2372-2407). Not be- 
longing as a part to the science of metaphysic itself, this practical 
reference, however, lies at least within the bounds of philosophy. 
(page 174, line 29.) [Appearance : illusion. M.] [Solved : to be 
removed, but also, if possible, as a natural provision. M.] [page 
172, line 9. 31.] 



The Olavis to an Index. 799 

§ 2837. — Principles which determine apriori the order of nature 
or rather * the understanding, which seeks nature's laws by ex- 
perience. (Second scholion to the transcendental dialectic, §§ 
2408-2443.) Provided that the thorough unity of the use of the 
understanding for the hehoof of a collective possible experience 
(in a system) can not belong to the understanding but with refer- 
ence to reason (§§ 1942, 2374, 2423, 2403), experience is mediately 
subordinate to the legislation of reason ,(cf. §2401). (page 175, 
line 17.) [* Or rather the : or rather of the. M.] [As they : though 
they. M.] [The nature of reason: i.e. the natural tendency of 
reason.] Cf. §§2440-2442. Cf. §§2429, 1409. [p. 172, 1. 25. M.] 

§ 2838. — Accomplished the analytic solution of the main ques- 
tion, (page 176, line 14.) See §§2674,2675. [From that: see 
Kant's note to § 2768.] [page 174, line 1. M.] 

Chapter V. -Solution of the General Question of the Prolegomena. How is 
Metaphysic Possible as a Science? (35 2839-2835 inclusive.) [See?2875.J 

§ 2839. — -Metaphysic, as a natural predisposition * of reason, is 
real, but by itself only (as the analytic solution of the third prin- 
cipal question [chapter iv.] evinces) dialectical and illusory, (page 
177, line 5.) Cf. §2811. [* Predisposition of nature : natural ten- 
dency. M.] [ Vies with: may overcome another.- Mi] [p. 175, 1. 4. M.] 

§ 2840. — Criticism alone contains in itself the whole well proved 
and approved plan* and even all the means of execution, whereby 
metaphysic can be brought about as a science, (page 177, line 15.) 
[Inferred: see §2760.] [Sources of — of — of: Mahafly omits of in 
these two lines.] [Persuasion: plausibility. M.] [*Yes: and. M.] 
[Elaboration: cultivation. M.] [Be made the most conducive: best 
be directed. M.] [page 175, line 14. M.] 

§ 2841. — Criticism stands in the same relation to the common 
metaphysics of the schools, as chemistry to alchemy or as astron- 
omy to judiciary * astrology, (page 178, line 11.) [* Judiciary : 
prognosticating. M.] [Seeming: mock. M.] [Preference: here is 
an advantage. M.] [Remains: unexplored.] [Closed: self-con- 
tained. M. (but he says it " does not adequately render the un- 
translatable " German "original Geschlossenes ").] [Particular: 
peculiar. M.] [page 176, line 14. M.] 

§ 2842. — Period of the downfall of all dogmatic metaphysic is 
undoubtedly arrived, (page 179, line 15.) [Lasts its time; for: 
lasts its time, but. JVL] [Moment of its fall : epoch of its decay. 
M.] [Inclination: tendency. M.] [page 177, line 22. M.] 

§ 2843. — Hope these Prolegomena will excite investigation in the 
field of criticism, (page 180, line 14.) [Bespeaks much : promis- 
ing. ML] [Represent to myself : imagine. M.] [page 178, line 25. M.] 



800 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2844. — Metaphysic can not give satisfaction to any reflecting 
mind, but it is quite impossible to forego it entirely ; a Criticism 
op Pure Eeason must therefore be attempted, or (if one exists) 
investigated, (page 180, line 25.) [Desire of: thirst for. M.] 
[page 179, line 5. M.] 

§ 2845. — Metaphysic, after all its bustle and noise, still remains 
as it was in the time of Aristotle ; though the preparations for it 
are (since the clew to synthetic cognitions has been found) un- 
doubtedly much better made than they formerly were, (page 181,. 
line 12.) [Determination: preciseness. M.] [Materials: from 
which the science still remains to be built. M.] Cf. § 2661. [More 
composed: i. e. complicated.] [page 179, line 21. M.] 

§ 2846. — Easily annul this accusation, by producing a single 
synthetic proposition (belonging to metaphysic) which he can * 
prove dogmatically apriori. (page 182, line 26.) [* Can prove : 
proposes to prove dogmatically apriori, for until he has performed 
this feat, I shall not grant. M.] [Forbid: deprecate. M.] [The 
toys of : trifling about. M.] [Understanding: common sense. M-.]j 
[Properties : peculiarities. M.] [page 181, line 4. M.] 

§ 2847.- — -Nothing can be more absurd than, in metaphysic (a. 
philosophy from pure reason), to think of grounding our* judg- 
ments upon probability and upon conjecture, (page 183, line 16.) 
[* Their: our. M.] [Is cognized: is to be cognized. M.] [Quite 
certain cases: but perfectly certain judgments concerning the de- 
gree of the probability of certain cases, under given uniform con- 
ditions, which. M.] [Accident: chance. M.] [page 181, line 24. M.} 

§ 2848. —Certainly a bad sign of a sound understanding to ap- 
peal to the testimony of common sense, (page 184, line 4.) Cf. § 
2638. [To the sound understanding: to sound sense. M.] [Com- 
mon understanding : common sense. M.] [The co?nmon intellect: 
common sense. M.] [Known : but what it has always thought 
when a pane was broken or a kitchen utensil missing, it then un- 
derstands the principle. M.] [Down only : down with contempt. 
M.] [page 182, line 14. M.] 

§ 2849. — Evasion which those false friends of common sense who> 
occasionally praise it highly but usually despise it, are wont to- 
make use of, when they say that there must* surely be at all 
events some* propositions which are immediately certain, and of 
which there is occasion to give not only no proof, but no account 
at all, because we otherwise could never have donef with the 
grounds of our judgments, (page 185, line 9.) [* Must at last : 
must surely be at all events some propositions. M.] [jNever have 
done : never stop inquiring into. M.] [Of this right (or moral fac- 



The Clavis to an Index. 801 

ulty) : of this privilege. M. (The word moral ought to be omitted, in 
any event).] [By my own power : by all my power. M.] [Or out 
of it : or beyond it also. M.] [page 183, line 16. M.] 

§ 2850. — Never make an appeal to common sense in metaphysic 
(* which must always be science), but only out of it (in practical 
philosophy, and then only when a belief of reason only is found 
possible for us, and sufficient to our want, and perhaps even more 
salutary than knowledge itself), (page 186, line 19.) Cf. §1145. 
[(On certain occasions) and when: on certain occasions, when. M. 
(omitting ( ) and and).~\ [* Mahaffy's use of ( ).] [Shape of the 
thing: attitude of the question. M.] [In gross : as a whole. M.] 
[Understanding : sense. M.] [page 184, line 28. M.] 

Appendix. — On what can be done to realize metaphysic as a science. 
(§2851.) 

§ 2851. — Investigation of the principles of the Criticism of 
Pure Reason must precede all judgment on its value, (page 187, 
line 14.) [Here: now. M. (i. e. the Critique).] [No sure: if no 
sure. M.] [Even that there: even if there.] [page 186, line 3. M.] 

Review of a judgment on the CRITICISM, which {judgment) is 
antecedent to investigation. (§§2852-2860 inclusive.) 

§ 2852. — Occasion to make a few illustrations which may guard 
the reader of these Prolegomena in a few cases against miscon- 
ception, (page 189, line 4.) 

§ 2853. — Let us see what sort of an idealism it is, which, though 
it is farf from constituting the soul of the system, pervades my 
whole work, (page 190, line 26.) [fVery far indeed.] 

§ 2854. — Idealism oe Kant contrasted with that of all genuine 
idealists, (page 192, line 1.) [The following is the full text of 
this section :] The proposition' of all genuine idealists, from the 
Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: 
"All cognition by sense and experience is nothing but mere ap- 
pearance [i. e. illusion*], and truth is in the ideas of the pure un- 
derstanding only, and of pure reason." Whereas the principle 
which thoroughly governs and determines my idealism is: "all 
cognition of things from mere pure understanding^or mere reason, 
is nothing but appearance [i. e. illusion*], and truth is in experience 
only." [*See Professor Mahaffy above, e. g. pages 786, 774.] 

§ 2855. — Idealism of Kant (more properly named critical 
idealism) subverts the common idealism. How Kant came to use 
this word in quite an opposite view. — Kant and Berkeley, (page 
192, line 12.) See §§ 1844, 2699. 

§ 2856. — .Nothing further remarkable in the judgment (§ 2852) 
on my book. The reviewer generally fights with his own shadow. 



802 Kant's Ethics. 

When I oppose the truth of experience to dreaming, he is not 
aware that I am alluding to the known somnio objective sumto of 
the Wolfian philosophy, which is merely formal, and by which the 
difference of sleeping and waking is not considered, (p. 194, 1. 9.) 

§ 2857. — Idealism is only adopted in Kant's system as the sole 
means of solving the problem of synthetic cognition apriori, upon 
whose solution the fate of metaphysic entirely rests, and which is 
the sole aim of the Criticism of Pure Eeason, as well as of these 
Prolegomena, (page 195, line 10.) 

§ 2858. — Standard for judging of that which is termed meta- 
physic, must be first found, (page 197, line 16.) 

§ 2859. — Challenging my reviewer to show in his way any one 
principle, which is maintained b} r him, to be really metaphysical, 
that is, synthetical and cognized apriori from conceptions, (page 
198, line 12.) 

§ 2860. — Eeviewer is free to choose any one of these eight prop- 
ositions [in §2787], and to assume it without proof, and then to 
attack my proof of the antithesis.* If I can save it, and show in 
this way that, on principles which every dogmatic metaphysician 
must acknowledge, the contrary f of the proposition adopted by 
him can be proved just as clearly, it is thereby established that 
there is in metaphysic a hereditary fault which can not be ex- 
plained (and not removed) but by mounting to its place of nativ- 
ity, Pure Eeason itself; and thus either my Criticism must be 
adopted, or a better one put in its place, (page 199, line 4.) [*If 
the reviewer selects one .of the antitheses, it is thereby made his 
thesis, and Kant's thesis is its antithesis.] [f See § 2790.] 

Proposal for an investigation of the CRITICISM, which the judg- 
ment can follow. (§§ 2861-2865 inclusive.) 

§ 2861. — Propose to prove it piece by piece from its foundation, 
and for this purpose to use these Prolegomena as a general sketch 
with which the work itself may be occasionally compared, (page 
200, line 22.) Cf. §2645. [Presumption that in: presumption of 
interest in.] [By consequence: and betrays by consequence.] 

§ 2862. — Embrace every good occasion to contribute to the com- 
mon interest of reason which enlightens itself more and more, if 
there is but some hope of thereby attaining the end. The mathe- 
sis, natural philosophy, law, the arts, and even moral philosophy, 
do not fill the mind entirely ; there still remains a place in it, 
which is marked out for the more pure and speculative reason, and 
whose void compels us to seek (in appearance) employment and 
entertainment, but at bottom dissipation only, in gewgaws and 
playthings, or even in extravagance, in order to deafen the trouble- 



The Clavis to an Index. 803 

some call of reason which (conformably to its destination) requires 
something that may absolutely satisfy it, and not merely put it in 
activity for the behoof of other designs or for the interest of the 
inclinations, (page 201, line 26.) .Of. §§2807, 2812. 

§ 2863. — Germans are praised for possessing the faculty of car- 
rying that to which constancy and persevering diligence are 
requisite, further in these respects than other nations, (page 202, 
line 26.) 

§ 2864. — Let attacks, repetitions, limitations, or confirmation, 
enlargement and complement, as it happens, contribute their 
part ; if the matter is only searched to the bottom, a system, if 
not mine, that can be a legacy to posterity for which they will 
have reason to be thankful, can not fail any longer of being 
brought to pass, (page 204, line 10.) 

§ 2865 Criticism, by being brought to its full exercise in meta- 
physic, grounds a way of thinking, which afterward extends its 
salutary influence to every other use of reason, and first infuses 
the true philosophic spirit. And the service which it does theology, 
by making it independent of the judgment of dogmatic specula- 
tion and thereby putting it fully in safety from all the attacks of 
such an opponent, certainly is not to be undervalued. Fanaticism, 
which in an enlightened age can not spring up but when it con- 
ceals itself behind a school metajDhysic, by whose aiispice it can 
venture (so to say) to speak at once like a madman and ration- 
ally, is driven from its last lurking hole by the Critical Philos- 
ophy, (page 204, line 21.) 

PROFESSOR MAHAFFY'S APPENDICES. 

The principal passages in the Critique of Pure Reason altered in the second 
(and following) editions. . Translated from the first edition by John P. 
3Iahaffy, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Dublin. 
(^2866-3000 inclusive.) Paging (in parentheses) of Mahaffy's Prolegomena. 
(London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1872.) Paging [in brackets] of Mahaffy's 
Fischer. (London: Longmans, Green A; Co., 1866) I follow the revised 
text appended by Professor Mahaffy to the Prolegomena. 

Appendix I.— Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the 
Understanding - . (>$ 2866-2912 inclusive.) 

TITLE II. -OF THE APRIORI GROUNDS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERI- 
ENCE, (gg 2866-2893 inclusive.) Cf. g 1596 et seqq. 

§ 2866. — Self-contradictory and impossible that a conception* 
should be generated completely apriori and have relation to an object 
without itself belonging to the conception f of possible experience 
or being made up of the elements of possible experience, (page 
191, line 5.) [page 309, line 6.] [* In order to maintain uniformity 



804 Kant's Ethics. 

in terminology. I have substituted the words conception and con- 
ceptions for Professor Mahaffy's words concept and concepts, when- 
ever they occur in the section heads taken from Mahaffy.] [f I 
have substituted the word conception for Professor Mahaffy's two 
words (the first of which he prints within brackets) " [general] 
notion."] 

.§j 2867. — Elements of all apriori cognitions, even those of ca- 
pricious and absurd chimeras, can not indeed be borrowed from 
experience (or they would not be apriori cognitions), but must in 
every case contain the pure apriori conditions of possible experi- 
ence, and of an object thereof: otherwise we should not only be 
thinking nothing by means of such chimeras, but they themselves, 
having no starting-point, could not even originate in thought, 
(page 192, line 3.) [page 309, line 21.] 

§ 2888. — Categories are the conceptions which contain apriori 
the pure thinking in each individual experience ; and it will be a 
sufficient deduction of them and a justification of their objective 
validity, if we prove that through them alone can an object be 
thought, (page 192, line 28.) [page 310, line 17.] 

§ 2869. — Subjective * sources which constitute the apriori foun- 
dation of the possibility of experience must be first discussed (not 
according to their empirical, but according to their transcendental, 
nature), (page 192, line 32.) [* Mahaffy says : " This is the as- 
pect omitted in the second edition, and alluded to in the first pre- 
face." (Cf. §§1407, 1434.)] [page 310, line 21.] 
§ 2870. — Foundation of a three-fold synthesis which necessarily 
occurs in all knowledge: (1) the apprehension of representations 
as modifications of the mind in intuition ; (2) the reproduction 
of them in the imagination; (3) their recognition in the concep- 
tion, (page 193, line 9.) [page 310, line 29.] [§2901.] 

Prefatory Remark. ' (§ 2871.) 

§ 2871. — Better, in the four following articles, rather to prepare 
than instruct the reader, and not to lay before him the systematic 
discussion of these elements of the understanding (§2870) till the 
succeeding third title (§2894 et seqq). (p. 194, 1. 2.) [p. 311, 1. 7.] 

Article I. — Of the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. (§§ 2872- 
2874 inclusive.) 

§ 2872. — All our cognitions must ultimately be subject to the 
formal condition of our internal sense — time — as being that in 
which they are all ordered, connected and brought into relation, 
(page 194, line 17.) [page 311, line 19.] 

§ 2873.— Synthesis of apprehension — an action directed imme- 
diately toward intuition, to make out of the manifold a unity of 



The Clavis to an Index. 805 

intuition. Intuition presents to us multiplicity, but (without a 
simultaneous synthesis) can not produce it as such and also as con- 
tained in one representation, (page 194, line 28.) Cf. §§ 1729, 
2901, 1600, 1642. [Mahaffy says: "The reader should here 
notice the element omitted (for the sake of simplicity) in Kant's 
^Esthetic, and to which he afterward refers" in a note named and 
referred to by Mahaffy (§ 1639).] [page 311, line 29.] 

§ 2874. — Synthesis of apprehension must also be carried out 
apriori (in the case of representations which are not empirical). 
For without it we could not have representations either of space 
or time apriori, as these can only be generated by means of the 
synthesis of the manifold, which ((manifold)) * the sensibility 
offers in its original receptivity, (page 195, line 13.) [page 312, 
line 8.] [* 1 substitute ((double parenthesis)) for the brackets 
[] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word manifold.'] 

Article II. — Of the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination. 
.(§§2875-2877 inclusive ) 

§ 2875. — Empirical law according to which representations 
which have often accompanied or followed one another at length 
become associated, and so form a connection, according to which, 
even in the absence of the object, one of these representations 
produces a transition of the mind to another, by a fixed rule. 
But this law of reproduction presupposes that phenomena them- 
selves are really subject to such a rule, and that in the multiplicity 
of their representations there is a concomitance or sequence ac- 
cording to a fixed rale, (page 195, line 22.) Cf §§2385, 2391, 
2398. [page 312, line 15.] 

§ 2876. — Synthesis of the imagination must be founded apriori 
on a principle prior to all experience, and we must assume a pure 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which lies at the very 
foundation of even the possibility of any experience, and which 
makes the reproduction of phenomena possible, by being the 
. apriori foundation of a necessary synthetical unity among; them, 
(page 196, line 20.) [page 313, line 1.] 

§ 2877. — Reproductive synthesis of the imaginative faculty is 
one of the transcendental operations of the mind ; and in refer- 
ence to these, we shall name this faculty the transcendental imag- 
ination, (page 197, line 16.) [page 313, line 25.] 

Article III — Of the synthesis of recognition in the conception. (§§ 
2878-2887 inclusive.) 

§ 2878. — Without the consciousness that what we now think is 

identical with what we thought a moment ago, all reproduction in 

.the series of representations would be useless. It is this one 



806 Kant's Ethics. 

(single) consciousness which unites the manifold, gradually in- 
tuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation., (page 
197, line 25.) [page 313, line 32.] §§ 1599, 1604. [Con-capio.] 

§ 2879.— Object corresponding to cognition and yet distinct from 
it. Mast be thought as something in general — x. because outside 
our cognition we surely possess nothing which we could place over 
against it, as corresponding to it. (p. 198, 1. 22.) [p. 314, 1. 21.] 

§ 2880. — Unity which the object necessarily produces can be 
nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthe- 
sis of the multiplicity of representations, (page 199, line 1.) 
[page 314, line 31.] 

§ 2881. — All cognition requires a conception, however incomplete 
or obscure; and this, in its very form, is something universal, and 
which serves as a rule, (page 199, line 32.) [page 315, line 20.) 

§ 2882. — Always a transcendental condition at the foundation 
of any necessity. Hence, we must be able to find a transcendental 
ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the mani- 
fold in all our intuitions, and in ail our conceptions of objects gener- 
ally — consequently, in all objects of experience, (page 200, line 
11.) [page 315, line 30.] 

§ 2883. — Transcendental apperception. — Xeifher can cognitions 
take place in us, nor. any conjunction or unity among them, with- 
out this unity of consciousness, which is prior to all the data of 
intuition, and by reference to which alone all representation of 
objects is rendered possible, (page 200, line 21.) [page 315, line 38.] 

§ 2884. — Original and necessary consciousness of the identity of 
self is at the same time a consciousness of just as necessary a 
unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to conceptions. 
For the mind could not possibly think its own identity in the mul- 
tiplicity of representations, and this too apriori, if it had not be- 
fore its eyes (so to speak) the identity of its own action, which 
.subjects all the empirical synthesis of apprehension to a transcend- 
ental unity, and is the necessary condition of the connection of 
this apprehension according to rules, (page 201, line 15.) [page 
316, line 23.] 

§ 2835. — Transcendental object (■= x). All representations have 
(as such) their object, and may themselves also become the objects 
of other representations. Phenomena are the only objects which 
can be given us immediately, and that which in the phenomenon 
refers immediately to the object is called intuition. These phe- 
nomena are not things i^er se, but themselves only representations, 
which, again, have their object, and this we can no longer intuite; 
it may therefore be called the non-empirical, or transcendental, 
object = x. (page 202, line 3.) [page 317, line 3.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 807 

§ 2886. — Pure conception of the transcendental object can contain 
no determinate intuition, and can therefore refer to nothing but 
that unity which must be found in the multiplicity of a cognition, 
as far as it stands in relation to an object, (page 202, line 14.) 
[page 317, line 12.] 

§ 2887. — Relation to a transcendental object (that is, the objec- 
tive reality of our empirical knowledge) depends on the transcend- 
ental law that all phenomena (so far as objects are to be given us 
through them) must submit to the apriori rules of their syntheti- 
cal unity, according to which alone is their relation in empirical 
intuition possible, (page 202, line 25.) [page 317, line 21.] 

Article IV. — Preliminary explanation of the possibility of the cat- 
egories as apriori cognitions. (§§2888-2893 inclusive.) 

§ 2888. — Experience is nothing but the synthetical unity of 
phenomena according to conceptions. Unity of synthesis according 
to empirical conceptions would be quite contingent ; and were these 
not based on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be pos- 
sible for a confused crowd of phenomena to fill our minds without 
our ever forming experience from them, (page 203, line 7.) [page 
317, line 34.] 

§ 2889. — Categories are nothing but the conditions of thinking 
in possible experience (just as space and time are the conditions 
of the intuition which is requisite for the same). The apriori 
conditions of experience are at the same time the conditions of 
the possibility of the objects of experience.* (page 203, line 29.) 
[* Mahaffy says : •' It is idle to add for us, since no noumenon can 
properly be called an object."^ [page 318, line 16.] § 1706. 

§ 2890. — Possibility, nay even the necessity, of these categories 
depends upon the relation in which the whole sensibility, and with 
it all possible phenomena, must stand to primitive apperception ; 
in which apperception everything must necessarily accord with 
the conditions of the thorough-going unity of self-consciousness, 
which means that everything must be subject to universal functions of 
synthesis — synthesis according to conceptions, (page 204, line 8.) 
[page 318, line 24.] §§ 1608, 1615. 

§ 2891. — Affinity of the manifold. What makes this thorough- 
going affinity of phenomena conceivable to you (by which they 
stand under and must be subject to permanent laws) ? (page 204, 
line 27.) [page 319, line 7.] § 2398. 

§ 2892. — Transcendental affinity. All possible phenomena be- 
long, as representations, to the whole of possible self-consciousness. 
But this being a transcendental representation, its numerical iden- 
tity is indivisible and certain apriori, because we can not possibly 



808 Kant's Ethics. 

know anything except through this primitive apperception. Now, 
•as this identity must necessarily bo introduced into the synthesis 
of all the manifold of phenomena which are ever to become em- 
pirical cognition, the phenomena must be subject to apriori con- 
ditions, to which their synthesis (in apprehension) must thoroughly 
conform. The representation of a general condition according to 
which a certain multiplicity can be brought before us (that is to 
say, a definite way of doing it) is called rule ; if it must be so 
brought before us, law. Consequently, all phenomena stand in 
thorough connection with one another according to necessary 
laws, and hence in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical 
is merely the consequence, (page 205, line 23.) [page 319, line 26.] 
§ 2893. — Nature must conform to our subjective apperception, 
(page 206, line 9.) [page 320, line 4.] §§ 1826, 2752. 

TITIE III. -OF THE RELATION OF THE UNDERSTANDING TO OBJECTS IN 
GENERAL, AND OF THE POSSIBILITY OF COGNIZING THEM APRIORI. <M 
2894-2912 inclusive.) 

§ 2894. — Three subjective sources of cognition, upon which rest 
the possibility of experience in general and the cognition of ob- 
jects: (1) sense; (2) imagination; (3) apperception, (page 207, 
line 3 ) Of. § 1472. [page 320, line 25.] 

§ 2895. — Transcendental principle of the unity of all multiplicity 
in our representations. (Pure apperception.) (page 207, line 23.) 
[page 321, line 6.] 

§ 2896. — Synthetical unity of the manifold (of consciousness) 
which is cognized apriori, and which gives just the same basis for 
synthetical apriori propositions which relate to pure thinking, as 
space and time give to such propositions as relate to. the form of 
mere intuition. The synthetical proposition that the various em- 
pirical consciousnesses must be combined in one single self-con- 
sciousness, is absolutely the first and synthetical principle of our 
thinking in general, (page 208, note.) [page 321, note.] 

§ 2897. — Transcendental unity of apperception points to the 
pure synthesis of imagination, as an apriori condition of the pos- 
sibility of any combination of the manifold into a single cognition. 
But it is only the productive synthesis of the imagination which can 
take place apriori ; for the reproductive depends on empirical con- 
ditions, (page 209, line 1.) Cf. §§2904, 1628. [page 322, line 1.] 

§ 2898. — Transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagina- 
tion is the pure form of all possible cognition, by means of which 
all objects of possible experience must be represented apriori. 
(page 209, line 14.) [page 322, line 12.] § 1627. 

§ 2899. — Understanding is the unity of apperception in relation 



The Clavis to an Index. 809 

to the synthesis of the imagination. The pure understanding, by 
means of the categories, is a formal and synthetical principle of 
all experiences, and phenomena have a necessary relation to the 
understanding, (p. 209, 1. 25.) Cf. §§ 1626, 1569. [p. 322, 1. 21.] 

§ 2900. — Perception of phenomena. The first thing given us 
is the phenomenon, which, if combined with consciousness, is 
called perception. (Without relation to at least a possible con- 
sciousness, the phenomenon could never be for us an object of 
cognition.) (page 210, line 19.) Cf. § 2949. [page 323, line 8.] 

§ 2901. — Apprehension op perceptions. As every phenomenon 
contains a certain multiplicity — that is to say, as various percep- 
tions are found within us, in themselves scattered and single — a 
connection of them is necessary, and this they can not have in 
mere sense. There is, then, within us an active faculty of the 
synthesis of this multiplicity, which we call the faculty of imagina- 
tion, and the action of which, when directed immediately upon the 
perceptions, I call apprehension. The province of the imagination 
is to unite the manifold of intuition into an image ; it must first, 
then, grasp the impressions actively, viz., apprehend them, 
(page 210, line 28.) Cf. §§ 1729, 2873. [page 323, line 16.] 

§ 2902. — Association of representations. — But it is clear that 
even this apprehension of the manifold by itself could produce no 
image, nor connection of impressions, if there were not present a 
subjective condition for summoning a perception from which the 
mind had made a transition to the next, to join this next, and. so 
produce whole series of these perceptions — in fact, if we did not 
possess a reproductive faculty of the imagination (which even 
then is only empirical). But representations, if they suggested 
one another just as they chanced to meet together originally, 
would have no determinate connection, but be a mere confused 
crowd, from which could spring no cognition ; their reproduction 
must therefore have a rule by which a representation enters into 
combination rather with this than with another representation in 
the imagination. This subjective and empirical cause of reproduc- 
tion according to rules, we call the association of representations, 
(page 211, line 7.) Cf. §§1628, 2877, 2904. [page 323, line 26.,] 

§ 2903. — Objective ground prior to any of the empirical laws of 
imagination, and ajjriori, on which depends the possibility — na}^, 
even the necessity — of a law extending over all phenomena ; 
which regards them universally to be such data of the senses as 
are in themselves associable, and subject to the general rules of a 
thorough-going connection when reproduced. {Affinity: §§2891, 
2892.) (page 212, line 1.) [page 324, line 9.] 

52 



810 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2904. — Imagination is consequently also a faculty of apriori syn- 
thesis, for which reason we call it the productive imagination ; 
and since, as far as it relates to the multiplicity of phenomena, it 
has no further object than to produce the necessary unity in their 
synthesis, we may call it the transcendental function of the im- 
agination, (page 213, line 3.) Of. § 2897. [page 324, line 37.] 

§ 2905. — Fixed and permanent ego (of pure apperception) con- 
stitutes the correlatum of all our representations, so far as the 
mere possibility of becoming conscious of them; and all conscious- 
ness belongs just as much to an all- comprehensive pure appercep- 
tion as all sensuous intuition (cjua representation) belongs to a 
pure internal intuition (namely, that of time), (page 213, line 24.) 
[page 325, line 16. J 

§ 2906. — Pure imagination, as an original faculty of the human 
soul, lying at the basis of all cognition apriori. By means of it 
we bring on the one side the multiplicity of intuition, and on the 
other the condition of the necessary unity of apperception, into 
mutual relation.* (page 214, line 7.) [* Mahaffy says : "Prom this 
point I have developed my explanation of the schematism of the 
categories."] [page 325, line 29.] 

§ 2907. — Real experience, consisting of apprehension, associa- 
tion (of reproduction), and finally, of the recognition of phenom- 
ena, contains in this last and highest (merely empirical element of 
experience) conceptions, which render possible the formal unity of 
experience, and with it all objective validity (truth) of empirical 
cognition. These fundamental causes of the recognition of mul- 
tiplicity, so far as they concern merely the form of experience in- 
general, are the very categories of which we are speaking, (page 
214, line 16.) [page 326, line 3.] 

§ 2908. — Order and regularity in phenomena, which we call 
nature, we ourselves introduce, and should never find it there if 
we (or the nature of our mind) had not placed it there, (page 215, 
line 3.) Cf. §§ 2893, 2756. [page 326, line 17.] 

§ 2909. — Understanding as the faculty of rules. Unity of ap- 
perception is the transcendental basis of the necessary regularity 
of all phenomena in experience. The same unity in relation to 
the multiplicity of representations (that is to say, determining it 
from a single representation) is the rule, and the faculty of these 
rules is the understanding, (page 215, line 15.) [Derselben, their 
nature, Professor Mahaffy emends, by changing it to desselben. 
But why not understand their of the categories, the general sub- 
ject under consideration ?] [page 326, line 27.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 811 

§ 2910. — Understanding itself is the source of the laws of na- 
ture and of the formal unity thereof. All empirical laws are only 
particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, 
under which, and according to the type of which, they first become 
possible, (page 216, line 23.) Cf. § 2752. [page 327, line 24.] 

§ 2911. — Pure understanding constitutes, in the categories, the law 
of the synthetical unity of all phenomena ; and hence it first ren- 
ders experience possible as to form.* (page 217, line 6.) [*Where- 
upon Mahafly remarks that Kant " never asserts that the matter 
of experience is created by the Ego.'' Kant's repeated and em- 
phatic protests against idealism a}3pear again and again in the 
pages of this clavis, and are absolutely conclusive. (See, ex. gr., § 
2855, page 801 above.)] [page 327, line 37.] 

Summary statement of the legitimacy and possibility of this and no 
other deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. (§ 2912.) 

§ 2912. — Categories must precede all experience, and make it 
even possible as to form. The way in which the manifold of sen- 
suous representations (intuition) belongs to one consciousness, 
precedes all cognition of the object, as being its intellectual form, 
and even produces a formal cognition of all objects apriori, so far 
as they are thought (categories), (page 217, line 18.) Cf. § 2717. 
[page 328, line 10.] 

Appendix II. — Distinction Between 2foumena and Phenom- 
ena. (§§ 2913-2920 inclusive.) 

Professor Mahaffy says : " After the words 'under such conceptions' 
[§ 1869], the following paragraph* [§ 2913] occurs in the first edition." 

§ 2913. — Categories, if taken for conceptions of things in gen- 
eral (that is, of transcendental application), would represent the 
logical function in judgments as the condition of the possibility of 
things themselves ; without there being the least evidence how 
they could then have their application and object, or how they 
could then have any meaning and objective validity in the pure 
understanding, without intuition, (page 220, line 7.) Cf. §§ 1869 
and 1687. [page 330, line 4.] [* The words " the following para- 
graph" refer to the entire text of §2913, not to my section head 
which immediately follows them in this clavis. The caution seems 
scarcely necessary ; but I suppose that misapprehension is pos- 
sible, not only here, but elsewhere in the clavis.] 

Professor Mahaffy says: " Instead of the note [§ 1871], the first 
edition has the following note." [§ 2914.] 

§ 2914. — Categories require, beyond the mere conception of the 
understanding, determinations of their application to sensibility in 



812 Kant's Ethics. 

general (schemata), and without this are not conceptions by which 
any object can be cognized and distinguished from another : they 
are rather so many ways of thinking an object for possible intui- 
tions, and giving it its signification (under conditions yet to be 
supplied), according to some function of the understanding ; that 
is, of defining it : but these categories can not themselves be de- 
fined. The logical functions of judgment in general — unity and 
plurality, affirmation and negation, subject and predicate — can not 
be defined without arguing in a circle, because such definition can 
not but be a judgment, and must therefore contain these functions. 
But the pure categories are representations of things in general, 
so far as the diversity of their intuition must be thought through 
one or other of these logical functions, (page 221, line 13.) See §§ 
1869, 1870, 1871, 1755. (See § 2717 and cf. § 2749.) [p. 331, 1. 3.] 

Professor Mahaffy says: "The passage commencing 'but there 
lurks' [§ 1876] and ending ' negative sense' [§ 1880] was rewritten in 
the second edition. Its original form was as follows. " [§§2915- 
2920 inclusive.] 

§ 2915. — Division of all objects into phenomena and noumena, 
and so of the world into one of sense and reason (mundus sensibilis 
et intelligibilis). And indeed the difference would not seem to be 
the logical form of the distinct or indistinct knowledge of one and 
the same object, but would start from the difference of the way in 
which they are given to our cognition, (page 223, line 3.) Cf. §§ 
1876-1880. [page 332, line 4.] 

§ 2916. — All our representations are in fact referred to some ob- 
ject by the understanding, as phenomena are nothing but repre- 
sentations. But this transcendental object (= x, of which we 
know nothing) can not be at all separated from the sensuous data, 
because then nothing remains by which it would be thought.* It 
is therefore no object of cognition in itself, (page 224, line 10.) 
[* Professor Mahaffy, in a note here, calling attention to Professor 
Kuno Fischer's misunderstanding of the matter, adds : "Because 
nothing is left for us-, when we subtract all the subjective conditions 
of the object, it does not follow that nothing at all remains." This 
is well said, and strictly Kantic doctrine (cf. §2810).] [page 332, 
line 36.] 

§ 2917. — Categories consequently do not represent any definite 
object given to the understanding alone, but only serve to deter- 
mine the transcendental object (the conception of something in 
general), by what is given in sensibility, so as by it to cognize em- 
pirically phenomena under conceptions of objects, (page 223 [mis- 
numbered], line 5.) [page 333, line 13 ] 



The Clavis to an Index. 813 

§ 2918. — Follows naturally from the very conception of a phe- 
nomenon in general, that something must correspond to it which 
in itself is not phenomenon ; because phenomenon can he nothing 
in itself beyond our faculty of representation, (page 223 [misnum- 
bered], line 11.) [page 333, line 18.] 

§ 2919. — Although our thought can abstract from all sensibility, 
the question still remains to be settled, whether it is then any- 
thing but the mere form of a conception, and whether, when such 
abstraction is made, any object at all is left* (p^ge 224 [misnum- 
bered], line 3 ) [* " Here," says Professor Mahaffy, " is the question 
of absolute idealism explicitly raised ; and the following paragraph 
[§ 2920] proceeds, not to solve it dogmatically, but merely to show 
that no possible data can be found for settling the question."] 
[page 334, line 5] 

§ 2920. — Object to which I refer the phenomenon in general is 
the transcendental object; that is, the totally undetermined thought 
of something in general. This can not be called the noumenon ; * for 
I do not know what it is in itself, and have no conception of it at 
all, except as the object of sensuous intuition in general, which is, 
accordingly, of the same description for all phenomena. I can 
not think it by means of any category; for such is valid only of 
empirical intuition, in order to subject it to the conception of an 
object in general. A pure use of the categories is indeed possible, 
or not contradictory, but has no objective validity, because it con- 
cerns no intuition on which it confers the unity of an object ; for 
the category is only a pure function of thought, by which no object 
can be given me, but by which I only think what is given in intui- 
tion, (p. 224 [misnumbered], 1. 24.) Cf. §§2934, 2885, 2155, 2955, 
2965, 2830, 2809, 2691, 2700, 1884, 1918. [p. 334, 1. 22.] [*The 
student will not fail to notice the caution with which the tran- 
scendental object is distinguished from the noumenon. (Compare 
transcendental in § 2937.) The transcendental object is no ob- 
ject for us. The noumenon is no possible object, being merely 
the intellectual schema denoting the place (vacant to all human 
sense) over against which stands that transcendental object of 
which we are and must remain ignorant so long as we are intel- 
lectually so constituted as now. For even if we should by some 
unexpected transposition come into possession of some new and 
different sensibility of whose very possibility we can form to our- 
selves no representation whatever, yet whatever we should through 
such strange faculty of representation be enabled to represent to 
ourselves would still be by virtue of such representation mere 
representation, that is to say phenomenon of no one knows what 
sort, leaving us quite as far as ever from any real knowledge of 



814 Kant's Ethics. 

the essential constituting of the thing in itself so appearing. But 
this whole matter of representation depends on the possession of 
a discursive understanding, a form which we have not only no 
warrant for transgressing, but also (the point here to he consid- 
ered) no warrant for imposing upon things in themselves. It fol- 
lows that we must not confound the noumenon which is in very 
conception no more than the intellectual representation of our own 
incapacity, with the transcendental object which the noumenon 
serves us to indicate. Such confusion would but make room for 
the most subtile of all idealism, most difficult to uproot because it 
can never be shown to be false. For my own part, I am inclined 
to the belief that the general conclusions of Spinoza (of whose 
writings I am entirely ignorant f) are true (Kant's criticism de- 
stroys only Spinoza's method and proof), and that God is all in 
all (Deo parere summa libertas est ; X see J. E. Morell's Tennemann's 
Manual of the History of Philosophy, § 338, page 316, London ; 
Bell & Daldy, 1870) ; but there is no foothold on Kantic ground 
for any system of idealism whatever. Kant's own system might 
have been better denominated critical realism, insomuch as he, 
first of all philosophers, thoroughly establishes reality in com- 
plete conformity with the nature of the human intellect.] § 870. 

Appendix III. — The Paralogisms of Rational Psychology. 

(§2921-3000 inclusive.) 

Professor Mahaffy says: " The following discussion [§§2921- 
3000] stood in the first edition after the ivords 'predicaments of pure 
psychology ' " [in § 2007]. 

Article I. — The first paralogism of pure psychology. (§§ 2921- 
2925 inclusive.) 

Text of the first paralogism. (§ 2921.) 

§ 2921. — Paralogism of substantiality. That of which the rep- 
resentation is the absolute subject of our judgments, and which 
consequently can not be used to determine anything else ((as predi- 
cate)),* is substance. Z, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject 

[t I am indebted to Seelye's Schwegler and Morell's Tennemann. I hastily 
glanced at a few paragraphs of the Ethics, eight or nine years ago, but the state- 
ment above requires no serious qualification.] $} 251, 266. 

[j "And whoso willeth, taketh the way unto his LORD: but ye shall not will, 
unless GOD willeth.'" See in the seventy-sixth chapter of the Koran (appendix 
xvi. below, \ 369, clause 19, sqq.). " Deus est qui operatur aeterna sua potentia." 
George Sale, in his preliminary discourse prefixed to his incomparable and most 
excellent translation of the Koran (I do not know Arabic), quotes (in not. ad 
sect, iv.; page 77 of Lippincott's edition ; page 85 of the Chandos Classics 
edition) from a Latin epistle written by a Moor named Ahmed Ebn Abdalla 
to Maurice prince of Orange, and Emanuel prince of Portugal, and also tran- 



The Clavis to an Index. 815 

of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself 
can not be used as the predicate of anything else. Therefore I, 
as a thinking being (soul), am substance, (page 226, line 3.) [page 
335, line 3.] [* I have substituted ((double parenthensis)) for the 
[brackets] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the words as 
predicate.'] 

Criticism of the first paralogism. (§§ 2922-2925 inclusive.) 

§ 2922. — Every one must necessarily consider himself as the 
substance and bis thoughts as the accidents of his existence and 
determinations of his condition, (p. 226, 1. 13.) [p. 335, 1. 12.] 

§ 2923. — What use can I make of this notion of a substance ? 
That I, as a thinking being, exist permanently — that I can not 
naturally either originate or pass away- — this I can not at all infer 
from it ; and yet it is the only use of the conception of the sub- 
stantiality of my thinking subject (with which I could otherwise 
well dispense), (page 227, line 11.) [page 336, line 1.] 

§ 2924. — Obliged to start from the permanence of an object de- 
rived from experience, if we wish to bring such an object under 
the enrpirically applicable conception of substance, (page 227, line 
18.) [Professor Mahaffy says that Kant " here approaches as 
closely as possible to the refutation of idealism in his second 
edition." (See § 1845.)] [page 336, line 7.] 

§ 2925. — Palms off upon us a pretended discovery, by setting 
up the continual logical subject of thinking as the cognition of 
the real subject of inherence. Of this latter we neither have nor 
can have the least knowledge, (p. 228, 1. 3.) [p. 336, 1. 22.] 

Article II — The second paralogism of transcendental psychology. 
(§§ 2926-2940 inclusive.) 

Text of the second paralogism. (§ 2926.) 

§ 2926. — Paralogism of simplicity. A thing whose action can 
not be regarded as the concurrence of the action of several things, 
is simple. Now the soul, or thinking Ego, is such a thing. 
Therefore, it is simple, (page 228, line 22.) [page 337, line 6.] 

scribes (in not. ad sect, viii.; pages 119, 120, and 122 of Lippincott's edition ; and 
pages 130, 131, and 134 of the Chandos Classics edition) from a postscript sub- 
joined to the epistle, in which (Sale says) " the point of free will is treated ex pro- 
fesso. Therein the Moorish author, having mentioned the two opposite opinions 
of the Kadarians, who allow free-will, and the Jabarians, who make man a neces- 
sary agent, (the former of which opinions, he says, seems to approach nearest 
to that of the greater part of Christians and of the Jews), declares the true opin- 
ion to be that of the Sonnites, who assert that man hath power and will to 
choose good and evil, and can moreover know he shall be rewarded if he do well 
and shall be punished if he do ill ; but that he depends, notwithstanding, on God's 
power, and willeth, if God willeth, but not otherwise. Then he proceeds briefly 



816 Kant's Elides. 

Criticism of the second paralogism. (§§ 2927-2940 inclusive.) 

§ 2927. — Achilles of all the dialectical syllogisms of pure psy- 
chology. Thought is [supposed to be] only possible in a substance 
which is not an aggregate of many substances, but absolutely 
simple, (page 229, line 5.) [page 337, line 12.] 

§ 2928. — Nervus probandi of this argument lies in the proposi- 
tion : that many representations must be contained in the absolute 
unity of the thinking subject to make up one thought. But this 
proposition no one can prove from conceptions, (page 230, line 3.) 
[page 338, line 3.] [I am often indebted to Professor Mahaffy for 
emphasis.] 

§ 2929. — Equally impossible to deduce from experience this 
necessary unity of the subject, as the condition of the possibility 
of each single thought, (page 230, line 24.) [page 338, line 20.] 

§ 2930.— Plain that if we wish to represent a thinking being, 
we must put ourselves in its place, and so supply our own subject 
to the object which we wish to obtain (which is not the case in 
any other sort of investigation), and that we only demand the ab- 
solute unity of the subject, because otherwise we could not say "7 
think (the manifold of the representation)." (page 231, line 3.) 
[page 338, line 26.] See § 2810. 

§2931. — "I think" is not experience, but merely the form of 
apperception, belonging to and preceding every experience. But 
with reference to possible cognition, this must be regarded merely 
as a subjective condition, which we have no right to exalt to a con- 
dition of the possibility of objects, that is, to a conception of a 
thinking being in general, (page 231, line 14.) [page 339, line 1.] 

§ 2932. — Simplicity of myself (as a soul) is not really inferred 
from the proposition "I think;" for it already exists in every 
thought. The proposition "lam simple" must be regarded as an 
immediate expression of apperception, just as the supposed Car- 
tesian conclusion, cogito, ergo sum, is really tautological, as cogito 
(=z sum cogitans) expressly asserts existence, (page 231, line 27.) 
Cf. § 2026. [page 339, line 12.] 

to refute the two extreme opinions, and first to prove that of the Kadarians, 
though it he agreeable to God's justice, inconsistent with his attributes of wisdom 
and power: ' Sapientia enim Dei,' says he, 'comprehendit quiequid fuit et futurum 
est ab seternitate in finem usque mundi et postea. Et ita novit ab Eeterno omnia" 
opera creaturarum, sive bona, sivamaia, quaefuerint creata cum poten.tia Dei, et ejus 
libera et determinata voluntate, sicut ipsi visum fuit. Denique novit eum qui 
futurus erat malus, et tamen creavit eum, et similiter bonum, quern etiam creavit: 
neque negari potest quin, si ipsi libuisset, potuisset omnes creare bonos: placuit 
tamen Deo creare bonos et malos, cum Deo soli sit absoluta et libera voluntas, et 
perfecta electio, et non homini. Ita enim Salomon in suis proverbiis dixit, 



The Clavis to an Index. 817 

§ 2933. — Subject of inherence is only indicated as transcenden- 
tal by the Ego attached to the thought, without noting in the least 
any of its properties, and without knowing or cognizing anything 
at all about 'it. It means something in general (a transcendental 
subject), the representation of which must indeed be simple, for 
the obvious reason that nothing at all is determined in it, since we 
can not represent a thing more simply than by the notion of a 
mere something. But the fact of the simplicity of the represen- 
tation of a subject is not, for that reason, a cognition of the sim- 
plicity of the subject itself, (page 232, line 4.) [page 339, line 21.] 

§ 2934. — Eepresent to myself by Ego always an absolute, though 
only a logical, unity of the subject (simplicity), but do not cog- 
nize through it the real simplicity of my subject, (page 232, line 
22.) Cf. §§ 2032, 2009, 2920, 2998. [There is no real conflict be- 
tween the first and second editions, the question being one of ex- 
position merely. It makes no real difference whether we say with 
the first edition that the categories abstract from sense have no 
application (cf. § 2914), or with the second edition that as mere 
modes of thought or logical representations they are not related 
to the categories (§ 2032).] [page 339, line 36.] 

§ 2935. — Assertion of the simple nature of the soul is merely of 
value so far as I am able by it to separate this subject from all 
matter, and consequently exempt it from decay, to which matter 
is always liable, (page 233, line 6.) [page 340, line 13.] 

§ 2936. — Thinking beings, as such, can never be represented to 
us as among external intuitions ; or, we can not intuite their 
thoughts, consciousness, desires, etc., externally ; for all these 
must come before the internal sense, (p. 233, 1. 23.) [p. 340, 1. 27.] 

§ 2937. — Admitting the simplicity of its nature, the human soul 
is not at all proved to be distinct from matter, as regards their re- 
spective substrata, when considered ^as it should be) merely as a 
phenomenon, (page 234, line 6.) [In a note at this point in 
Fischer (page 183), Professor Mahaffy says: " Kant here asserts 
as problematical or possible, what Spinoza taught as consequences 

Vitam et mortem, bonum et malum, divitias et paupertatem, esse et venire a 
Deo. Christiani etiam dicunt S. Paulum dixisse in suis epistolis: Dicet etiam 
lutum figulo, quare facis unum vas ad honorem, et aliud vas ad contumeliam? 
Cum igitur miser homo merit creatus a voluntate Dei et potentia, nihil aliud 
potest tribui ipsi quam ipse sensus cognoscendi et sentiendi an bene vel male 
faciat. Quae unica causa (id est, sensus cognoscendi) erit ejus gloria? vel poena? 
causa: per talem enim sensum novit quid boni vel mali ad versus Dei prsecepta 
fecerit.' The opinion of the Jabarians, on the other hand, he rejects as contrary 
to man's consciousness of his own power and choice, and inconsistent with God's 
justice, and his having given mankind laws, to the observing or transgressing of 



818 Kant's Ethics. 

of his system, as the English reader will see in Schwegler's His- 
tory of Philosophy (trans. Seelye) page 188," § 26.] [As to the 
transcendental ohject, see §2920.] [page 341, line 4.] 

§ 2938.— Get rid of the expression that souls only (as being a 
peculiar sort of substances) think ; we should rather use the or- 
dinary phrase, that men think ; that is to say, that the very same 
thing which is extended as an external phenomenon, is inter- 
nally (in itself) a subject not composite, but simple and thinking, 
(page 234, line 33.) Cf. §2030. [page 341, line 27.] §482. 

§ 2939. — Simple consciousness is not a cognition of the simple 
nature of our subject, so far as it is to be distinguished as such 
from matter as a composite existence. If I mean by soul a think- 
ing being per se, the very question is improper, if we mean to ask 
whether it is of the same kind or not as matter (which is not a 
thing per se). But if we compare the thinking Ego, not with mat- 
ter, but with the intelligible something at the basis of the exter- 
nal phenomena which we call matter, as we know nothing of this 
latter, we can not assert that the soul differs from it in any way 
internally, (page 235, line 22.) [page 342, line 10.] 

§ 2940. — Whole of rational psychology falls to the ground with 
its principal support; and we can as little here as' elsewhere hope 
to extend our information by pure conceptions (still less by con- 
sciousness, the mere subjective form of all our conceptions), (page 
236, line 8.) [page 342, line 24.] 

Article III. — The third paralogism of transcendental psychology. 
(§§ 2941-2947 inclusive.) 

Text of the third paralogism. (§ 2941.) 

§ 2941. — Paralogism of personality. That which is conscious 
of its own numerical identity at different times is, so far, a person. 
Now, the soul has this consciousness. Therefore it is a person, 
(page 237, line 2.) [page 343, line 11.) 

Criticism of the third paralogism. (§§2942-2947 inclusive.) 

§ 2942. — Personality of the soul should be regarded, not as an 
inference, but as a perfectly identical assertion of self-conscious- 

which he has annexed rewards and punishments. After this he proceeds to ex- 
plain the third opinion in the following words: ' Tertia opinio Zunis (i. e. 
Sonnitarum), qua? vera est, affirmat homini potestatem esse, sed limitatam a sua 
causa, id est, dependentem a Dei potentia et voluntate, et propter illam cogni- 
tionem qua deliberat bene vel male facere, esse dignutn poena vel prsemio. Man- 
ifestum est in seternitate non fuisse aliam potentiam praeter Dei nostri omnipo- 
tentis, e cujus potentia pendebant omnia possibilia, id est, quee poterant esse, 
cum ab ipso fuerint creata.' " [I omit part of Sale's transcription at this 
point.] " 'A potentia igitur Dei pendet solum quod potest esse, et possibile est 
esse; quae semper parata est dare esse possibilibus. Et si hoc penitus cognosca- 
mus, cognoscemus pariter omne quod est, sen futurum est, sive sint opera nostra. 



The Clavis to an Index. 819 

ness in time ; and this, too, is the reason why it is valid apriori. 
For it says nothing but this : In all the time in which I am con- 
scious of myself, I am conscious of this time, as belonging to the 
unity of myself; and it is indifferent whether I say, the whole of 
time is in me, who am an individual unity ; or, I am, with my 
numerical identity, present in all this time, (page 237, line 8.) 
[page 343, line 17.] 

§ 2943. — Personal identity must always be found in my own 
consciousness. But if I consider myself from the point of view of 
another person (as an object of his external intuition), the iden- 
tity which is necessarily bound up with my consciousness is not 
bound up with his (that is, with an external intuition of my sub- 
ject), (page 237, line 28.) [page 344, line 1.] 

§ 2944. — Identity of the consciousness of myself at different 
times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their con- 
nection, and does not demonstrate the numerical identity of my 
subject, (page 239, line 1.) [Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., p. Ill, § 
36.] [page 344, line 13.] 

§ 2945. — Proposition of some ancient schools, that everything is 
in a flux, and nothing permanent, is not refuted by the unity of self- 
consciousness, (page 239, line 13.) [page 345, line 1.] 

§ 2946. — Personality, and the permanence which it presupposes 
— that is, the substantiality of the soul — must now be proved first, 
(page 240, line 11.) Cf. §2998. [page 345, line 15.] 

§ 2847. — Conception of the identical self does not assist in solv- 
ing a single question which aims at synthetical cognition. What 
sort of thing per se (transcendental object) matter may be, is 
wholly unknown to us ; nevertheless, its permanence as phenom- 
enon may be observed when it is represented as something exter- 
nal. But when I wish to observe the mere Ego in the alteration 
of all representations — as I have no other correlatum for my com- 
parisons except the same identical self with the universal con- 
ditions of my consciousness — 1 can only give tautological answers 
to all questions by supplying my conception and its unity to those 

sive quidvis aliud, peridere a sola potentia Dei. Et hoc non privatim intelligitur, 
sed in genere de omni eo quod est et movetur, sive in coelis, sive in terra ; et nee 
aliqua potentia potest impediri Dei potentia, cum nulla alia potentia absoluta 
sit, prseter Dei; potentia vero nostra non est ase, nisi a Dei potentia.' " [I omit 
part of Sale's transcription at this point.] " 'Igitur Deus est qui operatur 
a?terna sua potentia.' " [I omit part of Sale's transcription at this point.] " 'Hom- 
ini tribuitur solum opus externe, et ejus electio, quae est a voluntate ejus et poten- 
tia; non vero interne. — Hoc est punctum illud indivisibile et secretum, quod a 
paucissimis capitur, ut sapientissimus Sidi Abo Hamet Elgaceli (i. c. Dominus 
Abu Hamed al Ghazali) afnrmat (cujus spiritui Deus concedat gloriam, Amen !) 
sequentibus verbis : Ita abditum et profundum et abstrusum est intelligere punc- 



820 Kant's Ethics. 

properties which I possess as an object, and so by assuming what 
was under investigation, (page 240, line 29.) (page 346, line 1.] 

Article IV. — The fourth paralogism of transcendental psychology. 
(§§ 2948-2965 inclusive.) [See § 2020.] 

Text of the fourth paralogism. (§ 2948.) 

§ 2948. — Paralogism of ideality (of external relations). What- 
soever can only be inferred to exist, as the cause of given per- 
ceptions, has only a doubtful ((problematical))* existence. Now, all 
external phenomena are of such a kind that their present exist- 
ence can not be perceived immediately, but we infer them to ex- 
ist as the cause of given perceptions. Consequently, the existence 
of all the objects of the external senses is doubtful. This uncer- 
tainty I call the ideality of external phenomena; and the doctrine 
which holds this ideality is idealism, in contrast with which the 
assertion of a possible certainty of objects of the external senses 
is called dualism, (page 241, line 22.) [page 346, line 21.] [*I have 
substituted ((double parenthesis)) for the [brackets] within which 
Professer Mahaffy prints the word problematical.'] 

Criticism of the fourth paralogism. (§§2949-2965 inclusive.) 
§ 2949. — Descartes justly restricted all perception in the strict- 
est sense to the proposition I (as a thinking being) exist ; for it is 
clear that, as the external [intellectually cogitated] is not in me, 
it can not possibly be found in my apperception, or in any percep- 
tion (which is properly only a determination of apperception), 
(page 242, line 9.) Cf. §§ 2900, 2957, 1963, 1754. [page 346, line 33.] 
§ 2950. — Doubtful whether all so-called external perceptions are 
not a mere play of our internal sense, or whether they indeed re- 
fer to real external objects as their causes, (page 242, line 24.) 
[Professor Mahaffy says : " This is the very question discussed in 
the much-abused refutation of idealism in the second edition. 
The definition of idealism which immediately follows " (in § 2951) 
" shows how strictly Kant confined both this and the correspond- 
ing refutation in the later editions " (§§ 1843-1849) " to Descar- 

tum illud Liberi Arbitrii, ut neque characteres ad scribendum, neque ullse 
rationes ad exprimendum sufficiant, et omnes, quotquot de hac re locuti sunt, 
haeserunt confusi in ripa tanti et tarn spaciosi maris.' " [A little below, in a 
separate note, Sale transcribes from the Moorish author quoted above] " the 
following passage, with which he concludes his discourse on Free-will: 'Intel- 
lectus fere lumine naturali novit Deum esse rectum judicem et justum, qui non 
aliter afficit creaturam quam juste: etiam Deum esse absolutum Dominum, et 
hanc orbis machinam esse ejus, et ab eo creatam; Deum nullis debere rationem 
reddere, cum quicquid agat, agat jure proprio sibi : et ita absolute poterit afflcere 



The Clavis to an Index. 821 

tes, and did not consider Berkeley, as Fischer and other Germans 
allege."] [page 347, line 11.] 

§ 2951. — Idealist is one who will not concede that the existence 
of external objects is known by immediate perception, and who 
concludes, accordingly, that we can never be absolutely certain of 
their reality by any possible experience, (page 243, line 14.) [page 
347, line 26.] 

§ 2952. — Transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an em- 
pirical realist (or, as he is called, a dualist); that is, he can con- 
cede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-con- 
sciousness, or assuming anything beyond the certainty of the rep- 
resentations in me. (page 243, line 20.) Cf. § 2150. [Internal pos- 
sibility : Professor Mahaffy says, in a note in Fischer (page 189) : 
" I suppose he means the occult forces or elements which we can 
possibly discover by experiment or observation. All these, if cog- 
noscible at all, must become objects of possible experience." But 
why not mean, by internal possibility, the schematism of the under- 
standing? without which that "complex of mere relations" 
(§ 1895) which Kant calls " matter," could not (so far as we know) 
exist. As the principles of the understanding make experience 
possible, there can be no difficulty in assuming that they make 
matter possible. The unknown substratum is not thereby denied.] 
[page 347, line 31] 

§ 2953. — Accepting our doctrine, all difficulty of admitting the 
existence of matter on the testimony of our mere consciousness 
vanishes, as well as of declaring it so proved, just as the existence 
of myself as a thinking being is so proved, (page 245, line 4.) 
[Professor Mahaffy remarks that this section maintains precisely 
the " doctrine of the refutation of idealism in the second edition" 
(§ 1846). f " The concluding limitation " (i. e., that external bodies 
are mere phenomena) " is also there distinctly implied in the state- 
ment " (§ 1844) f " that the aesthetic has removed all possibility of 
making space a property of things per se."] [page 348, line 26.] 
[f Professor Mahaffy refers to Meiklejohn's pages of the Critique : 
consequently I owe to him these and many other references.] 

prremio vel poena quern vult, cum omnis creatura sit ejus, nee facit cuiquam 
injuriam, etsi earn tormentis et pcenis seternis afficiat: plus enim boni et corn- 
modi accepit creatura quando accepit esse a suo creatore, quam incommodi et 
damni quando ab eo damnata est et affecta toi-mentis et poenis. Hoc autem in- 
telligitur si Deus absolute id faceret. Quando enim Deus, pietate et misericor- 
dia motus, eligit aliquos ut ipsi serviant, Dominus Deus gratia sua id facit ex 
infinita bonitate; et quando aliquos derelinquit, et poenis et tormentis afficit, ex 
justitia et rectitudine. Et tandem dicimus omnes pcenas esse justas quae a Deo 
veniunt et nostra tantum culpa, et omnia bona esse a pietate et misericordia ejus 
infinita.' " 



822 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2954. — Transcendental realism [§ 2952], on the other hand, 
necessarily becomes perplexed, and is forced to make way for em- 
pirical idealism [§ 2951], because it regards the objects of external 
senses as something distinct from the senses themselves, and mere 
phenomena as independent beings existing without us. (page 
246, line 1.) [page 349, line 16.] 

§ 2955. — Transcendental object, as well of internal as of ex- 
ternal intuition, is to us equally unknown. Not this, however, 
but the empirical object, is in question, (page 247, line 3.) [In a 
note to this section, and also in a note to § 2952, Professor Mahaffy 
recalls attention to Professor Kuno Fischer's mistake. The distinc- 
tions are sufficiently subtile to escape the notice of a careless rea- 
der, as may be readily seen by referring to Fischer's commentary 
(pp. 186-195). But there is no doubt that Dr. Fischer is wrong, 
and deserves Professor Mahaffy's censure. Professor Mahaffy has 
here disregarded the distinction between noumenon and transcenden- 
tal object (cf. § 2920), although doubtless for the most part such 
neglect would occasion no misapprehension. I can not agree with 
Professor Mahaffy that Kant's argument " is somewhat obscurely 
expressed." (Cf. above, at § 1985.)] [page 350, line 6.] 

§ 2956.— " Without us " is unavoidably ambiguous (meaning 
either that which exists as things per se, distinct from us, or 
merely that which belongs to external phenomena); and therefore 
(in order to secure to this conception the latter meaning — being 
that in which the psychological question about the reality of our 
external intuition arises) we shall distinguish empirically external 
objects (from those possibly so called in a transcendental sense) 
by denominating them simply things which can be perceived in 
space, (page 247, line 17.) Cf. § 1846. [page 350, line 19.] 

§ 2957. — Perception is that through which the material must be 
given, in order to supply objects to sensuous intuition. This ma- 
terial or real something which is to be intuited in space, neces- 
sarily presupposes* perception, and can not be in any way 
imagined or produced independently of this perception, which an- 
nounces the reality of something in space, (page 248, line 5.) Cf. § 
2900. [*" It presupposes ," says Professor Mahaffy, " as a necessary 
condition of being perceived, our faculty of perception." See Ma- 
haffy's note.] [page 350, line 27.] 

§ 2958. — Perception then (to keep to external intuitions at pres- 
ent) represents something real in space. Nothing can be con- 
sidered as real in space except that which is represented in it ; and, 
vice versa, what is given in space (or represented through percep- 
tion) is also real in it ; for, were it not so — that is, were it not 



The Clavis to an Index. 823 

given immediately by empirical intuition — it could not be invented, 
because tbe real element in intuitions can not at all be obtained by 
apriori thinking, (page 248, line 25.) [page 351, line 14.] 

§ 2959. — Eeality in space, as being the reality of a mere rep- 
resentation, is nothing but the perception itself. It is impossible 
that in this space anything without us (in the transcendental 
sense [§§ 2955, 2956]) should be given, (page 249, line 12.) [page 
351, line 26.] 

§ 2960. — Illusive representations may arise, not corresponding 
with objects ; and we must ascribe this illusion either to images of 
the fancy (dreams [§ 2856]), or to a mistake of the faculty of judg- 
ment (in the case of the so-called deceptions of the senses [§ 1927]). 
To avoid these illusions, we proceed according to the following 
rule : that which is connected with a perception according to empirical 
laws is real* (page 250, line 9.) Cf. §§ 1839, 1841, 1830. [* Mahaffy 
notes that " the substance of this remark is repeated in the end 
of the note on the refutation of idealism, in the second preface " 
(§§1434, 1846).] [page 352, line 17.] 

§ 2961. — Dogmatical idealist, the man who denies the existence 
of matter. He who doubts it, because it can not be proved, would 
be the skeptical idealist, (page 251, line 3.) [The following section : 
see § 2971 et seqq. Cf. § 2036 et seqq. Cf § 2031 et seqq. Cf. § 2150 
et seqq.~] [page 353, line 1.] 

§ 2962. — Skeptical idealist is a benefactor to human reason ; 
since he compels us, even in the most trifling steps of ordinary 
experience, to keep wide awake [§ 2856]. (page 251, line 13.) 
[page 353, line 10.] 

§ 2963. — Skeptical idealism compels us to take refuge in the 
ideality of all phenomena; and this we expounded in the tran- 
scendental aesthetic, independent of the consequences, which we 
could not have then foreseen, (page 252, line 1.) [page 353, line 27.] 

§ 2964. — Dualism must consequently follow in psychology, but 
only in the empirical sense. But neither dualism in the transcend- 
ental sense, nor pneumatism, nor materialism, which oppose it from 
different sides, has the least basis, (page 252, line 12.) Cf. §§ 
2037, 2019, 865, 2937, 2920. [page 353, line 37.] 

§ 2965. — Never even come into our heads to make investigations 
about the objects of our senses as to what they may be in them- 
selves, out of relation to our senses, (p. 253, 1. 6.) [p. 354, 1. 22.] 

Reflection concerning the whole of pure psychology, as an appendix 
to these paralogisms. (§§ 2966-2986 inclusive.) 

§ 2966. — Eemarkable difference between psychology and physi- 
ology. If we contrast the doctrine of the soul ((psychology)),! as the 



824 Kant's Ethics. 

physiology of the internal senses, with the science of bodies, as the 
physiology of the objects of the external senses, we shall find (in 
addition to the fact that in both we know a great deal empirically) 
this remarkable difference : that in the latter science much can be 
cognized apriori from the mere conception of an extended incom- 
pressible being; whereas in the former, from the conception of a 
thinking being, nothing can be cognized synthetically apriori. 
Because, although both are phenomena, yet the phenomenon pre- 
sented to the external sense has something permanent* or fixed, 
which gives a substratum lying at the basis of changeable deter- 
minations, and so gives us a synthetical conception, namely, that 
of space and a phenomenon in it. Time, on the contrary, which 
is the only form of our internal intuition, has nothing permanent 
in it ; so that it only lets us know the change of determinations, 
not the determinable object, (page 253, line 25.) [* Mahaffy says 
" this important passage again anticipates (almost verbally) the 
refutation of idealism of the second edition. It shows the superior 
dignity of external experience, as contrasted with internal, in af- 
fording us data for science." (Of. §§ 1434, 1846.)] [page 355, line 
4.] [f I have substituted ((double parenthesis)) for the [brackets] 
within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word psychology.] 

§ 2967. — All rational psychology falls to the ground, being a 
science surpassing all the powers of the human reason. In that 
which we call the soul, everything is in a continuous flux, and 
nothing is permanent except (if you will have it so) the Ego, 
which is perfectly simple, merely because this representation has 
no content or multiplicity ; for which reason it seems to represent 
or (I should rather say) indicate a simple object, (page 254, line 
12.) Cf. §§2006, 2001. [page 355, line 19.] 

§ 2968. — Important negative use of psychology, if we consider 
it as nothing but a critical treatment of our dialectical syllogisms, 
and indeed of the ordinary natural reason, (page 255, line 7.) 
[page 356, line 6.] 

§ 2969. — Securing our thinking self from the danger of materi- 
alism, (page 255, line 13.) [page 356, line 10.] 

§ 2970. — Find a reason in other than merely speculative grounds 
for hoping that my thinking nature will remain permanent in the 
midst of all possible changes of state, (page 255, line 25.) Cf. §§ 
2023, 2028. [page 356, line 21.] 

§ 2971.— Three additional dialectical questions, which form the 
proper object of rational psychology, and which can only be de- 
cided by the foregoing investigations : (1) the possibility of the 
community of the soul and an organic body, i. e. the animality 



The Clavis to an Index. 825 

of the condition of the soul in this life ; (2) the commencement of 
this community, i. e. the state of the soul at and before birth ; (3) 
the end of this community, i. e. the state of the soul at and after 
death (the question of immortality), (p. 256, 1. 7.) [p. 356, 1. 34.] 

§ 2972. — Difficulties with which these questions are supposed to 
be beset, are all based on a mere delusion, by which what only ex- 
ists in our thoughts is hypostatised, and, without its quality* 
being changed, assumed to be a real object without the thinking 
subject (for example, extension, which is nothing but a phenome- 
non, is taken for a property of external things existing apart from 
our sensibility; and motion is taken for their action, taking 
place really in itself, even apart from our senses, (page 256, line 
18.) Cf. § 1895. [* I would like to know whether the word ren- 
dered here (and below) quality ; is the same word which Kichard- 
son rendered quality in the Prolegomena, and which Mahaffy 
printed constitution (cf. §§2747,2758,2828).] [In a note to the 
close of this section, Professor Mahafiy says " a plain assertion 
of what T before explained, that Kant is refuting, not a thing per 
se, about which we can assert nothing, but such an absurdity as a 
noumenon in space." (Cf. § 2955.)] [page-357, line 5.] 

§ 2973. — Question is no longer about the community of the 
soul with other known and heterogeneous substances without us, 
but merely concerning the connection of the representations of 
the internal sense with the modifications of our external sensi- 
bility; and how it is that these are connected together according 
to constant laws, so as to form one systematic experience, (page 
257, line 8.) [page 357, line 23.] 

§ 2974. — Motion itself (and matter also, which makes itself cog- 
noscible by this means) is mere representation. .Remember that 
bodies are not objects per se, present to us, but a mere appeai*ance 
of nobody- knows- what-sort-of unknown object; that motion is 
not the effect of this unknown cause, but merely the appearance 
of its influence on our senses ; consequently, that both are not 
anything without us, but mere representations within us. It fol- 
lows, that it is not the motion of matter which produces represen- 
tations in us, but that this motion itself (and matter also, which 
makes itself cognoscible by this means) is mere representation, 
(page 257, line 29.) [page 358, line 7.] See §§2952, 2979. 

§ 2975. — Whole difficulty we have conjured up amounts to 
this: how and through what cause the representations of our sen- 
sibility are so related that those which we call external intuitions 
can be represented as objects without us, according to empirical 
laws. This question by no means contains the supposed difficulty 

53 



826 Kant's Ethics. 

of explaining the origin of the representations of causes which 
exist without us and act in a foreign way ( — in that we take the ap- 
pearances of an unknown cause to be a cause without us : a pro- 
ceeding which can breed nothing but confusion), (page 258, line 
30.) [page 358, line 32.] 

§ 2976. — Objections may be all divided into dogmatical, critical 
and skeptical. The critical objection, as it never touches the truth 
or falsity of the proposition, and only attacks the proof, does not 
require or pretend to a better knowledge of the object than the op- 
posed assertion ; it only proves the assertion groundless — not 
that it is false, (page 259, line 17.) [page 359, line 10.] 

§ 2977. — Foundation of all theories as to the community be- 
tween body and soul. (Subreptio.) (p. 260, 1. 11.) [p. 359, 1. 33.] 

§ 2978. — Three ordinary explanations of the community of 
the soul with matter : (1) physical influence ; (2) pre-established 
harmony ; (3) supernatural assistance. The two latter are based 
upon objections to the first (which is the representation of common 
sense), namely, ||that what appears as matter can not by immedi- 
ate influence be the cause of representations, which are a perfectly 
heterogeneous sort of effect. According to our principles, their 
theory must rather attempt to show that the true (transcendental) 
object of our external senses can not be the cause of those repre- 
sentations (phenomena) which we understand by the word matter. 
Now, as no one can pretend with any reason to know aught of 
the transcendental cause of the representations of our external 
senses, their || assertion is quite groundless, (page 260, line 25.) 
[ Wlien men argue in this way, etc., i. e. it is clear that they do not use 
the word object in the Kantic sense.] [page 360, line 7.] 

§ 2979. — All difficulties which beset the connection of thinking 
nature with matter arise, without exception, merely from the in- 
sinuation of the dualistic representation, that matter as such is 

not PHENOMENON, OR A MERE REPRESENTATION OP THE MIND, TO 

which an unknown object corresponds, but is that object itself 
in itself, as it exists without us, and apart from all sensibility, 
(page 261, Hue 19.) [page 360, line 29.] 

§ 2980. — No dogmatical objection can be made to the usually 
accepted physical influence. Assuming that matter and its motion 
are mere phenomena, and therefore themselves mere representa- 
tions, our opponent can only raise this difficulty, that the unknown 
object of our sensibility can not be the cause of representations in us — 
a thing which he has not the least right to assert, because nobody 

CAN TELL OP AN UNKNOWN OBJECT WHAT IT CAN OR CAN NOT DO. 

(page 262, line 8.) [page 361, line 9.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 827 

§ 2081. — Critical objection can still be made to the common 
doctrine of physical influence. Such a pretended community be- 
tween two kinds of substances (the thinking and the extended) 
presupposes a gross dualism, and makes the latter, which are noth- 
ing but mere representations of the thinking subject, into things 
existing per se. Physical influence thus misconceived may then be 
completely overthrown by showing its grounds of proof to be 
idle, and surreptitiously obtained, (p. 262, 1. 21.) [p. 361, 1. 20.] 

§ 2982. — Question concerning the community of that which 
thinks and that which is extended — if we discard all fictions — 
would simply come to this: How external intuition, viz., that of 
space (the occupation of it, figure and motion), can be at all possi- 
ble in a thinking subject ? But to this question no man can ever 
find an answer ; and we can never supply this gap in our knowl- 
edge, but only indicate it by ascribing external phenomena to 
a transcendental object (as the cause of this sort of phenomena), 
which, however, we do not know, and of which we can never ob- 
tain any notion, (page 262, line 30.) [page 361, line 28.] 

§ 2983. — Settlement of all disputes or objections which concern 
the condition of this thinking nature before the community (this 
life), or after its cessation (in death), (page 263, line 14.) [In a 
note Professor Mahaffy very correctly says : " To assert of the 
writer of the preceding argument that he is an absolute idealist, 
is surely very strange criticism. It is impossible to conceive 
a more distinct and official refusal to accept that extreme doctrine." 
(Cf §§2911, 2920.)] [page 362, line 3.] 

§ 2984. — Whoever he may be, he knows no more of the abso- 
lute and internal cause of external or corporeal phenomena than I 
or anybody else. He can not, then, reasonably pretend to know 
on what the reality of external phenomena depends in the present 
state (in life), nor consequently, that the condition of all external 
intuition, or even that the thinking subject itself, must cease to 
exist after this state (in death), (p. 264, 1. 3.) [p. 362, 1. 21.] 

§ 2985. — Whole dispute about the nature of our thinking being 
and its connection with the world of matter, merely arises from our 
supplying the gaps in our knowledge by paralogisms of the reason, 
in that we make our thoughts to be things, and hypostatise them, 
whence arises an imaginary science, both as regards its affirma- 
tions and its negations. We either pretend to know something of 
objects of which nobody has the least notion, or we consider our 
own representations to be objects, and so become involved in a 
perpetual circle of ambiguities and contradictions, (page 264, line 
16.) [page 362, line 32.] 



828 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 2986. — Nothing but the sobriety of a severe but fair criticismf 
can free us from this dogmatical illusion, (page 264, line 26.) 
[page 363, line 7.] [f I have substituted the word criticism for 
Prof. Mahaffy's word Critick. (See Eichardson, Proleg. passim.)] 

Concluding remark on the dialectical fallacy in the syllogisms of 
'pure psychology. (§§ 2987-3000.) 

§ 2987. — Owe to our reader a distinct and general explana- 
tion of the transcendental and yet natural illusion in the paralo- 
gisms of the pure reason, as well as a justification of their syste- 
matic arrangement and their running parallel to the categories, 
(page 265, line 16.) [page 363, line 20.] 

§ 2988. — Consider all illusion to consist in this : that the sub- 
jective condition of thinking is taken for the cognition of the ob- 
ject, (page 265, line 25.) [page 363, line 27.] 

§ 2989. — Dialectical illusion of the pure reason can not be an 
empirical illusion, occurring with determinate empirical cognition ; 
consequently it must concern the conditions of thinking generally, 
and there can be only three cases of dialectical use of the pure 
reason : (1) the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in gen- 
eral ; (2) the synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking; 
(3) the synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking, (page 265, 
line 27.) Cf. §§ 1966-1969 and 1986-1988. [page 363, line 28.] 

§ 2990.— Synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general is 
not at all objective, but merely a synthesis of the thought with 
the subject, which synthesis is falsely held to be a synthetical rep- 
resentation of an object, (page 266, line 20.) [page 364, line 14.] 

§ 2991. — Dialectical inference to the condition of all thinking in 
general, which is itself unconditioned, does not make a mistake as 
to content (for it abstracts from all content or object); but it is 
merely false as to form, and must be called a paralogism, (page 
266, line 27.) Cf. §§ 1997, 2016. [page 364, line 20.] 

§ 2992. — Ego is only the formal condition or logical unity of 
every thought, in which I abstract from all objects — and yet it is 
represented as an object which I think, that is, the Ego and its un- 
conditioned unity, (page 266, line 33.) [page 364, line 25.] 

§ 2993. — Suppose any one were to put to me the general ques- 
tion, "of what sort of nature is a. thinking being ?" 1 do not in the 
least know how to answer the question apriori, because the answer 
must be synthetical (for an analytical answer might perhaps ex- 
plain thinking, but could not extend our knowledge of that upon 
which thinking depends as to its possibility). But for every syn- 
thetical solution intuition is necessary, a point which is wholly 
passed over in the vague problem proposed, (page 267, line 8.) 
[page 364, line 32.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 829 

§ 2994. — Although I know no answer in general to that sort of 
question, it [illusively] appears to me that I might give one in the 
special case of the proposition " I think" which expresses con- 
sciousness, (page 267, line 20.) [page 365, line 4.] 

§ 2995. — Further investigation into the origin of these proper- 
ties, which I attribute to myself, as a thinking being in general, 
exposes the error. They are nothing more than pure categories, 
by which I can never think a determined object, but only the 
unity of representations, in order to determine them as an object. 
Without being founded on an intuition, the category alone can 
never provide me with a conception of an object; for only by in- 
tuition is the object given, which is afterward thought in accord- 
ance with the category, (page 268, line 5.) [page 365, line 15.] 

§ 2996. — Mere apperception {Ego) is in conception substance, is 
in conception simple, etc.; and so far all these psychological dogmas 
have indisputable truth. Yet what we really want to know about 
the soul is not at all discoverable in this way ; for, since all these 
predicates are not at all valid of intuition, and therefore can have 
no consequence applicable to objects of experience, they are quite 
void, (page 268, line 30.) [page 366, line 1.] 

§ 2997. — Subreption of hypostatisecl consciousness (apperceptionis 
substantiatas) . The illusion of considering the unity in the syn- 
thesis of thoughts to be a perceived unity in the subject of these 
thoughts, (page 269, line 27. [page 366, line 26.] See § 2782. 

§ 2998. — Paralogism in the dialectical syllogisms of rational 
psychology, so far as their premises are in themselves true, may 
be called a sophisma figurce dietionis, in which the major premiss 
makes merely a transcendental use of the category with reference 
to its condition, but the minor premiss and conclusion make of the 
same category an empirical use with reference to the soul, which 
has been subsumed under this condition, (page 270, line 21.) Cf. §§ 
2016, 2164, 2946. [page 367, line 10.] 

§ 2999. — Systematic connection of all these dialectical assertions 
in a fallacious psychology, (page 271, line 9.) Cf. §§ 1968, 2043, 
1972, 1986, 2025. [page 367, line 24.] 

§ 3000. — Assertions of pure psychology do not contain empirical 
predicates of the soul, but those which (if they occur) should de- 
termine the object per se independent of experience — that is, 
through the pure reason. They must therefore [but Dr. Kant has 
conclusively proved that they can not] be fairly based upon prin- 
ciples and universal notions of thinking natures in general, (page 
272, line 4.) [page 368, line 12.] [Cf. § 1935.] Consequently there 
does not exist any rational psychology as a doctrine furnishing any 
addition to our knowledge of ourselves. § 2024. 



830 Kant's Ethics. 

APPENDICES FROM PROFESSOR ABBOTT. 

"Kant's Theory of Ethics, or Practical Philosophy. Comprising: (1) Funda- 
mental Principles of the 31etaphysic of florals; (2) Dialectic and Method- 
ology of Practical Keason; (3) On the Kadical Evil in Human Nature. 
Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity 
College, Dublin; sometime Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University. 
London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer, 1873." The first division is 
Professor Abbott's translation of the Groundwork, of which Mr. Semple's 
translation is referred to in $1-14:6 inclusive (page 11—18) abov«. I make 
of Mr. Abbott's translation of the preface to the Groundwork, a sixth appen- 
dix to the Prolegomena (^ 8129—3145 inclusive, below). The second division' 
I place here as the fourth and fifth appendices to the Prolegomena (§§ 3001- 
8128 inclusive, below). The third division is Professor Abbott's translation 
of the first book of the Religion, of which Mr. Semple's translation is re- 
ferred to in §| 651—724 inclusive (pages 52-57) above. [See immediately the 
note to the preface, at § 3129 below.] 

Appendix IV. — Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.* (gg 3001- 

3103 inclusive.) 

Chapter I.— Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally, (s? 3001-3008.) 

§ 3001. — Pure reason always has its dialectic, whether it is 
considered in its speculative or its practical employment, [page 
123 (Of Longmans' edition of 1873 above mentioned).] 

§ 3002. — Antinomy of the pure reason which is manifest in its 
dialectic is in fact the most beneficial error into which human 
reason could ever have fallen, [page 294 (probably an error for 
124), line 1.] See §§ 2790, 2787, 2124, 2135, 2142, 2835. 

§ 3003. — Pure practical reason likewise seeks to find the uncon- 
ditioned for the practically conditioned, [page 294 (124), line 20.] 

§ 3004. — Philosophy in its ancient signification as a doctrine 
op the summum bonum, so far as reason endeavors to make this 
into a science, [page 295 (125), line 3.] § 2562. 

§ 3005. — Philosophy as well as wisdom would always remain an 
ideal, which objectively is presented complete in reason alone, 
while subjectively for the person it is only the goal of his unceas- 
ing endeavors, [page 295 (125), line 23.] 

§ 3006. — Self-contradictions of pure practical reason honestly 

[*The solution of the dialectic of pure speculative reason is an attempt on the 
part of man to justify his own reason, lest she quibble herself into a disbelief in 
her own freedom. The solution of the dialectic of pure practical reason is an 
attempt on the part of man (by showing that the supreme Law does not direct 
upon an impossible end) to justify GOD, the Author of the unconditioned Law. 
The former is a science of immediate rational interest, and belongs to the logical 
division of the science of ethics. (See #§ 1925-2444 inclusive, above, and con- 
sult §2120.) The latter is natural and perhaps inevitable, but, if admitted into 
the science, must be restrained to the form of an appendix, or scholion.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 831 

stated and not concealed, force us to undertake a complete critique 
of this faculty, [page 296 (126), line 16.] 

§ 3007. — Summum bonum may be the whole object of a pure prac- 
tical reason, i. e. a pure wiil, yet it is not on that account to be re- 
garded as its determining principle. (The moral law is the sole 
determining principle of a pure will.) [page 296 (126), line 25.] 

§ 3008. — Will is in fact determined by the moral law which is 
or may be included in the conception of the summum bonum. 
[page 297 (127), line 16.] 

Chapter II.— Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in Denning the Conception of 
the Summum Bonum. (5g 3009-3103 inclusive.) 

§ 3009. — Summum may mean either the supreme (supremum) or 
the perfect (consummatum). The former is that condition which 
is itself unconditioned, i. e. is not subordinate to any other (origina- 
rium): the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater 
whole of the same kind ^'perfectissimum). [page 128, line 4.] 

§ 3010. — Virtue and happiness together constitute the possession 
of the summum bonum. This summum bonum expresses the 
whole, the perfect good, in which, however, virtue as the condition 
is always the supreme good, [page 128, line 12.] 

§ 3011. — When two elements are necessarily united in one con- 
ception they must be connected as reason and consequence ; and 
this either so that their unity is considered as analytical (logi- 
cal connection), or as synthetical (real connection); the former fol- 
lowing the law of identity, the latter that of causality. The con- 
nection of virtue and happiness may therefore be understood in 
two ways, [page 129, line 18.] 

§ 3012. — Ancient Greek schools did not allow virtue and happi- 
ness to be regarded as two .distinct elements of the summum 
bonum, and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the 
rule of identity ; but they differed as to which of the two was to 
be taken as the fundamental notion, [page 130, line 4.] 

§3013. — Acuteness was unfortunately misapplied in trying to 
trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous notions, 
[page 130, line 18.] 

§ 3014. — Stqic maintained that virtue was the whole summum 
bonum, and happiness only the consciousness of possessing it, as 
making part of the state of the subject. The Epicurean main- 
tained that happiness was the whole summum bonum, and virtue 
only the form of the maxim for its pursuit; viz., the rational use 
of the means for attaining it. [page 131, line 8.] 

§ 3015. — Analytic of pure practical reason [see §§ 147-274 above] 
has shown what it is that makes the problem difficult to solve ; 
namely, that happiness and morality are two specifically distinct 



832 Kant's Ethics, 

elements of the summum bonum, and therefore their combination 
can not be analytically cognized, [page 132, line 5.] 

§ 3016. — Deduction must be transcendental. It is apriori 
(morally) necessary to produce the summum bonum by freedom of 
will: therefore the condition of its possibility must rest solely on 
apriori principles of cognition, [page 132, line 17.] 

Article I. — The antinomy of practical reason. (§§ 3017, 3018.) 

§ 3017. — Virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily com- 
bined in the summum bonum. This combination can not be 
analytical ; it must, then, be synthetical, and, more particularly, 
must be conceived as the connection of cause and effect, since it 
concerns a practical good, i. e. one that is possible by means of 
action ; consequently either the desire of happiness must be the 
motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the 
efficient cause of happiness. The first is absolutely impossible, 
[page 133, line 9. J 

§ 3018.— Second is also impossible, because the practical connec- 
tion of causes and effects in the world as the result of the deter- 
mination of the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions 
of the will, but on the knowledge of the laws of nature and the 
physical power to use them for one's purposes ; consequently we 
can not expect in the world by the most punctilious observance 
of the moral laws any necessary connection of happiness with 
virtue, adequate to the summum bonum. Now as the promotion 
of this summum bonum, the conception of which contains this 
connection, is apriori a necessary object of our will, and inseparably 
attached to the moral law, the impossibility of the former must 
prove the falsity of the latter If, then, the supreme good is not 
possible by practical rules, then the moral law also which com- 
mands us to promote it is directed to vain imaginary ends, and 
must consequently be false. f [page 133, line 26.] 

[t But the most holy law is for us men most absolutely the most apo- 
dictic and inevasible law of God, from which there is for us no escape 
possible, not even through the most complete demonstration that the end com- 
manded is impossible and imaginary and vain, for the inexorable law commands 
regardless of any end whatsoever (a statement which I need scarcely repeat to 
any student of Kant. See §§151, 152, 164, 178, 186, 242, and cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., 
vol. viii., pages 344, 345). Practically, therefore, there is no dialectic of pure 
practical reason ; although logically (because of our blindness) there is a dialec- 
tic of (originated by and belonging to) speculative reason concerning pure 
practical reason It may therefore be called " the antinomy of pure practical 
reason " merely in order to distinguish it from the antinomy of pure specula- 
tive reason ; but it would be better to term it " the dialectic of speculative rea- 
son in respect to practical reason," a designation which would prevent misap- 
prehension.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 833' 

Article II. — Critical solution of the antinomy of practical reason.. 
(§§ 3019-3030 inclusive.) 

§ 3019. — Antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar 
conflict between freedom and physical necessity in the causality 
of events in the world. It was solved by showing that there is no 
real contradiction when the events and even the world in which 
they occur are regarded (as they ought to be) merely as appear- 
ances, [page 134, line 20.] Cf. §§ 2207 et seqq. 

§ 3020. — Solution of the antinomy of pure practical reason. 
The first of the two propositions : That the endeavor after hap- 
piness produces a virtuous mind, is absolutely false ; but the 
second : That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness, is 
not absolutely false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as a 
form of causality in the sensible world. It is not impossible that 
morality of mind should have a connection as cause with happi- 
ness (as an effect in the sensible world) if not immediate } 7 et mediate 
(viz.: through an intelligent author of nature), and moreover 
necessary, [page 135, line 10.] § 2565. 

§ 3021. — Seeming conflict of practical reason with itself. The 
relation between appearances was taken for a relation of the things 
in themselves to these appearances [page 136, line 3.] 

§ 3022. — Philosophers of both ancient and modern times have 
been able to find happiness in accurate proportion to virtue even 
in this life (in the sensible world), or have persuaded themselves 
that they were conscious thereof. Epicurus as well as the Stoics 
extolled above everything the happiness that springs from the 
consciousness of living virtuously, [page 136, line 15.] 

§ 3023. — Epicurus, like many well-intentioned men of this day, 
who do not reflect deeply enough on their principles, fell into the 
error of presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons for 
whom he wished to provide the springs to virtue, [p. 137, 1. 11.] 

§ 3024. — Beware lest by falsely extolling this moral determining- 
principle as a spring, making its source lie in particular feelings 
of pleasure (which are in fact only results) [cf. §§ 215, 287] we 
degrade and disfigure the true genuine spring, the Law itself, 
[page 138, line 8.] §§ 220, 233, 232. 

§ 3025. — Consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by 
the Law is by no means analogous to the feeling of pleasure, [page 
139, line 16.] [Respect : reverence, a word used by Semple (vid. 
exemp grat , et conf, § 214), is a better word.] 

§ 3026. — Freedom and the consciousness of it as a faculty of 
following the moral law with unyielding resolution is independence 
on inclinations, at least as motives determining (though not as. 



834 Kant's Ethics. 

affecting') our desire ; and so far as I am conscious of this freedom 
in following my moral maxims, it is the only source of an unal- 
tered contentment which is necessarily connected with it and rests 
on no special feeling, [page 140, line 4.] 

§ 3027. — All must be directed to the conception of the Law as a 
determining principle, if the action is to contain morality and not 
merely legality. Inclination is blind and slavish whether it be of 
a good sort or not. [page 140, line 24.] §§ 291, 226, 302. 

§ 3028. — Consciousness of this faculty of a pure practical reason 
produces by action (virtue) a consciousness of mastery over one's 
inclinations, and therefore of independence on them, and conse- 
quently also on the discontent that always accompanies them, and 
"thus a negative satisfaction with one's state, i. e. contentment. 
[page 141, line 18.] [Cf. Zoroaster, Avesta, Yasna, xlvii., 12 (page 
176 above in §881).] 

§ 3029 — Morality is the supreme good, as the first condition of 
the summum bonum, while happiness constitutes its second ele- 
ment, but only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned 
(but necessaiy) consequence of the former, [page 142, line 8.] 

§ 3030. — Possibility of such connection of the conditioned with 
its condition belongs wholly to the supersensual relation of things. 
[page 142, line 25.] § 2565. 

Article III. — Of the primacy of pure practical reason in its union 
with the speculative reason. (§§ 3031-3036 inclusive.) 

§ 3031. — Primacy between two or more things connected by 
reason : the prerogative belonging to one, of being the first deter- 
mining principle in the connection Avith all the rest, [page 143, 
line 13.] 

§ 3032. — Interest of reason's speculative employment consists in 
the cognition of the object pushed to the highest apriori prin- 
ciples : that of its practical employment, in the determination of 
the will in resjDect of the final and complete end. [page 143, line 
19.] [See §§ 287, 125, 285, 2124, 2125, 2605, 1168, 1023," 469, 2607.] 

§ 3033. — Question is, which interest is the superior (not which 
must give way, for they are not necessarily conflicting), whether 
speculative reason, which knows nothing of all that the practical 
offers for its acceptance, should take up these propositions, and 
(although they transcend it) try to unite them with its own con- 
ceptions! as a foreign possession handed over to it, or whether it is 
justified in obstinately following its own separate interest, and ac- 
cording to the canonic of Epicurus rejecting as vain subtlety 
everything that can not accredit its objective reality by manifest 
examples to be shown in experience, [page 144, line 10.] [fl have 



The Clavis to an Index. 835 

substituted the word conceptions for Professor Abbott's word 
concepts. (See at the top of page 804 above.)] 

§ 3034. — Only one and the same reason which, whether in a 
theoretical or a practical point of view, judges according to apriori 
principles. Although, it is in the first point of view incompetent 
to establish certain propositions positively, which, however, do 
not contradict it, then as soon as these propositions are inseparably 
attached to the practical interest of pure reason, then it must accept 
them, [page 145, line 8.] §§ 246, 278, 2607. 

§ 3035. — When pure speculative and pure practical reason are 
combined in one cognition, the latter has the primacy, provided, 
namely, that this combination is not contingent and arbitrary, but 
founded apriori on reason itself and therefore necessary, [p. 146, 1. 9.] 

§ 3036. — All interest is ultimately practical, and even that 
of speculative reason is conditional,* and it is only in the practical 
employment of reason that it is complete, [page 146, line 20.] 

Article IV. — The immortality of the soul as a postulate of pure 
practical reason. (§§ 3037-3040 inclusive.) 

§ 3037. — Perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is 
holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible 
world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, never- 
less, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in 
a progress in infinitum toward that perfect accordance, [page 147, 
line 4.] Cf. § 713. 

§ 3038. — Endless progress is only possible on the supposition of 
an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same 
rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The 
summum bonum then practically is only possible on the supposi- 
tion of the immortality of the soul ; consequently this immortality, 
being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate 
op pure practical reason, [page 147, line 20.] Cf. §§ 2566, 1857. 

§ 3039. — Principle of the moral destination of our nature, 
namely, that it is only in an endless progress that we can attain 
perfect accordance with the moral law, is of the greatest use, not 
merely for the present purpose of supplementing the impotence of 
speculative reason, but also with respect to religion, [p. 148, 1. 5.] 

§ 3040. — Hope, not indeed here, nor at any imaginable point of 
his future existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration 
(which God alone can survey), to be perfectly adequate to His will, 
[page 149, line 3.] Cf. § 2558. See § 713. [See § 3Q56.] 

Article V. — The existence of GOB as a postulate of pure practical 
reason. (§§ 3041-3065 inclusive.) 

* Cognition being required only for the behoof of action. Cf. % 952, 1168, 2607. 



836 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 3041. — Law must also lead us to affirm the possibilit}^ of the 
second element of the summum bonum, viz.: HajDpiness propor- 
tioned to that morality. Must postulate the existence of GOD, as 
the necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum. 
[page 150, line 10.] 

§ 3042. — Ought to endeavor to promote the summum bonum, 
which therefore must be possible, [page 151, line 7.] 

§ 3043. — Summum bonum is possible in the world only on the 
supposition of a Supreme Nature having a causality correspond- 
ing to moral character, [page 151, line 29.] 

§ 3044. — Supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed 
as a condition of the summum bonum, is a being which is the 
cause of nature by f intelligence and will, consequently its 
author, that is God. [p. 152, 1. 15.] [f I think this transcendent.] 

§ 3045. — Postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good 
(the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest 
original good, that is to say, of the existence of God. [page 152, 
line 22.] 

§ 3046. — Necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we 
should presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum, and as 
this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it insep- 
arably connects the supposition of this with duty, that is, it is 
morally necessary to assume the existence of God. [page 152, line 
25.] Cf. § 2566. 

§ 3047. — Moral necessity is in this case subjective, that is, it is a 
want, and not objective, that is itself a duty, for there can not be a 
duty to suppose the existence of anything (since this concerns only 
the theoretical employment of reason), [page 153, line 5.] 

§ 3048. — Duty here is only the endeavor to realize and pro- 
mote the summum bonum in the world, the possibility of which 
can therefore be postulated ; and as our reason finds it not con- 
ceivable except on the supposition of a supreme intelligence, the 
admission of this existence is therefore connected with the con- 
sciousness of our duty, although the admission itself belongs to 
the domain of speculative reason, [page 153, line 13.] § 2831. 

§ 3049.— Hypothesis in respect of speculative reason ; but in 
reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral 
law (the summum bonum) and consequently of a requirement for 
practiced purposes, it may be called faith, that is to say a pure 
rational faith, [page 153, line 21.] [See the opening words of 
full text of § 913 and cf. § 817.] [See § 826 (page 64 above) and 
observe that the word faith is used correctly in this § 3049.] 

§ 3050. — Greek schools could never attain the solution of their 



The Clavis to an Index. 837 

problem of the practical possibility of the summum bonum, be- 
cause they made the rule of the use which the will of man makes 
of his freedom the sole and sufficient ground of this possibility, 
[page 154, line 1.] 

§ 3051. — Epicureans assumed as the supreme principle of mor- 
ality a wholly false one, namely that of happiness, [p. 154, 1. 14.] 

§ 3052. — Stoics on the contrary chose their supreme practical 
principle quite rightly, making virtue the condition of the sum- 
mum bonum ; but they left out the second element of the summum 
bonum, namely, personal happiness, [page 154, line 28.] 

§ 3053. — Christianity, even if we do not yet consider it as a re- 
ligious doctrine, gives touching this point a conception of the 
summum bonum (the kingdom op Cod) which alone satisfies the 
strictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is holy (un- 
yielding) and demands holiness of morals [see § 909] ; although 
all the moral perfection to which man can attain is only virtue 
[cf. §§ 232, 231, 229, 713, 750], implying consciousness of a con- 
stant propensity to transgression, or at least a want of purity 
£§ 677], that is, a mixture of many spurious (not moral) motives 
of obedience to the Law, consequently a self-esteem [§ 239] com- 
bined with humility [§§ 208, 220]. In respect, then, of the holi- 
ness which the Christian law requires, this leaves the creature 
nothing but a progress in infinitum, but for that very reason it 
justifies him in hoping for an endless duration of his existence, 
[page 155, line 23.] 

§ 3054. — -Christian morals, on their philosophical side, compared 
with the ideas of the Creek schools, would appear as follows : The 
ideas of the Cynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians, 
are : simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom* and holiness.^ Chris- 
tian morality, because its precept is framed (as a moral precept 
must be) so pure and unyielding, takes from man all confidence 
that he can be fully adequate to it (at least in this life), but again 
sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we act as well as it is 
in our power to do, then what is not in our power will come in 
to our aid from another source, [page 155, line 24 (note).] Cf. §§ 
724, 766. [f I desire to protest, once for all, against Professor 
Kant's exaltation of Christianity above every other religious creed 
(unless indeed I may correctly say with the exception of the 
pure rational creed). Or rather, since I ought not and do not de- 

[* Professor Abbott from Kant's preface makes an extract, from which I 
take the following: "Perhaps the expression virtue, with which also the Stoic 
made great show, would better indicate the characteristic of his school." Cf. $ 
730. Cf. Dr. Willich's Elements, p. 183 (see below at head of appendix viii.).] 



838 Kant's Ethics. 

sire even to seem to protest against the exaltation of any godly 
teaching, even though it may be combined with error, I shall with 
more propriety express myself as follows : I desire to protest, 
once for all, against Kant's degradation of every other religious 
creed (except possibly the pure rational creed) below Christian- 
ity.ff I do not here assert that Kant's position is false ; %% but 
what I have read and hereinbefore set forth of the words of the 
mighty Koraan stoic (that is all I know of stoicism), does not in- 
duce me to suppose that the stoic ideal (see especially pages 566, 
587, 580, and 574 above) is any less pure, exalted, and unattain- 
able than the Christian ideal, and even if it is, I do not know that 
the interests of morality and religion need that it be decried. f ff] 
§ 3055. — Christian morality supplies this defect (of the second 
indispensable element of the summum bonum [cf. §3052]) by rep- 
resenting the world in which rational beings devote themselves 
with all their soul to the moral law [cf. page 210 above], as a 
kingdom of God, in which nature and morality are brought into 

tt [I do not complain, for example, that in \ 723 (see page 57 above) the 
Christian religion is classed as a moral religion, but I complain of the use of the 
word alone. I do not complain that in g236 Kant says that the moral precepts 
of the gospel introduced purity of moral principle, but I complain of the use of 
the word first; for I can not conscientiously ignore Zoroaster (see the Gatha 
Ustavaiti) and Aristotle (see Nic. Eth. II., iv.) and I do not know that greater 
learning would not require of me further recollection. I do not complain that 
in \ 906 Kant speaks of a true catholic church, but I complain of the use of 
the definitive article, the true catholic church ; for I do not know any obstacle 
to the universality of Judaism, Zoroastrianism, or Mohammedism (nor even of 
Buddhism or Confucianism, since lack of religious fervor is certainly not such 
an obstacle, but merely an impediment, and I should be guilty of injustice here 
if. I did not define religious fervor to be devotion displayed immediately toward 
the person of the Deity, and so distinguish it from ethical fervor, which latter I 
do not by any means hold to be the less worthy in the sight of God).] 

XX [Because (1) in consequence of my want of learning, such my judgment 
would be presumptuous; because (2) my clavis is not a fit place for polemic, nor 
have I any time to spare for any polemic whatever, even if my information 
Avere sufficient; and because (3) the registration of a mere protest is all the de- 
fense which I require against the charge of infidelity.] 

ttt [In the above remarks, I have not entertained any distinction between 
Christianity, as a system of credenda, and the teachings of Jesus Christ, which 
latter include godliness ; but in reference to the former I desire to say that if the 
doctrine of vicarious atonement be fundamental and essentially constitutive in 
Christianity (as I suppose it to be, although I am ignorant of certainty, never 
having studied theology, and knowing no more of Christianity than any man 
may who has been born and bred in a Christian people), then I do not see how 
I can escape (and I do not attempt to escape) from the peremptory and absolute 
duty of rejecting Christianity.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 839 

harmony by a Holy Author who makes the derived summum 
bonum possible. Holiness of life is prescribed to them as a rule 
even in this life ; while the welfare proportioned to it, namely, 
bliss, is represented as attainable only in an eternity : because the 
former must always be the pattern of their conduct in every state 
[cf. § 717], and progress toward it is already possible and neces- 
sary in this life ; while the latter, under the name of happiness, 
can not be attained at all in this world (so far as our own power 
is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of hope, 
[page 157, line 14 ] 

§ 3056. — Christian principle of morality itself is not theological 
(so as to be heteronomy [cf. §§ 187, 183 (§ 183 may be found en- 
tire in Jour, of Sp. Phil., vol. v., pages 298, 299)]), but is autonomy 
of pure practical reason ; since it does not make God's knowledge 
[§ 3044] and His will the foundation of these laws, but only of the 
attainment of the summum bonum, on condition of followingy these 
laws, and it does not even place the proper spring of this obedi- 
ence in the desired results, but in the conception of duty only, as 
that of which the faithful observance alone constitutes the worthi- 
ness to obtain those happy consequences, [page 158, line 9.] [Cf. 
pages 152 (xviii.) and 184 (verse 5) above.] Cf. §910. §§215, 204. 

§3057. — Moral laws lead through the conception of the sum- 
mum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason 
to religion [cf. § 896], that is, to the recognition of all duties as 
divine commands, not as sanctions (that is to say, arbitrary ordinances 

[tin a note ad # 3040 (pa°;es 149, 150 of Abbott's translation), Professor 
Kant says:] It seems, nevertheless, impossible for a creature to have the con- 
viction [^2579. 2594, 2583] of his unwavering rirmness of mind in the progress 
toward goodness. On this account the Christian religion makes it come only 
from the same Spirit that works sanctification, that is, this firm purpose, and 
with it the consciousness of steadfastness in the moral progress. But naturally 
one who is conscious that he has persevered through a long portion of his life up 
to the end in the progress to the better, and this from genuine moral motives, 
may well have the comforting hope, though not the certainty, that even in an 
existence prolonged beyond this life he will continue steadfast in these princi- 
ples, and although he is never justified here in his own eyes, nor can ever hope 
to be so in the increased perfection of his nature (to which he looks forward, 
together with an increase of duties)*" nevertheless in this progress which, though 
it is directed to a goal infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as equiva- 
lent to possession [§ 713], he may have a prospect of a blessed future [§§761, 
754]; for this is the word that reason employs to designate perfect well-being in- 
dependent on all contingent causes of the world, and which, like holiness, is an 
idea that can be contained only in an endless progress and its totality, and con- 
sequently is never fully attained by a creature. £* I have inserted marks of 
parenthesis to improve the punctuation, and have italicized six of the words 
inclosed.] 



'840 Kant's Ethics. 

of a foreign will and contingent in themselves), but as essential laws 
of every free will in itself, which nevertheless must be regarded 
as commands of the Supreme Being, [page 158, line 21.] 

§ 3058. — All remains disinterested and founded merely on duty; 
neither fear nor hope being made the fundamental spring (they 
if taken as principles would destroy the whole moral worth of 
actions), [page 159, line 5.] Cf. § 242. See §§220, 16. 

§ 3059. — Morality is not properly the doctrine how we should 
make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of hap- 
piness, [page 159, line 24.] §§ 102, 93, 706, 821. 

§ 3060. — Man is worthy to possess a thing or a state, when his pos- 
session of it is in harmony with the summum bonum. All worthi- 
ness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the 
summum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest [Matthew, 
vii., 21 (page 219 above)], [page 160, line 1.] §§ 13, 93, 100. 

§ 3061. ^-Morality should never be treated as a doctrine of happi- 
ness, that is, an instruction how to become happy ; for it has to do 
simply with the rational condition (conditio sine qua non) of hap- 
piness, not with the means of attaining it. [page 160, line 7.] 

§ 3062. — Hope of happiness first begins with religion only, 
[page 160, line 12.] Cf. § 2558. See §706. 

§ 3063. — God's f ultimate end in creating the world, we must not 
name the happiness of the rational beings in it, but the summum 
bonum (which adds a condition to that wish of such beings, 
namely, the condition of being worthy of happiness). Those who 
placed the end of creation in the glory op God (provided that 
this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a desire to be praised), 
have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing glorifies 
God more than the observance of the holy duty that His Law im- 
poses on us. [page 160, line 23.] See §821. [f Professor Kant 
sometimes uses expressions which I regard as transcendent.] 

§ 3064. — GOD is the onlt holy, the only blessed, the only 
wise, because these conceptions already imply the absence of limi- 
tation. In the order of these attributes He is also the holy law- 
giver (and creator), the good governor (and preserver), and the 
just judge, three attributes which include everything by which 
God is the object of religion, and in conformity with which the 
metaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the reason, 
[page 161, line 19 (the note).] Cf. §879. [Cf. Socrates, in the 
Apology of Plato, quoted by Ueberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, 
vol. i., page 2) who refers to pages 20 and 23, ed. Stephanus.] 

§ 3065. — Humanity in our person must be holy to ourselves, 
[page 162, line 10.] Cf. §§ 97, 239. 



The Clavis to an Index. 841 

Article VI — Of the -postulates of pure practical reason. (§§3066- 
3069 inclusive.) 

§ 3066. — Postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but suppositions 
practically necessary. By means of their reference to what is 
practical, they give objective [see § 3072] reality to the ideas of 
speculative reason in general, [page 163, line 3.] [Conditions of 
obedience: obedience has no conditions. Let this be distinctly re- 
membered. (Cf. Koran, passim, ex. gr. cap. vi., vid. inf. appendix 
xvi., ^[ 95, clause 15, sqq., et sup., p. 301, line 6 ; et c. lxxvi., ^[369, 
clauses 21, 22, vid. sup., p. 314, 1. 5, sq.: et c. xxviii., ^] 236, clause 
24, sqq. vid. sup. p. 313, 1. 27.) Cf. §3091.] 

§ 3067. — Postulates are those of immortality, freedom posi- 
tively considered (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs 
to the intelligible world [cf. §§ 105, 124, 125, 174]), and the exist- 
ence of God. The first results from the practically necessary con- 
dition of a duration adequate to the complete fulfillment of the 
moral law; the second from the necessary supposition of inde- 
pendence on the sensible world and of the faculty of determining 
one's will according to the law of an intelligible world, that is, of 
freedom ; the third from the necessary condition of the existence 
of the summum bonum in such an intelligible world, by the sup- 
position of the supreme independent good, that is, the existence 
of God. [page 163, line 15.] 

§ 3068 — Fact that reverence f for the moral law necessarily 
makes the summum bonum an object of our endeavors, and the 
supposition thence resulting of its objective reality lead through 
the postulates of practical reason to conceptions which specula- 
tive reason might indeed present as problems, but could never 
solve, [page 164, line 6.] [f I have substituted the word rever- 
ence for Professor Abbott's word respect. (See page 833 above, 
at §3025.)] - 

§ 3069. — Immanent in practical reason (but only in a practical 
point of view), which for the speculative was only transcendent. 
We do not thereby take knowledge of the nature of our souls, 
nor of the intelligible world, nor of the Supreme Being, with re- 
spect to what they are in themselves ; but we have merely com- 
bined the conceptions of them in the practical conception* of the 
summum bonum as the object of our will, and this altogether apriori, 
but only by means of the moral law, and merely in reference to it, 
in respect of the object which it commands. Ideas the possibility 
of which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of 
which on the other hand no sophistry will ever wrest from the convic- 
tion even of the commonest man. [page 165, line 14.] [*§ 3033. f] 

54 



842 Kant's Ethics. 

Article VII — How is it possible to conceive an extension of pure 
reason in a practical point of view, without its knowledge as specula- 
tive being enlarged at the same time f (§§ 3070-3089 inclusive.) 

§ 3070. — Summum bonum is not possible without presupposing 
three theoretical conceptions (for which, because they are mere 
conceptions of pure reason, no corresponding intuition .can be 
found, nor consequently by the path of theory any objective 
reality): namely, freedom, immortality, and God. [p. 166, 1. 12.] 

§3071. — Actually have objects, because practical reason indis- 
pensably requires their existence for the possibility of its object, 
the summum bonum, which practically is absolutely necessary, 
and this justifies theoretical reason in assuming them. The above 
three ideas of speculative reason' are still in themselves not cogni- 
tions ; they are however (transcendent) thoughts in which there is 
nothing impossible, [page 167, line 2.] 

§ 3072. — Theoretical knowledge, not indeed of these objects, but 
of reason generally, is so far enlarged by this, that by the practical 
postulates objects were given to those ideas, a merely problematical 
thought having by this means first acquired objective reality, 
[page 167, line 29.] See §§ 2820, 2832. 

§ 3073. — Accession for which pure theoretical reason, for which 
all those ideas are transcendent and without object, has sinrply to 
thank its practical faculty, [page 168, line 24.] 

§ 3074. — Clearing up its knowledge, so as on one side to keep 
off anthropomorphism, as the source of superstition, and on the 
other side fanaticism, [page 169, line 5.] [See page 10 above.] 
(All these are hindrances to the practical use of pure reason, so 
that the removal of them may certainly be considered an exten- 
sion of our knowledge in a practical point of view.) 

§ 3075. — Reality is supplied by pure practical reason, and theo- 
retical reason has nothing further to do in this but to think those 
objects by* means of categories, [page 169, line 22.] [*§3063.f] 

§ 3076. — Category as a mere form of thought is here not empty 
but has significance, [page 170, line 17.] §§ 1687, 1917, 1861. 

§ 3077. — When these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the 
kingdom of God), and of immortality are further determined, 
[page 171, line 1.] §§2826,2438. [§3063.f] 

§ 3078. — Incapable of being the foundation of a speculative 
knowledge, and their use is limited simply to the practice of the 
moral law. [page 171, line 23.] See § 3074. [§ 2443.] 

§ 3079. — Eeality is given to the conception of the object of a 
will morally determined (the conception of the summum bonum), 
and with it to the conditions of its possibility, the ideas of God, 



The Clavis to an Index. 843 

freedom, and immortality, but always only relatively to the prac- 
tice of the moral law (and not for any speculative purpose.) [page 
172, line 12.] 

§ 3080.— Whether the notion of G-od is one belonging to physics 
(and therefore also to metaphysics, which contains the pure apriori 
principles of the former in their universal import) or to morals ? 
[page 173, line 16.] § 627. 

§ 3081. — Metaphysics, however, can not enable us to attain by 
certain inference from the knowledge of this world to the concep- 
tion of G-od and to the proof of His existence, [page 173, line 29.] 

§ 3082. — Absolutely impossible to know the existence of this 
Being from mere conceptions, [page 174, line 10.] § 2361. 

§ 3083. — Only one single process possible for reason to attain 
this knowledge, namely, to start from the supreme principle of its 
pure practical use (which in every case is directed sinaply to the 
existence of something as a consequence of reason). The neces- 
sary direction of the will to the summurn bonum discovers to us 
not only the necessity of assuming such a First Being in refer- 
ence to the possibility of this good in the world, but what is most 
remarkable, something which reason in its progress on the path of 
physical nature altogether failed to find, namely, an accurately de- 
fined conception of this First Being, [page 174, line 20.] § 2573. 

§ 3084. — Empirical inquiry (physics) leads to a conception of 
the First Being not accurately enough determined to be held ade- 
quate to the conception of Deity. (With metaphysic in its tran- 
scendental part nothing whatever can be accomplished.) [page 
175, line 5.] §§2371, 2349, 2343. 

§ 3085. — Moral principle admits as possible only the conception 
of an Author of the world j^ossessed of the highest perfection, [page 
175, line 29.] §§ 2573, 2566. 

§ 3086. — Conception of GJ-od consequently belongs originally 
not to physics, i. e. to speculative reason, but to morals. The same 
may be said of the other postulates [§3067]. [page 176, line 15.] 

§ 3087. — Grecian philosophy exhibits no distinct traces of a 
pure rational theology earlier than Anaxagoras. But when this 
acute people had advanced so far in their investigations of nature 
as to treat even moral questions philosophically, on which other 
nations had never done anything but talk; then first they found 
a new and practical want, which did not fail to give definiteness 
to their conception of the first being, [page 176, line 21.] 

§ 3088. — Reader of the Critique of Pure speculative Eeason 
will be thoroughly convinced how highly necessary that laborious 



844 Kant's Ethics. 

deduction of the categories [§§ 1578-1652] was, and how fruitful 
for theology and morals, [page 177, line 26.] [§§ 2866-2912.] 

§ 3089.--Path to wisdom, if it is to be made sure and not to be 
impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably pass 
through science, [page 178, line 24.] 

Article VIII. — Of belief from a requirement of pure reason. (§§ 
3090-3100 inclusive.) 

§ 3090. — Want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative 
use, leads only to a hypothesis ; that of pure practical reason leads 
to a postulate [§ 3067]. [page 179, line 7.] § 3049. 

§ 3091. — Requirement of pure practical reason is based on a 
duty, that of making something (the summum bonum) the object 
of my will so as to promote it with all my powers ; in which case 
I must suppose its possibility, and consequently also the conditions 
necessary thereto, namely, G-od, freedom, and immortality, [page 
179, line 24.] § 3045. 

§ 3092. — Subjective effect of the Law presupposes that the sum- 
mum bonum is possible, for it would be practically impossible to 
strive after the object of a conception which at bottom was empty 
and had no object, [page 180, line 16.] 

§ 3093. — Postulates concern only the physical or metaphysical 
conditions of the possibility of the summum bonum. [p. 181, 1. 1.] 

§ 3094.- — -Admitting that the pure moral law inexorably binds 
every man as a command (not as a rule of prudence), the right- 
eous man may say : I* will that there be a God, that my existence 
in this world bo also an existence outside the chain of physical 
causes, and in a pure world of the understanding, and lastly that 
my duration be endless ; I firmly abide by this, and will not let 
this faith be taken from me. [page 181, line 18.] [*§3063.f] 

§ 3095. — Duty to realize the summum bonum to the utmost of 
our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is un- 
avoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is 
necessary for its objective possibility, [p. 182, 1. 14 (the note).] 

§ 3096. — No one can affirm that it is impossible in itself that 
rational beings in the world should be worthy of happiness in con- 
formity with the moral law, and also at the same time possess this 
happiness proportionately, [page 182, line 4.] 

§ 3097. — Moral interest which turns the scale, [page 183, line 
9.] [See § 2595 : " But in these questions no man is free from all 
interest. For though the want of good sentiments may j)lace him 
beyond the influence of moral interests, still even in this case 
enough may be left to make him fear the existence of G-od and a 
future life."] 



The Clavis to an Index. 845 

§ 3098. — Eeason finds it (subjectively) impossible to render 
conceivable in a mere course of nature in tbe world an accurate 
correspondence between happiness and moral worth, [p. 183, 1. 25.] 

§ 3099. — Eeason can not decide* objectively in what way we 
are to conceive this possibility ; whether by universal laws of 
nature without a wise Author presiding over nature, or only on 
supposition of such an Author, [page 184, line 16.] [* i. e. Pure 
reason can not attain certain knowledge of this way. See §§2371, 
2583, 2593, 2366, 2832.] 

§ 3100. — Faith of pure practical reason. A free interest of 
pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a wise Author 
of the world. [REFLECT.] [p. 185, 1. 5.] Cf. § 3049. See § 3045. 

Article IX. — Of the wise adaptation of man's cognitive faculties to 
his practical destination. (§§ 3101-3103 inclusive.) 

^ 3101. — Critique of Pure speculative Eeason proves that this is 
incapable of solving satisfactorily the most weighty problems, 
[page 186, line 4.] § 3099. 

§ 3102. — Instead of the conflict that the moral disposition has 
now to carry on with the inclinations, in which, though after some 
defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually acquired, GOD 
and eternity with their awful majesty would stand unceasingly 
before our eyes. Most of the actions that conformed to the Law 
would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all 
from duty ; and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the 
eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that 
of the world depends, would cease to exist, [page 186, line 19.] Cf. 
Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. viii., page 342. 

§ 3103. — Eoom for true moral disposition, immediately devoted 
to the law. The unsearchable 'wisdom by which we exist is not 
less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it 
has granted, [page 187, line 28] 

Appendix V. — Methodology of Pore Practical Reason, (fy 
3104-8128 inclusive.) [See page 830 above.] 

§ 3104. — Methodology of pure practical reason — the mode in 
which we can give the laws of pure practical reason access to the 
human mind, and influence on its maxims; that is, by which we can 
make the objectively practical reason subjectively practical also, 
[page 189, line 5.] 

§ 3105. — Subjectively that exhibition of pure virtue can have 
more power over the human mind, and supply a far stronger spring 
even for effecting that legality of actions, and can produce more 
powerful resolutions to prefer the Law, from pure reverence for 
it, to every other consideration, than all the deceptive allurements 



846 Kan? 8 JSthicsi 

of pleasure, than all threatenings of pain and misfortune, [page 
190, line 1.] [See pages 555, 567, 568 above.] 

§ 3106. — Must bring before the mind the pure moral motive, 
which, not only because it is the only one that can be the founda- 
tion of a character (a practically consistent habit of mind with 
unchangeable maxims) [see § 714], but also because it teaches a 
man to feel his own dignity, gives power fy to tear himself from all 
sensible attachments, and to find a rich compensation for the sac- 
rifice in the independence of his rational nature, [p. 191, 1. 8.] 

§ 3107. — Proofs of the receptivity for such springs. The only 
method that exists of making the objectively practical laws of 
pure reason subjectively practical, through the mere force of the 
conception of duty, [page 191, line 25.] [ff§740.~; 

§ 3108. — Exercise the critical judgment of their scholars by 
comparison of similar actions under different circumstances. By 
the mere habit of looking on such actions as deserving approval or 
blame, a good foundation would be laid for uprightness in the 
future course of life, [page 194, line 10.] 

§ 3109. — Refer all to duty merely, and to the worth that a man 
can and must give himself in his own eyes by the consciousness 
of not having transgressed it. [page 195, line 8.] Cf. § 715. 

§ 3110. — None but philosophers can make the decision of this 
question doubtful, [page 196, line 1.] 

§ 3111. — Point out the criterion of pure virtue in an example 
first, [page 196, line 8.] 

§ 3112. — Virtue is here worth so much only because it costs so 
much, not because it brings any profit, [page 197, line 12.] 

§ 3113. — Every admixture of motives taken from our own hap- 
piness is a hindrance to the influence of the moral law on the heart. 
[page 197, line 27.] Cf. §§ 242, 221. 

§ 3114. — More necessary than ever to direct attention to this 
method in our times, when men hope to produce more effect on 
the mind with soft, tender feelings, or high-flown, puffing-up pre- 
tensions, which rather wither the heart than strengthen it, than 
by a plain and earnest representation of duty. [p. 198, 1. 13.] 

§ 3115. — Principles must be built on conceptions : on any other 
basis there can only be paroxysms, [page 199, line 3.] Cf. §§461, 
466, 1939, 147. 

§3116. — Moral law demands obedience, from duty (not from 
predilection, which can not and ought not to be presupposed at 
all), [page 199, line 15.] 

§ 3117. — Juvenal describes such an example in a climax, which 
makes the reader feel vividly the force of the spring that is con- 



The Clavis to an Index. 847 

tained in the pure law of duty, as duty, [page 200, line 3.] Cf. § 
717. 

§ 3118. — Consciousness of the Law, as a spring of a faculty that 
-controls the sensibility, [page 201, line 13.] Cf. § 221. 

§ 3119. — Make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural 
employment accompanying all our own free actions, as well as the 
observation of those of others, asking first whether the action con- 
forms objectively to the moral law. [page 201, line 29.] 

§ 3120. — Question whether the action was also (subjectively) done 
for the sake of the moral law, so that it not only is correct 
as a deed, but also (by the maxim from which it is done) has 
moral worth as a disposition? [p. 202, 1. 15] Cf. §§ 680, 711, 206. 

§ 3121. — Judging merely of the practical must gradually pro- 
duce a certain interest in the law of reason, and consequently in 
morally good actions, [page 202, line 21.] 

§ 3122. — Employment of the faculty of judgment, which makes 
us feel our own cognitive powers, is not yet the interest in actions 
and in their morality itself, [page 203, line 13.] 

§ 3123. — Exhibition of morality of character by examples, in 
which attention is directed to purity [§ 677] of will, first only as 
a negative perfection, insofar- as in an action clone from duty no 
motives of inclination [§ 227] have any influence in determining 
it. By this the pupil's attention is fixed upon the consciousness 
of his freedom, [page 203, line 29.] 

§ 3124. — Law of duty, in consequence of the positive worth 
which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier access through 
the reverence [§ 225] for ourselves in the consciousness of 
our freedom. When this is well established, when a man dreads 
nothing more than to find himself (on self-examination) worthless 
and contemptible in his own eyes [§ 211], then every good moral 
disposition can be grafted on it, because this is the best, nay the 
only, guard that can keep off from the mind the pressure of ignoble 
and corrupting motives, [page 204, line 23.] 

§ 3125. — Intention of these outlines is only to point out the 
most general maxims of the methodology of moral cultivation and 
exercise, [page 205, line 16.] 

CONCLUSION. (?§ 3126-3128 inclusive ) 

§ 3126. — Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing 
admiration and aw T e, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect 
on them : the starry heavens above and the moral law within. 
[page 206, line 2.] 

§ 3127. — Though admiration and reverence may excite to inquiry, 
they can not supply the want of it. The contemplation of the 



848 Kant's Ethics. 

world began from the noblest spectacle that the human senses pre- 
sent to us, and that our understanding can bear to follow in their 
vast reach ; and it ended — in astrology. Morality began with the 
noblest attribute of human nature, the development and cultiva- 
tion of which give a promise of infinite utility ; and ended — in 
fanaticism or superstition, [page 207, line 11,] 

§ 3128. — Science (critically undertaken and methodically direct- 
ed) is the narrow gate that leads to the true doctrine of practical 
wisdom \_Weisheitslehre, Abbott notes, and refers to § 3004], if we 
understand by this not merely what one ought to do, but what 
ought to serve teachers as a guide to constimct well and clearly the 
road to wisdom which every one should travel, and to secure others 
from going astray, [page 208, line 14.] 

AppendiT^ VI.— Preface to the Groundwork.* (?? 3129-3145.) 

§ 3129. — Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three 
sciences": physics, ethics, and logic. This division is perfectly 
suitable, [page 1, line 4.] 

§ 3130. — All rational knowledge is either material or formal. 
Formal philosophy is called logic! [p. 1, 1. 11.] Cf.'§§ 1529, 989. 

§ 3131. — Material philosophy, which has to do with determinate 
objects and the laws to which they are subject, is again two-fold; 
for these laws are either laws of nature or of freedom. The 
science of the former is physics ; that of the latter, ethics : they 
are also called natural philosophy and moral philosophy re- 
spectively, [page 1, line 16.] Cf. § 2608. 

§ 3132. — Logic can not have any empirical part; otherwise it 
would not be logic, i. e. a canon for the understanding or the rea- 

* "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals," Professor Abbott 
translates ; but because I have (page 11 above) Mr. Semple's rendering 
(" Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics ") of the title " Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten " (see Ueberweg's Hist. Phi!., ed. Morris, vol. ii., page 152), 
Avhich I moreover prefer (see the note * to \ 470. page 38 above), although I am 
ignorant of German, and consequently not entitled to an opinion respecting the 
relative merits of the translations, I have retained at the head of this appendix 
the designation " Groundwork." I find it necessary to say here, in so much as 
the reader will probably infer that I have deliberately preferred also Mr. Sem- 
ple's version of the whole matter of the Groundwork (gg 1—146 above), that I 
have examined but few paragraphs of Professor Abbott's translation, which I 
did not see till after that portion of the clavis had been printed. I am well 
satisfied with Mr. Semple, whose occasional inelegancies are abundantly com- 
pensated by vigorous intensity of expression at important points, and I do not 
desire to substitute for his translation any other ; but if GOD permits me to 
live to revise the first part of the clavis (a permission for which increasing in- 
firmities do not allow me to hope), I desire, to supplement Mr. Semple's trans- 
lation by subjoining to the section heads of the Groundwork some valuable 



The Clavis to an Index. 849 

son, valid for all thought, and capable of demonstration, [page 2, 
line 4.] Cf. §§ 1009, 993, 1533. 

§ 3133.— Natural and moral philosophy can each have an em- 
pirical part, [page 2, line 9.] Cf. §§ 2618, 297. 

§ 3134. — Pure philosophy deduces its doctrines from apriori 
principles alone. When it is merely formal, it is logic : if it is 
restricted to definite objects of the understanding, it is meta- 
physic. [page 2, line 19.] Cf §§ 1000, 1538. 

§ 3135. — Metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals. 
Physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part [cf. § 
2615]. It is the same with ethics ; but here the empirical part 
might have the special name of practical anthropology [§§ 3133, 
2618, 296], the name morality being appropriated to the rational 
part, [page 2, line 25] Cf. § 2611. 

§ 3136. — Whether pure philosophy in all its parts does not re- 
quire a man specially devoted to it [a separate chair in each uni- 
versity], [page 3, line 5.] 

§ 3137. — Always carefully separate the empirical from the ra- 
tional part, and prefix to physics proper (or empirical physics) a 
metaphysic of nature [§§1409, 2611, 2702, 2614], and to practical 
anthropology a metaphysic of morals [§§ 34, 296], which must be 
carefully cleared of everything empirical, so that we may know 
how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both cases. 
[page 3, line 28.] 

§ 3138. — Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct 
a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is 
only empirical, and which belongs to anthropology ? [page 4, line 
11.] Cf. § 33. 

variations which I may obtain from Professor Abbott's translation, in the sa ; ; e 
way in which I have supplemented John Richardson's translation of the Prole- 
gomena by selections from Professor Mahaflf'y. Because I have no desire to re- 
vise more than about 300 pages of the clavis, except it be for two reasons (one 
of which is concerned with the reconsideration upon practical ground of the 
scope of the extracts from the Memorabilia, in order to determine whether there 
ought not to be a reduction of that scope; and the other is my dissatisfaction 
with my general system of giving only a single general credit to each of the 
authors or translators to whom I am indebted for all the excellencies of my 
work, although I alone am responsible for all its defects), and because any person 
who chooses to reprint the clavis may do so without consulting me and without 
charge from me (the copyright has not been secured by me for any pecuniary 
purpose, but solely to prevent it from being secured by any other person), I 
find it convenient to say here that it is my wish that any person who desires to 
reprint the clavis, or any portion. thereof, shall first compare it with the desig- 
nated sources from which I have taken it, and append to ever} 7 foot note a 
specific credit to its proper author, editor or translator. 



850 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 3139. — All moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part. 
When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the 
knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws apriori 
to him as a rational being, [page 5, line 5.] Cf. § 27. 

§ 3140. — Metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably neces- 
sary, not merely for speculative reasons, in order to investigate 
the sources of the practical principles which are to be found apriori 
in our reason, but also because morals themselves are liable to all 
sorts of corruption as long as we are without that clue and supreme 
canon, [page 5, line 21.] 

§ 3141. — Wolfs general practical philosophy distinguished from 
a metaphysic of morals, just as general logic (which treats of the 
acts and canons of thought in general) is distinguished from tran- 
scendental philosophy (which treats of the particular acts and 
canons of pure thought, i. e. that whose cognitions are altogether 
apriori). [page 6, line 20.] Cf. § 1536. 

§ 3142. — Metaphysic of morals has properly no other foundation 
than the critique of pure practical reason; just as that of 
metaphysics is the critique of pure speculative reason, [p. 8, 1. 1.] 

§ 3143. — Metaphysic of morals, in spite of the discouraging title, 
is yet capable of being presented in a popular form, and one 
adapted to the common understanding, [page 8, line 25.] § 1074. 

§ 3144. — Present treatise is nothing more than the investigation 
and establishment of the supreme principle of morality; and 
this alone constitutes a study complete in itself, which moreover 
ought to be kept apart from every other moral investigation, 
[page 9, line 5.] 

§ 3145. — Method of this work : proceeding analytically from 
common knowledge to the determination of its ultimate principle, 
and again descending synthetically from the examination of this 
principle and its sources to the common knowledge in which we 
find it employed, [page 9, line 22.] 

APPENDIX FROM JOHN RICHARDSON. 

Appendix VII.— Two Extracts from John Richardson's Life 

of Kant.* 

While Kant stood upon the verge of this world, Death, that 
king of terrors to the guilty, was not armed with anything terrific, 

*"A sketch of the Author's Life and Writings, by the Translator," appended 
to John Richardson's translation of Dr. Kant's Logic (see page 820 above). 
In one of the notes to the appendix (pag'e 232, ed. 1819), Mr. Richardson says: 
" It were well worth a British philosopher's while to learn German for the sole 
purpose of studying the critical philosophy ; for that language, as it is a key to 
more science than either Greek or Latin, would certainly repay him iully for 
his time and labor. Meanwhile, if I am fortunate enough to be instrumental 



The Clavis to an Index. 851 

but the prince of peace, to him. He made the awful transition 
from time to eternity, from this corporeal earthly scene to the in- 
telligiblef world, with philosophical serenity or composure of mind, 
with the dignity peculiar to a wise man, with the calmness, forti- 
tude, and resignation of a virtuous mind deeply penetrated with a 
firm belief of reason in the Supreme Intelligence, and in a future 
state, the life spiritual, or the prolongation of our moral existence 
to infinite. " Virtue alone has majesty in death." [page 239.] 

;■< ^< $z ^fi ;J< ^ 

The true criticism on his moral character, as well as the most 
sublime panegyric that can be made on him, is, That he earnestly 
and steadfastly endeavored to practise what he professed, to make 
the moral law, the great comprehensive rule of duty, the spring 
of his actions. For, his life was, so to say, a comment or illustra- 
tion to his pure doctrine, and almost exemplified it, or was led as 
nearly up to it; consequently he, by precept and by example, came 
as near the idea of a sage, or of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, 
as perhaps the frailty inherent in the human nature allows. So 
that he gives us a conspicuous proof of the feasibility of acting, (as 
far perhaps as a mortal is capable of acting) on pure moral prin- 
ciple ; by his active, useful, and immaculate life he teaches us how 
to live, by his invaluable instruction and moral lessons how to grow 
wiser and better, and by his memorable death how to die. Quid 
virtus et quid sapientia possit, utile proposuit nobis exemplar Kanten. 

The way to excel unquestionably is, optima quaeque exempla et 
imitandum proponere; yet it, in strict propriety, is not the conduct 
of any man, how good soever it may be, but the moral law itself 
by which we should strive to direct our actions or to regulate our 
lives. Not the conduct of man as it is, therefore, but the idea of 
what it ought to be, can be a pattern for imitation, or set up as 
the standard of moral judgment or comparison. 

But, as we in general are neither so good nor so bad as our 
friends or our enemies usually represent us, as the virtue or moral 
goodness of the best of us is but relative, for absolute perfection 
does not fall to the lot of man in this transitory life, as no human 
portrait can be painted without some shade, we have made every 
possible inquiry among those envious of Kant's well-earned fame 

toward transplanting the genuine seeds of that philosophy to this country, I 
shall enjoy the consciousness of contributing essentially to the dissemination of 
real science, and therefore of not having traveled in vain or of not being alto- 
gether a passive or useless member of society.'' 

[t The word intelligible (which ought not to have been used here at all) must 
here be taken tropically: locupletatio animarum, non mundus intelligibilis 
philosophise. Yid. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 108 ad §26, and p. 112 ad §38.] 



852 Kant's Ethics. 

and " hating that excellence they can not reach" (for he had no ' 
other enemies, hut was esteemed and beloved by everybody who 
was acquainted with him), to find out a spot in his reputation, or 
character in the opinion of the world ; and all that they can lay 
to his charge is, that his economy bordered on avarice, or sordid 
parsimony- But even this imputation his friends deny, say it is 
an aspersion, and maintain, that his rigid frugality or strict econ- 
omy in early life was the effect of urgent necessity, but that, at a 
later period, he, when possessed of the means, did not suffer his 
increase of fortune to contract or to harden his heart (for an ample 
fortune is sometimes apt to contract and to harden the heart), but, 
so far from wanting brotherly love, was generous on proper occa- 
sions, beneficent to the honest industrious poor, not however "before 
men, to be seen," out of vanity or ostentation, but from a sense or 
motive of duty, bestowed his charity in private, "denied them noth- 
ing but his name," and that his principles were not only laid down 
in his head, but written and settled in his heart. For, as he was a 
man of a good heart, his benevolence was active, and his sympathy 
or fellow-feeling warm, but always regulated or governed by his 
understanding, always ruled by his reason, which superior faculty 
it was the study of his whole life to cultivate, and to exercise freely 
on all subjects and on all occasions, to the utmost of his power. 
virum sapientia sua simplicem, et simplicitate sua sapientem ! 
virum utilem sibi, suis, reipublicae, et humano generi! [pages 240-242.] 

APPENDICES FROM DR. WILLICH. 

"Elements of the Critical Philosophy: containing a conci-e ^account of its 
origin and tendencies; a view Of all the works published by its founder, Pro- 
fessor Immantjel Kant ; and a glossary for the explanation of terms and 
phrases. To which are added Three Philological Essays, chiefly translated 
from the German of John" Christopher Adelung, Aulic Counsellor and 
First Librarian to the Elector of Saxony. By A. F. M. Willich, M. D. 
London: printed for T. N\ Longman, No. 89 Paternoster-Row. 1798." To 
the paging of this work are references [in brackets] below in Appendices 
VIII.-XIV., which appendices are (except whatever in them is inclosed 
[thus], in brackets) literallj- transcribed out of Dr. Willich's Elements.* 

Appendix VIII.— The Critique of Practical Reason. 
[It will be seen by reference to §§ 210, 244, that Kant refers to 

a chapter which Semple (see his notes) has not translated. In the 

table of contents of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in Dr. 

"Willich's Elements [pages 100-103], I find the following, which I 

suppose refers to the chapter in question :] 

* Dr. Willich says in his preface [page iii ] : "Although I had the good for- 
tune to attend Prof. Kant's lectures between the years 1778 and 1781, during 
my residence at the University of Kcenigsberg, and again heard several of his 



The Clavis to an Index. 853 

Section II [of the Analytic]. — Of the idea concerning the object 
of pure practical Reason. 

Table of the Categories of Liberty relative to the cognitions 
we possess of the Good and Bad. 

I. — Of Quantity : [1] Subjective, in consequence of maxims : 
(opinions depending upon the will of the individual); [2] Objective, 
in consequence of principles : (precepts)] [3] Apriori objective as 
well as subjective principles of liberty : (laws). 

II. — Of Quality: [1] practical rules of appetition, (prceceptivce), 
[2] practical rules of omission, (prohibitive), [3] practical rules of 
exceptions (exceptivce). 

III. — Of Eelation : [1] To personality, [2] To the condition of 
the person, [3] Reciprocally of one person to the condition of 
another. 

IV. — Of Modality: [1] Permitted and non-permitted actions, [2] 
Duty and contrary to duty, [3] perfect and imperfect duty. [I have 
contracted the space of the above table, using figures inclosed in 
[brackets] to distinguish the heads.] 

Appendix IX.— Metaphysical Elements of Jurisprudence. 

[It will be seen by reference to § 378, that Semple has omitted 
what he calls " a course of theoretic law." The Metaphysische 
Anfangsgruende der Rechtslehre is number xxix. in Dr. Willich's 
analysis, [pages 127-134] ; and he concludes with the following :] 

FURTHER CONTENTS OP THE "WORK. 
PART I.— OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN GENERAL. 

[§§1-42.] 
Chapter I.— Of the Mode of Possessing Something External as Property. 

m i-9.] 

§ 1. — My property is that, with which I am so connected that 
the use, which another might make of it against my will, would 
injure me. The subjective condition of the possibility of use, in 
general, is possession. 

§§ 2, 3. — Juridical postulate of practical reason. It is possible 
to have every external object of my will as my property ; i. e. the 
maxim is contrary to justice, according to which, if it were a law, 
an external object of the will behooved to be in itself without an 
owner (res nullius). 

§ 4. — Exposition of the idea of external property. Of the ex- 
ternal objects of my will, there can be only three : (1) a corporeal 
thing without me ; (2) the will of another to a determined act 

lectures in summer 1792, when I revisited my native country; yet I must con- 
fess, that my other professional lahors have not permitted me to devote, to the 
study of the Critical System of Philosophy, that portion of time and close ap- 



854 Kant's Ethics, 

(praestatio); (3) the situation of another in relation to me, accord- 
ing to the Categories of Substance, Causality, and Community be- 
tween me and external objects, agreeable to the laws of freedom. 

§ 5. — Definition of the idea of external property. External 
property is that without me, to hinder me from using which, as 1 
choose, would be uujust, or an injury. 

§ 6. — Deduction of the idea of the mere legal or civil possession 
of an external object. 

§ 7. — Application of the principle of the possibility of external 
property to the objects of experience. 

§ 8 — To have something external as property, is only possible 
in a juridical state, under a public legislative power, i. e. in civil 
society. 

§ 9. — In the state of nature, nothing but a merely provisional, 
though real external, property can take place. 

plication, which, in more favorable circumstances, I should have been happy to 
bestow upon this important branch of human knowledge-" And he says [page 
vi.] : "Whatever the execution may be, for the anxiety of my wishes I can con- 
fidently appeal to the testimony of those literary friends, who have occasionally 
lent me their aid in correcting the grammatical part of both the Elements and 
the Essays. They well know my eager and sincere desire of improvement in 
English composition; and if any material errors should occur in the course of 
such a diversity of subjects as the present, I beseech the judicious reader and the 
candid critic to consider, that I have ventured into a field of inquiry, of which 
but a small part has hitherto been explored.'' Dr. Willich quotes [pages iv., v.] 
the advice of Professor Will, of Altdorf, to his pupils ; the second paragraph 
is as follows : " Not to complain of the want of that plainness which is neces- 
sar}' to render a book palatable to popular readers; since difficulty of appre- 
hension appears to be peculiar to the inquiries that form the object of the 
Critique." In addition to the compact exhibition of a table of contents of 
the Critique of pure Reason, [pages 64-67], and an exposition of that work 
[pages 67-80], Dr. Willich presents [pages 38-53] a Synopsis, " giving Kant's 
peculiar definition and division of Philosophy, accompanied with five connected 
problems," " originally digested," he says in a note, •' by Mr. John Schulze, 
an eminent Divine and Court Chaplain at Kcenigsberg; a particular friend of 
Kant's, who, on that occasion, congratulated him upon having fully entered 
into the spirit of the Critique, and bestowed upon him every mark of approba- 
tion." (Cf. pages 6, 7, of the following work, though I do not know whether it 
be by the same author; Ifind it among French translations of Kant's works by 
Tissot and Barni, which were procured from Paris and given to me by 
William H. Chilton, commercial editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal : 
" Eclairissements sur la Critique de la Eaison pure de M. le professeur Kant, 
par J. Schultze, predicateur aulique du roi du Prusse (Kcenigsberg, 1791); tra- 
duit de l'Allemand par J. Tissot, doyen de la Eaculte des Lettres de Dijon. 
Paris: Libraire Philosophique de Ladrange." 1865. Cf. also pages 189-238 of 
Tissot's Schultze with pages 43-53 of Dr. Willich's Elementary View.) In 
another note, Dr. Willich, relying " upon the information or that learned and 



The Clavis to an Index. 855 

Chapter II.— Of the Mode of Acquiring External Property. [§§10-36.1 
§ 10. — General principles of external acquisition. I acquire 
something originally, when I cause that to become mine, which 
formerly was the property of no other person. Division of the 
acquisition of external property: (1) according to the matter (the 
object) I acquire either a corporeal thing (substance), or the per- 
formance of another person (causality), or this other person, i. e. 
his or her state, so far as I obtain a right to rule over that person; 
(2) according to the form or mode of acquisition, I have either a 
real right, or a personal right, or both real and personal right to 
the possession, not the use, of another person or thing. 

Section I. — Of real rights. [§§ 11-17.] 

§ 11. — A real right is the right to the private use of a thing, in 
the common possession of which (whether original or acquired) I 
am with all others. 

sagacious pupil who condescended to translate the synoptical problems here 
stated, with their solutions, as a specimen of his progress in the German," compli- 
ments Dr. Ekid, of Glasgow, as ' : the first am<4ng the British philosophers, who 
distinguished clearly between the objective and subjective use of the words, which 
are employed to express the immediate objects .of sensation and -perception" 
[page 38.] Tennemann (Hist. Phil., 2d ed. Morell, page 476) mentions "Johann 
Schulze " as one of the editors of the works of Hegel, and (page 411) notes 
the titles of two works by " Job. Schulz " in reference to the Critique. Dr. 
Ueberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., page 196) says that ". Johannes 
Schultz, Court Preacher and Professor of Mathematics at Kcenigsberg, pub- 
lished an Exposition of Kant's .Critique (Erlaeuterungen ueber des Herrn Prof. 
Kant Kritik der reinen Vemunft, Kcenigsberg, 1784) which had Kant's full ap- 
proval." etc. The Chronological Analysis [pages 53-138] (from which I ex- 
tract the matter of the following appendices) and the Glossary [pages 139-183] 
are worthy monuments of the patient industry and zeal with which Dr. Willich 
endeavored to set before the British people the principles of the Kantic philos- 
ophj\ The reader will find a notice of the medical works of Dr. Willich in 
Allibone's Dictionary of Authors (Lippincott, 1872, vol. iii ., page 2755, where 
injustice is done to Dr. Willich so far as it seems to appear that the Elements- 
of the Critical Philosophy are translated from the German of J. C. Adelung, 
a remark which ought to have been restricted to the philological appendices). 
One of Dr. Willich's works (Domestic Encyclopaedia, 4 vols., 8vo., 1802) at- 
tained considerable reputation, I judge from the fact that it was reprinted twice 
in America (5 vols., 8vo., 1803-4, and 3 vols. 8vo., 1821, Allibone says). Dr. 
Willich's Glossary is arranged alphabetically, beginning with Aesthetic and 
ending with Wisdom. The concluding article is as follows, except that I have 
slightly changed the punctuation: "Wisdom [Weishelt) is the idea of the 
necessary unity of all possible purposes. It is therefore (1) theoretically con- 
sidered, the cognition of the highest good ; (2) practioally, an attribute of that 
will which realizes the highest good, or at least exerts itself for that purpose." 
Painstaking and conscientious, Dr. Willich knew Kant. 



856 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 12. — The first acquisition of a thing can be no other than that 
of the soil. 

§ 13. — Every part of the soil may be originally acquired, and 
the ground of the possibility of this acquisition is, that the soil in 
general was originally common. 

45 14. — The legal act of this acquisition is occupancy. 

§ 15. — It is in civil society alone that any peremptory acquisition 
can be made: in a state of nature, it can only he-provisional. 

§ 16.— Explanation of the idea of an original acquisition of the soil. 

§ 17. — Deduction of this idea. 

Section II. — Of personal rights. [§§18-21.] 

§ 18. — A personal right is the possession of the will of another, 
as the power of determining that will through mine to a certain 
action, according to the laws of freedom. Of the transference of 
will by contract. 

§. 19. — Of the constituents of a contract. 

§ 20. — Of the causality of the will of another, which is acquired. 

§ 21. — In a contract, a thing is not acquired by the acceptance 
of the promise, but by the delivery of what has been promised. 

Section III— Of real personal right. [§§22-32.] 

§ 22. — This right is that of the possession of an external object 
as a thing, and of the use of it as a person. 

§ 23. — Of the right of the Family-Society. 

§§ 24-27. — Title first : of the right of marriage. 

§§ 28, 29.— Title second: of the rights of parentage. 

§ 30. — Title third: of the rights of a Master of a Family. 

§§ 31, 32. — Dogmatical division of all the rights acquirable by 
contracts. I. Of Money. II. Of literary property. 

Section IV. — Of the ideal acquisition of an external object of the 
will. [§§33-36.] 

I. — § 33. — Of prescription, or the mode of acquiring property 
by length of possession. 

II. — § 34. — Of acquisition by Inheritance. 

III. — §§ 35, 36. — Of posthumous reputation. 

Chapter III.— Of the Subjectively Conditioned Acquisition, by the Sentence 
of a Public Court of Justice. Vil 37-42.] 

A. — § 37. — Of the contract of Donation. 

B. — § 38. — Of the contract of Loan (commodatum). 

C. — § 39. — Of the re-acquisition or reclaiming of property lost 
(vindicatio). 

D. — § 40. — Of the acquisition of security by oath (cautio jura- 
tor ia). 

§§ 41, 42. — Transition from property in a state of nature, to that 
in a juridical state, or civil society in general. 



The Clavis to an Index. 857 

PAET II.— OF PUBLIC LAW. [» 43-62.] 
Section I — §§ 43, 44. — Of the constitutional law of a state. 
§§ 45-47. — Of a State as a collection of men. — Of the powers in 
a state, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. " The only rational 
plan of government is that, in which the combined will of the 
people determines the law." 

§§ 48, 49. — Of co-ordinate and subordinate powers. 

GENERAL REMARKS. 

A. — Of the supreme power ; of the social compact, and the duty 
of obedience. Of redress of grievances. Of sedition and rebel- 
lion. — According to the principles established by Kant, "A change 
in the Constitution of a State, which its faults may sometimes 
render necessary, can only in justice be accomplished by the sov- 
ereign, by means of reform ; not by the people, by means of a revo- 
lution; and if it take place, it cau only affect the executive, not 
the legislative power. At the same time, if a revolution has once 
been brought about, and a new constitution established, the in- 
justice of this revolution in its beginning and accomplishment, 
does not free the subjects from the obligation to accomodate them- 
selves, as good citizens, to the new order of things." 

B. — Of the rights of the sovereign power to the territory of the 
state. Of the rights of taxation. Of finance and police. 

C. — Of the maintenance of the poor; of foundling hospitals; of 
a religious establishment. 

D. — Of the distribution of offices ; of rank in the state ; of 
nobility. 

E — Of criminal law, and a penal code ; of the right of punish- 
ing and pardoning. 

§ 50. — Of the relation of a citizen to his native and other coun- 
tries, in point of right and obligation. 

§ 51. — Of the different forms of government. 

§ 52. — Of the attainment of that rational form, which the spirit 
of an original compact requires, which makes freedom alone the 
principle, i. e., the basis, and condition of all force. Of the rep- 
resentative system. 

Section II — Of the law of nations, or international law. [§§ 53-61.] 

§§ 53, 54. — Nations, in their external relation to each other, are 
in a state of nature, not unlike lawless savages, among whom the 
right of the strongest is established [cf. § 686.] ; consequently, a 
confederacy of states becomes necessary, in order to protect one 
another against external attacks, conformably to the idea of an 
original social compact. 

55 



858 Kant's Ethics. 

§§ 55-58. — Of the right of making war, both with regard to the 
subjects of a state, and foreign nations. 

§'§ 59, 60.— Of the right of peace. 

§ 61. — Of the injustice of a state of warfare. " There shall be no 
war, is the irresistible veto of mora] ly -practical Reason." — Of the 
mode of bringing nations, like individuals, from a state of nature 
to a juridical state. Of the establishment and maintenance of a 
perpetual peace, by means of a permanent congress of states. 

Section III. — Of cosmopolitical law, or the rights of the citizen of 
the world. [§ 62.] 

§ 62. — Of the right of mutual intercourse and commerce, as be- 
longing to all mankind. 

CONCLUSION. 

This union of the whole human race, under certain universal 
laws, it may be said, is not the partial, but the total and complete 
attainment of the grand aim, the final purpose of Jurisprudence 
within the boundaries of mere Reason, For, that the prototype 
of a juridical federation of men, according to public laws in gen- 
eral, must be derived from Reason apriori, is now obvious ; since 
all the examples, taken from experience, can indeed serve the pur- 
pose of illustrating, but not of establishing, the necessity of a 
metaphysical decision of this important question. Those very 
men, who smile at the novelty of this inquiry, incautiously betray 
themselves, when they admit, and even make use of the common- 
place assertion, "that that is the best constitution, in which the 
laws govern, not men." And what, says the author, can be more 
sublime than this idea, which is evidently applicable to practice,. 
and capable of being realized in experience, and which alone — 
provided it is not attempted to be brought about by means of rev- 
olutions, or the forcible overthrow of all erroneous establishments 
(for that would be the annihilation of all law and justice), but by 
gradual reform, according to fixed principles — leads by continual 
approximation to the supreme political good, a perpetual peace. 

Appendix X. — Everlasting- Peace. 

[" Ever} T thing tends at last to the practical," says Dr Kant in § 
1168; and again, in § 3036, " all interest is ultimately practical." 
We have just seen (appendix ix.) that " the final purpose of 
Jurisprudence within the boundaries of mere reason," is precisely 
that " perpetual peace " which is to be given to the world under 
the " victorious sway " of morality, when " the opposing evil " 
has been subdued (page 206, verse 27 above) by the establishment 
of the dominion of the Good Principle " according to moral laws" 



The Clavis to an Index. 859 

(see §855). But the two ideas, "like all other representations 
of the absolute and unconditioned" notwithstanding their objective 
reality as practically obligatory regulative principles, are not in 
real fact adequately exemplified by anything phenomenal (see § 
854); and consequently "the philosophical millennium, which ex- 
pects a period of perpetual peace, grounded on a universal league 
of nations, constituting themselves into a grand cosmical republic, 
is — -just like the theological, which tarries for the complete moral 
amendment of the whole human race — universally derided as a 
fanatical delusion " (§ 686). Dr. Kant's " Project for a Perpetual 
Peace" (Zum ewigen Frieden, ein philosophiscJier Mitwurf, Kc&nigs- 
berg, 1795; see Ueberweg's Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. if, page 
153) is number xxviii. in the analysis of Dr. Willich, who speaks 
of it [pages 121-127] as follows :] 

Of this original work, which is so much and justly admired on 
the continent, we already possess an English translation.* And 
if the appearance of this production in foreign versions could es- 
tablish any proof of its merits, I might acid that " Kant's Project 
for a 'Perpetual Peace " has been likewise translated into French, 
and indeed with the sanction of the author, who has furnished the 
French translator with a new supplement, which contains " a 
secret article far a perpetual peace." 

Many of our political readers must remember, that the idea of a 
perpetual peace has formerly employed the pen of the good Abbot 
de St. Pierre ; and that, at a still earlier period, the most patriotic 
king of whom France can boast, Henry IV. [A. D. 1553-1610; as 
to his " senate of the Christian commonwealth," see New Am. 
Cyclop., vol. ix., page 97, ed. 1860, article Henry IV.~\, was seriously 
engaged in modeling this beneficent plan, which he proposed to sub- 
mit to the consideration of his cotemporary potentates, if an untimely 
death had not frustrated that philanthropic design. Though our sage 
politicians have always considered plans of this kind as the fanci- 
ful productions of good-natured fanatics, it may on the other hand 
be observed, that by disputing on the possibility of a perpetual 
peace, the necessity of a perpetual warfare must be admitted as a 
maxim ; because, without being continually prepared for war, the 
different states of Europe could not long exist together. This 

-["Kant's Essays and Treatises," 2 vols., London, 1798 ; see the contents 
inserted by Professor Morris in the literature of Dr. Ueberweg's § 121, vol. ii., ' 
pages 138, 139, where the title of the sixth number of the first volume is "Eter- 
nal Peace." Semple (Ethics, page vii., of both editions of 1836 and 1869) says 
" the Essays are apparently rendered by a foreigner and printed abroad, al- 
though graced with a London title page."] 



850 Kant- 8 Ethics. 

maxim, however, is as abominable in theory, as it is practically 
destructive of every principle of morality. For, if all independent 
states adopt or continue to practice such a maxim, and if their 
views be constantly directed to the execution of it, their political 
existence itself must be extremely precarious. From this source, 
I am inclined to derive the frequent revolutions in the political 
world, the frequent returns from a state of intellectual and moral 
improvement to their former barbarism, and the perpetual animosi- 
ties (emphatically called, natural enmities) between man and man, 
which are so industriously transmitted from one generation to 
another ; especially in the frontier provinces of different nations. 
Man is a fighting animal ! is the general outcry of all those who 
are interested, whether directly or indirectly, in propagating this 
absurd and pernicious doctrine. Even admitting, that man is 
naturally prone to exercise his physical powers ; that he has this 
propensity in common with the lower animals ; that he occasion- 
ally manifests the desire of revenge and conquest, not unlike the 
rapacious tiger or the victorious lion ; and that he can not easily 
overcome these natural inclinations, as long as his inhuman feats 
are more admired and encouraged than the dignified, though less 
alluring, exertions of his intellect ;- — does it follow from these prim- 
itive dispositions of savage man, that perpetual warfare is a neces- 
sary evil in the present state of society ? I hope for the honor of 
humanity, that none but the callous financiers of deluded nations, 
or the avaricious contractors of armies and navies, with their num- 
erous train of connections, will be hardy enough to draw so false a 
conclusion. 

When we consider those, who direct the affairs of nations, in a 
moral as well as legislative capacity, it is rather surprising, that 
the important plan of a perpetual peace has never been duly 
weighed : while many subjects of less consequence, and compara- 
tively trifling matters,, daily occupy their attention. Nobody will 
deny, that the ideas of right and wrong, of just and unjust, are 
equally applicable to a plurality of states, as to different individ- 
uals of one or several countries. The only obstacle to the just ap- 
plication of these ideas must, therefore, lie in the diversity of 
opinions, arising among those corrupted servants of the state, to 
whom the management of external affairs is intrusted. Why, 
therefore, do the rulers of nations not agree upon a general feder- 
ation of states ? Why do they not, like every other reasonable 
being, submit to arbitration, by choosing the arbiters from the 
bosom of disinterested states ; in order to settle such differences 
as their own ministers can not determine? This would be the 



The Clavis to an Index. 861 

only rational and proper method ; a method which is daily prac- 
ticed in private life, by those very men, who seem to oppose its in- 
troduction in diplomatic transactions, Nay, if the arm of violence 
and rapacity were permitted to decide the quarrels of individuals, 
all civil institutions and social compacts would soon be dissolved. 
And does not the same reasoning apply to every government, 
whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic ? — have we not 
sufficient testimonies upon historical record, that dissolution and an- 
nihilation have hitherto been their ultimate fate ? 

Induced by such considerations, the venerable Kant, after hav- 
ing observed the political changes of Europe for upward of half a 
century, steps forward with a plan drawn up in a diplomatic form. 
His noble design of stopping the prodigal effusion of human blood, 
and his aim at convincing the governors of nations, that the prac- 
ticability of this plan merely depends upon the exertions of their 
•moral will, are equally conspicuous. The great modern improve- 
ments in Ethics throughout society, particularly in the higher 
ranks ; the view of the innumerable sufferings and exterminations 
accompanying the present state of warfare in Europe ; and finally 
the conviction, that his " Project " is truly practicable and morally 
unexceptionable ; these were sufficient motives to rouse the " hoary 
philosopher of the North," and to animate him with new vigor 
for this grand and benevolent attempt. 

The author exhibits the Preliminary and Definitive Articles for a 
perpetual peace, in two sections, which he accompanies with 
proper illustrations. The preliminary articles are as follows : 

1. — " No treaty of peace shall be considered as valid, that has 
been concluded with a secret reserve of matters for a future war. 

2. — "No independent state shall ever be permitted to be trans- 
ferred to the dominion of another state, whether by inheritance, 
exchange, purchase, or donation. 

3. — " Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be entirely 
discharged. 

4. — "No national or state debts shall be contracted, that relate 
to the external or foreign affairs of the state. 

5. — " No state shall, by force of arms, interfere with either the 
constitution or government of other states. 

6. — " No state, at war with another, shall make use of such hos- 
tilities, as must destroy their reciprocal confidence in a future 
peace; for instance, the employing of assassins, poisoners, the 
violation of cartels, the instigation of treasonable practices, re- 
bellion in the inimical state, etc." 

The conclusion of a definitive peace presupposes it as a postu- 



862 Kant's Ethics. 

late: "that all men. who are able to produce reciprocal effects 
upon each other, must necessarily be subject to some civil institu- 
tions." All civil institutions, however, as far as regards the per- 
sons submitting to them, may be reduced to three classes : 

(1) Those concerning the right of the citizen in the state; 

(2) Those relative to the right of nations ; and 

(3) Those ascertaining the rights of the citizen of the world 
(cosmopolite). 

Conformably to this introduction, the author proposes three 
Definitive Articles. 

I. — The civil constitution of every state ought to be republican. 

By a republican constitution is here understood such a one, as 
is founded upon the principles of liberty, dependence, and equality. 
By means of that liberty, acquired by the constitutional law, all 
the members of a state must be entitled to the privilege of obey- 
ing no other external or by-laws than those, to which they have 
given their consent. By virtue of their legal dependence, all mem- 
bers of a society are subject to only one common legislation. And 
by their legal equality, among men as citizens of the state, there 
must subsist such a relation, that none of them can lawfully oblige 
the other, without subjecting himself to the law, by which the 
other party may reciprocally compel him in a similar instance. 
This, therefore, is the only constitution, which forms the basis of 
every other in civil society ; and it is also the only one, that can 
lead to a perpetual peace. For, in a government where the con- 
sent of the citizens of the state is required for declaring war, they 
will be very cautious in giving their approbation to those horrid 
measures, in consequence of which they themselves must bear all 
the calamities of a bloody contest. 

In order to prevent any misconstruction of terms, Kant distin- 
guishes a republican from a democratic constitution, by discrimina- 
ting between the forms of government {imperii), and those of ad- 
ministration (regiminis); the former of which are determined by the 
distinction of persons, who hold the supreme power of the state, 
but the latter, by the mode of governing the people by a supreme 
head, whoever this may be. The forms of government, or those 
of the former kind, are autocracy or the power of the prince, aris- 
tocracy or the power of the nobles, and democracy or the power of 
the people : those of the latter kind, namely the forms of admin- 
istration, are republicanism and despotism. The former of these 
again consists, according to the essential characters above de- 
scribed, in the separation of the executive power from the legisla- 
tive; the latter, namely despotism, is the arbitrary execution of 



The Olavis to an Index. 863 

the laws, -which the sovereign himself has enacted ; so that his 
private will becomes the public law of the nation. Concerning 
democracy, theo, Kant affirms that it necessarily leads to despiotism; 
because it establishes a legislative and executive power by which 
all have a share in forming resolutions relative to one. and even 
against this one, who consequently would not agree with them, so 
that all are said to partake of the legislation, when in fact they do 
not so; which is in contradiction to the general will itself and to 
liberty. 

II — The rights of nations ought to be founded upon a federation 
of independent states. 

The author's ideas in this article are expressed with equal bold- 
ness, energy, and truth. The result of them is this : In the rela- 
tive condition of states to one another, there can be rationally no 
other method of extricating themselves from the lawless condition 
that engenders continual wars, than to imitate individual man in 
the resignation of his wild (unconstrained) liberty ; to accommo- 
date themselves to public compulsory laws ; and thus to form a 
state of nations, gradually increasing, and at length compre- 
hending all the nations of the earth. Since, however, according 
to their notions of the right of nations, they are averse to sub- 
mit like individuals to the laws of compulsion; and since they re- 
ject in hypothesi what is just in thesi ; let them at least adopt the 
negative substitute of a federation (congress) for the prevention of 
war, instead of the positive establishment of an universal repub- 
lic. Such a congress may at least save us from total ruin, by 
checking that hostile disposition of man which shuns the operation 
of the law ; it may gradually spread its beneficent influence to 
distant nations ; though it will nevertheless be in constant clanger 
of being interrupted, by the' capricious opposition of a lawless 
monarch. 

III. — The cosmopolitical right shall be limited to conditions of uni- 
versal hospitality. 

The cosmopolitical right is that of a stranger, by which he is 
intitled to a friendly reception at his arrival upon foreign ground. 
It is not strictly the right of hospitality, but that of visiting one 
another, which belongs to all men, in offering their company, by 
virtue of their common inhabitation of the surface of the earth 
[cf. the third subdivision of § 370. Both statements should be 
struck out, both cases being covered by the general principles of 
ethics and requiring no special statement]. The inhospitality of 
sea-coasts, for instance that of Barbary, and the inhospitable con- 
duct of cultivated and chiefly of commercial nations of our quarter 



864 Kant's Ethics. 

of the globe, who change their visits into conquests, is consequently 
against the law of nature. As, however, the means of communi- 
cation among the nations of the earth are so much improved, that 
the violation of a right on one spot of the globe is now felt in all 
countries ; it hence follows that the idea of a cosmopolitical law 
is not a whimsical or extravagant representation of a right, but a 
necessary supplement to a code, that remains to be written, and 
that relates to the rights of states and nations, as well as to the 
rights of man in general. Under this condition only, we may 
natter ourselves with the hopes of a continual, though gradual, 
approximation to a perpetual peace. 

In the further illustrations annexed to these articles, the author 
maintains that both morals and politics, so far from being in op- 
position to this plan, rather tend to confirm and to render it uni- 
versal; "for," says he, "the guarantee of this compact is the 
grand and ingenious artist, nature herself, who by her mechanical 
course evidently manifests her purposed aim of restoring har- 
mony among men, even against their will, and in the very bosom 
of their contentions. The provisional dispositions made by nature 
for this purpose, are the following : 

" (1) That she has provided for the subsistence of man in all 
climates ; 

" (2) That she has dispersed them, through wars, in every di- 
rection, even to the most inhospitable countries, in order to peo- 
ple them ; and 

" (3) That she has thus compelled them to enter into reciprocal 
engagements, which are more or less established by law." 

The many valuable hints and jmilosophical reflections, contained 
in this little work, it is impossible to abridge. And as we possess 
an English translation of it, I must refer the curious reader to the 
book itself; at the same time assuring him, that he will find the 
arts of courts and the juggles of statesmen exposed, in a manner 
altogether original. 

Appendix XI. — Critique of the Faculty of Judgment. 

[In § 298, Dr. Kant says : "With regard to the division, just men- 
tioned, of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and that this 
last could be no other than moral science, I have elsewhere ex- 
plained myself at length (Disquisition on the apriori Functions of 
the Judgment)." (Cf. §§1027, 1168,2611, 2607, 3131.) Kant's 
Kritik der Urtheilskraft, in Dr. Willich's analysis, is spoken of 
[pages 103-113] as follows :] 

The author's princij)al aim in this work is to inquire " whether 
the Judging Faculty, which, in the order of our cognoscible powers, 



The Clavis to an Index. 865 

forms an intermediate capacity between the Understanding and 
Reason, has likewise its own principles apriori; whether these are 
constitutive or merely regulative; and whether that faculty of 
judging affords apriori the rule for the sensations of pleasure and 
displeasure, which again are the intermediate degrees between the 
cognoscible and appetitive faculties." 

"A Critique of pure Reason, i. e. of our capacity of judging con- 
formably to principles apriori, would be incomplete, if the Judging 
Faculty, which likewise claims these principles, were not treated 
as a separate part of that Critique; although, in a system of pure 
philosophy, the principles of judgment must not be considered as 
a separate part, belonging either to the theoretical or practical de- 
partment of the system ; but, in cases of emergency, they may be 
occasionally connected with either. For, if such a system shall 
once be established under the general name of Metaphysics (a work, 
the complete attainment of which is by no means impossible, and 
which would be of the first importance to the general use of Rea- 
son); the Critique must have previously investigated the ground, 
on which this structure is to be erected, as well as the solidity of 
the basis of this faculty, that deduces its principles independent 
on experience : and if any one part of this fabric should be found 
to stand upon a slight foundation, the downfall of the whole would 
be the inevitable consequence. 

'' But we may easily perceive from the nature of the Judging 
Faculty, that the discovery of the peculiar principle of it, must be 
attended with great difficulties ; for this faculty must -necessarily 
contain some such principle apriori ; because, in the contrary case, 
it could not be subject to the most common critique as a particular 
faculty of acquiring knowledge ; and because the proper use of it 
is so necessary, and so universally admitted, that everybody is 
acquainted with its influence. That principle, however, must not 
be derived from notions apriori, since these are the property of the 
Understanding, and the application of them only belongs to the 
Judging Faculty. Hence the latter must furnish an idea, through 
which indeed we obtain no intuition of any object, but which 
serves as a rule to that faculty itself. This rule, however, is not 
of an objective nature, so that we could comj>are the judgment with 
it in concreto; for to do this, there would be required a second 
Judging Faculty, in order to enable us to distinguish whether the 
case applies to the rule or not [cf. § 444]. 

" This perplexity on account of a principle (whether a subjective 
or objective one) chiefly manifests itself in those judgments which 
are called cesthetical, which relate to the Beautiful and the Sublime, 



866 Kant's Jtithics. 

whether that of nature or art. And yet is the critical investiga- 
tion of a principle of the Judging Faculty, respecting those ob- 
jects, the most important part of the Critique of this power. For, 
though the eesthetical judgments, of themselves, contribute noth- 
ing to the knowledge we obtain of things, they nevertheless belong 
exclusively to the cognoscible faculty, and evince the immediate 
relation of this faculty to the sensations of pleasure and displeasure, 
in consequence of some one principle apriori, without confounding 
it with that, which may be the cause of determining the appetitive 
faculty ; because this has its principles apriori in notions, which 
are the produce of Reason." 

Having premised this extract from the author's preface to the 
work under consideration, I shall only add the result of Kant's in- 
quiry respecting the final purposes of nature, as exhibited in the 
Second Book of this publication ; though, in my opinion, this in- 
vestigation forms the most interesting and essential part of the 
whole. It is as follows : 

In conformity to our Reason, we are obliged to assume a certain 
connection subsisting between the final purposes of nature, in the 
same manner as our Understanding, in consequence of its consti- 
tution, is impelled to combine things according to their efficient 
causes. As soon as we observe a certain positive relation among 
things to one another ; as soon as we can represent to ourselves 
one thing as possible only through the idea we possess of another; 
we can reduce such a combination to no other idea than that of 
final causes, or of means and purposes. Although we are not able 
to perceive and to determine the ground, on which that connection 
rests, as a thing independent on our senses ; we may still conceive 
it, in a general manner, as the ground of such a combination as 
can be represented by us under the idea of connecting final causes; 
we may thus think of it under the only symbol, which can prop- 
erly denote the basis of this association, namely, that of Reason. 
In this way, however, we have no title to refer the modes and 
actions we observe in our Reason, to that being (substratum) 
itself; but we must make use of them only as a symbol, which at 
least expresses similar relations. 

We must, therefore, justly consider the world as if everything 
were arranged in it by the highest Understanding [see §§748, 
2420, 897]; and we must, with the greatest attention, endeavor to 
discover in experience those traces that are everywhere scattered 
for the support of this conclusion ; in order to prepare our minds 
for the conviction arising from a very considerable number of in- 
dividual cases. In this, we shall the better succeed, if, as the 



The Clavis to an Index. 867 

groundwork of this inquiry, we exhibit that systematic order 
which is already determined by our Reason apriori, and in conse- 
quence of which determination the moral beings compose the last 
and absolute purpose, to which all other things ultimately and 
necessarily refer as the means of the former [of. sup. §§ 72, 88]. But 
since we can recognize no other moral being than man, we must 
accordingly regulate our investigations relative to final purposes, 
and particularly attend to what is connected with his nature. 
Here, however, we must abandon the notion hitherto erroneously 
maintained by many theologians, that everything has a necessary 
relation to man. For; as the world of moral beings certainly con- 
sists of more classes than we are acquainted with [II. Peter, if, 
11 ; Revelations, xix., 14], we may indeed presuppose that men 
are absolute purposes, yet far from being exclusively so ; and 
that nature has not been constituted for the sake of men alone, 
but that, at the same time, other moral beings have not been 
disregarded. We may therefore safely admit that nature has 
been so formed that the essential purposes concerning man 
can be certainly attained, notwithstanding that the acciden- 
tal purposes must occasionally remain unaccomplished, on ac- 
count of others that are more important, and necessary. For 
this assertion, which is supported merely upon the principles of 
our moral nature, and not by any intuitive knowledge of the world 
itself, experience only furnishes us with arguments, which this 
order of the world displays in individual cases. But the greatest 
number of phenomena must necessarily remain inexplicable to us, 
who are acquainted only with the smallest part of the world, and 
from whom the extensive territory of moral beings is almost 
wholly concealed [see page 112 above] : whereas a complete knowl- 
edge of their relations to purposes would presuppose not only a 
thorough knowledge of the world of sense, but likewise that of 
moral beings. We derive from the contemplation of the world no. 
proofs showing a regular order of moral purposes, but we investi- 
gate the cases corresponding with that order, so as to ascertain it 
in the individual, and to strengthen our knowledge upon what we 
had already presupposed, in consequence of our moral nature. 
For, that which affords some knowledge in a general way, gives 
but a slight degree of conviction ; while that which animates this 
conviction and renders it applicable to particular cases, i. e. our 
sensation of it, is produced ouly by individual instances. 

According to these principles, we shall be able to discover traces 
of divine wisdom in a great number of phenomena, without neg- 
lecting on that account our inquiries into nature [§ 2129], which 



868 Kant's Ethics. 

alone can extend our knowledge of things, which previously un- 
folds the matter of knowledge, and which points out the relations 
wherein divine wisdom is evident. The field of physics is im- 
mense ; and by an appeal to the Deity, who has produced nature 
itself conformably to final causes, we can set no limits to that field. 
For, to obtain a complete view of final causes, and to apply them 
to the explanation of phenomena, is entirely out of our power:, 
we can only mark them as the results arising from our intuitive 
knowledge of nature, with this limitation; that, when we obtain 
a more accurate knowledge of the nature of these things, we shall 
likewise discover a greater variety of final causes, and so on in in- 
finitum. 

The contemplation of nature, agreeably to final purposes, is 
therefore fully established in the constitution of our Reason; al- 
though we have no intuition of the being that is the basis of this 
order. We can conceive this being merely by the idea of Reason 
in general [§ 3044], as the only possible way of apprehending it: 
thus, however, our knowledge of the nature of that being is not 
increased [§ 3072] ; and we only satisfy a subjective [§ 3047], but 
necessary claim of our Reason. For such an order of things as 
depends upon a regular succession of final causes, can be thought 
of by no other relation but that of a causality conformably to 
ideas ; a result which exactly corresponds with the general idea of 
an efficient Reason. 

[Here follows the table of] CONTENTS. 

INTRODUCTION". 

I. — Of the division of philosophy into theoretical and prac- 
tical. [§298.] 

II. — Of the extent of philosophy in general. 

III. — Of the Critique of the Judging Faculty, being the medium 
of combining the two parts of philosophy into one system. 

IV. — Of the Judging Faculty being a legislative power apriori. 

Y. — The principal of formal f conformation (Zweckmaessigkeit) 
of nature is a transcendental principle of the Judging Faculty. 

VI. — Of the connection between the sensation of pleasure and 
the idea of the conformation of nature. 

VII. — On the eesthetical method of representing this conforma- 
tion. 

t [Perhaps this is a misprint for "final conformation." In the glossary [page 
150] Dr. Willich says that "conformation — ZLveckmaessigkeit — i. e. forma, sive 
nexus finalis, is that constitution of an object (or even of a state of mind, or of 
an action), which can be conceived, or thought of by us, as possible only 
through a causality according to conceptions — that is, through a Will" (cf. j$ 
2825, 2828, 2420).] 



The Clavis to an Index. 



869 



VIII. — On the logical method of exhibiting the same. 

IX. — On the connections formed between the legislative acts of 
the Understanding and Eeason, by means of the Judging Faculty. 

The following table exhibits the whole of what relates to the 
province of 

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Collective facilities of the mind. 



The faculty of cognition. 

The sense of pleasure and displeasure 

The faculty of desiring [cf. § 163]. 



Faculties of cognition. 



The Understanding. 
The Judging Faculty 
Reason. 



Principles apriori. 



Legality. 
Conformation. 
Final purpose. 



Application to 



Nature. 

Art. 

Liberty. 



DIVISION I.-CRITIQ,UE OF THE iESTHETICAL FACULTY OF 
JUDGING, [gg 1-60.] 

Section I.— Analysis of the JEsthetical Judging Faculty. [§§ 1-53.] 

BOOK I.— ANALYSIS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. [§£1-22.] 

First modification of the Judgment of Taste according to its 
quality. [§§1-5.] 

§ 1. — The judgment of taste is cesthetical. 

§ 2.— The approbation determined by this judgment is not in- 
fluenced by any self-interest relative to the object. 

§ 3. — The approbation, or the satisfaction we express upon what 
is agreeable, is connected with self-interest. 

§ 4. — The same is the case with regard to what is good. 

§ 5. — Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of sat- 
isfaction. 

Second modification of the Judgment of Taste, namely according 

tO its QUANTITY. [§§ 6-9.] 

§ 6. — That which is represented as an object of universal ap- 
probation, independent on collateral notions, is called Beautiful. 

§ 7. —Composition of the Beautiful, the Agreeable, and the Good, 
by the above stated character. 

§ 8. — The universality of approbation, in a judgment of taste, is 
represented only in a subjective sense. 

§ 9. — Investigation of the question : whether in a judgment of 
taste the sense of pleasure precede the act of judging upon the 
object, or follow it. 

Third modification of the Judgments of Taste, according to their 

RELATION tO purposes. [§§ 10-17.] 

§ 10.— Of Conformation in general. 

§ 11. — The judgment of taste is wholly founded upon the form 
or the nexus finalis of an object (or on the manner of represent- 
ing that object to the mind). 



870 Kant's Ethics. 

■ § 12. — The judgment of taste depends upon principles apriori. 

§§ 13, 14. — This judgment is not related to any emotion of the 
mind. 

§ 15. — It is equally unconnected with the idea of perfection. 

§ 16. — That judgment of taste, by which an object is declared to 
be beautiful only under a certain condition, can not be called a 
pure judgment. 

§ 17. — On the prototype of Beauty. 

Fourth modification of the Judgment of Taste, according to the 
modality of the satisfaction in the object. [§§ 18-22.] 

§ 18. — This modality of an sesthetical judgment is not a neces- 
sary, but an exemplary determination of all individuals, respecting 
a judgment, that is considered as an example of a general rule, 
the particulars of which can not be defined. 

§ 19. — The subjective necessity, which we attribute to an sesthet- 
ical judgment, is conditional. 

§ 20. — The condition of the necessity, which a judgment of 
taste supposes, is the idea of a common sense. 

§ 21. — Whether we have grounds, on which we may conclude 
the reality of a common sense. 

§ 22. — The necessity of the general approbation, which is con- 
ceived in an sesthetical judgment, is a subjective necessity, which, 
under the supposition of a common sense, is represented as ob- 
jective. 

Corollaries from these four modifications. 

I. — -Taste is the faculty of judging of an object, or of repre- 
senting it by means of approbation or disapprobation, unconnected 
with any self-interest. The object of such approbation is called 
Beautiful. 

II. — Beautiful is that which affords universal satisfaction, with, 
out reducing it to u certain idea. 

III. — Beauty is the conformation or nexus finalis of an object, so 
far as it is observed in it, without the representation of a purpose. 

IV. — Beautiful is that which is recognized as an object of neces- 
sary satisfaction, without combining with it a particular idea. 
BOOK II.— ANALYSIS OF THE SUBLIME. 

§ 23. — Transition from the judging power of the Beautiful to 
that of the Sublime. 

§ 24. — Of the division of an inquiry into the sensation of the 
Sublime. 

A. — On the mathematical Sublime. [§§ 25-27.] 

§ 25. — Definition of the Sublime: " Sublime, in general, is that 
which is absolutely great, which admits of no comparison, to think 



The Clavis to an Index. 871 

of which only proves a faculty of the mind, which is not subject 
to any scale of the senses, etc." 

§ 26. — Of the mathematical computation of natural objects, 
which is requisite to produce the idea of the Sublime. 

§ 27. — Of the quality of the satisfaction we receive in judging 
of the Sublime. 

B. — On the dynamical Sublime of nature. 

§ 28. — Nature considered as might (potentici). 

§ 29. — On the modality of the judgment respecting the Sublime 
of nature. 

Deduction of the pure cesthetical judgments. 

§ 30. — The deduction of sesthetical judgments upon the objects 
of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in the lat- 
ter, but to the Beautiful only. 

§ 31. — -On the proper method of this deduction. 

§ 32. — First peculiarity of an sesthetical judgment : " that it de- 
termines its object with respect to the satisfaction found in it, at 
the same time claiming the approbation of everybody, as if it were 
objective." 

§ 33. — Second peculiarity : " that it can not at all be determined 
by argumental proofs, as if it were merely subjective." 

§ 34. — No objective principle of taste can be discovered. 

§35. — The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the 
judging faculty in general. 

§ 36. — How the deduction of sesthetical judgments must be 
carried on. 

§ 37. — What is properly asserted apriori, in this judgment, con- 
cerning the object. 

§ 38. — Deduction of eesthetical judgments. 

§ 39. — How a sensation can be communicated. 

§ 40. — Of Taste, as a species of sensus communis. 

§ 41. — Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful. 

§ 42. — Of the intellectual interest. 

§ 43. — Of art in general. "Art is distinguished from Nature f 
like doing (Jacere) from acting or operating in general (agere); and 
the production of the former, i. e. work (opus) is distinguished 
from the latter as operation (ejfectus). Art, as human ingenuity, 
is further distinguished from Science, like the practical from the 
theoretical part of geometry ; for to be acquainted with the princi- 
ples of navigation, for instance, does not yet form a practical navi- 
gator : hence the Sciences imply the knowledge of things, and the 
Arts teach us the practical application of that knowledge. Lastly,, 
Art is distinguished from handicraft ; the former may be called 
free, the latter mercenary art." 



872 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 44.— Of the fine arts. 

§ 45. — By fine arts is understood any art, so far as it, at the same 
time, is imitative of nature. 

§ 46, 47. — The fine arts are the efforts of genius. 

§ 48. — Of the distinction subsisting between genius and taste. 
" To judge of beautiful objects, as such, requires taste; but the art 
of producing such objects, supposes genius." 

§ 49. — Of the faculties of the mind, which compose what is 
called genius. [Cf. §§ 543, 544.] 

§ 50. — Taste and genius must be combined in the productions of 
the fine arts. 

§ 51. — Of the division of the fine arts: 

" (1). — The arts of language, viz.: Oratory and Poetry; 

" (2). — The arts of sensible imitation, which are either those 
of true or of illusory exhibitions, the former are called Plastic, 
the latter Painting: plastic includes Statuary and Architecture; 
painting consists either in copying beauteous nature, or in beauti- 
fully arranging her productions; i.e. in the respective arts of 
Painting or Pleasure-gardening ; 

" (3). — The beautiful combination of external sensations, viz.: 
the arts of Music and Dying " [? tragedy perhaps]. 

§ 52. — Of the combination of the fine arts in one and the same 
production. 

§ 53. — Comparison of the fine arts with one another, with re- 
gard to their sesthetical value. 

Section II.— Dialectic of the JEsthetical Judging Faculty. 

§§ 55-57. — Eepresentation and Solution of the Antinomy of 
Taste. 

§ 58. — On the Idealism of conformation in nature as well as art, 
being the only principle of the sesthetical faculty of judging. 

§ 59. — Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality. 

Appendix. 

§ 60. — Of the methodical doctrine of taste. 

DIVISION II.— CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF 

JUDGING. [§§61-91.] 

§ 61. — Of the objective conformation of nature. 

Section I.— Analysis of the Teleological Faculty of Judging. [§§ 62-68.] 

§ 62. — Of the objective conformation, which is merely formal, 
in distinction from what is material. 

§ 63. — Of the relative conformation of nature, in distinction 
from the internal. 

§ 64. — Of the peculiar character of things, as purposes of nature. 



The Qlavis to an Index. 873 

§ 65 — Things, as natural purposes, are organized beings. 

§ 66. — Of the principle of judging of the internal conformation 
of organized beings. 

§ 67. — Of the teleological principle of judging of Nature in 
general, as a system of purposes. 

§ 68.- — Of the principle of Teleology, as an internal principle of 
Natural Philosophy. 

Section II.— Dialectic of the Teleological Faculty of Judging. [§§ 09-78.] 

§ 69. — The antinomy of the Judging Faculty. 

§§ 70, 71. — Representation and solution of this antinomy. 

§ 72. — Of the various systems respecting the conformation of 
nature. 

§ 73. — None of these systems is satisfactory. 

§ 74. — The cause of the impossibility of treating this idea, 'that 
nature is technically arranged," in a dogmatical manner, lies in our 
incapacity of explaining the design or aim of nature. 

§ 75. — The idea of an objective conformation of nature is a crit- 
ical principle of Reason, belonging to the reflex Faculty of Judging. 

§ 76. — Illustrating remarks. [It is stated in the New American 
Cyclopaedia (article Kant, vol. x., page 113, ed. 1860) that Schel- 
ling (Phil. Schriften, i. s. 114), says that "there were perhaps 
never so many deep thoughts compressed in so few leaves as in § 
76 of the ' Criticism of the Judgment.' " Dr. Ueberweg (Hist. 
Phil, vol. ii., page 193, ed. Morris) says (I do not know what sec- 
tion he had in view): " In the analogy of the forms of the differ- 
ent classes of organisms Kant finds (in agreement with the subse- 
quent speculations of Lamarck and Darwin) ground for the sup- 
position that they are really related to each other through genera- 
tion from a common original germ." (Cf. Averroes, in Ueberweg, 
Hist. Phil., Dr. Morris' translation, vol. i.,page 415, line 41.) Cf. ^ 
2382 (page 745) above] 

§ 77. — Of the peculiarity of the human understanding, from 
which the idea of the purposes of natm*e arises. 

§ 78. — On the principle of the universal mechanism of matter, 
united with the teleological principle in the technical (architec- 
tonic) arrangement of nature. 

Appendix.— Methodical Doctrine of the Teleological Faculty of Judging. 

[U 79-91.] 

§ 79. — Whether Teleology ought to be treated as a branch of 
Physics. [See the History of Creation (vol. i., pages 101, 106, 
Appleton. New York, 1876), by Ernst Haeckel (professor in the 
University of Jena), who says, in quoting a passage from § 79, 

56 



874 Kanfs Ethics. 

methodical svstem of the teleological faculty of Judgment: "On 
account of this one passage taken by itself," (but that, in justice 
to Kant, it can not be taken by itself, is immediately afterward 
evident, as Haeckel in equivalent language admits), " we might 
place Kant beside Goethe and Lamarck, as one of the first founders 
of the doctrine of descent," etc. (page 105).] 

§ 80. — Of the necessity of classing the principle of mechanism 
under that of teleology, when we attempt to explain a thing as a 
design of nature. 

§ 81. — On the association of mechanism with the teleological 
principle, accounting for natural purposes, as being the produc- 
tions of nature. 

§ 82. — Of the teleological system in the external relations of or- 
ganized beings. 

§ 83. — Of the last purpose (design) of nature as a teleological 
system. 

§ 84. — Of the final purposes of the existence of a world, i. e. of 
the creation itself. 

§ 85. — Of physico-theology. 

§ 86.— Of ethico-theology. 

§ 87. — Of the moral proof of the existence of God. 

§ 88. — The validity of this moral proof is limited. 

§ 89. — Of the use of the moral argument. 

§ 90. — Of the manner of admitting things as true, in a moral 
proof of the existence of God. 

§ 91. — Of the manner of considering things as true, by means 
of a practical belief. 

Appendix XII.— Metaphysical Principles of Natural Phil- 
osophy . 

[In § 276, Dr. Kant says: " I shall therefore here, as formerly 
in the metaphysical elements of natural philosophy, print in the 
text that part of law which is strictly systematic and apriori; and 
that part which regards given cases in experience, I shall discuss 
in notes, since otherwise it would not be clear what ought to be 
considered as metaphysics, and what as practical laws." The 
Metaphysiche Anfangsgruende der Naturwissenschaft " is number 
xxii. in the analysis of Dr. Willich, who speaks of it [pages 93- 
99] as follows :] 

This is, without exception, the most profound of Kant's works; 
and in order to afibrd the reader a concise view of the author's 
aim, I shall first give an abstract from the elaborate preface to this 
publication, and then exhibit the principles of this new science, 
in a close translation. 



The Clavis to an Index. 875 

" It is oftbe greatest importance to the progress of the sciences," 
says Kant, "to separate dissimilar principles from one another, to 
reduce each set of them to a particular system, that they may 
form a science of a peculiar kind. Thus we shall prevent that un- 
certainty in sciences, which arises from confounding them, and in 
consequence of which we can not easily distinguish the limits, 
which, in a doubtful case, are to be assigned to each of them ; nor 
can we discover the source of the errors, that may attend the 
practical application of them. On this account, I have deemed it 
necessary, to exhibit systematically the pure part of Natural Phil- 
osophy (Physica G-eneralis), in which metaphysical and mathe- 
matical constructions of ideas occur promiscuously; and, in treat- 
ing of the former, to show at the same time the principles of that 
construction, and consequently to prove the possibility of a System 
of Natural Philosophy, deduced from mathematical demonstrations. 
This division of sciences, beside the advantage already stated, is 
attended with the particular satisfaction, which the unity and har- 
mony of knowledge afford, when we can prevent the limits of the 
sciences from interfering with one another.'' 

'■As a second reason of recommending this process, it may be 
urged, that in every department of Metaphysics -\ve may hope to 
attain to absolute completeness [cf. §§2729, 2841. 1409, 1424], such 
as we can not expect in any other species of knowledge ; conse- 
quently, the completeness of the Metaphysics of material nature 
may be expected, here, with the same confidence as in the Meta- 
physics of nature in general [§§ 2611, 2613. 2614. 1409. Ueber- 
weg (Hist. Phil., vol. if. page 154) says : "A manuscript on the 
Metaphysics of Nature, on which Kant labored in the last years of 
his life, has never been published ; see (Grinscher?) in the Preuss. 
Jahrbuecher, ed. by Haym, I.. 1858, pp. 80-84, Schubert, in the N. 
preuss. Provincialblatt, Koenigsb.. 1858, pp. 58-61, and particularly 
Kuclolf Keicke, in the Altpreuss. Monatschr , vol. i., Koenigsberg, 
1864, pp. 742-749 ; " and again (p. 180) Dr. TJeberweg says : " The 
transition from the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science to 
physics is provided for in the ' Metaphysics of Nature ' (a work co- 
ordinated with the Metaphysics of Ethics [§275, page 26 above], 
which includes the doctrines of legal right and of morality), which 
treats of the motive forces of matter, and is divided by Kant into an 
'Elementary System' and a 'System of the World.' The manu- 
script was left unfinished. (Some fragments of it will perhaps 
soon be edited by Eeicke.) "] For, in Metaphysics, the object is 
merely considered, agreeably to the general laws of thought, while 
in other sciences it must be represented according to the different 



876 Kant's Ethics. 

data of perception, whether this be pure or empirical. In Meta- 
physics, too, we acquire a determined number of cognitions, which 
can be completely exhausted; because here the object must be 
continually compared with all the necessary laws of thought: 
while in the other sciences, on account of the infinite variety of 
perceptions, or objects of thought, which they present to the mind, 
we never can attain to absolute completeness, but may extend 
them in infinitum, as is the case with pure Mathematics and ex- 
perimental Physics. I likewise believe, that I have completely 
stated these metaphysical principles of Natural Philosophy, to 
their utmost extent ; but though I have succeeded in this attempt, 
I do not natter myself with having performed any extraordinary 
task." 

•' To complete, however, a metaphysical system, whether that 
of nature in general, or that of the material world, the Table of 
the Categories must serve as its Schema [see § 2717 above]. For 
there are in reality no more nor fewer pure intellectual notions 
concerning the nature of things, than I have stated in that table. 
All the determinations relative to the general notion of matter, 
consequently all that can be conceived of it apriori, that can be 
exhibited in mathematical construction, or that can be proposed 
as a determined object of experience, must admit of being reduced 
to the four classes of the Categories, viz.: that of Quantity, Qual- 
ity, Relation, and Modality. There remains nothing to be dis- 
covered or added here ; but if imperfections should occur, with 
respect to perspicuity and order, the .system in this respect may 
be occasionally improved." 

"The idea of matter must, therefore, be examined through all 
the four mentioned functions of the intellect (in four sections), in 
each of which a new determination of that idea occurs. The 
primary attribute of something, that represents an object of the 
external senses, must be motion ; for by that only can these senses 
be affected. To this, the Understanding reduces all other predi- 
cates of matter that relate to its nature [cf. §§ 1500, 1632] ; and 
thus Natural Philosophy is, throughout, either a pure or applied 
theory of motion. The metaphysical principles of this science 
must, consequently, be divided into four sections : in the first of 
which, motion is considered as a pure quantum, according to its 
composition, without any quality of that which is movable, and 
hence may be called Phoronomy ; in the second, motion is investi- 
gated in its relation to the quantity of matter, under the name of 
an originally moving power, and is therefore called Dynamics ; in 
the third, matter is examined in reciprocal relation to this quantity, 



The Clavis to an Index. 877 

1>3' its peculiar motion, and appears under the title of Mechanics ; 
and in the fourth section, the motion or rest of matter is determined 
merely in relation to the mode of representing it, or Modality, 
consequently as phenomenon of external senses, on which account 
it is called Phenomenology.'' [Cf. Ueberweg. ii., 179.] 

{Here follows the table of] CONTENTS. 

Section I.— Metaphysical Principles of Phoronomy. 

Position I. — Matter is that which is movable in space. That 
space, which itself is movable, is called the material, or likewise, rela- 
tive space ; that, in which all motion must be ultimately conceived 
(and which consequently in its own nature is absolutely immov- 
able), is called the pure, or likewise, absolute space. 

Position II. — The motion of a thing is the change of its external 
relations to given space. 

Position HI. — Eest is the permanent presence ( praesentia per- 
durabilis) in the same place ; permanent, however, is that which 
exists, i. e. continues for a certain time. 

Position IV. — To construct the" idea of compound motion, means 
to represent motion apriori in the perceptive faculty, as far as the 
former arises from two or several joint motions in one movable 
space. 

Theorem. — Every motion, as object of experience, may be con- 
sidered either as the motion of a body in a resting space, or as the 
rest of a body and, on the other hand, motion of space in opposite 
direction with equal velocity. 

Position V. — The combination of motion is 'the representation of 
the motion of a point, as being homologous with two or several 
motions of it united together. 

Section II.— Metaphysical Principles of Dynamics. 

Position I.— Matter is that which is movable, so far as it fills a 
space. To fill a space, is to resist all that is movable and that 
makes an effort, by its motion, to penetrate into a certain space. 
A space that is not filled, is a vacuum. 

■Theorem I. — Matter fills a space, not by its mere existence, but by 
a particular moving power. 

Position II. — The power of attraction is that moving power, by 
which one matter may be the cause of the approach of others 
toward it ; or, in other words, by which it resists the removal of 
others from it. The power of repulsion is that, by which one mat- 
ter may be the cause of removing others from it ; or, in other words, 
by which it resists the approach of others toward it. 

Theorem II. — Matter fills its spaces by the repulsive power of 



878 Kant's Ethics. 

all its parts, i. e. by a peculiar power of extension, that has a de- 
termined degree, beyond which smaller or greater degrees may be 
conceived in infinitum. 

Position III. — One matter, in its motion, penetrates another, 
when, by means of compression, it completely removes the space 
of its extension. 

Theorem III. — Matter may be compressed in infinitum ; but it 
never can be penetrated by matter, however great its pressing 
power may be. 

Position IV. — That impenetrability of matter, which depends upon 
the resistance proportionally increasing with the degrees of com- 
pression, is called relative ; as on the contrary that, which rests upon 
the supposition, that matter, as such, is not liable to any compres- 
sion whatever, is here called absolute impenetrability. The filling 
of space with absolute impenetrability may be called mathematical, 
while that of relative impenetrability receives the name of 
dynamical. 

Position V. — Material substance is that in space, which is mov- 
able of itself, i. e. separate from every other thing that exists with- 
out it in space. The motion of a part of matter, by which it ceases 
to be a part, is separation. The separation of the parts of matter 
is the physical division. 

Theorem IV. — Matter is divisible in infinitum, and indeed into 
parts, each of which is again matter. [See §§ 1735, 2092.] 

Theorem V. — The possibility of matter renders a power of at- 
traction necessary ; this being the second essential and fundamen- 
tal power of it. 

Theorem VI. — By the mere power of attraction, without that 
of repulsion, we can not conceive the possibility of any matter. 

Position VI — Contact, in a physical sense, is immediate action 
and re-action of impenetrability. The action of one matter upon 
another, without contact, is the action at distance (actio in distans). 
This action at distance, which is possible without the aid of inter- 
venient matter, is called the immediate action of matter upon mat- 
ter, through empty space. 

Theorem VII. — The attraction essential to all matter, is the im- 
mediate action of it upon another matter, through empty space. 

Position VII. — A moving power, by which matters can imme- 
diately act upon one another only in a common surface of contact, 
is called a superficial power; but that, by which one matter can im- 
mediately act upon the parts of another, even beyond the surface 
of contact, may be called a penetrating power. 



The Clavis to an Index. 879 

Theorem VIII. — The original power of attraction, upon which 
the possibility of matter itself, as such, must depend, extends 
in the universe immediately from every part of it to another 
ad infinitum. 

Section III.— Metaphysical Principles of Mechanics. 

Position I. — Matter is that which is movable, so far as it (as such) 
possesses moving power. 

Position II. — The quantity of matter is the amount of that which 
is movable in a determined space. This, so far as all its parts are 
considered in their motions as operating (moving) at the same 
time, is called congeries ; and we say, that a matter acts in a con- 
geries, when all its parts, moved in the same direction, exercise 
their moving power externally, and at the same time. A congeries 
consisting of a determined shape is called a body (in a mechanical 
sense). The magnitude of motion (mechanically computed) is that 
which is estimated both by the quantity of matter moved, and its 
velocity : when phoronomically considered, it consists merely in 
the degree of velocity. 

Theorem I. — The quantity of a piece of matter, in comparison 
with any other, can be estimated only by the quantity of motion in 
a given velocity. 

Theorem II. — First law of Mechanics. In all the changes of 
corporeal nature, the quantity of matter remains, upon the whole, 
without increasing or diminishing. [See § 1757.] 

Theorem III. — Second law of Mechanics. Every change of 
matter has an external cause. (Every material body remains in 
its state of rest or motion, in the same direction, and with the 
same velocity, unless it be compelled by some external cause, to 
change this state.) [See § 1771.] 

Theorem IV-. — Third Mechanical law. In every communi- 
cated motion, the action and re-action always correspond with one 
another. [See § 1813.] 

Section IV.— Metaphysical Principles of Phenomenology. 

Position. — Matter is that which is movable, as far as in that re- 
spect it can be an object of experience. 

Theorem I. — -The motion of matter, in a straight line, is, with 
respect to an empirical space, merel} r a possible predicate, in contra- 
distinction to the opposite motion of space. The very same predi- 
cate is impossible, if we conceive it in no external relation to mat- 
ter, i. e. as absolute motion. 

Theorem II. — The circular motion of matter, in contradistinc- 
tion to the opposite motion of space, is a real predicate of it ; 



880 Kanfs Mhics. 

whereas the opposite motion of a relative space, if substituted for 
the motion of the body, is no real motion of the latter, and if con- 
sidered as such, is a mere illusion. 

Theorem III. — In every motion of a body, by which it is mov- 
ing, with respect to another body, an opposite equal motion of the 
latter is necessary. 

Appendix XIII. — Kant's Inaugural Dissertation. 

[In §2682 Dr. Kant says that space and time are " pure intui- 
tions that lie apriori at the basis of the empirical" (Mahaffy's edi- 
tion). In § 1482 Kant says that space is ' : a pure intuition." In 
§ 1198 Kant says that time is " a pure form of the sensuous intui- 
tion." In § 1472 Kant says that " there are two sources of human 
knowledge (which probably [Professor Mahaffy (Fischer, page 4) 
translates " perhaps"] spring from a common, but to us unknown 
root), namely, sense and understanding" (Meiklejohn's translation, 
page 18). Professor Kuno Fischer (commentary on the Critique 
of Pure Reason, Mahaffy's translation, ed. 1866, page 4) says that 
(i this determination of the distinction between sensibility and un- 
derstanding is the first position taken by the critical philosophy 
[ef. §§ 1524, 1473]. Kant himself in his inaugural treatise, notes 
the difference in kind between the two . cognitive faculties as the 
propaedeutic of the new school of metaphysic." Dr. Ueberweg 
(Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii.,p. 149) says (in reference to this in- 
augural treatise): " The fundamental conception underlying the 
Critique of the Pure Reason, becomes here already manifest in re- 
gard to space and time, but not yet in regard to substantiality, 
causality, and the other categories." Dr. Fischer says (page 6) 
that " the doctrine of the form-giving principles of the sensuous 
world develops quite clearly and accurately what the Critique of 
the Pure Reason repeats in the transcendental aesthetic." In the 
next sentence, Professor Fischer refers particularly to Section III. 
of the inaugural treatise. Dr. Willich [page 64] says " that the 
preceding extract from the author's Inaugural Dissertation has 
been given in his [Kant's] own words, in the original Latin;" 
and the reader will readily see, merely from the brief heads of the 
third section, that, as Dr. Fischer (page 7) says, " in his inaugural 
treatise Kant stands (as it were) with one foot firmly on critical 
ground." Kant himself says (in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, 
dated August 18, 1783; the statement appears in Ueberweg at 
page 151) that the Critique embodied the result of at least twelve 
years of reflection : it is of interest to note what progress he had 
made in* 1770. Dr. Willich's abstract [pages 62-64] is as follows]: 



The Clavis to an Index. 881 

DE MUNDI SENSIBILIS ATQUE TXTELLTGIBILIS FORMA ET 

PRINCIPIIS. 
Dissertatio pro loco professions Log. et Metapb. ordinariae rite sibi vindi- 
cando; quam exigentibus statutis academicis publice tuebitnr Immanuel Kant. 
jRegiomonti; in auditori maximo, boris matutinis et pomeridianis confuetis ; Die 
XX., Aug.. MDCCLXX. 

Sectio I.— De Notione Mundi Generatim. 

Momenta, in mundi definitione attendenda, haec sunt: 

I. — Materia (in sensu transcendental!) h. e. partes, quae hie 
summit nr esse substantias. 

II. — Forma quae consistit in substantiarum co-ordinatione, non 
subordinatione. 
III. — Universitas quae est omnitudo compartium absoluta. 
Sactio II.— De Ssnsibilium atcjue Intelligibilium Discrimine Generatim. 

Sensualitas est receptivitas snbjecti, per quam possibile est, ut 
status ipsius repraesentativus objecti alicujus praesentia certo modo 
amciatur. 

Intelligentia (ratio nalitas) est facultas subjecti, per quam, quae 
in sensus ipsius per qualitatem suam, incurrere non possunt, sibi 
repraesentari valet. 

Sectio III.— De Principiis Formae Mundi Sensibiiis. 
DE TEMPORE. 

I. — Idea Teinporis non oritur sed supponitur a sensibus. 
II. — Idea Temporis est singularis. non generalis : Tempus enim 
quodlibet non cogitatur, nisi tanquam pars nnius ejusdem temporis 
immensi. 

III.— Idea itaqne temporis est intuitu*, et quoniain ante omnem 
sentationem coneipitur, tanquam conditio respectuum in sensibili- 
bus obviorum, est intuitus, non sensualis, sed pur us. 

IV. — Tempus est quantum continuum et legum continui in muta- 
tionibus universi prineipium. 

V. — Tempus non est objecti vum aliguid etreale, nee substantia, nee 
accidens, nee relatio, sed subjectiva conditio per naturam mentis 
humanae necessaria, quaelibet sensibilia, certa lege sibi co-ordin- 
andi, et intuitus purus. 

YI- — Tempus est conceptus verissimus, et, per omnia possibilia 
sensuum objecta, in infinitum patens, inluitivae repraesentationis 
conditio. 

VII. — Tempus itaque est prineipium for male Mundi sensibiiis ab- 
solute prim urn. 

de s PATIO. 

A. — Conceptus spatii non abstrahitur a sensationibus externis. 

B — Conceptus spatii est singularis representatio omnia in se 

comprehendens, non sub se continens notio abstracta et communis. 



882 Kant's Ethics. 

C. — Coneeptus spatii itaque est intuitus purus ; cum sit coneeptus 
singularis, sensationibus non conflatus, sed omnis sensationis ex- 
ternae forma fundamentalis. 

D. — Spatium non est allquid objectivi et realis, nee substantia, nee 
accidens, nee relatio ; sed subjectivum et ideale et a natura mentis 
stabili lege proficiscens, veluti schema, omnia omnino externe sensa 
sibi co-ordinandi. 

E. — Quanquam coneeptus spatii, ut objectivi alicujus et realis en- 
tis vel atfectionis, sit imaginarius, nihilo tamen secias, respective ad 
sensibilia quaecunqve, non solum est verissimus, sed et omnis verita- 
tis in sensualitate externa fundamentum. 

Sectio IV.— De Principio Formae Mundi Intelligibilis. 
Sectio V".— De Methodo Circa Sensitiva et Intellectualia in Metaphysieis. 

[Dr. Willich thinks that an abstract of the last two sections 
" could not be rendered intelligible to the reader, without stating 
likewise the illustrations of the different positions, at full length." 
Dr. Fischer (page 6, speaking of section iii.) says : " Comparing it 
with the Critique of the Pure Reason, there is a perfect harmony 
between this part of the Inaugural Treatise and the transcend- 
ental ^Esthetic. The opposite is the case when we compare the 
doctrine of the form-giving principles of the intelligible world with 
the transcendental Logic." And again (pages 6, 7), " The order 
of the world, existing independent of the human reason, which 
can therefore never be an object of sensuous intuition, but of 
thought — the forms and principles of this intelligible world can 
not have their fovndation either in human nature, or in the nature 
of things, but only in the Deity. From God, as Creator, comes the 
harmom 7 of the world." See further in Fischer (pages 7 and 89), 
and also TJeberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., pages 149, 
150). Cf §§ 3046,Wd 3053.] [See § 279.] 

Appendix XIV. — Kant's First Essay. 

[Dr. Ueberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., p. 142) says that 
the date is " 1747 (not 1746, the date given on the title page; the 
dedication is dated April 22d, 1747) " Ueberweg also says (page 
137) that Kant, "was born on the 22d day of April, 1724.'' See 
in Ueberweg (page 143) the judgment of B. W. H. Lexis, from 
the present standpoint of science. Dr. Willich prefaces his an- 
alysis [pages 55-60] with what he calls "the singular Motto pre- 
fixed " by Kant to this essay, as follows:] 

Nihil magis praestandum est, quam ne pecorum ritu sequamur 
antecedentiumgregem, pergentes, non qua eundum est, sed qua itur. 
Seneca de vita beata ; Cap. I. 



The Clavis to an Index. 883 

\_Gedanken von der wahren Schaeizung der lebendigen Kraefte und 
Beurtheilung der Beweise, deren sich Leibnitz und andere Mechaniker 
in dieser Streitsache bedient haben, is the title as I find it in Ueber- 
weg (page 142).] 

REFLECTIONS UPON THE TRUE COMPUTATION OF 
LIVING (MOVING) POWERS. Koenigsberg, 220 pp., large 
8vo., with two plates, 1746. 

After having paid handsome and due compliments to his meri- 
torious countrymen Leibnitz, Wolf, Herrmann, Bernoutlli, 
Buelfinger, and many other eminent philosophers, the young 
author examines the diffei'ent theories and proofs advanced k - on 
the living (inherent) powers of bodies,'' and endeavors to show 
that their notions on this intricate subject were far from being 
correct, and that the dissensions prevailing among them arose 
chiefly from having, each of them, considered the subject in a dif- 
ferent point of view. Thus their understandings were misled hj 
paying an undue regard, partly to the obstacles overcome by weight; 
partly to matter as acted upon, or moved, by weight; partly to the 
pressure suffered by elastic bodies ; and finally to the velocities aris- 
ing from compound motion. He attacks Leibnitz most severely, 
while he enters upon a fundamental inquiry into the origin of his 
theory concerning the moving powers. It appears obvious to 
Kant, that Leibnitz had been led to this theory, b}^ implicitly 
proceeding on the known rule from which Descartes explains the 
nature of the lever. Prior to Leibnitz, the world had admitted 
the simple proposition of Descartes, "that the mere velocity of 
bodies, even snch as are in actual motion, serves as a rule for 
ascertaining their power." But Leibnitz suddenly roused the 
reasoning powers of man, by proposing a new law which, since 
that period, has offered rich materials for discussion to the most 
learned and acute. Descartes had computed the powers of bodies 
in motion by mere velocity. But Leibnitz adapted the square of 
velocities in this computation. [See further, on this subject, Ueber- 
weg (page 142) referred to above.] 

CONTENTS. 
Chapter I.— Of the Power of Bodies, in General. 
§ 1.— Everj- mechanical body possesses an essential power. 
§ 2. — This power of bodies Leibnitz expressed by the common 
name, effective power. 

§ 3. — It ought to be called vis motrix (moving power). 
§ 4. — On the method of explaining motion from the effective 
powers in general. 



S84 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 5. — Of the difficulties arising from the theory of reciprocal 
operation of body and mind, if we attribute to the former no other 
power than the vis motri.v. 

§ 6. — Of the obstacles thence arising in the explanation of the 
manner in which the mind affects the body ; of the method of re- 
moving them, if we adopt a common vis activa. 

§ 7. — There may exist things, the presence of which can not be 
at all demonstrated. 

§ 8. — It is not improbable, in a strict metaphysical sense, that 
there may be more than one world. 

§ 9. — If bodies, or substances, had no power to operate externally, 
there would be neither extension nor space. 

§ 10. — The triple dimension of space is probably derived from 
the law, according to which the powers of substances affect each 
other. 

§ 11. — Of the condition which renders the existence of a plural- 
ity of worlds probable. 

§ 12. — Some metaphysicians maintain, that bodies, by means of 
their (peculiar) powers, incline toward motion in all directions. 

§§ 13, 14. — Two objections against this opinion : (a) That the 
moving body does not advance in an equal ratio with the body 
moved; (b) That the effort toward motion, which substances man- 
ifest in all directions, must have a certain degree of intensity; for 
it can not be infinite, and a finite (limited) exertion, without a 
certain degree of effort, involves a contradiction. 

§ 15. — Motion must be considered to be of two different kinds. 

§ 16. — Motion of the first kind is analogous to dead (inert) pres- 
sure. 

§§ 17, 18. 19. —Motion of the second kind presupposes a power, 
which corresponds with the square of velocity. [Dr. Ueberweg (p. 
143) says that " a characteristic affirmation is made by Kant in § 
19, that metaphysics, like many other sciences, had only reached 
the threshold of well-grounded knowledge."] 

Chapter II.— Inquiry into the Principles upon which the Adherents of 
Leibnitz Explain the .Living Powers. 

§§ 20, 21. — Buelfingcr's advice in settling differences between 
parties. 

§ 22.— Leibnitz's and Descartes's method of computing powers. 

§ 23. — First error of Leibnitz, in asserting 'if a body is in ac- 
tual motion, its power is equal to the square of its velocity." 

§ 24. — Actual motion is that, which is not merely at the point 
of beginning, but during which a certain time has elapsed. This 
intermediate time, between the beginning of motion and the mo- 



The Clavis to an Index. 885- 

nient in which the body moves, properly constitutes what is called 
actual motion. 

§ 25 — Second error of Leibnitz, " that the time consumed during 
motion is the true and only character of living power, and that 
from this alone the difference of computing dead and living powers 
must result." 

§ 26. — Further proof against Leibnitz, from the law of con- 
tinuity. 

§ 27. — The time elapsed during motion, consequently the reality 
of motion, is not the true criterion of computing the living power- 
of bodies. 

§§ 28, 29. — Mathematics can not prove the reality of living 
powers. 

§ 30. — Leibnitz was first misled in the computation of living- 
powers, by Descartes's explanation of the lever. 

§ 31. — Herrmann's assertion, that the powers are in proportion 
to the heights, to which they may rise. 

§ 32. — Refutation of this assertion. 

§ 33. — The followers of Descartes commit the same error. 

§§ 34, 35. — Lichtscheid's doubts upon this head removed. 

§§ 36, 37 38. — An instance which proves, that in the computa- 
tion of power arising from weight, time must be necessarily taken 
into account. 

§ 39. — Summary of all the proofs derived from the motion of 
elastic bodies. 

§ 40. — The Leibnitzians refute their own conjectures, through 
the Systems of Mechanics which they establish. 

§ 41. — Herrmann's statement, respecting the repulsion of three 
elastic bodies, examined. 

§§ 42, 43. — The origin of the fallacy in the reasoning, by which 
he established his conclusion. 

§ 44. — This conclusion was unknown to Mad. de Chastelet. 

§§ 45, 46. 47. — Turin's objection concerning the reciprocal pul- 
sion of two elastic and unequal bodies ; — Bernoulli's answer to 
this objection, in comparing it with the pressure suffered by elastic- 
bodies ; — his ideas on the subject are refuted by his own premises, 
which confirm Kant's opinion. 

§ 48. — Defense of the living powers, supported by the constant 
balance of power in the world. 

§§ 49, 50. — Two different ways of explaining this assertion. 

§ 51. — The source of Leibnitz's hypothesis relative to the pre- 
servation of a uniform power, with proposals for settling this con- 
troversy, and a conclusive answer to his assertion. 



Kant's Ethics. 

§ 52. — According to the law established by Leibnitz, the power 
exercised in the touch, between a small and a larger elastic body, 
is the same, before as after this contact. 

§ 53. — The fallacy of this observation itself refutes the theory 
of the living powers, as maintained by the Leibnitzians. 

§ 54. — This appears still more obvious, by inverting the case ; 
if, namely, a larger elastic body is brought into contact with a 
smaller one. 

§ 55. — Calculation affords proofs of the Cartesian law, that " if 
a larger body touches a smaller one. there remains an equal pro- 
portion of pow T er."' 

§ 56. — The power, with which a smaller body recoils from a 
larger one, is called minus. 

§ 57. — Mad. de Chastelet has very improperly ridiculed this de- 
termination, which M. de Mairan first proposed. 

§ 58. — The Leibnitzians shrink from the inquiry into the living 
powers, by means of the pulsion observed in unelastic bodies. 

§ 59. — The latter is more decisive in determining the living- 
powers, than the resistance of elastic bodies. 

§§ 60, 61. — The Leibnitzians give a frivolous answer to these ob- 
jections, by saying, that "in the repulsion of unelastic bodies, one 
half of the power is consumed in the impression made upon the 
parts of these bodies.'" 

§ 62. — Eeply first: because this is a mechanical, not a mathe- 
matical effect of bodies. 

§ 63. — Reply second : because we have * right to call a body 
unelastic, though it be perfectly hard. 

§ 64. — Reply third: the impression made upon the parts, offers 
no argument for asserting, that a part of the jjower of unelastic 
bodies is lost by the resistance exerted on their side. 

§ 65. — Reply fourth : the degree of hardness in unelastic bodies, 
and the degree of power exerted in the contact, must yet be de- 
termined by the Leibnitzians. 

§ 66. — The resistance of unelastic bodies entirely destroys the 
living powers. 

§§ 67-70. — General proof, that the concussion of elastic bodies 
must, in every instance, evince the falsity of supposing living 
pow T ers; — that in the percussion of elastic bodies, we ought to con- 
sider only the incipient velocity of the body percussed. 

§§ 71-77. —Examination of the proofs of the living powers de- 

* [There is a small blank space here in my copy of Dr. Willich's Elements; 
it is at- the end of a line, and perhaps the word « or the word no has been broken 
oft" or dropped out in putting the form to press.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 887 

rived from compound motion : particularly Buelfinger's, which is 
refuted in several ways. 

§ 78. — The straight power in the diagonal line does not corres- 
pond with the amount of power exerted toward the lateral parts. 

§ 79. — In the computation of power by Leibnitz, the amount of 
it, in an oblique direction, is equal to the diagonal power ; but in 
that by Descartes, the former frequently is infinitely greater than 
the latter. 

§§ 80-83. — A new case toward the refutation of living powers; 
viz.: " that a body moving in a circle produces the same effect, 
with respect to gravity, as if it reclined upon an oblique surface ; 
and that a circular moving body, in every finite measure of time, 
produces the effect of a finite power, even against the obstacles of 
gravity. 

§ 84. — Descartes removes this difficulty by his method of com- 
puting power. 

§ 85. — Another contradiction in this computation by the square; 
for every one agrees " that the computed power of velocity re- 
sulting from the multiplication with itself, according to the right 
angle, must have infinitely more force, than that which is simply 
expressed by the measure of velocity ; and that it has the same re- 
lation to this, as the surface has to the line." 

§ 86. — The case stated by Bernouilli, concerning the elastic 
power of four similar springs, is here refuted. 

§§ 87-90. — Mairan's objection against the statement of Herr- 
mann ; the utility of the method adopted by the former ; its ten- 
dency to prevent certain palpable mistakes, which have long re- 
mained concealed. 

§ 91. — Buelfinger's distinctions, by which he endeavors to elude 
the objection of Mairan, are settled by this method. 

§§ 92, 93. — A singular compound case by Leibnitz, which rests 
upon fallacious reasoning. "As Bernouilli, Herrmann, and Wolf 
the admirers of Leibnitz, have not in the usual manner informed 
us that nothing equals this proof in point of invention and'(appar- 
ent) strength, I am inclined to think,"' says Kant, ; ' that so great 
a man as Leibnitz could not err without gaining reputation by the 
very idea that misled him into this error." I can not. upon this 
occasion, forget the words of Hector in Virgil: 

Si Pergama dextra 
Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent. — Virg. Aeneid. 

§§ 94, 95. — The power, which the body A has acquired by the 
arrangement of a machine, is not the effect of power produced by 
the bodv B. 



888 Kant's Elides. 

^ 90. — The same is confirmed from the law of continuity. 

§ 97. — The whole extent of the sufficient reason in the preceding 
})08ition. 

§ 98. — The only difficulty, that still prevails in the Leibnitzian 
argument, is answered. 

§ 99. — Papin's evasive objection is weak and untenable, viz: 
"Quomodo autem per translationem totins potentiae corporis A in 
corpus B, juxta Cartesium, obtineri possit motus perpetuus evi- 
dentissime demonstrat, atque ita Cartesianos ad absurdum redue- 
tos arbitratur. Ego autem et motum perpetuum absurdum esse 
fateor, et CI. \ r ir. demonstrationem ex supposita translatione esse 
legitimatu." And after having, in this positive manner, declared 
himself against that important position of Descartes, he seeks for 
shelter, in disputing the premises of his adversary; and in chal- 
lenging him, to solve this gordian knot. The following words dis- 
cover his opinion : Sed Hypothesis ipsius possibilitatem transla- 
tions nimirum totius potentiae ex corpore A in corpus B pernega, 
etc. (Act. Erudit, 1691, page 9.) 

§§ 100, 101. — Leibnitz's reply to Papin is equally inconsistent, 
and Kant believes that the former has written these words in good 
earnest: " Cum Florentiae essem, dedi amico aliam adhuc demon- 
strationem, pro possibilitate translations virium dotalium, etc. 
corpore majore in minus quiescens, prorsus assinem iis ipsis, quo 
01. Papinus ingenuosissime pro me juvando excogitavit, pro quibus 
gratias debeo, imo et ago, sinceritate ejus dignas." Proof, that a 
quadruple body may communicate to a single body four degrees of 
velocity by means of percussion upon a lever ; how Papin ought 
to have reasoned against Leibnitz; all the arguments for proving 
the entity of living powers against the computation of Descartes 
have failed ; no hopes are left to reconcile them. 

^ 102. — The principal arguments of the Leibnitzians refuted. 

§§ 103, 104. — Wolf's argument, and his principal axiom: " if a 
body has passed through the same space, it has also jiroduced the 
same innocuous effect." 

§ 105. — Another axiom of the Wolfian. Schediasrna : ''As spaces 
(objects of space), in the act of uniform motion, bear a compound 
relation to the velocities and times ; so the innocuous effects cor- 
respond with the masses, times, and velocities of bodies." Upon 
this axiom, Wolf establishes the following erroneous theorem: 
Actiones quibus idem effectus producitur, sunt et celeritates. 

§ 106. — We are not yet in the possession of a System of 
Dynamics. 

§§ 107, 108. — The argument of Muschenbroek examined. 



The Clavis to an Index. 889 

§ 109. — A new case for the confirmation of the Cartesian 
method of computing powers. 

§ 110. — The doubts of Leibnitz solved by Jurin. 

j§§ 111, 112. — : Mad. de Chastelet's frivolous objection against 
Jurin's argument exposed. 

§ 113. — Eichter's objections share the same fate. — The author 
concludes this chapter with some supplementary notes and illus- 
trations, in which he unfolds the following particulars : (a) "Why 
the undetermined idea of finite time, also includes the portion of 
time infinitely small ? (6) Leibnitz's method of computing pow- 
ers can not even be admitted under the condition of finite (lim- 
ited) velocity, (c) Why time must necessarily enter into the 
computation of the obstacles occasioned by gravity. 

Chapter III.— A View of a New Method of Computing the Living Powers ; 
Being the Only True Measure of Natural Powers. 

§ 114. — -That law, which has been found inapplicable in Mathe- 
matics, may nevertheless apply to Natural Philosophy. 

§ 115. — Distinction between mathematical and natural bodies, 
and between the laws relative to both. 

§ 116. — Yelocity affords no just idea of power. 

§ 117. — There would be no power, if there were no effort to 
preserve the status in se; illustration of the idea of intension. 

§ 118. — If intension be comparable with a point, power resembles 
a line, namely that of velocity. 

§ 119. — If intension be finite, i. e. like a line, power is compar- 
able with a square. 

§ 120. — A body, that manifests an internal effort to preserve its 
motion free and constant, has a power analogous to the square of 
velocity. 

§ 121. — A body can not acquire its living power from without. 

§ 122. — There is an infinite number of intermediate degrees be- 
tween dead and living power ; — the latter can arise only in a finite 
time, after the beginning of motion. 

§ 123. — That state, in which the power of bodies is not yet liv- 
ing (evolved), but is in a progressive crisis, Kant terms the vivifi- 
cation. 

§§ 124, 125. — According to a new estimation of powers, a body 
that preserves its velocity, in free motion, in infinitum undiminished, 
possesses living power, i. e. such a power as can be estimated by 
the square of velocity. 

§ 126. — -As there are free motions, there are likewise living 
powers. — Mathematics admit no free motions. 

§ 127. — An easier method of applying these reflections to ad« 
vantage. 57 



890 Kant's Ethics. 

§ 128. — Bernouilli was not unacquainted with these ideas. "Vis 
viva," says he, " est aliquid reale et substantial, quod per se sub- 
sists, et quantum in se est, non dependit ab alio : — Vis mortua non 
est aliquid absolutum et per se durans," etc. 

§ 129. — The living powers are of an accidental nature. 

§§ 130, 131. — Experience confirms the successive vivification. 

§§ 132, 133. — Vivification is not applicable to all velocities in 
general ; — application of this rule to motion, in a resisting medium. 

§§ 134, 135. — Whether vivification and free motion, in all the 
higher degrees of velocity, are possible in infinitum. 

§§ 136-138. — The living power may in part vanish, without 
having produced any effect. 

§§ 139, 140. — The phenomena of those bodies which overcome 
gravity, neither manifest any living power, nor do they militate 
against it. 

§ 141. — Soft bodies do not operate with their collective power. 

§§ 142, 143. — Query: whether the effect of bodies, without dis- 
tinction, is proportional to the mass of their living power. 

§§ 144, 145. — The mass, in which a body can produce effects 
proportional, to its living power, must be determined; smaller 
masses, under a certain size, can not produce that effect. 

§§ 146, 147. — Fluid bodies operate in proportion to the square 
of velocity. 

§§ 148-151. — The motions of elastic bodies are inconsistent with 
the computation of Leibnitz, but they agree with that of Kant. 

§§ 152, 153. — Mechanical proof of the living powers, by Musch- 
enbroek. 

§§ 154, 155. — A spring of equal elasticity communicates a greater 
degree of power to a larger body than to a smaller one. 

§§ 156-158. — Whence the squares of velocities of cylinders are 
in an inverse ratio to the masses. 

§§ 159-161. — In the effect of gravity, time ought to be computed; 
— soft substances are of a very different nature. 

§ 162. — The force of resistance of soft matter takes place with 
finite velocity. 

Appendix XV. — How to Study Kant. 

1. — Every day, before beginning to study, read Job, xxxiv., 31, 
32, on your knees, on every occasion. (See page 319 above.) 

II. — Eead Semple's translation of Kant's Ethics. If you read 
forty pages a day, it will take you a week ; if you read ten pages 
a day, it will take from you a month. Pay no attention to any in- 
troduction or preface by any person. If you come to a paragraph 



The Clavis to an Index. 891 

which you do not understand, waste no time in seeking for explana- 
tion ; but note your difficulty upon the margin with your pencil, 
and go on. 

III. — Read Meiklejohn's translation of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason. If you read forty pages a day, it will occupy you about 
two weeks ; if you read ten pages a day, it will require two months. 
Waste no time in seeking for explanation of any passage which 
you do not understand ; but make a pencil note on the margin, 
and go on. 

IV. — Read Semple's translation of Kant's Ethics. Be sure that 
you understand every word. In regard to every doubtful point, 
search diligently through the Ethics and the Critique for explana- 
tion. Search nowhere else. Whenever you are perplexed, you 
will probably remember that there is a paragraph somewhere, 
either in the Ethics or in the Critique, which you have seen, which 
will perhaps throw light on the difficulty. Find that paragraph, 
even if it takes a month, and make a full note of it on the margin. 
Then go on. 

V. — Read Meiklejohn's translation of Kant's Critique. Be sure 
that you understand every word. In regard to every doubtful 
point, search diligently through the Critique and the Ethics, for 
passages which you remember seeing somewhere there, which you 
think will help you. Never give up. Never look elsewhere. Note 
every reference and every explanation on the margin. 

If you follow this programme earnestly [Dharmapada 30, page 
271 above], you will complete the second reading of the two books 
specified (which together will cost you about $6) in about eighteen 
months. 

VI. — Read Semple's translation of Kant's Ethics. (See § 983, 

page 320 above.) 

Revelation. 

XIX. 11. — And I saw heaven opened, and behold a white 

horse, and he who sat upon him, called Faithful and True ; and 

in righteousness he judges, and makes war. 12. His eyes were 

as a flame of fire, and on his head were many crowns ; and he had 

a name written, which no one knows but he himself. 13. And he 

was clothed with a garment dipped in blood ; and his name is 

called, THE WORD OF GOD. 14. And the armies which are in 

heaven followed him upon white horses, clothed in fine linen, white, 

pure. 15. And out of his mouth goes a sharp sword, that with it 

he may smite the nations; and he will rule them with a rod of 

iron ; and he treads the wine-press of the fierceness of the wrath 

of GOD THE ALMIGHTY. 

— American Bible Union, second revision. 



892 Kant's Ethics. [Appendlx 

APPENDIX XVI. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE KORAN.t 

CHAPTEE I.— KEVEALED AT MECCA. 

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 

[«fl 1.] 1 Praise be to GOD, 2 the LORD of all creatures ; 3 the 
most merciful, 4 the king of the day of judgment. 5 Thee do we 
worship, 6 and of thee do we beg assistance. 7 Direct us in the 

t The text of the following extracts from the Koran is taken out of the 
English version of George Sale ("sixth edition, with a memoir of the trans- 
lator, and with various readings and illustrative notes from .Savary's version of 
the Koran. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1876"), which (it is stated 
on the title page) is " translated into English immediately from the original 
Arabic, with explanatory notes, taken from the most approved commentators," 
and "to which is prefixed a Preliminary Discourse," by the translator, of very 
great value. For convenience of reference, I have subdivided the extracts 
into paragraphs (marked ^ and numbered consecutively) and clauses (designated 
by numerals which I have inserted uninclosed and unexplained in the text).* 
I have retained Sale's numbering of the chapters. I have omitted the particu- 
lar title of each chapter, except so much thereof as states the place where the 
chapter was revealed, whether at Medina or at Mecca (see the fifth paragraph of 
the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse). I have retained Sale's num- 
bering of the thirty sections named Ajza (from the singular Joz) of which ex- 
planation is to be found in the ninth paragraph .of the third section of Sale's 
Preliminary Discourse: in the seventh paragraph of the third section Sale gives 
a sufficient reason for not making a division of the chapters into those smaller 
portions which (Sale says in the sixth paragraph) " we customarily call verses ; 
but the Arabic word is Ayat, the same with the Hebrew Ototh, and signifies 
signs, or wonders; such as are the secrets of GOD, his attributes, works, judg- 
ments, and ordinances, delivered in those verses;" etc. 1 have omitted certain 
letters of the alphabet with which certain chapters begin (see the twelfth 
paragraph of the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse). For detailed 
reference to my omissions from the text, see the notes. Omissions of entire 
notes are made by me in silence : omissions of parts of notes are indicated. 
References appended to the notes (which I find printed in the form of subsidi- 
ary notes, usually at the foot of the page) I have inclosed within marks of 
parenthesis (thus) and transposed them into the notes to which they pertain: I 
have not attempted to verify any of these references, except such of them as 
refer either to the Bible, or to the Koran, or to the Preliminary Discourse ; of 
the rest the verification requires works which I do not possess, and also in 
many instances scholarship, which I do not possess. I have retained many of 
the various readings and some of the notes from Savary : for these lam wholly 
indebted to the edition published by Lippincott & Co.; I am too ignorant of 
French to be willing to undertake the task of verification, a task which would 
exact from me a sacrifice of time altogether disproportionate to the compara- 
tively worthless result which I would attain. I have added some various read- 



to §968.] ^ ie Clavis to an Index. 893 

right way, 8 in the way of those to whom thou hast been gracious ; 
9 not of those against whom thou art incensed, 10 nor of those 
who go astray. 

ings and notes selected by me from the English version of the Eev. J. M. Rod- 
well, M. A., (Williams and Norgate, London and Edinburgh, 1861, to the 
paging of which edition are references below). 

[CHAPTER I. — The title of the chapter. I have omitted the title, except 
so much thereof as states the place where the chapter was revealed: see the 
fifth paragraph of the, third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse. In a note 
upon that portion of the title which I have omitted, after stating what it is in 
Arabic (giving what I suppose to be an English transliteration; I do not know 
Arabic, but I do not know how a transliteration can be of any service, and 
I have omitted it), Sale proceeds as follows :] This chapter is a prayer, 
and held in great veneration by the Mohammedans, who give it several other 
honorable titles; as the chapter of prayer, of praise, of thanksgiving, of treasure, 
etc. They esteem it as the quintessence of the whole Koran, and often repeat 
it in their devotions both public and private, as the Christians do the Lord's 
Prayer. (Vide Bobovium de Precib. Mohammed., page 3, et seq.) — Sale. 

[IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD.— See the tenth 
paragraph of the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse. I find inserted 
(I do not know by whom: the Advertisement printed at page xvi. of the 
edition published by J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, from which I am 
taking these extracts, begins as follows: "The present Edition of Sale's Trans- 
lation of the Koran will, it is hoped, be found to possess some advantages over 
every other. Many useful notes, and several hundred various readings, are 
added from the French version by Savary") among Sale's notes a note by 
Savary, of which the following is the first part :] " This formula is prefixed to 
all the chapters (with the exception of one [the ninth]). It is expressly recom- 
mended in the Koran. The Mohammedans pronounce it whenever they 
slaughter an animal, and at the commencement of their reading, and of all im- 
portant actions." — Sava.ry. [I find printed in Rodwell's preface (page xxvi.) 
Lieutenant Burton's version of this chapter. Rodwell subjoins to Burton's ver- 
sion a quotation from which I take the following words : "'I have endeavored,' 
he adds, 'in this translation to imitate the imperfect rhyme of the original 
Arabic. Such an attempt, however, is full of difficulties.' " (See a few lines 
below.) Burton's version begins as follows :] " In the Name of Allah, the Mer- 
ciful, the Compassionate ! " — Burton. [Rodwell's own version is as follows :] 
" In the Name of GOD, the Compassionate, the Merciful." — Rodwell (page 11). 

[1 1.] [Clause 2.} The original words are Rabbi 'lalamina, which literally 
signify, LORD of the worlds; but alamina, in this and other places of the 
Koran, properly means the three species of rational creatures, men, genii, and 
angels. Father Maracci has endeavored to prove from this passage that 
Mohammed believed a plurality of worlds, which he calls the error of the 
Manichees. etc. (In Prodromo ad Refut. Alcorani, part iv., p. 76, et in notis ad 
Ale. cap. 1): but this imputation the learned Reland has shown to be entirely 
groundless (De Religione Mohammed., p. 262). — Sale. Savary translates it 
"Sovereign of the worlds." 

[Clauses 1-10 inclusive.] " Praise be to GOD, LOPvD i of the worlds ! The 
compassionate, the merciful ! King on the day of reckoning ! Thee only do we 



894 Kant's Ethics. [Appendix 

CHAPTEE II.— REVEALED PARTLY AT MECCA, AND 
PARTLY AT MEDINA. 

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 

[^[ 2.] 1 There is no doubt in this book ; 2 it is a direction to 
the pious, 3 who believe in the mysteries of faith, 4 who observe 
the appointed times of prayer, 5 and distribute alms^ out of what 

worship, and to Thee do we cry for help. Guide Thou us on the straight path,t 
the path of those to whom Thou hast been gracious ; — with whom Thou art not 
angry, and who go not astray." — Rodwtll. [t At the foot of the page, with ref- 
erence to the word path, Eodwell prints the single word Islam.] [+ Here and 
throughout the following pages of the clavis, I print the words GOD and LORD 
in capital letters, an improvement which I believe was suggested to me by the 
example of the common English version of the Bible at Deuteronomy, xxviii., 
58 (see page 99 above). If I have done wrong, the fault must not be ascribad 
to Rod well nor to Sale.] 

[Clauses 5-10 inclusive.] " Thee alone do we worship, and of thee alone do 
we ask aid. Guide us to the path that is straight — The path of those to whom 
thy love is great, Not those on whom is hate, Nor they that deviate. Amen." — 
From IAeut. Bin-ton's version of this chapter, which is printed in RodvielUs pre- 
face, page xxvi. [See page 893 line 32, above.] 

[Clauses 7-10 inclusive.] This last sentence contains a petition, that GOD 
would lead the supplicants into the true religion, by which is meant the Mo- 
hammedan, in the Koran often called the right way; in this place more particu- 
larly denned to be, the way of those to uhom GOD hath been gracious, that is, of 
the prophets and faithful who preceded Mohammed ; under which appellations 
are also comprehended the Jews and Christians, such as they were in the times of 
their primitive purity, before they hud deviated from their respective institu- 
tions; not the way of the modern Jews, whose signal calamities are marks of the 
just anger of GOD against them for their obstinacy and disobedience ; nor of 
the Christians of this age, who have departed from the true doctrine of Jesus, 
and are bewildered in a labyrinth of error. ( Jallalo'ddin, al Beidawi, etc.) 

This is the common exposition of the passage ; though al Zamakhshari, and 
some others, by a different application of the negatives, refer the whole to the 
true believers; and then the sense will run thus : The way of those to whom thou 
hast been gracious, against whom thou art not incensed, and who have not erred. 
"Which translation the original will very well bear. — Sale. 

[CHAPTER II.— The title of the chapter. I have omitted the title of the 
chapter, except so much thereof as states the place where the chapter was re- 
vealed : see note t page 892 above.] 

\f{ 2.] [Clause 1. I have omitted certain letters of the alphabet with which 
the second chapter begins : see the twelfth paragraph of the third section of 
Sale's Preliminary Discourse.] 

[Clause 3 — Mysteries.] The Arabic word is gheib, which properly signifies a 
thing that is absent, at a great distance, or invisible, such as the resurrection, par- 
adise, and hell. And this is agreeable to the language of scripture, which defines 
faith to be the evidence of things not seen. (Heb. xi, 1. See also Romans viii, 
24, 25. II Cor. iv, 18 and v. 7.)— Sale. 



to § 968 .] The Clavis to an Index. 895 

we have bestowed on them, 6 and who believe in that revelation, 
7 which hath been sent down unto thee 8 and that which hath 
been sent down unto the prophets before thee, 9 and have firm as- 
surance of the life to come : 10 these are directed by their LORD, 
11 and they shall prosper. 

[^[ 3.] 1 As for the unbelievers, 2 it will be equal to them 
whether thou admonish them, 3 or do not admonish them ; 4 they 
will not believe. 5 GOD hath sealed up their hearts and their 
hearing; 6 a dimness covereth their sight, 7 and they shall suffer 
a grievous punishment. 8 There are some who say, 9 We believe 
in GOD, 10 and the last day ; 11 but are not really believers : 12 
they seek to deceive GOD, 13 and those who do believe, 14 but they 
deceive themselves only, 15 and are not sensible thereof. 16 There 
is an infirmity in their hearts, 17 and GOD hath increased that in- 
firmity ; 18 and they shall suffer a most painful punishment, 19 
because they have disbelieved. 20 GOD shall mock at them, 21 
and continue them in their impiety ; 22 they shall wander in con- 

[lf 2.] [Clauses 2-11, inclusive.] "It is a guidance to the God-fearing, who 
helieve in the unseen, who observe prayer, and out of what we have bestowed on 
them, expend for God; and who believe in what hath been sent down to thee, 
and in what hath been sent down before thee, and full faith have they in the life 
to come : these are guided by their LORD; and with these it shall be well." — 
Rodwell (page 429). 

[Clause 8.] The Mohammedans believe that GOD gave written revelations 
not only to Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, but to several other prophets ; (vide 
Keland. de Eelig. Moham, p. 84, et Dissert, de Samaritanis, p. 34, etc.) ; 
though they acknowledge none of those which preceded the Koran to be now 
extant, except the Pentateuch of Moses, the Psalms of David, and the Gospel of 
Jesus ; which yet they say were even before Mohammed's time altered and cor- 
rupted by the Jews and Christians ; and therefore will not allow our present 
copies to be genuine. — Sale. 

[Clause 9. — The life to come.'] The original word al-a.kherat properly signi- 
fies the latter part of any thing, and by way of excellence, the next life, the latter 
or future state after death ; and is opposed to al-donya, this world; and al-oula, 
the former or present life. The Hebrew word ahharith, from the same root, is 
used by Moses in this sense, and is translated latter end. (Numbers xxiv. 20. 
Deuteronomy viii, 16.) — Sale. 

[If 3.] [Clause 5, 6.] "Their hearts and their ears hath GOD sealed up ; and 
over their eyes is a covering." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 12-15 inclusive.] "Pain would they deceive GOD and those who 
have believed; but they deceive themselves only, and know it not." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 16, 17.] "Diseased are their hearts ! And that disease hath GOD 
increased to them." — Rodwell (page 430). 

[Clauses 19, 20.] I have omitted ninety-two words of Sale's text between 
clause 19 and clause 20. 

[Clauses 20-22 inclusive.] "GOD shall mock at them, and keep them long in 
their rebellion, wandering in perplexity." — Rodwell (page 430.) 



896 Kant 's Ethics. [Appendix 

fusion. 23 These are the men who have purchased error at the price 
of true direction : 24 but their traffic hath not been gainful, 25 
neither have they been rightly directed. 26 They are like unto one 
who kindleth a fire, 27 and when it hath enlightened all around 
him, 28 GOD taketh away their light 29 and leaveththem in dark- 
ness, 30 they shall not see ; 31 they are deaf, 32 dumb, 33 and blind, 
34 therefore will they not repent. 35 Or like a stormy cloud from 
heaven, 36 fraught with darkness, 37 thunder, 38 and lightning, 
39 they put their fingers in their ears 40 because of the noise of the 
thunder, 41 for fear of death; 42 GOD encompasseth the infidels : 
43 the lightning wanteth but little of taking away their sight ; 44 
so often as it enlighteneth them, 45 they walk therein, 46 but when 
darkness cometh on them, 47 they stand still ; 48 and if GOD so 
pleased, 49 he would certainly deprive them of their hearing and 
their sight, 50 for GOD is almighty. 

[^[ 4.] 1 O men of Mecca, 2 serve your LOKD who hath created 
you, 3 and those who have been before you: 4 peraclventure ye 
will fear him ; 5 who hath spread the earth as a bed for you, 6 and 
the heaven as a covering, 7 and hath caused water to descend from 
heaven, 8 and thereby produced fruits for your sustenance. 9 Set not 

[Clause 26.] In this passage, Mohammed compares those who believed not on 
him, to a man who wants to kindle a fire, hut as soon as it burns up, and the 
flames give a light, shuts his eyes lest he should see. As if he had said : You, 
Arabians, have long desired a prophet of your own nation, and now I am sent 
unto you, and have plainly proved m3 r mission by the excellence of my doctrine 
and revelation, you resist conviction, and refuse to believe in me; therefore shall 
GOD leave you in your ignorance. — Sale. 

[Clause 27.] The sense seems to be here imperfect, and may be completed by 
adding the 'words he turns from it, shuts his eyes, or the like. — Sale 

[Clauses 35-38.] Here he compares the unbelieving Arabs to people caught 
in a violent storm. To perceive the beauty of this comparison, it must be ob- 
served, that the Mohammedan doctors say, this tempest is a type or image of 
the Koran itself : the thunder signifying the threats therein contained; the 
lightning, the promises ; and the darkness, the mysteries. The terror of the 
threats makes them stop their ears, unwilling to hear truths so disagreeable; 
when the promises are read to them, they attend with pleasure ; but when any 
thing mysterious or difficult of belief occurs, they stand stock still, and will not 
submit to be directed. — Sale. 

[Clauses 35-42 inclusive.] "Or like those who, when there cometh a storm- 
cloud out of the Heaven, big with darkness thunder and lightning, thrust their 
fingers into their ears because of the thunder-clap, for fear of death ! GOD is 
round about the infidels." — Roc/well. 

[1f 4.] [Clause 1. In the Chandos classics edition (Frederick Warne and Co., 
London), the word Mecca is printed in italics, and also in Kodwell's edition.] 

[Clauses 1, 2.] "0 men of Mecca adore your LORD, who hath created you." 
Roclwell (page 431). 



to § 96 8. J 



The Clavis to an Index. 897 



up therefore any equals unto GOD, 10 against your own knowledge. 

[^] 5.] 1 But bear good tidings 2 unto those who believe 3 and 
do good works. 

[^[ 6.] 1 How is it that ye believe not in GOD ? 2 Since ye were 
dead, 3 and he gave you life ; 4 he will hereafter cause you to die, 
5 and will again restore you to life ; 6 then shall ye return unto 
him. 7 It is he who hath created for you whatsoever is on earth ; 

8 he knoweth all things. 

[^[ 7.] 1 children of Israel, 2 remember my favor wherewith I 
have favored you; 3 and perform you?- covenant with me, 4 and I 
will perform my covenant with you ; 5 and revere me : 6 and 
believe in the revelation which I have sent down, 7 confirming that 
which is with you, 8 and be not the first who believe not therein, 

9 neither exchange my signs for a small price ; 10 and fear me. 
11 Clothe not the truth with vanity, 12 neither conceal the truth 
against your own knowledge ; 13 observe the stated times of prayer, 
14 and pay your legal alms, 15 and bow down yourselves with 
those who bow down. 18 Will ye command men to do justice, 
17 and forget your own souls ? 18 yet ye read the book of the law : 
19 do ye not therefore understand ? 20 Ask help with persever- 
ance and prayer ; 21 this indeed is grievous, unless to the humble, 
22 who seriously think they shall meet their LOED, 23 and that to 

[f 4.] [Clause 10. I have omitted sixty-one words of Sale's text immediately 
after the end of clause 10.] 

[^ 5.] [Clauses 2, 3.] "To those who believe and do the things that are right." 
— Rodwell (page 431.) [Clause 3. I have omitted one hundred and fifty-nine 
words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 3.] 

[If 6.] [Clause 3.] i. e. Ye were dead while in the loins of your fathers, and 
he gave you life in your mothers' wombs; and after death ye shall be again 
raised at the resurrection. ( Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. [See If 39.] 

[Clauses 7, 8. I have omitted sixteen words of Sale's text between clause 7 and 
clause 8.] [Clause 8. I have omitted three hundred and forty-six words of 
Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 8.] 

[1f 7.] [Clause 9.] '-Corrupt not my doctrine for vile gain. Fear me." — Savary. 

[Clauses 1-19.] "O children of Israel! remember my favor wherewith I shewed 
favor upon you, and be true to your covenant with me ; I will be true to my 
covenant with you ; me therefore, revere me ! and believe in what I have sent 
down confirming your Scriptures, and be not the first to disbelieve it, neither for 
a mean price barter my signs : me therefore, fear ye me ! And clothe not the 
truth with falsehood, and hide not the truth when ye know it : and observe 
prayer, and pay the legal impost, and bow down with those who bow. Will ye 
enjoin what is right upon others, and forget yourselves ? Yet ye read the Book : 
will ye not understand?" — Rodwell (page 434). 

[Clauses 20-22.] "And seek help with patience and prayer : a hard duty 
indeed is this, but not to the humble, who bear in mind that they shall meet 
their LOED,"— Rodwell. 



898 Kant's Ethics. [Appendix 

him they shall return. 24 O children of Israel, 25 remember my 
favor wherewith I have favored you, 26 and that I have preferred 
you above all nations: 27 dread the day wherein one soul shall not 
make satisfaction for another soul, 28 neither shall any intercession 
be accepted from them, 29 nor shall any compensation be received, 
30 neither shall they be helped. 

[^[ 8.] 1 Surely those who believe, 2 and those who Judaize, 
3 and Christians, 4 and Sabians, 5 whoever believeth in GOD, 6 
and the last day, 7 and doth that which is right, 8 they shall 
have their reward with their LOKD ; 9 there shall come no fear on 
them, 10 neither shall they be grieved. 

[Clauses 28-30.] "Nor shall any intercession be accepted from them, nor shall 
any ransom be taken, neither shall they be helped." — Rodwell (page 435.) 

[Clause 30. I have omitted four hundred and ninety words of Sale's text im- 
mediately after the end of clause 30.] 

[If 8.] [Clause 4. Sale's note is appended to clause 4, but I suppose that it 
refers to the entire paragraph, except perhaps the eighth clause, which does not 
appear near the end of f 83.] From these words, which are repeated in the fifth 
chapter, [at the end off 83], several writers (Selden. de Jure. Nat. et Gentium 
sec. Hebr. 1. 6, c. 12. Angel, a. S. Joseph. Gazophylac. Persic, p. 365. Nic. 
Cusanus in Cribratione Alcorani, 1. 3, c. 2, etc.,) have wrongly concluded that 
the Mohammedans hold it to be the doctrine of their prophet that every man 
may be saved in his own religion, provided he be sincere and lead a good life. 
It is true, some of their doctors do agree this to be the purport of the words ; 
(see Chardin's Voyages, vol. ii, p. 326, 331) ; but then they say the latitude 
hereby granted was soon revoked, for that this passage is abrogated by several 
others in the Koran, which expressly declare that none can be saved who is not 
of the Mohammedan faith ; and particularly by those words of the third chapter, 
Whoever followeth any other religion than Islam (i. e. the Mohammedan), it shall 
not be accepted of him, and at the last day he shall be of those who perish. 
(Abu'lkasem Hebatallah de Abrogante et Abrogato.) However, others are of 
opinion that this passage is not abrogated, but interpret it differently ; taking 
the meaning of it to be, that no man, whether he be a Jew, a Christian, or a Sabian, 
shall be excluded from salvation, provided he quit his erroneous religion and 
become a Moslem, which they say is intended by the following words, Whoever 
believeth in GOD and the last day, and doth that which is right. [I omit the 
remainder of Sale's note.] (Vide Reland. de Eel. Moham. p. 128, etc.) — Sale. 

"Verily, they who believe (Muslims), and they who follow the Jewish religion, 
and the Christians, and the Sabeites t — whoever of these believeth in GOD and 
the last day, and doeth that which is right, shall have their reward with their 
LORD : fear shall not come upon them, neither shall they be grieved." — Rod- 
well (pages 436, 437). (t The Sabeites are identical with the Mendaites, or so- 
called Christians of S. John, residing in the marshy district at the mouth of the 
Euphrates, but are not the same with the star-worshiping Sabians of Harran in 
Mesopotamia. See D'Herbelot, Bibl. Or., under the word Sabi; Assemani, Bibl. 
Or. iii. 2, 609. For curious details as to the elements of the Sabeite religion, see 
Chwolson's SSabier und SSabaismus I. — RodwelUs note.) [See Sale's Prelimi- 
nary Discourse, section i., at about the eleventh page.] 



to 5 968.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 899 



[*[| 9.] 1 They say, 2 The fire of hell shall not touch us but for a 
certain number of days. 3 Answer, 4 Have ye received any promise 
from GOD to that purpose f 5 for GOD will not act contrary to his 
promise : 6 or do ye speak concerning GOD that which ye know 
not ? 7 Verily whoso doth evil, Sand is encompassed by his iniquity, 
9 they shall be the companions of hell fire, 10 they shall remain 
therein for ever: 11 but they who believe 12 and do good works, 
13 they shall be the companions of paradise, 14 they shall continue 
therein for ever. 

[^] 10] 1 Remember also, 2 when we accepted the covenant of 
the children of Israel, 3 saying, 4 Ye shall not worship any other 
except GOD, 5 and ye shall show kindness to your parents 6 and 
kindred, 7 and to orphans, 8 and to the poor, 9 and speak that 
which is good unto men, 10 and be constant at prayer, 11 and give 
alms. 12 Afterward ye turned back, 13 except a few of you, 14 and 
retired afar off. 15 And when we accepted your covenant, 16 say- 
ing, 17 Ye shall not shed your brother's blood, 18 nor dispossess one 
another of your habitations ; 19 then ye confirmed it, 20 and were 

[If 8.] [Clause 10. T have omitted six hundred and seven words of Sale's text 
immediately after the end of clause 10.] 

[*i 9.] [Clause 2.] That is, says Jallalo'ddin, forty ; being the number of days 
that their forefathers worshiped the golden calf; after which they gave out 
that their punishment should cease. It is a received opinion among the Jews 
at present, that no person, be he ever so wicked, or of whatever sect, shall remain 
in hell above eleven months, or at most a year ; except Dathan and Abiram, 
and atheists, who will be tormented there to all eternity. (Vide Bartoloccii 
Biblioth. Eabbinic. torn. 2, p. 128, et torn. 3, p. 421.)— Sale. 

[Clause 6.] "or, Speak ye of GOD that which ye know not V— Rodwell. [Rod- 
well seems to indicate by his capital S a division (of the words directed to be 
spoken) into two alternative parts or answers.] (Rodwell's page 439.) 

[Clause 7.] By evil in this case | the commentators generally understand poly- 
theism or idolatry ; which sin, the Mohammedans believe, unless repented of in 
this life, is unpardonable, and will be punished by eternal damnation ; but all 
other sins they hold will at length be forgiven. This therefore is that irremissi- 
ble impiety, in their opinion, which in the New Testament is called the sin 
against the Holy Ghost. — Sale, [t The Chandos classics edition reads 'place.'] 

[Clauses 7-14.] "Bat they whose only gains are evil works, and who are 
environed by their sins, — they shall be inmates of the fire, therein to abide for 
ever : But they who have believed and done the things that be right, they shall 
be the inmates of Paradise, — therein to abide for ever." — Rodwell (page 439.) 

[If 10.] [Clauses 4-11.] "Worship none but GOD, and be good to your parents 
and kindred, and to orphans, and to the poor, and speak with men what is right, 
and observe prayer, and pay the stated alms." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 15-18. In the Chandos classics edition, clause 19 is the beginning 
of a new sentence : the effect of such punctuation (and I presume that it is cor- 
rect) appears to me to be to refer clauses 15-18 back to clause 1.] 



900 Kant's Ethics. [Appendix 

witnesses thereto. 21 Afterward ye were they who slew one another, 
22 and turned several of your brethren out of their houses, 23 mu- 
tually assisting each other against them with injustice and enmity ; 
24 but if they come captives unto you, 25 ye redeem them : 26 yet 
it is equally unlawful for you to dispossess them. 27 Do ye there- 
fore believe in part of the book of the law, 23 and reject other part 
thereof"? 29 But whoso among you doth this, 30 shall have no 
other reward than shame in this life, 31 and on the day of resurrec- 
tion they shall be sent to a most grievous punishment ; 32 for GOD 
is not regardless of that which ye do. 33 These are they who 
have purchased this present life, 34 at the price of that which is to 
come ; 35 wherefore their punishment shall not be mitigated, 36 
neither shall they be helped. 

[^[ 11.] 1 Dost thou not know that GOD is almighty? 2 Dost 
thou not know that unto GOD belongeth the kingdom of heaven 
and earth ? 3 neither have ye any protector or helper except GOD. 
4 Many of those unto whom the scriptures have been given, 5 
desire to render you again unbelievers, 6 after ye have believed ; 
7 out of envy from their souls, 8 even after the truth is become 
manifest unto them; 9 but forgive them, 10 and avoid them, 11 till 
GOD shall send his command; 12 for GOD is omnipotent. 13 Be 
constant in prayer, 14 and give alms ; 15 and what good ye have 
sent before for your souls, 16 ye shall find it with GOD ; 17 surely 
18 GOD seeth that which ye do. 

[Clause 21.] This passage was revealed on occasion of some quarrels which 
arose between the Jews of the tribes of Koreidha, and those of al Aws, al Nadhir, 
and al Khazraj, and came to that height that they took arms and destroyed one 
another's habitations, and turned one another out of their houses; but when any 
were taken captive, they redeemed them. When they were asked the reason of 
their acting in this manner, they answered, That they were commanded by their 
law to redeem the captives, but that they fought out of shame, lest their chiefs 
should be despised. ( Jallalo'ddin). — Sale. 

[Clauses 27, 28.] "Believe ye then part of the Book, and deny part ?" — Rod- 
well (page 440). 

[Clause 36. I have omitted eight hundred and thirty-seven words of Sale's 
text immediately after the end of clause 36.] 

[f 11.] [Clauses 3, 4. I have omitted thirty words of Sale's text between 
clause 3 and clause 4.] 

[Clauses 7, 8.] " out of selfish envy, even after the truth hath been clearly 
shown them." — Rodwell (page 444). 

[Clauses 9-12 inclusive.] " But forgive them, and shun them till GOD shall 
come in with his working. Truly GOD hath power over all things." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 13-18 inclusive.] "And observe prayer, and pay the legal impost :f 
and whatever good thing ye have sent on before for your soul's sake, ye shall 
find it with GOD. Verily GOD seeth what ye do." — Rodwell. (t In all Mu- 
hammadan countries the first time of prayer is the moghreb or sunset, or rather, 



to 5 968.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 901 



[^[ 12.] 1 They say, 2 Yerily none shall enter paradise, 3 except 
they who are J ews or Christians : 4 this is their wish. 5 Say, 6 
Produce your proof of this, 7 if ye speak truth. 8 Nay, 9 but he who 
resigneth himself to GOD, 10 and doth that which is right, 
11 he shall have his reward with his LOBD : 12 there shall come 
no fear on them, 13 neither shall they be grieved. 14 The Jews 
say, 15 The Christians are grounded on nothing ; 16 and the Chris- 
tians say, 17 The Jews. are grounded on nothing : 18 yet they both 
read the scriptures. 19 So likewise say they who know not the 
scripture, 20 according to their saying, t 21 But GOD shall judge 
between them 22 on the day of the resurrection, 23 concerning that 
about which they now disagree. 

[^J 13.] 1 Who is more unjust than he who prohibiteth the 
temples of GOD, 2 that his name should be remembered therein, 3 
and who hasteth to destroy them ? 4 Those men can not enter 
therein, 5 but with fear: 6 they shall have shame in this world, 7 
and in the next a grievous punishment. 8 To GOD belongeth the 

four minutes later ; the second the eshe, when it has become quite dark; the third 
the soobh or fegr, the daybreak; the fourth, doohr, or a little after noon, when 
the sun has begun to decline; the fifth, the asr, midway between noon and 
nightfall. The obligatory legal alms or impost are called, as here, zekah (lit. 
purity), the voluntary, sudackah. It is, however, left to the conscience of indi- 
viduals to give and to apply them as they think fit. — RodwelVs note.) [See a 
more particular explanation in Sale's Preliminary Discourse, section iv.] 

[^f 12.] [Clause 3.] This passage was revealed on occasion of a dispute which 
Mohammed had with the Jews of Medina, and the Christians of Najran, each of 
them asserting that those of their religion only should be saved. ( Jallal'n) — Sale. 

[Clause 9.] Literally, resigneth his face, etc. — Sale. 

[Clauses 8-11.] "But they who set their face with resignation Godward, 
and do what is right, — their reward is with their LORD." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 15.] The Jews and Christians are here accused of denying the 
truta of each other's religion, notwithstanding they read the scriptures. 
Whereas the Pentateuch bears testimony to Jesus, and the gospel bears testi- 
mony to Moses. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

% [Clauses 19, 20.] "So with like words say they who have no knowledge."! — 
Rodwell. (f The idolatrous Arabs. — RodwelVs note.) 

[1f 13.] [Clause 1.] Or hindereth men from paying their adorations to GOD 
in those sacred places. This passage, says Jallalo'ddin, was revealed on news 
being brought that the Romans had spoiled the temple of Jerusalem ; or else 
when the idolatrous Arabs obstructed Mohammed's visiting the temple of Mecca, 
in the expedition of al Hodeibiya, which happened in the sixth year of the 
Hejra. (Vide Abu'lfedaa Yit. Moham. p. 84, etc.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 1-3.] "And who committeth a greater wrong than he who hind- 
ereth GOD's name from being remembered in his temples, and who hasteth 
to ruin them?" — Rodwell (page 445.) 

[Clauses 8-11.] " The east and the west is GOD'S: therefore, whichever way 
ye turn, there is the face of GOD." — Rodwell. 



902 Kant's Ethics. 



[Appendix 



east and the west ; 9 therefore, 10 whithersoever ye turn yourselves 
to pray, 11 there is the face of GOD ; 12 for GOD is omnipresent 
and omniscient. 

[<fl 14.] 1 They say, GOD hath begotten children : 2 GOD forbid ! 
3 To him belong eth whatever is in heaven, 4 and on earth : 5 all is 
possessed by him, 6 the Creator of heaven and earth ; 7 and when 
he decreeth a thing, 8 he only saith unto it, 9 Be, 10 and it is. 11 
And they who know not the scriptures say, 12 Unless GOD speak 
unto us, 13 or thou show us a sign, 14 we will not believe. 15 So 
said those before them, 16 according to their saying : 17 their 
hearts resemble each other. 18 We have already shown manifest 
signs unto people who firmly believe : 19 we have sent thee in 
truth, 20 a bearer of good tidings, 21 and a preacher; 22 and thou 
shalt not be questioned concerning the companions of hell. 23 
But the Jews will not be pleased with thee, 24 neither the Chris- 
tians, 25 until thou follow their religion : 26 say, 27 The direction 
of GOD is the true direction. 28 And verily if thou follow their de- 
sires, 29 after the knowledge which hath been given thee, 30 thou 
shalt find no patron or protector against GOD. 31 They to whom 
we have given the book of the Koran, 32 and who read it with its 
true reading, 33 they believe therein; 34 and whoever believeth 
not therein, 35 they shall perish. 36 O children of Israel, 37 
remember my favor wherewith 1 have favored you, 38 and that 1 
have preferred you before all nations ; 39 and dread the day where- 
in one soul shall not make satisfaction for another soul, 40 neither 
shall any compensation be accepted from them. 41 nor shall any 
intercession avail, 42 neither shall they be helped. 

[f 14.] [Clause 1.] This is spoken not only of the Christians, and of the Jews 
(for they are accused of holding Ozair, or Ezra, to be the son of GOD), but also 
the pagan Arabs, who imagined the angels, to be the daughters of GOD. — Sale. 

[Clause 2.] " No! Praise be to Him !" — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 5, 6.] "All obeyeth Him, sole maker of the heavens and of the 
e.irth ! " — -Rodwell. 

[Clauses 15-22 inclusive.] " So, with like words, said those who were before 
them : their hearts are alike : clear signs have we already shown for those who 
have firm faith : verily, with the Truth have we sent thee, a bearer of good 
tidings and a warner : and of the people of hell thou shalt not be questioned." — 
Rodwell. [Clause 80.] "thou shalt find neither helper nor protector against 
GOD."— Rodwell. 

[Clauses 31-35 ] " They to whom we have given the Book, and who read it 
as it ought to be read, — these believe therein : but whoso believeth not therein, 
shall meet with perdition." — Rodwell (page 446). 

[Clause 40.] " nor shall any ransom be taken from it," — Rodwell. 

[Clause 42. I have omitted four hundred and thirty-seven words of Sale's 
text immediately after the end of clause 42.] 



to 5 968.] The Clavis to an Index. 903 

[^[15.] 1 They say, Become Jews or Christians that ye may be 
directed. 2 Say, 3 Nay, 4 we follow the religion of Abraham 
the orthodox, 5 who was no idolator. 6 Say, 7 We believe in 
GOD, 8 and that which hath been sent down unto us, 9 and that 
which hath been sent down unto Abraham, 10 and Ismael, 11 and 
Isaac, 12 and Jacob, 13 and the tribes, 14 and that which was de- 
livered unto Moses, 15 and Jesus, 16 and that which was delivered 
unto the prophets from their LORD : 17 we make no distinction 
between any of them, 18 and to GOD are we resigned. 19 Now 
if they believe according to what ye believe, 20 they are surely 
directed, 21 but if they turn back, 22 they are in schism. 23 GOD 
shall support thee against them, 24 for he is in the hearer, the 
wise. 25 The baptism of GOD have we received, 26 and who is 
better than GOD to baptize? 27 him do we worship. 28 Say, 

[^f 15.] [Clause 4.] " the religion of Abraham, the sound in faith," | — Rodwell. 
[f In a note at this point (page 448) Rodwell refers to his note at page 252 (see 
ch. xvi., *{ 174 below), where the same expression, "sound in faith," occurs.] 
(t Ar. a Hanyf. According to a tradition in Waquidi, fol. 255, Zaid (who died 
only five years before Muhammad received his first inspiration, and undoubt- 
edly prepared the way for many of his subsequent announcements) adopted this 
term at the instance of a Christian and a Jew. who exhorted him to become a 
Hanyf. Zaid having at that time renounced idolatry, ' and being unable to 
receive either Judaism or Christianity, " What," said he, "is a Hanyf?" They 
both told him, it was the religion of Abraham, who worshiped nothing but 
GOD. On this Zaid exclaimed, "0 GOD, I bear witness that I follow the reli- 
gion of Abraham." The root, whence Hanyf is derived, means generally to 
turn from good to bad, or vice versa, and is equivalent to the verbs convert and 
pervert. — Rodwell' s note (page 252). [In a note on a passage which I have 
omitted (after the end of \ 64), in ch. iv, Sale expounds his text as follows: 
" That is, if GOD had not sent his apostle with the Koran to instruct you in 
your duty, ye had continued in idolatry and been doomed to destruction ; except 
only those who, by GOD's favor and their superior understanding, should have 
true notions of the divinity ; such, for example, as Zeid Ebn Amru Ebn Nofail, 
and Waraka Ebn Nawfal, who left idols, and acknowledged but one GOD, 
before the mission of Mohammed." On Zeid, Sale says, "vide Millium, de Mo- 
hammedismo ante Moh. p. 311 ;" and on Waraka, "see the Prelim. Disc, sect. 
ii ;" and at the end of the note Sale refers to al Beidawi.] 

[f 15.] [Clause 18.] " and to GOD are we resigned (Muslims)." — Rodwell. 
[In a note on a passage (" LOED, make us also resigned unto thee,") which 1 
have omitted (after the end of \ 14), Sale says, "The Arabic word is Moslemuna, 
in the singular Moslem, which the Mohammedans take as a title peculiar to 
themselves. The Europeans generally write and pronounce it Musulman."] 

[Clauses 21, 22.] "but if they turn back, then do they cut themselves off 
from you." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 24. " for he is the hearer, the wise." — Chandos classics edition, Lon- 
don.} " for He is the Hearer, the Knower." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 25.] By baptism.ia to be understood the religion which GOD insti- 



904 Kant's Ethics. [Appendix 

29 Will ye dispute with us concerning GOD, 30 who is our 
LOKD, 31 and your LOKD ? 32 we have our works, 33 and ye 
have your works, 34 and unto him. are we sincerely devoted. 35 
Will ye say, 36 Truly Abraham, 37 and Ismael, 38 and Isaac, 39 
and Jacob, 40 and the tribes 41 were Jews or Christians ? 42 Say, 
43 Are ye wiser, 44 or God? 45 And who is more unjust than he who 
hideth the testimony which he hath received from GOD ? 46 But 
GOD is not regardless of that which ye do 47 That people are 
j^assed away, 48 they have what they have gained, 49 and ye shall 
have what ye gain, 50 nor shall ye be questioned concerning that 
which they have done. 

[JOZ 11.] [«[ 16.] 1 The foolish men will say, 2 What hath 
turned them from their Keblah, 3 toward which they formerly 
prayed? 4 Say 5 Unto GOD belongeth the east and the west: 6 he 
directeth whom he pleaseth into the right way. 7 Thus have we 
placed you, 8 Arabia?is, 9 an intermediate f nation, 10 that ye may 
be witnesses against the rest of mankind, 11 and that the apostle 

tuted in the beginning; because the signs of it appear in the person who pro- 
fesses it, as the signs of water appear in the clothes of him that is baptized. 
(Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

"Islam is the Baptism of GOD.'' — Rodwell. (The original simply has Bap- 
tism of GOD. — Beginning of RodweWs note.) 

[Clause 29.] These words were revealed because the Jews insisted that 
they first received the scriptures, that their Keblah was more ancient, and that 
no prophets could arise among the Arabs; and therefore if Mohammed was a 
prophet, he must have been of their nation. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 29-31. " Will ye dispute with us about GOD ? when He is our LOKD 
and your LOKD!" — Rod-well. 

[Clauses 42-44.] "Say: Who knowethbest, ye, or God?" — Rodwell. 

[Clause 48.] Or deserved. The Mohammedan notion, as to the imputar 
tion of moral actions to man, which they call gain, or acquisition, is suffi- 
ciently explained in the Preliminary Discourse. — Sale's note on a similar pas- 
sage [which passage I have omitted before the beginning of^f 15]. 

[Clause 48.] "They have the reward of their deeds." — Rodwell (page 449). 

[_% 16.] [Clause 3.] At first, Mohammed and his followers observed no par- 
ticular rite in turning their faces toward any certain place, or quarter of the 
world, when they prayed ; it being declared to be perfectly indifferent. (See 
before, page [902 above, If 13].) Afterward, when the prophet fled to Medina, 
he directed them to turn toward the temple of Jerusalem (probably to ingra- 
tiate himself with the Jews), which continued to be their Keblah for six or 
seven months; but either finding the Jews too intractable, or despairing other- 
wise to gain the pagan Arabs, who could not forget their respect to the temple 
of Mecca, he ordered that prayers for the future should be toward the last. 
This change was made in the second year of the Hejra (vide Abulf. Vit. Mo- 
ham, p. 54), and occasioned many to fall from him, taking offense at his incon- 
stancy. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clause 9.] This seems to be the sense of the words ; though the commenta- 



to 5 968.] The Clavis to an Index. 905 

may be a witness against you. 12 We appointed the Keblah to- 
ward which thou didst formerly pray, 13 only that we might know 
him who followeth the apostle, 14 from him who turneth back on 
the heels ; 15 though this change seem a great matter, 16 unless unto 
those whom GOD hath directed. 17 But GOD will not render 
your faith of none effect ; 18 for GOD is gracious and merciful unto 
man. 19 We have seen thee turn about thy face toward heaven 
with uncertainty, 20 but we will cause thee to turn thyself toward a 
Keblah that will please thee. 21 Turn, 22 therefore, 23 thy face 
toward the holy temple of Mecca ; 24 and wherever ye be, 25 turn 
your faces toward that place. 26 Neither is GOD regardless of 
that which ye do. 27 From what place soever thou comest forth, 
28 turn thy face toward the holy temple ; 29 and wherever ye be, 
30 thitherward turn your faces, 31 lest men have matter of dispute 
against you; 32 but as for those among them who are unjust doers, 
33 fear them not, 34 but fear me, 35 that I may accomplish my 
grace upon you, 36 and that ye may be directed. 37 As we have 
sent unto you an apostle from among you, 38 to rehearse our signs 
unto you, 39 and to purify you, 40 and to teach you the book of the 
Koran 41 and wisdom, 42 and to teach you that which ye knew 
not : 43 therefore remember me, 44 and I will remember you, 45 
and give thanks uuto me, 46 and be not unbelievers. 

[^| 17.] 1 true believers, 2 beg assistance with patience and 
prayer, 3 for GOD is with the patient. 4 And say not of those who 

tors ( Jallalo'ddin, Yahya, etc.) will have the meaning to be, that the Arabians 
are here declared to be a most just and good nation. — Sale. 

t[i. e. in the right way, in the path of the mean. See the Confucian Doctrine 
of the Mean, ch. xiii. (page 110 above) ; and Arist. Nic. Eth. II. vi, 6 (page 429 
above).] [Clauses 7-9 inclusive.] "Thus have we made you a central people," J 
— Rodwell. (JOr, intermediate, i. e., according to the commentators, not addicted 
to excess, just. — First part of RodweWs note, page 449.) 

[Clause 10.] We have established you, O chosen people, to bear witness 
against the rest of the nation, as your apostle will bear it against you." — Savary. 

[Clause 14. On the heels : on his heels. — Chandos classics edition.'] 

[Clauses 15, 16.] "The change is a difficulty, but not to those whom GOD 
hath guided." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 17.] Or will not suffer it to go without its reward, while ye prayed 
toward Jerusalem.— Sale. 

[Clauses 25, 26. I have omitted one hundred and ninety-one words of Sale's 
text between clause 25 and clause 26.] 

[Clause 37.] That is, of your own nation. — Sale. 

" And we sent to you an apostle from among yourselves." — Rodwell (page 450) . 

[Clause 46.] "and be not ungrateful." — Rodwell. 

[If 17.] Clauses 1-3 inclusive.] "O ye who believe! seek help with patience 
and with prayer, for GOD is with the patient." — Rodwell. 

58 



906 Kant's Ethics. {Appendix 

are slain in fight for the religion of GOD, 5 that they are dead ; 6 yea, 
7 they are living : 8 but ye do not understand. 9 We will surely 
prove you 10 by afflicting you in some measure with fear, 11 and 
hunger, 12 and decrease of wealth, 13 and loss of lives, 14 and 
scarcity of fruits : 15 but bear good tidings unto the patient, 16 who, 
17 when a misfortune befalleth them, 18 say, 19 We are GOD's, 20 
and unto him shall we surely return. 21 Upon them shall be 
blessings from their LOJRD 22 and mercy, 23 and they are the 
rightly directed. 

[11"18.] 1 For I am easy to be reconciled 2 and merciful. 3 
Surely 4 they who believe not, 5 and die in their unbelief, 6 npon 
them shall be the curse of GOD, 7 and of the angels, 8 and of all 
men ; 9 they shall remain under it for ever, 10 their punishment 
shall not be alleviated, 11 neither shall they be regarded. 12 
Your GOD is one GOD ; 13 there is no GOD but He, 14 the most 
merciful. 15 Now 16 in the creation of heaven and earth, 17 and 
the vicissitude of night and day, 18 and in the ship which saileth 
in the sea, 19 loaden with what is profitable for mankind, 20 and 
In the rain water which GOD sendeth from heaven, 21 quickening 
thereby the dead earth, 22 and replenishing the .same with all 
sorts of cattle, 23 and in the change of winds, 24 and the clouds 
that are compelled to do service 25 between heaven and earth, 26 
are signs to people of understanding : 27 yet some men take idols 
beside GOD, 28 and love them as with the love due to GOD ; 29 but 

[Clause 4.] The original words are literally, who are slain in the way of 
GOD. [I omit the remainder of Sale's note. See, immediately, If 23, clauses 
12-16 inclusive (page 911 below).] — Sale. 

[Clause 20. I have no doubt that Sale's reference is to clause 19 also.] An 
expression frequently in the mouths of the Mohammedans, when under any 
great affliction, or in any imminent danger. — Sale. 

[Clause 23, I have omitted one hundred and nine words of Sale's text im- 
mediately after the end of clause 23.] 

[If 18.] [Clauses 1, 2.] "for I am He who Turnetb, the Merciful."— Rod- 
well (page 451). 

[Clauses 3-5 inclusive.] Verily, they who are infidels and die infidels. ". — 
Rodwell. 

[Clauses 10, 11.] "their torment shall not be lightened, and GOD will not 
even look upon them." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 11.] Or, as Jallalo'ddin expounds it, GOD will not wait for their 
repentance. — Sale. 

[Clauses 13, 14.] "there is no GOD but He, the Compassionate, the Mer- 
ciful." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 15-17 inclusive.] "Assuredly in the creation of the heavens and of 
the earth; and in the alternation of night and day." — Rodwell (page 452). 

[Clause 24.] The original word signifies properly that are p?*essed or com- 



to § 968. J 



The Clavis to an Index. 907 



the true believers 30 are more fervent in love toward GOD. 31 
Oh that they who act unjustly did perceive, 32 when they behold 
their punishment, 33 that all power belongeth unto GOD, 34 and 
that he is severe in punishing ! 35 When those who have been 
followed 36 shall separate themselves from their followers, 37 and 
shall see the punishment, 38 and the cords of relation between 
them shall be cut in sunder ; 39 the followers shall say, 40 If we 
could return to life, 41 we would separate ourselves from them, 42 
as they have now separated themselves from us. 43 So GOD will 
show them their works \ 44 they shall sigh grievously, 45 and 
shall not come forth from the fire of hell. 

[^T 19.] 1 O men, 2 eat of that which is lawful and good on the 
earth ; 3 and tread not in the steps of the devil, 4 for he is your 
open enemy. 5 Verily 6 he comniandeth you evil and wickedness, 
7 and that ye should say that of GOD which ye know not. 8 And 
when it is said unto them who believe not, 9 Follow that which GOD 
hath sent down ; 10 they answer, 11 Nay, 12 but we will follow 
that which we found our fathers practise. 13 What ? 14 though 
their fathers knew nothing, 15 and were not rightly directed? 
16 The unbelievers are like unto one who crieth aloud to that which 
heareth not so much as his calling, 17 or the sound of his voice. 
18 They are deaf, 19 dumb, 20 and blind, 21 therefore they do not un- 
derstand. 22 O true believers, 23 eat of the good things which we 
have bestowed on you for food, 24 and return thanks unto GOD, 
25 if ye serve him. 26 Verily 27 he hath forbidden you to eat that 

petted to do personal service without hire; which kind of service is often exacted 
by the eastern princes of their subjects, and is called by the Greek and Latin 
writers Angaria. The scripture often mentions this sort of compulsion or force. 
[Matt, v., 41 ; xxvii., 82, etc.] — Sale. 

[Clause 31 ] Or it may be translated, Although the ungodly will perceive, etc. 
But some copies instead of yara, in the third person, read tara, in the second"; 
and then it must he rendered, Oh if thou didst see when the ungodly behold, 
their punishment, etc. — -Sale. 

[Clauses 85-38 inclusive.] [See ^[308 and ^j 153.] "When those who have 
had followers shall declare themselves clear from their followers after that they 
have seen the chastisement, and when the ties between them shall be cut asun- 
der." — Rodwell. ■ 

[If 19-] [Clause 16. I suppose the reference should be to clauses 16-21.] "The 
unbelievers are like unto him who heareth the sound of the voice withoutcompre- 
hending anything. Deaf, dumb, and blind, they have no understanding." — Savary. 

[Clauses 16, 17.] "The infidels resemble him who shouteth aloud to one who 
heareth no mare than a call and cry." — Rodwell (page 453). 

[Clauses 24, 25.] "and give GOD thanks if ye are his worshipers." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 26-35, inclusive.]. "But that which dieth of itself, and blood, and 
.swine's flesh, and that over which any other name than that of GOD hath been 



908 Kant's Ethics. [Appendix 

which dieth of itself, 28 and blood, 29 and swine's flesh, 30 and that 
on which any other name hut GOD's hath been invocated. 31 But 
he who is forced by necessity, 32 not lusting, 33 nor returning to 
transgress, 34 it shall be no crime in him if he eat of those things, 
35 for GOD is gracious and merciful. 

[*J[ 20.] 1 It is not righteousness thatye turn your faces in prayer 
toward the east and the west, 2 but righteousness is of him who 
believeth in GOD 3 and the last day, 4 and the angels, 5 and the 
scriptures, 6 and the prophets ; 7 who giveth money for GOD's 
sake 8 unto his kindred, 9 and unto orphans, 10 and the needy, 
11 and the stranger, 12 and those who ask, 13 and for redemption 
of captives ; 14 who is constant at prayer, 15 and giveth alms ; 16 
and of those who perform their covenant, 17 when they have cov- 
enanted, 18 and who behave themselves patiently 19 in adversity, 
20 and hardships, 21 and in time of violence : 22 these are they 
who are true, 23 and these are they who fear GOD. 

[^[ 21.] 1 It is ordained you, 2 when any of you is at the point 
of death, 3 if he leave any goods, 4 that he bequeath a legacy to his 
parents, 5 and kindred, 6 according to what shall be reasonable. 
7 This is a duty incumbent on those who fear GOD. 8 But he who 
shall change the legacy, 9 after he hath heard it bequeathed by the 
dying person, 10 surely the sin thereof shall be on those who change 
it, 11 for GOD is he who heareth and knoweth. 12 Howbeit 13 he ■ 
who apprehendeth from the testator any mistake or injustice, 

invoked, is forbidden you. But he who shall partake of them by constraint, 
Avithout lust or willfulness, no sin shall be upon him. Verily GOD is Indul- 
gent, Merciful." — Rodweli. 

[Clause 30.] For this reason, whenever the Mohammedans kill any animal 
for food they always say Bisini'llah,ov In the name of GOD ; which if it be neg- 
lected, they think it not lawful to eat of it. — Sale. 

[Clause 85. I have omitted one hundred and six words of Sale's text imme- 
diately after the end of clause 35.] 

[If 20.] [Clauses 1-6, inclusive.] "There is no piety in turning your faces to- 
ward the east or the west ; but he is pious who believeth in G-OD, and the last 
day, and the angels, and the Scriptures, and the prophets." — Rod-well. 

[Clause 7. for GOD's sake.'] "for the love of GOD." — Rodweli. 

[Clauses 14-23 inclusive.] "who observeth prayer, and payeth the legal 
alms, and who is of those who are faithful to their engagements when they have 
engaged in them, and patient under ills and hardships, and in time of trouble : 
these are they who are just, and these are they who fear the LORD." — Rod- 
well (page 454). 

[Clause 23. I have omitted one hundred and four words of Sale's text imme- 
diately after the end of clause 23.] 

[If21.] [Clause 6.] That is, the legacy was not to exceed a third part of the 
testator's substance, nor to be given where there was no necessity. But this in- 
junction is abrogated by the law concerning inheritances. — Sale. 



t0§968>] The Clavis to an Index. 909 

14 and shall compose the matter between them, 15 that shall be 
no crime in him, 16 for GOD is gracious and merciful. 

[*|J 22.] 1 O true believers, 2 a fast is ordained you, 3 as it was 
ordained unto those before you, 4 that ye may fear GOD. 5 A certain 
number of days shall ye fast : 6 but he among you who shall be 
sick, 7 or on a journey, 8 shall fast an equal number of other days. 
9 And those who can keep it, 10 and -do not, 11 must redeem 
their neglect 12 by maintaining of a poor man. 13 And he who 
voluntarily dealeth better with the poor man than he is obliged, 14 
this shall be better for him. 15 But if ye fast 16 it will be better 
for you, 17 if ye knew it. 18 The month of Ramadan shall ye fast, 

[Clause 14.] "and shall make a settlement between the parties." — Rodwell. 

[^[22.] [Clause 9.] The expositors differ much about the meaning of this 
passage, thinking it very improbable that people should be left entirely at lib- 
erty either to fast or not, on compounding for it in this manner. Jallalo'ddin 
therefore supposes the negative particle not to be understood, and that this is 
allowed only to those who are not able to fast, by reason of age or dangerous 
sickness: but afterward he says, that in the beginning of Mohammedism it was 
free for them to choose whether they would fast or maintain a poor man ; which 
liberty was soon after taken away, and this passage abrogated by the following : 
Therefore let him who shall be present in this month, fast the same month. Yet 
this abrogation, he says, does not extend to women with child, or that give 
suck, le'st the infant suffer. Al Zamakhshari, having first given an explanation 
of Ebn Abbas, who, by a different interpretation of the Arabic word Yotikunaho, 
which signifies can or are able to fast, renders it, Those who find great dif- 
ficulty therein, etc., adds an exposition of his own, by supposing something to 
be understood ; according to which the sense will be, Those who can fast, and 
yet have a legal excuse to break it, must redeem it, etc. — Sale. 

[Clause 12.] According to the usual quantity which a man eats in a day, 
and the custom of the country. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 18-17 inclusive.] "And he who of his own accord performeth a 
good work, shall derive good from it : and good shall it be for you to fast — if ye 
knew it." — Rodwell (page 455). 

[Clauses 18-23 inclusive.] "As to the month Ramadhan, in which the Koran 
was sent down to be man's guidance, and an explanation of that guidance, 
and of that illumination."! — Rodwell. [fRodwell, in a note at this point, refers, 
on the word Furquan, to a passage (in ch. xxi.), which I have omitted at the 
end of If 198, which Sale translates, " We formerly gave unto Moses and Aaron 
the Law, being a distinction between good and evil, and a light and admonition 
unto the pious ; " and in a note on the word distinction, Sale says, "Arab, al 
Forkan. See the Prelim. Disc. sect, iii., " near the beginning of which it is ex- 
plained that al Forkan, one of the appellations of the Koran, eommon to other 
books of scripture, is "from the verb faraka, to divide or distinguish; not, as the 
Mohammedan doctors say, because those books are divided into chapters or sec- 
tions, or distinguish between good and evil; but in the same notion that the 
Jews use the word Perek, or Pirka, from the same root, to denote a section or 
portion of scripture." Sale refers to Gol. in append, ad Gram. Arab. Erpen. 
175, and adds, "A chapter or subdivision of the Massictoth of the Mishna is 



910 Kant's Ethics. [Appendix 

19 in which the Koran was sent down from heaven, 20 a direction 
unto men, 21 and declarations of direction, 22 and the distinction 
23 between good and evil. 24 Therefore, 25 let him among you who ■ 
shall be present in this month, 26 fast the same month ; 27 but he 
who shall be sick, 28 or on a journey, 29 shall fast the like number 
of other days. 30 GOD would make this an ease unto you, 31 and 
would not make it a difficulty unto you ; 32 that ye may fulfil the 
number of days, 33 and glorify GOD, 34 for that he hath directed 
you, 35 and that ye may give thanks. 36 When, my servants ask 
thee concerning me, 37 Verily 38 I am near ; 39 I will hear the = 
prayer of him that prayeth, 40 when he prayeth unto me : 41 but 
let them hearken unto me, 42 and believe in me, 43 that they may 
be rightly directed. 

[^j 23.] 1 Thus GOD declareth his signs unto men, 2 that ye 
may fear him. 3 Consume not your wealth among yourselves in 
vain ; 4 nor present it unto judges, 5 that ye may devour part of 
men's substance unjustly, 6 against your own consciences. 7 It is 

also called Perek. Maimon. praef. in Seder Zeraim, p. 57." The same passage • 
Eodwell (page 176) translates, "We gave of old to Moses and Aaron the illu- 
mination, and a light and a warning for the God-fearing," and in a note on the • 
word illumination Kodwell says that Ar. furquan is " a word derived by Mu- 
hammad from the Jews, constantly used in the Talmud," Rodwell states its - 
equivalents in that use, and proceeds, "and meaning as in Syr. and JEth.de-- 
liverance, liberation." Eodwell refers to two passages in ch. viii., one of which 
will be found four or five lines before the end of ^117 below, and proceeds,, 
" and hence illumination, revslition, generally. The usual interpretation here 
and in other passages is," he adds, " the distinction, i. e. between good and evil,, 
lawful and unlawful. The title is applied to the Koran and Pentateuch alike. ' r ' 
— Rodwell (page 176).] 

[Clause 19.] See the Preliminary Discourse, sect. iv. — Sale. 

[Clause 25 — present.'] i..e. At home, and not in a strange country, where' 
the fast can not be performed, or on a journey. — Sale. 

[Clauses 30-35 inclusive.] "GOD wisheth you ease, but wisheth not your- 
discomfort, and that you fulfill the number of days, and that you glorify GOD' 
for his guidance, and that you be thankful." — Rodwell (page 455). 

[Clause 43. I have omitted one hundred and fifteen words of Sale's text im- 
mediately after the end of clause 43.] 

[H 23.] [Clauses!, 2.] "Thus GOD maketh his signs clear to men that they 
may fear Him." — Rodwell (page 456). 

[Clauses 4-6 inclusive.] " nor present it to judges that y r e may consume a part 
of other men's wealth unjustly, while ye knowtf/te sin which ye commit." —Rodwell. 

[Clauses 6, 7. I have omitted twenty-seven words of Sale's text between 
clause 6 and clause 7.] 

[Clause 7.] Some of the Arabs had a superstitious custom after they had 
been at Mecca (in pilgrimage, as it seems), on their return home, not to enter 
their house by the old door, but to make a hole through the back part for a pas- 
sage, which practice is here reprehended, — Sale, 



to § 9 6 8 . ] 



The Clavis to an Index. 911 



not righteousness that ye enter your houses by the back parts 
thereof, 8 but righteousness is of him who feareth GOD. 9 There- 
fore enter your houses by their doors ■; 10 and fear GOD, 11 that ye 
may be happy. 12 And fight for the religion of GOD 13 against 
those who fight against you ; 14 but transgress not 15 by attacking 
them first, 16 for GOD loveth not the transgressors. 17 And fear 
GOD, 18 and know that GOD is with those who fear him. 19 Con- 
tribute out of your substance toward the defense of the religion of 
GOD, 20 and throw not yourselves with your own hands into per- 
dition ; 21 and do good, 22 for GOD loveth those who do good. 
[^| 24.] 1 Perform the pilgrimage of Mecca, 2 and the visitation 
of GOD ; 3 and, if ye be besieged, 4 send that offering which shall 
be the easiest ; 5 and shave not your heads, 6 until your offering 
reacheth the place of sacrifice. 7 The good which ye do, 8 GOD 
knoweth it. 9 Make provision for your journey ; 10 but the best 
provision is piety : 11 and fear me, 12 ye of understanding. 13 It 
shall be no crime in you, 14 if ye seek an increase from your LORD, 
15 by trading during the pilgrimage. 16 And when ye go in proces- 
sion 17 from Arafat, 18 remember GOD 19 near the holy monument; 

[Clauses 12-16 inclusive.] "And fight for the cause of GOD against those 
who fight against you: hut commit not the injustice of attacking them first: 
GOD loveth not such injustice."' — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 16, 17.] I have omitted one hundred and forty-three words of Sale's 
text between clause 16 and clause 17.] 

[Clauses 19, 20.] "Give freely for the cause of GOD, and throw not your- 
selves with your own hands into ruin." — Rodwell (page 457). 

[Clause 20.] — i. e., Be not accessory to your own destruction, by neglecting 
your contributions toward the wars against infidels, and thereby suffering them 
to gather strength. — Sale. 

[^[24.] [Clause 2.] " and the visitation of the holy places in honor of GOD." 
— Rodwell. . 

[Clause 5.] For this was a sign they had completed their vow, and performed 
all the ceremonies of the pilgrimage. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 6, 7. I have omitted one hundred and forty-one words of Sale's 
text between clause 6 and clause 7.] 

[Clauses 9, 10.] "And provide for your journey; but the best provision is 
the fear of GOD."— Rodwell (page 458). 

[Clause 16.] The original word signifies to rush forward impetuously ; as the 
pilgrims do when they proceed from Arafat to Mozdalifa. — Sale. 

[Clause 17.] A mountain near Mecca. — First part of Sale's note. 

[Clause 19.] In Arabic, al Masher al haram It is a mountain in the farther 
part of Mozdalifa, where it is said Mohammed stood praying and praising GOD. 
till his face became extremely shining. (Jallalo'ddin.) Bobovius calls itForkh j 
(Bobov. de Peregr. Meccana. p. 15), but the true name seems to be Kazan; the 
variation being occasioned only by the different pointing of the Arabic letters. 
— Sale. [iFarkh. — Chandos classics edition.'] 



912 Kant's Ethics. 



[Appendix 



20 and remember him 21 for that he hath directed you, 22 
although ye were before this of the number of those who go astray. 
23 Therefore 24 go in procession from whence the people go in pro- 
cession, 25 and ask pardon of GOD, 26 for GOD is gracious and 
merciful. 27 And when ye have finished your holy ceremonies, 
28 remember GOD, 29 according as ye remember your fathers, 
30 or with a more reverent commemoration. 

[^[ 25.] 1 There are some men who say, 2 O LORD, 3 give us our 
portion in this world ; 4 but such shall have no portion in the next 
life : 5 and there are others who say, 6 LOED, 7 give us good in 
this world 8 and also good in the next world, 9 and deliver us from 
the torment of hell fire. 10 They shall have a portion of that which 
they have gained : f 11 GOD is swift in taking an account. 12 There- 
fore fear GOD, 13 and know that unto him ye shall be gathered. 

[^[ 26.] 1 GOD is gracious unto his servants. 2 true believers, 
3 enter into the true religion wholly, 4 and follow not the steps of 
Satan, 5 for he is your open enemy. 6 GOD is mighty and wise. 
7 "Whoever shall change the grace of GOD 8 after it shall have 
come unto him, 9 verily 10 GOD will be severe in punishing him. 
11 The present life was ordained for those who believe not, 12 and 
they laugh the faithful to scorn ; 13 but they who fear GOD 
14 shall be above them, 15 on the day of the resurrection : 16 for 
GOD is bountiful unto whom he pleaseth 17 without measure. 18 

\\ 25.] [Clauses 5-11 inclusive.] "And some say, ' our LOED ! give us good 
in this world and good in the next, and keep us from the torment of the fire.' 
They shall have the lot which they have merited : and GOD is swift to reckon." 
— Rodioell (page 458). 

t [Clause 10. See ^[15, clause 48, page 904 above.] 

[f25.] [Clauses 11, 12. I have omitted forty-five words of Sale's text be- 
tween clause 11 and clause 12.] 

[Clause 13.] I have omitted one hundred and fourteen words of Sale's text 
immediately after the end of clause 13.] 

[II 26.] [Clauses 5, 6. I have omitted sixteen words of Sale's text between 
clause 5 and clause 6.] 

[Clauses 6, 7. I have omitted forty-six words of Sale's text between clause 
6jind clause 7.] 

[f 26.] [Clause 11. I suppose the reference is concerned with clauses 
11-17 inclusive.] "The life of this world is strewed with flowers for the unbe- 
lievers. They make a scoff of the faithful. Those who have the fear of the 
LORD shall be raised above them at the day of resurrection. GOD dispenseth 
as he pleaseth his innumerable gifts." — Savary. 

[Clauses 11, 12.] "This present life is prepared for those who believe not, and 
who mock at the faithful." — Rodwell (page 459). 

[Clauses 17, 18. I have omitted eighty-two words of Sale's text between 
clause 17 and clause 18.] 



t0 § 968 j The Clavis to an Index. 913 

GOD directeth whom he pleaseth into the right way. 19 Did ye 
think ye should enter paradise, 20 when as yet no such thing had 
happened unto you, 21 as hath happened unto those who have been 
before you ? 22 They suffered calamity, 23 and tribulation, 24 and 
were afflicted ; 25 so that the apostle, 26 and they who believed with 
him, 27 said, 28 When will the help of GOD come 9 29 Is not the 
help of GOD nigh ? 

[^[ 27.] 1 They will ask thee what they shall bestow in alms: 
2 Answer, 3 The good which ye bestow, 4 let it be given to parents, 

5 and kindred, 6 and orphans, 7 and the poor, 8 and the stranger. 
9 Whatsoever good ye do, 10 GOD knoweth it. 

[^[ 28.] 1 They will ask thee also what they shall bestow in alms : 

2 Answer, 3 What ye have to spare. 4 Thus GOD showeth his 
signs unto you, 5 that peradventure ye might seriously think 

6 of this present world, 7 and of the next. 

[^[ 29.] 1 They will also ask thee concerning orphans : 2 Answer, 

3 To deal righteously with them is best ; 4 and if ye intermeddle 
with the management of what belongs to them, 5 do them no wrong ; 6 
they are your brethren : 7 GOD knoweth the corrupt dealer 8 from 
the righteous ; 9 and if GOD please, 10 he will surely distress you, 
11 for GOD is mighty and wise. 

[■fj 30.] 1 And fear GOD, 2 and know that ye must meet him ; 
and bear good tidings 4 unto the faithful. 5 Make not GOD the 
object or your oaths, 6 that ye will deal justly, 7 and be devout, 
8 and make peace among men ; 9 for GOD is he who heareth 10 
and knoweth. 11 GOD will not punish you for an inconsiderate 

[Clauses 19, 20.] "Think ye to enter Paradise, when no such things have 
come upon you," — Rodwell (page 460). 

[f 27.] [Clauses 7, 8.] "and the poor, and the wayfarer." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 10. I have omitted two hundred and thirty-one words of Sale's 
text immediately after the end of clause 10.] 

[lf'29.] [Clause 10.] viz.: By his curse, which will certainly bring to nothing 
what ye shall wrong the orphans of. — Sale. 

[Clause 11. I have omitted one hundred and seventy words of Sale's text 
immediately after the end of clause 11.] 

[1f30.] [Clause 5.] So as to swear frequently hy him. The word translated 
object, properly signifies a butt to shoot at with arrows. ( Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 6-8 inclusive.] Some commentators (Jallalo'ddin, Yahya) expound 
this negatively, That ye will not deal justly, nor be devout, etc. For such wicked 
oaths, they say, were customary among the idolatrous inhabitants of Mecca ; 
which gave occasion to the following saying of Mohammed : When you swear 
to do a thing, and afterward find it better to do otherwise, do that which is better, 
and make void your oath. — Sale. 

[Clause 11.] When a man swears inadvertently and without design. — Sale. 

[Clauses 5-14 inclusive.] " Swear not by GOD, when ye make oath, that ye 



914 Kant 8 Ethics. [Appendix 

word 12 in your oaths ; 13 but he will punish you for that which 
your hearts have assented unto: 14 GOD is merciful and gracious. 
15 And fear GOD, 16 and know that GOD seeth whatsoever ye do. 
[JOZ. III.] [«fl" 31.] 1 true believers, 2 give alms 3 of that which 
we have bestowed unto you, 4 before the day cometh 5 wherein 
there shall be no merchandising, 6 nor friendship, 7 nor intercession. 
8 The infidels are unjust doers. 9 GOD ! 10 there is no GOD but he ; 
11 the living, 12 the self-subsisting : 13 neither slumber nor sleep 
seizeth him ; 14 to him belongeth whatsoever is in heaven, 15 and 
on earth. 16 Who is he that can intercede with him, 17 but through 
hi£ good pleasure ? 18 He knoweth that which is past, 19 and that 
which is to come unto them, 20 and they shall not comprehend any 
thing of his knowledge, 21 but so far as he pleaseth. 22 His throne 

will be virtuous and fear GOD, and promote peace among men ; for GOD is 
He who Heareth, Knoweth. GOD will not punish you for a mistake in your 
oaths: but He will punish you for that which your hearts have done. GOD is 
Gracious, Merciful." — RodweU (page 462). 

[Clauses 14, 15. 1 have omitted six hundred and twelve words of Sale's text, 
between clause 14 and clause 15.] 

[Clause 16. I have omitted one thousand and ninetj'-one words of Sale's text, 
immediately after the end of clause 16. I have omitted nine hundred and 
eighty five words between the end of clause 16 and the end of Joz II., and one 
hundred and six between the beginning of Joz III. and the beginning of H31.J 

[If 31.] [Clause 5.] "when there shall be no trafficking." — RodweU (page 468). 

[Clause 8. are unjust doers.] " are the wrong-doers." — Rod-well. 

[Clauses 9-12 inclusive.] " GOD ! There is no GOD but He; the Living, the 
Eternal."— RodweU. 

[Clause 9.] The following seven t lines contain a magnificent description of 
the divine majesty and providence; but it must not be supposed the translation 
comes up to the dignity of the original. This passage is justly admired by the 
Mohammedans, who recite it in their prayers; and some of them wear it about 
them engraved on an agate or other precious stone. (Vide Bobov. de Prec. 
Moham. p. 5, et Eeland. Dissert, de Gemmis Arab. pp. 285, 239.) — Sale, [t In 
the text before me, published by J. B. Lippincott & Co., clauses 9-25 inclusive, 
occupy precisely seven lines.] 

[Clauses 16, 17.] " Who is he that can intercede with Him but by His own 
permission ? " — RodweU. 

[Clauses 18, 19.] "He knoweth what hath been before them and what shall 
be after them." — RodweU. 

[Clause 20 — comprehend.^ " grasp." — Rod-well. 

[Clause 21.] " save what He willeth." — RodweU. 

[Clause 22.] This throne, in Arabic called Corsi, is by the Mohammedans- 
supposed to be GOD's tribunal or seat of justice ; being placed under .that other 
called al'Arsh, which they say is his imperial throne. The Corsi allegorically 
signifies the divine providence, which sustains and governs the heaven and the 
earth, and is infinitely above human comprehension. (Vide D'Herbelot. BibL 
Orient. Art. Corsi.) — Sale. 



to -§968] The Clavis to an Index. 915 : - 

is extended over heaven and earth, 23 and the preservation of both 
is no burden unto him. 24 He is the high, 25 the mighty. 

[^J 32.] 1 Let there be no violence in religion. 2 Now is 
right direction manifestly distinguished from deceit : 3 whoever 
therefore shall deny Tagut, 4 and believe in GOD, 5 he.shall surely 
take hold on a strong handle, 6 which shall not be broken ; 7 GOD 
is he who heareth 8 and seeth. 9 GOD is the patron of those who 
believe ; 10 he shall lead them out of darkness 11 into light : 12 but 
as to those who believe not, 13 their patrons are Tagut ; 14 they 
shall lead them from the light 15 into darkness ; 16 they shall be, 
the companions of hell fire, 17 they shall remain therein for ever. 

[■[[ 33.] 1 GOD is mighty, 2 and wise. 3 The similitude of those 
who lay out their substance 4 for advancing the religion of GOD, 
5 is as a grain of corn which produceth seven ears, 6 and in every 
ear an hundred grains ; 7 for GOD giveth twofold unto whom he 
pleaseth : 8 GOD is bounteous and wise. 9 They who lay out their 
substance for the religion of GOD, 10 and afterward follow not 
what they have so laid out by reproaches or mischief, 11 they shall 
have their reward with their LOED ; 12 upon them shall no fear 
come, 13 neither shall they be grieved. 14 A fair speech and to 

[Clauses 24, 25.] -'and He is the High, the Great! " — Rodwell. 

[f 32.] [Clause 1.] This passage was particularly directed to some of Moham- 
med's first proselytes, who, having sons that had been brought up in idolatry or- 
Judaism, would oblige them to embrace Mohammedism by force. ( Jallaln.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 1, 2.] "Let there be no compulsion in Religion. Now is the right 
way made distinct from error." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 3; Tagut.'] This word properly signifies an idol, or whatever is wor- 
shiped besides GOD ; particularly the two idols of the Meccans, Allat and TJzza : . 
and also the devil, or any seducer. — Sale. 

[Clauses 7, 8.] " and GOD is He who Heareth, Knoweth." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 16, 17.] "They shall be given over to the fire: they shall abide- 
therein forever." — Rodwell (page 469). 

[Clause 17. I have omitted two hundred and eighty-two words of Sale's text 
immediately after the end of clause 17.] 

[^[33.] [Clauses 3-8 inclusive.] "The likeness of those who expend their 
wealth for the cause of GOD, is that of a grain of corn which produceth seven 
ears, and in each ear a' hundred grains ; and GOD will multiply to whom he 
pleaseth: GOD is Liberal, Knowing." — Rodwell (page 470). 

[Clause 10.] i. e. Either by reproaching the person whom they have relieved, 
with what they have done for him ; or by exposing his poverty to his preju- 
dice. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clause 10.] " and never follow what they have laid out with reproaches, 
or harm ." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 14, 15.] " Humanity in words and actions is better than alms after 
inj ustice." — Sa vary. 

[Clauses 14, 15.] "A kind speech and forgiveness is better than alms followed 
by injury." — Rodwell. 



916 Kant's Ethics. [Appendix 

forgive, 15 is better than alms followed by mischief. 16 GOD is 
rich and merciful. 17 O true believers, 18 make not your alms of 
none effect 19 by reproaching, 20 or mischief, 21 as he who layeth 
out what he hath 22 to appear unto men to give alms, 23 and 
believeth not in GOD 24 and the last day. 25 The likeness of such 
a one 26 is as a flint covered with earth, 27 on which a violent rain 
falleth, 28 and leaveth it hard. 29 They can not prosper in any 
thing 30 which they have gained, 31 for GOD directeth not the 
unbelieving people. 32 And the likeness of those who lay out their 
substance 33 from a desire to please GOD, 34 and for an establish- 
ment for their souls, 35 is as a garden on a hill, 36 on which a vio- 
lent rain falleth, 37 and it bringeth forth its fruits twofold : 38 and 
GOD seeth that which ye do. 

[^[ 34.] 1 Thus GOD declareth his signs unto you, 2 that ye 
may consider. 3 O true believers, 4 bestow alms of the good things 
which ye have gained, 5 and of that which we have produced for 
you out of the earth. 6 and choose not the bad thereof, 7 to give 
it in alms, 8 such as ye would not accept yourselves, 9 otherwise 
than by connivance : 10 and know that GOD is rich and worthy 
to be praised. 11 The devil threateneth you with .poverty, 12 and 
commandeth you filthy covetousness ; 1 3 but GOD promiseth you 
pardon from himself 14 and abundance : 15 GOD is bounteous and 
wise. 16 He giveth wisdom unto whom he pleaseth ; 17 and he 

[Clauses 18-22 inclusive.] " Make not your alms void by reproaches and in- 
jury, like him who spendeth his substance to be seen of men." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 25-31 inclusive.] " The likeness of such an one is that of a rock with 
a thin soil upon it, on which a heavy rain falleth but leaveth it hard: No 
profit from their works shall they be able to gain; for GOD guideth not the un- 
believing people." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 32-37 inclusive.] "And the likeness of those who expend their sub- 
stance from a desire to please GOD, and for the stablishing of their souls, is 
as a garden on a hill, on which the heavy rain falleth, and it yieldeth its fruits 
twofold." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 37, 38. I have omitted fourteen words of Sale's text between clause 
37 and clause 38.] 

[Clause 38. I have omitted fifty-three words of Sale's text immediately after 
the end of clause 38.] 

[1f34.] [Clauses 1, 2.] "Thus GOD maketh plain his signs to you that ye may 
reflect." — Rodwell (page 471). 

[Clause 9.] That is, on having some amends made by the seller of such 
goods, either by abatement of the price, or giving something else to the buyer 
to make up the value. — Sale. 

[Clauses 11, 12.] "Satan menaceth you with poverty,! and enjoineth base 
actions." — Rodwell. (t That is, Satan would dissuade you from liberal contribu- 
tions by instilling the fear of poverty. — RodwelVs note.) 

[Clause 16.] " He giveth wisdom to whom He will." — Rodwell. 



to 5 968.] 



The Clavis to an Index. 917 



unto whom wisdom is given 18 hath received much good : 19 but 
none will consider, 20 except the wise of heart. 21 And whatever 
alms ye shall give, 22 or whatever vow ye shall vow, 23 verily 
GOD knoweth it ; 24 but the ungodly shall have none to help them. 
25 If ye make your alms to appear, 26 it is well ; 27 but if ye conceal 
them, 28 and give them unto the poor, 29 this will be better for 
you, 30 and will atone for your sins : 31 and GOD is well informed of 
that Which ye do. 32 The direction of them belongeth not unto 
thee ; 33 but GOD directeth whom he pleaseth. 34 The good that 
ye shall give in alms 35 shall redound unto yourselves ; 36 and ye 
shall not give unless out of desire of seeing the face of GOD. 37 And 
what good thing ye shall give in alms, 38 it shall be repaid you, 
39 and ye shall not be treated unjustly ; 40 unto the poor who are 
wholly employed in fighting for the religion of GOD, 41 and can 
not go to and fro on the earth ; 42 whom, the ignorant man think- 
eth rich, 43 because of their modesty : 44 thou shalt know them by 
this mark, 45 they ask not men with importunity ; 46 and what 
good ye shall give in alms, 47 verily GOD knoweth it. 48 They 
who distribute alms of their substance night and day, 49 in private 
and in public, 50 shall have their reward with the LOED ; 51 on 
them shall no fear come, 52 neither shall they be grieved. 

[^1 35.] 1 They who devour usury 2 shall not arise from the dead, 
3 but as he ariseth whom Satan hath infected by a touch : 4 this 
shall happen to them because they say, 5 Truly 6 selling is but as 
usury: 7 and yet GOD hath permitted selling 8 and forbidden 
usury. 9 He therefore who 10 when there cometh unto him an 
admonition from his LOED 11 abstain eth/rom usury for the future, 
12 shall have what is past forgiven him, 13 and his affair belongeth 
unto GOD. 14 But whoever returneth to usury, 15 they shall be the 
companions of hell fire, 16 they shall continue therein for ever. 17 
GOD shall take his blessing from usury, 18 and shall increase alms : 
19 for GOD loveth no infidel, 20 or ungodly person. 21 But they 
who believe 22 and do that which is right, 23 and observe the 
stated times of prayer, 24 and pay their legal alms, 25 they shall 
have their reward with their LOED : 26 there shall come no fear 
on them, 27 neither shall they be grieved. 28 O true believers, 

[Clause 36.] i. e. For the sake of a reward hereafter, and not for any worldly 
consideration. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 42, 43.] •' Those who know them not, think them rich because of 
their modesty." — Rodwell (page 472). 

[^f 35.] [Clause 3.] viz. Like demoniacs or possessed persons, that is, in great 
horror and distraction of mind and convulsive agitation of body. — Sale. 

[Clause 30.] Or the interest due before usury was prohibited. For this some 



'918 Kant's Ethics. [Appendix 

29 fear GOD, 30 and remit that which reniaineth of usury, 31 if ye 
. really believe ; 32 but if ye do it not, 33 hearken unto war, 34 which 
is declared against you from GOD and his apostle : 35 yet if ye 
repent, 36 ye shall have the capital of your money. 37 Deal not 
unjustly with others, 38 and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly. 

[^j~ 36.] 1 If there be anj r debtor under a difficulty of paying his 
debt, 2 let his creditor wait till it be easy for him to do it; 3 but if ye 
remit it as alms, 4 it will be better for you, 5 if ye knew it. 6 And 
fear the day wherein ye shall return unto GOD ; 7 then shall every 
soul be paid 8 what it hath gained, 9 and they shall not be treated 
unjustly. 

[_^[ 37.] 1 O true believers, 2 when ye bind yourselves one to the 
other 3 in a debt 4 for a certain time, 5 write it down ; 6 and let a 
writer write between you 7 according to justice, 8 and let not the 
writer refuse writing 9 according to what GOD hath taught him ; 
10 but let him write, 11 and let him who oweth the debt dictate, 

42 and let him fear GOD his LOED, 13 and not diminish aught 
thereof. 14 And disdain not to write it down, 15 be it a large <?<?&£, 
16 or be it a small one, 17 until its time of -payment : 18 this will 
be more just 19 in the sight of GOD, 20 and more right for bearing 
witness, 21 and more easy, 22 that }^e may not doubt. 23 But if 
it be a present bargain 24 which ye transact between yourselves, 
25 it shall be no crime in you, 26 if ye write it not down. 27 And 
take witnesses 28 when ye sell one to the other, 29 and let no harm 
be done to the writer, 30 nor to the witness ; 31 which if ye do, 
32 it will surely be injustice in you : 33 and fear GOD, 34 and 
GOD will instruct you, 35 for GOD knoweth all things. 36 And 
if ye be on a journey, 37 and find no writer. 38 let jnedges be taken : 
39 but if one of you trust the other, 40 let him who is trusted 41 
return what he is trusted with, 42 and fear GOD his LOED. 

43 And conceal not the testimony, 44 for he whoconcealeth it hath 
surely a wicked heart : 45 GOD know^eth that which ye do. 

of Mohammed's followers exacted of their debtors, supposing they lawfully 
might. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 35-38.] "Yet if ye repent, ye shall have the principal of your 
money. Wrong not, and ye shall not be wronged." — Rodwell (page 473). 

[_% 36.] [Clauses 7, 8.] " Then shall every soul be rewarded according to its 
desert." — Rod-well. 

\^\ 37.] [Clauses 13, 14. I have omitted eigtdy-five words of Sale's test be- 
tween clause 13 and clause 14.] 

[11 37.] [Clauses 14-22 inclusive.] "And disdain not to put the debt in writ- 
ing, be it large or small, with its time of payment: this will be more just for 
you in the sight of GOD, better suited for witnessing, and the best for avoiding 
•.doubt." — Rodwell. 



to § 968.] The Clavis to an Index. 919 

[^[ 38.] 1 Whatever is in heaven and on earth is GOD's: 2 and 
whether ye manifest that which is in your minds, 3 or conceal it, 
4 GOD will call you to account for it, 5 and will forgive whom he 
pleaseth, 6 and will punish whom he pleaseth ; 7 for GOD is 
almighty. 8 The apostle believeth in that which hath been sent 
down unto him from his LOED, 9 and the faithful also. 10 Every 
one of them believeth in GOD, 11 and his angels, 12 and his scrip- 
tures, 13 and his apostles : 14 we make no distinction at all between 
his apostles. 15 And they say, 16 We have heard, 17 and do obey : 
18 we implore thy mercy, 19 O. LOED, 20 for unto thee must we 
return. 21 GOD will not force ?a\y soul beyond its capacity : 22 it 
shall have the good which it gaineth, 23 and it shall suffer the evil 
which it gaineth. 24 O LOED, 25 punish us not, 26 if we forget, 
27 or act sinfully : 28 O LOED, 29 lay not on us a burden 30 like that 
Avhich thou hast laid on those who have been before us ; 31 neither 
make us, 32 O LOED, 33 to bear what we have not strength to 
bear, 34 but be favorable unto us, 35 and spare us, 36 and be mer- 
ciful unto us. 37 Thou art our patron, 38 help us therefore against 
the unbelieving nations. 

CHAPTER III.— EEYEALED AT MEDINA. 

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 

1% 39.] 1 There is no GOD but GOD, 2 the living, 3 the self-subsist- 
ing : 4 he hath sent down unto thee the book of the Koran 5 with 

[*[ 38.] [Clause 9.] '-as do the faithful also.'" — Rodwell (page 474). 

[Clause 14.] But this, say the Mohammedans, the Jews do, who receive 
Moses, but reject Jesus; and the Christians, who receive both those prophets, 
but reject Mohammed. (Jallalo'ddin.) — Sale. 

[Clauses 21-23 inclusive.] " GOD will not burden any soul beyond its power. 
It shall enjoy the good which it hath acquired, and shall bear the- evil for the 
acquirement of which it labored." — Rodwell. [See f 15, clause 48, page 904 above.] 

[Clause 30.] That is, on the Jews, who, as the commentators tell us, were 
ordered to kill a man by way of atonement, to give one fourth of their sub- 
stance in alms, and to cut off an unclean ulcerous part, (Jallalo'ddin), and were 
forbidden to eat fat, or animals that divide the hoof, and were obliged to observe 
the sabbath, and other particulars wherein the Mohammedans are at liberty. 
(Yahya.)— Sale. 

[Clauses 34-36 inclusive.] -'but blot out our sins and forgive us, and have 
pity on us." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 37.] --Thou art our protector." — Rodwell. 

[CHAPTER III.— The title of the chapter.— I have omitted the title, ex- 
cept so much thereof as states the place where the chapter was revealed: see 
note 1\ page 892 above.] 

[IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD : in reference to 
this auspicatory introduction, see the notes to chapter i., p. 893 above.] 



920 Kanfs Ethics. 



[Appendix 



truth, 6 confirming that which was revealed before it ; 7 for he had 
formerly sent down the law 8 and the gospel, 9 a direction unto 
men ; 10 and he had also sent clown the distinction 11 between 
good and evil. 12 Yerily 13 those who believe not the signs of 
GOD 14 shall suffer a grievous punishment ; 15 for GOD is mighty, 
16 able to revenge. 17 Surely 18 nothing is hidden from GOD, 19 
of that which is on earth, 20 or in heaven : 21 it is he who formeth 
you in the wombs, 22 as he pleaseth ; 23 there is no GOD but he, 
24 the mighty, 25 the wise. 26 It is he who hath sent down unto 
thee the book, 27 wherein are some verses clear to be understood, 
28 they are the foundation of the book ; 29 and others are jaara- 
bolical. 30 But they whose hearts are perverse 31 will follow that 
which is parabolical therein, 32 out of love of schism, 33 and a 
desire of the interpretation thereof; 34 yet none knoweth the inter- 
pretation thereof, 35 except GOD. 36 But they who are well 
grounded in knowledge 37 say, 38 We believe therein, 39 the 
whole is from our LOBD ; 40 and none will consider except the 
prudent. 41 O LOBD, 42 cause not our hearts to swerve 43 from 
truth , 44 after thou hast directed us : 45 and give us from thee mercy, 
46 for thou art he who giveth. 

\fl 39.] [Clause 1. I have omitted certain letters of the alphabet, with which 
the third chapter begins : see note t, page 892 above.] 

[Clauses 2, 3 ] "The Living, the Merciful !" — Rodwell (page 494). 

[Clause 10. the distinction.'] "the 'Illumination,' t (Furkan.) " — Rodwell. 
[fin a note at this point (page 495) Bodwell refers to his note on a passage in 
chapter xxi.: see extracts from it at ^f 22, page 910 above.] 

[Clauses 15, 16.] "And GOD is Mighty, the Avenger I"— Rodwell (page 495). 

[Clause 29. I suppose the reference should also include clauses 27, 28.] This 
passage is translated according to the exposition of al Zarnakhshari and al Beidawi, 
which seems to be the truest. The contents of the Koran are here distinguished 
into such passages as are to be taken in the literal sense, and such as require a 
figurative acceptation. The former being plain and obvious to be understood, 
compose the fundamental part, or, as the original expresses it, the mother of the 
book, and contain the principal doctrines and precepts ; agreeably to and con- 
sistently with which, those passages which are wrapt up in metaphors, and de- 
livered in an enigmatical, allegorical style, are always to be interpreted. (See 
the Preliminary Discourse, section hi.) — Sale. 

[Clause 29.] " and others are figurative." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 32, 33.] " craving discord, craving an interpretation." — Rodwell. 

[Clause 40.] "This language is that of the wise." — Savary. 

[Clause 40.] " But none will bear this in mind, save men indued with un- 
derstanding." — Rodwell. 

[Clauses 41-44 inclusive.] " O our LOBD ! suffer not our hearts to go astray 
after that thou hast once guided us," — Rodwell. 

[Clause 46. I have omitted twenty-eight words of Sale's text immediately 
after the end of clause 46.] 



